Self-knowledge at the margins
| dc.contributor.advisor | Dogramaci, Sinan | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Montague, Michelle | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Sosa, David | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Bettcher, Talia | |
| dc.creator | Trees, Hannah | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-01-20T22:42:04Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-01-20T22:42:04Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2021-08 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-07-24 | |
| dc.date.submitted | August 2021 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2022-01-20T22:42:06Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | This dissertation is a collection of three papers – “Knowing Oneself for Others,” “Stereotype Threat and the Value of Self-Knowledge,” and “Self-Knowledge, Epistemic Work, and Injustice” – in which I address the connections between self-knowledge production and social inequality. I explain, using a variety of contemporary political and cultural examples, that marginalized individuals are more likely to be required to know certain things about themselves than socially privileged individuals, especially about those aspects of their lives and identities which are essential to their being marginalized. I argue that this should make us rethink our basic understanding of epistemic injustice, which is typically thought of as involving the prevention of marginalized individuals from producing knowledge. More specifically, in “Knowing Oneself for Others,” I introduce the notion of “compulsory self-disclosure,” a social phenomenon in which an individual is forced to reveal things about themselves, often in ways that further contribute to their oppression. “Stereotype Threat and the Value of Self-Knowledge” addresses how self-ignorance can actually be desirable for individuals facing stereotype threat, and I argue that treating stereotype threat as an epistemic injustice issue can actually harm rather than help individuals in certain cases. Finally, in “Self-Knowledge, Epistemic Work, and Injustice,” I assess the reasoning behind the assumption that marginalized people are self-ignorant; I argue that we need to appreciate the central role that epistemic work plays in self-knowledge production to understand why the standard assumption about marginalized self-ignorance is misguided. Ultimately, I would have us think of self-knowledge production as not just epistemic work but as work that is often emotionally difficult and even metaphysically transformative – coming to have self-knowledge in certain ways can quite literally change who you are. In light of this, the overarching aim of this work is to argue for there being an inextricable link between an individual’s knowledge of themselves and their social status, as well as to discourage readers from thinking of the production of self-knowledge as inherently desirable or as a wholly epistemic issue. | |
| dc.description.department | Philosophy | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/2152/94777 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/21694 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | Feminism | |
| dc.subject | LGBTQ | |
| dc.subject | Epistemology | |
| dc.subject | Metaphysics | |
| dc.subject | Social epistemology | |
| dc.subject | Epistemic injustice | |
| dc.subject | Self-knowledge | |
| dc.title | Self-knowledge at the margins | |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.type.material | text | |
| thesis.degree.department | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | The University of Texas at Austin | |
| thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | |
| thesis.degree.name | Doctor of Philosophy |