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**SHOULD I RETALIATE? THE ROLE OF AGGRESSION,
FORGIVINGNESS, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND SOCIAL
INTEREST IN THE DECISION TO RETURN HARM FOR
HARM**

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**Should I Retaliate? The Role of Aggression, Forgiveness, Moral
Responsibility, and Social Interest in the Decision to Return Harm
for Harm**

by

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Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to those who have given me unfailing support during its completion. To my mother, Betty Locasio; my father, Victor Locasio; my brother, Vic Locasio; my dearest friend, Laura Oelofse, and those whose contributions to my life I could not have lived without, Judy Jennings and Nancy Smith.

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Should I retaliate? The role of aggression, forgiveness, moral responsibility, and social interest in the decision to return harm for harm

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This study examined the four constructs of forgiveness, aggression, moral responsibility, and social interest as they impact retaliation among college students. There has been renewed research interest into the concept of forgiveness in the last ten to fifteen years. While forgiveness refers to the propensity to refrain from resentment or seeking revenge against an offender, forgiveness is defined as the tendency to engage in acts of forgiveness across time and across situations. It is a trait or disposition. Research on aggression, moral responsibility, and social interest has been ongoing for several decades. Aggression refers to physical or verbal behavior intended to hurt someone. Moral responsibility means the tendency to act morally, in accordance with generally accepted standards of right and wrong, even when others may choose to do

otherwise. Social interest is defined as having a sense of belonging to all of humanity, such that one's connections with others are focused solely on the common good of all. This study looks at these three constructs along with level of forgiveness as they relate to retaliation. Retaliation in this study was defined as taking back not only what was taken from oneself, but going beyond that, taking more, in order to punish the other participant. Why people retaliate or refrain from doing so is not completely clear, but this study shows that forgiveness and social interest each play a part in predicting level of retaliation. These two constructs were predictors of the outcome variable; however, aggression, moral responsibility, and membership in a group where harm was done, intended, or neither, did not predict retaliation.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

To be wronged is nothing unless you continue to remember it.

–Confucius

This is a study about forgivingness and several other constructs. In the empirical literature, much is made of the fact that forgiving someone who harms oneself, and retaliating against that person, are opposing constructs. However, few studies have set up a situation where harm actually occurs or is intended to occur, to examine how a person might respond. It is still not clear why people retaliate against wrongdoers or refrain from doing so. This study contained the hypothesis that being in a group where harm was done and intended, or not done but still intended, would affect how forgiving a person would be when harm was done or intended to him or her. A group where harm was neither done nor intended served as a control group to give a basis for comparison. It was also hypothesized that a participant with a high level of forgivingness, a high level of moral responsibility, and a high level of social interest would be less likely to retaliate than participants who were low in these traits, and that a participant with a high level of aggression would be more likely to retaliate than a participant with a low level of aggression. The researcher hypothesized that the four traits of aggression, forgivingness, moral responsibility, and social interest would all predict the level of retaliation.

To forgive someone means to give up one's felt need to retaliate against another who has inflicted harm on oneself, and to replace negative feelings, cognitions, and behaviors toward the offender with more positive ones. Research on forgiveness is still in comparatively early stages, and much remains to be discovered about what it is and how it works. Forgiving someone is a process that can take more or less time depending on the magnitude of the offense, the closeness of the relationship between the two parties, their prior history, and other important factors. The idea of forgivingness as a trait, as opposed to forgiveness as an act, conveys the willingness to forgive people across time and across situations.

Social interest means an overall concern for the well being of humanity, above and beyond the concern for the specific persons one knows or the specific community to which one belongs. It includes a willingness to empathize with another and to take the perspective of another. Therefore it may be useful as a predictor of the willingness to refrain from taking revenge against another.

Moral responsibility refers to an individual's tendency to act in an ethical way, even when others may choose not to do this, or when to act otherwise might seem justified. A strong sense of morality can restrain retaliation. Aggression refers to physical or verbal behavior that is intended to hurt someone else. It makes sense that an overall tendency to engage in aggressive behaviors might increase the likelihood of retaliating for a specific offense.

Previous research indicates that people who forgive others easily, are high in social interest, are morally responsible, and are low in aggression are less likely

to retaliate against someone who has harmed them. What follows is an examination of these theories to see which of those variables most impacts retaliation against another.

CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH

AN OVERVIEW OF FORGIVENESS AND FORGIVINGNESS

Forgivingness, while publicly approved as a disposition, has not always been the attitude of choice in dealing with wrongdoing against the self. Vengefulness and acts of retaliation, while publicly deplored, have always been popular ways of attempting to solve conflicts. Much violence occurs as revenge for some wrong previously incurred by the one committing it. Nations as well as street gangs do violence to others in the name of settling the score. In light of great wrongs between people being a frequent occurrence, difficult but important questions need to be asked about the role that forgiveness and a disposition of forgivingness might play in ameliorating great wrongdoing and preventing it from escalating, such as what occurs with war and terrorism. But before anyone can ask about forgiveness in large groups or whole societies, or the nature of a forgiving disposition, it is necessary to find out more about what it is, how it works, where it is likely to be an issue, who is most likely to need to forgive what offenses, and why that is so.

Although the basic premises underlying forgiveness were stated long ago, research on the topic was rare until recently. Up until 1970, there were very few articles or books about it (Enright & North, 1998). In the 1980s, clinicians in counseling psychology led the way (e.g., Jampolsky, 1980) and these authors published articles in journals that were mostly read by other clinicians. The first

non-clinical study was done by Trainer (1981) who distinguished between forgiveness expected by one's role, forgiveness done on the basis of expediency, and intrinsic forgiveness, all in the context of divorce.

By the early 1990s, although research by and for clinicians continued, researchers had begun to inquire into the cognitive, affective, and interpersonal dimensions of forgiveness (Enright, 1994) as well as its psychometric properties and issues (McCullough et al., 2000). Park and Enright (1997) have stated that there are different types of forgiveness strategies that exist (active and passive, angry or generous) and that these affect the demonstration of forgiving behaviors. Research on forgivingness, the tendency to forgive people across time and across situations, has only just begun, although much of the literature on forgiveness as a single act is at least implicitly dealing with the nature of a forgiving disposition as well. To look at forgiveness and forgivingness is to examine the role of moral responsibility, because forgiving people is part of developing a moral identity (Piaget, 1932). One's level of social interest probably plays a part as well, because a person with a high level of social interest has empathy for others, perhaps even for someone who wrongs oneself, and has a sense of common humanity and shared common good with other persons (Adler, 1958).

In this literature review, I will discuss forgiveness in more depth than forgivingness, because there is much more information available about it. Dispositional forgivingness means engaging in the process of forgiveness under many different circumstances, over time, and with different people, so in order to understand forgivingness it is necessary to understand the process of forgiveness.

Following the review of the literature on forgiveness and forgivingness, there is a review of the work of researchers and theorists who have explored moral responsibility, social interest, aggression, and retaliation.

DEFINITIONS OF FORGIVENESS

A clear definition of the construct of forgiveness has remained elusive. Forgiveness has a fairly short empirical history, so there is a lack of consensus about how to define it. There are three possible reasons for this. First, the construct is a relative newcomer to psychological research, so a coherent definition may not have had time to emerge. Second, psychologists in the past have been wary about studying anything related to spirituality or religiosity (DiBlasio, 2000). Finally, forgiveness is an interpersonal construct, therefore researching it is more complicated than studying something that happens within a single individual. However, interest in forgiveness has increased in the last 10 to 15 years (McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000) and so has interest in defining it. Various researchers have proposed several definitions. Here I will discuss those definitions, note their similarities and differences, and present my own working definition, used in the study I am reporting here. This discussion will focus on forgiveness before forgivingness, because it is necessary to understand forgiveness to comprehend forgivingness, which is the disposition to forgive across people, times, and places.

Most people seem to be familiar with the concepts of forgiveness and having a forgiving disposition, but many misconceptions surround them. The

nature of forgiveness, constructs related to it, and the distinction between forgiveness and other concepts such as justice, reconciliation, and empathy, have all been topics of discussion and debate since 1990 (e.g., McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000). While a clear definition has remained elusive, exploration of the nature of forgiveness has increased greatly in recent years, so consensus regarding a definition will probably not be long in coming.

North (1987) described forgiveness as an overcoming of deserved resentment toward an offender by striving to view the offender with mercy and benevolence. In this way, he stated, negative feelings cease and positive feelings replace them. Enright (1991) added to this definition the replacing of negative behaviors and cognitions, as well as negative feelings, with positive ones.

By 1992 there were at least 70 books and articles in print defining forgiveness (Enright, Eastin, Golden, Sarinopoulos, & Freedman, 1992). Although the definitions were usually similar, they did not all completely agree. Empiricists have said that forgiveness is “a willingness to abandon one’s right to resentment, negative judgment, and indifferent behavior toward one who injured us, while fostering the undeserving qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love toward him or her” (Rique et al., 1999, pp. 127-128). Freedman and Enright (1992) say that forgiveness occurs when a person who has been wrongfully hurt gives up resentment toward the one who inflicted the hurt, while fostering the qualities of undeserved empathy and compassion toward that individual.

Still another definition is comprised by four criteria:

- 1) The one who forgives has suffered a deep hurt, which elicits resentment.
- 2) The offended person has a moral right to resentment, but overcomes it nonetheless.
- 3) A new response to the other emerges, including compassion and love.
- 4) The loving response occurs despite the realization that there is no obligation to love the offender (Hebl & Enright, 1993, p. 658).

Perhaps the idea of empathy and compassion being “undeserved” is somewhat problematic in these definitions. What these authors may have meant was that the offender deserved revenge or at least ill will from the victim, because there would seem to be some kind of moral right to reciprocate in kind. But the term “moral right to resentment” implies moral superiority on the part of the victim, implying that the victim will be charitable toward the offender while all the while keeping in mind how undeserving of kindness the offender really is.

In some instances, the notion of an “undeserving” offender is particularly problematic, and that is where there is not a clear offender and victim role. While some offenses are clearly done by one person while no blame could possibly be attached to another, such as a criminal act, there are other offenses where the so-called victim might not be completely innocent of wrongdoing. This is particularly likely in close relationships.

Some writers have raised another concern, however, and that is with an offender receiving forgiveness too easily and thereby being given an incentive to

repeat the offense. Many offenders will not apologize or make restitution for what they did, and in that sense they are indeed “undeserving” of receiving compassion from the one against whom they committed the harm. This is especially true when one considers that some offenses, particularly those that fall under the category of crimes, are not considered to be offenses solely against another person but against the whole community. Still, forgiveness does not mean that a criminal justice system cannot operate. In one study, inmates of a correctional institution reported that they were or were not forgiven by their victims even though they had all been incarcerated for their crimes (York, 2000).

Another definition of forgiveness is the decreased motivation to get revenge on another person who has wronged oneself, along with decreased desire to maintain estrangement from that person, together with increased good will and desire for reconciliation (McCullough, Worthington & Rachal, 1997). These authors stress that forgiveness is motivational in nature; decreased motivation for revenge is the cornerstone for it. This definition does not mention the undeserving status of the offender, so it is more in keeping with the essence of what forgiveness is.

Other authors mention the need for the absence of negative affect, judgment, and behavior toward an offender, and how these must be replaced with positive affect, judgment, and behavior toward that offender (Subkoviak et al., 1995). The best definitions, according to some, are those that show the important historical precedents of forgiveness, distinguish forgiveness from related constructs, take into account the most well-developed theory, and are as

parsimonious as possible (Enright, Eastin, Golden, Sarinopoulos, & Freedman, 1992). The lack of a congruent definition has been somewhat of a problem to date (Enright & Coyle, 1998), and yet all of the existing definitions are quite similar. They all point to the need to give up negative reactions voluntarily to someone who has inflicted an unjust injury. They all say that the negative reactions must somehow be replaced with positive ones. The positive reactions include changes in cognition, affect, and behavior toward the wrongdoer. All of these attributes imply that forgiveness is an active process and not a passive one.

Another aspect of forgiveness that deserves mention is forgiveness as the cancellation of a debt. In this model, forgiveness is an act of absolution or release of something that the offender owes to the victim, but on which the victim has chosen not to demand payment. This model, according to one author, illustrates that forgiveness is not simply something that goes on within the one who forgives; it encompasses not only a change of heart, but also a change in the moral universe (Scholz, 2000).

Based on a summary of the commonalities and differences in these definitions and models, I have defined forgiveness as follows:

Forgiveness is the decision to give up one's right to resentment and revenge toward someone who has inflicted an unjust injury on oneself, and to cancel the moral debt owed to oneself by the offender. Positive affective and behavioral changes that are facilitated by empathy for the offender, and that foster compassion and love toward the offender, follow this decision.

I have created this definition based on existing ones, but with an eye to historical precedents as well as recent developments. The definition above takes into account the requirements for a good definition proposed by Enright (1992) concerning historicity, sound recent theory, and parsimony. The history of forgiveness research has shown clear links to moral psychology (e.g., Enright, 1994; Piaget, 1932) so I have mentioned morality in the definition. Recent research (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997) has found that empathy is the most closely related construct to forgiveness, so I have added that as well. Finally, forgiveness can only come from the one who has been wronged, but at the same time it has implications for the surrounding community. If some kind of a moral debt is cancelled or released, there may well be positive effects that emanate from that event which need to be taken into account.

MODELS OF FORGIVENESS

There have been numerous models of forgiveness proposed. According to Kaminer (2000) they fall into four categories: typographic models, task-stage models, models based on theories of personality and psychopathology, and developmental models. Typographic models are those that “categorize phenomena based on critical features that differentiate them” (Kaminer et al., 2000, p. 347) and she states that models such as Trainer’s (1998), Nelson’s (1992) and Veenstra’s (1992) do this by listing types and categories of forgiveness that are presumed to exist. Veenstra’s typology includes categories such as

overlooking, excusing, pardoning, releasing, and reestablishing trust. Nelson's (1992) categories discuss forgiveness as limited, detached, and full. Trainer (1981) made distinctions between role-expected forgiveness (outwardly forgiving actions accompanied by hostile inner emotions) role-expedient forgiveness (forgiving as a means to an end, such as attaining a morally superior position over the wrongdoer) and true intrinsic forgiveness. These models each have their distinguishing typological categories of the construct. They do not propose to set one level above another, nor do they describe how someone might change from one level to another (Kaminer et al., 2000), although there is some empirical support for their descriptions.

The task-stage models go further in outlining the tasks, or steps, one might take in advancing towards true forgiveness (Kaminer et al., 2000). These models are almost too numerous to mention, although according to Kaminer they have several things in common. They include recognizing that an offense occurred, making a decision to forgive instead of doing something else, and then proceeding to engage in certain cognitive, affective, and behavioral changes that help to bring about forgiveness. Many authors acknowledge that not only recognizing that an unjust injury happened, but feeling the full range of affect connected with the injury, is important, and therefore the stages of the forgiveness process can take a long time (e.g., Sells & Hargrave, 1998). These models are the equivalent of an ordinal scale in measurement because they recognize that there is some kind of sequential order to the forgiveness process; this idea is amplified, for example, in the work of McCullough et al. (1997) who have proposed a path analysis to show

a theoretical sequence of events leading to forgiveness. However, Kaminer (2000) states that these models have two major weaknesses. First, even though each one illustrates the sequencing of certain steps, it is usually not clear how one gets from one step to another. Second, there is little or no allowance for individual variations.


There have also been proposed models of forgiveness that are based on theories of personality. Psychoanalytic theory (e.g., Brandsma, 1982) has provided one base for these models. There are others based on object relations theory (Gartner, 1988), Jungian theory (Todd, 1985), cognitive theory (Droll, 1984), and family systems theory (Hargrave, 1994). Most of these models are psychodynamic in nature and therefore do not say very much about the interpersonal or social factors that hinder or facilitate forgiveness (Kaminer et al., 2000).

The models that Kaminer et al. call *developmental models* are the more recent ones espoused by Enright (1991), Coyle and Enright (1997), Freedman and Enright (1996) and Subkoviak et al. (1995). These models have received fairly strong empirical support and are discussed more fully in the section on the developmental aspects of forgiveness. However, it is likely that a total developmental transformation from anger and resentment to unconditional forgiveness and love is rarely achieved, given the complexities and nuances of the behavior of real human beings (Kaminer et al., 2000). These authors state that the developmental models take into account individual factors, including individual religiosity and social factors such as cultural background. They also

allow for factors of time and space such as time elapsed since the injury and closeness of the prior relationship with the offender. But they are focused on close interpersonal relationships rather than cases of criminal violations or acts of war, where no prior relationship between the wrongdoer and the victim exists.

The proposed integrative model conceptualized by these authors is below.

Figure 1 An integrative developmental model of forgiveness



Source: Kaminer et al. (2000), p. 353. (Reprinted with permission)

RELIGIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON FORGIVENESS

Forgiveness is an ancient topic. All of the major religions of the world mention it. Here follows a brief description of how forgiveness is defined, the nature of its function, and how it works, broadly speaking, in Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism. These descriptions are taken from an article by Rye et al. (2000) concerning different religious views of forgiveness.

Judaism

Forgiveness is one of the central ideas in Judaism. An injured party can forgive the injurer, while still attempting to ensure that he or she will not suffer in the same way again. Nevertheless, if the victim forgives the offender, that is tantamount to accepting the offender as at least a possible candidate for an ongoing relationship. The basis for Jewish people to forgive others is the forgiving nature of God in Judaism and the requirement that people, as best they can, imitate this nature. According to Jewish tradition, if an offender asks a victim for forgiveness publicly three times, and the victim refuses to forgive, then the victim becomes an offender too. Thus it is not only that people forgive to imitate God; there is also a religious law demanding that Jews forgive others. This law is mentioned in the Jewish scriptures and also in the Talmud, another Jewish holy book.

Jewish people are supposed to ask others for forgiveness on The Day of Atonement. This day, called *Yom Kippur*, is the most important day in the Jewish

calendar. Tradition says that in order for God to forgive a person on that day, those whom he/she has offended must forgive that person first; therefore, human forgiveness is seen as intertwined with divine forgiveness. From the victim's point of view, there is only an obligation to forgive an offender if that offending person goes through a process of returning to the community, called *teshuvah*. Offenders earn their right to be forgiven by going through this prescribed process that includes, among other things, expressing regret for the wrong and making restitution to the victim. This process has the purpose of guarding against forgiveness becoming cheap or easy, especially when the offense is serious.

Forgiveness does not automatically mean reconciliation in the Jewish faith. Neither does reconciliation require forgiveness. They are two separate concepts. One can forgive an offender and still choose not to relate to that person, and there may be good reasons for that choice, such as the offender having a history of similar offenses. On the other hand, one can reconcile with an offender without forgiving that person. As stated above, if the offender does not go through the *teshuvah* process, there is no obligation to forgive. A victim might still choose to reconcile with an offender who did not go through *teshuvah*, but who is a close friend or a member of the family, because the proximity of the relationship might make that a practical necessity.

Christianity

Forgiveness in the Christian religion is associated with the concepts of release and showing compassion to others. There is even a word in the Christian

Greek New Testament, *splanchnizomai*, which is derived from the word for *intestines* and signifies pouring one's insides out, one's intestines, with the depth of one's compassion. It would seem that this level of compassion would seek to release another person from any offense that would impede the relationship between the two.

As in Judaism, the God of Christianity has a forgiving nature and is a role model for human beings to forgive one another. The Christian God also makes forgiveness possible, enabling people to forgive others even when that seems humanly impossible. There are many references to forgiveness in the Christian scriptures but the most important one is Jesus' request to God from the cross, asking God to forgive those who crucified him because "they do not know what they are doing" (Luke 23:34, Holy Bible). Forgiveness is at the core of Christianity not only religiously and theologically but ethically as well. It signifies the ever-present possibility of individuals changing and becoming better people in terms of their relationships with God and other persons. While forgiveness is a precursor of reconciliation, and Christian people should always allow for that possibility, reconciliation may not occur under all circumstances. Still, the intent of forgiveness being offered and accepted is to restore a reciprocal relationship between the offender and the offended, and the community as a whole (Newman 1987).

Islam

The concept of forgiveness in the Qur'an, the holy book of Islam, is expressed by three Arabic terms denoting first, pardon; second, turning away from a sin or a misdeed; and finally, remitting, covering, or forgiving a wrong. God, or Allah, is seen as the ultimate being who can forgive. In the Muslim faith, Allah has 99 attributes and one of those is *Al-Ghafoor*, the "Forgiving One", who cancels debts of wrongdoing against God or any part of the creation. In Islam, an offense need not be against a human being but can be against a group of people or a society, or against any part of the nonhuman world such as plants, animals, air, or water. The Qur'an has many mentions of forgiveness by Allah. Muhammad, who is considered to be the prophet of Allah, is reported to have demonstrated forgiveness by declaring amnesty against his enemies after the conquest of their city.

It is stressed in Islam that those who want to be forgiven for their wrongs must forgive other people for theirs. Forgiveness is most important for the afterlife, but also is seen to bring happiness in this one by improving relationships with other people. Islam allows revenge or recompense for the extent of the harm done, but prefers that Muslims forgive rather than take that path because it is possible to go too far with revenge. This is quite possible for the Muslim because forgiveness of another does not require repentance by the offender. Islamic texts show awareness that offenses against one person by another are not always clear-cut cases of one person being right and another wrong, and in such instances mediation or arbitration should be used. Among Muslims, reconciliation is

desirable but does not have to follow from forgiveness if the offender has serious defects of character. The most important thing is to stay in contact with the Muslim community as a whole, even if one cannot reconcile with a specific person in that community.

Buddhism

Defining forgiveness in Buddhism is problematic because there is not one Buddhist tradition but many. The Buddhist religion does not have one holy book or set of sacred texts; the texts considered sacred vary. Buddhism is linguistically and practically diverse, taking different forms around the world. Nevertheless, there are some commonalities. The idea of forgiveness in Buddhism comprises two ideas. First, there is a ceasing of retribution. Second, there is a giving up of anger and resentment towards the wrongdoer. These are both considered highly desirable, but they are separate actions. Taken together, they are most accurately translated as *forbearance*. Forbearance indicates enduring a wrong done against oneself and giving up the anger and resentment connected to it—which is closely allied with, if not identical to, what forgiveness means. It signifies that an offender is no longer seen as an offender. Instead, the victim empathizes with the offender's suffering and even takes steps to ameliorate it, even though the offender deserves none of this. Buddhism is aware of the possibility that the offender will be shamed by his/her own wrong in the face of the victim's compassionate response to it, but this is neither necessary nor required.

Buddhists see the world as basically just. Good actions bring good responses and bad actions bring bad ones. The world is a place of suffering and Buddhists ideally commit to ending suffering whenever they can, so forgiveness becomes part of that picture. Resentment causes suffering to the victim by moving that person to actions that have a strong possibility of increasing evil. According to one text, to practice forbearance is to cut evil off before it has a chance to start. In Buddhism, to hate another is to create the conditions for being hated in the future, in this life or in another. So forbearance, in Buddhism, is enlightened self-interest.

Forgiveness as such is not a central theme of Buddhism, but the dual ideas of forbearance and compassion are. Compassion is the main idea behind all Buddhist practices. Forbearance allows, even demands, the exercise of compassion. No remorse or apology is needed on behalf of the wrongdoer for a victim of wrong to show these virtues. By practicing forbearance and compassion, one becomes more and more like a truly enlightened person, a Buddha.

Compassion can happen with or without the reconciliation of relationships. In Buddhism it is best if one can reconcile because that is at the heart of compassion; still, it is not a necessity. In general, most Buddhist texts say that a Buddhist should be vigilant in controlling the emotions and actions of the self yet be tolerant and understanding of the actions of others, even (perhaps especially) others who hurt him or her.

Hinduism

Hinduism uses the word *ksama* to signify forgiveness, combining it with words that mean *mercy*. Similar to Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, Hinduism emphasizes the forgiving nature of God as the basis for human beings forgiving each other. Evidence in Hindu religious texts of God showing a forgiving nature are found in the *Rig-Veda*, which may have been written anywhere from 5000 to 1000 years B.C.E. Such texts include petitions to God for forgiveness along with descriptions of various wrongdoings and atonements for them. The religion implies by its stories that repentance is required for forgiveness except for divine forgiveness. In human relationships where a person wrongs another, repentance is required for forgiveness. This is illustrated by a story where there is an unrepentant wrongdoer who boasts about his act. There is no forgiveness and it is not expected because he shows no remorse.

In the diverse Sanskrit texts of Hinduism, concepts of forgiveness, forbearance, duty, and compassion appear frequently. The most common concept in these texts is *karma*, which is a law of cause and effect. Practicing forgiveness and its related virtues such as compassion and patience contribute to good *karma*. Unresolved anger and resentment are believed to affect an individual's future lives negatively. Those who want to follow the right path in this life, for the sake of lives to come, need to practice forgiveness and mercy. This is the reason that forgiveness is important in this religion. There is no consensus in Hinduism over

whether reconciliation follows forgiveness. In some texts it happens, in others it does not.

NATURE OF THE PROCESS OF FORGIVENESS AND FORGIVINGNESS

Forgiveness begins with a decision that someone makes with regard to another person who has unjustly injured him or her. The decision to forgive is made after a person comes to some kind of realization that it is necessary; that all is not right with oneself because of negative feelings and negative desires for vengeful action or perhaps after carrying out such action. To make the decision to give all of this up is to begin the process of forgiveness. The decision is followed by gradually more positive affective and behavioral change toward the wrongdoer.

