Erosion by Deference: Civilian Control and the Military in Policymaking (Summer 2021)
| dc.creator | Beliakova, Polina | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2021-08-17T21:59:09Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2021-08-17T21:59:09Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021 | |
| dc.description | Delegating policymaking functions to members of the military profession can undermine civilian control in democracies, and yet democratic leaders continue to do just this. So why do leaders of democratic states delegate policymaking responsibilities to the military? Existing research does not provide a comprehensive answer to this question. To shed light on this understudied phenomenon, I advance a new concept of erosion of civilian control by deference. Using the Trump presidency as a case study, and considering additional evidence from the Clinton and Bush (43) administrations, I investigate three drivers of deference — boosting approval, avoiding responsibility, and cajoling the military. Relying on qualitative and quantitative analysis, I also show how deference to the military eroded civilian control under the Trump administration. | en_US |
| dc.description.department | LBJ School of Public Affairs | en_US |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2152/87038 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/13988 | |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Texas National Security Review | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartof | Texas National Security Review | en_US |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Texas National Security Review;Vol 4, Iss 3 | |
| dc.rights.restriction | Open | en_US |
| dc.subject | TNSR Vol. 4, Iss. 3 | en_US |
| dc.subject | policymaking functions | en_US |
| dc.subject | delegation | en_US |
| dc.subject | civilian control | en_US |
| dc.subject | deference | en_US |
| dc.title | Erosion by Deference: Civilian Control and the Military in Policymaking (Summer 2021) | en_US |
| dc.type | Journal | en_US |