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**Intervention, War Expansion, and the International Sources of
Civil War**

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To Donna.

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Any errors, and there are bound to be a few, remain my own, but I hope this work inspires future research and promotes peace.

Intervention, War Expansion, and the International Sources of Civil War

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Why do some civil wars become interstate wars while others do not? In this dissertation I develop a theory of rebellion, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation that connects civil and interstate war. I argue that civil wars expand when rebels and third parties underestimate the government's resolve, and there are three key predictors of interstate war: the size of the local stakes relative to the third party's territory, the rebels' loss of autonomy when receiving external support, and the third party's affinity for the rebels. I evaluate the model and test its predictions using a mixed-methods approach. I use newly collected data on war expansions to show how factors such as escalation costs affect risks of intervention and retaliation, and I explore the causal mechanisms of my theory through the Afghan Civil War from 1978 to 1989. My findings have implications for models of conflict, conflict prevention, and U.S. grand strategy.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Why do some civil wars become interstate wars while others do not? Third party states often support rebels in civil wars, but domestic governments differ in how they respond to external intervention. In the mid-1970s, the new governments in decolonized Angola and Mozambique started supporting the South-West Africa People's Organization and the African National Congress in Namibia and South Africa, respectively. The apartheid regime in Johannesburg responded with a combination of military incursions into both countries and supporting rebel groups in both countries, and the results were devastating. Hundreds of thousands of people died in the wars in Angola and Mozambique in the proceeding decade. Other times the domestic government chooses to tolerate intervention. During the 1990s, Sudan provided funding for the Egyptian terrorist group al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya, which it used to target and kill hundreds of Egyptian police and soldiers from 1992 to 1998. Egypt, despite enjoying military superiority in quantity and quality, declined to retaliate against its neighbor. Why did one

government retaliate while the other did not?

In this dissertation I propose an answer. Civil wars are nested within an international context, and so the local interacts with the international to produce challenges to the existing political order, be it in the civil war country or between the two states. Domestic governments, rebels, and third parties fight to maintain or remake political order, and their costs and benefits for fighting are interdependent in ways not accounted for by existing theories—because civil wars and interstate wars have largely been treated as separate and distinct phenomena. But these conflict types are manifestations of the same strategic interaction: rebels want to take power and third parties want to help them, but neither know whether the domestic government is willing to fight. Uncertainty about the government's costs for fighting (i.e. resolve) sometimes prompts risky behavior, so the rebels challenge, risking civil war, and the third party intervenes, risking retaliation and losing its own territory. My theory therefore accounts for a range of outcomes: peace, localized civil wars, internationalized civil war, and interstate war.

While the dissertation offers several developments in the theoretical modeling of conflict, its main contribution lies in the explanation for and description of a widespread phenomenon that has been understudied. Compared to the literature on the causes and consequences of third-party interventions, there are few theoretical models in which governments retaliate against foreign interveners, and I am not aware of any systematic empirical study of the phenomenon. This is odd, because war expansion is common, and arguably quite important.

As I show later in the dissertation, of the 91 civil wars that started between 1975 and 2009, 20 saw the domestic government use direct military force against a third-party rebel supporter outside of the civil war territory. Furthermore, some of the deadliest conflicts of the last century were civil wars nested within interstate conflict, including the First and Second Congo Wars. Lastly, the threat of retaliation looms over third parties' decision to intervene and rebels' decision to fight, thus influencing broader patterns of conflict.

1.1 The international dimensions of civil war

Most civil wars are international in one way or another. From 1975 to 2009, about 75% of all civil wars experienced intervention by another state on the side of the government, the rebels, or both. Intervention can take many forms, as third parties offer a wide range of support to warring parties. Some provide sanctuary in their own territory, while others send arms or money, and sometimes even their own troops to fight the domestic government or the rebels. During the height of the Syrian Civil War, third parties provided a range of support for the warring parties. As is often the case, the government received significant support from external actors. Russia, at the urging of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, conducted air strikes and deployed military advisors and special operations forces to Syria to fight various rebel groups. Other states, such as Iran and Iraq, have also supported the Assad regime. Numerous other states intervened to support the opposition as well. The United States, Great Britain, and France provided arms and training to rebel groups seeking to defeat Assad (and allegedly sent special

operations forces to conduct covert attacks), but refrained from direct military involvement, except to fight the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

The Syrian Civil War illustrates how civil wars exist within an international context, and the existence (or threat) of external actors affect domestic processes. Third parties can shift the balance of power and determine outcomes by sending arms, and they can prolong civilian suffering and disrupt peaceful settlements. Russian intervention in Syria might have saved Assad from ouster (and death) and prevented a swift end to the conflict. Expectations over intervention can also affect the local actors' willingness to fight. Given Assad's pariah status, the Syrian opposition might have expected international support and chose to take up arms based on third-party support.

If intervention is the process of international politics imposing itself on domestic politics, then the expansion of civil wars is the extension of that integration. The same way it is hard to imagine the Syrian Civil War absent international intervention, we cannot explain the First or Second Congo Wars without accounting for the conflict in Rwanda. What has been called Africa's First World War started in full when the Rwandan government sent troops into then Zaire to root out rebel groups. The expansion of the civil war in Rwanda into Zaire drew in numerous other countries, including Sudan and Uganda, and culminated in the overthrow of Zairean President Mobutu Sese Seko.

While these wars show that civil wars and international conflict are intertwined, we lack a theory that explains how they connect. We have to explain why domestic governments choose to retaliate, and in turn, how that threat condi-

tions the decision of the third parties to intervene and the decision of the rebels, who often depend on external support, to challenge the government in the first place. The outcome of these conflicts depends on the military balance of power, but that alone cannot explain the variation in civil war expansion. For instance, after the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, Iran started supplying arms and other resources after 2005 to the growing insurgency next door. These militias and rebel groups targeted both Iraqi and occupying forces, resulting in the death of U.S. troops and dragging the country into a fully-fledged civil war. Despite the costs of this intervention imposed on the occupier, successive U.S. administrations decided not to retaliate against the Iranian government. Rather than launch attacks against the border to compel an Iranian secession of rebel support, both Presidents Bush and Obama decided that the conflict would remain local. Their chief concern was that Iran could too easily escalate the fighting, likely because of Iran's covert and proxy force capabilities in the area. In other words, the world's only superpower would rather suffer costly intervention than escalate a conflict with a long-standing and militarily inferior rival. We therefore need to consider political variables in the decision to retaliate.

Third parties also consider factors beyond military strength when deciding to intervene or not. The United States chose to support the Afghan Mujahideen in 1980s, despite believing that the rebels had few chances of winning a military contest against the Kabul government, and later the Soviet occupying force. President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in a memo shortly after the Soviet invasion in December 1979 that the Mu-

jahideen were badly organized, with no sanctuary or central government and limited foreign support, and that the Soviet Union was likely to “act decisively.”¹ Despite these misgivings, Brzezinski advocated for more money and arms for the rebels, which suggests the administration was motivated by concerns beyond the chance of winning the war.

Another reason why the balance of power is not sufficient to explain variation in war expansion is the fact that we observe war expansions, which implies dual deterrence failure. War expansion is costly to the third party because it endangers its territory, so we have to explain why third parties sometimes intervene under the threat of retaliation. Conversely, if a third party intervenes, it typically does so with limited means. Why does a domestic government then choose to expand the war and incur additional costs? If we take the wars in Southern Africa as an example, a theory of war expansion must explain why Angola and Mozambique decided to support rebels in Namibia and South Africa despite being overmatched by the apartheid regime’s military. Furthermore, it must explain why South Africa decided it would rather fight two costly international wars rather than focus its military resources on fighting the rebels in its own territory.

Explaining retaliation has implications beyond the expansion of civil wars. In some cases, the threat of retaliation can even deter intervention from happening in the first place. The United States threatened Great Britain with war if it intervened on the side of the Confederacy during the American Civil War. Some

¹See: “Reflections on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan,” Memo to President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 26, 1979.

opposition groups might also depend on external support, and if so, the onset of civil war is a function of domestic as well as international processes.

These cases suggest that we need a theory that connects civil war and interstate war. These are conflicts over domestic and international order, and the two are intertwined. Because states are the constituent parts of the international system, efforts by one state to change another state's domestic order can shift the international distribution of political preferences. Additionally, war expansion is an attempt at changing the distribution of benefits between states by remaking borders. To explain war expansion then, we must explain why domestic governments retaliate, thus upending international order, but also why third parties intervene and rebels challenge in the shadow of retaliation.

1.2 The argument in brief

The argument proceeds from acknowledgement that these are nested conflicts. This is a straightforward observation about how warring parties make decisions on whether to fight or not. Rebels decide to fight or not depending on whether a third party will intervene, the domestic government decides how to respond to a challenge based on whether intervention will happen, and the third party intervenes or not based on whether it believes the government will retaliate in response to intervention. The last decision by the government to retaliate or tolerate intervention conditions all decisions before it and links together civil war

and interstate war.²

The strategic problem at the heart of the interaction, and why war breaks out, is that the rebels and the third party do not know whether the domestic government is willing to fight or not. The problem is two-fold; the rebels do not know whether the government will acquiesce to a challenge or not, and the third party does not know if a government that rejects a challenge will retaliate or not. As such, uncertainty over the government's underlying resolve explains the onset of civil war, internationalized civil war, and interstate war. While there might be other sources of uncertainty too in these conflicts, I focus on uncertainty about the domestic government's resolve because this is a parsimonious assumption that is both intuitive and useful. Domestic governments have an incentive to withhold private information about its costs of fighting. They might have concerns about the loyalty and quality of the military, or the leader might have a subjective distaste for violence. Because overtly weak governments can invite challenges and attract external intervention when it would otherwise not, they do not want to divulge this information. Additionally, as I show in chapter 2, uncertainty over the government's resolve can help explain disparate empirical patterns in the onset of civil wars.

While third parties often intervene, rebels may or may not want help. External supporters can come with their own agenda and dictate policy or set con-

²I focus on rebel-sided intervention and government retaliation because I am not aware of any instance of the reverse. Rebels can in theory retaliate against external rebel supporters, but if they do, it is exceedingly rare. Furthermore, if it were to happen, it would not constitute interstate war, but rather the spread of one civil war into a second territory.

ditions for aid, if the rebels take power. I call this the rebels' autonomy costs. In exchange for support, they lose some autonomy if they win the civil war. The extent to which rebels are susceptible to external domination depends on several factors, the main ones being the extent to which they have local support and institutions. With the support of the population and functioning institutions, they are less beholden to third party demands. The implication of autonomy costs is that for some rebels, help is too costly, and so they might choose not to challenge, if a third party will intervene.

The third party must weigh the costs and benefits of intervening. Intervention helps the rebels win, but to what end? Civil wars are violent competitions over the political arrangements of a country, and we should understand intervention as a way for third parties to pursue their interests in who governs. How much they care about the outcome of the civil war depends on the value of the country itself and its affinity for the rebels. Implicit in this formulation of intervention is the acknowledgement that state sovereignty is limited. When third parties are not indifferent to who governs and what they govern, they have a stake in the outcome of any domestic conflict, which can prompt them to intervene.

Intervention, however, is not without risks. The domestic government can retaliate, and conceptualizing this response is important for understanding the costs and risks it poses to a third party and connecting the two types of war. I argue that by expanding the war into the third-party territory, the domestic government effectively increases the pie being fought over. Under certain conditions, it might prefer a larger war over a local war—despite war expansion carry-

ing additional escalation costs. The decisions to intervene and retaliate therefore hinge on the size of what the domestic government controls (the local stakes) and what the third party controls (the international stakes), and so relative stakes provide the basis for a unified theory of civil and interstate war.