Forgiveness is paradoxical in the sense that it involves the renunciation of resentment and revenge, and yet resentment and revenge seeking are normal and even expected responses to grave interpersonal injury. All the proposed models involve giving those up, but this implies that resentment and revenge seeking must exist in the victim's mind as possible options. West (2001) found that anger, hurt, and fear had to be explored in depth as part of the forgiveness process.

A cognitive mechanism behind forgiveness has been proposed (Enright, 1994) that draws on Piaget's work (1932) to explain how it functions. As stated earlier, the initial decision to pursue forgiveness is based on the realization that current strategies are not working (Hebl and Enright, 1993). However, once the cognitive decision has been made, affective variables become involved,

particularly the emotions of anger and its related resentment and hatred which must be overcome (Freedman & Enright, 1992).

This process is poorly understood; not everyone even knows that it is a process. Saying “I forgive you” may or may not be part of the forgiveness process, but according to any of the definitions given to date, it is far from the whole picture. Furthermore, many people seem to believe that the offended person must first settle the score, or that the offender must be punished in some way or at least apologize before forgiveness can happen (Power, 1994). There is no study that says that any of these things are true; in fact, most of them say that forgiveness is something that happens unilaterally by the one affected by the wrongdoing (e.g., Enright, 1991).

It may be a fruitful time to explore such questions because apologizing and asking for forgiveness are currently “in vogue” (McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, 2000, p. 2) and so new research is coming out more often than in the past. These authors question the efficacy of the forgiveness that is currently happening, noting that it does not seem to have made the world a less violent place, nor has it caused individuals or the relationships between them to be any healthier. Yet current studies indicate that forgiveness has this potential. Because of the many mistaken ideas surrounding what forgiveness is and is not, it is probably necessary to educate the general public about what it really entails.

Forgiveness, and growing in the ability to do it (increased forgivingness) has been called one of the most difficult and yet most meaningful life tasks that a person can undertake, and yet few if any young people in the United States

receive even the most rudimentary instruction on the basics of forgiveness (Thoresen et al., 1998). This may be because of the long association of forgiveness with religiosity, which would contradict the separation of church and state in this country. However, the steps to forgiveness have now been proposed in several models, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that forgiveness education could be implemented as part of moral or character education for young people.

One study that underscores the need for forgiveness education is the one conducted by Al-Mabuk, Enright, and Cardis (1995). Here, the researchers educated two groups of late adolescents about forgiveness who self-identified as being parentally love-deprived. One group was educated up to the point of learning what “willingness to forgive” entailed, but went no further than that. The other group received the full training in all 17 steps of Enright’s forgiveness model. Results showed that those who learned how to reach a point of willingness to forgive were, in fact, largely willing to forgive, but most of them did not make a commitment actually to engage in forgiveness. Those who learned all of the steps in the model, including what the process of forgiveness is like, were much more likely to commit to forgiving their parents. It seems that forgiveness is not well understood, but teaching people how to do it can be highly beneficial. What is not known is whether receiving this type of education causes growth in dispositional forgivingness, as well as forgiving a specific person on a specific occasion.

There is empirical support for forgiveness and forgivingness being related to gender. For instance, there seems to be some conflict between forgiveness of

others and espousing a traditionally masculine role, among Christian men at least (Walker & Doverspike, 2001). In this study, men who adhered to traditional descriptions of what it meant to be masculine did not engage as fully in the forgiveness process as those who did not endorse a traditional masculine role. In addition, female students' mean scores on the Enright Forgiveness Inventory (EFI, Subkoviak et al., 1999), and on its behavioral and affective subscales, were found to be significantly higher than males' scores (Lukasik, 2000).

Because forgiveness is a process that begins with awareness that a decision is needed, the implication is that one does not have to feel ready to make the decision; it is an act of the will. The decision, as previously defined, involves giving up something to which one has a strong feeling of being morally entitled—anger and retaliation. The felt need to retaliate will be discussed further in the section on revenge.

When a wrong occurs, it seems instinctive to feel that one has a right to anger, and often this anger leads to acts of revenge seeking (Newberg et al., 2000). Newberg's theory posits that anger and seeking revenge may be evolutionary, because they would have survival value in preserving the self and fending off threats. The problem is, according to these authors, that a human being perceives the self in a more inflated way than one perceives others. This tendency toward grandiosity, too, has survival value because it would lead one to preserve the self in any way possible. However, this can lead to revenge seeking that is out of proportion to the original harm done, because the extent of the injury is often overestimated in light of one's inflated opinion of oneself.

Therefore, substituting forgiveness for revenge, or at least the revenge of nursing self-righteous anger, means letting the harm to the self be what it is, without striking back against it. If this theory is correct, then forgiveness is on some level unnatural, and therefore it would make sense that a difficult process might have to ensue in order to complete it successfully. This is what most researchers have implied, by offering models of forgiveness of varying complexity. For instance, one simple model has been proposed (McCullough, Exline, & Baumeister, 1997) which has been called the REACH model. It is made up of the following steps:

- Recall the hurt;
- Empathize with the one who inflicted the hurt;
- (offer the) Altruistic gift of forgiveness;
- (make a) Commitment to forgive; and
- Hold on to the forgiveness.

Other models have gotten more detailed and complex; as mentioned above, Enright's model has 17 steps in it (Enright, 1991).

Some authors have said that there has been less theorizing about forgiveness than might be expected, given its promising therapeutic outcomes (Kaminer et al., 2000). Most models of forgiveness note the need to deal with strong affective responses to the injury, as well as a struggle to accept the fact that one may have been permanently and negatively changed in some way as a result of the harm done. At later steps in the process, it is possible to look for meaning in the event, to see possibilities as well as limits, and not to see the injurer in completely negative terms (Enright et al., 1998). Finally, the victim may come to

a place where there is enough empathy for the offender that compassion and possibly even love for that person can occur.

Understanding as well as applying forgiveness matters a great deal, because there are actions that may look like forgiveness but are not (Coyle & Enright, 1998). Such things, they say, include condoning, excusing, denying that harm was done, and forgetting, or claiming to forget, the offending event. These are all examples of what can masquerade as forgiveness or be labeled as such without bringing about the benefits that true forgiveness may confer.

The initial decision to forgive may be cognitive, but the process of forgiving is a motivational transformation that causes people to inhibit relationship-destructive behaviors and to behave in a constructive way toward someone who has behaved destructively toward them (McCullough, Worthington, & Rachal, 1997). These authors state that the relationship between receiving an apology from, and forgiving, one's offender is a function of increased empathy for the offender. Forgiving is not itself motivation, but forgiving occurs when the motivation to seek revenge and maintain estrangement diminish, while the motivation to pursue conciliatory behavior increases (McCullough, Worthington & Rachal, 1997). Real forgiveness requires an attitude of human equality toward the offender; a recognition that no matter how good or how deplorable one's actions may be, there is always a core of common humanity in both offender and victim (Enright, 1991).

Forgiveness is not a linear process. Enright (1991) described it as a series of stops with both feedback and feed-forward loops, involving much going

backwards and forwards, sometimes more than one step in either direction. Likewise, West (2001) stated that forgiveness is a process to which one must return many times to complete. He said that for some people the process might never end, while for others it may never start.

FORGIVENESS FACTORS AND A FORGIVENESS SCHEMA

It seems likely that multiple factors are taken into account with regard to whether one forgives or not. Many kinds of information seem to be involved, and it may be that the impact of one piece of information depends on a combination of other pieces (Mullet & Girard, 2000) such as whether or not an offender apologizes or makes an effort at restitution. Age, gender, socioeconomic status, culture, the magnitude of the offense as perceived by the victim, and the nature of the relationship between offender and offended may all be potentially important. The process by which someone combines such information, and the relative weight given to each piece in order to make a final judgment remain unknown, although various authors have proposed information-processing theories that might apply (Przygodsky & Mullet, 1997; Anderson, 1997; Munoz-Sastre, 1999).

A schema seems to exist for forgiveness (Girard & Mullet, 2000). “A schema is a cognitive organization that may be applied to more or less complex stimulus fields” (Anderson, 1996, p. 23). Forgiveness uses an additive rather than a configural forgiveness schema (Mullet & Girard, 2000) in that a person integrates each piece of information separately. In algebraic terms, in an additive forgiveness schema, one adds together rather than averages each unit of

information in order to reach some kind of judgment in response to the total amount of knowledge available. Each element acts independently in the production of the response of the single judgment of forgiveness or unforgiveness, and therefore different elements leading to the forgiveness response (or lack thereof) do not interact. The forgiveness schema is thus a true summative schema where each factor adds something to the other factors, and this effect is independent of how much of each of the other factors is present.

The forgiveness schema is important because it illustrates a pattern of factors that a person may take into account, and the manner in which he/she does so, when deciding whether or not to forgive someone. It also implies that incorporating a number of factors into a study on forgiveness is a good idea because there are so many of them. For example, Mullet & Girard (1997) found that a person's age has something to do with how likely they are to forgive, with elderly people being more likely to forgive than young adults or teenagers. They also found that cancellation of consequences to the offender, the intent of the offender, the proximity of the offender, and whether or not the offender apologized, had something to do with forgiveness or unforgiveness. This is just one possible summative schema, of course. There are probably others.

Forgiveness has been linked with a number of social-attributional constructs such as the perceived responsibility of the offender for the injury, how much intentionality the offender had in inflicting the injury (Darby & Schlenker, 1982) and how severe the offense was (Boon & Skulsky, 1997). Recently, the social-psychological factors in predicting forgiveness have been explored in the

context of offense-related determinants, relational determinants, personality-level determinants, and level of empathy (McCullough et al., 1998) who found that apology, rumination, and several indexes of relationship closeness were associated with self-reported forgiveness, and that empathy was the most proximal factor of all in one's ability to forgive others. A close relationship prior to the offense, combined with a high level of empathy for the offender, along with the offer of an apology, were strongly associated with the likelihood of forgiveness.

Forgiveness has also been characterized as a cooperative response following a competitive one, noting that forgiving and cooperative strategies in such mixed-motive simulation games as the prisoner's dilemma game (Axelrod, 1980) work well in many situations, especially those associated with uncertainty about other people's motivations, and that such strategies promote greater cooperation overall (Komorita, Hilty, & Parks, 1991). The desire to cooperate may therefore also be a factor in forgiveness. It may be that while on the surface forgiveness seems unnatural, it can at least be learned, and there seem to be benefits to practicing it – not least of which is becoming a more forgiving type of person. It has been observed that some people are more forgiving than others, which suggests that forgivingness is a general personality trait or disposition (McCullough & Worthington, 1999). However, these authors also state that people vary in how forgiving they are depending on the situation, so that the phenomenon of forgiveness has different levels of specificity as well, which might be amenable to change. For example, the same person might find it easier

to forgive a spouse than a co-worker for a serious transgression. Some studies find religiosity and overall forgivingness to be strongly correlated, which seems to hold true over time (Shoemaker & Bolt, 1977; Poloma & Gallup, 1991). These studies found that highly religious people claimed to value the continual practice of forgiveness as an important part of their religion, and also saw themselves as being more forgiving than those who were less religious. Interestingly, however, when it comes to forgiveness for specific transgressions, only moderate associations have been found between religious involvement and forgiving specific wrongs (Rackley, 1993). It may be that the influence of religious involvement on real-life incidents of forgiveness is under the control of a variety of social and cognitive influences (McCullough & Worthington, 1999) and that religiosity is not, therefore, at the forefront of causality here. The link between religion and the formation of a forgiving personality needs further exploration.

MEASURING THE CONSTRUCTS OF FORGIVENESS AND FORGIVINGNESS

There are about 15 inventories and scales currently in existence that measure some aspect of the forgiveness and forgivingness constructs, and new ones have appeared regularly over the last few years. Some of these measures have become well established, while others appear only in a single journal article or doctoral dissertation. Most of these inventories measure the level of forgiveness that a person has relative to a specific offender and offense; some deal directly with religiosity; some are for specific populations; some assess forgiveness in families and committed relationships. The first scale focused

solely on forgivingness appeared only a year ago. A summary of the various methods of measurement follows. These instruments are those for which forgiveness is the primary or only construct being measured.

Act of Forgiveness Scale

Presented by Drinnon (2001), this is a 45-item instrument measured with a 5-point Likert-type scale. It measures the extent to which a person has forgiven a specific person who has harmed him or her. Its Cronbach's alpha is .96 and its mean inter-item correlation is .37. When subjected to factor analysis, the scale measured four factors, which the author named Trust/Respect (for the offender), Anti-Rumination, Antipathy, and Empathy. The test-retest reliability after eight weeks was $r(53) = .91, p < .01$. Validity was established by correlating the total AFS score with a criterion item reading, "Basically, I have forgiven this person." The correlation with the criterion item was $r = .70$. The author also demonstrated construct and criterion validity for this instrument.

Enright Forgiveness Inventory—U.S. Version

Subkoviak, Enright, et al published the Enright Forgiveness Inventory (EFI) in 1999. This 65-item instrument, scored on a 6-point Likert-type scale, asks the respondent to think of the most recent instance where he/she was wronged, and of the specific person that committed the offense. It has three subscales: Positive/ Negative Affect, Positive/Negative Behavior, and

Positive/Negative Cognition. The authors say that it measures degree of forgiveness of the specific person named by the respondent. Cronbach's alpha measured .98 for the total EFI with a range of .93 to .97 for the subscales. Test-retest reliability ranges from .67 for a single subscale to .86 for the total scale score. Internal and construct validity seem acceptable. The subscales are highly correlated with each other, with correlation coefficients from .80 to .87. There are also strong correlations between the subscales and its One-Item Forgiveness scale (.60 to .68.) The One-Item Forgiveness Scale asks specifically to what extent the respondent has forgiven the person in question.

Forgiveness Attitudes Questionnaire

This questionnaire was presented by Kanz (2000). The Forgiveness Attitudes Questionnaire has two parts. The first part consists of 26 one-paragraph scenarios in which an interpersonal hurt occurs. The second part consists of 23 yes or no questions designed to measure the beliefs about forgiveness that people have. The total Cronbach's alpha for internal consistency for this instrument is .92. The author states that further validity studies are required.

Forgiveness of Others Scale

Developed by Mauger et al. (1992), this scale is part of a more extensive instrument, the Behavior Assessment System (Mauger et al., 1992) that is intended to measure personality disorders. The Forgiveness of Others Scale

consists of 15 items scored on a Likert-type scale. Mauger et al. reported that the Cronbach's alpha of internal reliability was .79, and test-retest reliability was .94. The scale's discriminant validity was established by its scores being inversely related to relevant constructs, such as depression and anxiety, on the MMPI.

Forgiveness Scale

In 1989, Wade presented the Forgiveness Scale. This is an 83-item scale with 9 subscales. The subscales are titled Revenge; Freedom from Obsession; Affirmation; Victimization; Feelings; Avoidance; Toward God; Conciliation; and Holding a Grudge. Wade conceptualized forgiveness as multidimensional so this scale measures various cognitive, behavioral, and affective aspects of forgiveness. Specifically, the scale measures the degree to which the respondent has forgiven a particular person who has harmed him or her. Cronbach alpha reliabilities range from .79 to .91 for the 9 subscales as first reported by Wade (1989); subsequent research showed internal consistency reliabilities of between .65 and .95 (McCullough & Worthington, 1995; Woodman, 1991). More recently this scale has been revised, shortened and modified (McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough et al., 1997) and the items from the Avoidance and Revenge scales have been combined to form the Transgression-Related Interpersonal Motivations (TRIM) inventory (McCullough et al., 1998).

“Harm-doing act” Measure

Ohbuchi & Sato (1993) presented this measure as part of their empirical study. It consists of six pictures along with a recorded narration of a scenario in which harm was done and intended, and in which harm was done and not intended. It was used experimentally in two elementary school classes of children. It was designed to determine how children judge intentionality of harm done, the moral culpability of the wrongdoer, the perceived remorse of the wrongdoer, and the extent to which children would forgive the wrongdoer. No statistics for reliability or validity are given.

Interpersonal Relationship Resolution Scale

Hargrave & Sells (1997) created the IRRS. This scale consists of 44 items and has two subscales, the Forgiveness Scale and the Pain Scale. Each of these scales has four subscales. The Forgiveness Scale and the Pain Scale have internal reliabilities of .92 and .95, respectively, although their subscales are less reliable (Cronbach’s alphas range from .63 to .86). The two scales do not correlate significantly with each other ($r = .15$) so they seem to measure different constructs. The authors established concurrent validity of this instrument with four other instruments measuring ethics and trust in the family system, and found significant correlations between IRRS subscales and subscales on three out of four of these instruments that measured forgiveness and pain in the family.

Predictive validity exists for this scale because it can discriminate between clinical and non-clinical groups (Hargrave & Sells, 1997).

Measure of Forgiving

McCullough, Worthington, and Rachal (1997) presented the Measure of Forgiving. This scale is an amalgamation of several scales, some created by the authors and some borrowed from others. The separate scales measure Perceived Degree of Apology; Affective Empathy; Forgiving; Forgiveness Related Items; Conciliatory Behaviors Toward Offender; and Avoidance Behaviors Toward Offender. The Affective Empathy Scale is from Batson's scale (Toi & Batson, 1982) and the Forgiveness Related Items scale consists of 20 items from the Forgiveness Scale (Wade, 1989). Cronbach's alpha for each of the scales varies from .74 to .90.

Forgiving Personality Scale

The Forgiving Personality Scale was designed by Drinnon, Jones, and Lawler (2000). This is a 33-item measure of the tendency to forgive another person for an offense. It measures dispositional forgivingness by asking the test-taker to say the extent to which he or she is a forgiving person and how quickly he or she takes offense. Therefore, it is more of a trait forgivingness measure than a state forgiveness measure. The alpha coefficient for the scale is .93 and the test-retest reliability is .79 after a two-month interval (n = 69). This scale has only

been validated on one occasion, when it was found to be positively correlated to a dispositional measure of the willingness to give and receive apologies (Jones, 2000) and it has only been presented as a poster in one conference so far.

Vengeance Scale

Stuckless and Goranson (1992) presented the Vengeance Scale. This is a 20-item instrument in the format of a 7-point Likert scale, which measures attitudes toward revenge. When it was developed it showed acceptable reliability and construct and criterion validity. This scale is included because revenge seeking and forgiveness are considered to be opposite constructs (e.g., Enright, 1991) so this scale would presumably measure attitudes opposite to forgiving ones. More recently, further evidence of the external validity of the Vengeance Scale has been published (Holbrook, White, & Hutt, 1995) although these authors say that further research into external validity of this scale would be desirable because there remains a question about whether the scale is equally valid for females and males.

BENEFITS OF FORGIVENESS AND FORGIVINGNESS

While the process of forgiveness may go somewhat against human nature, engaging in forgiveness can bring a variety of benefits to one who chooses it.

Many of these benefits are related to one's physical and mental health. Forgiving can be a health-related phenomenon in elderly people (Strasser, 1984) and it may modulate the effect of interpersonal stress on physical health (Thoresen et al., 1998) although these authors call the exact relationship of forgiveness to health an unknown. Still, there is evidence to suggest that the capacity to forgive others may make a difference in certain aspects of one's health. It may affect cardiovascular functioning, for example, because hostility level clearly predicts cardiovascular health and mortality from all causes (Miller et al., 1996), and forgiveness includes a lessening or cessation of hostility (Enright et al., 1991). Evidence for a direct link between physical health and forgiveness is scant, but the indirect evidence is interesting. One group of researchers found that cardiac patients who blamed other people for their heart attack were more likely to have a recurrence (Affleck, Tennen, Croog, & Levine, 1987). Unresolved anger hurts the self in many ways (Coyle & Enright, 1998) and forgiveness, by definition, is about a lessening of anger. All the evidence so far is retrospective and yet the possibility exists of a connection. It is plausible to hypothesize that the ability and willingness to forgive, which involves letting go of hostility, can be one indicator of emotional health as well as physical well-being (Thoresen et al., 1998).

In addition to the cessation of hostility, forgiveness can reduce other emotions such as anxiety, depression, and hopelessness, all of which are related to physical disease (Segerstrom, Taylor, Kemeny, & Fahey, 1998). Another way it may work to benefit physical health is by increasing one's sense of emotional

competence and self-efficacy, in the sense that a person could decide that he/she can manage anger well enough not to get permanently offended by another (Bandura, 1997; Thoresen et al., 1998). Only one study so far has linked self-efficacy to forgiveness (Luskin & Thoresen, 1999). In this study, two groups of young adults were asked to respond to certain questions such as “I can think about the offense and remain calm and peaceful” and “I can take responsibility for the angry thoughts that arise toward the offender.” They rated the confidence they had on a scale from 1 to 100 that they could do these things. The results were that those young adults who participated in a 10-week forgiveness education and intervention program increased their overall confidence that they could forgive someone significantly more than a matched control group did.

People cannot undo their memories of past offenses against them. But if they develop patterns of thinking about those offenses, and offenders, in forgiving rather than unforgiving ways, they may be able to change their emotions and bodily responses in a way that positively affects health. According to Lang’s theory (1979, 1995) because bodily responses are essential aspects of emotional experiences, memories, and imagined responses to others, it makes sense that a grudge or revenge fantasy would affect physiology in a negatively arousing way. By the same token, imagined forgiving responses might have a positive, calming influence on such arousal. Other theorists have noted that extended physiological reactions in general can also adversely affect health (McEwen, 1998).

Witvliet, Ludwig and VanderLaan (2001) conducted a within-subjects, repeated measures experiment to test the effects of imagining forgiving versus

unforgiving responses to the same offense. They asked the participants to use unforgiving strategies (rehearsing the hurt, harboring a grudge) and forgiving ones (empathizing with the offender, granting forgiveness). They asked each participant to think about the same offense for both sets of responses, and the order of forgiving and unforgiving responses was counterbalanced systematically across participants to control for order effects. The purpose was to experimentally assess physiological responses as well as self-report measures for what was occurring with each set of responses. After imagining a set of forgiving responses, or unforgiving responses, there was a relaxation period before the other set of responses were imagined.

They used a computer to record the physiological measures such as skin conductance, heart rate, and blood pressure. They also had each participant fill out a questionnaire describing their level of negative and positive emotions, level of arousal, and levels of anger, sadness, and perceived control. Participants also recorded how much empathy they felt for the offender and to what extent they had forgiven that person. Data for the 'hurt' and 'grudge' imagery trials were averaged, as were data for the 'feeling empathy' and 'granting forgiveness' trials.

Results indicated that the theoretical predictions were supported. During unforgiving imagery, participants said they had more negative feelings and were more highly aroused, angry, sad, and less in control. While imagining forgiving responses, participants said they felt significantly greater empathy for, and forgiveness of, the offender. One of the more interesting results was that after imagining unforgiving responses, participants' arousal levels as measured by

heart rate, skin conductance and blood pressure stayed fairly high, suggesting that the negative emotions persisted beyond the relatively short period of time involved with the imagery trial (several seconds each time). It seems that the emotional valence of one's response to an interpersonal offense can substantially affect one's physiological reactions. These authors contend that these measures provide a conservative view of what goes on outside of the laboratory when victims imagine unforgiving or forgiving responses toward real offenders—especially given that such responses in real life would probably last longer than just a few seconds. The implications for forgivingness are especially interesting, because presumably a forgiving disposition means an overall tendency to have positive rather than negative emotions.

When one engages in forgiving behaviors, increased emotional well being tends to result, as does prosocial involvement and the overcoming of addictions (Wuthnow, 2001). The process of forgiving can help heal relationships in families dealing with alcoholism (Flanigan, 1987) and with marital conflict (Worthington & DiBlasio, 1990). Forgiveness is useful for people who have been hurt by abusive or neglecting families (Hope, 1987). Several studies have shown forgiveness to be associated with decreased anxiety and depression and with increased self-esteem and hope (Coyle & Enright, 1997; Freedman & Enright, 1992).

The discourse on forgiveness as it may affect physical and mental health has shifted to more overtly include the idea of forgivingness (Worthington, Berry, & Parrott, 2001, p. 110), which, instead of focusing on individual acts of

forgiveness, looks at the disposition to forgive as a personality trait that is enduring. These authors state that a person high in the overall trait of forgivingness would be more likely than a person low in that trait to forgive a specific offense, and that a person high in the forgivingness trait might have better physical and mental health than someone low in this trait. The idea lends itself to intriguing questions about what makes for a more forgiving versus a less forgiving person; whether engaging in individual acts of forgiveness over time would promote the disposition to forgive; and whether some people are inherently more forgiving than others for biological reasons.

Any construct that may have a beneficial impact on the quality of human relationships is worth studying. With the high divorce rate, as well as the loss of confidence in what used to be stable institutions of our society (Wuthnow, 2000) it is worth investigating whether developing one's disposition of forgivingness may help repair some of these fractured relationships. Many books about this emphasize that to forgive is a process of pardoning persons that have wronged oneself, and making amends to those that one has wronged, depending upon whether a given individual is on the giving or receiving end of forgiveness. With all the beneficial aspects of forgiveness to physical and mental health, perhaps its greatest potential benefit is interpersonal—the way it can make relationships healthier (Harvey & Brenner, 1997).

Not every study has found benefits to forgiveness. In a study of 95 male prison inmates no correlation was found between anger and forgiveness, nor

between depression and forgiveness (McKenzie, 1997) although anger and depression, not surprisingly, were found to be correlated.

