Browsing by Subject "Aristotle"
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Item Affecting violence : narratives of Los feminicidios and their ethical and political reception(2012-12) Huerta Moreno, Lydia Cristina; Robbins, Jill, 1962-; Domínguez Ruvalcaba, Héctor, 1962-; Arroyo, Jossianna; Chapelle-Wojciehowski, Hannah; Ravelo-Blancas, Patricia; Pia Lara, MariaIn Mexico there is an increasing lack of engagement of the Mexican government and its citizens towards resolving violence. In the 20th century alone events such as the Revolution of 1910, La Guerra Cristera, La Guerra Sucia, and most recently Los Feminicidios and Calderon’s War on Drugs are representative of an ethos of violence withstood and inflicted by Mexicans towards women, men, youth, and marginalized groups. This dissertation examines Los Feminicidios in Ciudad Juarez and the cultural production surrounding them: chronicles, novels, documentaries and films. In it I draw on Aristotle’s influential Nicomachean Ethics, Victoria Camps’ El gobierno de las emociones (2011), María Pía Lara’s Narrating Evil (2007), Vittorio Gallese’s and other scientists’ research on neuroscience empathy and neurohumanism, and socio-political essays in order to theorize how a pathos-infused understanding of ethos might engage a reading and viewing public in what has become a discourse about violence determined by a sense of fatalism. Specifically, I argue that narrative and its interpretations play a significant role in people’s emotional engagement and subsequent cognitive processes. I stress the importance of creating an approach that considers both pathos and logos as a way of understanding this ethos of violence. I argue that by combining pathos and logos in the analysis of a cultural text, we can break through the theoretical impasse, which thus far has resulted in exceptionalisms and has been limited to categorizing as evil the social and political mechanisms that may cause this violence.Item Aristotle and Plato on Law : the Nicomachean Ethics and the Minos(2011-08) Kushner, Jeremy Christopher; Pangle, Lorraine Smith; Stauffer, DevinIn this paper, I examine the treatments of law contained within Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Plato’s Minos. I find that both offer powerful and complementary critiques of law, while recognizing law’s power and promise in shaping the character and opinions of each citizen. The Minos, though, goes further than the Ethics in describing and examining the possibility of divine law that transcends the limitations of merely human laws.Item Aristotle and the Foundations of American Liberalism(2010-10-01) Dempsey, ErikItem Aristotle on rhetoric and rationality : a study of Aristotelian political psychology(2014-12) Verbitsky, Mark Stephen; Stauffer, Devin, 1970-This study explores Aristotle’s political psychology, focusing on the lessons it teaches regarding the character of human reasoning. Contemporary political science has largely adopted the behavioral-economic model of political psychology. This model offers many insights into the limits of human reasoning, highlighting in particular the errors and biases that shape our choices. However, these insights come at the cost of an overly narrow view of human reasoning. When such a political psychology is applied to public policy and political rhetoric, it offers lessons on how to direct public action by taking advantage of unconscious thought processes, but it fails to teach how leaders might constructively engage human rationality. I argue that Aristotelian political psychology offers a useful corrective, one that can help us better understand both the potential and limitations of political guidance. To gain access to Aristotle’s political psychology, I begin with an overview of several of his psychological works: On the Soul, On the Motion of Animals, and the Nicomachean Ethics. I focus in particular on the concepts Aristotle uses in his study of human choice, and I draw out Aristotle’s unitary understanding of psychology, meaning the interrelated nature of thought and desire, which in turn illuminates the constitutive role that thought plays in shaping the ends of human action. From this theoretical basis, I turn to a more concentrated study of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, exploring first the rhetorical concepts Aristotle introduces in the work, and then delving into the psychology of persuasion. In this study, I explore the ways that rhetoric necessarily engages the audience’s rationality and judgment. A particularly valuable lesson is the way in which rhetoric can draw out overlooked concerns and thereby broaden the audience members’ considerations, all in order to help them reach conclusions they would not by themselves. Returning to contemporary political science, I argue that Aristotle’s conception of political psychology offers us a better understanding of human choice, and he offers guidance on how rhetoric can be used to refine, rather than only exploit, public