Together, these assumptions provide a simple explanation for war expansion. In equilibrium, civil wars expand when rebels and third parties underestimate the government's resolve. Rebels challenge the government because they believe the threat of intervention will compel the government to give up power, and the third party intervenes once fighting starts because it believes the government will tolerate an intervention. Three factors condition the information problem. First, the size of the local stakes relative to the international stakes determines the risks and benefits of intervention and retaliation. When the local stakes are sufficiently large, the domestic government has little to gain from expansion, but the third party has much to gain from intervening. However, larger local stakes make it less likely that the domestic government will acquiesce in the first place. Second, the rebels lose autonomy when receiving external support, so they must weigh the risk of rejection by the government against the costs of third-party intervention. Finally, the third party only intervenes when it likes the rebels sufficiently to make up for the costs of intervention and the risks of retaliation.

The theory shows how actors' preferences over domestic and international political order interact, and so outcomes that have typically been treated separately are in fact interdependent. While third parties can impose their politics on local conflicts, domestic governments can turn it around and attempt

to remake international borders. This has implications for how we understand interventions and civil wars. For instance, my theory explains when local-only civil wars occur in equilibrium and shows how the threat of retaliation deters intervention and shapes what kinds of rebels take up arms. When third parties stay out, the rebels' autonomy costs do not matter. Rebels that would otherwise avoid a challenge because they cannot withstand external domination, might risk civil war if there are no willing interveners. Under these circumstances, a credible threat from the domestic government can deter intervention, but encourage rebellion. This result suggests that domestic equilibria are only truly domestic absent any third parties, so all local politics is international (Gleditsch, 2009, cf.).

1.3 Road map

The dissertation is roughly divided in two parts: theory building and theory evaluation. Because I am trying to build a general theory of war expansion, I take the cartographic-epistemological approach to theoretical parsimony (Gunitsky, 2019), which allows me to make useful generalizations from simplifying assumptions. The cartographic approach is distinct from the empiricist-epistemological approach, which is more appropriate for positivist hypothesis testing. By treating theories like maps, I take the advice of Clarke and Primo (2012) that models should be evaluated by their usefulness, rather than their realism. This approach also allows me to explain the problem of war expansion.

I build my theory over two chapters. In the next chapter, I discuss existing

scholarship and analyze simple theoretical and empirical models of rebellion, intervention, and retaliation. These discussions help me to establish the first principles of my theory in terms of structure, preferences, and beliefs. I identify the actors' costs and benefits of fighting, the link between domestic and political order, and how private information generates the core strategic problem facing the rebels and the third party.

The third chapter lays out my main argument. I specify and analyze a formal model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation. I focus on two complementary equilibria: one with localized civil war, and one with intervention and probability of retaliation. In addition to explaining the logic of war expansion, I derive comparative statics to generate hypotheses for rebellion, intervention, and retaliation. Lastly, I discuss the American Civil War and the Wars in Southern Africa as cases of the threat of retaliation successfully and unsuccessfully deterring intervention, respectively. These vignettes are empirical existence proofs meant to demonstrate the empirical relevance of the model (Goertz, 2017, p. 178).

In the fourth chapter, I present newly collected data on war expansion covering all civil wars with rebel-sided intervention from 1975 to 2009, and I test several of the hypotheses that fall out of the theoretical model, focusing on a select few parameters. These tests show that the theory is generalizable to a global sample, and I uncover several empirical patterns of rebellion, intervention, and retaliation. For instance, I find that escalation costs, operationalized as the size of each country's urban population, predicts intervention and retaliation. Highly

urbanized civil war countries are more likely to experience rebel-sided intervention and less likely to retaliate. Correspondingly, third parties become less likely to intervene the larger their urban population. These results show that the formal model is useful for explaining a wide swathe of conflicts, because the actors' behavior corresponds with how I conceptualize and model the costs and benefits of fighting.

The fifth chapter is a case study of the Afghan Civil War in the 1980s, focusing especially on the U.S. decision to fund and expand its support for the Mujahideen, despite the threat of retaliation by the Soviet occupying power against Pakistan. Given my epistemological approach, case studies are particularly useful for evaluating my theory. Studying cases puts an emphasis on *how* a variable or set of variables affect an outcome rather than *whether* they do (Goemans and Spaniel, 2016). One of the more puzzling aspects of the Afghan Civil War is that the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union did not deter rebel-sided intervention, despite the Reagan administration's concerns about retaliation. Instead, the Soviet occupation encouraged intervention and prompted the formation of an intervention coalition between the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. My theory explains why. The Soviet presence increased the relative size of the local stakes, particularly relative to Pakistan. The Kremlin had little to win by defeating Pakistan, and much to lose, especially as it sought to restart détente under President Mikhail Gorbachev. The United States was therefore able to intervene, and later escalate its involvement, in the face of an irresolute Soviet Union.

The dissertation concludes with a discussion of implications for other re-

search. For the civil war literature, I discuss how a nested theory of civil and interstate war informs our understanding of existing models of civil war onset and intervention. I also show that the duration of civil wars depends on retaliation, so studies of the relationship between intervention and duration might be conflating separate mechanisms of prolonged fighting. My research also has implications for conflict prevention and mitigation. I discuss potential avenues for overcoming the information problem causing war, and how peace hinges on international mechanisms. Relatedly, my argument has implications for foreign policy and debates about grand strategy. The current debate about U.S. grand strategy overlooks indirect and proxy conflicts as a manifestation of international competition amongst great powers, and I discuss the challenges this poses to the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.

Chapter 2

First Principles of Rebellion, Intervention, and Retaliation

If civil wars are complicated, civil wars nested within interstate conflict are chaotic.¹ The conflicts vary in the number of groups and interveners, as well as variation in retaliation, and this heterogeneity poses substantial challenges to a modeler. In this chapter, I evaluate the existing literature on civil war onset, intervention, and war expansion to establish some first principles for a theory connecting civil and interstate war.

Civil wars are hardly an understudied phenomenon in international relations, but the various research programs tend to discuss specific processes and mechanisms in isolation. For my purposes, I have to draw on a wide range of programs to build something from the ground up. In other words, I have to scavenge for parts. Most parts are there, as existing models of rebellion, interven-

¹As John Patty put it so succinctly when describing the modeling enterprise: two players is company, three is chaos.

tion, and retaliation offer insights into the preferences of and dilemmas facing the relevant actors. As I show in this chapter, we have a good idea of what motivates rebels and third parties, but I introduce and analyze some new theoretical and empirical models to explain disparate findings and synthesize arguments from different research programs. We know less about the domestic government, especially when and why it chooses to retaliate, and even less about how all three actors interact. Some theoretical table-clearing and insights from extended deterrence models and international competition literature help answer these questions and set up the theoretical model in the next chapter.

I focus on first principles for two reasons. First, the decisions to rebel, intervene, and retaliate are interdependent. Rebels may or may not be more likely to fight if they are expecting external support, but the threat of retaliation can deter third parties from intervening. Second, in order to explain the range of relevant outcomes to my inquiry, I need to develop a general model of civil and interstate war that rests on a select few assumptions. Identifying common considerations across the three actors allows me to develop a parsimonious model that is both general and analytically tractable. These first principles identify the actors' incentives for fighting, how they connect, and how they clash.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I start by discussing the rebels. When do groups rebel, and what do they want? Next, I discuss the costs and benefits of external support to rebels. I then examine how the threat of intervention can encourage or discourage rebellion. I focus especially on the role of private information in causing the outbreak of war. Following that, I discuss the motivations

of third parties, and when and why they intervene. Reasons vary from conflict to conflict, but general explanations tend to focus on the relationships between the third party and the rebels, or the third party and the civil war state. In the next section, I expand the scope of the argument and explain how international competition drives decisions on intervention. Lastly, I examine the existing models of civil war retaliation and show why they cannot answer my research question. In short, because they focus on interstate relations and ignore domestic processes, they cannot explain why these conflicts start in the first place.

2.1 Models of rebellion

In this section I discuss some broad themes and findings of the civil war literature to answer two basic questions. First, when do groups rebel? Second, what do they want? In short, groups take up arms when they are dissatisfied with the status quo, but they face a strategic problem unique to domestic conflicts: governments can renege on agreements once a group disarms (Walter, 1997). Therefore, groups tend to seek total control, rather than fight for a power-sharing agreement, which has implications for how we model rebellion.

Historically, the study of why civil wars occur has been divided into two research programs: economists have examined greed or opportunity as a predictor of rebellion, whereas political scientists have studied the role of grievances in explaining civil wars. The former program, in its most extreme form, argues that rebellion is best explained as an industry that generates profits, so that insur-

gents are no different than bandits or pirates (Grossman, 1999, pp. 268-269), but later work explores the political economy of civil wars in broader terms (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, e.g.). Rebels care about the distribution of income, but also external support and the opportunity costs of rebellion. For instance, poorer countries are at elevated risk of civil war because the foregone income from fighting instead of working is smaller than in richer countries. As such, the greed program focuses on "atypical opportunities for building a rebel organization" (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, p. 563). However, opportunity alone is an unsatisfactory explanation for rebellion, because rebels are typically weaker than the government (Cunningham et al., 2009, p. 582). The grievance program, on the other hand, focuses on the motives of rebels. For instance, Cederman et al. (2010, p. 88) argue that horizontal inequality explains rebellion. Ethnic groups are more likely to fight the government if they are excluded from power, have the capacity to mobilize, and have recent experience with conflict. Opportunity thus plays a role in rebellion, but the key motivation for fighting lies in the desire for political power.

A sensitivity analysis of empirical models suggest that variables from both programs are consistent and robust predictors of civil war onset. In particular, gross domestic product per capita, economic growth, and various measures of domestic political institutions are all robust predictors of civil war (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006, pp. 524-526). Bartusevičius and Gleditsch (2019) suggest that disparate findings in the literature are due to the conflation of two related, yet distinct phases of conflict: the emergence of contested incompatibilities and the

militarization of conflict.² Horizontal inequality predicts contested incompatibilities but not the escalation to armed conflict, whereas refugee flows, which provide opportunities for rebellion through the import of arms and combatants, predict militarization but not the initial incompatibility (Bartusevičius and Gleditsch, 2019, p. 244). Regardless, the findings of both programs imply that rebels are motivated by dissatisfaction with the status quo; they can make economic gains if the conditions are right, or they fight for power because there is a disparity between the distribution of power and distribution of benefits (see Powell (1999)).

Rebel groups have varying aims in civil wars. Some seek to take over the state, while others want to secede and establish a new state or join another. Their aims depend on their capabilities relative to the government (Buhaug, 2006, p. 700). Rebels in large and ethnically diverse countries limit their aims to territorial sovereignty, while smaller states have few opportunities for secessionism, so they are more likely to experience center-seeking rebels. Rebel aims might also differ in their aims for the state itself. In countries with weak and exploitative governments, rebels merely seek to replace the government, because they see the state as a way to extract resources, in line with the greed explanation for civil wars. Conversely, when the opposition has grievances towards the state, they pursue civil wars of legitimacy to remake the relationship between the state and society (Sobek and Payne, 2010, p. 214).

²The authors define contested incompatibilities as the active pursuit of an object that cannot be enjoyed by both, or only partially so, such as control of a territory or the state (Bartusevičius and Gleditsch, 2019, p. 228).