In a similar vein, other authors have said that forgiveness may increase one's sense of connectedness and belonging to a community. Social support may increase as a result of others perceiving that the forgiver is sacrificing something, and being of service to others in some way, as a result of engaging in forgiveness (Thoresen et al., 2000). In some cases, forgiveness may allow for a greater sense of spirituality, and of connectedness with some kind of higher power, among more spiritually oriented persons. Some cultures recognize and reward forgiving behaviors by labeling them as divine (Newberg et al., 2000) which may partially explain why forgiveness has so long been associated with the domain of religion.

. Some people will grant forgiveness only if others significant in the victim's life pressure him/her to forgive. In contrast, at the very highest stage of some forgiveness models, forgiveness is finally presented as an unconditional gift that is given for the sake of good will. At this stage, forgiveness does not require any reciprocity or response. Forgiveness brings with it freedom, allowing the self to be free of someone that one needs to forgive (Benson, 1987).

It is possible to see forgiveness as a kind of motivational and relational transition (Rusbult et al., 1991) in which, when people forgive, they inhibit those destructive responses that would further injure the relationship, and instead use constructive responses that help restore the broken relationship to where it was before the offense occurred.

DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF FORGIVENESS AND FORGIVINGNESS

To discuss the developmental aspects of forgiveness and forgivingness is to deal with two issues. First, there is the fact that understanding and being able to employ forgiveness is a function of developmental maturity. Second, the process of forgiveness itself has certain steps, or stages, that must be completed in order for full forgiveness to take place. This process of moving through the steps is linked to increasingly sophisticated levels of moral reasoning and moral action. Some suggested models of how the developmental steps or stages work have already been discussed in section II.

Piaget (1932) first linked the ability to forgive with age-related development. He argued that young children tend to endorse concrete reciprocity advocating that someone who hurts another should be paid back in a similar way, while older children often saw that negative exchanges could continue forever and might advocate not retaliating. Piaget stated that older children saw the need for the restoration of good social relationships through ideal reciprocity, where an order is re-established for people to interact as equals. In Piaget's words, forgiveness is completely understood when one forgives as a result of being forgiven in the past and of needing to be forgiven in the future. This kind of complex understanding probably takes time to develop and become fully functional. On the basis of these ideas, Piaget stated that forgiveness has a developmental component, may be linked with the emergence of formal operations, and probably cannot be well understood until late childhood (Piaget, 1932).

This makes sense in light of the way children's notions of friendship develop and the increasingly complex relationships that begin by sharing objects (toys) to sharing feelings and thoughts and talking with one another (Shantz, 1983). In light of this, it would be unlikely that a very young child would have the relational skills necessary to comprehend the processes of betrayal or forgiveness. Young children often confuse forgiveness with revenge, in the sense that they frequently say that someone who hurts another must be paid back in kind before he/she can be forgiven or the hurt forgotten (Enright, Santos, & Al-Mabuk, 1989).

At a very basic level, a person must reach a certain stage of development in order to consider forgiving another. A person must not only be able to recognize harm to the self, but be able to remember it over time and link the harm to whoever caused it (Newberg et al., 2000). This would likely preclude a very young child from being able to do it. These authors say that at a minimum, these factors of harm recognition and long-term memory must be present to allow one to recognize that either revenge seeking or forgiveness is possible in the face of interpersonal injury.

Some authors say that the developmental aspects of forgiveness are cross-cultural. The nature of this development is far from fully known, but the development can extend across the whole life span (Mullet & Girard, 2000). These authors state that the development of forgiveness in human beings seems to follow the same path across the United States, in Asian countries, and elsewhere,

so even though many cultures remain to be studied, there may be aspects to it that are universal.

There seems to be a developmental progression in one's ability to forgive. One model proposes that there are stages to forgiveness, although noting that forgiveness is also a process (Enright, 1994). There seem to be phases that a person goes through in order to complete a process of forgiveness (Enright, 1991a). The first two of these so-called "soft stages" (Power, 1994, p. 82) are based on concrete reciprocity, because someone in these early stages believes that forgiveness can only occur after one gets even with the offender. These stages seem to require that justice be done first. The third stage, this author says, is based more on ideal reciprocity and the recognition that 'two wrongs don't make a right' (Power, 1994, p. 82). He says that according to this logic, forgiveness is the renunciation of concrete reciprocity, the recognition that retaliation is actually unjust, and the restoration of relationships. Because a person can grow in the understanding and practice of forgiveness, people can probably also grow in having a forgiving disposition, although this has not yet been tested.

One study that sheds light on the developmental aspects of forgiveness is the one done by Park and Enright (1997). They were trying to understand whether growth in understanding forgiveness was age-based, and also whether increasing one's understanding of forgiveness led to more sophisticated forgiving behaviors being manifested. Their 60 teen-aged and young adult Korean participants had all experienced serious injustices from a friend of the same gender in the past several months. They studied 30 seventh and eighth graders

and 30 juniors and seniors in college. All participants were interviewed and presented with an adapted version of the Heinz dilemma (Enright, 1989), which became the “Mr. Kim” dilemma for the Korean participants; and a friendship dilemma from Selman’s (1980) interpersonal understanding interview. The researchers asked questions from these vignettes to provide ways of assessing conditions under which participants would forgive or not forgive; strategies for forgiveness; and manifestations of forgiveness behaviors. They found that the understanding of forgiveness was moderately related to age ($r = .51$) and that the college students scored significantly higher on the scale measuring the understanding of forgiveness. The understanding of forgiveness versus the degree of forgiveness that the participant had offered his/her friend approached, but did not reach, significance. However, the correlation between understanding forgiveness and strategies used to forgive and restore the friendship was significant ($r = .55$) indicating that the more the participant understood forgiveness, the more she or he used a proactive forgiveness strategy to attempt to restore the injured relationship.

From its beginnings as an empirical construct, forgiveness has been linked with moral awareness. Selman’s (1980) logic of social perspective taking and Kohlberg’s (1985) descriptions of moral development both imply that forgiveness is a function of growth in morality. Kohlberg’s theory of the development of moral reasoning has stages that correspond one-to-one with the stages in Enright’s (1991) model. In the lowest stage of that model, forgiveness can only occur after the wrongdoer has been repaid in like kind for his/her

offense, or the offender has gotten revenge. In higher stages, forgiveness will be granted only if others significant in the victim's life pressure him/her to forgive. At the very highest stage of the model, forgiveness is finally presented as an unconditional gift that is given for the sake of good will. At this stage, forgiveness does not require any reciprocity or response. The stages of justice proposed by Kohlberg, along with the corresponding stages of forgiveness created by Enright, are shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2

Stages of Justice and Forgiveness

Stages of Justice	Stages of Forgiveness
Punishment and Obedience Orientation. I believe that justice should be decided by the authority, by the one who can punish.	Revengeful Forgiveness. I can forgive someone who wrongs me only if I can punish him or her to a similar degree to my own pain.
Relativist Justice. I have a sense of reciprocity that defines justice for me. If you help me, I must help you.	Restitutional or Compensational Forgiveness. If I get back what was taken from me, then I can forgive. Or, if I feel guilty about withholding forgiveness, then I can forgive to relieve my guilt.
Good Boy/Girl Justice. Here, I reason that the group consensus should decide what is right and wrong. I go along so that others will like me.	Expectational Forgiveness. I can forgive if others put pressure on me to forgive. It is easier to forgive when other people expect it.
Law and Order Justice. Societal laws are my guides to justice. I uphold laws in order to have an orderly society.	Lawful Expectational Forgiveness. I forgive when my religion demands it...
Social Contract Orientation. I am still interested in that which maintains the social fabric but I also realize that unjust laws exist. Therefore, I see it as just, as fair, to work within the system for change.	Forgiveness as Social Harmony. I forgive when it restores harmony or good relations in society. Forgiveness decreases friction and outright conflict in society. Note that forgiveness is a way to control society. It is a way of maintaining peaceful relations.
Universal Ethical Principle Orientation. My sense of justice is based on maintaining the individual rights of all persons. Conscience rather than laws or norms determine what I will accept when there are competing claims.	Forgiveness as Love. I forgive unconditionally because it promotes a true sense of love. Because I must truly care for each person, a hurtful act on his or her part does not alter that sense of love. This kind of relationship keeps open the possibility of reconciliation and closes the door on revenge. Note that forgiveness is no longer dependent on a social context, as in stage 5. The forgiver does not control the other by forgiving; he or she releases the other.

Enright and the Human Development Study Group (1991b), p.138.
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Moving from one stage to another in the forgiveness process seems to be made possible by a growth in interpersonal understanding and the ability to put oneself in the place of another. This harmonizes with recent research findings showing that the crucial variable determining whether or not forgiveness is possible is affective empathy toward the offender (McCullough et al., 1998).

One study that has intriguing implications for the stages or processes of forgiveness is the one done by Huang and Enright (2000). The purpose of this study was to measure anger-related emotions and emotional well-being in people who had forgiven someone out of a sense of obligation, versus those who had forgiven someone out of the moral principle of love. The participants in this study were people who had experienced a significant interpersonal injury within the past three years. Blood pressure measures, along with videotapes of facial expression, 'masking' smiles (smiles used to disguise negative emotion) and casting down of the eyes, were used as observed measures of anger. The Anger Expression Scale (Johnson et al., 1987) that has a .84 reliability as measured by Cronbach's Alpha, was used as a self-report measure of anger. These measures were given during, or just after, participants talked about the experience of great interpersonal injury that they had experienced.

Results showed that participants who said they had forgiven their offender out of a sense of obligation had significantly more instances of masking smiles and casting down of eyes than did participants who said that they based their forgiveness on the moral imperative of love. These results suggest that within any group of people there will be differences in how individuals think about

forgiveness, and that the effect of forgiveness on the forgiver will vary according to a developmental continuum.

RELATED CONSTRUCTS I: CONSTRUCTS OFTEN ASSOCIATED WITH FORGIVING

There are a number of constructs to which forgiveness and forgivingness have a clear relationship. There are several other constructs with which they are often confused. I will discuss pseudo-forgiveness first, showing some behaviors and attitudes that seem to resemble forgiveness but are not, and which tend to obfuscate what forgiveness really is. Then I will move on to constructs that are truly related to forgiveness and forgivingness.

In *pseudo-forgiveness* (Coyle & Enright, 1998) a person who was wronged might claim to have forgotten the incident when that is not the case, or might condone the action as not being wrong or harmful after all. This is similar to equating forgiveness with overlooking or ignoring offenses (Forward, 1989) but this is not forgiveness at all, only a kind of masking of anger and a form of denial (Enright, Eastin, Golden, Sarinopoulos, & Freedman, 1992). These authors state that a certain period in which anger is felt and explored is a part of the forgiveness process. They also say that it is possible to excuse someone for what they did by minimizing its impact upon the self, but this is not the same as forgiveness either, because forgiveness requires a recognition that real harm has been done. It is also possible to act in a forgiving way while harboring negative emotions within (Park & Enright, 1997) and there is another form of pseudo-

forgiveness where one supposedly forgives for the sake of feeling or acting morally superior to the offender—a kind of ‘manufactured magnanimity’ (Park & Enright, 1997, p. 394).

The offer of an *apology* makes it easier for someone to forgive an offender. Apology has been shown to make the process of forgiveness easier. Willingness to forgive has been linked to social-cognitive variables such as the victim’s view of the offender’s intentionality and motives (Darby & Schlenker, 1982) and because an apology is a way of saying that the offender did not intend the injury, forgiveness becomes more likely. These authors showed that it was indeed easier for an offender to forgive someone who offered an apology than someone who did not. More elaborate apologies by the offender resulted in a greater degree of forgiveness by the victim. Cultural differences exist here. For instance, Japanese college students seem more likely to apologize in a way that shows remorse while American students tend to minimize the harm done (Sugimoto, 1997). This study found that the Japanese were more likely to apologize than Americans when they offended someone, and requested forgiveness more directly than American students did. It may be that there is a greater degree of forgiveness offered and received in Japan, but it is possible that there are other cultural factors at work here as well. Cultural factors remain an understudied area in forgiveness research.

Empathy mediates relationships between dispositional and environmental variables and their causal effects on forgiving, with forgiving being strongly mediated by empathy. Of all the constructs related to forgiveness, empathy seems

to be the most salient. However, because forgiving is mediated by empathy, it is also distinct from it. Because forgiving is causally more proximal, it is more strongly related to forgiving behaviors than is empathy (McCullough, Worthington & Rachal, 1997). A model for the empathy-prosocial behavior link has been proposed (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Batson et al 1997). McCullough et al. based the empathy-forgiveness link on Batson's model and concluded that empathy is the construct most closely related to forgiveness. Drinnon (2000) found that within a series of experiments, to the extent that one person was able to take his or her partner's perspective, that person was more likely to forgive that person. Drinnon also found that partner perspective taking mediated the relationship between general perspective taking and forgiveness. In addition, general perspective taking is significantly related to being forgiving, so a person who is inclined to take the perspective of others is also likely to have a forgiving disposition.

Takaku's (2001) study questioned whether empathy functioned in this way. The author attempted to clarify the nature of the link of cognitive and affective activity to forgiveness by showing how taking the perspective of an offender, the perspective of a victim, and the perspective of oneself as a person who has transgressed in the past, could influence someone to be more forgiving. Taking the transgressor's perspective seems to result in increased empathy for the transgressor and thus in a more forgiving attitude toward that transgressor (e.g., McCullough et al., 1998; McCullough et al., 1997). Empathizing with someone in need of help is associated generally with prosocial behaviors and limitations on

aggression (Batson, Sanger et al., 1997; Davis, 1994; Rusbult et al., 1991). However, Takaku (2001) questioned whether empathy or cognitive dissonance was really responsible for forgiveness, in the sense that people who recalled times that they themselves had transgressed, but did not forgive someone else who did, would feel hypocritical. If cognitive dissonance was involved then forgiveness, according to Takaku, need not be related to feeling empathy because the well established need for cognitive dissonance reduction (e.g., Fried & Aronson, 1995; Stone, Weigand, Cooper, & Aronson, 1997) might provide enough of an explanation for a forgiveness response.

Takaku used a one-factor (type of perspective taking) between-subjects design with four types of perspective taking: recalling oneself as a transgressor at some time in the past; imagining how one would think, feel, and act in the shoes of the transgressor in the present scenario (imagine self); imagining how the transgressor would think, feel, and act in the present scenario (imagine other); and imagining how one would think, feel, or act in the situation as the victim (own perspective/control group). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four groups and presented with a scenario in which a classmate had borrowed some vitally important class notes to copy just before an exam, and had returned them late and torn. The participants then read the classmate's apology for doing this, and this was followed by their answering questions regarding attributions, emotional reactions, and the likelihood of forgiving the classmate.

The results showed that participants experienced more negative emotional reactions when they saw the transgression's cause as more stable ($r = .44, p < .01$

rather than less stable ($r = -.38, p < .01$) and that more positive emotional reactions were associated with greater likelihood of forgiveness ($r = .58, p < .01$). Levels of positive versus negative emotional reactions were the only significant predictors of forgiveness, and emotional reactions were more proximal determinants of forgiveness than were cognitive-attributions about the offense. Takaku reported that making the participants aware of their own past transgressions created what he called a hypocrisy dissonance (Aronson, Fried, & Stone, 1991) that resulted in attributions of the classmate's offense as less stable and more external, and that in turn led to more positive emotional reactions and greater likelihood of a forgiving response.

While Takaku's study provides an interesting challenge to the relatedness of forgiving and empathy, other studies have validated the close link between the two constructs. For example, empathic concern and perspective taking have both been shown to be related to forgiveness (Konstam, Chernoff, & Deveney, 2001) when these constructs were measured with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, Davis, 1980), an instrument designed to measure four aspects of empathy. Konstam et al. found that empathic concern was correlated with total forgiveness ($r = .17, p < .05$) and that perspective taking was correlated with total forgiveness ($r = .23, p < .01$). Of course, it may be that empathy and cognitive dissonance could both be involved in producing a forgiving response. If one sees oneself as an empathic person, then to act in an unforgiving way would produce cognitive dissonance by showing one to be a hypocrite. At the same time, feeling empathy for the offender would make unforgiveness painful in the long run for the victim.

Guilt is a construct related to both empathy and forgiveness, because processes of forgiveness help reduce feelings of guilt (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1998). Both guilt and forgiveness are what these authors call “social emotions” (p. 217) and, like guilt, they are related to empathy because they can only happen when people are mature enough to understand another person’s anger or hurt, and also realize that they can be the cause of such emotions in another. Several other researchers have pointed out the role of empathy in the development of guilt (Hoffman, 1994a, 1994b; Zahn-Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990.) There are gender differences in feelings of guilt. From adolescence onward, females feel it more often than males do, and this may reflect women’s greater concern for relatedness and community (Gilligan, 1982). Guilt is a frequent emotion among strong interpersonal relationships, so with women’s greater concern for communality, it makes sense that women would experience guilt more often than men (Baumeister et al., 1994). In one study involving college students and others, it was found that forgiveness might be more crucial to the victim than the offender in terms of alleviating feelings of guilt (Estrada-Hollenbeck & Heatherton, 1997).

Disagreement exists regarding the relationship of forgiveness to *reconciliation*. Enright, Eastin, Golden, Sarinopoulos and Freedman (1992) say that to forgive is to give up all resentment and desire for revenge, whether or not the offender acknowledges one’s hurt or has any wish to reconcile. Yet these authors also say that an essential dimension of forgiveness is the restoration of what they call “a sense of loving community” (p. 96). Perhaps they are saying that restoration of community is an ideal that should be achieved only if it is

possible, and only if the offender agrees to change and cease the destructive behavior. Other authors insist that forgiveness can occur without reconciliation, because forgiveness is only about one person's stance toward another (Subkoviak et al., 1995; Enright, 1996). Power (1994) diverges from these authors on the reconciliation issue, saying that forgiveness without reconciliation is necessarily incomplete, but this is a minority view.

Much needless controversy has resulted from confusing forgiveness with other concepts that seem to resemble it but do not. For example, forgiveness is sometimes confused with *justice*, in the sense that forgiveness seems to circumvent or prevent justice from being done. Nietzsche (1887) argued that forgiveness was only for the weak, who have insufficient power to demand justice. Frankena (1973) proposed that forgiveness and justice arise from two different moral principles, with justice being based on equality and forgiveness on beneficence. However, forgiveness and justice, while they are not the same, are not incompatible, because recognition of justice is necessary in order to know when it has been violated (Enright, 1994). When one person suffers at the hand of another who is consequently better off as a result of inflicting such suffering, an act of revenge against that other equalizes, or seems to equalize, the suffering so that it is shared by the one who originated it. Frijda also says that revenge serves as a deterrent to doing harm to someone else in the first place, because the fear of retaliation may be a potent inhibitor of impulsive wrongdoing motivated by self-interest. Therefore, retaliation is rational behavior on a social level. Frijda also notes that there are gains in self-esteem from engaging in vengeance; one no

longer sees oneself as a helpless victim, but as someone who has taken action to right a wrong against oneself.

It is possible for forgiveness and justice to co-occur, because many victims of crime have forgiven those who committed crimes against them while allowing the criminal justice system to impose penalties for those crimes (Jaeger, 1998). In this way, forgiveness also differs from pardon, because pardon is the legal term for the revocation of such penalties; a well-known example is President Gerald Ford pardoning Richard Nixon. Legal consequences can be imposed for wrongdoing while a victim of such wrongdoing can concurrently choose to forgive the offender. In many cases where a crime has been committed, the pursuit of justice precedes forgiveness. In some cases it may confer well-being independently of forgiving the offender, as for example in the case of rape (Kaminer, 2000).

RELATED CONSTRUCTS II: LINKING RETALIATION, AGGRESSION, MORAL RESPONSIBILITY, AND SOCIAL INTEREST WITH FORGIVINGNESS

To consider forgivingness is to be forced to consider its counterpart, *retaliation*, known as vengefulness at the trait level. Desire for revenge and the performing of vengeful acts have always been a part of human history. They appear in ancient Greek literature, in stories from the Bible, and in more recent events connected with religious and political causes. The former Yugoslavia and the present Middle East are rife with situations where vengeance for past acts, some of them long past, drives present-day violence. Revenge is the motive for inflicting suffering on another in response to the other, or someone similar to the

other, inflicting it on oneself first. Such revenge is characterized by the absence of material gain or usefulness to the actor, the degree of violence or vindictiveness of the act, and the duration of rumination and planning the act, which can go on for a long time (Frijda, 1994). Frijda states that vengeance is not entirely bad because it serves the social function of equalization of power. In a society without an organized system of justice, it helps to maintain the social order. When one person suffers at the hand of another who is consequently better off as a result of inflicting such suffering, an act of revenge against that other equalizes, or seems to equalize, the suffering so that it is shared by the one who originated it. Frijda also says that revenge serves as a deterrent to doing harm to someone else in the first place, because the fear of retaliation may be a potent inhibitor of impulsive wrongdoing motivated by self-interest, thus retaliation is rational behavior on a social level. Frijda also notes that there are gains in self-esteem from engaging in vengeance; one no longer sees oneself as a helpless victim, but as someone who has taken action to right a wrong against oneself.

From all of the above, revenge is clearly not without some kind of value, although probably the fear of revenge and its deterrent effect are of more value than the acts of revenge themselves. The problems with revenge come in the tendency to engage in acts of extreme cruelty while engaging in acts of vengeance (Frijda, 1994) and for the cruelty to increase over time.

A theory by Newberg et al (2000) states that when a wrong occurs, it seems instinctive to feel that one has a right to anger, and often this anger leads to acts of revenge seeking. This theory posits that anger and seeking revenge may

be evolutionary, because they would have survival value in preserving the self and fending off threats. The problem is, according to these authors, that a human being perceives the self in a more inflated way than one perceives others. This tendency toward grandiosity, too, has survival value because it would lead one to preserve the self in any way possible. But this can lead to revenge seeking that is out of proportion to the original harm done, because the extent of the injury is often overestimated in light of one's inflated opinion of oneself.

In addition to the possible tendency to have an over-inflated human ego, it seems that in the face of wrongdoing, victim and offender have vastly different perspectives about the amount of harm done. The victim tends to overestimate, and the offender to underestimate, the harm that has been inflicted (Baumeister & Catanese, 2001).

A system of justice is a way of dealing with the emotions as well as the facts of personal violation. Whatever sense of justice a person has moves him or her to avoid harming someone else even if one's immediate interests would be served that way (Solomon, 1994). A sense of justice is violated when someone else harms a person because that same sense of justice leads one to expect that others will refrain from doing so. According to Solomon, a balance has been violated when this happens, and revenge is an attempt to correct that balance. Revenge is not, therefore, merely punishment for harm; it carries with it "often delayed, protracted, or frustrated emotion" (Solomon, 1994, p. 305) so that the attempt to get even, or put matters back in balance, is driven by strong emotion and therefore likely to be excessive or even cruel. This was the primary reason

for the ancient law of *Lex Talionis*, or “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” (Frijda, 1994) because such a law would restrain the perpetuation of a cycle of revenge by saying that harm done in response to prior harm could not exceed what was done in the first place.

Otherwise, the balance of justice is likely not to be restored, but tipped in favor of the avenger; thus the initial wrongdoer becomes motivated to retaliate for the retaliation, and a cycle of revenge is likely to happen. Forgiveness cannot be understood without taking all of this seriously, and without realizing that the urge and occasion for revenge are its precursors.

Brandsma (1982) has theorized that when a person is violated in some way, there is an accompanying sense of frustration, loss, and diminishment of self. The self-concept is reduced and self-efficacy is threatened. There may be loss of possessions or loss of dreams, goals, or hopes. According to Brandsma, this leads to a person externalizing these losses by responding quickly and automatically with anger in order to protect the self and restore a sense of self-esteem. This anger can then lead to a bitter outlook on life, or to hostile behavior. He states that even if the initial reaction of anger was rooted in a desire for justice, if the state of felt threat or anger continues, it can damage relationships and lessen one’s willingness to trust others, including, but not limited to, the original offender. To the extent that Brandsma’s theory holds, forgiveness becomes of value by interrupting the cycle of distrust, anger, resentment, and depression. It can prevent the victim from being victimized all over again by holding on to negative emotions and actions after the event is over.

Studies are beginning to appear about the tendency to be vengeful as a personal attribute (e.g., McCullough, Bellah, Kilpatrick, & Johnson, 2001). In this study, vengefulness was found to be correlated with less forgiving, greater rumination about the offense, higher negative affect, and lower life satisfaction. Initial level of vengefulness was negatively correlated with change in level of forgiving after an 8-week follow-up measure. These authors also found that, in terms of what are commonly called the Big Five personality factors, vengefulness was negatively associated with Agreeableness and positively associated with Neuroticism. Clearly, vengefulness is a problem for individuals as well as for the society around them.

In fact, inflicting harm on someone else after a perceived wrong has been done to oneself (the definition of vengeance) has been implicated in a wide variety of criminal and antisocial behaviors (Holbrook, 1997). Holbrook found that such retaliatory tendencies can be ameliorated through anger management programs. He conducted his own study with prison inmates who tended to ruminate over many past injustices, and then to explode in disproportionate anger to a perceived wrongdoing based on the buildup of the ruminations to that point. One study measuring participants' tendencies to be vengeful found that coworkers and strangers were more likely targets than those with whom one had intimate relationships (Cota-McKinley, Woody, & Bell, 2001). These authors found that men are more likely than women to be accepting of vengeful attitudes although the willingness to seek revenge did not differ by gender. Another finding of the

study was that older people tended to be less inclined toward revenge than younger ones.

