GPS Spoofing Detection System

Date

2010

Authors

Psiaki, Mark
O'Hanlon, Brady
Humphreys, Todd E.
Bhatti, Jahshan A.

Journal Title

Journal ISSN

Volume Title

Publisher

Abstract

A real-time method for detecting GPS spoofing in a narrow-bandwidth civilian GPS receiver is being developed. It is needed in order to detect malicious spoofed signals that seek to deceive a C/A-code civilian GPS receiver regarding its position or time. The ability to detect a spoofing attack is important to the reliability of systems ranging from cell-phone towers, the power grid, and commercial fishing monitors. The spoofing detector mixes and accumulates base-band quadrature channel samples from two receivers, one a secure reference receiver, and the other the defended User Equipment (UE) receiver. The resulting statistic detects the presence or absence of the encrypted P(Y) code that should be present in both signals in the absence of spoofing.

Description

LCSH Subject Headings

Citation