Reduction, ontology and the limits of convention
| dc.contributor.advisor | Sainsbury, R. M. (Richard Mark) | en |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Dever, Joshua | en |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Koons, Robert | en |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Hochberg, Herbert | en |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | MacBride, Fraser | en |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Bonevac, Daniel | en |
| dc.creator | Pickel, Bryan William | en |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2011-06-13T18:02:27Z | en |
| dc.date.available | 2011-06-13T18:02:27Z | en |
| dc.date.available | 2011-06-13T18:02:41Z | en |
| dc.date.issued | 2010-12 | en |
| dc.date.submitted | December 2010 | en |
| dc.date.updated | 2011-06-13T18:02:41Z | en |
| dc.description | text | en |
| dc.description.abstract | It is widely agreed that ontological reduction is possible, that the ontology of one theory can be shown to be nothing over and above the ontology of a distinct theory. However, it is also widely agreed that one assesses a theory’s ontology by determining what it says there is. I show that there is a tension between these orthodox positions. To resolve this tension, I propose and defend the view that the ontological commitments of a statement are sensitive to the theory in which it is embedded. | en |
| dc.description.department | Philosophy | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | en |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2010-12-2367 | en |
| dc.language.iso | eng | en |
| dc.subject | Metaphysics | en |
| dc.subject | Ontology | en |
| dc.subject | Ontological commitment | en |
| dc.subject | Reductionism | en |
| dc.subject | Meta-ontology | en |
| dc.title | Reduction, ontology and the limits of convention | en |
| dc.type.genre | thesis | en |
| thesis.degree.department | Philosophy | en |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | en |
| thesis.degree.grantor | University of Texas at Austin | en |
| thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | en |
| thesis.degree.name | Doctor of Philosophy | en |