Rebels can try to reach a peaceful settlement with the government, but the rebels face a strategic problem: they do not know if the government will abide by a peace agreement. Power-sharing agreements can be dangerous, encouraging rebels to seek complete control. Following the coup in Afghanistan in 1978, the country was run by the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, which was comprised of two main factions: the hardline Khalq and the more moderate Parcham. When the civil war started in the following year, the Khalq faction, including President Nur Muhammad Taraki, started purging the government of Parcham members. They executed both top leaders and people of middle ranks, according to Soviet documents.³

Existing work on the role of domestic politics in civil wars can explain why compromise is dangerous. Commitment problems prevent peaceful settlements in civil wars because governments can renege on agreements (and even attack) after rebels have disarmed (Walter, 1997). But this dilemma is not exclusive to war settings; once a group has reached a certain position, in potential power or organization, disarming can be risky. If a group organizes to obtain political concessions, it becomes a threat to the sitting government. This dilemma might be particularly pronounced in countries most likely to experience civil wars. A wide swath of scholarship suggests that there is a curvilinear relationship between democracy and conflict. Authoritarian regimes deter rebellion because they have the means to repress opposition, whereas democracies allow peaceful

³“Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan,” March 17, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25 dok.1, ll. 1, 12-25. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113260>.

collective action.⁴ Anocracies, on the other hand, lack the ability to deter rebellion, which invites violence. Furthermore, these regimes lack the institutions to uphold domestic bargains, causing commitment problems for the government. More recent analysis suggests that the u-shaped relationship is a product of how Polity codes anocracies. Countries are coded as anocracy when political participation is factional, which is often associated with violence. The empirical finding then suggests that civil war is more likely when hostile factions resort to political violence (Vreeland, 2008, pp. 402-403). This finding then suggests that political instability rather than political underdevelopment leads to rebellion, but regardless of which mechanism is at play, groups are incentivized to demand total control because power sharing is not credible.

These arguments have implications for how we think about rebel behavior vis-a-vis the government. They illustrate why behavior that indicates issue indivisibility (i.e. rebels seeking total control) is actually a form of commitment problem (see Powell (2006, p. 177-178)). It is not that power-sharing is not possible; rather, it is likely to be an unsound strategy given the government's inability to honor its commitments. Issue indivisibility is then a simplifying assumption, with some costs to explanation. If we abstract away from the *how* of commitment problems by assuming issue indivisibility the way many crisis bargaining models do, we can explain how other factors, such as private information, affect the risk of civil war. However, this simplification narrows the scope of our argument to

⁴Early arguments for this relationship can be found in (de Nardo, 1985; Muller and Weede, 1990; Francisco, 1995), while Hegre et al. (2001); Fearon and Laitin (2003) find support with large-n studies.

cases where domestic agreements are unlikely to be upheld.

The arguments presented here offer some common themes. They show that rebels want power, through political or economic gains, but their willingness to fight and the aims they pursue are tempered by the likelihood of victory. Rebels are typically weaker than the government, and most lack the institutions or industrial base to build a regular military. Furthermore, both taking up arms and reaching a peaceful settlement are risky, so if rebels fight, they should fight for total control. Why do they fight then? In the next section I discuss how third parties can alter the balance of power in a conflict, but receiving support comes at a cost.

2.2 The costs and benefits of support

Third-party interventions can have a profound effect on the development of the conflict and the warring parties themselves. For the rebels, the prospect of external support offers promise and risks. As I show in this section, rebel support is often substantial and can help give the group a fighting chance against a stronger government. However, rebels are also at risk of losing their autonomy when third parties get involved. Help can come with strings attached, so weaker groups might compromise their political goals in exchange for necessary support.

Intervention comes in many forms, and a key question is who gets support. Third parties can intervene as a neutral party or support one of the warring parties. The former is typically referred to as an unbiased intervention, whereas

the latter constitutes a biased intervention. Unbiased interventions are often studied as policy interventions meant to end fighting or prevent violence, with the implicit or explicit assumption that third parties, such as international organizations, want peace, rather than one particular side to win (Hultman et al., 2013, e.g.).

Distinct from these peacekeeping or peacemaking interventions are biased interventions, typically performed by states. Early studies of third-party interventions differed in what they assumed about the third party's motivations. Some assumed that the goal of such intervention was to resolve conflicts (Regan, 1996, 2002a,b, e.g.), while other studies sidestepped the motivations of the interveners and only focused on which side got support (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008). What they have in common is the idea that intervention alters the domestic balance of power, which in turn can shorten or prolong fighting. However, interventions affect the likelihood of a civil war ending differently, depending on which side gets support. Rebel-sided intervention increases the chances of rebel victory, but government-sided intervention seemingly has no or a lesser effect on the probability of government victory (Gent, 2008; Sullivan and Karreth, 2015). There are two potential explanations for this pattern. One, it can be the product of selection bias in the data; because governments tend to be stronger than the rebels, as Gent (2008) argues. Third parties tend to intervene on the side of the government in the toughest cases, where intervention is less likely to be effective, such as when rebels already have external support. Alternatively, rebel support is more effective than government support be-

cause rebels are more likely to lack conventional war-fighting capacity, per Sullivan and Karreth (2015). These studies suggest that the balance of power and the likelihood of victory are key to third parties' decision-making.⁵

The form of intervention differs from conflict to conflict, ranging from passive support to direct military involvement. Third parties might offer sanctuary to a warring party, so the actor can train and plan attacks under the protection of the other state. For instance, during the Vietnam War, the Viet Cong supplied arms from China through Thailand and on through the Ho Chi Minh Trail in eastern Cambodia. The Cambodian sanctuary was key to the North Vietnamese war effort, and unsuccessful efforts by the United States to persuade King Sihanouk to shut down the supply routes later led to a U.S. bombing campaign and invasion of Cambodia. However, it is not clear whether the King actually had the ability to secure his own territory and control the border. Treating sanctuary as intervention is then problematic if we are to focus on purposeful actions by third parties.

Most interventions, though, are more explicit. Third parties often send money or arms, provide intelligence, or dispatch troops. Civil war governments and rebel groups can use cash to pay their supporters or fighters, but often third parties send actual weapons. The types of weapons can vary from conflict to conflict, or over time within a conflict. The United States first started sending British-

⁵Third parties can also prolong fighting if they pursue an independent agenda. Cunningham (2010) argues that the addition of an additional actor introduces new or exacerbates existing bargaining friction, but it is unclear how the threat of such interventions affect the onset of conflict.

made .303 bolt-action Lee Enfield rifles to the Afghan Mujhideen (Coll, 2004, p. 59), but later, and after much internal discussion, sent more advanced weaponry such as the shoulder-mounted anti-aircraft Stinger missiles (Kuperman, 1999). Towards the end of the conflict, the Central Intelligence Agency even floated the idea of sending Soviet tanks abandoned by Iraqi forces during Desert Storm to the Afghan rebels (Coll, 2004, p. 226). The choice of what to send can depend on who the rebels are or who they are fighting. For instance, Iran did not supply the type of advanced anti-tank weaponry to its allies in Iraq during the U.S. occupation that it supplies to Hezbollah in Lebanon, because doing so could have provoked a more forceful response from the United States (Ricks, 2009, p. 302). Third parties therefore have a choice in what they send to warring parties, as well as conflict-related constraints on what kind of support they can or should provide.

The most extreme form of intervention is the deployment of troops. Often this comes in the form of military advisors or special operations forces meant to assist the warring party. In 2011, after the NATO-led military intervention in Libya, several European countries, sent military advisors to assist rebels in protecting civilians. Other times, third parties send troops to participate in fighting. After the attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States sent CIA officers into Northern Afghanistan to recruit and support Afghan militias against the Taliban government (Schroen, 2006), and during the Bosnian War, the Serbian secessionists in Bosnia-Herzegovina consisted of officers, including its commander Ratko Mladic, from the Yugoslav People's Army, Yugoslavia's military until 1992.




Figure 2.1: Distribution of levels of support by recipient.

The data on external support suggest that most third parties choose a middle route when intervening in a civil war. Using the External Support dataset from UCDP (Pettersson, 2011), I generate an ordinal measure of level of support from states to either governments or rebels, with territory only coded as “Low,” any kind of material support except troops coded as “Moderate,” and providing troops coded as “High.” Figure 2.1 shows that moderate support is by far the most common level of support, and rebels more often receive sanctuary in another

state, while governments far more often receive support in the form of third-party troops. These statistics suggest that third parties can provide substantial aid to rebels, but they often temper their involvement.

For the warring parties, support comes at a cost. Both governments and rebels must give up some autonomy in exchange for protection, and this dilemma might be especially acute for rebels. They are typically weaker than the government (Sullivan and Karreth, 2015), so third-party support is more essential to their continued existence and ability to win. Supporters exploit this dependence by influencing aims, strategies and tactics of the rebels, and over time, the rebels might start to behave like their patron (Sullivan and Karreth, 2015, p. 501). Rebels must therefore weigh the benefits of support against the risks of being dominated by an external supporter. As I discuss in the next section, empirical patterns suggest that more often than not, the benefits outweigh the costs of support, as the prospects of external support encourage rebellion.

2.3 Rebellion in the shadow of intervention

Governments and opposition groups often bargain under the looming threat of intervention, and expectations over external support shape the risk of civil war. At the systemic level, international competition amongst great powers can affect patterns of civil wars by increasing the supply of support for domestic actors (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010) or encourage warring parties to continue fighting (Anderson, 2016). Scholarship on hierarchies in international relations (Lake, 2009,

e.g.) and rebel diplomacy (Huang, 2016, e.g.) show that governments and rebels, respectively, seek out third-party support before or during conflict. In general, expectations over rebel-sided intervention increases the risk of civil war, while expectations over government-sided intervention decreases the risk of civil war. As I show in this section, one explanation for these patterns is that the rebels do not know the domestic government's resolve for fighting.

There are several mechanisms through which expectations over external support may cause the outbreak of civil war. Theoretical models of rebellion in the shadow of intervention show how expectations of support can increase rebels' willingness to take up arms. However, the presence of a rebel supporter is not sufficient to cause war. Under complete information, rebel support only affects demands made in equilibrium, rather than the risk of rebellion (Cetinyan, 2002). For third parties to cause civil war, there has to be some bargaining friction, such as private information about intervention or a commitment problem generated by future intervention. Thyne (2006) proposes that cheap talk, but not costly signaling, by third parties can increase or decrease the risk of civil war. He proposes several mechanisms, with the simplest mechanism focused on unitary actors. Governments are typically better informed than rebels about the likelihood of intervention, so third-party signals hostile to the government cause divergent expectations about intervention; the rebels update their belief about the likelihood of receiving support strictly upwards, whereas the government is better informed about whether intervention is coming and who is receiving support. Estimating models of civil war onset as a product of cheap signals, Thyne finds

that the more supportive third-party signals are, the less likely civil war becomes.

Kuperman (2008) proposes a similar, but less clear, mechanism. He argues the norm of humanitarian interventions causes moral hazard; groups that would otherwise not rebel, take up arms because they expect intervention if the government retaliates by committing genocide. Even when intervention is uncertain, it presents rebels with a no-lose scenario: either the government acquiesces to a challenge, or the government retaliates and some third party intervenes. Because the threat of intervention encourages rebellion but fails to coerce all governments, uncertain intervention results in some positive probability of war. However, uncertainty should coerce governments into acquiescing as well as encourage rebellion, and Kuperman does not explain why we should expect the former to swamp the latter in expectation.⁶

The prospect of government-sided support affects the risk of war differently. Cunningham (2016) argues that because governments are typically stronger than rebels, and government-sided support can be so profound, the rebels' costs of fighting can exceed their probability of victory. Expected government intervention should therefore, on average, deter rebellion. Cunningham's argument is not dependent on private information, and he claims "a likely intervention leading to extreme asymmetry should prevent civil war even if the government and dissidents are perfectly informed about this likelihood" (Cunningham, 2016, p. 315). He finds support for his argument with empirical models of civil war onset:

⁶For a broader critique of Kuperman's argument, and particularly the indeterminate relationship between uncertainty and war, see Wagner (2005, p. 244).

the risk of civil war is negatively associated with membership in the U.S. hierarchy as a proxy for expected government support.

