The Collapse Narrative: The United States, Mohammed Mossadegh, and the Coup Decision of 1953 (August 2019)
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Date
2019-08
Authors
Brew, Gregory
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Publisher
Texas National Security Review
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On Aug. 19, 1953, elements inside Iran organized and funded by the Central Intelligence Agency and British intelligence services carried out a coup d’état that overthrew the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. Historians have yet to reach a consensus on why the Eisenhower administration opted to use covert action in Iran, tending to either emphasize America’s fear of communism or its desire to control oil as the most important factor influencing the decision. Using recently declassified material, this article argues that growing fears of a “collapse” in Iran motivated the decision to remove Mossadegh. American policymakers believed that Iran could not survive without an agreement that would restart the flow of oil, something Mossadegh appeared unable to secure. There was widespread skepticism of his government’s ability to manage an “oil-less” economy, as well as fears that such a situation would lead inexorably to communist rule. A collapse narrative emerged to guide U.S. thinking, one that coalesced in early 1953 and convinced policymakers to adopt regime change as the only remaining option. Oil and communism both impacted the coup decision, but so did powerful notions of Iranian incapacity and a belief that only an intervention by the United States would save the country from a looming, though vaguely defined, calamity.