Browsing by Subject "Experience"
Now showing 1 - 7 of 7
- Results Per Page
- Sort Options
Item The intellectual given(2010-05) Bengson, John Thomas Steele; Sosa, David, 1966-; Bealer, George; Dancy, Jonathan; Pautz, Adam; Sainsbury, Mark; Tye, MichaelSome things we know just by thinking about them: for example, that identity is transitive, that three are more than two, that wantonly torturing innocents is wrong, and other propositions which simply strike us as true when we consider them. But how? This essay articulates and defends a rationalist answer which critically develops a significant analogy between intuition and perception. The central thesis is that intuition and perception, though different, are at a certain level of abstraction the same kind of state, and states of this kind are, by their very nature, poised to play a distinctive epistemic role. Specifically, in the case of intuition, we encounter an intellectual state that is so structured as to provide justified and even knowledgeable belief without requiring justification in turn—something which may, thus, be thought of as given. The essay proceeds in three stages. Stage one advances a fully general and psychologically realistic account of the nature of intuition, namely, as an intellectual presentation of an apparent truth. Stage two provides a modest treatment of the epistemic status of intuition, in particular, how intuition serves as a source of immediate prima facie justification. Stage three outlines a response to Benacerraf-style worries about intuitive knowledge regarding abstract objects (e.g., numbers, sets, and values); the proposal is a constitutive, rather than causal, explanation of the means by which a given intuition connects a thinker to the fact intuited.Item Looking beyond the visual: considering multi-sensory experience and education with video art in installation(2010-05) Spont, Marya Helen; Bolin, Paul Erik, 1954-; Mayer, Melinda M.This study problematizes how the history, theory, and practice of art education (as documented) have predominantly focused on visually-based artworks and on visual aspects of other, multi-sensory artworks. I posit that existing pedagogical approaches become particularly limiting when addressing contemporary artworks that engage multiple senses and question how art educators might adapt such paradigms to consider individual learners’ multi-sensory experiences—particularly, aural, bodily, and spatial, as well as visual, experiences—as they operate in relation to video art in installation. To offer a point of reference for subsequent discussion, I narrate and interpret my own multi-sensory experience of Krzysztof Wodiczko’s "...OUT OF HERE: The Veterans Project" (2009), and then situate both visual and non-visual aspects of my experience in relation to various possible experiences of time, still and changing images, sound, the static or mobile body, other bodies, and space. By synthesizing and building upon recent scholarly literature pertaining to interpretation, multi-sensory and bodily experience, and learner-centered pedagogy, I consider theoretical and practical implications for teaching and learning with video art in installation, and recommend art educators’ mediation through creating communities of questioning, listening, and “speaking with,” in addition to looking. Throughout this study, I argue that encouraging learners to interpret their individual bodily and sensory experiences of artworks should be considered an essential part of the process of making meaning of those artworks in art education environments and, more importantly, of the process of helping learners to become more critically aware of their own sensory experiences in the world.Item Make perception phenomenology again(2023-12) Quinn, Connor D.; Tye, Michael; Dunlop, Katherine; Mendelovici, Angela; Litland, JonThis project concerns the representational contents of experience generally and visual experience specifically. I justify and then employ a phenomenology-first methodology, where the most important test of a claim about perceptual content is whether it matches perceptual phenomenology. In the first chapter, I argue that the contents and phenomenology of an experience are identical, not merely correlated or explanatorily linked. I use this conclusion in the second chapter to argue that the content of visual experience is a property complex, which is itself structured from simpler properties and relations. Much of the defense of the property complex view consists in demonstrating how an experience with non-propositional content can play a robust cognitive and epistemic role in our mental lives. Despite compelling arguments to the contrary, I argue that we do not need to attribute propositional contents to visual experiences to explain how they reliably cause and justify true beliefs. The third chapter enlists George Berkeley as an ally. Berkeley appeals to a notion of association between non-propositional mental states in his writings on vision. I argue that this notion, properly understood, can be used today to explain away intuitions that lead some to posit higher-order visual contents.Item Making sense with design : a taxonomy of designed experiences(2006) Poggio, Natacha Lorena; Lee, GloriaSo automatically do we perceive things through sight, sound, smell, and touch that we easily can take our senses for granted. My design research strives to deepen the understanding of our senses by creating innovative experiences that make us react in new ways, even to the most common experiences. My aspiration is that the resulting experiences will re-shape our memory and perception of the world. This report is a documentation of my inquiry into the design of human experience; where I look beyond applied products and broaden my view to include all sorts of objects and environments with which people interact. Serving as a guidebook, it outlines the different disciplines