These theoretical models rely on different assumptions about domestic processes specific to their research questions. A more general model should account for the effect of government- and rebel-sided intervention on domestic bargaining, and explain why the former tends to deter rebellion while the latter encourages rebellion. Furthermore, the private information models do not clearly distinguish between the likelihood of the rebels risking war and the probability of the government rejecting an offer or challenge. For instance, expectations about intervention can encourage a rebel group to challenge the government, but at the same time compel the government into acquiescing to a challenge, because it does not want to fight an internationalized civil war. Modeling the effects of intervention on the probability of civil war is straightforward, as long as we assume D has private information about its resolve.

Suppose a one-period crisis bargaining game where R either challenges D for control of the government (normalized to 1), but is uncertain about D 's resolve. If D rejects a challenge, the two fight a costly civil war ($c_i > 0$), where the probability of victory is a product of the actors' military strength, so D wins with probability $\frac{m_D}{m_D+m_R}$ and R wins with probability $\frac{m_R}{m_D+m_R}$. I assume that R is satisfied ($c_R > \frac{m_R}{m_D+m_R}$), because otherwise, war happens just because R prefers costly war to peace. D 's type is defined by its cost of fighting and uniformly distributed ($c_D \sim U(0, \bar{c}_D)$). If so, R challenges D when rebel victory is sufficiently likely. R 's expected utility of challenging is increasing in m_R because increased

rebel strength makes it more likely that 1) D will acquiesce, and 2) R will prevail in a civil war (proof in the appendix).

Let us now suppose a third party T can either support the rebels or the domestic government, and both actors know which side is getting support. If T will support R , by providing some resources ($s > 0$) that increases the probability of rebel victory ($\Pr(R \text{ win}) = \frac{m_R+s}{m_D+m_R+s}$) at no cost, the presence of T strictly increases R 's willingness to challenge D compared to no T . I make the simplifying assumption that rebels prefer support to fighting alone, because the prevalence of rebel-sided support suggests that most groups are willing to give up some autonomy. With these assumptions, increased chances of winning strictly makes R more likely to challenge. Conversely, if T will support D ($\Pr(D \text{ win}) = \frac{m_D+s}{m_D+m_R+s}$), the presence of the third party strictly decreases willingness to challenge D . This simple game then explains how expectations over third-party intervention shape rebel behavior in line with the expectations of the models of rebellion discussed above.

Whether intervention increases or decreases the risk of civil war, depends on the probabilities of R challenging and D rejecting. I find that increased rebel support increases R 's willingness to challenge more than it decreases the probability of D rejecting a challenge (proof in the appendix). Conversely, increased government support decreases R 's willingness to challenge more than it increases the probability of D rejecting a challenge. These results show that a parsimonious model of rebellion and intervention with uncertainty over D 's resolve can explain the empirical patterns identified by Thyne (2006), Kuperman (2008), and

Cunningham (2016). Besides being an intuitive explanation for war, private information about the domestic government's willingness to fight can also explain intervention. As I discuss in the next sections, a potential rebel supporter might also be uncertain about the government's resolve, so the third party and the rebels face the same strategic dilemma.

2.4 Models of intervention

When and whether rebels challenge the government in the shadow of intervention depends on the conditions under which intervention happens. In this section I discuss why third parties intervene in civil wars, in order to define the scope of my inquiry and establish some first principles. In broad terms, the decision to intervene is motivated by the potential intervener's relationships with the warring parties. Sometimes states intervene to support specific rebels, and studies suggest a consistent relationship between transnational ethnic links and intervention. Ethnic groups with co-ethnics in positions of power abroad are more likely to receive external support than other groups (Saideman, 2002), states are more likely to intervene in civil wars with co-ethnic groups than without (Austvoll, 2005), and transnational ethnic ties are associated with an increase the risk of civil war (Gleditsch, 2007). More recently, San-Akca (2016, p. 90) finds that third parties are more likely to support a rebel group when they share ethnic, ideological, or religious ties (jointly defined as ideational ties).

These results indicate that third parties are motivated by their affinity for

warring parties when making the decision whether to intervene and whom to support. However, the results do not offer a clear explanation as to why states care about ideational ties. Austvoll (2005, p. 67) shows that country-dyads where the third party government has ethnic ties to the opposition in the civil war government are more likely to experience rebel-sided intervention than no intervention, but there is only weak evidence that rebel-sided intervention is more likely than government-sided intervention. Similarly, San-Akca (2016, p. 90) finds that both ideational ties between the third party's majority and a rebel group and the third party's minority group(s) and a rebel group are associated with an increase in the likelihood of external support. Further complicating these results, Koga (2011, p. 1153) finds that ethnic ties only increase the likelihood of rebel-sided intervention when the third party is democratic. The role of affinity might then depend on the third party's domestic politics.

Other times, intervention is driven by interstate rivalry or economic considerations. Third parties are more likely to support one side in a civil war if the other side is receiving support from a rival state (Findley and Teo, 2006, p. 834), which suggests that conflicts become more important when other states intervene. Economic opportunities or threats can also motivate interventions. Third parties are more likely to intervene in a civil war if the conflict threatens access to markets (Aydin, 2012), and they are more likely to support rebels specifically if the civil war country has lootable resources (Findley and Marineau, 2015, p. 475).

These factors help explain why third parties have an interest in other states'

civil wars, but they do not necessarily explain why third parties choose military intervention to pursue these interests. When third parties intervene on the side of the rebels, they are delegating war-fighting to another actor (Salehyan, 2010). This delegation involves a trade, where the third party gives up some control in exchange for providing resources to the rebels, so we should understand rebel-sided intervention as a matching process between potential supporters and recipients (Salehyan et al., 2011). Some states even use rebel support as a screening mechanism to coerce the target states into making policy concessions (Bapat, 2012). If we follow the logic of foreign policy substitutability (Most and Starr, 1984; Morgan and Palmer, 2000, e.g.), rebel support is a lower-cost alternative to direct military confrontation. Ironically, more powerful countries are more likely to use lower levels of violence than weaker countries, at least for policy disputes. The former are more capable of absorbing the costs of longer deployments, less concerned with first-move advantages, and more able to unilaterally withdraw from a conflict. Therefore, stronger countries have a lower threshold for using limited military operations to reduce uncertainty about opponents' resolve than weaker countries (Rapport, 2015, p. 209-210).

The above studies suggest a wide range of proximate sources of intervention, but they are often context specific (e.g. ethnic ties) or dependent on prior relationships (e.g. rivalry), and elide one fundamental feature of civil wars: they are struggles over domestic political arrangements. Most rebels want to remake the status quo, whether through center-seeking or secessionist behavior, and so we should understand civil war interventions as a way to preserve or alter the

status quo by supporting the government or the rebels, respectively. In the next section I articulate a broader explanation for intervention premised on international competition over how states govern themselves.

2.5 International competition and domestic politics

Competing political preferences drive decisions on intervention because states have an interest in other states' domestic political arrangements. Wagner (2007, ch. 6) argues that variations in domestic bargains imply different incentives for revisionist policies, because institutions or domestic coalitions can more or less restrain leaders from pursuing private gains. While some states are territorially satisfied, and some might be able to offer each other guarantees of mutual security, others have more revisionist preferences. Some leaders can also leverage race, religion, ethnicity, or ideology to create political mass mobilization, which in turn reduces executive predation (Wagner, 2007, pp. 202-203). In a world of heterogeneous states, leaders have an incentive to remake others' domestic political arrangements because reducing the political differences between states can reduce the risk of conflict and create more opportunities for joint gains. Intervening on the side of co-ethnic brethren helps move that state's political arrangements closer, if co-ethnics share similar political preferences.

We can therefore understand interventions as the product of multilateral political competition where actors share the costs of eliminating a threat. Transnational ideological networks and elite polarization drives competition over

ideas and political preferences, which explains why states promote regime change in others (Owen IV, 2010). During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union intervened in numerous third-world countries, often on opposing sides, to spread their preferences and build international order (Westad, 2005), and such competition affects the global pattern of civil wars (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010).⁷ Similarly, Europe in the first half of the 20th century saw a wave of civil wars brought about by revolutionary sentiment and aided by Revolutionary Russia (Payne, 2011). Domestic institutions also change after war is over, as post-war settlements establish a new political order that influences the regime type of new and old states (McDonald, 2015; Gunitsky, 2017). The spatial distribution of domestic political arrangements should therefore be seen as the product of international processes, and intervention into civil wars is one manifestation.

To see whether ideological and institutional disagreements can predict intervention into civil wars, I estimate several empirical models of intervention and political distance.⁸ Specifically, I use multinomial logit to test if political distance between civil war countries and another state can predict whether the government, the rebels, or both sides get support from the third party.⁹ The sample

⁷The U.S. pursuit of a liberal international order might not be conditional on competition with the Soviet Union. Choi (2013, pp. 128-129) finds evidence that U.S. humanitarian interventions are driven by the pursuit of liberal goals rather than national interests as construed by realist theories, in a sample that covers the period 1981-2005.

⁸Ideology and institutions are not interchangeable concepts, but they are correlated. We can imagine them having somewhat varying effects on intervention, depending on states' resource constraints and how they identify competitors. Some states might focus on ideological differences because those differences might be more fundamental, while others focus on institutional differences because they provide a short-cut to policy change in the target.

⁹There are few observations where a third party starts supporting both sides in the same year,

includes all civil wars and interveners in the period 1975-2009, using the UCDDP External Support dataset (Pettersson, 2011), and I structure it on the conflict-potential intervener level, where every other state in the system at the year of conflict onset is included as a potential intervener. For every dyad, I generate measures of their political distance by taking the absolute difference between their scores. I generate distinct measures using indicators of countries' ideology, institutions, and policy preferences (full results and details of analysis presented in appendix), but I focus particularly on the Liberal democracy index measure (from here on Libdem) from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2020). Libdem measures the extent to which liberal democracy is achieved in a given country, including degrees of political competition, executive recruitment, and executive constraint (Coppedge et al., 2020, p. 43), so it broadly captures ideological and institutional liberalism. I also estimate models using distance in ideal points (Bailey et al., 2017), polyarchy (Coppedge et al., 2020), level of democracy (Marshall et al., 2002), and trade openness (Chinn and Ito, 2006).

and these are most likely the result of third parties picking one side first, who then win or lose power in the same year, and then continuing to support it. As such, it is difficult to interpret the coefficients for this outcome.