opinion.Item Divinity and humanity in Aristotle's ethics(2016-08) Green, Jerry, Jr. Dwayne; White, Stephen A. (Stephen Augustus); Dancy, Jonathan; Evans, Mathew; Hankinson, Robert J; Woodruff, Paul; Moss, JessicaAristotle wrote two major ethical works, the Nicomachean Ethics (NE) and Eudemian Ethics (EE), and the relationship between the two has long been a matter of scholarly controversy. To further complicate things, three chapters are printed verbatim in the middle of both works: NE V-VII = EE IV-VI. Without knowing where these so-called ‘Common Books’ properly belong, we cannot know even what constitutes the text of the NE or EE, let alone the relationships between them. The nearly universal consensus is that the Common Books were written as part of the early EE, then revised or replaced for the later NE, at which point the later version supplanted the EE originals even in the EE manuscripts. I argue here that this is likely incorrect: the Common Books do not belong in the NE at all. The NE defends a view where persons are identified with a single part of the soul that (i) is the seat of both theoretical and practical wisdom, and (ii) is divine in a way that makes human happiness the same kind of activity as the gods’ activity. The Common Books reject both these positions, as does the EE. This suggests that the Common Books are philosophically inconsistent with the NE; it is therefore probable the Common Books were neither written as a part of the NE nor revised for inclusion in it. I conclude by defending the results and methodology of this project from various objections, and show how the undisputed NE can still form a complete treatise even without the Common Books.Item Essence and potentiality: Aristotelian strategies of addressing problems of change and persistence(2005) Bowin, John Francis; Mourelatos, Alexander P. D.When Aristotle makes his case that time is a property of motion, he not only argues that time depends for its existence on motion, but that it derives its structural properties from motion as well. But if this is to avoid a vicious circularity, then motion cannot presuppose time, and the order of motion must be definable in abstraction from the order of time. I argue that Aristotle is able to do exactly this, based upon his theory of act and potency (energeia and dunamis), and upon the theory that all natural change is teleological. I propose that a linear order may be defined on the phases of a change, using the relation “x is potentially y,” where x and y range over different phases of an Aristotelian natural substance (e.g., Socrates-as-a-boy, Socrates-as-a-man, etc.). This is possible, I claim, because a special asymmetric potentiality is involved which marks out the stages of a change as prior and posterior based upon their proximity to a given goal, rather than upon their order in a temporal sequence. I also argue that if x and y appear in states of affairs that obtain at different times, then the “x is potentially y” relation provides a criterion for diachronic identity, since it relates a single entity at one time to itself at another time. Moreover, I argue, based on an account that takes forms to be individuals that persist over time, that the forms which give substances these special potentialities are early analogues of the individual essences proposed by the Stoics and by Duns Scotus as criteria for identity, and by contemporary metaphysicians such as Kaplan and Plantinga to secure identity across possible worlds. I look at two ancient puzzles about persistence, viz., the Growing Argument by Epicharmus, and a similar puzzle about alteration mentioned by Aristotle in Phys. 4.11, and assess the adequacy of Aristotle’s criterion of identity for solving them. As a point of comparison, I also assess the solution to the Growing Argument proposed by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus, which features a reductio ad absurdum of certain premises of these puzzles.Item The Grand Projects: Technology in New French Architecture(1990-04-11) Lévi, MichelAudio files are EID restricted. Individuals without an EID should send an email request to apl-aaa@lib.utexas.edu.Item J. B. Jackson Guest Lecture(1980-01-21) Jackson, John BrinckerhoffAudio files are EID restricted. Individuals without an EID should send an email request to apl-aaa@lib.utexas.edu.Item Making a change : Aristotle on poiêsis, kinêsis and energeia(2011-05) Chen, Fei-Ting, 1974-; White, Stephen A. (Stephen Augustus); Hankinson, R. J.; Woodruff, Paul; Mourelatos, Alexander P. D.; Koons, RobertI examine the relation between the action of producing a change (kinêsis) in something else and the action of exercising one’s nature or craft (energeia). I call for the distinction between kinêsis and energeia by arguing that in Metaphysics IX.1-5 change should be construed as a transformational change that is still characterized in accordance with the categories, whereas in Met. IX.6-9 the action of exercising of one’s nature or craft should be construed