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**Showing Up is the Hardest Part: Examining Geographic
Barriers to Immigration Court Access**

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**Showing Up is the Hardest Part: Examining Geographic
Barriers to Immigration Court Access**

by
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Report

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Abstract

Showing Up is the Hardest Part: Examining Geographic Barriers to Immigration Court Access

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What is the impact of geographical barriers to immigration court on court attendance? Building on Herd and Moynihan's (2018) theory of administrative burdens, I examine the role of compliance costs in attending immigration court hearings, arguing that a reduction in geographical compliance costs can lead to more equitable outcomes in immigration court hearings. I utilize Executive Office of Immigration Review individual level case data and leverage both logistic regression and an interrupted time series to predict the impact of drive time to the court, driver's license access, and virtual court access on the likelihood that an immigrant is present at court. My results suggest that geographical burdens limit immigrants' abilities to comply with the court's administrative burdens. Increasing virtual court access may lead to fewer in absentia deportations as a result of missed court hearings.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Popular political rhetoric suggests that unauthorized immigrants intentionally skip their scheduled court hearings in order to evade anticipated deportation proceedings (Cramer and Tillis, 2022; Richards, 2014; Rizzo, 2019). In a 2019 interview with Jake Tapper, Mike Pence argued that “Ninety percent of the people never show up for their hearing in the months ahead... The overwhelming majority, plus-90 percent, don’t show up.” (Rizzo, 2019). He is not alone in disseminating this narrative. Five years before, Representative Louie Gohmert stated that “You know good and well they won’t show up and we won’t go looking for them. When they get their piece of paper saying report back on such a day and such a time, they take that as their legal permit to stay in the country and they go do what they want” (Richards, 2014).

These narratives sorely over-inflate the proportions of immigrants who miss their hearings by at least 50%, with crucial consequences. Claims such as these, though refuted by experts and the data released by the Department of Justice (Eagly and Shafer, 2020), are cited to justify increasingly harsh policies towards unauthorized immigrants. For example, Senator Cramer (joined by eight other co-signing United States senators) proposed the *Asylum Accountability Act* in 2022, which would increase the penalty for missing an immigration court hearing from a ten year ban on asylum application to a permanent ban on asylum application (Cramer and Tillis, 2022). This rhetoric is also used to provide grounds for incarcerating unauthorized immigrants, leading to mandatory incarceration orders for some classes of immigrants, such as those with minor criminal convictions (Eagly and Shafer, 2020). Additionally, parole anklets have been placed on immigrants awaiting hearings in order to locate them should they miss their hearings; however, these anklets have induced psychological harm to immigrants who then avoid contact with coethnic groups out of fear of introducing ICE to their meeting locations. Finally, immigrants are generally automatically deported for missing their court hearings, accounting for 40%

of deportations each year (Ardalant, 2020; Koh, 2017). Put simply, consequential policies limiting the freedoms and determining the futures of immigrants are being issued and justified with questionable and false narratives from top political officials.

In this research letter, I challenge this narrative that large proportions of immigrants are dodging their immigration court hearings. Instead of asking if immigrants do miss their immigration court hearings, I ask why. Specifically, having demonstrated that immigration court attendance rates rarely fall below 75%, I ask why the immigrants who do not attend their hearings are absent. Using Herd and Moynihan's theory of administrative burdens, I discuss several learning costs and psychological costs to attending court. I then introduce additional compliance costs to the literature. In my first study, I demonstrate that an EOIR COVID mitigation policy increasing the rate of virtual hearings leads to a discontinuous increase in the rates of court attendance. In my second study, I use an individual level analysis to predict absence from immigration court using three primary explanatory variables: the length of time it takes to drive to one's assigned court location, driver's license eligibility in one's state, and whether the hearing is held virtually or in-person. I find that each of these explanatory variables has a significant impact on an immigrant's likelihood of attending their court hearing. From this, I conclude that policies and practices implemented by the United States government and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) institute barriers to accessing the immigration courts and that reducing these barriers could lead to even higher levels of compliance.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