Table 2.1: Liberal democracy and Ideal point distance as predictors of intervention

	Staying out	Gov. supp.	Reb. supp.	Both	Staying out	Gov. supp.	Reb. supp.	Both
Liberal democracy distance	0.184 (0.39)	0 (.)	4.394*** (4.08)	47.28*** (3.30)				
Liberal democracy (D)	4.338*** (5.97)	0 (.)	1.832 (1.67)	-28.26 (-1.74)				
Liberal democracy (T)	-0.956* (-2.16)	0 (.)	-5.901*** (-5.42)	-32.29* (-2.00)				
Ideal point distance					-0.0972 (-0.97)	0 (.)	0.428** (2.79)	0.598 (0.26)
Ideal point (D)					0.0799 (0.57)	0 (.)	0.789*** (3.42)	4.725 (1.94)
Ideal point (T)					-0.343** (-3.26)	0 (.)	-0.481** (-3.17)	-1.976 (-1.60)
Observations	24284				23602			

t statistics in parentheses

Coefficients omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

I find that Liberal democracy distance is a consistent predictor of who third parties support in a civil war (Table 2.1). As two countries' Liberal democracy distance increases, the third party (T) becomes more likely to support the rebels relative to supporting the government (D). The coefficient is highly statistically significant ($p < 0.001$), even when I include a battery of control variables and region-fixed effects. This result suggests that democracies are more likely to support rebels than authoritarian governments in civil wars and vice-versa. The magnitude of the relationship is also large. While the risk of intervention is overall low (unsurprising given the large sample of potential interveners), the risk of rebel support relative to government support increases 2.5 times going from minimum distance to mean distance. As I describe in the appendix, this result is also robust to alternative specifications (restricting the sample to politically relevant dyads) and alternative measures (polyarchy). Polity2 is not a consistent

predictor of intervention, which could be due to how interregnum periods are coded in PolityIV (Vreeland, 2008).




Figure 2.2: Risk of rebel support relative to government support by Liberal democracy distance (left) and Ideal point distance (right).

I also find that more policy-oriented measures of distance are not as consistent or robust in predicting intervention. Ideal point distance performs better than trade openness (which never has a statistically significant coefficient), but is outperformed by Liberal democracy distance. As Figure 2.2 shows, both Liberal democracy distance and Ideal point distance are positively associated with an increase in the risk of rebel support. However, once I include both measures

in the same model, the latter coefficient loses statistical significance (see Table A.5 in the appendix).

These results help explain why we rarely see civil war governments and third parties bargain directly before or during fighting, which has implications for how we conceptualize the states' interaction. Unlike bargaining over interstate issues, third parties tend not to ask civil war governments for territorial or other costly concessions in exchange for (non)intervention. Even when third parties are involved in diplomatic processes, such as the United States and the Soviet Union during the Afghan Civil War in the 1980s, they are making demands specific to the political arrangements in the civil war country. In other words, the contested issue is the actual civil war state, rather than some interstate issue such as the territorial boundary between the third party and the domestic government. Intervention is the means to achieve political transformation, rather than a tool to extract policy concessions, which is why these conflicts are distinct from strictly interstate conflicts.

A broader implication of these results is that state sovereignty is not absolute, because states have an interest in others' political arrangements. Furthermore, the configuration of regional interests matter for civil wars because it defines the potential for external coalition building. Both governments and rebels can receive support, depending on the relationship amongst states. Domestic processes are therefore a product of international politics.

2.6 Models of retaliation and escalation

While third parties intervene to affect domestic political arrangements, interventions are not without risks. Rebel support in particular can have unintended consequences and even threaten the third party's own political order. Support can cause moral hazard problems by emboldening rebels (Kuperman, 2008; Salehyan, 2010; Bapat, 2012), and intervention in general is associated with increased refugee flows (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006, pp. 344-7). The most severe risk is that a domestic government retaliates against the third party for supporting rebels, thus starting an interstate war. Gleditsch et al. (2008) find that interventions into a civil war increase the risk of interstate war between the countries, though the mechanism through which this escalation occurs is not specified, in part because the research design does not define directionality. Regardless, intervention is both costly in terms of resources and risky in terms of potential indirect and direct costs imposed by other actors.

Theoretical models of retaliation offer some potential explanations, but they focus on interstate relations so they cannot explain why these conflicts arise in the first place. The two most relevant models for this inquiry are Maoz and San-Akca (2012) and Schultz (2010), and both explain retaliation in the context of interstate rivalry. Maoz and San-Akca (2012, p. 724) argue that retaliation occurs when both states are dissatisfied, so the third party supports the rebels because an interstate conflict is happening regardless, and it is better off enlisting the rebels rather than fighting alone. Schultz (2010, p. 286), however, argues

that retaliation occurs because domestic governments cannot perfectly observe whether third parties stay out of civil wars or support rebels, so sometimes third parties “cheat,” hoping it will go undetected, and sometimes this results in retaliation.

The main limitation of these theoretical models is that they bracket domestic processes and take conflict as a given.¹⁰ The civil wars we observe, are a product of domestic bargaining breakdown, which can hinge on the threat of retaliation. If a domestic government can credibly threaten retaliation, it can deter intervention, which may or may not deter rebellion. Rebels who need external support might never pick up arms, while rebels who do not want intervention, might be more inclined to fight absent a third party. Rebels can also have preferences over retaliation itself, as some groups attack targets outside of their territory to divert government forces (Holtermann, 2019). Without accounting for domestic processes, we cannot explain why these conflicts start in the first place. Furthermore, if civil war onset and intervention are correlated with the government’s ability to retaliate, we risk biased estimates of predictors of retaliation.

Schultz (2010) offers insights into how secrecy can serve as a mechanism for conflict escalation. Often times interventions are done covertly, which poses problems for domestic governments. However, private information about intervention alone cannot explain these conflicts. If we extend his model backwards to include domestic bargaining, we would need some bargaining friction

¹⁰Schultz (2010, p. 296) notes as much that in order to fully explain civil war expansion, you need additional actors, such as a rebel group, and other kinds of private information.

between the rebels and the government to cause war. The natural extension is to assume the rebels also have private information about the likelihood of intervention. If that were the case, satisfied rebels would have no incentive to challenge the government if the third party will not intervene but the government will fight, because they would be strictly worse off fighting a civil war alone than keep the status quo. Such a private information structure cannot explain why both rebels and a third party take actions that carry some risk of war.¹¹

Secrecy can also help reduce the risk of war expansion, because of domestic political pressure. Carson (2016, pp. 111-4) argues that the ability to intervene covertly allows states to manage unintended escalation. Retaliation happens because of overt intervention, when the intervener is not interested in managing escalation. But because his theory seeks to explain variation in secrecy, rather than retaliation, it is not clear how a target state can deter intervention in the first place.¹² Overt intervention, and thus a risk of escalation, is most likely in the context of "low technological sophistication, local conflicts with no or one-sided outside interest, and if intervening powers are domestically insulated and lack alliance considerations" (Carson, 2016, p. 115). None of these factors can be influenced by the target state within the scope of the theory, so it only explains

¹¹A model with private information about intervention that explains civil war would require several more moving parts. For instance, the model could include additional moves, such as giving the domestic government the ability to threaten the rebels and the rebels the option to back down afterwards, akin to existing crisis bargaining models (Slantchev, 2011, e.g.). Such a model would then necessitate reputational costs as well, making it more complicated than a model with private information about the domestic government's resolve.

¹²Carson suggests that leaders "may feel trapped into escalating their involvement in a particular conflict to avoid damaging their reputation for support of partners and allies" (Carson, 2016, p. 113).

cases where the domestic government is restrained from retaliating, except when subjected to domestic political pressures.

Assuming that expansion is strictly suboptimal for the domestic government limits the scope of these models and raises the question of why perfectly informed governments would retaliate. Some governments might be deterred from retaliating because they do not have the capabilities to fight an interstate war, or the escalation costs are simply prohibitive. However, retaliating might also come with benefits. Models of conflicts with multiple actors imply varying stakes (Gartner and Siverson, 1996; Werner, 2000). With civil wars, retaliation means increasing the stakes of a conflict. Rather than fighting for the status quo against the rebels and an intervener, the government forces the third party's territory or resources into the conflict by launching an interstate war. If the states are rivals or have a history of conflict, defeating the intervener can offer short-term and long-term gains. War expansion thus increases the domestic government's potential gains from fighting, even if it comes at increased costs.

An alternative explanation for retaliation might be that leaders, rather than states, have an incentive for expanding a conflict. Chiozza and Goemans (2011) argue that domestic politics can cause leaders to seek international conflicts. When leaders face the risk of forcible removal, and even death, starting an interstate war can help them defeat domestic opposition. However, they do not connect civil war and interstate war in both directions. Civil war expansion happens because a government retaliates against an external rebel supporter, whereas Chiozza and Goemans treat the other state merely as a target of diver-

sionary violence. They therefore cannot explain how civil wars and interstate wars interact.

A theory of retaliation must account for the costs and benefits of war expansion, which are best understood as challenged to existing political order. If intervention is meant to change domestic political order, then war expansion is an attempt at revising the international order. The domestic government does not do this by accident or because it is compelled to; rather, it does so when it prefers a broader conflict to tolerating a foreign-fueled challenge to its own position. Rebels and third parties must reckon with the fact that domestic and international order hang together when they make the decisions to fight and intervene.

2.7 Summary

In this chapter, I have discussed the broader themes and arguments on the causes of civil war, intervention, and retaliation. This scholarship suggests some first principles of a theory linking civil and interstate war, pertaining to the preferences of the actors, the dilemmas they face, and the role of private information in the breakdown of peace.

Rebels seek power, whether it be due to opportunity or political exclusion, but fighting is risky. They are typically less powerful than the government, even if they secure some settlement, like a power-sharing agreement, the government can renege once the group disarms. These challenges shape rebel behavior. They

do not take up arms lightly, and when they do, they tend to seek total control, whether it be over a specific geographic area or the entire state.

To achieve rebel victory, groups often receive external support. Third parties can provide a range of material support, including arms, money, and even troops that can tip the balance of power in their favor. But support comes at a cost. Rebels give up autonomy when a third party comes to their aid, and groups differ in how much they are able to withstand external domination.

Expectations over intervention shape the behavior of rebels and governments. Because both sides can get support, intervention can increase or decrease the risk of civil war. While there are several potential mechanisms for third parties disrupting domestic bargaining, I show that the empirical patterns uncovered in existing literature can be accounted for by a parsimonious theoretical model of rebellion and intervention where the domestic government possesses private information about its resolve. This assumption is intuitive: governments have an incentive to withhold information about their costs for fighting, because otherwise, weaker governments would invite successful challenges. Third parties should be facing the same strategic problem, because governments should want to prevent a challenge and rebel-sided intervention.

To explain how expectations over intervention shape the risk of war, we need a theory of intervention. Models of intervention abound, and they suggest third parties make decisions on intervention based on their relationships with rebels and the domestic government. Third parties decide to support a group based on how their goals or ideology align, but interventions into civil wars are

more than just foreign aid. Civil wars are conflicts over domestic political arrangements, so interventions are efforts to maintain or remake political order. As I show in this chapter, political distance between states predict who supports whom in a civil war. If states have an interest in other states' domestic affairs, this implies that domestic equilibria are a product of international processes.

Intervention represents the imposition of international politics onto domestic politics, but domestic governments can respond to threats to their political order. They can retaliate against external rebel supporters, which means expanding the war into third-party territory, and in effect remake international order. While war expansion is costly, it also means raising the stakes, and potential benefits, of the war.

Taken together, these first principles suggest that a theory linking civil and interstate war requires us to consider the costs *and* benefits of fighting for all parties. Only then can we explain how the decisions of the rebels, the government, and the third party interact. In the next chapter, I articulate my theory of civil war expansion, which focuses on private information about the domestic government's resolve, endogenous stakes, the rebels' autonomy costs, and the third party's affinity for the rebels.

Chapter 3

A Theory of Civil War Expansion

3.1 Introduction

This chapter develops a formal model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation in order to explain why some civil wars become interstate wars while others do not. I rely on the first principles articulated in the previous chapter to build a parsimonious and general model. A key part of the model is private information; the rebels and the third party do not know the domestic government's resolve for fighting, so they must weigh the risk of fighting against the chances of taking power or winning territory. What they can gain or lose, however, depends on whether the domestic government chooses to expand the war or not. Therefore, endogenous stakes link the actors' incentives for fighting together to generate a nested model of civil and interstate war.

