Characterization of Receiver Response to Spoofing Attacks
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Date
2011-05
Authors
Shepard, Daniel
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Abstract
Test procedures are developed for characterizing the response of civil GPS receivers to spoofing attacks. Two response characteristics are analyzed in detail for four representative GPS receivers: (1) the aggressiveness with which a spoofer can manipulate the victim receiver’s time and position solution, and (2) the spoofer power advantage over the authentic signals required for successful receiver capture. Two of the tested receivers are commonly used in critical infrastructure applications, one in “smart” power grid regulation and one in telecommunications networks. The implications of the test results for these critical infrastructure applications are discussed.
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THESIS
Presented to the Faculty of the Undergraduate School of
The University of Texas at Austin
in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements
for the Degree of
BACHELOR OF SCIENCE
IN
AEROSPACE ENGINEERING