of design that address the design of experiences. Additionally, selected case studies from the body of work I have pursued during my graduate studies are presented as a collection of stories of my experience designing user experiences. My design philosophy embodies the importance of engaging multiple senses in each designed activity to better enhance the overall quality of the experience for everyone, including people with disabilities.Item Phenomenological study on the racialized experiences of African American assistant collegiate football coaches(2018-06-27) Howe, Jonathan Emmanuel; Hunt, Thomas M.; Kelly, Darren DavidThe dearth of African American football coaches at the collegiate FBS level is evident solely with an eye test. When looking at the numbers, there are only 13 Black head football coaches out of 128 jobs. Additionally, African American coaches represent less than 30% of assistant coaches (Lapchick, Marfatia, Bloom, & Slyverain, 2017). These numbers are shocking especially when considering the amount of coaching positions available at the conclusion of every season. While there have been a number of scholars researching the lack of head football coaches at the collegiate level, not much focus has been placed on the assistant coaches and not enough emphasis has been placed on studies of qualitative nature. The purpose of this study was to analyze and then gain an understanding of the experiences of Black assistant football coaches at the FBS level. This study utilized a Critical Race Theory framework in order to examine the intersectionality of race and sport to provide an understanding in regards to the dearth of African American assistant football coaches and their path, or lack thereof, to becoming head coaches at the collegiate level.Item The process of experience(2013-08) Grube, Enrico; Tye, MichaelPerceptual experience seems to relate us not only to non-temporal features of objects such as colors and shapes, but also to certain temporal properties such as succession and duration, as well as to the sensible properties of temporally extended events such as movements and other kinds of change. But can such properties really be represented in experience itself, and if so, what does this tell us about the nature of experience? Different theories of time consciousness answer this question in different ways. Atomists deny that experience represents temporal properties and maintain instead that in experience we only represent non-temporal properties, "snapshots" of the world. Retentionalists maintain that, while experiences may be instantaneous mental states, they simultaneously represent temporally extended periods of time, while extensionalists claim that experiences themselves extend in time, either only for very short periods or over whole streams of consciousness. I articulate and defend a version of the latter view, which I call 'simple extensionalism', lay out its ontological foundations, and argue that it accounts for the temporal phenomena of perceptual experience better than its rivals.Item Time out : organizational training for improvisation in lifesaving critial teams(2012-08) Ishak, Andrew Waguih, 1982-; Browning, Larry D.; Ballard, Dawna I.; Stephens, Keri K.; Maxwell, Madeline M.; Ziegler, Jennifer A.Exemplified by fire crews, SWAT teams, and emergency surgical units, critical teams are a subset of action teams whose work is marked by finality, pressure, and potentially fatal outcomes (Ishak & Ballard, 2012). Using communicative and temporal lenses, this study investigates how organizations prime and prepare their embedded critical teams to deal with improvisation. This study explicates how organizations both encourage and discourage improvisation for their embedded critical teams. Throughout the training process, organizations implement a structured yet flexible “roadmap”-type approach to critical team work, an approach that is encapsulated through three training goals. The first goal is to make events routine to members. The second goal is to help members deal with non-routine events. The third goal is to help members understand how to differentiate between what is routine and non-routine. The grounded theory analysis in this study also surfaced three tools that are used within the parameters of the roadmap approach: experience, communicative decision making, and sensemaking. Using Dewey’s (1939, 1958) theory of experience, I introduce a middle-range adapted theory of critical team experience. In this theory, experience and sensemaking are synthesized through communicative decision making to produce decisions, actions, and outcomes in time-limited, specialized, stressful environments. Critical teams have unique temporal patterns that must be considered in any study of their work. Partially based on the nested phase model (Ishak & Ballard, 2012), I also identify three phases of critical team process as critical-interactive, meaning that they are specific to action/critical teams, and they are engaged in by critical teams for the expressed purpose of interaction. These phases are simulation, adaptation, and debriefing. These tools and phases are then placed in the Critical-Action-Response Training Outcomes Grid (CARTOG) to create nine interactions that are useful in implementing a structured yet flexible approach to improvisation in the work of critical teams. Data collection consisted of field observations, semi-structured interviews, and impromptu interviews at work sites. In total, I engaged in 55 hours of field observations at 10 sites. I conducted 31 semi-structured interviews with members of wildland and urban fire crews; emergency medical teams; and tactical teams, including SWAT teams and a bomb squad. I also offer practical implications and future directions for research on the temporal and communicative aspects of critical teams, their parent organizations, and considerations of improvisation in their work.