Civil wars expand when rebels and third parties underestimate the government's resolve. Rebels challenge the government because they believe the threat of intervention will compel the government to give up power, and the third

party intervenes once fighting starts because it believes the government will tolerate an intervention. Three factors help predict interstate war. First, the size of the local stakes relative to the international stakes determine the risk of intervention and retaliation jointly. As the outcome of the civil war becomes more valuable relative to the territory controlled by the third party, the domestic government is less likely to retaliate and the third party is more willing to intervene. However, increased local stakes make it less likely that the domestic government will acquiesce to a challenge in the first place. Second, the rebels lose some autonomy when receiving external support, so they must weigh the risk of rejection against the costs of intervention. If external support is particularly costly, the threat of intervention can actually deter rebellion. Third, the third party is trying to help the rebels win, which means any benefits of rebel victory depend on how closely aligned the two actors' political goals are. Therefore, intervention becomes increasingly the more affinity the third party has for the rebels.

The model shows how the interaction of local and international stakes presents the third party with a dilemma and explains why the threat of retaliation does not deter intervention. The threat of intervention can compel the domestic government into giving up power, so promising support to the rebels can help them grab power. However, intervention is a double-edged sword. Greater support, such as advanced weaponry or troops, makes it more likely the the government will yield to a challenge, but less likely to tolerate intervention if it rejects a challenge. Uncertainty over the government's resolve can therefore explain why many third parties end up facing retaliation; they do not intervene because they

relish war, but because they have to weigh the benefits of support against the risk of interstate war.

The model produces several empirical predictions. First, interstate war is most likely when the local stakes are similar in size to the international stakes (i.e. what the third party controls). Second, the probability of civil war is strictly decreasing in the rebels' autonomy costs, and internationalized civil war is particularly likely when the rebels can withstand external domination. Third, the more destructive an interstate war will be for all parties, the less likely war expansion is. Lastly, stronger rebels may make intervention more or less likely, depending on the strength of the domestic government. If the government is strong, then stronger rebels deter intervention, because the third party has too much to lose from a potential interstate war.

To evaluate the empirical relevance of the model, I conclude the chapter by examining cases of non-intervention and retaliation. First, the American Civil War is an example of successful deterrence against third-party intervention. The United States government threatened to wage war against Great Britain if it were to support the Confederacy, and this threat against British holdings in Canada and the Caribbean helped deter British intervention. Second, Angola and Mozambique supported rebels in South Africa and Namibia in the 1970s and 1980s, and the apartheid regime in South Africa conducted extensive retaliation, including several invasions. The rebel supporters underestimated the South African government's resolve, and the transnational competition between African liberation and apartheid meant both sides had enough to gain from de-

feating the other to ensure the civil wars expanded into interstate war. These cases show that war expansion is not a hypothetical scenario; retaliation can happen, sometimes leading to tremendous destruction, and the threat of it can deter intervention.

3.2 Modeling onset, intervention, and retaliation

In this section I specify a game of civil war onset, intervention, and war expansion with three actors: a domestic government D and an opposition group R in Country A, and a third-party state T that may support R . First, I assume that D has private information about its resolve, but the uninformed actors know D 's willingness to fight an interstate war is correlated with its willingness to fight a civil war. I define resolve as the government's ability to endure fighting and suffer losses while staying in power. Governments vary in how much they internalize the costs of war. Some governments can insulate themselves from the destruction accompanying wars by moving fighting away from government resources, while others can insulate themselves from the political costs of losses such as appealing to nationalism or clamping down on opposition groups. Second, the actors can fight over a local set of stakes, or they fight over the local stakes plus an international set of stakes (combined, I refer to them as the total stakes). The local stakes entail control over Country A, represented by $\pi \in (0, 1)$, and I normalize the total stakes to 1, so $1 - \pi$ are the international stakes, which entail control

over T 's territory.¹ D decides which set of stakes is being fought over by either retaliating against T , which prompts an interstate war, or tolerating intervention, which keeps the fighting contained to its own territory. Third, if D does not retaliate, R pays some autonomy cost (a) while T gains some influence if R wins. Fourth, if D retaliates, the three actors engage in a war of all-against-all where everyone fights alone for the total stakes (Gallop, 2017, cf.).

The game starts with nature drawing D 's type, defined by its underlying resolve ($c_D \in (0, \bar{c}_D]$). D 's type is private information, so R and T do not know if D is of a type that will acquiesce to a challenge, fight but tolerate an intervention, or fight and retaliate. D has an incentive to keep this information private so as to deter domestic challenges and foreign intervention. For instance, D 's leader might have private information that the military is in disarray or the security forces have become factionalized. If that were known by the other actors, it could encourage intervention from a third party and invite a challenge from the opposition. To streamline the analysis, I also assume that D 's type is uniformly distributed.

Once nature draws D 's type, R either challenges D for the local stakes (π) or accepts the status quo. I assume the stakes are indivisible, such as control over the central government, because the model is meant to explain why war breaks out and then expands, rather than how the threats of intervention and retaliation

¹An alternative choice would be to give each country their own parameter for their worth, but I use one parameter to capture the relative size of the local stakes to the international stakes.




Figure 3.1: The sequence of the game after Nature draws D 's type.

shape the size of demands.² However, to ensure that war does not happen under complete information, I assume that R is not dissatisfied.³

The value of the local stakes can depend on several factors. The American Civil War was valuable particularly to Great Britain because of its dependence on cotton industry in the South. Intervention would increase the chances of rebel victory, and in turn assure Britain continued access to American cotton (Poast, 2015). Other times, military concerns determine the value of a civil war. Pakistan intervened in Afghanistan because a friendly regime in Kabul would give it strategic depth in the conflict with India (Rubin, 2002a, pp. 247-248). If R opts for the status quo, T keeps its territory $(1 - \pi)$,⁴ so we get the following payoffs:

$$U_i(\text{Status quo}) = \begin{cases} \pi, & \text{if } i = D \\ 0, & \text{if } i = R \\ 1 - \pi, & \text{if } i = T \end{cases}$$

If the rebels challenge, D must decide whether to fight or acquiesce. Acquiescing is costly because it means giving up π . As such, fighting is costly, but

²This is a common simplifying assumption in crisis models that focus on why war breaks out rather than the specifics of demands (Fearon, 1997; Schultz, 2001; Sartori, 2002; Kurizaki, 2007; Slantchev, 2011, e.g.). This is in contrast to models that explain how challengers alter their demands when faced with (uncertain) third-party support for the target (Werner, 2000; Yuen, 2009, e.g.).

³As I show in the proofs, this is a trivial assumption, as there is always some range of c_R where deterrable types R risk war by challenging D . In other words, war does not break out simply because war offers opportunities peace cannot afford.

⁴I assume that T has no interest in who controls Country A, absent any intervention. While third parties often have preferences over who governs another country, in this model only external support yields some influence over a new rebel government. I assume this stark difference in T 's choice to focus on the direct costs and benefits of fighting. As I show in the appendix, giving T some interests in Country A's politics absent intervention does not change why T intervenes.

giving up office can be worse. If D acquiesces, R assumes power in Country A, but T 's payoff remains the same:

$$U_i(\text{Government concedes}) = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } i = D \\ \pi, & \text{if } i = R \\ 1 - \pi, & \text{if } i = T \end{cases}$$

If D fights, a civil war breaks out. T must then decide whether to intervene on the side of the rebels or stay out. If T stays out, D and R fight over π . D 's chances of winning are based on the two sides' military capabilities ($m_D > 0$ and $m_R > 0$), defined as $p_D^{CW} = \frac{m_D}{m_D + m_R}$, with the complementary probability of rebel victory. Both sides pay some cost for fighting that is unique to each of them ($c_D > 0$ and $c_R > 0$). Without intervention, T simply keeps its own territory, and we get the following payoffs for civil war:

$$U_i(\text{Civil War}) = \begin{cases} p_D^{CW} \pi - c_D, & \text{if } i = D \\ (1 - p_D^{CW}) \pi - c_R, & \text{if } i = R \\ 1 - \pi, & \text{if } i = T \end{cases}$$

If T intervenes, it provides some support s that is a portion of its military capabilities ($m_T > s > 0$). This support can range from the shipment of cash and arms to the deployment of troops, such as military advisors, to aid the rebels, and geography or other factors constrains how much T can intervene in a given conflict. Following intervention, D must fight a stronger R , such that $p_D^{ICW} = \frac{m_D}{m_D + m_R + s}$, but R loses some autonomy if it wins ($a > 0$). A group's level of institutionalization or the degree of local support affect its autonomy costs.

If a group lacks these characteristics, the third party can impose its policy preferences after a rebel victory because it has governing expertise or the ability to withhold resources necessary to run the new government. Several cases illustrate variation in this client-patron relationship during fighting, which indicate the groups' ability to withstand dominance once fighting ends. UNITA in Angola retained its organizational structure despite significant support from South Africa (Minter, 1994, p. 31), while the Pakistani military dictated which Afghan rebels group received support in the fight against the Soviet Union (for numerous examples of groups losing autonomy, see: Salehyan (2010, p. 501)).

For T then, intervention is costly ($c_T > 0$), but also promises influence over the rebels when it intervenes. Therefore, its payoff from an internationalized civil war is a function of its affinity (b) for R . For instance, the Soviet Union supported various socialist movements, including the South-West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) fighting for Namibian independence from South Africa. We can think of b as representing the influence T achieves with R in power based on their shared political preferences.⁵ External support therefore comes with costs and benefits to the rebels and the third party, but to keep the analysis tractable, I assume away any bargaining between the two actors. Once intervention occurs, D must decide whether to tolerate intervention or retaliate. If it does not retaliate, we get the following payoffs:

⁵For simplicity's sake, I do not assume that the rebels' autonomy costs are a function of b . If it were, a would be a decreasing in b , so stronger rebel-intervener ties would mean fewer realized costs for external support, and thus stronger ties would associated with a higher risk of intervention *and* rebellion.

$$U_i(\text{Internationalized Civil War}) = \begin{cases} p_D^{ICW} \pi - c_D, & \text{if } i = D \\ (1 - p_D^{ICW})(\pi - a) - c_R, & \text{if } i = R \\ (1 - \pi) + (1 - p_D^{ICW})\pi b - c_T, & \text{if } i = T \end{cases}$$

If D retaliates, the conflict expands, either into the third-party territory or some other object of interest, such as a client state of T . For instance, in 1996, Rwanda invaded Zaire to defeat rebels who had sought refuge in the neighboring country, and the resulting war led to the Zairian government's collapse. By raising the stakes of fighting to include what T otherwise controls ($1 - \pi$), D starts an interstate war where each of the actors fight over the total stakes. I assume retaliation triggers a free-for-all war because to do otherwise would require additional assumptions about how R and T would divide up the full territory after a coalition victory, which is not directly relevant to the research question. Assuming a three-sided war keeps the analysis simple while ensuring that relative power is taken into account.⁶ In an interstate war, D wins with probability $\frac{m_D}{m_D+m_R+m_T} = p_D^{IW}$, R wins with probability $\frac{m_R}{m_D+m_R+m_T} = p_R^{IW}$, and T wins with complementary probability $1 - p_D^{IW} - p_R^{IW}$. Interstate war is more destructive than a local conflict, so each actors' war costs are amplified by a common escalation term ($e > 1$). War expansion affects R and T differently. R is weaker without external support, but also retains its full autonomy. Retaliation spurs T into mobilizing its entire military and, because the war is now a free-for-all, T 's utility

⁶The most straightforward assumption for a post-war division of the goods would be by the balance of power, but without returns to scale or other club goods, this would yield the same expected utilities as in a free-for-all contest.

for fighting no longer depends on its affinity for R . Assuming otherwise simply means that any loss of territory to R would be discounted by how much it likes R . We therefore get the following payoffs for interstate war:

$$U_i(\text{Interstate War}) = \begin{cases} p_D^{IW} - (e \times c_D), & \text{if } i = D \\ p_R^{IW} - (e \times c_R), & \text{if } i = R \\ (1 - p_D^{IW} - p_R^{IW}) - (e \times c_T), & \text{if } i = T \end{cases}$$

I have presented a model of one informed party actor facing multiple uninformed actors. As such, it bears resemblance to several existing models of crisis bargaining and extended deterrence, but it differs in several ways. Crisis bargaining models with third parties tend to focus on the crisis at hand (Schultz, 1998; Wolford, 2014; Ramsay, 2004, e.g.), with the assumption that the stakes of the crisis are fixed. Wolford (2020), on the other hand, includes an uninformed third party whose only stake in the current crisis is information about the informed actor's future behavior. However, third parties care about the civil war today *and* the risk of interstate war tomorrow.

