Essays on real options and strategic interactions

dc.contributor.advisorBoyarchenko, Svetlana I.en
dc.contributor.committeeMemberAlmazan, Andresen
dc.contributor.committeeMemberStinchcombe, Maxwell B.en
dc.contributor.committeeMemberTompaidis, Stathisen
dc.contributor.committeeMemberWiseman, Thomasen
dc.creatorDehghani Firouzabadi, Mohammad Hosseinen 2012en
dc.description.abstractChapter 2 considers technology adoption under both technological and subsidy uncertainties. Uncertainty in subsidies for green technologies is considered as an example. Technological progress is exogenous and modeled as a jump process with a drift. The analytical solution is presented for cases when there is no subsidy uncertainty and when the subsidy changes once. The case when the subsidy follows a time invariant Markov process is analyzed numerically. The results show that improving the innovation process raises the investment thresholds. When technological jumps are small or rare, this improvement reduces the expected time before technology adoption. However, when technological jumps are large or abundant, this improvement may raise this expected time. Chapter 3 studies technology adoption in a duopoly where the unbiased technological change improves production efficiency. Technological progress is exogenous and modeled as a jump process with a drift. There is always a Markov perfect equilibrium in which the firm with more efficient technology never preempts its rival. Also, a class of equilibria may exist that lead to a smaller industry surplus. In these equilibria either of the firms may preempt its rival in a set of technology efficiency values. The first investment does not necessarily happen at the boundary of this set due to the discrete nature of the technology progress. The set shrinks and eventually disappears when the difference between firms’ efficiencies increases. Chapter 4 studies the behavior of two firms after a new investment opportunity arises. Firms either invest immediately or wait until market uncertainty is resolved. Two types of separating equilibrium are possible when sunk costs are private information. In the first type the firm with lower cost invests first. In the second type the firm with higher cost invests first leading to a smaller industry surplus. The results indicate that the second type is possible only for strictly negatively correlated sunk costs. Numerical analysis illustrates that when first mover advantage is large, the firm that delays the investment should be almost certain about its rival’s sunk cost. When market risk increases, the equilibria can exist when the firm is less certain.en
dc.subjectReal optionsen
dc.subjectTechnology adoptionen
dc.subjectPolicy uncertaintyen
dc.subjectClean technologyen
dc.subjectRegime switchingen
dc.subjectStrategic investmenten
dc.subjectIncomplete informationen
dc.titleEssays on real options and strategic interactionsen
dc.type.genrethesisen of Texas at Austinen of Philosophyen

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