Keeping Directors In Line: Social Distancing As A Control Mechanism In The Corporate Elite

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dc.contributor.utaustinauthorWestphal, James D.en
dc.contributor.utaustinauthorKhanna, Poonamen
dc.creatorWestphal, J. D.en
dc.creatorKhanna, P.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-16T13:56:54Zen
dc.date.available2015-04-16T13:56:54Zen
dc.date.issued2003-09en
dc.description.abstractIn this study, we consider the social process by which the corporate elite may have resisted pressure from stakeholders to adopt changes in corporate governance that limit managerial autonomy. We examine (1) how directors who participate in corporate governance changes that reflect greater board control over management may be subjected to a kind of informal social sanctioning, which we refer to as social distancing, on other boards; (2) how the tendency for directors to experience social distancing may be moderated by their status in the corporate elite; and (3) how directors who experience such social control could be deterred from participating subsequently in governance changes that threaten the interests of fellow top managers. We test our hypotheses with survey data on processes of social control from a sample of directors and CEOs at Forbes 500 companies and archival data on director participation in four corporate governance changes. The findings show that (1) directors who participate in governance changes that threaten managerial interests experience a higher level of social distancing on other boards, particularly when they have low to medium status in the corporate elite, and (2) directors are less likely to participate in such changes if they have recently experienced social distancing (directly or indirectly). Our theory and empirical tests ultimately address the question of how, or by what social process, boards of directors help maintain the solidarity of the corporate elite and serve the interests of corporate leaders.(.)en
dc.description.departmentManagementen
dc.identifier.citationJames D. Westphal and Poonam Khanna. Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 48. No. 3 (Sep., 2003), pp. 361-398. DOI: 10.2307/3556678en
dc.identifier.doi10.2307/3556678en
dc.identifier.issn0001-8392en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/29272en
dc.language.isoEnglishen
dc.relation.ispartofserialAdministrative Science Quarterlyen_US
dc.rightsAdministrative deposit of works to UT Digital Repository: This works author(s) is or was a University faculty member, student or staff member; this article is already available through open access or the publisher allows a PDF version of the article to be freely posted online. The library makes the deposit as a matter of fair use (for scholarly, educational, and research purposes), and to preserve the work and further secure public access to the works of the University.en
dc.subjectconsistent covariance-matrixen
dc.subjectinterlocking directoratesen
dc.subjectantitakeoveren
dc.subjectprovisionsen
dc.subjectboard compositionen
dc.subjectceo compensationen
dc.subjectpoison pillsen
dc.subjectgovernanceen
dc.subjectownershipen
dc.subjecttopen
dc.subjectperformanceen
dc.subjectbusinessen
dc.subjectmanagementen
dc.titleKeeping Directors In Line: Social Distancing As A Control Mechanism In The Corporate Eliteen
dc.typeArticleen

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