as the presence of a state or an action that exhibits one’s nature or craft, which is meant to be a way of characterizing that-which-is (to on) that goes beyond the categories. Instead of the conventional patient-centered account of change, I argue that Phys. III.3 and V.4 suggest a non-patient-centered account of change and that the agent’s acting-upon (poiêsis) should also be construed as a non-self-contained change, just as the patient’s being-acted-upon (pathêsis), and therefore cannot be conflated with exercising one’s nature or craft. I also point out that a genuine Aristotelian event cannot be composed of the agent’s acting-upon and the patient’s being-acted-upon. I argue that Phys. VII.3 suggests a two-way relation between the action of producing a change in something else and the action of exhibiting one’s own nature, based on which I outline a hylomorphic proposal that a genuine Aristotelian event is composed of the action of producing a change in something else as the material part of the event and the action of exhibiting one’s own nature as the formal part of the event. While the former provides the material necessitation force from the bottom up to the occurrence of the event, the latter provides the formal constraint force from the top down to the occurrence of the event.Item Monarchy and political community in Aristotle's Politics(2012-05) Riesbeck, David J., 1980-; White, Stephen A. (Stephen Augustus); Gagarin, Michael; Morrison, Donald; Perlman, Paula; Woodruff, PaulThis dissertation re-examines a set of long-standing problems that arise from Aristotle’s defense of kingship in the Politics. Scholars have argued for over a century that Aristotle’s endorsement of sole rule by an individual of outstanding excellence is incompatible with his theory of distributive justice and his very conception of a political community. Previous attempts to resolve this apparent contradiction have failed to ease the deeper tensions between the idea of the polis as a community of free and equal citizens sharing in ruling and being ruled and the vision of absolute kingship in which one man rules over others who are merely ruled. I argue that the so-called “paradox of monarchy” emerges from misconceptions and insufficiently nuanced interpretations of kingship itself and of the more fundamental concepts of community, rule, authority, and citizenship. Properly understood, Aristotelian kingship is not a form of government that concentrates power in the hands of a single individual, but an arrangement in which free citizens willingly invest that individual with a position of supreme authority without themselves ceasing to share in rule. Rather than a muddled appendage tacked on to the Politics out of deference to Macedon or an uncritical adoption of Platonic utopianism, Aristotle’s defense of kingship is a piece of ideal theory that serves in part to undermine the pretensions of actual or would-be monarchs, whether warrior- or philosopher-kings.Item Moneymaking and economics in Aristotle's politics(2020-05-07) Quillen, Henry T.; Stauffer, Devin, 1970-Aristotle’s Politics I.8-11 contains a profound reflection on the relationship between moneymaking and the divergent needs of individuals and politics. It offers not only a clear confrontation with the issue of scarcity, but, unlike modern economics, also a causal explanation of limitless demand. Moreover, Aristotle suggests that the psychological consequences of scarcity pull human beings away from the satisfaction of a fuller range of their needs, and that clarity about those needs greatly weakens the human passion for limitless moneymaking. Need and utility, not unlimited acquisitiveness, are the focus of Aristotelian economics. Yet he also shows that clarity about human needs is quite rare, and, in political life, necessarily absent. I argue that Aristotle’s teaching in Politics I.8-11 is that the philosopher, an essentially private individual, is the true economist on account of his unique clarity about human neediness.Item On fictionalism in Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics(2009-08) Cho, Young Kee, 1971-; Hankinson, R. J.The aim of this dissertation is to show that Aristotle’s ontology cannot provide a model for mathematics. To show this, I argue that (i) mathematical objects must be seen as fictional entities in the light of Aristotle’s metaphysics, and (ii) Aristotle’s mathematical fictionalism is not compatible with his metaphysical realism. My interpretation differs from that of other fictionalists in denying this compatibility. For Aristotle, mathematical objects are “something resulting from abstraction ([Greek phrase]).” For example, geometry investigates a man not qua man, but qua solid or figure. Traditionally, Aristotle’s abstraction has been interpreted as an epistemic process by which a universal concept is obtained from particulars; I rather show his abstraction as a linguistic analysis or conceptual separation by which a certain group of properties are selected: e. g., if a science, X, studies a qua triangle, X studies the properties which belong to a in virtue of a’s being a triangle and ignores a’s other properties. Aristotle’s theory of abstraction implies a mathematical naïve realism, in that mathematical objects are properties of sensible objects. But the difficulty with this mathematical naïve realism is that, since most geometrical objects do not have physical instantiations in the sensible world, things abstracted from sensible objects cannot supply all the necessary objects of mathematics. This is the so-called “precision problem.” In order to solve this problem, Aristotle abandons his mathematical realism and claims that mathematical objects exist in sensibles not as actualities but ‘as matter ([Greek phrase]).’ This claim entails a mathematical fictionalism in metaphysical terms. Most fictionalist interpretations argue that the fictionality of mathematical objects does not harm the truth of mathematics for Aristotle, insofar as objects’ matter is abstracted from sensibles. None of these interpretations, however, is successful in reconciling Aristotle’s mathematical fictionalism with his realism. For Aristotle, sciences are concerned with ‘what is ([Greek phrase])’ and not with ‘what is not ([Greek phrase]).’ Aristotle’s concept of truth rests on a realist correspondence to ‘what is ([Greek phrase])’: “what is true is to say of what is that it is or of what is not that it is not.” Thus, insofar as mathematical objects are fictional, Aristotle’s metaphysics cannot account for the truth of mathematics.Item Pleasure and political philosophy in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics(2022-05-05) Jiang, Jonathan; Stauffer, Devin, 1970-; Pangle, Lorraine SmithThis thesis analyzes Aristotle’s treatment of pleasure in book seven of the Nicomachean Ethics. The thesis argues that Aristotle’s identification of contemplative activity with a certain kind of pleasure fulfills a key part of his project to articulate a vision of happiness that is unified and harmonious and, accordingly, that Aristotle’s reflections on pleasure help illuminate his claim that the philosopher is the architect of the end of human life. The thesis suggests further that Aristotle implicitly qualifies this vision of happiness by indicating the internal tensions of the philosophic life.Item Practical necessity : a study in ethics, law, and human action(2011-05) O'Brien, Matthew Bennett; Deigh, John; Dancy, Jonathan; Koons, Robert; Woodruff, Paul; Kane, Robert; Pink, ThomasThe dissertation is an examination of obligation, which I argue is a mode of rational necessity that is proper to human agency. I begin from G. E. M. Anscombe’s celebrated attack against modern moral philosophy, and then sketch a positive theory of obligation as it figures in morality and in law, drawing upon the work of Aquinas and Aristotle. The first chapter explicates this idea of “practical necessity” and the second chapter shows that Aristotelian ethics, because it is not a theological law conception of ethics, has no place for a peculiarly moral conception of obligation. The third chapter examines Aquinas’s conception of moral law and argues that Aquinas vindicates Anscombe’s negative critique of the “moral ought.” The fourth chapter shows that the application of exceptionless moral norms (i.e. moral absolutes), which is one kind of obligation, requires attention to aspects of social practices. Attention to social practices allows the resolution of controverted problems about specifying intentions and applying the principle of double effect in a way that makes exceptionless moral norms workable. The fifth and final chapter defends the conception of intentional action assumed in the fourth chapter, and demonstrates that the scholastic ‘sub specie boni’ thesis is an integral part of action explanation, as well as Anscombe’s notion of “practical knowledge”. The upshot of the dissertation is an integrated investigation into how the ideas of good and necessity figure in ethics, law, and human action.Item Rhetorical Balance in Aristotle's Definition of the Tragic Agent: Poetics 13(The Classical Quarterly (New Series), 1980) Armstrong, David; Peterson, Charles W.Item The role of actuality in Aristotle's first philosophy(2014-05) Battiste, Brian; Hankinson, R. J.I show how Aristotle’s theory of the priority of actuality and his theory of non-correlative actuality help prepare the way for his own positive account of the separate, non-sensible substances. Aristotle argues that actuality is prior to potentiality in Metaphysics [Theta]8, and in particular that actuality is prior in substance and in a more authoritative kind of way. I show how both of these arguments are to be understood, and how the more authoritative kind of priority (which is not substantial priority, as usually thought) is again appealed to in Metaphysics [Lamda]6 in order to draw important inferences about the primary principles. I also show how the theory of non-correlative actuality