• DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE y Intelligence Memorandum Third World Reaction to Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia 17 September 1968 No. 0622/68 -SECRET ~Q parejgn Dissem CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Directorate of Intelligence 17 September 1968 INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM Third World Reaction to Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia Summary The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has pro­duced largely predictable reactions among the "third­world" nations of Africa and Asia. A great majority of the governments making official statements have voiced disapproval of the Soviet action, but in vary­ing degrees of severity. In Asia, criticism of the Soviets in · nonaligned countries was generally sub­dued, while in Africa the reaction was almost unan­imously hostile. (See Table) There is already some evidence, however, that the unpopularity of the So­viet action will be only temporary, and will have little long-range impact on Soviet relations with the nations of Africa and Asia. Note: This memorandum was produced solely by CIA. It was prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence and coordinated with the Office of National Estimates. Reaction of Those African and Asian Governments Making Official Statements APPROVAL Iraq Mali North Korea North Vietnam Southern Yemen Syria DISAPPROVAL Australia Afghanistan Burma Burundi Cameroon Ceylon Congo (K) Dahomey Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Ghana India Indonesia Israel Ivory Coast Jordan Kenya Lesotho Libya Malagasy Republic Malaysia Mauritania Nepal Niger Pakistan Philippines Senegal Tanzania Thailand Togo Uganda Zambia • --SECRET ~io Poreign Disscm Asia. 1. Asian governments generally have been re­strained in their official reactions to the events in Czechoslovakia. Except for the anticipated con­demnations by Australia, the Philippines, and Thai­land, no Asian country expressed more than simple disapproval of the Soviet action. The only explicit endorsements of the Soviet intervention came from North Korea and North Vietnam. 2. South Asia's two major powers, India and Pakistan, officially reacted with caution--as evi­denced by their abstention from the UN resolution condemning Soviet intervention. India's reliance on substantial Soviet military and economic aid and its consequent unwillingness to jeopardize Indo­Soviet relations diluted the government's censure but did not prevent widespread public condemnation and hostile parliamentary debate. The Pakistani Government, by failing to issue any public statement on the Czech crisis and instructing the press to tone down its criticism of the invaders, demonstrated a firm intention to avoid offending the USSR at a time when Pak-Soviet relations are increasingly warm and Soviet military aid may be forthcoming. The only unequivocal statement in South Asia came from the Government of Ceylon, which labeled the Soviet action "a treacherous stab in the back." 3. In Southeast Asia, Malaysia and Burma merely issued statements voicing adherence to the principles of coexistence and noninterference in the internal affairs of another country. Malaysia's position was presumably influenced by large Soviet purchases of rubber, as well as Moscow's support in the current dispute with the Philippines over Sabah. The Indo­nesian Government, although expressing shock and criticism in private conversations, tempered its official reaction because of the scheduled arrival of a Soviet economic delegation on 29 August to dis­cuss debt rescheduling and economic assistance. -2­ P.1o:o~Disser~ -ET" SECRET ~Jo Foreign Dissem Africa 4. The African countries were nearly unanimous in their disapproval and condemnation of the Soviet intervention. Such an overwhelmingly unfavorable reaction was made possible by the lack of substantial dependence on the USSR for military and economic as­sistance. In addition, African capitals are increas­ingly hostile to any action by a "Great Power" which hints of interference in the internal affairs of an­other state, a reaction emphasized by the repeated disapproval of the violation of the territorial in­tegrity and national sovereignty of Czechoslovakia. 5. Only the radical state of Mali has officially endorsed the Soviet action, and even here there are indications that the Bamako regime took the action only after strong Soviet pressures had been applied. Although the Guinean regime has maintained a public silence on the event, regime leaders, including Presi­dent Toure, are evidently disturbed by the Soviet tactics and concerned at the divisions the invasion has created in the socialist camp. Elsewhere in West Africa, numerous official statements accused the Soviets of flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Czechoslovakia and demanded the immediate with­drawal of all Soviet forces from the country. Ghana labeled the Soviet invasion an act of "unjustified aggression and blatant interference," while Gambia suspended its limited cultural relations with the USSR and its Warsaw Pact associates in the Czech venture. Senegal's foreign minister privately characterized the Soviet action as "open aggres­sion" which destroyed the Soviet claim to be a peace-loving nation. Although no public statement was issued in Dakar, Senegal's representative at the UN said his government "regrets and condemns" the intervention. 6. Strong Soviet support for Lagos' efforts to maintain Nigerian unity probably was the most important factor in Nigeria's refusal to comment of­ficially on Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. The Soviet's backing of federal military forces fighting a civil war with secessionist Ibo tribesmen -3­-~Jo F-e:r::e i gn Dis•e.m. __ ....... _ --sECRE'I' ,, ~EGRET • JJo--Poreign Dissem has included the sale of jet planes, patrol boats, and other military equipment. Widespread public outcry in Nigeria against the Soviet intervention was dampened by Lagos, which put a stop to unfavor­at~2 press articles. 7. The reaction in Central Africa was severe. Zambia's statement denounced the "Russian imperial­ism in Czechoslovakia" as a "monstrous act of un­called-for savagery." Congo (K) acted to withdraw all its students from Warsaw Pact countries. Burundi condemned the Soviet intervention, and students scheduled to study in the USSR were denied permis­sion to leave the country. 8. Condemnation from the East African nations, though generally more restrained, was nevertheless widespread. Kenya called the Soviet intervention a "naked and brutal manifestation of the worst form of imperialism." Tanzania in unusually strong state­ments condemned the Soviet "aggression" as a direct violation of international law and of the UN charter. Uganda stated that respect had been lost for the USSR as a country assertedly opposing imperialism and championing freedom and democracy. Haile Selassie deplored the events in Eastern Europe as another ex­ample of a small country being overrun, and urged the withdrawal of Soviet forces as quickly as pos­sible. Lesotho, in Southern Africa, condemned the "un­justified invasion" of Czechoslovakia by Soviet forces in "the strongest possible terms." Middle East 9~ Although the USSR has tried to elicit Arab support for the intervention by emphasizing Israeli assistance to the "far-reaching imperialist plans" for Czechoslovakia, most Arab countries have avoided making an official state~ent on the issue. Suppo~t for Moscow has come from Iraq, Syria, and Southern Yemen, all left-wing regimes dependent on, or hopeful of, military assista~ce from the USSR. Similarly, criti­cism has come mainlv from those states considered pro­west: Jordan, Israel, and Libya. The UAR has taken an equivocal line, which is interesting in view of the large amounts of aid received from the Soviets. So have Morocco and Sudan, which are more recent bene­ficiaries of the USSP. -4­ --sECRET iqo Foreign DisseJ+t 10. The UAR's most authoritative commentary to date makes little attempt to hide Cairo's distaste for the Soviet action.· Hasanayn Heykal, editor of Cairo's major daily Al Ahram and a confidant of President Nasir, wrote on 30 August that the dangers to Czechoslovak Co:mmunism were "not sufficient to warrant military intervention." Because of "prin­ciple," he said, he chose not to approve the inva­sion, but because of "circumstance" he chose not to condemn it. Nevertheless, he concluded that "mili­tary intervention is wrong" and "what is wrong is wrong." 11. There have been other signs of the UAR's displeasure. Cairo's press spokesman, Al-Zayyat, has missed both weekly news conferences ·since the invasion and, according to US sources there, has privately repudiated the pro-Soviet line. Other press comment points to Egypt's long-standing friend­ship with Czechoslovakia, especially Prague's assi~t­ance in helping to break the Western arms monopoly in 1955. Newspapers have also carried Western press accounts of the event, which is not usual in Egypt, along with numerous pictures of the occupation. 12. There are many reasons why Cairo--and possibly other Arab states--might resent Moscow's occupation of Czechoslovakia. As of late, the Egyptians have appeared to be looking toward the us and the USSR to arrange a political settlement of the Middle East deadlock. Cairo surely views the occupation as a serious blow to those hopes. Now Egypt's only major ally--the USSR--is in de facto military occupation of another nation and Cairo can hardly support such an action whil~ pro­testing the occupation of its own territory~ By and large, however, the UAR is trying to lie low, and has issued no official statement thus far. 13. Of all the Middle Eastern states justify­ing the Soviet action, Iraq has been the most forth­right, calling the invasion a "defense of world-wide freedom." The Soviet government has hitherto re­served judgment on the new Iraqi regime, implying that Moscow's approval is linked to Baghdad's future performance. Iraq may believe that supporting the intervention will increase its standing with the Kremlin. -5­-No Foreign Dissem SECRET Effects 14. The image the Soviet Union has sought to create for itself in Africa and Asia as an enemy of imperialism and champion of democracy has obvi­ously been tarnished by recent events in Czechoslo­vakia. Several African governments have canceled cultural exchange programs with the USSR and pre­viously existing suspicion in some governments of Soviet propaganda efforts has probably been in­creased. Nevertheless, there is unlikely to be ~ush lasting or significant impact on Soviet relations with these countries. Many of them receive Soviet military and economic assistance, and some have strategic or internal political reasons for keeping their relations with Moscow on an even keel. In most of the others, oscc~ had little prestige to lose. -6­-~~o Fo:reign Disse:m ­