To assess the validity of this rhetoric, we must first consider whether the decision to show up to one's court hearing is a strategic endeavor, as the political narrative increasingly suggests (Eagly and Shafer, 2020; Cramer and Tillis, 2022; Rizzo, 2019). Failure to show up to a court hearing results in an in absentia deportation order by the immigration judge (Ardalant, 2020; Murphy, 1991), and these deportation orders can only be challenged in few, narrowly defined extenuating circumstances, such as those related to one's own health or the health of their immediate family (Ardalant, 2020; Koh, 2017; Murphy, 1991; Werlin, 2010). Challenges are difficult to win and usually rely on an attorney for success. Additionally, missing an immigration court hearing results in a ten year ban from applying for legal status in the United States, even in cases of asylum, leading to insurmountable barriers to gaining legal status in the United States for immigrants who miss their court hearings.

What if one anticipates a deportation order at their immigration court hearing? Should they skip the court hearing? According to reputable legal advisors and their free, accessible online advice, immigrants should attend every scheduled court hearing (noa, 2019, 2023). An immigrant's best chance at remaining in the United States is through attending every court hearing, especially due to increased interior enforcement under the Trump administration (Ardalant, 2020). Even if one intends to flee internal immigration enforcement, attending court does not jeopardize one's ability to do so because after a judge orders an individual to be deported, they are released for a waiting period or an appeal process rather than taken into custody. There are no clear strategic reasons why an immigrant would choose to miss their court hearing. Why, then, do we see non-negligible levels of immigration court absence?

2.1 Administrative Burdens to Immigration Court Access

Herd and Moynihan develop a theory concerning the role of administrative burdens on the lives of those who interact with the state (Herd et al., 2023), including specifically the administrative burdens faced by immigrants (Moynihan et al., 2022). Utilizing the three central components of their theory – learning costs, psychological costs, and compliance costs – I expand the scope of their theory to argue that the administrative burdens placed on immigrants who interact with the immigration courts are so severe and unequally distributed that they determine who is able to stay in the United States and who is not, and thus altering the makeup of today’s immigrant population in the United States.

2.1.1 Learning Costs

Accessing information about one’s immigration court hearing can be a burdensome challenge for many immigrants, often requiring the submission of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to learn the details of one’s own case (Heerent, 2014). Even a simple change of address request to ensure that immigrants receive notice of their scheduled immigration court hearings requires that an official document be sent by certified U.S. mail to three separate recipients (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2023). Because of these learning costs, immigrants rely heavily on legal counsel to ascertain the facts of their case and navigate the immigration court processes (Barnes, 2003; Chang, 2022; Ryo, 2018); however, these attorneys often necessitate substantial monetary costs (Barnes, 2003). For those who are able to afford this financial burden, risks of fraud, unlicensed lawyers, and indolent representation pervade immigration law and leave immigrants with unabated risk of incomplete information (Barnes, 2003; Bran, 2021; Chang, 2022).

For immigrants who are able to obtain legal representation, the learning costs remain unalleviated. Language barriers persist in the courtroom on both the part of the court and the attorneys, who fail to accurately translate documents and dialogue

to the immigrant and rely on the error-prone official translations to make decisions (Barak, 2023; Obinna, 2021). Finally, all immigration court notices are sent via mail, meaning that those with either an incorrect address or an incomplete change of address request will likely never know of their hearing unless they have obtained an attentive attorney.

2.1.2 Psychological Costs

Immigrants interacting with the immigration court system face considerable loss of autonomy, stress, and stigma. This is especially the case among the detained immigrant population, who are severely constrained by the state out of fear that immigrants will skip their immigration court hearings and “disappear” into the United States. Among the non-detained population, many regretful decisions are made as a direct result of the immigration court proceedings. Immigrants who are eligible for social safety net programs intentionally avoid bettering their circumstances out of fear of their judges determining them to be a “public charge” (Barofsky et al., 2021). Additionally, immigration officials have placed ankle monitors on many undocumented immigrants to limit their ability to hide from immigration officials should they miss their hearing (Caldwell and Hackman, 2023). These ankle monitors have had profound psychological impacts on immigrants, who have experienced weakened familial and ethnic ties for fear of leading immigration officials to the location of other undocumented immigrants (Martinez-Aranda, 2022).

