Ideology vs. Interest Group Politics in U.S. Energy Policy

dc.creatorSpence, David B.
dc.creatorAdelman, David E.
dc.date.accessioned2017-09-11T18:01:52Z
dc.date.available2017-09-11T18:01:52Z
dc.date.issued2017-03-27
dc.descriptionThe political economy of energy policy in the United States is dominated by a combination of ideological partisanship and interest group lobbying. Both are reflected in the widespread belief that, under the Obama administration, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) was engaged in a misguided “war on coal,” despite the coal industry’s status as the leading industrial source of air pollution and compelling evidence that the benefits of EPA’s regulations vastly exceed their costs. This conflict is persistent and unresolved, notwithstanding repeated involvement of the Supreme Court over the last few years. The politics of this conflict are compounded by tensions between electricity managers and environmental regulators. Much of this tension is driven by competing perspectives: EPA’s focus has been on the national costs and benefits of its rules, whereas grid managers operate regionally. This Article resolves the apparent conflicts by downscaling the regulatory analyses of three highprofile (and highly litigated) EPA rules addressing emissions of conventional pollutants, air toxics, and greenhouse gases associated with climate change from coal-fired power plants. This Article utilizes complementary EPA databases and draws on several model estimates to examine the regional impacts— both costs and benefits—of regulations targeting coal-fired power plants. Overall, this Article finds that the distribution of both the compliance costs and environmental benefits of the rules are roughly commensurate with each region’s reliance on coal-fired power plants, particularly older facilities. That is, the benefits of reducing emissions under these rules are predominantly local. As a consequence, regulatory benefits exceed costs not only at the national level but at the regional level as well, and typically by large margins. Further, with a few important caveats, we find that while the EPA rules will hasten power plant closures, most will occur in electricity markets that have sufficient excess capacity to mitigate potential threats to electricity supplies and reliability. Nevertheless, opposition to the rules persists, which we explain as the product of a combination of both interest group and ideological/partisan opposition. Interestingly, ideological/ partisan opposition appears to hold greater sway based on varying levels of political opposition regionally and may— incrementally—be shifting in EPA’s favor.en_US
dc.description.departmentThe Kay Bailey Hutchison Center for Energy, Law, and Businessen_US
dc.identifierdoi:10.15781/T2WM1491W
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/61537
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofKBH Energy Center Research and Publicationsen_US
dc.rights.restrictionOpenen_US
dc.subjectEnergyen_US
dc.subjectair pollutionen_US
dc.subjectair toxicsen_US
dc.subjectClimate changeen_US
dc.subjectcoal-fired power plantsen_US
dc.subjectcompliance costsen_US
dc.subjectconventional pollutantsen_US
dc.subjectElectricityen_US
dc.subjectelectricity suppliesen_US
dc.subjectemissionsen_US
dc.subjectenvironmentalen_US
dc.subjectenvironmental benefitsen_US
dc.subjectEnvironmental Protection Agencyen_US
dc.subjectEPAen_US
dc.subjectEPA rulesen_US
dc.subjectGreenhouse gasesen_US
dc.subjectideological partisanshipen_US
dc.subjectIdeologyen_US
dc.subjectinterest group lobbyingen_US
dc.subjectInterest Group Politicsen_US
dc.subjectObama Administrationen_US
dc.subjectpolitical economyen_US
dc.subjectregulationen_US
dc.subjectrulesen_US
dc.subjectSupreme Courten_US
dc.subjectwar on coalen_US
dc.subjectU.S. energy policyen_US
dc.titleIdeology vs. Interest Group Politics in U.S. Energy Policyen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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