Forgetting how to win : the U.S. Army, U.S. Department of State, and U.S. Agency for International Development in post-combat operations (1983-2008)

This dissertation explores how bureaucracies adapt to – and learn from – unexpected crises that lay outside their core mission. Few modern crises have challenged bureaucratic practitioners more than unexpected post-combat operations, which is today a trillion-dollar policy problem with many lives at risk. The central research question for this study is how do bureaucracies adapt to conduct unexpected post-combat operations? This study examines three national security institutions – the U.S. Army, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) – and how these organizations adapted to unexpected post-combat operations across four cases: Grenada (1983-1985), Panama (1989-1994), Kosovo (1999-2008), and Afghanistan (2001-2008). The study is organized as a comparative case study that draws from three overlapping bodies of literature: bureaucracy theory, the theory and practice of modern post-combat operations, and the available literature on the four cases and three bureaucracies in question.

This dissertation makes two main arguments. The central argument is that these bureaucracies adapted to individual post-combat operations in similar ways. These comprise four adaptive pathways: relying on existing offices or capabilities; hand-selecting the best of its available leaders, resources, and capabilities; responding favorably to practitioners’ calls for more resources or autonomy; and investing in long-term organizational learning and institutional change. This dissertation’s secondary argument is that personal relationships and trust shaped how each bureaucracy adapted to each crisis. The study concludes that these lessons provide a framework for bureaucratic executives and practitioners guiding organizations through future crises. This work also examines interagency unity of effort in each case, the comparative advantages of each bureaucracy, and the merits and limitations of top-down and bottom-up adaptations.