Just as studies are beginning to appear about forgivingness as a dispositional trait (Berry, Worthington, Parrott, O'Connor, & Wade, 2001), there are also, as mentioned before, studies being done about the trait of vengefulness. But a clear distinction needs to be made between *distributive* justice (Lerner, Miller, & Holmes, 1976) and *retributive* justice (Hogan & Emler, 1981). Vengefulness is about retributive, not distributive, justice. If someone has been unjustly deprived of resources, those resources should be restored to them. This is distributive justice, and there seems to be a general consensus among most people that this principle should be followed. The problem arises with retributive justice, or the aforementioned vengefulness, striking back with a hurt in retaliation for a previous hurt, because it is difficult to know how much hurt is justified in response to a particular act of harm. Because the victim and the perpetrator have vastly different perspectives on this matter, with the victim tending to overestimate and the offender to underestimate the magnitude of harm done (Baumeister & Catanese, 2001), the possibility of setting up an endless cycle of revenge seems quite strong. As stated earlier, revenge and forgiveness are viewed as opposite constructs (Enright, 1991) with forgiveness being defined as reduced motivation to seek revenge. It seems logical that these constructs at the dispositional level, i.e., trait forgivingness and trait vengefulness, would be opposite to one another as well.

Retributive justice, vengeance, is morally problematic while distributive justice is not. A study showing that the tendency to engage in retributive justice is affected by one's level of morality, while the tendency to engage in distributive justice is not (Batson, Bowers, Leonard, & Smith, 2000) provides support for the differentiating of these concepts, although they need to be further explored in the context of forgivingness.

Why do people retaliate? Several theories are discussed above, but much about the motives for retaliation remain unknown. For instance, the retaliatory response may be geared toward the future as much as the past, to control future behavior (Miller & Vidmar, 1981) in the sense of showing another person that it does not pay to hurt oneself. It may also function to induce perspective taking, by showing the other person what the pain is like that he/she inflicted on oneself, by making that person share it (Batson, 2000). Batson also suggested that retaliation might be an interpretation of the offender's act as a permission to do the same, because presumably if someone else can do such a thing, then it is all right to do it in return. This would constitute a type of role modeling.

Aggression means physical or verbal behavior intended to hurt someone. Aggression is linked to deep feelings of vengefulness (Wolfgang & Ferracuti, 1967) and a human propensity to divide the world into in-groups and out-groups and to subdivide human beings into "us" and "them" (Erikson, 1968). In Erikson's theory, those who are counted as other than oneself are considered to be alien and less than human. This is invoked as a way of justifying aggression against those people. Those who do not belong to one's own group are

considered to be the different others, the “them” who are less than fully human. Racial conflict and wars between nations are examples of the “us versus them” mentality. This largely explains why forgivingness and aggression are opposing constructs. A large part of a forgiving nature is rooted in understanding one’s common humanity with all other human beings (Enright, 1996).

Aggression has always been part of being a member of the human species. Human beings went through experiences early on in evolution that made it necessary to develop aggressive capabilities in order to survive (Neuman, 1987). Neuman contends that there is an imbalance between the tendency to aggress and the ability to inhibit aggressive impulses when they are inappropriate. Therefore, because human beings are not well equipped to keep their aggressive tendencies under control, aggression gets out of hand very easily; this is one reason that there has been so much killing of people and destruction of property throughout human history.

There is ongoing debate among psychologists over whether aggression is instinctual or whether it is a learned behavior. Biological influences certainly play a part, because researchers have found neural patterns in the brain that drive aggression and increase hostility (Myers, 1996). However, environmental influences, such as the frustration that results when one’s progress toward a goal is blocked, also facilitate aggressive responses. Frustration occurs when there is a gap between expectations and achievements. Anger arises, which is an emotional readiness to aggress (Berkowitz, 1989). Therefore when there is frustration, an aggressive act often follows. Although this is fairly common knowledge, most

mental health specialists receive little or no training in how to handle excessive anger in their clients (Fitzgibbons, 2000).

A person might aggress for two reasons, hostility and instrumentality (Myers, 1996). Hostile aggression includes acts of retaliation. They are intended to injure someone else because of the aggressor's anger and frustration. Instrumental aggression, on the other hand, is done for the purpose of gaining some other end. There may or may not be feelings of anger involved, but the main purpose of the aggression is the pursuit of some kind of material or non-material reward.

While aggression is at some level innate to both human and animal species, social learning also influences whether or not a given person will aggress. If a person sees a role model aggressing, he or she may well imitate that person's example (Bandura et al., 1961). Or a person might engage in aggression and find that it pays off in terms of gains in possessions and status; that person will be likely to aggress again. In contrast, severe defeat breeds submissiveness (Ginsburg & Allee, 1942).

On an interpersonal level, being attacked or insulted by another is extremely likely to result in an act of aggression in return, that is to say, retaliation (Ohbuchi & Kambara, 1985; Dengerink & Myers, 1977). In an overwhelming number of cases, a perceived attack by another person led to a retaliatory attack of equal or greater intensity. Intentional attacks breed retaliation in return. The negative emotions, including anger and frustration, that result from such an attack frequently lead to a counterattack.

Other social conditions facilitating interpersonal aggression are the experience of crowding, which is common in urban areas. Crowded conditions are stressful. The discomfort of heat can also bring on acts of aggression, which is why riots in urban areas often occur in the summer months. In addition, the presence of a great deal of media violence is a kind of role modeling of aggression. All of this means that modern living conditions as a whole make person-to-person aggression a likely possibility.

Moral responsibility means the propensity to act in an ethical way, even when others may choose to do otherwise (Batson et al., 2000). Such a moral sense seems to motivate people to forgive. Most, although not all, of the studies done to date seem to focus largely on how forgiveness feels good, makes a person happy, leads to increased self-esteem and self-efficacy, and promotes health. While these are important issues, they are issues relating to how forgiving benefits the individual. The foundation for granting forgiveness to another remains a moral one, going beyond the individual to the whole community. Gregory Jones (1995), a Christian theologian, has expressed concern that forgiveness has become a purely therapeutic endeavor, with psychotherapists encouraging their clients to forgive for purely personal, even self-centered, reasons, with the sole concern of increasing one's own level of personal well being. When researchers, therapists, and others fail to take into account the complex interpersonal and political aspects of being human, as well as individual intrapersonal concerns, the moral dimension often gets left out of the picture.

First and most generally, forgiveness has become an increasingly marginal notion. Modernity's emphasis on such themes as individual autonomy, isolated acts rather than character, inevitable progress rather than repentance, and the fascination with technique have all helped to undermine practices of forgiveness and to marginalize conceptions of it. If all that ultimately matters is individual autonomy, then forgiveness and reconciliation—which are designed to foster and maintain community—are of little importance. (Jones, 1995, p. 37)

Piaget (1932) first identified forgiveness as part of the development of the moral judgment of the child, in his book by that title. Selman (1980) and Kohlberg (1985) have both implied in their theories of moral development that the increasing ability to forgive others corresponds with an increasing moral awareness and responsibility. Carol Gilligan (1982) identified care and responsiveness, in addition to justice, as legitimate concerns in solving moral dilemmas—and care and responsiveness are closely related to the concept of empathy. McCullough, Worthington and Rachal (1997) have stated that empathy is the most proximal variable to forgiveness that has been found to date, and a study correlating forgiveness with empathy and perspective taking provides support for this finding (Konstam, Chernoff, & Deveney, 2001) although Takaku (2001) has challenged this. Enright (1994) has stated that the history of forgiveness research shows clear links to moral psychology. Many definitions of forgiveness (e.g., Hebl & Enright, 1993) say that part of forgiveness means abandoning one's moral right to resentment, and what this implies is that there is some kind of higher morality that is invoked. Enright (1994) stated that engaging in forgiveness causes a person to grow in his/her identity as a moral person because it requires one to assume that all human beings, regardless of how they

conduct themselves, have a common core of humanity and are of equal intrinsic worth. Empirically, the results from one study showed that people who forgave others out of the moral imperative of love were able to forgive more completely than those who forgave out of a sense of obligation (Huang & Enright, 2000).

Power (1994) reported that with the decision to forgive must come, at some point, a realization that *retaliation is actually unjust* (emphasis mine). This negates some of the definitions of forgiveness that discuss some kind of moral right to resent and to seek revenge. It may be more accurate to say that there is a *felt right* or perhaps a *felt need* to retaliate, but that this is not a true moral right, just a part of instinctive human nature. To the extent that Newberg's (2000) theory on the neuropsychological correlates of revenge and forgiveness is true, long-standing resentment and seeking revenge are actually counterproductive responses that create many more problems than they solve—and therefore are not “moral rights” at all.

A recent news article discussed what had happened to a married couple by the name of Biehl (Murphy, 2002). Murphy reported that the Biehls' daughter Amy, a Fulbright scholar from Southern California, was stoned and stabbed to death in South Africa in 1993. The Biehls' response to this act was to quit their jobs in order to work full-time on racial reconciliation. They testified in favor of political amnesty for the killers and even offered two of them jobs. Peter Biehl reported that for him and his wife, it was liberating to forgive (Murphy, 2002).

Many of the same kinds of things were said during the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, which began in 1994 to deal

with the aftermath of apartheid in that country (Tutu, 1999). Desmond Tutu, the chairman of the TRC, said that the Commission heard from black people who said that once they forgave those who had committed atrocities against them or their families, they experienced a great sense of relief. Tutu stated that forgiveness in this context was related to the African concept of *ubuntu*, which means that a person's humanity is inextricably bound up in the humanity of others. The experience of the Biehls' and the events in South Africa are illustrations of the dimensions of moral responsibility in restraining retaliation.

Morality in its complete form takes into account mercy as well as justice (Enright, Gassin & Wu, 1992). It was Carol Gilligan (1982) who first proposed that care and responsiveness, in addition to justice, were important in solving moral dilemmas. Forgiveness may be a fundamental means of conflict resolution when the hurt inflicted has been particularly great and the injury egregious (Park & Enright, 1997). It may be true that practicing forgiveness increases one's identity as a moral person because it requires one to see that all human beings are equal in intrinsic worth, regardless of how one human being treats another (Enright, 1994) and it is this inherent equality that makes forgiveness possible.

Forgiveness, because it is a moral issue, is not a self-centered process. This seems paradoxical because forgiveness is done by one person internally (Enright, Eastin, Golden, Sarinopoulos, & Freedman, 1992) but it is still interpersonal in nature and not a form of self-soothing or self-help. These authors say that it is not usually instantaneous; instead, it incorporates affective and behavioral approaches and consists of many steps in what is usually a long

process. Therefore, to say “I forgive you” may or may not be part of the forgiveness process, but cannot be taken as *prima facie* evidence that forgiveness has happened.

People at different levels of moral development may practice forgiveness either as an obligation or as a moral imperative of love (Huang & Enright, 2000) with the latter harboring less suppressed anger than the former. Lack of hostility, resentment, and revenge seeking toward an offender are markers of forgiveness (McCullough et al., 1998) and because hostility is related to cardiovascular health and mortality from all causes (Miller, Smith, Turner, Guijarro, & Hallet, 1996) forgiveness may be related to health outcomes.

Social Interest is a broad construct first proposed by Alfred Adler (1958). It is translated from the original German word *Gemeinschaftsgefühl*, and encompasses a wide variety of attitudes and behaviors that all have in common a sense of shared humanity with the human race and the desire to care for the interests of others as well as one’s own. According to Manaster, Cemalcilar, & Knill (2002), it encompasses cooperation, contribution, compassion, and empathy. It does not merely indicate being a well-adjusted member of one’s ethnic group, tribe, or country. In fact, having strong identifications with these things can be a cover for feelings of personal inferiority. In contrast, possessing social interest means having a sense of belonging to humanity. It is not so much a trait or disposition as it is a view of all of life. It means “living with so little sense of inferiority and vanity that our connections with others demand only efforts for the common good” (Manaster, Cemalcilar, & Knill, 2002). According to Crandall

(1981) social interest includes the ideas of being sympathetic, forgiving and moral. Forgiveness is probably an integral part of the concept of social interest, because social interest encompasses interest in others and in the community and implies empathy, sympathy, understanding, cooperation, and concern for the common good of all (Crandall, 1981). It seems likely that forgiveness would be part of this diverse and altruistic package of concepts. Social interest involves transcending the limits of the self and achieving the ability to identify and empathize with others. It means being able to see another's point of view, and to care about doing this and work at it. Adler (1958) believed that social interest did not contradict legitimate self-interest but went hand in hand with it.

It is reasonable to suppose that social interest might be correlated with forgivingness and moral responsibility. Perhaps persons possessing a high level of forgivingness, a high level of moral responsibility, and a high level of social interest—as well as a low level of aggression—might be less likely to retaliate and seek revenge in the face of personal harm than those who are low in the first three traits and high in the latter one.

CURRENT DIRECTIONS AND ISSUES IN FORGIVENESS RESEARCH: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS

Many unanswered questions exist regarding the nature, effects, and measurement of forgiveness. Although forgiveness was first considered in the context of morality, it is not known whether practicing forgiveness causes one to take on the moral identity of a forgiving person as a result (Rique et al., 1999). In fact, the practice of forgiveness, compared with individual variations in the

personality trait of forgivingness, is a fruitful area for study. Another unknown is the interaction, if any, between forgiveness of others and self-forgiveness (Coyle & Enright, 1998). Self-forgiveness might be related to forgiveness of others in either a moderating or mediating role (Thoresen, Harris, & Luskin, 2000).

What all present models of forgiveness leave out is whether or not justice of some kind has been administered to the offender (Kaminer, 2000). It is conceivable that it would be easier for a victim to forgive a criminal who had committed a violation against him or her if the police and courts had acted to arrest and convict the person. In a similar way, according to this author, therapeutic benefits of forgiveness have received empirical support but in some cases, there may be therapeutic benefits to pursuing justice before, or in place of, forgiveness. And that might further depend on the type of justice that the offender receives. Some theorists (e.g., Enright, 1991) have stated that forgiveness is not incompatible with justice. It remains to be seen how much of a difference it makes in the actual process and practice of forgiveness when some kind of justice is or is not meted out to the offender.

With a clearer picture emerging about what forgiveness is and is not, and constructs related to it, education about the nature of forgiveness seems to be important (Enright, Gassin, & Wu, 1992) including discussion and argument over the various philosophical positions taken concerning it. As stated previously, except in research or therapeutic settings, people are not often taught the basics of how to forgive.

Many recent intervention studies have used clinical samples that undergo weekly individual sessions using a manual called “The Moral Development of Forgiveness” (Enright, 1992). Interventions have been done with incest survivors (Freedman & Enright, 1992), elderly women (Hebl & Enright, 1992), post-abortion men (Coyle & Enright, 1997), and with parentally love-deprived late adolescents (Al-Mabuk, Enright, & Cardis, 1995). More research needs to be done on forgiveness as a developmental issue because, although it has been identified as a developmental process (Kaminer et al., 2000; Mullet & Girard, 2000; Piaget, 1932), the nature of how it unfolds is far from completely explained.

There have been very few different research designs and methods used in studying forgiveness. Clinical studies exist in plentiful supply, as do brief questionnaire self-reports. However there is a lack of studies involving persons of different cultures and ethnicity, different religions or types of spirituality, various ages, and different basic value systems. There is also a scarcity of interview data and empirically based process studies (Thoresen et al., 2000). These authors suggest the use of structured and semistructured interviews in order to assess how people think and feel about forgiveness. It might be fruitful to ask interview questions related to whether or not they have thought about forgiveness and how they practice it, if in fact they do so.

A pressing need exists to expand the psychometric options available to assess forgiveness in more contexts (McCullough, Hoyt, & Rachal, 2000). These authors propose a 3 x 2 x 4 taxonomy to categorize existing instruments using the following dimensions: *specificity* with which forgiveness is assessed (dyadic or

dispositional), *direction* of measurement (granting versus seeking or accepting forgiveness), and the *method* by which forgiveness is measured (self-reported, outside observer reported, measures of constructive/destructive behaviors toward an offender). The authors note that there are more directions for granting forgiveness (from the forgiver's perspective) than there are for seeking or accepting it (from the transgressor's perspective). Furthermore, they say, there do not seem to be any measures of how an offender perceives that an offended partner has forgiven him/her (however, a dissertation by York was published in 2000 that addresses this topic); no observer-report measures have been done of disposition to forgive; and no behavioral measures exist to assess dispositional forgiveness by observing and summing people's behaviors across a range of real-life events. They put forth the following six questions based on variance components of forgiveness.

To what extent is forgiveness a function of actor characteristics?

To what extent is forgiveness a function of partner characteristics?

To what extent is forgiveness a function of characteristics of the dyad?

To what extent is forgiveness a function of the magnitude of the offense?

Do actors vary in their willingness to forgive minor versus major offenses?

Do partners vary in their forgiveability for minor versus major offenses?

To what extent is forgiveness a function of systematic or random factors...

(p. 78)

No single study could attempt to answer all of these questions. This list is simply provided to emphasize how little is known and how much there is to discover about the construct of forgiveness. The fact that forgiveness is indeed a construct apart from other related constructs has been established (Enright, 1999) such as its difference from justice (Power, 1994) and empathy (McCullough et al., 1998). Researchers have found that although empathy is distinct from forgiveness, level of empathy is a strong predictor of forgiveness and mediates relationships between dispositional and environmental variables affecting one's level of forgiveness of an offender (McCullough, 1997).

When concepts have a short empirical history, it is difficult to determine how the construct is related to other constructs because little solid theoretical work exists, and the existing psychometric studies will be preliminary (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955). Forgiveness is such a concept. Its empirical track record goes back not much more than fifteen years. The psychometrics associated with forgiveness are much in need of elaboration and refinement, just as are the models and definitions of the construct.

One issue affecting research design is whether forgiveness and one's need to forgive are sensitive topics (Thoresen, Harris, & Luskin, 2000). If many people find it difficult to admit that there is someone they need to forgive, or if some people never consider forgiveness until they know what it is, it may require a careful research design to explore its nature. These authors suggest the use of qualitative as well as quantitative research designs, preferably in combination, to

get a fuller picture of forgiveness processes. Failure to do this may result in valuable information remaining untouched and unseen.

Another issue is recognizing the role of individual differences in socioeconomic status, ethnicity, gender, age, culture, and religion in one's propensity to forgive (Thoresen, Harris, & Luskin, 2000). Because so many of the studies are of small clinical samples, these variables have not been studied as much as they need to be. Forgiveness does seem to be related to gender (e.g., Lukasik, 2000) although in some studies conducted on people's propensity to forgive, no gender differences are observed (Mullet & Girard, 2000). These same authors found other studies in which forgiveness was statistically significant with regard to age. The older the person, the more likely they were to be forgiving, and adolescents but not adults seemed to take into account the attitude of other people in deciding whether or not to forgive someone. Nevertheless, these findings are still preliminary and need further exploration.

It may be that level of religiosity is one strong determining factor, given its long association with forgiveness (Worthington, Berry, & Parrott, 2001). However, given the dearth of accurate knowledge of what forgiveness is among the general public, a large number of people may not have thought about it very much, or they may have thought about it in ways that are inaccurate. More needs to be done to determine the best methods for educating different kinds of people on the basics of forgiving others who have offended them.

It is possible, and seems logical, that forgivingness is related to overall social interest. It is possible that both are related to the tendency to be low in

aggression, high in moral responsibility, and to refrain from retaliating after being harmed. To date, no study has been done that attempts to correlate aggression, forgivingness, moral responsibility, and social interest with the tendency to retaliate for wrongs done to oneself. This is not surprising because the study of forgivingness as a general attitude is still in its earliest stages and the first measure of forgivingness only appeared recently (Berry, Worthington, Parrott, O'Connor, & Wade, 2001) although studies on the other three constructs are more plentiful.

CHAPTER 3

STUDY

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

There are few studies looking at forgiveness or forgivingness in conjunction with other variables to see how they affect retaliation. This study is patterned on one done by Batson et al. (2000) that looked at moral responsibility and whether it increased or restrained retaliation after being harmed. These authors pointed out that, despite ongoing empirical interest in vengefulness, we still do not know very much about why people retaliate or decide not to do so. The current research was designed to shed further light on that question by examining retaliation in light of moral responsibility along with three additional variables that might reasonably, based on their theory and empirical history, be connected to retaliation. These variables are aggression, forgivingness, and social interest.

This is a fruitful time to do this study because there is now a reliable measure for the trait of forgivingness. This is new. Measures have been in existence for many years for the other three constructs of aggression, moral responsibility, and social interest. Instruments have also been available for at least ten years that measure forgiveness as a single act. But now overall forgivingness can be examined along with these other traits, acts, and orientations. (Social interest is considered an overall outlook on life, or an orientation, rather than a trait *per se*.) Levels of aggression, forgivingness, and social interest could

be pivotal in determining level of retaliation just as much as moral responsibility is. A person's inherent aggression level might make it more likely that he or she would retaliate, while high levels of the other three traits might cause the opposite to happen. The purpose of this study was to find out to what extent that was true.

Because this study was designed to be similar to the Batson study, what follows is a detailed summary of that study, with similarities and differences to the present research noted where appropriate. Batson et al. looked only at moral responsibility as it restrained or increased the likelihood of retaliation. This study examined the four variables described above as they each affect retaliation.

The study done by Batson et al. was designed to find out the impact of a person's sense of moral responsibility on his or her reaction to being harmed. These researchers stated that moral responsibility might either intensify or restrain the tendency to retaliate in the face of harm. They pointed out that on the one hand, moral responsibility could cause a person to be so concerned with justice that when an injustice occurred, a person would retaliate swiftly and surely. On the other hand, moral responsibility could restrain retaliation by causing a person to refrain from responding in kind, by treating the other person better than he/she deserved in light of the offense. So having a strong sense of moral responsibility could result in either reaction, and the Batson study was designed to find out which one it would be.

Because harming a research participant is morally problematic, these empiricists set up an experimental situation in which a participant received ten raffle tickets, which would serve as a means of harm being done or intended when

they were taken away, or an unsuccessful attempt was made to take them away. Each participant was told that the tickets were good for a series of drawings for a \$30 gift certificate to the store of the participant's choice. The experimenter told the participant that he/she was Participant B, and that he/she was going to be involved in a 'social exchange' with another participant called Participant A. He/she would never see or meet Participant A, but the two participants would communicate by written instructions and forms that the experimenter would deliver back and forth between them. In reality, Participant A was fictitious.

In the first round of this social exchange, the experimenter delivered instructions, ostensibly from Participant A, demanding nine of Participant B's ten raffle tickets. Participant B had been told at the outset that should this happen, he/she had to give up the requested tickets and put them in an envelope for the experimenter to deliver to Participant A. In one experimental group, the tickets were taken away and that ended the first round. In another experimental group, the experimenter brought back the tickets after taking them away, and said that although Participant A had tried to take them, the experimenter had erred in allowing Participant A to do this. The experimenter was now correcting the error and returning the tickets to Participant B for the second and final round. In this condition, Participant B ended up with his/her original ten tickets, but knew that Participant A had tried to take them away and had not succeeded—so Participant A had intended, but had not been able to inflict, harm on Participant B. This part of Batson's procedure, with the harm-done, harm-intended group and the harm-

not-done, harm-intended group, is similar to the present study that has these two conditions as the experimental groups.

During the second round in these groups, Participant B was always in control and was always informed, just before the round started, that this second round would be the last one. Therefore, the giving up of the raffle tickets to Participant A was the experimental manipulation of “harm done/harm intended” and having the tickets returned after giving them up constituted “harm not done/harm intended”. These two manipulations were designed to produce a condition where Participant B could choose whether or not to retaliate against Participant A for taking, or attempting to take, nine tickets from Participant B. Participant B always filled out the final raffle ticket reallocation form and could request as many tickets from Participant A as he/she wanted. Participant B knew that Participant A would not have the chance to respond, that the two of them would never meet, and that nobody would know what Participant B’s final decision was. In sum, Participant B had a completely free choice about how matters would end up regarding the number of raffle tickets allocated to each participant. This was true in all of Batson’s conditions, including the control condition. This was also true in the present study.

The control group was set up in the same way in Batson’s study and the present one. In this group there was only one round. Participant B knew this, and was told that each participant had ten tickets and that it was up to Participant B to decide in that one round whether to give to, or take tickets from, Participant A, and how many. Once Participant B did this, the experimenter took the allocation

instructions away, ostensibly to deliver the instructions (and possibly also tickets) to Participant A. The experimenter then brought the correct number of tickets to Participant B if any were requested, and that ended the round and the session.

The present study closely follows this format, with the exception of having three conditions instead of four. The present study, unlike Batson's, did not have a condition in which harm happened by chance. Batson's study had a fourth experimental condition called "harm done/harm not intended" in which Participant B had to give nine raffle tickets to Participant A, but this supposedly happened by random drawing. This study did not include that condition, because the focus of the outcome measure depended on at least the intention of harm to Participant B., rather than on what happens when chance is involved in causing harm.

The three groups in the present study were Harm Done/Harm Intended; Harm Not Done/Harm Intended; and Harm Not Done/Harm Not Intended. The level of retaliation, measured by the number of tickets with which Participant B finished the social exchange, was the sole dependent variable, just as it was in Batson's original study. However, the present study had five independent variables instead of the two in Batson's study. Batson et al. had group membership and moral responsibility as the two independent variables. The present study included these, but added aggression, forgiveness, and social interest, for a total of five independent variables.