2.1.3 Compliance Costs

Immigrants face substantial burdens in efforts to comply with the demands of their immigration proceedings, specifically when asked to be present at an in-person immigration court hearing. Scholars have identified that immigrants with greater informational access – via attorneys and successful address changes with the court – are more likely to comply with court attendance; however, the very method by which im-

migrants show up to their in-person court hearings – travel – remains underexplored. Gomez theorizes the geographical challenges present when immigrants are required to be physically present at their hearings, specifically noting that immigrants are not always assigned to their closest immigration court and often must rely on sparsely available public transit or generous loved ones (Gomez, 2023). In this work, I expand upon her theory and provide an empirical test of these barriers, challenging the popular narrative that immigrants are intentionally missing their immigration court hearings.

To begin, I argue that the accessibility of virtual court hearings should reduce the compliance costs of court attendance. Virtual hearings are not available at all assigned courts locations, and they are only granted at the discretion of an immigration judge¹ (EOIR 2023). Virtual immigration court hearings became far more widespread after March 18th, 2023 when the EOIR issued a policy memorandum (EOIR PM 20 - 10) encouraging immigration judges to hold their hearings virtually in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (EOIR 2020). Leveraging this dramatic shift in the proportion of immigration court hearings held virtually, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 1: EOIR PM 20-10, which resulted in a significant increase in the proportion of virtual hearings, will lead to discontinuous increase in court hearing attendance.

While COVID-19 provides a useful test, I also expect the impact of virtual hearings to persist over time because virtual court access nearly eliminates the need for travel, regardless of any exogenous shocks to the system. Therefore, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 2: Immigrants who are assigned virtual immigration court hearings will be more likely to attend their hearings than those who are assigned an in

¹While the immigrant can file documents to request that their hearing be held virtually, it is ultimately their assigned immigration judge who must decide whether or not to grant that request.

person hearing.

Next, I argue that the accessibility of driving to the court should reduce the compliance costs of court attendance for those immigrants who are assigned in-person hearings, but not virtual hearings. I examine this relationship from two angles. First, I argue that shorter drive times to the court should make attendance more accessible. This argument holds true when examining eviction defendants, who are another class of less affluent defendants (A. Hoffman and Strezhnev, 2023), and I expect it to remain true in the case of immigrants attending court. Specifically, I hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 3a: As the drive time between an immigrant’s locality and the immigrant’s assigned court location increases, the immigrant will be less likely to attend their in-person court hearing.

Hypothesis 3b: As the drive time between an immigrant’s locality and the immigrant’s assigned court location increases, the immigrant will be equally as likely to attend their virtual court hearing.

Second, acknowledging that these immigrants largely do not have legal status in the United States, I argue that immigrants will be more likely to attend their court hearing if they can legally obtain a driver’s license in their state of residence. The accessibility of driver’s licenses both increase the chances that an immigrant can drive to the court themselves and that they can receive a ride from someone else without fear of someone receiving a criminal charge (Barajas, 2021). This hypothesis is as follows:

Hypothesis 4: Immigrants who have driver’s license eligibility for unauthorized immigrants in their state of residence will be more likely to attend their court hearings than those who do not.




Figure 2.1: Blue line represents issuance of PM 20-10 on March 18, 2023.

Chapter 3: Data and Results

3.1 Data and Method

I utilize the Executive Office for Immigration Review’s case data, updated to include all cases through January of 2023, and available in their Freedom of Information Act Library courtesy of a request by Syracuse University’s Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse. These data include case details of over 20 million immigration court hearings, dating back to before the 1980s. I utilize the data from court hearings ranging from the beginning of 2018 to the end of 2022 in order to encompass the hearings held during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic as well as two years before and after. With these data, I conduct two unique studies. In Study 1, I implement regression discontinuity design to understand if the COVID-19 pandemic’s increase in virtual hearings led to an increase in court hearing attendance. Building off of these results, in Study 2, I leverage an individual level approach to further test my theory by calculating and measuring the impact of transit time and access on each individual’s likelihood of court attendance. I go into depth about each research design below.

