The Organizational Determinants of Military Doctrine: A History of Army Information Operations (Winter 2022/2023)

For the past four decades, the U.S. Army has made repeated attempts to create an enduring doctrinal framework that describes the role of information in conflict, yet these attempts have been largely unsuccessful. What accounts for this struggle? More broadly, why do militaries choose one doctrinal concept over others, and what determines whether a new doctrine will succeed or fail? Building upon classic scholarship in military innovation, this paper traces the evolution of Army information doctrine to highlight the unique role of military sub-communities in determining whether changes to doctrine endure or are ultimately rejected. The structural reforms that were necessary to modify and elevate the role of information within Army doctrine ultimately came to handicap the Army’s ability to transform that role when the strategic environment demanded it. While strategic and technological conditions can create the necessary pretext for doctrinal change, there are important organizational determinants of doctrine that may operate independently of the demands of the overarching strategic environment and that can force difficult and suboptimal compromises with respect to the final product.