One important aspect of both studies was that in the harm done/harm intended group, it was possible for Participant B to do three things: 1) take from 1

to 19 tickets from Participant A; 2) to give away 1 ticket to Participant A; or 3) not to give or take any tickets. In the harm not done/harm intended group and in the harm not done/harm not intended group, it was only possible for Participant B to 1) take 1 to 10 tickets from Participant A, 2) to give away 1 to 10 tickets, or 3) not to give or take any tickets. The measure of retaliation, therefore, was not the number of tickets taken from Participant A, but the number of tickets that Participant B had in hand at the end, because the starting point for these groups was not the same. The final distribution of tickets—how many tickets from 0 to 20 that Participant B ended the experiment with—was the measure that counted and the measure that was called ‘retaliation’. The more skewed the distribution of tickets was in favor of Participant B, the higher the retaliation score.

Batson et al. found that moral responsibility (the first independent variable) along with the four combinations of harm done/harm intended, harm done/harm not intended, harm not done/harm intended, or harm not done/harm not intended (the second independent variable) impacted the dependent variable called level of retaliation, measured by the number of tickets taken from Participant A and, more importantly, the number of tickets with which Participant B finished.

There was a main effect for moral responsibility in Batson’s study. Participants scoring high on moral responsibility were less likely to retaliate. There was also a main effect for harm done and one for harm intended. More retaliation was observed in the harm done/harm intended condition than in the harm not done/harm intended condition, although the level of retaliation in the

harm not done/harm intended condition was also statistically significant. There was a significant interaction effect between level of moral responsibility and harm intended. Participants low in moral responsibility took significantly more tickets than those high in moral responsibility after they learned that Participant A intended to take nine tickets from them. Participants who scored high in moral responsibility had a smaller difference in scores based on intent, and this difference was not statistically significant. So high moral responsibility restrained, rather than intensified, the level of retaliation in groups where harm was intended.

One important difference between the Batson study and the present one is that in the Batson study, the researchers dichotomized moral responsibility by dividing it into 'high' and 'low' levels. To do this, the researchers split the scores at the median. They measured their results with ANOVAs. The present study measured moral responsibility as well as aggression, forgivingness, and social interest as continuous variables using the method of correlation, with ANOVAs used to measure differences by group.

RESEARCH HYPOTHESES

H1. The level of retaliation will differ according to the degree with which harm was both intended and/or done, with the highest level of retaliation occurring in the Harm Done/Harm Intended condition.

H2. Retaliation scores will differ according to forgivingness scores. Retaliation scores will be higher as forgivingness scores are lower.

H3. Retaliation scores will differ according to social interest scores.
Retaliation scores will be higher as social interest scores are lower.

H4. Retaliation scores will differ according to moral responsibility scores.
Retaliation scores will be higher as moral responsibility scores are lower.

H5. Retaliation scores will differ according to aggression scores.
Retaliation scores will be higher as aggression scores are higher.

H6. Levels of forgivingness, social interest, moral responsibility, and aggression will predict the level of retaliation.

PARTICIPANTS

One hundred and twenty one (121) undergraduate students participated in this study. Forty-two were men, and seventy-nine were women. Eighty-four (about 69 percent) were white, twenty-two (about 18 percent) were Asian, nine (about 7 percent) were Black, one (about 1 percent) was Hispanic, and the five other participants did not indicate ethnicity. The average age of the participants was 20.6 years. They were enrolled in one of several undergraduate courses in Educational Psychology and recruited from the Educational Psychology Subject Pool. They received course credit for participation in the study.

METHOD

The study had an independent variable of group membership, with individuals assigned to one of two experimental groups and one control group.

The conditions of Harm Done/Harm Intended and Harm Not Done/Harm Intended constituted the experimental groups, and Harm Not Done/Harm Not Intended served as the control group. In addition to being assigned to one of these three groups, all participants completed instruments measuring aggression, forgivingness, moral responsibility, and social interest. The dependent variable was the level of retaliation, measured by the number of raffle tickets held at the end by Participant B. (Every participant in the study was designated Participant B and told so, with Participant A being fictitious although Participant B did not know this.) All participants were told that the raffle for which the tickets were used was only open to participants in the study, so the chances of winning were quite good. There was indeed a \$50 prize given at the end of the study, that all participants had an equal chance of winning, and it was awarded at the completion of the study.

A qualitative questionnaire was also included to gather additional information. The qualitative questionnaire was designed to seek confirmation that what seemed to be happening, given the quantitative results, was actually happening based on statements made by the participants themselves.

This procedure closely replicated the one done by Batson et al. (2000) described above. Prior to the experimental session and prior to taking the tests, participants completed consent forms and demographic information. On the demographic questionnaire, participants were asked to indicate gender, ethnicity, and religious preference. They were also told to use the last four digits of their student ID number on every form they filled out that day, for identification

purposes. Either prior to the experiment or following it, they completed the Aggression Questionnaire, the Moral Responsibility Scale, the Social Interest Scale and the Transgression Narrative Test of Forgiveness. Half of the participants completed the experiment with the raffle tickets first, while the other half completed the tests first. This was done to check for order effects.

The participants took the tests in small groups supervised by the experimenter. They were told that not talking to the other test-takers was very important, and that if they had any questions about any of the test items or if anything was not clear, they should feel free to ask the person in charge.

For the experimental part of the study, participants were randomly assigned to a group called Harm Done/Harm Intended; Harm Not Done/Harm Intended; and Harm Not Done/Harm Not Intended (control group) as shown below. There was no Harm Not Intended/Harm Done group because the retaliation to be measured depended on at least the perception of harm being intended to the participant.

Figure 3

The Two Experimental Groups (1,2) and Control Group (3)

	<u>Harm Done</u>	
<u>Harm Intended</u>	Yes	No
Yes	1	2
No	X	3

All participants in all groups received written instructions that there was another participant, designated Participant A (who was fictitious), and that he/she was Participant B. Prior to the social exchange of raffle tickets, the experimenter took each participant to a room in which he or she was alone when the experimenter was not there. Then the experimenter presented the participant with ten raffle tickets and asked the participant to count them. The counting of the tickets was intended to make them salient to the participant as well as to check for accuracy in the number of tickets. All participants began with 10 raffle tickets.

After the participant counted the raffle tickets, the experimenter gave the participant a piece of paper with written instructions on it. The instructions read as follows:

This study is part of ongoing research concerning outcomes in social situations. You and one other same-sex Educational Psychology student will be placed in an outcome situation. One of you will be randomly designated Participant A and the other Participant B. To ensure that each of you care about the outcomes received, it is necessary to use real outcomes. Therefore, prior to entering the outcome situation, each of you will be given 10 raffle tickets, each good for one chance at winning a \$50 gift certificate to the store of the winner's choice. Depending on the result of the outcome situation, however, you may end up with more or less than 10 tickets. There are several raffles, and only participants in this study are eligible for these raffles, so anyone who ends up with a number of tickets has a good chance of winning a gift certificate. Obviously, the more tickets you have at the end, the better your chance.

The experimenter left the room while the participant read these written instructions, and then returned after a few minutes to see if the participant had any questions. If so, the experimenter answered any questions that were asked, and then told the participant that he/she was to be Participant B and the other

participant was Participant A. Along with the written instructions and raffle tickets, the participant was now given an envelope labeled 'Participant B', in which were a raffle ticket reallocation form and an additional envelope inside the envelope labeled 'Participant B' which was labeled 'Participant A'. Also included in Participant B's envelope were instructions saying that if Participant A chose to give tickets to Participant B, those tickets would be found in the envelope. However, if Participant A wanted tickets from Participant B, then Participant B must put the requested number of tickets in the envelope labeled 'Participant A'.

Group One was the Harm Done, Harm Intended condition and **Group Two** was the Harm Not Done, Harm Intended condition. In these groups, the experimenter gave the participant an envelope labeled "Participant B" which explained that the envelope contained the reallocation form for Round 1 completed by Participant A. The experimenter said, "Once I leave, you need to look at this. If Participant A wants tickets from you, you need to put those tickets in the envelope. If Participant A decided to give you tickets, there will be tickets already in the envelope." In these groups, participants never received any tickets, but always received a raffle ticket reallocation form that looked like it had been filled out by Participant A. The form read, "Participant A has 10 tickets. Participant B has 10 tickets. I want to: **take tickets from Participant B**" (this was circled, while **give tickets to Participant B**, the other choice, was left blank.). Next to this, on the same form, there was the question "How many tickets?" and the number 9 was written in the blank space following the question,

as if Participant A had filled out these instructions. The bottom of the form read, “Participant A has 19 tickets. Participant B has 1 tickets”. Again, the digits were written in blank spaces provided for them, and it appeared that Participant A had calculated the total number of tickets that each participant would have following the first exchange in Round 1. The experimenter left for a few minutes so that Participant B could place nine tickets in the envelope labeled ‘Participant A’. Then the experimenter returned and took the nine tickets away. This procedure was the same in both the Harm Done/Harm Intended group and the Harm Not Done/Harm Intended group.

In the Harm Done/Harm Intended condition, the experimenter returned and informed participants that there would be a second round, that this would be the final round, and that Participant B would be in control. Participants were then given a) detailed information sheets for Round 2, which said that at the start of the round Participant A had 19 tickets and Participant B had 1; b) a reallocation form on which participants could indicate whether they wished to give or take tickets from Participant A; and c) an envelope labeled “Participant A” in which to place the reallocation form for delivery to Participant A. All participants were left alone to read this information, complete the reallocation form and place it in the envelope. The experimenter then came back to pick up the reallocation form and left with it. A few minutes later, the experimenter returned with the number of tickets requested, if the participant had requested any.

In the Harm Not Done/Harm Intended group, the experimenter returned after a few minutes and said to the participant, “It turns out I made a mistake.

There was only supposed to be one round, and you were supposed to be in control. So what I've done is return your tickets to you. This will be the first and only round, and you are in control. Participant A has ten tickets and so do you. I've brought you a reallocation form and you need to make a decision about the raffle tickets." The experimenter handed these participants 1) a correct detailed information sheet for Round 1, saying that Participant A had ten tickets and Participant B had ten tickets; 2) a reallocation form for Participant B to fill out; and 3) an envelope labeled 'Participant A'. The experimenter then left the room again for a few minutes, returning after that time to pick up the envelope with its completed reallocation form (and tickets, if any). When the participant requested tickets, the experimenter returned again after a short interval with the number of tickets requested.

In **Group Three**, the Harm Not Done, Harm Not Intended condition (control group) participants received three items in an envelope labeled 'Participant B': 1) an instruction sheet which said that there was only one round and that Participant B was in control of it; 2) a reallocation form saying that Participant A and Participant B each had ten tickets, and that Participant B needed to make a decision about whether to give or take tickets, and how many, along with a form to fill out; 3) an envelope labeled 'Participant A'. They were left alone to fill out the reallocation form. They filled out this form and put it in the envelope labeled 'Participant A' for the experimenter to pick up; the experimenter then came back and picked it up, left again, and came back after a few minutes to deliver tickets to Participant B if any were requested.

After making their reallocation decisions, participants in both of the experimental groups were asked to complete a qualitative measure describing why they made the reallocation decision that they did. Sample items for this questionnaire were, “It made me angry when I lost 9 tickets” and “I thought about taking back more than my share of tickets, but I didn’t” “What I did was exactly what Participant A deserved” and “I wanted to show Participant A what being fair and kind was like”. After each item, the participant was asked to indicate how strongly he or she agreed or disagreed with it, and each item there was the word “Why?” There were also a few open-ended items such as “What did you think about when you lost 9 tickets?” “How did you feel when you lost 9 tickets?” “When it came time for your turn, what were you thinking and feeling then?” The purpose of these questions was to find out, in the participants’ own words, what kinds of thoughts occurred to them when harm was done or intended, and how forgiving and social interest did or did not play a part in that. Answers to these qualitative questions are reported along with the quantitative data analyses, and the implications of both are discussed.

Following the conclusion of the experiment and all data collection, a drawing was held in which all participants were entered, and \$50 was awarded to the winner. Participants were fully debriefed by e-mail about the nature of the procedure and its goals. Although there was no face-to-face debriefing, participants seemed to believe the subterfuge about Participant A and accepted Participant A as real. One who indicated on her qualitative measure that she did not was dropped from analysis.

MEASURES

The first measure was the retaliation score. This was measured by counting how many raffle tickets Participant B held at the end of the experiment. This was done to provide a consistent measure in the three groups. Participants in the Harm Done/Harm Intended group had the opportunity to take from 0 to 19 tickets or to give away 0 tickets or 1 ticket. In contrast, participants in the Harm Not Done/Harm Intended and the Harm Not Done/Harm Not Intended groups had the opportunity to give or take from 0 to 9 tickets. Therefore it would have been misleading to measure the number of tickets taken from Participant A. The measure of interest was how many tickets each participant held at the end of the social exchange, from 0 to 20, and that was what was scored.

The Aggression Questionnaire (Buss & Perry, 1992) is a 29-item test with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Its alpha coefficient is .89 and its test-retest reliability in the initial administration was .80. Construct validity was established by correlating the scores on this scale with scores on various other personality tests measuring similar traits such as verbal and physical aggression, anger, and hostility. Persons scoring high on the Aggression Scale also tended to be nominated by their peers for being aggressive people.

The Social Interest Scale (SIS: Crandall, 1981) is a short scale in which the respondent is presented with 24 pairs of personal characteristics and asked which one of the pair that he/she would prefer to have as one of his/her own characteristics; some of the characteristics indicate social interest and others do not. Internal reliability was measured by the Kuder-Richardson Formula, which

yielded a coefficient alpha of .73. Test-retest reliability was .82 over five weeks. Construct validity was established by administering the SIS to a group of prison inmates (N = 30), a group of freshman college students (N = 38) and a group of male university employees (N = 104). The social interest scores for the inmates were significantly lower than the scores for the freshmen and the university employees. This was expected, because by definition people who commit crimes are low in social interest. The instrument was also validated with other instruments measuring different aspects of social interest such as cooperation ($r = .32, p < .01$); altruism, comparing two groups of people, one who volunteered for a task and another who did not ($t(22) = 2.21, p < .05$); and empathy ($r = .40, p < .005$). The authors established discriminant validity by showing that the SIS had only a weak negative correlation with desire for acceptance ($r = -.14, p < .01$). Social interest is not supposed to correlate with introversion or extraversion (Crandall, 1981) and in the SIS it does not ($r = .06, p > .50$). The author also stated that the SIS does not correlate with level of intelligence, although the correlation coefficient was not reported for this. The scale has adequate reliability and validity for a research instrument.

The Transgression Narrative Test of Forgiveness (TNTF: Berry, Worthington, O'Connor, Parrott, & Wade, 2001) consists of five narrative scenarios presenting the respondent with situations in which someone transgresses against him/her and asking how likely it would be that the respondent would forgive in those circumstances. The instrument is scored on a five point Likert-type scale from "definitely not forgive" to "definitely forgive." After an

administration of the test to a sample of 105 persons, Cronbach's alpha for internal reliability reached .79, which is acceptable for a five-item scale employing a relatively small sample size. The authors stated that the sample sizes they have used thus far have not been extremely large. They also used Rasch scaling procedures to test the psychometric reliability of the scale (Rasch, 1960). Rasch scaling is used to estimate a person's probable response to a given test item, taking into account how much of the trait they possess and how easy or hard the item is to endorse. The Rasch's Person R was .82 and the Rasch's Item R was .99. The authors established convergent validity by correlating scores on the TNTF with scores on several inventories measuring dispositional anger and found negative correlations ($r = -.38$ for correlations with the total Trait Anger Scale.) The authors note that this is important because evidence of an angry disposition is considered to be evidence against a tendency to forgive (Williams, 1989).

The scale used to measure moral responsibility is a composite of three scales: the Social Responsibility Scale (Berkowitz & Lutterman, 1968) the Ascription of Responsibility Scale (Schwartz, 1968), and the Machiavellianism Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970). The three tests together have 56 items. According to Batson et al. (2000) it is common practice in empirical research to use this combination of scales as a measure of moral responsibility. Staub (1974) found that the three measures together correlate significantly with helping behavior.

The Social Responsibility Scale is an 8-item test with a 5-point Likert-type scale. Its authors describe it as internally reliable, although no reliability and validity coefficients are given. The authors state that the scale measures a

person's likelihood of contributing to the greater good of his or her society. Berkowitz and Lutterman (1968) state that the socially responsible person is one who is involved in society, has a sense of social obligation, and subscribes to the traditional Protestant work ethic.

The Ascription of Responsibility Scale (Schwartz, 1968) is a 28-item test with a 4-point, Likert-type scale. Its Kuder-Richardson coefficient of reliability was .67 and its test-retest reliability was .63 in its initial administrations. Construct validity was established by comparing results on this test with the results of a so-called "Prisoner's Dilemma" in which a person chooses to either cooperate or not with another person whose choice is unknown, for a certain payoff. If one cooperates and the other does not, the non-cooperating person receives the greater reward. Those who scored high on the Ascription of Responsibility (AR) Scale also tended to score high on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. Those with high scores on the AR also tended to be rated by their peers as responsible persons.

The Machiavellianism Scale (Christie & Geis, 1970) measures a person's tendency to be manipulative and to seek power in social relationships. It is a 20-item, 5-point Likert-type scale. Its split-half reliability is .79 and its internal reliability is between .60 and .67. Construct validity was established by correlating scores on this scale with scores on personality scales measuring related traits, such as a tendency to lie and to act in antisocial ways. The score on this test was subtracted from the combined score on the other two moral responsibility measures.

CHAPTER 4

RESULTS

DISCUSSION OF THE SIX HYPOTHESES

In this section, the results are reported in the same order as the hypotheses. Each hypothesis is discussed in turn. For hypothesis one, the effect of membership in the Harm Done/Harm Intended, Harm Not Done/Harm Intended, or Harm Not Done/Harm Not Intended groups will be discussed and shown. There were order effects present, and those are discussed next. Hypotheses two through five deal with the correlations between each of the four independent variables of aggression, forgivingness, moral responsibility, and social interest with the dependent variable of retaliation.

There was some multicollinearity present. For this reason, in the discussion of the second hypothesis, a discussion of the correlations between the various test scores precedes the discussion of the results of the second hypothesis. For hypotheses three through five, only the correlations between each test score and the retaliation score are discussed. In the discussion of the sixth hypothesis, it is possible to see how well each of the experimental variables predicted the outcome variable; that is, to what extent aggression, forgivingness, moral responsibility, and social interest predicted the level of retaliation.

H1. The level of retaliation will differ according to the degree with which harm was both intended and/or done, with the highest level of retaliation occurring in the Harm Done/Harm Intended condition.

This hypothesis was not supported. To see whether the level of retaliation differed according to the degree with which harm was done and/or intended, a one-way ANOVA by group, using the three groups of Harm Done/Harm Intended, Harm Not Done/Harm Intended, and Harm Not Done/Harm Not Intended, was performed to test for significant differences across the conditions, with the dependent variable being retaliation scores measured by the number of tickets held at the end by Participant B. The results for hypothesis 1 are shown in tables 1 and 2. The means for each group are shown in table 1, and the ANOVA result is shown in table 2. There were no statistically significant differences between the means, so the level of retaliation did not differ by group. In table 3, the frequency of each retaliation score from 0 to 20 is indicated. A score of 0 means that the participant ended up with no raffle tickets, while a score of 20 means that the participant ended up with all of the raffle tickets.

Table 1

Retaliation Score Means (Tickets Taken from Participant A) By Group

<u>Group</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>
Harm Done, Harm Intended	42	13.64	5.47	0	20
Harm Not Done, Harm Intended	40	14.33	4.47	4	20
Harm Not Done, Harm Not Intended	39	13.28	5.45	4	20

Table 2

ANOVA of Means Across the Three Groups

<u>Source</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Sig.</u>
Between groups	22.25	2	11.12	.419	.66
Within groups	3136.31	118	26.58		
Total	3158.56	120			

Table 3 shows the frequencies of each retaliation score. The mean score for retaliation was 13.75 tickets, indicating that participants tended to end up with somewhat more than the 10 tickets with which they began. The median number of tickets held by the participants at the end of the experiment was 15. The mode was 20, which shows that more participants ended up with all of the tickets than ended up with any other number. The retaliation scores attained by the participants ranged from 0 tickets to the full 20. These results did not vary significantly by the group to which the participant was assigned.

Table 3

Frequency of Retaliation Scores

Score	Frequency	Percent	Cumulative Percent
0	3	2.5	2.5
4	2	1.7	4.1
5	6	5.0	9.1
7	2	1.7	10.7
8	4	3.3	14.0
9	5	4.1	18.2
10	13	10.7	28.9
11	8	6.6	35.5
12	5	4.1	39.7
13	8	6.6	46.3
14	2	1.7	47.9
15	17	14.0	62.0
16	6	5.0	66.9
17	2	1.7	68.6
18	5	4.1	72.7
19	10	8.3	81.0
20	23	19.0	100.0
Total	121	100.0	100.0

SPECIAL NOTE CONCERNING ORDER EFFECTS

Order effects existed. Whether or not participants took the tests first, or did the experiment with the raffle tickets first, made a statistically significant difference in their retaliation scores. This difference in scores based on order effects did not extend to aggression scores, forgiveness scores, moral responsibility scores, or social interest scores. Participants did not score

differently on any of the tests by doing them first or second. Neither did the order effect cause much variation in the correlations between forgivingness and retaliation, moral responsibility and retaliation, aggression and retaliation, or social interest and retaliation. For example, the correlation between forgivingness and retaliation when participants took the tests first was $-.279$, and the correlation between these variables when the participants did the experiment first was $-.337$. Other variations in correlations, depending on whether the participants did the tests or experiment first, were also small.

There was no interaction effect between group membership and doing the test or experiment first. The order effect impacted only the dependent variable of retaliation. Participants taking the tests first retaliated significantly less than participants doing the experiment first. Order effects in terms of group means (the group doing the tests first and the group doing the experiment first) are shown in table 4, and an ANOVA showing their significance appears in table 5.

Table 4

Order Effects on Retaliation Score of Doing Tests or Experiment First

<u>Condition</u>	<u>N</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>Min.</u>	<u>Max.</u>
Tests first	58	12.07	5.01	0	20
Experiment first	63	15.03	4.77	0	20

Table 5

ANOVA of Order Effects on Retaliation Score

<u>Source</u>	<u>SS</u>	<u>df</u>	<u>MS</u>	<u>F</u>	<u>Sig.</u>
Between groups	315.57	1	315.57	13.21	.00
Within groups	2842.99	119	23.89		
Total	3158.56	120			

H2. Retaliation scores will differ according to forgivingness scores.

Retaliation scores will be higher as forgivingness scores are lower.

This hypothesis was supported. In order to determine all correlations, those between the test scores as well as those between the scores on each test and

the retaliation scores, a correlational analysis was performed with the test statistic being the Pearson r . The correlation between forgiveness scores and retaliation scores was $-.284$, a statistically significant correlation in the expected negative direction. This correlation is shown in Table 6. While there was multicollinearity present between many of the tests, the magnitude of the correlations indicates that although the constructs being measured overlap to a degree, they do not measure exactly the same thing.

The correlation between the scores on the measure of aggression and the measure of moral responsibility was $-.502$, which is a fairly substantial negative correlation. It indicates that aggression and moral responsibility are somewhat opposing constructs. Aggression correlated negatively with social interest and forgiveness as well, although not so strongly. Moral responsibility correlated positively with both social interest and forgiveness. Social interest and forgiveness were not significantly correlated, although the Pearson r was in the expected positive direction.

Hypotheses 2 through 5 refer to tables 6 and 7. Correlations between the test scores are shown in table 6. Descriptive statistics, obtained for scores on all the tests and also on the measure of retaliation, are shown in table 7.

Table 6

Correlations Between Test Scores

	<u>Aggression Questionnaire</u>	<u>Moral Responsibility Scale</u>	<u>Social Interest Scale</u>	<u>Transgression Narrative Test of Forgiveness</u>	<u>Retaliation</u>
Aggression Questionnaire	xxx	-.502*	-.326*	-.399*	.145
Moral Responsibility Scale		xxx	.376*	.289*	-.268*
Social Interest Scale			xxx	.148	-.259*
Transgression Narrative Test of Forgiveness				xxx	-.284*

*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 7

Descriptive Statistics for Scores on All Tests and the Retaliation Measure (N = 121)

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>Range</u>
Aggression Questionnaire	71.63	15.47	29-145
Moral Responsibility Scale	54.95	15.41	16-132
Social Interest Scale	10.21	3.47	0-16
Transgression Narrative Test of Forgivingness	14.05	3.15	5-25
Retaliation score	13.75	5.13	0-20

H3. Retaliation scores will differ according to social interest scores.

Retaliation scores will be higher as social interest scores are lower.

This hypothesis was supported. As shown in Table 6, the $-.259$ correlation between social interest scores and retaliation scores was negative and statistically significant.

H4. Retaliation scores will differ according to moral responsibility scores. Retaliation scores will be higher as moral responsibility scores are lower.

This hypothesis was supported. As shown in Table 6, the $-.268$ correlation between these two sets of scores was negative and statistically significant.

H5. Retaliation scores will differ according to aggression scores.

Retaliation scores will be higher as aggression scores are higher.

