-CONFIDENTIAL_ ·. . ' ' ' U. S. AR.i.~S CONTROL AND DISARJ."'1.AMENT AGENCY March 23, 1968 STATUS REPORT ON THE DRAFT TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SUMMARY Consideration of a draft Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was completed in the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee. (ENDC) in Geneva on March 14. It will now be considered in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) around April 17, along with a proposed resolution of the Security Council dealing with security assurances. It is our hope that after 3 or 4 weeks debate the GA will endorse the present text substantially as is and recommend that it be opened for prompt signa­ture. We should be able to persuade most of the nations with little or no nuclear potential to support the NPT. However, several of the poten­ tial nuclear weapon states, such as India, Italy, Brazil, and the Federal Republic of Germany, still have reservations concerning certain aspects of the present draft, and there are still uncertain­ties as to how the GA debate may turn out. In view of these uncertainties, U.S. action with respect to signing the Treaty, submitting it to the Senate, and ratifying it, needs to be related to future developments which cannot be clearly predicted at this time. Once the NPT is concluded and opened for signa­ture there will be strong pressures applied on the nuclear powers to start making progress on nuclear disarmament measures, such as a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapon testing and a halt in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes. The language of the NPT will also raise an expectation ..,,., ___ ______ ­ -GGNF-fDENTIA ·_, 2 CONFIDENTIAL ­ that the US and the USSR will engage in an early dialogue leading to agreement to limit the stra~ tegic arms race. Finally, a strong iriterest has already developed in applying arms control provi­sions to the ocean floor. I. Status and Nex t Ste~s The ENDC in Geneva completed deliberations on the text of a joint US-USSR sponsored draft NPT on March 14, 1968 (Annex A). This draft treaty along with comments and views of ENDC and other governments regarding the Treaty have been incorporated in an ENDC report to the UNGA pursuant to a request of the latter made during its 22nd session last fall. The report also has annexed to it a proposed 8ecurity Council resolution dealing with the question of providing assurances to non-nuclear weapon states which become parties to the NPT (see next section below). · The 22nd UNGA is expected to resume sometime around April 17 to 24 to consider the report of the ENDC. Our objective is to obtain wide support for the draft NPT and obtain a resolution after about 3 weeks of .debate which endorses the Treaty and asks that it be opened for signature. Action on security assurances, after initial consideration. along with the draft NPT in the Political Cormnittee, could also take place in the Security Council at about the same time, perhaps on the basis of a recommendation by the General Assembly. Ambassador Goldberg and Soviet Ambassador Malik have been in consultation with one another and with other dele­gations regarding the timing of the resumed session and tactics to be pursued. Thought is being given to where 3 -GeNFI DENTIA!.. and at what level signing of the NPT might take place ; the Soviets have indicated a preference for Geneva . We are also holding open the possibility for Foreign Ministers attending the concluding stages of the UN debate , if this should be deemed desirable . Between now and the time the GA reconvenes we will work through diplomatic channels to garner maximum support for the present text . Particular attention will be given to certain nations such as India , Italy , Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, Israel , South Africa , etc ., which still express reservations about certain aspects of the present text, or have thus far been noncommittal regarding their support. (See Section III below elaborating various country attitudes.) Some critics of the present text , who nevertheless basically favor barring the further spread of nuclear weapons, can be expected to propose amendments in order to bring about --as they see it --a more " equitable" balance of obligations under the Treaty as between the nuclear and non­nuclear powers. Rather than directly attacking the present draft other opponents may attempt to remand the NPT back to the ENDC for further consideration , or withhold final action until after conclusion of the Conference 0£ the ·Non-Nuclear Weapon States schedu]ed for late August 1968 . (At this Conference the non-nuclear-weopon States will harmonize their views with respect to the NPT. ) One probl m will be to control the Soviet inclination to "railroad" the NPT through the GA session, which we and the UK believe would be counter-productive . While permitting the -GG-NILIDEN1'IAL.. CONFIDENTIAJ_, ­ UN to "talk itself out" we would nevertheless like vey the impression that the text submitted the text which wo11ld be onened ror s·g at -.. .. j_ i n If we achieve our aims in the UNGA we can proceed promptly to sign the NPT along with other willing countries. However, it may nonetheless still not prove desirable for the U.S. to deposit its instrument of ratification this summer ev n though Senate action msy have been completed. The U.S.S.R. may not ratify until the FRG does, which in turn may only follow an agreement on safeguards between the IAEA and EURATOM.. Under these circumstances we may also vish to defer completion of ratification. If we fail in our objectives at the UNGA and the Treaty is remanded to the ENDC, or final action is postponed until after the Conference of Non-Nuclear Nations in August, it might be inadvisable to submit it to the Senate this summer, even though we still might wish to consider signature by those nations \·Jilling to proceed notwithstanding the UNGA action. In any event questions concerning the timing of U.S. signature, submission to the Senate, and ratification can only be answered in the light of GA action yet to come . II. Security Assurances On March 7, the United States, the Soviet Union and the UK sub1nitted to the ENDC a draft Security Council resolution welcoming the intention of certain nuclear-weapon states to provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon party that is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear ·weapons are used. (Annex B.) During consideration of the resolution by the Security Council we plan to make a unilateral declaration of how we intend to act under the resolulion. The Soviet Union and GONFI DEN11. fAb the UK will also make declarations identical in all substan­tive provisions . We would declare that aggression with nuclear weapons, or the threat of such aggression, against a non­nuclear state would create a qualitatively new situation in which the nuclear states \vhich are permanent members of the UN Security Council would have to act immediately through the Security Council to take the measures necessary to counter the aggression or to remove the threat in accordance with the UN Charler . We ·would also affirm our intention, as a permanent mem­ber of the UN Security Council , to seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance , in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear state , party to the NPT, that is a victim of an act of agsression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used . ( See Annex C for full text of the declaration.) Both the Security Council resolution and the US declara­tion are applicable only to non-nuclear countries that adhere to the 1\TPT. They create no new obligations for the United States; any measures which might result would be strictly in accordance with existing provisions and procedures of the United 1otions Charter. The assurance actipn contains no promise by nuclear powers not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to the NPT, which omissions will undoubt­edly cause criticism by some non-nuclear countries . The proposed assurances action is nevertheless of great political significance because it will represent concerted policy of the United States and the Soviet Union in a security field of great importance for non-nuc]car countries and will thus be regarded by a great many non··nuclear countries as