used in [Theta]8 is, just like the more authoritative kind of priority, again applied in [Lamda]6 in parallel kinds of ways. It turns out that the traditional interpretation which ascribes the notion of “pure actuality” to Aristotle is mistaken, and this comes to light once Aristotle’s theory of non-correlative actuality is properly understood and the texts are properly interpreted.Item Shame and virtue in Plato and Aristotle(2013-05) Raymond, Christopher Cecil; Woodruff, Paul, 1943-In this dissertation, I examine Plato and Aristotle's reasons for denying that aidôs, or a sense of shame, is a virtue. The bulk of my study is devoted to the interpretation of two key texts: Plato's Charmides and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics. Although both philosophers see an important role for shame in moral education, they share the view that a fully virtuous person's actions are guided not by aidôs, but by practical wisdom. In the opening chapter, I provide an overview of their conception of shame as an essentially social emotion that expresses our concern for the opinions of others. I present and give a critique of a recent theory of shame that challenges this conception. The starting point of the second chapter is a brief passage in the Charmides where Socrates examines Charmides' claim that aidôs is the same as sôphrosunê ("temperance" or "moderation"). Socrates refutes the definition by citing a single verse from Homer's Odyssey: "aidôs is no good in a needy man." In order to make sense of his dubious appeal to poetic authority, I provide a close reading of Socrates' opening narration, in which he describes his initial encounter with the beautiful young Charmides. I show that the ambivalence about aidôs expressed in the quotation is justified through Socrates' portrait of Charmides. Though admirable at this early stage of his life, Charmides' aidôs is the very thing that prevents him from challenging Socrates' argument and gaining a deeper understanding of virtue. In the third chapter, I turn to the discussion of shame in Book 4 of the Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle explicitly argues that aidôs is not a virtue. The two arguments of NE 4.9 have puzzled commentators. My aim is to reconstruct Aristotle's view of aidôs and show that he does in fact have good grounds for excluding it from his list of virtues.Item Should Aristotle pass the buck? : on choosing a virtuous act for itself(2011-12) Smith, Kevin Wayne; White, Stephen A. (Stephen Augustus); Dancy, JonathanIn the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle identifies three conditions that are necessary in order for a virtuous act to have been done as a virtuous agent: the act must be done (1) knowingly, (2) for itself, and (3) from a steady disposition. I examine previous interpretations of the second item, and then offer my own: a virtuous act is chosen for itself if it is chosen for its virtue-making features that are also reasons to do the act, and these features motivate the agent to such an extent that the agent would do the act even if there were no other reason to do it.Item Thumos in Aristotle’s Politics(2009-12) Morgan, Dorothy Lam; Pangle, Thomas L.; Stauffer, DevinRecent interest and scholarship in the role of emotions in politics provide an opportunity for revisiting the idea of ancient Greek thumos as understood by Aristotle. In Aristotle’s Politics, thumos is a capacity of the soul for affection; it is most clearly seen in anger and righteous indignation; and it is indispensable for understanding the nature of politics. Aristotle shows that thumos motivates political actions that can be beneficial as well as destructive to the city. This ambivalence has an enormous impact on what is possible or desirable in political life and raises important questions about the extent to which thumos should be cultivated in society and in individuals.Item Toward an Aristotelian liberalism(2011-05) Sherman, James Arthur; Bonevac, Daniel A., 1955-; Dancy, Jonathan; Hurka, Thomas; Martinich, Aloysius P.; White, Stephen A.My dissertation develops and defends a contemporary Aristotelian form of political liberalism. I articulate an Aristotelian interpretation of individual autonomy as excellence in deliberating about ends, and develop a decision-theoretic model for representing this type of deliberation. I then provide a precise characterization of individual freedom, building on Amartya Sen’s neo-Aristotelian theory of freedom as capability. I argue that we should understand individual liberty, the guiding value of political liberalism, as a compound of autonomy and freedom as I have articulated these notions. I then argue that liberty in this sense is the proper focus of a liberal theory of distributive justice. I provide a teleological justification of the state’s authority to pursue a liberty-based program of distributive justice, and argue for a liberty-based interpretation of the harm principle as the appropriate limitation on state action.