3.2 Study 1

3.2.1 Research Design

My first study examines whether the increase in the proportion of virtual hearings occurring after the issuance of EOIR PM 20-10 leads to an increase in the attendance rate of immigrants at their court hearings. To test this, I implement an interrupted time series model, examining the rates of court hearing attendance before and after EOIR PM 20 - 10. My dependent variable is the attendance rate for immigrants at immigration court in a given week, and my primary independent variable is a treatment dummy variable indicating whether or not the observation

occurred before or after the implementation of EOIR PM 20 -10. The model is as follows:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 I + \beta_3 P + \epsilon$$

T represents time in units of weeks,¹ I represents whether the observation occurred prior to or after the intervention of PM 20-10, and P represents the amount of time passed since the intervention of PM 20-10.




Figure 3.1: Vertical line indicates EOIR PM 20-10

¹Data are aggregated into weeks to avoid the influence of patterns found in the hearings held on different days of the week.

Table 3.1:

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Attendance Rate
COVID Memorandum	0.145*** (0.013)
Time Since Memorandum	-0.0002 (0.0002)
Time	-0.001*** (0.0001)
Constant	0.864*** (0.010)
Observations	261
R ²	0.368
Adjusted R ²	0.361
Residual Std. Error	0.053 (df = 257)
F Statistic	49.949*** (df = 3; 257)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

3.3 Study 2

3.3.1 Research Design

In this study, I aim to demonstrate that virtual court access determines hearing attendance by delineating the effect of transit time, driver’s license access, and hearing medium on the likelihood that an immigrant attends their hearing. I do this by first taking the full population of all hearings from 2018 through 2023 ($n = 747,997$) and filtering the dataset to include only the first hearing for each immigrant’s case.

To determine each immigrant’s drive time, I begin by geocoding the coordinates of immigrants’ cities of residences along with the immigration courts to which they were assigned. First, to collect the coordinates of immigration courts, I utilized Open Street Maps API to geocode the location coordinates of the courts based on their addresses. Second, to collect the locations of immigrants’ residential areas, I utilized Open Street Maps API to geocode the centroid of their reported zip code. Though the centroid of the zip code is not optimally precise, it is the most granular data that is available in order to protect the privacy of these immigrants.

After successfully retrieving coordinates for both immigrants’ location of residence and the locations of their assigned immigration courts, I begin the process of calculating the drive time between the two locations using the Open Street Maps API. The Open Street Maps API produces the estimated drive time, using standard traffic patterns, in units of minutes. I validate the measures generated by Open Street Maps by working with a team of research assistants to manually search drive time data using Google Maps for roughly 10% of my sample ($n = 10,000$). Additionally, my research assistants and I collected public transit access data for this random sample also manually utilizing Google Maps. Having completed these calculations, my data are ready for analysis.

I implement a binary logit model to predict the impact of drive time between an immigrant’s location of residence and the immigration court on the likelihood that the immigrant will show up to court. My dependent variable is whether or not the

immigrant attends their scheduled hearing. My primary independent variables are the drive time in minutes between their location of residence and assigned immigration court, whether they have access to a driver’s license in their state of residence², and whether their hearing is virtual. I include an interaction term measuring the distinct relationship between virtual hearings and drive time. I include an additional interaction term for drive time and the immigrant’s detention status.

I control for other motivations which might discourage immigrants from showing up to their hearings at the immigration courts. Specifically, I control for whether or not the immigrant speaks English in anticipation that an immigrant’s inability to understand the language that their hearing is conducted in may impact their decision to attend. Additionally, I control for the custody status of the immigrant, expecting that immigrants who are currently detained will be more likely to show up to court than those who are not given that they will have transportation services or virtual hearings available to them. I also control for whether or not the case is an asylum case, predicting that those with less consequential hearings may be less likely to show up to court. The model and its results are presented below.

$$Y(CourtAbsence) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Drive\ Time + \beta_2 Virtual + \beta_3 Attorney + \beta_4 License + \beta_5 English + \beta_6 AddressChange + \beta_7 Asylum + \beta_8 Custody + \beta_9 DriveTime * Virtual + \beta_{10} DriveTime * Custody + \epsilon$$

3.3.2 Results

To begin, I assess Hypothesis 2, which predicts that immigrants who are assigned virtual immigration court hearings will be more likely to attend their hearings than those who are assigned an in person hearing. Supporting this hypothesis, I find that an immigrant’s likelihood of being absent from court is significantly decreased

²Only states which permit undocumented driver’s licenses from 2018 - 2023 are included in this variable.