The model incorporates some features from the extended deterrence literature, but private information plays a different role. Unlike canonical models such as Smith (1996), the third party supports the challenger/attacker in my model, because I seek to explain how retaliation can deter civil war onset and intervention, and not how intervention deters onset (though that is a possibility in my model). I therefore make different assumptions about private information. Both Werner (2000) and Yuen (2009) assume private information about the

third party, so the challenger is uncertain whether the target will receive support. Because the challenger receives support in my model, however, I assume both the challenger and the third party are uncertain about the target's resolve. Otherwise, war breaks out because R is uncertain about getting support, and interstate war would only occur when T prefers interstate war to staying out, which implies unusually large local stakes or mobilization benefits to T .

I also simplify the onset of war. Werner (2000), who focuses on target support, allows the challenger to modify its demands to prevent intervention, while abstracting away from the interaction between the challenger and the target. My model abstracts away from varying demands, because varying demands would not affect T 's decision to intervene other than change posterior beliefs about D 's type. Relatedly, I simplify the onset of war so the challenger (R) cannot back down once a challenge has been issued, unlike many crisis bargaining models (Slantchev, 2011, e.g.). Doing otherwise would merely add another layer of screening, without changing why R challenges in the first place. Furthermore, I assume away the efficacy of threats in domestic crises. D either fights or acquiesces in order to isolate the relationship between the threat of retaliation and intervention.

Unlike models that allow a third party to conduct unbiased intervention or choose a side (Gent, 2008; Favretto, 2009; Kydd and Straus, 2013; Spaniel, 2018, e.g.), I restrict mine to rebel-sided intervention. Whereas unbiased intervention are meant to reduce the risk or costs of civil war, and these models focus on perverse incentives of peacemaking, my model seeks to explain when and why ac-

tors fight over control of the state(s). As for modeling third parties choosing sides, rebels could in some circumstances retaliate against external government supporters, but I am unaware of any significant episode of rebel retaliation. Regardless, retaliation by rebels would imply a different mechanism of war expansion, focused on when groups are constrained by international borders.

3.3 Analysis

In this section I show how the model explains civil war, internationalized civil war, and interstate war. I analyze two Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) where civil war occurs in one, and internationalized civil war and interstate war occur in the other. Civil wars expand into interstate wars when: 1) the rebels think the third party is going to acquiesce to a challenge because of the threat of intervention, and 2) the third party thinks the domestic government is going to tolerate intervention despite rejecting the rebels' challenge.

To explain why interstate war happens, I start by describing the domestic government's strategies, because they condition the decisions of the uninformed parties. Next I describe the two equilibria in terms of the rebels' and the third party's strategies and beliefs about the domestic government's type. Interstate war can only occur if the third party intervenes, so I first describe the PBE where T is deterred from intervening, but R nonetheless challenges D . This equilibrium shows how a third party can shape the risk of war, even when intervention does not happen. I then describe the PBE where R challenges D and T intervenes,

under the shadow of retaliation.

The three actors' strategies interact in several ways. The threat of retaliation by the domestic government can deter third-party intervention, and thus a challenge from the rebels. But intervention can also compel the domestic government into acquiescing to the rebels' demands. Additionally, intervention may or may not encourage rebellion, because external support means giving up autonomy.

3.3.1 The domestic government's strategies

Before I describe the conditions under which the rebels and the third party risk war, I have to describe the role of uncertainty in this model. Private information about the domestic government's resolve causes war in this model, because the rebels and the third party do not know what type of government they are facing, and this uncertainty looms over their decisions to challenge and intervene, respectively. However, R and T know that D 's type is continuously distributed ($c_D \sim U(0, \bar{c}_D)$) and that D plays cut-point strategies that change depending on whether T intervenes. The types of D can be split into three intervals: Low types that reject a challenge and retaliate against the third party, middle types that reject a challenge but tolerate intervention, and high types that acquiesce to a challenge and tolerate intervention.

D is indifferent between tolerating intervention and retaliating at




Figure 3.2: The domestic government's cutpoint strategies.

$$c_D^{\ddagger} = \frac{p_D^{IW} - p_D^{ICW} \pi}{e - 1}, \quad (3.1)$$

so the risk of interstate war after D has rejected a challenge goes up as the escalation costs go down. Whether D acquiesces to a challenge from R or not, depends on whether T is intervening. If T stays out, D is indifferent between acquiescing and fighting a civil war at $c_D^{\dagger} = p_D^{CW} \pi$. The cutpoint shows that D is more likely to fight the higher the costs of relinquishing power. If T is intervening, D is indifferent between tolerating an internationalized civil war or acquiescing at $c_D^{\circ} = p_D^{ICW} \pi$. These two last cutpoints show that the range of high types D differ depending on whether T intervenes.

3.3.2 Equilibria

Facing this strategic problem of uncertainty, T has to decide whether to intervene or not, which in turn determines whether retaliation and interstate war can occur in equilibrium. I start by describing a PBE where T is deterred from intervening, but R nonetheless challenges D . I then contrast this civil war-only PBE with another PBE where T does intervene in a civil war, and retaliation happens with some probability. Together, these two equilibria account for all outcomes of the model, and explain how the decisions to challenge and intervene interact in the shadow of retaliation.

If T will not intervene, T observes a rejection and believes D is a type that will retaliate with probability

$$\Pr(\text{retaliate} \mid \text{reject, stay out}) = \frac{c_D^\ddagger}{c_D^\dagger} = \frac{p_D^{IW} - p_D^{ICW} \pi}{(1-e)(p_D^{CW} \pi)}, \quad (3.2)$$

and D is a type that will tolerate intervention with probability

$$\Pr(\text{tolerate} \mid \text{reject, stay out}) = \frac{c_D^\dagger - c_D^\ddagger}{c_D^\dagger} = 1 + \frac{p_D^{IW} - p_D^{ICW} \pi}{(1-e)(p_D^{CW} \pi)}. \quad (3.3)$$

Both outcomes occur with positive probability when D has much to gain from war expansion ($\pi < \pi^{IW}$) but escalation costs are sufficiently large ($e > e_{CW}$). Given these beliefs, T chooses to stay out when its potential influence over R is too small and it has too much to lose in an interstate war ($b < b^\dagger$ and $\pi < \pi_T^\dagger$).

Deterring intervention therefore hinges on factors outside of the domestic government's control, like the relationship between a third party and the opposition.

Without the prospects of external support, a challenge means D fights with probability $\frac{c_D^\dagger}{c_D}$ or gives up power with probability $\frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^\dagger}{c_D}$. R risks a civil war when fighting is not too costly ($c_R < c^\dagger$) and is sufficiently optimistic D will acquiesce ($\bar{c}_D > \bar{c}_D^{CW}$). Otherwise, a challenge is too risky and war too costly.

Proposition 1. *When $\pi < \min(\pi^{IW}, \pi_T^\dagger)$, $e > e_{CW}$, $\bar{c}_D > \bar{c}_D^{CW}$, $c_R < c^\dagger$, and $b < b^\dagger$ there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which:*

- R challenges.
- D rejects and retaliates when $c_D < c_D^\dagger$, rejects and tolerates when $c_D^\dagger \leq c_D < c_D^\dagger$ and accepts when $c_D \geq c_D^\dagger$.
- If D rejects, T believes $c_D \sim U(0, c_D^\dagger]$ and stays out; otherwise T believes $c_D \sim U(c_D^\dagger, \bar{c}_D]$

Proposition 1 shows that uncertainty over the government's resolve can cause the onset of a civil war, but the presence of a third party and potential retaliation determine the conditions under which civil war occurs. The threat of retaliation deters intervention and shapes what kinds of rebels take up arms. For instance, the equilibrium has no constraints on the rebels' autonomy costs. Rebels that would otherwise avoid a challenge because they cannot withstand external domination, might risk civil war if there are no willing interveners. Un-

der these circumstances, a credible threat from D can deter intervention, but encourage rebellion.

For interstate war to occur in equilibrium, T has to intervene first. I identify a PBE where T intervenes following a challenge from R , where there is some probability of D retaliating against an intervening T . In this PBE, if R challenges and D rejects, T can stay out, or intervene, risking its own territory in a war against both R and T . T 's decision is contingent on its beliefs about D 's type and the likelihood of retaliation. Following a rejection, T believes D is a type that will retaliate with probability

$$\Pr(\text{retaliation} \mid \text{intervene, reject}) = \frac{c_D^\ddagger}{c_D^\circ} = \frac{p_D^{ICW} \pi - p_D^{IW}}{(1-e)(p_D^{ICW} \pi)}, \quad (3.4)$$

and D is a type that will tolerate intervention with probability

$$\Pr(\text{tolerate} \mid \text{intervene, reject}) = \frac{c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger}{c_D^\circ} = \frac{p_D^{IW} - (e\pi p_D^{ICW})}{(1-e)(p_D^{ICW} \pi)}. \quad (3.5)$$

When the local stakes are sufficiently small ($\pi < \pi^{IW}$) but the escalation costs are sufficiently high ($e > e_{IW}$), D either retaliates or tolerates in equilibrium. In other words, T is uncertain about what type of opponent it is facing. T intervenes when it believes D will probably tolerate intervention despite rejecting a challenge from R . But because there is some chance of retaliation and intervention is costly regardless, T only intervenes when it likes R enough ($b > b^\circ$) and the

costs of fighting are sufficiently low ($c_T < c_T^\circ$).⁷ As such, intervention, and thus interstate war, only happens when D is sufficiently likely to tolerate intervention *and* the third party and the rebels are sufficiently aligned politically.

With external supporting coming, R must choose between the status quo and challenging. The former yields zero, while the latter can result in interstate war ($\Pr(\text{IW}) = \frac{c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D}$), internationalized civil war ($\Pr(\text{ICW}) = \frac{c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D}$), or D giving up power ($\Pr(\text{Acquiesce}) = \frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^\circ}{\bar{c}_D}$). Since a peaceful regime change is R 's best outcome, R challenges when it is sufficiently optimistic that the threat of intervention will compel D to acquiesce to its demand ($\bar{c}_D > \max\{\bar{c}_D^{\text{IW}}, \bar{c}_D^\circ\}$) and fighting is cheap ($c_R^\circ > c_R$). This equilibrium therefore provides an informational and international explanation for civil war (and expansion) that hinges on the preferences of another state.