This hypothesis was not supported. As shown in Table 6, aggression did not correlate significantly with retaliation, although the .145 correlation was in the expected positive direction.

H6. Levels of forgiveness, social interest, moral responsibility, and aggression will predict the level of retaliation.

This hypothesis was partially supported. A backward regression analysis was performed to determine the degree to which scores on the four scales and group membership predicted retaliation behavior. In a backward regression, all the variables are initially entered into the regression equation. With each iteration, the variables that are not statistically significant ($p < .05$) are removed from the model; the final model includes only those variables whose predictive value is statistically significant. The R^2 value of the final model represents the amount of variance accounted for in retaliation behavior that is due to the remaining variables.

The mean level of retaliation scores (number of tickets held at the end by Participant B) was regressed on the scores on the Aggression Questionnaire, Moral Responsibility Scale, Social Interest Scale, and the Transgression Narrative Test of Forgiveness, for each of the three groups. In this experiment, forgiveness and social interest scores were the strongest predictors of retaliation scores, while aggression scores, moral responsibility scores, and group membership were not statistically significant. The results are shown in Table 8.

Table 8

Summary of Backward Regression Analysis for Variables Predicting Retaliation Scores

Variable	β	SE β	Beta	Sig.
Step 1				
Aggression score	-.0351	.035	-.106	.319
Moral Responsibility score	-.0608	.035	-.183	.086
Social Interest score	-.276	.141	-.187	.052
Forgivingness score	-.398	.154	-.245	.011
Harm done or intended	-.0990	.552	-.016	.858
Step 2				
Aggression score	-.0035	.035	-.105	.321
Moral Responsibility score	-.006	.034	-.179	.085
Social Interest score	-.280	.138	-.190	.045
Forgivingness score	-.401	.153	-.246	.010

Note. $R^2 = .152$ for step 1; change in $R^2 = 0.0$ for step 2.
 R^2 for step 2 = .152 ($p < .05$)

Step 3

Moral Responsibility score	-.0046	.032	-.140	.145
Social Interest score	-.257	.138	-.174	.062
Forgivingness score	-.354	.145	-.218	.016

Note. $R^2 = .152$ for step 2; change in $R^2 = .007$ for step 3.
 R^2 for step 3 = .145 ($p < .05$)

Step 4

Forgivingness score	-.409	.141	-.251	.005
Social interest score	-.328	.128	-.222	.012

Note. $R^2 = .145$ for step 3; change in $R^2 = .016$ for step 4.
 R^2 for step 4 = .129 ($p < .05$)

The final model shows that forgivingness and social interest scores together were the best predictors of retaliation behavior within this set of variables. However, the R^2 value in the final model was only 0.129. Although forgivingness and social interest were the best predictors in this group, they only accounted for 12.9% of the variance in retaliation scores.

OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Hypothesis 1 was not supported. Membership in the groups of Harm Done/Harm Intended, Harm Not Done/Harm Intended, or Harm Not Done/Harm

Not Intended had no impact on retaliation scores. Hypotheses 2 through 4 were supported. Scores on tests of forgiveness, moral responsibility, and social interest correlated significantly and positively with retaliation scores. Hypothesis 5 was not supported. Aggression scores and retaliation scores did not correlate significantly. Hypothesis 6 was partially supported, in that forgiveness scores and social interest scores predicted retaliation scores. Moral responsibility scores, aggression scores, and group membership did not.

No statistically significant differences based on gender, ethnicity, or religious preference were found in scores on the four tests or on retaliation scores.

CHAPTER 5

DISCUSSION

INTRODUCTION

Forgivingness is a construct that is receiving increased attention from researchers. In the past ten to fifteen years in particular, many clinicians and empiricists have been exploring the nature of the construct, both its situation-specific acts of forgiveness and its dispositional aspects of what makes for a forgiving person. The consensus at this point is that forgiveness is a choice to give up resentment and the desire for revenge against someone who has offended oneself. It means that negative thoughts, feelings, and behaviors toward the offender lessen, and positive ones increase. Depending on the magnitude of the offense, this can be either a relatively brief or prolonged process.

Engaging in acts of forgiveness repeatedly is likely to cause one to take on the identity of a forgiving person. Some researchers, such as Enright (1994) have said that practicing forgiveness probably increases one's identity as a moral person; it seems likely that practicing forgiveness would also facilitate becoming a more forgiving person, although the jury is still out on this point (Rique et al., 1994).

Someone with a forgiving disposition realizes that retaliation is not only an attempt to repay in kind, but also an act accompanied by a buildup in emotions of anger and frustration over time. Retaliation is actually unjust because it is overwhelmingly likely to be disproportionate to the initial offense (Power, 1994)

and therefore leads to escalation of acts of injury and even cruelty, creating more problems than the one it is supposed to solve.

The present study showed that forgivingness and social interest were predictors of whether a person would take away a valued resource disproportionate to what was first taken from him or her. This may or may not have been an example of retaliation against the other; in some cases it was, in others not. The study did show that both forgivingness and social interest were related to, although not the same as, moral responsibility; and that forgivingness as a disposition influenced the decision about giving to or taking something from another person.

The research on forgiveness is still in its early stages. The research on forgivingness has barely begun. This study added new insights into how forgivingness and several other constructs influenced a decision to take or not take a valued resource away from someone else. It raised intriguing questions about greed and competitiveness as additional important factors in a decision of this kind. Perhaps in the future, empiricists will discover more about how people engage in forgiving and grow in forgivingness. Perhaps clinicians will build on this research and design ways to help people eschew destructive revenge and more easily make a forgiving response. If this is possible, all of society will benefit.

This section begins with a discussion of the first hypothesis, including descriptive statistics regarding the retaliation scores. The irrelevance of group membership on retaliation scores will be explored, with possible reasons for it. A

discussion of the order effect follows; that is, the effect of having either the tests or the experiment first. That was a finding that occurred but was not anticipated. Following this, the issue and nature of multicollinearity between the tests is explored, preceding the specific discussion of the second hypothesis. The nature of the various test scores' correlations with the outcome measure of retaliation scores will be discussed, as hypotheses two through five are explained. The expected correlations of the retaliation scores with scores on forgiveness, moral responsibility, and social interest will be covered first. Then there is a discussion of why retaliation and aggression did not significantly correlate. Finally, the sixth hypothesis is discussed. Because forgiveness and social interest were the only constructs to have predictive value with regard to the retaliation score, there is a discussion of the overall findings in the context of forgiveness and social interest. Following this, there is an exploration of several other factors that might have influenced the outcome: greed, competitiveness, and financial desperation.

In a separate section, the results of the qualitative questionnaire, and the way they illuminated and added to the quantitative data, are explained. While it is unusual to report qualitative measures *in toto* in the discussion section, doing so here makes sense because it preserves the data as a unity, and this data is best understood in that way. The qualitative measure can be found in Appendix G.

DISCUSSION OF QUANTITATIVE DATA

The first hypothesis

Whether harm was done, intended, or neither did not make a statistically significant difference in the group means on retaliation. The finding that aggression did not vary significantly with retaliation, in conjunction with the finding that the number of tickets taken did not vary significantly by whether harm was done or intended, suggests that retaliation may have been something of a misnomer. In the study, the act of taking more tickets away than were originally taken from oneself was labeled retaliation. However, the fact is that whether harm was done, intended, or neither done nor intended, made no difference in the average number of tickets taken. Therefore instead of retaliation, an issue of basic fairness was probably involved. Justice plays a part in forgiveness just as mercy does. More than one researcher (e.g., Kaminer et al., 2000; Enright, 1991b) has noted that having justice done, or at least an apology offered, makes forgiving someone else's offense much easier.

Participants scoring 10 on the retaliation scale did not retaliate; they merely made the situation what it was at the beginning. A score of less than 10 is to be understood as a negative score on retaliation. Participants scoring less than 10 did not retaliate, since they ended up with fewer tickets than they began with.

To be sure, the qualitative measures indicated that students often went through a process of resenting the other student and then choosing not to act on that feeling, and so the process of forgiveness—feeling resentment and then letting it go—seemed to operate. However, it cannot be ruled out that something

other than forgivingness was involved if a participant ended up with less than the 10 tickets that he or she began with. It is possible that lack of entitlement or low self-esteem could have played a part. Possibly a participant, for whatever reason, felt undeserving of the tickets. One participant stated that she thought that the tickets were not hers to begin with, so their loss was not a matter of great concern. A few participants seemed to say they were indifferent to the outcome, so for them, the experiment may not have had a strong enough manipulation to involve them. These statements could reflect lack of entitlement, indifference, boredom, or simply a participant's truthful version of the nature of the situation in which he or she found himself or herself.

The frequency table showed that more participants chose to take all the tickets they could, leaving Participant A with no tickets, than chose to do anything else. Twenty-three students did this, and ended up with a score of 20. An additional 23 participants ended up with from 16 to 19 tickets. Seventeen students ended up with 15 tickets. That represents more than half of all the participants. Twenty-three participants ended up with eleven to fourteen tickets. Thirteen participants chose to break even and ended with the original ten tickets with which they began. In contrast, only 22 of the 121 participants finished with less than 10 tickets, ending with anywhere from 0 to 9 of them. The total number of participants who ended with more than 10 tickets was 86; the total number of participants who ended with less than 10 tickets was 22, while 13 students ended up with exactly 10 tickets. The median number of tickets taken was 15, which means that half of all the participants took that many tickets or more. Clearly the

trend was toward taking tickets rather than giving them, and taking them in fairly large quantities.

Yet the fact remains that the number of tickets that the participant finished with did not vary by group. The perception of harm, or harm done, did not make a significant difference in the number of tickets held by the participant at the end. Something else was at work, besides the perception or intention of harm, to influence the large numbers of tickets taken and held by the participants. Possibilities for this ‘something else’ are greed, competitiveness, and financial desperation. These constructs are discussed in some detail in the later section titled “Other possible factors influencing the outcome” (p. 123).

The order effect

The order effect was an unexpected and interesting finding. Participants who took the tests first, followed by the experiment, tended to take fewer tickets than those who did the reverse. This was true even though the tests’ titles themselves did not mention anything about forgivingness or morality; they were labeled with such neutral terms as “attitude scale” and “opinion scale.” As stated in the prior section, the order effect did not have any significant impact on individual test scores. Participants’ scores on the individual measures of aggression, forgivingness, moral responsibility, and social interest were not affected by whether they took the tests first or did the experiment first. There was no effect of group membership on these scores either, nor was there an interaction effect of group membership and having the tests or experiment first. Correlations

between the test scores and retaliation were not significantly changed by the order in which the participant did each part of the procedure. In short, the only score that varied by order was the retaliation score.

What this means is that the test contents, measuring forgivingness, social interest and related constructs, might have acted as a kind of treatment. Perhaps the participants, having first completed measures of aggression, forgivingness, moral responsibility, and social interest were primed to view the decision about the raffle tickets as a moral one, and acted accordingly.

Issue of Multicollinearity

Although there was multicollinearity present, it makes sense to consider the constructs separately in discussing hypotheses two through five. The correlations between the tests themselves suggest that although the constructs being measured shared something in common, they did not measure exactly the same thing. This is not an unusual occurrence; some degree of multicollinearity is often present when studying the impacts of multiple constructs, especially when testing constructs of a similar nature.

The strongest correlation among the independent variables was the negative correlation between aggression and moral responsibility. Participants who were aggressive tended not to be very moral, as measured by these instruments. Individuals scoring high on the aggression measure also tended not to be very forgiving or very high in social interest. This finding agrees with what researchers and theorists have said about aggression. Aggressive individuals

engage in acts that injure others verbally or physically, either for hostile reasons or instrumental ones. In either case, aggression is not a moral behavior in the sense of being ethical. Aggressive persons by nature are not concerned with the common good, but only with releasing their own frustrations or gaining rewards for their own ends. Aggression may pay off, but it is not considered a fair way of getting ahead.

Moral responsibility was correlated positively with social interest and forgivingness. This is not surprising either. It is possible that these are part of a package of constructs. People who are morally responsible probably see care for fellow human beings and forgiving those who harm them as part of the whole picture of being morally responsible. Although none of these correlated with religious preference, it is possible that such morally responsible people have a more active spiritual outlook on life, or at least a tendency to measure their own behavior by external, accepted social standards of what constitutes moral behavior. Previous research has found that religiosity is not a direct cause of morality, but it does have something to do with it (Poloma & Gallup, 1991). It appears that the influence of religion on forgiving a specific offense is under the control of a variety of social and cognitive influences (McCullough & Worthington, 1999). An overall moral outlook may prevent people from simply doing what feels good at the time, such as taking as many tickets as they can get away with.

Social interest and forgivingness did not correlate significantly. This was surprising given the correlations between these two constructs and moral

responsibility, but it means that the two constructs each measure something different and contribute something different to the outcome variable of retaliation.

It makes sense that forgiveness and social interest did not correlate significantly, in that while the two constructs point to the same reality, social interest is a much broader construct than forgiveness is. That is, both constructs relate to a general pattern of behavior more than they relate to each other. Social interest is concerned with how a person relates to the world in general. Forgiveness, and the test of forgiveness, asks how forgiving a person would be in several specific hypothetical situations that purportedly call for a forgiving response.

Therefore, given the broad scope of the construct of social interest and the much narrower scope of the construct of forgiveness, social interest may not correlate with one particular trait (in this case, forgiveness) very highly. It is likely that each construct made its own unique contribution to the variance in the retaliation scores.

The fact that they did not correlate significantly may also be an artifact of the format of the two tests. The test of social interest is a forced-choice test between pairs of personality traits, with one personality trait and not the other indicating social interest. The participant chooses one trait in each pair. The test of forgiveness is a series of five narratives where one person commits an offense against another. In this test, the participant must indicate, on a Likert-type scale of one to five, how likely he or she would be to forgive the offender in that situation. A one on the scale means, “definitely not forgive” and a five on the

scale means, “definitely forgive”. Due to these very different types of test format, a lack of correlation in the results is plausible. The tests correlated positively, but the correlation did not reach significance. However, because a later hypothesis showed both of these constructs to be the two predictors of the retaliation score, it is in a sense useful that they are not significantly correlated with each other.

The second hypothesis

Forgivingness scores tended to be higher as retaliation scores were lower. The correlation was in a negative direction. This finding was expected, because a forgiving disposition has been found to indicate a lower likelihood of returning harm for harm. The Transgression Narrative Test of Forgivingness, one of very few measures of forgivingness as a disposition as opposed to individual acts of forgiveness, seems to have measured something significant about a participant’s forgiving disposition. In this study, that translated into a tendency to take away a resource from someone else or to refrain from doing so. Forgivingness is defined as “an enduring disposition to the act or process of forgiveness’ (Roberts, 1995, p. 289) as well as a tendency to forgive repeatedly across persons, times, and places. Participants who said that they were likely to forgive someone in a greater number of circumstances, rather than fewer, took a smaller number of raffle tickets away from Participant A. It is not clear that the taking away of raffle tickets constituted a specific act of ‘forgiving’ the other participant for taking the tickets first, but it is clear that something about having a forgiving disposition matters, in terms of the decision each participant made about giving or taking

tickets. The propensity to take tickets away from someone else was less in people who indicated that they would forgive in more circumstances.

Others have found that the disposition to forgive wrongdoers is negatively associated with a variety of undesirable traits, including ruminating in a vengeful manner after someone wrongs them (e.g., Berry, Parrott, O'Connor, & Wade, 2001). So although the negative correlation between forgivingness and taking excess tickets away may not be conclusive evidence of lack of retaliation, it indicates that possibility. Possessing such a trait might cause a person to let go of offenses more easily. A forgiving individual might decide that to respond in kind after having something taken away would not be worth the escalation of negative emotion or energy that would result.

The third hypothesis

Moral responsibility and retaliation were inversely correlated. This was expected. Moral responsibility seems to cause a person to retaliate less. Batson et al (2000) found the same thing when they conducted a similar study to this one. Morally responsible persons by definition are concerned with doing the right thing, even in the face of the other person not doing the same. This desire to do the right thing may cause a person not to do the most natural thing, which is to take tickets away in disproportionate response to having them taken from oneself.

The fourth hypothesis

Social interest and retaliation varied inversely as well. This also was expected. Social interest is in many ways the very antithesis of retaliation. The taking of something important from someone else in excess of the harm done to oneself by that other person would be contrary to an attitude of concern for the common good. Social interest means caring about the welfare of others and about human society in general. It is important to note that participants high in social interest often chose to take back the tickets that were taken from them so that they were left with the original ten tickets they started with. This does not constitute retaliation because it merely means restoring matters to the way they were before. In terms of the literature, this is called engaging in *distributive justice* rather than *retributive justice*. There was a strong tendency for participants who scored high in social interest to refrain from going beyond that equalization point. They tended not to end up with more raffle tickets than the other participant, although they might, and often did, end up with their original ten tickets.

The fifth hypothesis

It was interesting that aggression did not correlate significantly with retaliation. The correlation was positive but not statistically significant. So there was not a strong tendency for aggression to influence ticket taking. This may

mean that the responses given by the participants during the experiment with the tickets were not related very much to aggression level. In fact, there are good reasons to suppose that aggression would not have to be a driving force at all.

Aggression, as stated earlier, is physical or verbal behavior intended to hurt someone else. The decision about whether or not to take raffle tickets did not have to mean that one wanted to aggress against the other person. It probably did mean that the participant had a stake in righting a wrong. The other findings, especially the discovery that forgivingness and social interest predicted retaliation while aggression did not, indicate that the construct called 'retaliation' was related more to issues of morality and justice than to hostility.

The sixth hypothesis

Forgivingness and social interest predicted retaliation while aggression, moral responsibility, and group assignment did not. Various aspects of the constructs of forgivingness and social interest can explain how things turned out this way.

Forgiving people are fair-minded people as well as merciful people (Enright, Gassin, & Wu, 1992). For instance, one of the unanswered questions in the literature to date is whether practicing forgiveness causes one to take on the identity of a forgiving person. It seems likely that it does. The Transgression Narrative Test of Forgivingness measures dispositional forgivingness. This trait overrode in importance the group membership of the participant, in terms of

whether harm was done or intended or neither. The participants who scored higher on forgivingness, whether or not they consciously forgave the other person for what was done (in the groups where harm was done or intended) or merely considered the other person's position as well as their own (where harm was neither done nor intended) refrained from ending up with more than their share of tickets, and took actions to make this so. Forgivingness seems to have had a hand in making this happen.

Forgivingness is by definition about eschewing self-centeredness and considering and empathizing with others. Care and responsiveness, as well as justice, count in solving moral dilemmas. Empathy is the most proximal variable to forgivingness that has been found up to this point. The participant who scored high on the forgivingness scale was likely to be the participant who could take the perspective of another. This person would be someone who could realize that other people have bad days, for instance; who could recall that people do not always act in the best way they know how, whether because of fatigue, stress, anger, desperation, or simply acting without thinking. This person could consider possibilities like these, because this kind of participant would know himself or herself to be capable of the same, and could make allowances for someone else. That is what empathy and perspective taking is about. Such thinking is much more likely in someone who is concerned about others as well as the self. This is perhaps why the crucial variable determining whether or not forgiveness happens is affective empathy toward an offender.

In such cases as these, a person who engages in this kind of thinking and acting cares for the self as well as for the offending other. When one engages in empathy, positive behavioral and affective changes occur; almost everyone who has researched forgiveness states this. An empathic attitude and forgiving actions can lead to less negative feelings such as anger and sadness, and more positive feelings such as hopefulness and a sense of peacefulness. A forgiving disposition has the tendency to generate positive rather than negative emotions and behaviors. Participants who chose not to act as unfairly as the fictitious other participant did may, therefore, have been taking care of themselves in the very act of caring for the other.

When forgiving occurs, the motivation to seek revenge decreases and is replaced by more positive thoughts and behaviors. Forgiving is a process, and this study took place in a relatively short amount of time. Still, there was evidence in the qualitative measures that some participants did indeed experience a certain resentment toward the other participant, but made the decision not to act on that feeling. In that sense, these participants did engage in a short forgivingness process. Because forgiving another person is in part a function of the magnitude of an offense, it is plausible that in this research context, the magnitude of the offense was minor and that the participants who eschewed acting out of resentment did engage in a short process of forgiving. Further support for this idea comes from findings that people vary in how forgiving they are depending on the situation. It may have been fairly easy, for example, for the participant to forgive someone that he or she did not know, and had never met and

would never meet, rather than someone whom the participant knew and disliked. The fact that the other participant's motive could not be a known factor allowed a participant, if he or she chose, to infer benign rather than malicious motives for Participant A's unfair actions. This, coupled with the relatively unimportant context of a research study, might facilitate forgivingness.

Social interest as well as forgivingness can explain how someone might right a wrong done to him/her but not go beyond that point. Social interest is about transcending the limits of the self and the self-centered perspective, in order to act like someone who is part of the whole human family. If individual autonomy and preserving the self are all that matters, then any actions designed to strengthen community are of little importance (Jones, 1995); while if the community matters at least as much as the self, people who consider themselves to be community members as well as individuals may reflect upon how their actions impact others as well as the self.

A participant who was more skilled in transcending the limits of the self in order to identify with others was likely to be the participant who tended not to do something that would leave the other person worse off than he/she was before the ticket exchange. Social interest involves empathy just like forgivingness does, and perhaps the ability to see the point of view of another person enabled the participant to see the situation fairly and to act that way as well. Empathy is about a sense of common connection and a sense of community.

Social interest also involves a belief in the inherent equality of all human beings. This belief means that even if another person engages in a deplorable

action, that person is still human. In that sense, offender and victim share a basic equality. This sense of equality, of being essentially the same as others, means that a person has very little sense of inferiority or vanity. Flowing from this attitude is a commitment to adding to, rather than detracting from, the common good. When a person high in social interest faces a situation like the one in this study, perhaps that person refrains from exacerbating the wrong because of his or her ongoing commitment to the good of all.

Other possible factors influencing the outcome

There are other possibilities for factors influencing the decision involving giving or taking tickets. One such possibility is that a large number of participants felt a sense of competition with the fictitious other participant with whom they were paired. Perhaps they saw it as a game. In the study, the giving and taking of raffle tickets was never described as any kind of game or contest. Nevertheless, to the degree that the participants did see it that way, then they would not have seen it as a moral dilemma or any kind of life-changing experience.

Given the results of the study, a sense of competition might have played a part, overruling issues of forgivingness or fairness. Because the average participant ended up with either 13 or 14 tickets, perhaps this occurred often. It might have been quite easy to justify taking more tickets than were lost, or seeking to add tickets to one's original supply, by telling oneself that this was no more than a competition.

For some participants, however, the idea that the ticket exchange was a competition might have more easily allowed forgiveness and fairness. The paradigm of a contest could have worked this way too. Some participants who ended up with their original ten tickets or less, and who also saw the situation as a kind of contest, could have decided that because the situation was not important or life-changing there was no harm in letting the other participant have the tickets that he/she seemed to want so desperately. So whether the participant viewed the situation as a game, or as something more important than that, would not preclude attitudes of forgiveness and social interest from operating.

Another possibility is that it was simply greed that motivated some participants to take tickets away in excess of what was taken from them. The \$50 prize may have been attractive enough to arouse this greed. The tendency of greed and social interest to be mutually exclusive has been noted in describing a personality type that wishes to acquire goods or status beyond reasonable limits and without regard for the common good (Richardson & Manaster, 1992). But with greed and social interest being opposing constructs, it would appear that to the extent that greed was a factor, social interest failed to operate. The comments made in the qualitative questionnaire, described in the next section, referred frequently to greed.

It is also possible that the participants in the study were so short of money that a prize worth \$50 was extremely attractive. This attractiveness would result from a sense of financial desperation. College students are, in general, known for being short of money due to the considerable price tag associated with attending

college and paying living expenses along with tuition. If this were the case, then the participants would simply be doing what they deemed necessary in order to have the best chance of acquiring goods that they might not be able to get any other way. However, there did not seem to be any indication that this was widespread, in that the qualitative measure (discussed in the next section) did not contain any direct mention of financial desperation.

In this study, no statistically significant differences in test scores or the retaliation measure were expected based on gender, ethnicity, or religious preference, and none were found. Once again, this points to other variables having a role to play in determining whether a participant would take an excessive number of tickets from another participant or not.

DISCUSSION OF QUALITATIVE DATA

The qualitative questionnaire (found in Appendix G) provided some insights into what the students were thinking about regarding the raffle tickets and the decisions they made concerning them. The questionnaire itself was titled “Questions for Reflection.” Participants in the two experimental groups completed it after they had finished both the tests and the experiment. The nature of several of the questions, which had to do with a participant’s thoughts and feelings about losing raffle tickets, precluded it from being administered to the control group.

The questionnaire first asked what the participants were feeling and thinking about when they lost nine tickets to the other participant. The next

question was “What went through your mind when it was time for your turn to give or take away raffle tickets?” Several other statements followed these questions, and the participant was asked to indicate how strongly he or she agreed or disagreed with each statement. There was a 5-point Likert-type scale on which a 1 meant “strongly disagree,” a 2 meant “disagree,” a 3 meant “neither agree nor disagree,” a 4 meant “agree,” and a 5 meant “strongly agree.” After each 1 to 5 scale, in which the participant was asked to circle his or her chosen answer, there was the word “Why?” and the participant had space to explain his or her agreement or disagreement. Examples of statements were items like “It made me angry to have to give up the raffle tickets” “I thought about taking back more than my share of the raffle tickets, but I didn’t” “What I did was exactly what Participant A deserved” “I wanted to do the right thing in this situation, not what I was most inclined to do” and “One of the reasons I did what I did during the raffle ticket exchange is that, in general, I try to be a good person.” (The full questionnaire is included in the Appendices.)

Descriptive statistics showing the responses for each question are given in table 9. The table begins at question 4 because questions 1 through 3 were open-ended questions without a Likert-type scale. Most of the participants disagreed with question 4 that it made them angry to have to give up their raffle tickets. They more commonly used words like “frustrated” “irritated” or “confused”. The mean response to question 5 was 2.56, with participants close to neither agreeing nor disagreeing with the statement that they thought about taking back more than their share of raffle tickets but did not. The standard deviation was 1.40, so there

was a fairly high spread of scores on this question. A similar pattern appears for answers to questions 6 and 7. Participants tended to agree with the statement that they were satisfied with the decision they made regarding the giving or taking of raffle tickets, regardless of what that decision was. Responses to statements 8 and 9 tended to be statements with which participants neither agreed nor disagreed. In statement 10, participants tended to strongly agree that it may not have been a nice thing for Participant A to take 9 tickets, but that they would not hold it against Participant A. Respondents often commented that things might have been different if they knew each other, or that a person should not be judged by a single action. Statement 11 was a similar statement that received similar responses.

Participants tended to neither agree nor disagree, or to agree, with the statement that read in part, “acting fairly is one part of being a good member of society”. Many of them did not see the connection between their actions and the larger society. This question was designed to ask about social interest. Some participants agreed and indicated in one way or another that the community had a stake in decisions like theirs. However, most of the participants emphasized that it was just a game and society had nothing to do with it, or that fairness was served well enough by their decisions, even if their decisions were to take a lot of tickets. Some seemed to take exception to the question and asked what it had to do with what they had just done. There was a tendency for them to agree with the following statement, number 14, which stated that they did what they did because they tried in general to be good people. This question was also designed to examine social interest. Perhaps they understood this question better than the

previous one in some cases, or simply knew that seeking to be a good person is socially desirable. Interestingly, participants in all categories, those scoring above and below the mean on forgiveness and on retaliation, agreed with this statement with some frequency. Those who took more tickets sometimes wrote elaborate justifications for what they did, suggesting that thinking about being a good person, and simultaneously thinking about taking many tickets, might have induced a degree of discomfort at an apparent hypocrisy.

Table 9

Descriptive statistics for responses on qualitative questionnaire

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>N</u>
4. It made me angry to have to give up the raffle tickets	2.46	1.16	1	5	54
5. I thought about taking back more than my share of the raffle tickets, but I didn't	2.56	1.40	1	5	54
6. I wanted to show Participant A what being fair and kind was like	2.85	1.19	1	5	54
7. What I did was exactly what Participant A deserved	2.85	1.08	1	5	53
8. I'm satisfied with the decision I made regarding the giving or taking away of raffle tickets	4.04	1.10	1	5	54
9. I think it would be fair for anyone in my position to take back what I lost and more, to show the other person what it's like to be treated unfairly	2.63	1.23	1	5	54
10 I wanted to do the right thing in this situation, not what I was most inclined to do	2.96	1.10	1	5	54

Table 9 (cont.)

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>SD</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>N</u>
11. It may not have been a nice thing to do to take away my raffle tickets, but I won't hold it against Participant A	4.32	0.88	1	5	55
12. If I ever met Participant A, I would be open minded and not be determined to dislike him/her right away	4.49	0.90	1	5	55
13. I tried to act fairly during the raffle ticket exchange because acting fairly is one part of being a good member of society	3.40	1.03	1	5	55
14. One of the reasons I did what I did during the raffle ticket exchange is that in general, I try to be a good person	3.67	0.94	2	5	55
15. While I may not know exactly why Participant A took the raffle tickets, I don't resent Participant A for it	4.40	0.91	1	5	55

Forgivingness scores

The questionnaires were sorted first according to the forgivingness scores, and then according to the retaliation scores. In each sorting, the questionnaires were put into two groups, scores below the mean and scores above the mean. The forgivingness score was chosen as one basis for sorting because it had the strongest predictive value of all the constructs of the number of tickets taken. The retaliation score was chosen as the other basis for sorting because it was the outcome measure.

In both cases, comments from participants scoring below and then above the mean are discussed in numerical order, with comments from participants scoring below the mean discussed in descending order and comments from participants scoring above the mean discussed in ascending order.

With regard to responses based on forgivingness scores, the types of responses made by those who scored above the mean (14.05 out of a possible 25) on the forgivingness measure tended to be different from those who scored below it. What follows is a general contrasting of some typical responses of participants who scored below the mean, followed by comments from those who scored above it. After that, the responses of participants scoring below the mean are discussed in detail, with forgivingness scores in descending order. Discussions of those scoring above the mean in forgivingness come next, with scores in ascending order.

In general, those who scored below the mean in forgivingness said things like “I felt like it sucked to give (the tickets) up” and “Every man for himself.”

One participant scoring below the mean in forgivingness said that she felt it was “fair” to end up with 19 tickets rather than the 10 she started with, because that was “pretty much what happened to me.” This contrasted with participants scoring above the mean in forgivingness, who tended to say that what was fair in this situation was for each participant to end up with the original ten tickets he/she began with. Therefore those scoring below the mean tended to prefer retributive over distributive justice. For those above the mean, the reverse was true.

Participants scoring both high and low on the forgivingness measure sometimes said, “It’s only a game” and said they did not take the situation seriously, even though their decisions about what to do in this perceived trivial situation did differ. That lends support to the idea that competitiveness might have been a factor. A very common response to having to give up tickets was some version of “I felt like I lost the game.” However, there were a few participants who expressed both competitiveness and blame. One of these described Participant A as “ruthless” and said that that was what inspired her to also compete ruthlessly, ending up with all 20 tickets. A participant who scored 16 on forgivingness said that “fair is great, but winning in a fair manner is better.”

Comments from participants scoring below the mean on forgivingness

One person who scored 14, slightly below the mean, said that her response to losing nine raffle tickets was “dang it”. In response to the questionnaire statement that “I wanted to do the right thing in this situation, not what I was most inclined to do” she said that she strongly disagreed, and said “If I had thought it

was wrong to take all of their tickets, I wouldn't have, but I don't see how that is doing anything "unfair." She said later on that she did not resent Participant A for doing what she did because "I would have done the same thing." Other participants scoring below the mean on forgiveness repeated the idea that "anyone" would do the same thing that they did.

There were a few questionnaires where, despite the forgiveness score being below the mean, the responses were more forgiving than might be expected. One participant who scored 14 on the forgiveness measure said that when she had to give up the raffle tickets "it was ok. I believe everyone should have a fair chance and I would do the same thing". She said she decided not to take as many raffle tickets as the other person did "because that is not nice" "because it is not right to seek revenge" and "I do not hold grudges. I forgive easily". There was also a participant who scored 10 on the forgiveness measure who said similar things.

More typical than this, however, was the participant with the score of 14 who said that she did not like what Participant A did, and when she had the chance, left Participant A with no tickets because "I did want to show Participant A what it was like to have all the tickets taken". This is an example of engaging in retributive justice. Another participant who scored slightly below the mean said that she was "sad and angry" when she had to give up her tickets. She disagreed with the statement that she wanted to show Participant A what being fair and kind was like. Her reason was, "This is about winning a raffle and not bringing kindness into this." She neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement

that what she did was exactly what Participant A deserved, because “Participant A didn’t deserve anything.” She claimed that she did the right thing in this situation, not what she was most inclined to do, because “I did the right thing if I wanted to win. There was no other choice.”

What one participant said went through his mind when his turn came to give or take raffle tickets was “I was glad it was the last round and I had the upper hand. I gave A one ticket because I didn’t want A to go away empty-handed and that’s what he did to me in the first round.” (What this participant meant was that he left Participant A with one ticket.) This participant noted that “A took more than his share”, “A did it to me first”, but that participant A “did what he should have to win” so he would not hold Participant A’s actions against him. This participant had a forgivingness score of 11.

A participant with a score of 10 reported that she was annoyed when she had to give up her 9 raffle tickets, and felt badly because she thought she had lost. She took back more than her share of raffle tickets because “they took the majority without thinking of me”. She disagreed with the statement about showing fairness and kindness to Participant A because “that’s not how life works.” She left Participant A with four tickets to her sixteen saying, “maybe they would be more fair next time”. She admitted that she “considered taking back only 9, but I got greedy.” She said she resented Participant A for leaving her with only one ticket.

Another person with a forgivingness score of 9 said that at first she felt sad when she had to give up her tickets. She added, “At the beginning I didn’t know

what I want(ed) to do, but then I decided to take from my partner.” She ended up with 19 tickets to her partner’s 1 ticket because she said “that’s the way life works” and “I did to her what she did to me.” These responses were similar to a number of others with low forgivingness scores.

While many participants referred to how participant A was greedy, some of them were greedy in return while others were not. One participant who scored well below the mean on forgivingness and ended up with 15 tickets stated that he was “annoyed” by Participant A’s actions, that he wanted to win, that he was “going to make sure I had more tickets”, that Participant A was “punished” because he was going to know what it was like to be treated unfairly. When given the question “I wanted to do the right thing in this situation” the respondent said that he disagreed strongly because “I don’t know this person” and that “he needed to be taught a lesson.” Perhaps not surprisingly, this individual had an aggression score that was well above the mean.

A participant scoring 9 on forgivingness said that what he thought about when he had to give up nine tickets was “Participant A was a greedy person because he took 9 tickets” and that he felt “annoyed” by this. What went through his mind when he had to make a decision about giving or taking tickets was, “I was going to make sure I had more tickets.” He agreed with the statement that it made him angry to have to give up tickets, and disagreed that he did not take back more than his share of tickets because “he started it by taking 9 of my 10”. He strongly disagreed that he wanted to show Participant A what being fair and kind was like. Underneath that statement, he wrote, “Screw him.” He said that the

other participant “needed to be taught a lesson about being fair”. To the statement saying in part, “I try to be a good person”, the participant agreed, and underneath it wrote “Karma, baby.”

Comments from participants scoring above the mean on forgiveness

Those who were above the mean in forgiveness found Participant A’s actions just as objectionable, generally, than those who were below it. They frequently took exception to someone taking away nine of their tickets, just as those scoring below the mean did. That their initial reactions did not differ much from lower scorers is not surprising. Several studies of forgiveness state that in order to forgive, the possibility of revenge must also be considered. An act of forgiveness is a choice. Even relatively forgiving participants in this study were aware of their desire for revenge. This showed up in their comments about what they were thinking and feeling when they had to give up their tickets.

People scoring slightly above the mean also did not differ very much overall in their responses from people slightly below it. They were inclined to point out that Participant A injured them first, and that therefore it was not morally problematic to cause Participant A to end up with fewer tickets than he/she began with. Sometimes they would qualify those statements later in the questionnaire. For instance, one participant with a score of 15 said, “Just because I was treated unjustly doesn’t mean that I should do the same back to the other person. The prize is not mine to begin with so I’m indifferent about obtaining it.”

This participant left Participant A with five tickets. One of her comments was “Everyone’s a little greedy at times.”

One participant who scored 15 on forgivingness ended up with slightly more than ten tickets, but expressed remorse about it in the qualitative questionnaire. She said that she decided to be “a little bit nicer” than Participant A, “but not too nice since the prize sounds good.” Later in the questionnaire, she stated that “I should’ve left her with 10 tickets” because one should “treat others the way you want to be treated” and “be above what they did.” She stated. “I did what I was inclined to do rather than the right thing.” Perhaps this was a person who was a little bit short of money and found the prize especially attractive.

A participant with the same score as this person stated that “the other guy was greedy and that is his down-fall and I didn’t really care.” He went on to say that “I didn’t want to be greedy but I also didn’t mind having a little edge in the drawing”. His decision was to end up with fifteen tickets to Participant A’s five. Here the issue had nothing to do with aggression or revenge at all. This participant had, on the one hand, a tendency to observe and analyze rather than react. He said that what happened was about the other person, not him, and that he took extra tickets just to give himself a little more of an advantage. Later in the questionnaire, however, he said, “I feel like now, I should have left him with 10 to make it fair...I was a little greedy, and now I regret it.” This sentiment was echoed by another person who said, “I wanted to do the right thing, but I did what I was inclined to do...I wish I would have made it fair because it preys on my conscience.”

Another participant with the same score said, “I left (Participant A) with some tickets, but I still wanted more.” In these questionnaires, both greed and competitiveness were factors. Mentioning something about desiring to win the game, and also about getting greedy, happened often in questionnaires scoring above the mean – but there were far fewer mentions of anger or vengefulness. In fact, some of these participants, like the ones above, expressed regret in the questionnaire about taking more than their share of tickets.

As mentioned earlier, participants above the mean as well as below it often saw the situation as a kind of game or contest. Still, those who scored above the mean were less likely to make angry statements about the other participant than those who scored below it. They commonly said things like “I didn’t take it personally.” They sometimes took just as many tickets as those who said they were angry, but with the motivation of winning the game rather than taking revenge on the other participant. They tended to see this person as their opponent in a contest, as a fellow player, and said they were not angry because the other person just did what they might have done if they had played first. These participants usually took exception to any idea that they wanted to blame or punish the other participant.

A female participant with a score of 16, who ended up with 11 tickets to Participant A’s 9 tickets, said, “I was inclined to do the right thing. I just had to be a little selfish”. She also said, “I wouldn’t judge anyone on competitive behavior if I didn’t know him or her” and that Participant A was “just looking out for herself, which we all do sometimes.” This is an example of empathy. This

participant was able to put herself in Participant A's place and see her essential similarity to the other. Several studies show that empathy is the most proximal construct to forgiving.

A participant with a score of 17 said that he left the other person with "50% of her tickets" because "I still want him to have a chance and I am going to be nicer than he was". She still ended up with 15 tickets to Participant A's 5 tickets, but took exception to the idea that she should have taken more than that because "that isn't nice or kind." This participant did at least indicate that being fair and kind mattered to her, although her decision to end up with 15 tickets was more like that of participants scoring below the mean than above it. Those scoring below the mean had a tendency to say that neither fairness nor kindness had anything to do with this situation.

A participant who scored 17 said that Participant A wanting 9 tickets was "funny" and said "I figured she really wanted the tickets, so I gave them to her". In this case, Participant A ended up with 16 tickets and Participant B only gave herself 4. She said she actually considered giving the other participant all of the tickets; she agreed that she wanted to show Participant A what being fair and kind is like, because "maybe they won't be so greedy next time!" She disagreed that she did exactly what Participant A deserved, because "nobody should get what they deserve". The implication seemed to be that people should get better than they deserve. She also said, "Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." Another participant had a similar reaction, saying, "Just because your (sic)

mad doesn't mean you should be revengeful. You should always do what is right."

A participant scoring 20 on forgivingness said that what went through his mind when it was time to give or take away raffle tickets was "I will take back what is mine. But I should not take more." Once again, the often-noted preference for distributive over retributive justice showed itself in a person high in forgivingness. He said that while he did not think it was fair of Participant A to take more, "I subscribe to the turn-the-other-cheek philosophy" although he also said that he did indeed think about taking all of the tickets. He did not do so; he took back only his original ten. Here again, the possibility of taking revenge was considered, because he took exception to Participant A's unfairness, but then discarded in favor of forgiving.

Another participant scoring 20 said that although he felt "out of control of the situation as far as having something taken away from me" he "really just wanted to get back the raffle tickets which had been taken from me, so either way I hadn't gained anything or lost anything and it was still fair to the other person". He also said that he did not take more raffle tickets than his original ten because he knew that if he were going to be entered into a drawing, he would rather win knowing it was a fair draw. He said that in doing that, he was not trying to be fair or kind to the other, but that "it was more of a character issue with myself". It was only natural, he said later, for people to want to take the opportunity to get ahead in the game. He also said that someone in his place might "think it was his prerogative" to take more than ten tickets, but that it was "just not something I

would do.” This man was able to consider Participant A’s position, his own position, the position of someone else that might be in his place, and the whole situation. “Both of us by being in an experiment are put in a somewhat compromising position” was his last comment.

As the scores got higher above the mean, there was a tendency for the reactions to losing nine tickets to vary more. Participants with scores of 15 or 16 did not vary much in what they said about their initial reactions to losing the tickets. They usually expressed some version of anger, resentment, sadness, or disgust at the other person’s greed. Participants scoring 17 or above (admittedly, not a huge number) often said their reactions were of humor, like the participant above; or surprise, perplexity, curiosity, or indifference. In other words, these participants seemed to be able to distance themselves from the situation and analyze it with a lower level of emotion than others did. One participant said that he wondered “what strategy the other person is using” although he was “somewhat reluctant to give up so many (tickets)”.

A participant who scored 23 on the forgivingness measure said that she “felt bitter” that the other participant took nine tickets, but that “they are just raffle tickets, even with 100 I can still lose.” She agreed that she thought about taking back more than her share of raffle tickets, but did not do it because “I felt that because he won the coin toss, that was his ball.” She disagreed with the idea that she wanted to show Participant A what being fair and kind was like. “That never crossed my mind. Fair is very relative. When I win, things are very fair.” She agreed that she did what Participant A deserved, because “I did him a favor, I

gave him what he originally had in the toss, and he certainly did not deserve it, since he robbed me earlier.” She said she could see herself doing the same thing Participant A did, although she chose not to do that in this case. At the end of the questionnaire, she made the general statement that “being a good person to one side, immediately makes you a bad person to opposing sides, so I follow my heart.”

The highest scorer on forgivingness (25) had a set of responses that were like those of the participants just discussed, but greater in their magnitude of compassion. This person identified herself as “a Christian”. She said that she thought it was “a shame” that the other person took so many tickets, but “I wanted to show some sort of kindness and grace.” She admitted to being angry about having so many of her tickets taken. However, her response was, “I wanted to show some sort of love by giving and not taking.” She said, “It would be nice to win, but maybe the other person needed it more...” “an eye for an eye” is not how I was taught to treat people...I really would have liked the certificate, but I know that what I did was the right thing.” She wondered if “maybe (Participant A) has never been taught how to serve someone. She needs an example set for her.”

Retaliation scores

With regard to responses based on retaliation scores, the types of responses made by those who scored above the mean (13.75 out of a possible 20) tended to be different from those who scored below it. What follows is a general contrasting of responses of participants who scored below the mean, followed by responses from those who scored above it. With regard to retaliation, a score of

10 tickets meant an even distribution between the participants, but the mean was almost 14 tickets. There was a fairly strong tendency for participants to end with more than 10 tickets.

Forgivingness and retaliation scores were correlated negatively. Therefore, participants scoring below the mean on retaliation would be expected to have responses somewhat similar to participants who scored above the mean on forgivingness, and vice versa. To a large extent this was true.

Comments from participants scoring below the mean on retaliation

Participants scoring below the mean on retaliation (the mean was 13.75 out of a possible 20) were those who retaliated less rather than more. A participant scoring 13 said that he “still let the other person have some (tickets). Just to be nice.” This person thought that because he did not take all of the tickets, he had treated Participant A better than Participant A deserved. He said, “I was being reasonable” and agreed that he was satisfied with his decision because “I came out with more tickets.”

Another participant with a score of 12 said that she “wanted to take some back, but leave the other person with some chance of winning.” She said, “I could’ve divided them evenly, but I wanted to have a couple extra... I think it was fair. They should see how it feels to be in a position with a disadvantage.” This was a common idea expressed by those with scores near the mean. Fairness to these participants meant getting one’s own tickets back, plus either punishing the other participant slightly, leaving oneself with a slight advantage, or both.

A participant scoring 11 justified her decision by saying that “she wanted to get her own tickets back plus 1” and “what goes around comes around.” Another participant with this score said that she ended up with 11 tickets because Participant A was so selfish. This was a common response. She said, “I didn’t take all of them, just 1 more so I would have the advantage.” What one participant said he thought about when he lost nine raffle tickets was “Will I have the opportunity to get them back?” He decided to take his 9 tickets back plus 1 more, to score 11, saying that that was fair under the circumstances. Another participant scoring 11 said that she took 1 more back than her original 10 because Participant A was being “overly selfish.” She said, “I didn’t really punish her – just made her feel guilty?”

Participants scoring 10, who decided that both participants should end with an equal number of raffle tickets, referred often to principles of distributive justice by saying things like “I just wanted to level the playing field” and “take away unnecessary advantages”. One participant with a score of 10 disagreed with the statement that it would be fair to take back all she lost and more. She said that there would be “no point. Be the bigger person. It would have been even bigger for me to give tickets to A.” These participants often said that playing fair was important to them. One comment along this line was “I just wanted back what had been taken from me; I didn’t want to take what wasn’t mine.” A participant responding to how she felt when it was time to give or take raffle tickets said “I’ll kill them with kindness.”

A female participant who ended up with 9 tickets to Participant A's 11 said she arranged it that way so that "he might do the same thing someday to someone else". She agreed with the statement that she was angry to have to give up nine raffle tickets, and "was at the mercy of Participant A" but "even though he took all I had, I still gave to him. What a statement!" Another participant scoring 9 said that "I didn't really care about the gift certificate" but also said that "I felt good because I was giving someone else a greater chance of winning. I also thought it was funny that they asked for nine of my ten—very strategic." Another participant with a score of 9 said that she did what she did because she knew that what was fair was 10 tickets each, but left the other person with 11 instead because "you don't have to stoop down and do what they did. You can make a point that way just as easy."

A participant with a score of 8 tickets to Participant A's 16 said she did so because "maybe she would appreciate it and do it to someone else someday." Another participant with the same score said "don't judge someone else by 1 thing they did" and "I don't hold grudges, life is too short." A similar comment by another participant was "we're all putting in the same time and should have the same chance, unless there was a competitive aspect to it." (Because she ended up with less than 10 tickets, she may have not felt particularly competitive). She said she would not hold it against Participant A because "some people are just like that. It's not my duty to change them."

Few participants scored from 2 to 7 tickets, but some comments from those who did were "I thought about giving her all my tickets", "Everyone should

follow the golden rule” and “I was inclined to do the right thing.” These participants seemed to say, in one way or another, that one should err on the side of generosity.

With a score of 1 ticket to Participant A’s 19, one participant said that he “felt bitter” that Participant A tried to take nine of his tickets. He was in the group called Harm Not Done/Harm Intended, where Participant A tried to take nine of his tickets but did not succeed. When his turn came, he gave the nine tickets to Participant A because “I figured that he got to make the decision initially, so I just went with that.” He agreed strongly with the statement that it would be fair to take back what he lost and more, to show the other person what it is like to be treated unfairly, saying, “Yeah, it would be fair, but no one can win that way, on second thought, I wish I would have evened it out.” For this participant, perhaps an initial lack of entitlement prevented him from engaging in distributive justice, and later, a concern for fairness between himself and the other participant emerged and he regretted that he had not been fairer to himself.

A participant scoring zero on retaliation said that what he thought about when he lost nine raffle tickets was “nothing, total indifference. With 2000 raffle tickets out there, my chances were too slim to take the time to feel anything.” What went through his mind when it was time to give or take away raffle tickets was “let her have them.” Many of his other responses reflected indifference to the situation, but he did agree with the statement that he wanted to show Participant A what being fair and kind was like, saying “I thought I would be nice since they probably meant more to her.” He strongly disagreed with the statement that what

he did was what Participant A deserved, but said again that he decided to be “nice.” He said he was satisfied with his decision to give away his one remaining raffle ticket because “I bet nobody else did that!” He strongly agreed with the statement that in general, he tried to be a good person, saying “when you can be a good person over something as stupid as raffle tickets, why not. You can make someone’s day without giving up much.”

Other participants who ended up with no raffle tickets expressed these ideas in a similar way. They tended to say they felt nothing or were indifferent to what happened, with one participant saying he “wasn’t expecting anything from the beginning.” (This indifference was repeated in a few other participants’ comments who scored below 10 on retaliation.) This participant said that he thought it would be fair to get back his original 10 tickets, because “I think it’s fair to take back your share only. It’s like returning something you bought and asking for more money than you spent.” But he did not ask for his 10 tickets back because “he wanted to please everyone”. He said he was satisfied with his decision because “I acted unselfish.”

Comments from participants scoring above the mean on retaliation

Only 2 participants scored 14, and their comments were sparse. They said things similar to those scoring 15, in that they wanted to “not be as greedy as the other person, but still win the prize” and said they felt “taken advantage of” which justified their decision. The 17 participants who scored 15 said “Participant A took my tickets to win, but since she did that I did the same to her”. Participants

scoring 15 and above made many comments about the competitive aspect of the study, or else they reported feeling competitive with the other participant. They talked about the other participant taking advantage of them, and then getting the advantage back. One participant said, “you do what you feel you should do. I was just doing to them what they had done to me.” He later said, “I wasn’t all that fair.” Another participant said, “I wanted a better chance of getting the prize.”

In addition to wanting to win, participants scoring 15 often said that what they did was quite fair, because they took only 5 of the other participant’s tickets instead of 9. They said things like “fairness is a virtue” and justified leaving the other person with 5 tickets because “maybe she deserved to win too.” Because this participant left the other person with 5 tickets, she seemed to be saying that that person deserved some chance to win, although not an equal chance with her. Another participant was more explicit about this, saying ‘I left her with 5 chances in 20 so she could still win, even though I had 15 chances in 20.’ Another participant said ‘I wanted to leave her with at least some, but I wanted to leave her with more than she left me.’ Another person said that she would have expected Participant A to take raffle tickets; she only objected to the fact that Participant A took so many, which caused her to react as she did.