Table 3.2:

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Court Absence	
Drive Time	0.002***	(0.00004)
Virtual Hearing	-0.709***	(0.012)
Attorney	-2.517***	(0.010)
Driver's License Eligibility	-0.153***	(0.009)
English	-0.637***	(0.021)
Address Change	-0.679***	(0.010)
Asylum Case	-0.869***	(0.011)
Never Detained	6.397***	(0.049)
Released	5.751***	(0.050)
Drive Time * Virtual	0.00000	(0.00002)
Drive Time * Never Released	-0.003***	(0.00004)
Drive Time * Released	-0.003***	(0.00004)
Constant	-5.465***	(0.048)
Observations	747,997	
Akaike Inf. Crit.	332,714.500	

Note:

*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

($p < 0.001$) when the hearing is held virtually rather than in person. This effect is demonstrated in Figure 3, equating to a substantive impact of a 1% decrease in the likelihood of missing court.³ The effect of virtual hearings is much more pronounced as I move on to discuss the interaction of virtual hearings with the length of time it takes an immigrant to drive to the court in order to test Hypothesis 3.




Figure 3.2: Predicted Probabilities of Court Access

³The effect presented in this figure are substantively small due to the interaction term between drive time and virtual hearings analyzed next. A model without this interaction term, which demonstrates the strong effects of virtual hearings, can be found in the appendix.

Hypothesis 3 argues that as the drive time between an immigrant's locality and the immigrant's assigned court location increases, the immigrant will be less likely to attend their *in-person* court hearing. Importantly, immigrants should be equally as likely to miss court at all values of drive time if their hearing is held virtually. In support of this hypothesis, I find that as the length of an immigrant's drive time to the court increases, they become significantly more likely to miss their court hearing ($p < 0.001$); however, drive time has no effect when interacted with virtual hearings, indicating that an immigrant's likelihood of missing court is unaffected by drive time as long as their hearing is held virtually rather than in-person.

Finally, I test Hypothesis 4, which asserts that immigrants who have driver's license eligibility for unauthorized immigrants in their state of residence will be more likely to attend their court hearings than those who do not. I find statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), though substantively small effects supporting this hypothesis. Immigrants who live in states which allow for unauthorized immigrants to obtain driver's licenses are roughly a third of a percentage point more likely to attend their court hearings as compared to those who live in states without unauthorized immigrant driver's license eligibility. Though this effect is quite small, it remains statistically meaningful in conjunction with various other predictors of court attendance, suggesting that inclusive immigration policies do produce positive outcomes for immigrants, and in some cases such as this, for the immigration adjudication system as well.




Figure 3.3: Increased drive time to court (in minutes) leads to increased likelihood of court absence




Figure 3.4: Having the opportunity to obtain a driver's license decreases the probability that one is absent from court

Chapter 4: Conclusion

This research provides convincing evidence that policies and practices implemented by the United States government and the EOIR have a meaningful impact on who shows up to their immigration court hearings. Study 1 demonstrates that an exogenous shock introducing higher rates of virtual court hearings leads to a discontinuous and substantively large increase in immigration court attendance. Moving to an individual level analysis in Study 2, I find that the length of time it takes to drive to the court increases one's likelihood of missing their court hearing while holding virtual hearings and providing undocumented immigrants access to driver's licenses can increase their chances of missing their hearing. The placement and jurisdiction of immigration courts, the medium of the hearing, and driver's license laws are all burdens that can be alleviated by United States political institutions. Minimizing these administrative burdens may lead to higher rates of compliance, reducing the number of immigrants deported without a trial.

Appendix A: Additional Test of Hypothesis 1

A.1 Additional Test of H1: Regression Discontinuity Design

A.1.1 Research Design

Given the expected increase in the rate of attendance, I implement a regression discontinuity design in order to determine the potential causal effect of the EOIR PM 20 - 10 on the rate of attendance of court hearings. The score variable in this design is temporal, and more specifically, in units of weeks from 2018 to 2023. The treatment variable is the issuance of PM 20 - 10, altering the ways in which immigration judges are able to manipulate the medium of the hearings they conduct. Finally, the cutoff is March 18th, 2023, when PM 20 - 10 was issued. This is sharp regression continuity design given that all the immigration judges receive this policy memorandum at the same time.

Formally, the model is presented as follows:

$$Y_i = f(x_i) + \rho D_i + \eta_i$$

where Y_i represents the hearing attendance rates of a given week, $f(x_i)$ represents the temporal function attendance rates, and D_i is a binary treatment variable indicating whether or not EOIR PM 20 - 10 had been issued. The temporal function of deportation rates is calculated as follows:

$$E[Y_{0i}|x_i] = f_0(x_i) = \alpha + \beta_{01}\tilde{x}_i + \beta_{02}\tilde{x}_i^2 + \beta_{03}\tilde{x}_i^3 + \beta_{04}\tilde{x}_i^4$$

and

$$E[Y_{1i}|x_i] = f_1(x_i) = \alpha + \rho + \beta_{11}\tilde{x}_i + \beta_{12}\tilde{x}_i^2 + \beta_{13}\tilde{x}_i^3 + \beta_{14}\tilde{x}_i^4$$

where each of the β terms represent one of the polynomial terms in the fourth order polynomial calculation, and ρ represents the treatment effect, given that $\tilde{x}_i = x_i - x_0$.

When constructing the regression discontinuity design, I choose to a fourth order polynomial estimation using a triangular kernel and MSE-optimal bandwidth selection. I use a fourth order polynomial model because it fits the data well much better than a local linear model, as well as better than a third or fifth order polynomial.¹ More justification for these decisions can be found in Appendix A. I fit a weighted least squares design on both sides of the cutoff, and I use Titiunik et al’s robust bias correction procedure to dampen the impact of the bias of the estimate. I present the results in the section that follows.

A.1.2 Results

The regression discontinuity plot is presented in *Figure 2*. Visually, we see a discontinuous jump in the rate of attendance around the time of EOIR PM 20 - 10; however, we also see anticipatory effects in the weeks leading up to this policy memorandum. To be sure that there are not significant differences between the types of cases being heard right before and right after the cutoff, I run robustness checks below. The results of the regression discontinuity design are presented below in *Table 1*.

Table 1

Method	Coef	Std. Error	z	P > z	95% C.I.
Conventional	0.052	0.024	2.131	0.033	[0.004 , 0.100]
Robust	-	-	2.029	0.042	[0.002 , 0.109]

When calculated using both conventional and robust methods, we see a statistically significant increase in the proportion of court hearing attendance as a result of EOIR PM 20 - 10. Substantively, this means that we see a 5.2% increase in the

¹A local linear model estimation fits my theory well, though it does not fit the data well. A local linear model maintains statistical significance, as do various other polynomial order choices.




Figure A.1: Along the x-axis, week 0 represents January 2018, week 100 is November 2019, week 200 is October 2021, and week 300 is September 2023.

attendance rate as a result of this policy memorandum. To be sure that it is the virtual court access driving this increase in attendance, I run further tests in Study 2.

Appendix B: Alternative Model for Study 2

The table below depicts the model displayed in Study 2 without the interaction term between drive time and virtual hearings.

I am currently constructing different predicted probabilities plots for different immigrant characteristics. For example, are virtual hearings more predictive of attendance for those who have never been detained compared to those who have been detained? Do virtual hearings increase the rate of attendance in a substantively larger way for those with asylum cases?

Table B.1:

		<i>Dependent variable:</i>
		Court Absence
Travel Time		0.002*** (0.00004)
Virtual Hearing		-0.708*** (0.010)
Attorney		-2.517*** (0.010)
English		-0.637*** (0.021)
License		-0.153*** (0.009)
Address Change		-0.679*** (0.010)
Asylum Case		-0.869*** (0.011)
Never Detained		6.397*** (0.049)
Released		5.751*** (0.050)
Travel Time * Never Detained		-0.003*** (0.00004)
Travel Time * Released		-0.003*** (0.00004)
Constant		-5.464*** (0.048)
Observations	28	747,997
Log Likelihood		-166,344.300
Akaike Inf. Crit.		332,712.500

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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