Elite Settlements
| dc.creator | Burton, Michael G. | en |
| dc.creator | Higley, John | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2010-10-29T22:29:01Z | en |
| dc.date.available | 2010-10-29T22:29:01Z | en |
| dc.date.issued | 1987 | en |
| dc.description.abstract | Following the classical elite theorists' injunction to study variations in elite structure, we examine the elite settlement as a major, yet largely overlooked, form of political change. Elite settlements consist of broad compromises among previously warring elite factions, resulting in political stability and thus providing a necessary precondition for representative democracy. To identify the common features of elite settlements, we draw upon four historie cases: England in 1688-1689, Sweden in 1809, Colombia in 1957-1958, and Venezuela in 1958. We conclude by arguing for the extraction of elite settlements from their current embeddedness in such concepts as "bourgeois revolutions" and "democratic transitions," and we advocate greater attention to the elite paradigm in efforts to explain macropolitical outcomes. | en |
| dc.description.department | Latin American Studies | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0892-3507 | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2152/8952 | en |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.relation.ispartofseries | Texas Papers on Latin America;87-01 | en |
| dc.subject | Politics | en |
| dc.subject | Latin America | en |
| dc.title | Elite Settlements | en |
| dc.type | Working Paper | en |