In a similar way, participants scoring 16 said, for example, that the taking of nine tickets was unfair and that they would take most of the tickets because theirs were taken first. One participant said that she was satisfied with her decision to end up with 16 tickets because she “took more but left more than A

did.” Another participant pointed out that “I left her with 4 chances to win” and said that she thought, when she lost nine raffle tickets, “will I have a chance to get them back?” This was the person who said, “I thought about taking back only 9” (leaving the score 10 to 10) “but I got greedy”. A combination of reacting to the unfairness and being greedy over tickets seemed to operate in those scoring 15 and above, as well as in a few participants scoring below that.

A participant scoring 17 said that when she lost nine raffle tickets, she “felt as if someone had just stolen them from me”. She said “I sort of felt as if she took more why couldn’t I” and “I wanted to show her a bit how I felt, but not leave them completely depleted or short of tickets”. She agreed with the statement that she wanted to show the other person what it is like to be treated unfairly. She said, “Yes I agree that fairness is good, but I am a tad competitive.” Another participant with this score said that she neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that she wanted to show Participant A what being fair and kind was like, saying, “I may have wanted to (be fair and kind) but I took tickets from A”. She did not agree with the statement about being satisfied with her decision, saying “I should have given them away” and “I wanted to do the right thing but I did not.” She said that while what she did was not fair, “I think that is what most people would do.” She said near the end of the questionnaire “I do try to be a good person, but I chose to make the wrong decision.” (This was a person with a forgiveness score well above the mean.)

A participant who scored 18 said that she took more than her share of tickets, that “I didn’t have a malicious intent” and that she felt quite satisfied with

her decision. She said that she did not think of it as being unfair and that she did what she was inclined to do. She neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that acting fairly is one part of being a good member of society, saying “I didn’t necessarily act fairly but I didn’t think of it as me not being a good member of society.”

Participants who scored 19 made frequent mentions of competition. “I thought I would increase my chances by taking more tickets” one participant said, while another one said, “I viewed it more as a game.” The first participant disagreed that he did what he did to be a good member of society because “I did it for self-interest” and neither agreed nor disagreed with the statement that in general he tried to be a good person because “I wasn’t a good person.” However, other participants who scored 19 said “I didn’t think what I did was unfair” and “I did the same that she ask (sic) me to do.” “I viewed it as a game, so the object was to win. My actions were justified. I didn’t do anything wrong.” A frequent comment from those scoring 19 was that they were leveling the playing field. They often said that the other participant asked for nine tickets, so they asked for nine of the other person’s. They reasoned about this decision in a similar way to those scoring 10, but their version of what was fair differed. “I just ask (sic) her for the same amount that she ask (sic) me before. That (sic) the way life works.”

Another common response from those scoring above the mean on retaliation was some version of feeling out of control, or like they had come out the loser. “I felt helpless, like I had to give in” was one comment. One man said in one word what he felt when he had to give up tickets:” Loser”. In some cases,

respondents directly stated that that was what caused them to take the number of tickets they did. One participant who scored 19 said that what went through her mind when it was time to give or take raffle tickets was “yay! I can get them back!” Another said, “I was glad that it was the last round and *I had the upper hand*” (emphasis mine). He said he wanted \$50 and “now I have 19 tickets and A doesn’t”.

One participant scoring 20 was emphatic in saying “it was just a game” because she said that 8 times on her questionnaire. She also said that because that was so, her decision had nothing to do with being fair or kind, or with being a good member of society. Another person said “this is about winning a raffle and not bringing kindness into this.” Still another said, “I played the game, and this is what happened, if they had gotten all my tickets, they would have deserved them as well.”

These participants often disagreed with the statements that they wanted to show Participant A what being fair and kind was like, by denying that the situation called for such traits. One participant agreed that he did the right thing, not what he was most inclined to do, because “the right thing was to win.” Another participant said five times in his questionnaire, “Do what it takes to win.” Another participant agreed, saying that her thought upon losing nine tickets was “you got my tickets, now I’m going to get yours.” She disagreed that she tried to act fairly during the exchange because acting fairly is one part of being a good member of society, saying, “what I did wasn’t totally fair.”

One participant scoring 20 wrote about a somewhat different motivation. He said he “never wins” raffles, and wanted to win for once, so he did what he had to do to win. But he also said “I think that’s fair. To let the other person know what it feels like” (to lose tickets). He said, “People deserve fair chances to win in raffles and one person shouldn’t have the advantage.” This was an interesting statement because he gave himself a complete advantage over the other participant, whom he left with no tickets.

Retaliation and social interest

Some of the questions on the qualitative questionnaire were specifically designed to study the construct of social interest. Social interest has to do with one’s sense of connection to the whole human community. It means living with so little sense of inferiority that everything one does is directed toward the common good. The questions asking about being a good member of society and being a good person sometimes led to statements being made that were indicative of social interest or the lack of it. Sometimes statements showing awareness of social interest appeared in other responses as well.

Participants scoring below the mean on retaliation sometimes said they left the other participant with some tickets to be fair or kind to that person, even in the face of that person doing otherwise. This statement not only shows social interest, but is the very definition of moral responsibility as well. Unfortunately these participants did not act to leave each person with an equal distribution of tickets, so in that way their words did not translate into action. However, some

did at least endorse the values of fairness or kindness. Most of the participants seemed to be aware that they had some sort of obligation to act as a good member of the human community. In that way, they knew they were connected to others, even though their decisions about the tickets did not reflect that knowledge.

The participants who scored above the mean on retaliation still said that in most cases fairness and kindness are desirable. They usually appealed to competing values such as the desire to win a game. Winning, they implied, mattered more than fairness or kindness in this particular situation. For them, values compatible with social interest were desirable, but winning the game or having the advantage over Participant A superseded any desire they may have had to show social interest. One man even expressed concern that he would be seen, not as losing the game, but as a loser in general.

That seemed the crux of the matter to the participants expressing competitiveness in their responses. Those who show social interest are commonly supposed to be the real winners. But people who act in socially interested ways often place fairness or kindness to others ahead of winning. In that sense, at least in the short term, a very competitive person might find it difficult to act in a socially interested manner and conversely, a socially interested person might indeed lose something. People who are fair and kind may not gain or win as much as they might if they did not act according to principles of social interest. This seemed to be the dilemma for many participants, and many of the questionnaires seemed to say so.

Participants who scored a 10 on their ticket distributions pointed often to wanting to take back only what belonged to them and not more. A score of 10 is the score most compatible with social interest since it is the score resulting in equality. The inherent equality of all human beings is one of the tenets of social interest. These participants were able to take care of themselves and others. Social interest does not contradict legitimate self-interest but goes hand in hand with it. Participants scoring 10 seemed to be aware of this. One participant even said that she would not take back goods to a store and ask for more money than was originally spent, and said that this situation was analogous to that one.

Participants scoring below the mean on retaliation occasionally said that they regretted being not fair to themselves. For these few, a lack of entitlement may have caused them to let the other person have their tickets. A lack of entitlement reflects feelings of personal inferiority and to the extent that they exist, contradict social interest, which goes hand in hand with legitimate self-interest. However, most of those scoring below the mean said that they let the other person have the tickets because the tickets might have meant more to Participant A than to them. This could indicate either indifference or a sincere wish for Participant A to win or succeed. In some cases, it was clearly one or the other; in other cases, it was not so clear.

Many participants did not make the specific connection between what they did in the experiment and being a good member of society. Some of them directly said so, and asked what one had to do with the other. They may have misunderstood the question, or perhaps for some of them, it was too much of an

abstraction to invoke all of society for a small encounter such as took place in this experiment. However, as mentioned earlier, they gave answers in other questions mentioning fairness and kindness that indicated social interest or the lack of it. In one questionnaire, a respondent indicated social interest by saying that although it would be good if others acted in fair ways, it was not her duty to change them, only to act in such a way herself.

LIMITATIONS

There were definite correlations, in the expected directions, with most of the test scores and the measure called retaliation. Still, it is clear that other constructs are involved in correlating with and predicting the outcome measure. The four constructs of aggression, forgivingness, moral responsibility, and social interest together only account for 12.9 percent of the variance in the retaliation scores. Constructs other than the ones included in this study seem to account for most of the variation in those scores.

The nature of retaliation seems to be something different from its label, and it is not possible to tell from this study exactly what it is. However, as previously stated, it probably has something to do with fairness, justice, and righting a wrong, and little to do with aggression. Scores on retaliation of less than 10 may mean forgivingness, moral responsibility, and social interest were high, or it may mean that some participants felt a lack of entitlement to the tickets or perhaps low self-esteem. Levels of forgivingness, moral responsibility, and

social interest certainly played a part in how both the quantitative and qualitative results came out, but it would have been interesting to see how they work alongside some other constructs, perhaps including but not limited to competitiveness, greed, and financial desperation. The results of the qualitative measure point to a level of competitiveness and greed being present, and perhaps financial need as well in a few cases.

The students were not asked about their income level. Given the outcome of the study, and the possibility of financial status being involved, it might have been a good idea to ask this question in the demographic information form. Students who were financially well off might not have found a \$50 prize as attractive as students who were short of money. On the other hand, they might have been just as competitive or greedy overall. These factors might or might not overrule issues of forgivingness and fairness. It was not possible to answer these kinds of questions with this study.

Another limitation was that the participants in the control group did not complete the qualitative measure, because it was expected that only the responses of the participants in the experimental groups would be of interest. However, because there was no difference between the number of tickets taken in terms of whether a participant was in an experimental group or the control group, it would have added something to the study to see how those in the control group came to their decisions about the tickets and how they justified what they did, because they did not have the excuse of tickets being taken from them first.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

Future studies might be done adding other constructs in an attempt to capture more of the variance in the outcome measure. In addition, it might be fruitful to repeat the study using participants from a different type of institution of higher learning. Perhaps second-career students at a community college, for example, would be more established in their occupations and personal lives and would be less likely to be as competitive with another participant, if competition was indeed a driving force. Possibly individuals with a higher median income, for example from a private university, would have different results. Age could also be varied in future studies. Young people tend in general to be more competitive than older ones. This group of participants had a mean age of less than 21. Also, as previously stated in the literature review, forgivingness can also be a function of age, with older people tending to be more forgiving than younger people. Future studies could explore such possibilities. A more ethnically diverse group of participants might have caused the study to come out differently. Despite the fact that the University of Texas at Austin is somewhat ethnically mixed, the sample was still mostly white. Adding tests that measure competitiveness and greed would be a good idea, as would assessing participants' financial status along with other demographic information.

Because greed was mentioned so often in the qualitative measure, future research could usefully focus solely on greed, or perhaps greed versus social interest or greed versus moral responsibility. A similar study with one or more measures of greed, looking at the value placed on having plenty of money as

opposed to more intangible life goals, or the importance of material success to happiness in life, could shed further light on the nature of greed and how it operates.

Nevertheless, this study was useful in showing links between the constructs that served as independent variables, and links between the independent variables and an outcome measure that was called retaliation but ended up looking more like some version of putting self-interest over the interests of others. In addition to the quantitative data, the qualitative measure was suggestive in two ways. First, it showed a polarity between the responses of people who were more forgiving and those who were less so; and second, it had interesting implications for naming other factors that might have been involved in shaping the results that were found.

Appendices

- A Aggression Questionnaire**
- B Transgression Narrative Test of Forgivingness**
- C Moral Responsibility Scale**
- D Ascription of Responsibility Scale**
- E Machiavellianism Scale**
- F Social Interest Scale**
- G Qualitative Questionnaire**

Appendix A

AGGRESSION QUESTIONNAIRE

Please answer the following questions as honestly as you can. All responses will be kept strictly confidential. Rate each item on a scale of 1 to 5 and circle the appropriate number.

- 1 = Extremely uncharacteristic of me**
- 2 = Uncharacteristic of me**
- 3 = Neither characteristic nor uncharacteristic of me**
- 4 = Characteristic of me**
- 5 = Extremely characteristic of me**

Once in a while I can't control the urge to strike another person.

1 2 3 4 5

I tell my friends openly when I disagree with them.

1 2 3 4 5

I flare up quickly but get over it quickly.

1 2 3 4 5

I am sometimes eaten up with jealousy.

1 2 3 4 5

Given enough provocation, I may hit another person.

1 2 3 4 5

I often find myself disagreeing with people.

1 2 3 4 5

When frustrated, I let my irritations show.

1 2 3 4 5

At times I feel I have gotten a raw deal out of life.

1 2 3 4 5

If somebody hits me, I hit back.

1 2 3 4 5

When people annoy me, I may tell them what I think of them.
1 2 3 4 5

I sometimes feel like a powder keg ready to explode.
1 2 3 4 5

Other people always seem to get the breaks.
1 2 3 4 5

I get into fights a little more than the average person.
1 2 3 4 5

I can't help getting into arguments when people disagree with
me.
1 2 3 4 5

I am an even-tempered person.
1 2 3 4 5

I wonder why sometimes I feel so bitter about things.
1 2 3 4 5

If I have to resort to violence to protect my rights, I will.
1 2 3 4 5

My friends say that I'm somewhat argumentative.
1 2 3 4 5

Some of my friends think I'm a hothead.
1 2 3 4 5

I know that "friends" talk about me behind my back.
1 2 3 4 5

There are people who pushed me so far we came to blows.
1 2 3 4 5

Sometimes I fly off the handle for no good reason.
1 2 3 4 5

I am suspicious of overly friendly strangers.

1 2 3 4 5

I can think of no good reason for ever hitting a person.

1 2 3 4 5

I have threatened people I know.

1 2 3 4 5

I have trouble controlling my temper.

1 2 3 4 5

I sometimes feel that people are laughing at me behind my back.

1 2 3 4 5

I have become so mad that I have broken things.

1 2 3 4 5

When people are especially nice, I wonder what they want.

1 2 3 4 5

Appendix B Transgression Narrative Test of Forgiveness

Below are a number of situations in which people might find themselves. People respond in different ways to these situations in terms of what things they will forgive. We would like you to read each situation and imagine it has happened to you. Then we would like you to use the scale below to indicate how you think you would respond to the situation:

- 1 = *definitely not forgive,*
- 2 = *not likely to forgive,*
- 3 = *just as likely to forgive as not,*
- 4 = *likely to forgive,*
- 5 = *definitely forgive.*

Someone you occasionally see in a class has a paper due at the end of the week. You have already completed the paper for the class and this person says he or she is under a lot of time pressure and asks you to lend him or her your paper for some ideas. You agree, and this person simply retypes the paper and hands it in. The professor recognizes the paper, calls both of you to her office, scolds you, and says you are lucky she doesn't put you both on academic probation. Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to forgive the person who borrowed your paper.

1 2 3 4 5

A fairly close friend tells you that he or she needs some extra money for an upcoming holiday. You know a married couple who needs a babysitter for their 3-year-old for a couple of nights, and you recommend your friend. Your friend is grateful and takes the job. On the first night, the child gets out of bed and, while your friend has fallen asleep watching television, drinks cleaning fluid from beneath the kitchen sink. The child is taken by an ambulance to the hospital and stays there for 2 days for observation and treatment. The married couple will not speak to you. Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to forgive your friend.

1 2 3 4 5

A friend offers to drop off a job application for you at the post office by the deadline for submission. A week later, you get a letter from the potential employer saying that your application could not be considered because it was postmarked after the deadline and they had a very strict policy about this. Your friend said that he or she met an old friend, went to lunch, and lost track of time. When he or she remembered the package, it was close to closing time at the post office and he or she would have to have rushed frantically to get there; he or she decided that deadlines usually aren't that strictly enforced so he or she waited until the next morning to deliver the package. Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to forgive your friend for not delivering the application on time.

1 2 3 4 5

You just started a new job and it turns out that a classmate from high school works there, too. You think this is great; now you don't feel like such a stranger. Even though the classmate wasn't part of your crowd, there's at least a face you recognize. You two hit it off right away and talk about old times. A few weeks later, you are having lunch in the cafeteria and you overhear several of your coworkers, who do not realize you are nearby, talking about you and laughing; one even sounds snide and hostile toward you. You discover that your old classmate has told them about something you did back in school that you are deeply ashamed of and did not want anyone to know about. Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to forgive your old classmate for telling others your secret.

1 2 3 4 5

A distant cousin you haven't seen since childhood calls you one day and asks if he can stay with you while he looks for work and an apartment. You say it will be fine. He asks you to pick him up from the bus station that night and you do so. Your cousin is just like you fondly remember him; you reminisce for several hours. The next morning you give him some advice on job and apartment hunting in the area, then you go about your own business. That night you come home and witness an angry argument in front of your residence between your cousin and a neighbor. Your cousin is obviously very drunk, cursing, and out of control. You ask what's happening and without really taking the time to recognize you, your cousin throws a bottle at you, cutting the side of your head. The police arrive and, with some scuffling, take your cousin away and take you to the emergency room where you have stitches put on your cut. The next afternoon, your cousin calls from the police station. He says he is really sorry about the

whole scene and that it was not like him but he was upset about being turned down for three jobs that day. Imagine yourself in such a situation and mark how likely you are to forgive your cousin.

1 2 3 4 5

Appendix C
MORAL RESPONSIBILITY SCALE

Answer the following items as honestly as you can. All responses will be kept confidential. Rate each item on a scale of 1 to 5 and circle the appropriate number.

- 1 = Strongly Agree**
- 2 = Agree**
- 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree**
- 4 = Disagree**
- 5 = Strongly Disagree**

It is no use worrying about current events or public affairs; I can't do anything about them anyway.

1 2 3 4 5

Every person should give some of his/her time for the good of his/her town or country.

1 2 3 4 5

Our country would be a lot better off if we didn't have so many elections and people didn't have to vote so often.

1 2 3 4 5

Letting your friends down is not so bad because you can't do good all the time for everybody.

1 2 3 4 5

It is the duty of each person to do his/her job the very best he/she can.

1 2 3 4 5

People would be a lot better off if they could live far away from other people and never have to do anything for them.

1 2 3 4 5

At school I usually volunteered for special projects.

1 2 3 4 5

I feel very bad when I have failed to finish a job I promised I would do.

1 2 3 4 5

Appendix D
Ascription of Responsibility Scale

Each of the items below is a statement of an attitude or opinion some people have. There are no right or wrong responses to these statements. For each item, circle the number which best indicates the extent to which you agree or disagree with it. If you are not certain, answer Agree or Disagree according to which comes closer to your opinion.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
If a good friend of mine wanted to injure an enemy of his, it would be my duty to try to stop him.	1	2	3	4
Failing to return the money when you are given too much change is the same as stealing from a store.	1	2	3	4
I wouldn't feel that I had to do my part in a group project if everyone else was lazy.	1	2	3	4
If I hurt someone unintentionally, I would feel almost as guilty as I would if I had done the same thing intentionally.	1	2	3	4
Gossiping is so common in our society that a person who gossips once in a while can't really be blamed so much.	1	2	3	4
When a person is nasty to me, I feel very little responsibility to treat that person well.	1	2	3	4
I would feel less bothered about leaving litter in a dirty park than in a clean one.	1	2	3	4
No matter what a person has done to us, there is no excuse for taking advantage of him or her.	1	2	3	4
When a person is completely involved in valuable work, you can't blame that person if he or she is insensitive to other people.	1	2	3	4

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
If I damaged someone's car in an accident that was legally his or her fault, I would still feel somewhat guilty.	1	2	3	4
When you consider how hard it is for an honest person to get ahead, it is easier to forgive shrewdness in business.	1	2	3	4
When a person is pushed hard enough, there comes a point beyond which anything he or she does is justifiable.	1	2	3	4
Even if something you borrow is defective, you should still replace it if it gets broken.	1	2	3	4
You can't blame basically good people who are forced by their environment to be inconsiderate of others.	1	2	3	4
No matter how much a person is provoked, a person is always responsible for whatever he or she does.	1	2	3	4
Being upset or preoccupied does not excuse a person for doing anything he or she would ordinarily avoid.	1	2	3	4
As long as people in business don't break laws, they should feel free to do their business as they see fit.	1	2	3	4
Occasionally in life people find themselves in a situation in which they have absolutely no control over what they do to others.	1	2	3	4
I would feel obligated to do a favor for a person who needed it, even though that person had not shown gratitude for past favors.	1	2	3	4

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Agree	Strongly Agree
With the pressure for grades and the widespread cheating in school these days, the individual who cheats occasionally is not really as much at fault.	1	2	3	4
I wouldn't feel bad about giving offense to someone if my intentions had been good.	1	2	3	4
Extenuating circumstances never completely remove a person's responsibility for his or her actions.	1	2	3	4
You can't expect a person to act much differently from anyone else.	1	2	3	4
It doesn't make much sense to be very concerned about how we act when we are sick and feeling miserable.	1	2	3	4
You just can't hold a store clerk responsible for being rude and impolite at the end of a long work day.	1	2	3	4
Professional obligations can never justify neglecting the welfare of others.	1	2	3	4
If I broke a machine through mishandling, I would feel less guilty if it was already damaged before I used it.	1	2	3	4
When you have a job to do, it is impossible to look out for everybody's best interests.	1	2	3	4

Appendix E
MACHIAVELLIANISM SCALE

Please fill out this form as honestly as you can. Circle the answer that is true for you, as indicated below, to show how strongly you agree or disagree with the statement.

- 1 = Strongly Agree**
- 2 = Agree**
- 3 = Neither Agree Nor Disagree**
- 4 = Disagree**
- 5 = Strongly Disagree**

1. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
1 2 3 4 5
2. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reason for wanting it rather than giving reasons which might carry more weight.
1 2 3 4 5
3. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
1 2 3 4 5
4. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
1 2 3 4 5
5. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
1 2 3 4 5
6. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when they are given a chance.
1 2 3 4 5
7. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.
1 2 3 4 5
8. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
1 2 3 4 5

9. It is wise to flatter important people.
1 2 3 4 5
10. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than important and dishonest.
1 2 3 4 5
11. Barnum was wrong when he said there's a sucker born every minute.
1 2 3 4 5
12. People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly to death.
1 2 3 4 5
13. It is possible to be good in all respects.
1 2 3 4 5
14. Most people are basically good and kind.
1 2 3 4 5
15. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
1 2 3 4 5
16. Most people forget more easily the death of their father than the loss of their property.
1 2 3 4 5
17. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
1 2 3 4 5
18. Generally speaking, people won't work hard unless forced to do so.
1 2 3 4 5
19. The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals are stupid enough to get caught.
1 2 3 4 5
20. Most people are brave.
1 2 3 4 5

Appendix F SOCIAL INTEREST SCALE

Below are a number of pairs of personal characteristics or traits. For each pair, choose the trait which you value more highly. In making each choice, ask yourself which of the traits in that pair you would rather possess as one of *your own* characteristics. For example, the first pair is “imaginative/rational.” If you had to make a choice, which would you rather be? Write 1 or 2 on the line in front of the pair to indicate your choice.

Some of the traits will appear twice, but always in combination with a different other trait. No pairs will be repeated.

Be sure to choose *one* trait in *each* pair.

(NOTE: THE CHOICES WITH NUMBERS AFTER THEM INDICATE SOCIAL INTEREST)

I would rather be....

imaginative
rational

helpful 1
quick-witted

neat 2
sympathetic

level-headed
efficient

intelligent 2
considerate

self-reliant
ambitious

respectful 1
original

creative sensible	
generous individualistic	1
responsible likable	1
capable tolerant	2
trustworthy wise	1
neat logical	
forgiving gentle	1
efficient respectful	2
practical self-confident	
alert cooperative	2
imaginative helpful	2
realistic moral	2
popular conscientious	

considerate 1
wise

reasonable
quick-witted

sympathetic 1
individualistic

ambitious
patient 2

Appendix G
QUALITATIVE QUESTIONNAIRE

Please take the time to answer these questions honestly and thoroughly. Where you are asked to give written answers, be as complete and specific as you can.

1. What did you think about when you had to give up the raffle tickets?

2. What did you feel when you had to give up the raffle tickets?

3. What went through your mind when it was time for your turn to give or take away raffle tickets?

Indicate how true each statement is for you, then say why you answered as you did.

1 = Strongly Disagree

2 = Disagree

3 = Neutral

4 = Agree

5 = Strongly Agree

4. It made me angry to have to give up the raffle tickets. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

- 1 = Strongly Disagree
- 2 = Disagree
- 3 = Neutral
- 4 = Agree
- 5 = Strongly Agree

5. I thought about taking back more than my share of raffle tickets, but I didn't. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

6. I wanted to show Participant A what being fair and kind was like. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

7. What I did was exactly what Participant A deserved. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

8. I'm satisfied with the decision I made regarding the giving or taking away of raffle tickets. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

9. I think it would be fair for anyone in my position to take back what I lost and more, to show the other person what it's like to be treated unfairly. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

10. I wanted to do the right thing in this situation, not what I was most inclined to do. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

11. It may not have been a nice thing to do to take away my raffle tickets, but I won't hold it against Participant A. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

12. If I ever met Participant A, I would be open-minded and not be determined to dislike him/her right away. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

13. I tried to act fairly during the raffle ticket exchange because acting fairly is one part of being a good member of society. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

14. One of the reasons I did what I did during the raffle ticket exchange is that in general, I try to be a good person. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

15. While I may not know exactly why Participant A took the raffle tickets, I don't resent Participant A for it. 1 2 3 4 5

Why?

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