Proposition 2. *When $\pi < \pi^{\text{IW}}$, $e > \max\{e_{\text{IW}}, e_T^\circ\}$, $\bar{c}_D > \max\{\bar{c}_D^{\text{IW}}, \bar{c}_D^\circ\}$, $c_R^\circ > c_R$, $b > b^\circ$, and $c_T < c_T^\circ$, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which:*

- R challenges.
- D rejects and retaliates when $c_D < c_D^\ddagger$, rejects and tolerates when $c_D^\ddagger \leq c_D < c_D^\circ$ and accepts when $c_D \geq c_D^\circ$.
- If D fights, T believes $c_D \sim U(0, c_D^\circ]$ and intervenes; otherwise T believes $c_D \sim U(c_D^\circ, \bar{c}_D]$.

⁷Additionally, the escalation costs have to be sufficiently high ($e > e_T^\circ$) for T not to be undeterrable.

Proposition 2 shows why interstate war can happen in equilibrium, despite the costs of war expansion. D retaliates when it has enough to gain from expanding the conflict, but deterrence nevertheless fails because the benefits of influencing a new rebel government outweigh the risks of T losing its territory. Whether R challenges because of this deterrence failure or in spite of it, however, depends on several factors, which I discuss below.

3.3.3 Comparative statics

So far I have focused on *why* war occurs, but not when we are more or less likely to see different types of war. Taking comparative statics on the probability of war (D rejecting a challenge) and the equilibrium constraints on R 's and T 's strategies produce several implications and predictions. Without intervention, the probability of civil war is

$$\Pr(\text{civil war} \mid \text{no intervention}) = \frac{c_D^\dagger}{\bar{c}_D} = \frac{p_D^{CW} \pi}{\bar{c}_D}, \quad (3.6)$$

and with intervention, the probability of internationalized civil or interstate war is

$$\Pr(\text{civil war} \mid \text{intervention}) = \frac{c_D^\circ}{\bar{c}_D} = \frac{p_D^{ICW} \pi}{\bar{c}_D}. \quad (3.7)$$

The probabilities of war with and without intervention differ in one regard. Because intervention shifts the balance of power away from D ($p_D^{CW} >$

p_D^{ICW}), the probability of D rejecting a challenge is strictly smaller with intervention than without. In other words, external rebel support has a pacifying effect on domestic conflicts, all else being equal, by compelling some high types D into acquiescing who would otherwise reject a challenge and fight a civil war.

Lemma 3.3.1. *The probability of D rejecting a challenge from R is strictly smaller when T will intervene than when it will stay out.*

The relative size of the local stakes (π) play a key role in the probability of war, and the kind of war that occurs in equilibrium. Equations (6) and (7) show that the probabilities of war are increasing in the relative size of the local stakes (π), regardless of intervention. In other words, the more valuable it is to stay in power, the less likely the government is to give up power. However, increased local stakes make D less likely to retaliate, because there is less to gain from defeating T . The local stakes thus shape T 's and R 's decisions in two ways; they affect the probabilities of acquiescence and retaliation, while also affecting the potential benefits of winning the civil war.

I start with how the local stakes affect T 's decision to intervene, because it shapes R 's choice, and it because it is relatively straightforward. The higher the local stakes are relative to T 's possessions, the more likely intervention is (assuming that T prefers keeping its stakes to fighting an interstate war). The reason why is straightforward: the larger π is, the more T has to gain by supporting R , and the less likely D is to retaliate. Increases in the relative size of the local stakes thus increase the likelihood of internationalized civil war relative to interstate

war. One example of this effect is the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The superpower's intervention on the side of the Kabul government made rebel-sided intervention more attractive to third parties such as the United States. A similar process emerged during the insurgency in Iraq following the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. The presence of U.S. troops, while bolstering the Iraqi government's military strength, made the conflict attractive to third parties such as Iran, because rebel victory meant taking Baghdad and defeating an international rival there. While the United States possessed the capabilities to retaliate, both the Bush and Obama administrations concluded that the costs of expansion outweighed the benefits, especially because Iran could impose significant escalation costs (Filkins, 2013).

Result 3.3.2. *Increased local stakes relative to the international stakes make intervention more likely and retaliation less likely.*

The local stakes play a less straightforward role in R 's decision to challenge in the first place, and thus the probability of civil war onset. If T is not intervening, R is strictly less likely to challenge the higher π is, because D is more likely to reject a challenge. If T is intervening, however, the relationship is concave. When π is small, R becomes more likely to challenge as π increases, because the benefits of winning the local stakes outweigh the likelihood of war. But when the local stakes are particularly high, increased local stakes deter R from challenging because the relative gains of fighting over larger stakes diminish. We should therefore not expect to see wars of any kind when the local stakes are either very small or very large.

Result 3.3.3. *Rebellion is most likely when the local stakes and the international stakes are of similar size.*

Taking these comparative statics together, they imply that interstate war is uniquely likely when π is in an intermediary range. Under such conditions, T and D are most likely to intervene and retaliate, respectively, while R can challenge with some probability of T coercing D into acquiescence.

One implication of these results is that the distribution of benefits in a region affect a country's risk of war. A consistent finding in the literature on civil wars is that the risk of civil war is negatively associated with gross domestic product (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006, p. 513). However, economic growth may or may not make a country more at risk of civil war. If a poor country's economy starts growing, it becomes an increasingly attractive target to its neighbors. But in a richer country, the government is less likely to give up power, and the rebels have less to gain from a potential interstate war. A correlation between poverty and civil war could be obscuring a process where poorer countries experience steeper and more heterogenous growth than richer countries, which in turn encourages intervention and rebellion in the former but not the latter. Predicting war without accounting for these factors may produce biased estimates.

The threat of intervention can be a double-edged sword for the rebels. It can force D into giving up power, but it can also result in loss of autonomy if the challenge fails. Comparative statics of the rebels' autonomy costs show that they play a crucial role in determining whether and what kind of war occurs in

equilibrium. a does not factor into R 's decision-making when T stays out, but it does affect the conditions under which the second PBE exists. The higher the autonomy costs are, the less likely R is to challenge. We should therefore expect to see opposition groups with high autonomy costs rebel less frequently than those with low costs, all else being equal.

Result 3.3.4. *The probability of civil war is strictly decreasing in the rebels' autonomy costs.*

Conversely, we should see more civil wars with intervention than without when the opposition has small autonomy costs, because those groups are more likely to challenge (assuming that autonomy costs play no role in third parties' decision to intervene). Groups like the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Palestine Liberation Organization, both of which have received substantial amounts of external support, have certain characteristics that prevent them from being dominated by third parties. They comprise of both political and military wings and often enjoy strong local support, so they should be more likely to rebel because the benefits of third-party intervention outweigh the costs.. The role of autonomy costs in the decision to rebel can also help explain why secessionist groups are more likely to rebel than other groups (Cederman et al., 2010, p. 105). These ethnic groups have the internal cohesion and institutions to withstand pressure from a third party.

Result 3.3.5. *When the rebels have small autonomy costs, observed civil wars with intervention are more likely than civil wars without intervention.*

Relatedly, since autonomy costs only affect R 's decision to challenge, and only when T is intervening, we should also expect more civil wars expand into interstate wars when a is low.

Result 3.3.6. *If civil war occurs, war expansion is more likely the smaller the rebels' autonomy costs are.*

The threat of retaliation can encourage some high autonomy-cost groups to rebel. When autonomy costs are high, rebels are more likely challenge the government when the third party is not intervening than when it is. If the domestic government's ability to deter intervention is negatively correlated with the rebels' cohesion (i.e. rebels are more likely to be factionalized in the face of a strong government), Result 3.3.5 can account for the empirical finding that internal division within groups increase the risk of civil war Cunningham (2013). As groups become more divided, they are less able to withstand pressure from a third party, especially if one or more factions have ties with a third party. A stronger government thus deters intervention, but in doing so risks a challenge from rebels that would otherwise be deterred by intervention.

Escalation costs do not affect D 's decision to reject a challenge or not, but increased costs make retaliation less likely. They therefore have countervailing effects on T 's decision to intervene and R 's decision to challenge. Increased escalation costs may make intervention more or less likely, depending on whether they lower the risk of retaliation more than raise T 's costs of fighting an interstate war. Higher escalation costs deter intervention when the rebels are strong

and affinity is low, because T has little to gain from either war outcomes. As such, T is concerned with both the potential actions of D and whether R can exploit a larger conflict. When intervention is coming, costly interstate war makes R more likely to challenge when R is sufficiently weak but T offers substantial support. Higher escalation costs thus deter retaliation but not challenge when R is more likely to win an internationalized civil war. We therefore get the following predictions for escalation costs:

Result 3.3.7. *The probability of D retaliating against T is decreasing in the actors' escalation costs.*

Result 3.3.8. *The probability of T intervening is decreasing in the actors' escalation costs when the rebels are sufficiently strong.*

Result 3.3.9. *The probability of R risking civil war is increasing in the actors' escalation costs when potential support from T is sufficiently large.*

Taken together, these results imply that countries are most likely to experience a civil war that expands into an interstate war when war expansion will be moderately destructive.

The latter two predictions are conditional because T and R have to consider both the cost of interstate war and the risk of interstate war. However, if we decompose the escalation costs in the second PBE's constraints to the unit-level, we get straightforward predictions for intervention and rebellion. In short, rising individual escalation costs make T less likely to intervene and R less likely

to challenge. Conversely, T is more likely to intervene the greater D 's escalation costs are.

Result 3.3.10. *The probability of T intervening is decreasing in T 's escalation costs.*

Result 3.3.11. *The probability of R challenging is decreasing in R 's escalation costs.*

Result 3.3.12. *The probability of T intervening is increasing in D 's escalation costs.*

The balance of power affects the actors' likelihood of winning a war and willingness to risk war. In either PBE, the probability of D rejecting a challenge is increasing in D 's chances of winning a war. However, the amount of support T will provide to R in an internationalized civil war has a two-fold effect. On the one hand, increased support reduces D 's chances of winning an internationalized civil war, thus making it more likely D will acquiesce to a challenge. But on the other hand, increased support makes it less likely that D will tolerate an intervention if it rejects a challenge. As such, the threat of large support compels D into giving up power, which benefits R but yields T nothing. However, it also increases the risk of interstate war if fighting starts. These results show how rebels can exploit third parties for domestic political gain, at the risk of international conflict.

Result 3.3.13. *Larger external support for R makes D more likely to acquiesce to a challenge, but more likely to retaliate if it rejects a challenge.*

Faced with these risks, T stays out if R and D are both too strong, because it risks losing everything in a free-for-all war. Conversely, the more likely R is to win a civil war or an interstate war, the more likely it is to challenge D .

Result 3.3.14. *When D is sufficiently strong, stronger R deters T from intervening.*

Result 3.3.15. *The stronger R is, the more likely it is to challenge D .*

This result provides an alternative explanation for the empirical finding that moderately strong rebels are most likely to receive external support (Salehyan et al., 2011, pp. 726-727). The rebels are sensitive to autonomy costs, but I assume that cost is separate from their ability to fight. Instead, stronger rebels do not receive external support because the third party does not want to risk losing territory, and weak rebels do not fight, even when intervention is coming, because they are likely to lose.

Besides predicting the onset of war, the results of the model have implications for when and why wars end. Various studies have found that third-party interventions into civil wars may or may not prolong duration depending on the characteristics of the actors and who gets support (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Regan, 2002a; Balch-Lindsay et al., 2008; Gent, 2008; Cunningham, 2010, e.g.). However, intervention and duration can be spurious to the relative size of the local stakes, and war expansion may or may not prolong fighting. For instance, