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-2-SECTO ONE, DECEMBER 29 FROM LBJ RANCH .TEXAS. (SECTION ! OF !iJ 
PAGE 3 RUEPWW 2D S ~ 6 Al T LIMIT DISTRIBUTION ·. 
INGREDIENT TO PASS PROPOSA~ 'WAS A SIGNATURE FROM WEsr· BERLIN. · 

BECAUSE OF THESE PRES~URES BRANDT HAD AUTHORIZED KORBER TO 
SIGN AGREEMENT BY ORDER OF CHIEF OF CHANCELLERY OF 
BERLIN SENAT ACTING ON ORDERS OF MAYOR. CARSTENS SAID 
FRG WAS INFORMED OF THIS WORDING ONLY AFTER BRANDT' HAD 

MADE PROPOSAL BUT THAT BONN HAD DECIDED Not TO TRY. 
VETO THE PROPOSAL, BECAUSE OF DANGER OF DESTROYING HOPES

OF WEST BERLINERS. . 
/ 
CARSTENS CONCLUDED THAT THERE HAD NOT BEEN 
SUFFICIENT FRGISENAT COORDINATION. SCHROEDER SAID 
THERE HAD BEEN .' INSUFFICIENT ANALYSIS OF 
IMPLICATIONS OF ABUSCH LETTER WHiCH HAD SHOWN NO CHANGE IN 

GDR BASIC POSITION BUT ~~ICH CONTEMPLATED CHANGE IN 
FR GISENAT/ POSITION. 
SCHROEDER ALSO SAW ·DANGER IN FRGISENAT ·BEING EXPOSED 
TO MORE PUBLIC PRES~URES THAN EXPECTED ON FUTURE GDR 
APPROACHES. 

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ON COORDINATION, MCGHEE COMMENTED THAT COMMANDANTS HAD ·. 
BEEN CONSULTED ONLY AFTER FIRST SENATIFRG Discus~IoN. "CARSTENS 
AGREED FULL CONSULTATION NECES~ARY BEFORE A~Y DECISIVE 

PAGE 4 RUEPWW 2D Sf 26 i ET LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 
STEP TAKEN. HE ADDED THAT THERE WERE REPORTS 
GDR HAD BEEN AC~ING UNDER SOME. PRES£URE IN FORM 
REPRESENTATIONS FROM GROMYKO TO ULBRICHT. 

SECRETARY ASKED WHY GDR HAD BEEN WILLING ACCEPT 
DR AMATIC CONTRAST BETWEEN TREATMENT GIVEN EAST AND WES! 
BERLINERS •• HE MADE TWO COMMENTS: 

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1. ENORMOUS GRAVITATIONAL PULL OF WEST BERLIN AND 
FR G COULD LEAD TO AN ALMOST DE FACTO REUNIFICATI~N IF TRAVEL,
CONTACTS AND CO~MUNICATIONS BETWEEN BOTH SIDES COULD BE 
lNCREASED, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD BE AN EVOLUTIONARY · 
PR OCESS WHICH WOULD TAKE TIME. 

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2 •. BUT IN THIS PROCEss; RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF 
THREE WESTERN POWERS IN BERLIN MUST BE PROTECTED. ,
IF WE WERE TO BE IN A CRAEH LANDING, THEN WE MUST BE 

THERE FOR THE TAKE-OFF· WE WERE NOT RAISING FORMAL OR 
.HYPOTHETICAL QUESTIONS, BUT ANYTHING WHICH ERODED OR 
UNDERMINED WESTERN RIGHTS IN BERLIN COULD ~E 

DANGEROU • 

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~J-SECTO ONE, DECEMBER 29 FROM LBJ RANCH TEXAS. (SECTION I OF :I) 
TYLER ASKED ABOUT ROLE OF FRG REPRESENTATIVE-VON 
ECKHART IN SENATIFRG COORDINATION. SCHROEDER COMMENTED 
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PAGE 5 RUEPWW 2D S ~ 6 A ! T LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 
THAT COORDINATION MIGHT WELL BE LESS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
THAN PERSONALITY PROBLEM. CARSTENS SAID FRG .WAS 
HOPING TO AVOID DI~CLOSURE OF ITS BELIEF THAT 
CONSULTATION HAD B£EN TOO LATE. PRESSURES IN BERLIN 
WERE SUCH THAT INSTRUCTIONS TO NEGOTIATOR£ PROBABLY 
'SHOULD COME FRO~ DISTANT, LESS EMOTIONAL PLACE. 
SCHROEDER DIFFERED WITH SECRETARY'S OPTIMISM ON 
GRAVITATIONAL PULL OF WEST. IF EAST'S ESSENTIAL 
POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED, THEN WEST RUNS · · 
SERIOUS DANGERS IN MERELY ACCEPTING OR NEGOTIATING ON ' 
AMELIORATING OFFERS 
ON TRAVEL, CONTACTS, ETC. FROM EAST. THIS COULD REACH POINT . 
WHERE EAST'S ATTRACTIVENESS WOULD GROW. WpRLD PUBLIC OPINION,
SEEING INCREASED COf\"TACTS BECAUSE OF HUMANE OFFERS FROM EAST, · 
MIGHT CONCLUDE THAT EAST AND wtsT "GERMANS COULD REACH 
PERMANENT AGREEMENT WITHOUT ANY BASIC INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES· 

THE "ALL GERMANS AT ONE TABLE" THEME MIGHT BECOM~ · 
HARD TO REBUT UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. HE DENIED 
SUGGESTION THAT EAST BERLIN PASS OFFER HAD BEEN ENCOURAGED 
·BY 'RECENT MENDE SPEECH IN BERLIN, THOUGH MENDE MIGHT BELI'rVE 
THIS• ; . 
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., TELEGRAM epai-tment ofState• 
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TF PP RUEHCR 	' . 
DE RUEPWW 3 D 2911850 s 
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? 29!725Z F · , 

s 	FM SECSTATElLBJ RANCH TEXAS/ Q I 8 8 2 5 
TO RUEHCR/SECSTATE WASHDC I lrO RUEHCR/ AMEMB BONN ~ ::·J,3 OE.C 2,..9_ p~.\ 2 \ 7
RUEHCR/AMEMB PARIS 	,,
E R 	RUEHCR/AMEMB LONDON RUEHCR/ AMEMB MOSC,OW RUEHCR/USBER BERLIN STATE BT 
S a-.......!9T 	. 

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION FINALS ?EC o~ 2 ACTION SECSTATE WASHINGTON 1§.i..cT.Q ONE/ , SCHROEDER SAID HE AT FIRST HAD BEEN OPPOSED TO 6CCE?TANCE or EAST'S PASS OFFER BUT THAT "THI~GS HAD GOTTEN OUT OF HAND". CHRISTMAS SENTIMENT HAD OBVIOUSLY ~ADE ACCEP­TANCE AN "UNPOLITICAL STEP". HE RErERRED TO NEWS REPORTS THAT BAHR HAD SAID FRG AND SENAT ~ERE UNITED IN WISH THAT' FURTHER TRAVEL FACILITI£S COULn BE SET UP BETWEEN E~ST AND WEST BERLIN SCHROEDER REPEATED WE MUST THINK THROUGH 
PAGE 2 RUEPWWM 30 S i 9 A E T LIMIT DISTRIBUTION FULL IMPLICATIONS OF SUCH AG~EEMENTS. NO ONE HAD BEEN ABLE TO DEVELOP TO HIM A CO~PLETE THEOR~ O~ WHAT T~E FINAL END OF THESE CONTACTS ~OULD BE. AS or NOW SC~ROEDER SAW THAT THE QUASI-RECOGNITION WHICH CAME FROM AGqEEMENTSMADE ON HUMANITARIAN BASIS WOULD ONLY CONSOLIDATE STATUS QUO WITHOUT CHANGING ANYTHING BASIC 'IN GDR. SECRETARY SAID WE 'HAD NO FIXED THEORY ON THIS. THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO PROBLEM FRO~ US ON RECOGNITION OF GOR. ~E ·. WERE STRICTER THAN REST OF ALLIANCE ON THIS POINT. BUT HE SAID WE WERE IMPRESSED WITH LON~ING O~ EAST GER~ANS TO REJOIN THEIR BROTHE-RS IN WEST. Tl-{!S "'AS IMPORTANT BECAUS£ THINGS WERE MOVING IN EASTERN EUROPE AND, · I~ EASTER~ EUROPE COULD LOSE THEIR FEARS OF GERMANY CPARTICUL~RLY A REUNIFIED . GERMANY> SOME O~STACLES TO REUNIFICATION ~IG~T 
. 
REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS ------~----PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED" 

-2-SECTO ONE, DECEMBER 29 FROM LBJ RANCH TEXAS (SECTION II OF II). 

BE REMOVED. THE QUESTION OF 'How WE MIGHT UTILIZE THE ~OVE~ENT· 
IN EASTERN EUROP~ F'OR THE BENEF·IT Olt" GERM ANY MIGHT 1.t'ELL 
BE DISCUSSED IN AMBASSADORIAL GROUP. 
SCHROEDER SAID FRG LONG-RA.NGE POLICY TOWARD EASTE~N 
EUROPE REFLECTED SECRETARY'S THINKING• . BUT HE WAS CONCERNED · 
THAT PRESSURES FROM SOVIETS AND BLOC TO MAKE GDR CHANGE· TACTICS 

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PAGE 3 RUEPWW 30 St[ a A e ~ LIMIT DISTRIBUTION 
ttrERE DESIGNED ONLY TO BOLSTEq GDR, NOT HELP F"RG. 'POll'ER 
Or TOTALITARI~N RULE SHOULD NOT BE U~DERESTIMATED, 
BECAUSE WE SEE IN POLAND THAT ALTHOUGH 90 PERCENT 
OF PEOPLE OPPOSE REGIME, RE~AINING 10 PERCENT ~RE A9LE ~AI~TAI~ 
COMMUNIST RULE. SITUATION WAS SAME IN GOR. HE ~ELT TH6T 
BASIC SITUATION COULD BE CHA~GEn ONLY BY CHANGE IN WORLn 
POWER SITUATION OR BY ARMED I~TERVENTION. LATTER WAS OB­VIOUSLY EXCLUDED. HE HIMSELF WAS NOT CONVINCED THAT BASIC 
INTERNAL STRUCTURE OF COMMUNIST REGIME COULD BE CHANGED 
BY TYPES Or AGREEMENTS WE SEE~ED TO BE DISCUSSING. 
IN CONCLUDING, SCHROEDER SUGGESTED THAT CONSULTATIVE 'PROCESS 
MIGHT BE HELPED BY CHANGE OF VENUE FROM BE~LIN TO BONN. T~REE . · 
A~BASSADORS AND FRG WERE THERE AND SENATE REPRESENT~TIVE 
COULD JOIN. SECRETARY AGREED ON · NEED FOR BETTER CONSULTATION 
BUT HE WANTED TO RESERVE HIS REPLY ON SCHROEDER'S SUGGESTION. 
SCHROEDER SAID QUESTION ALSO REMAINED OF ~HETHER BERLIN 
SHOULD BE PERMITTED TO MAKE ALL-GERMA~ POLICY. TYLER COMMENTED 
THAT ALLIED RIGHTS IN BERLIN DATE BACK TO 1945 AND WE 
SHOULD BE CAREFUL ABOUT UNDERMINING BERLIN COMMANDANTS' 
AUTHORITY BY CHANGING Focµs Olt"" DISCUSSIONS ON THESt QUESTIONS 

PAGE 4 RUEPWW 3D S 2 6 R B T LI~IT DISTRIBUTION 
TO BONN. SECRETARY STRESSED NEED OF ~ULL CO~SULTATION WITH 
BRANDT. WE MUST HAVE COMPLETE UNITY ON ANY STE~ WE T~KE, 
AND WE DO NOT WANT TO GET OUT OF STEP WITH PEOPLE 
OF BERLIN. SCHROEDER REPLIED T~AT VIEWPOINTS IN 9ERLI~ SF.EMED 
TO BE LESS UNIVIED THAN PREVIOUSLY AND THERE WERE EVEN 
BER(I~ERS WHO REPROACHED THE rRG FOR NOT TAKING A HARDER 

LINE O~l THE CHRISTMAS PASSES. · 
AT THIS POINT, UNDER SECRETARY AND GOVERNOR HERTER AR~IVED, 
AND SECRETARY SUGGESTED THAT CONVERSATION SHIFT TO RESULTS 0~ 
BRUSSELS AGREEMENT GP-l 
BT 

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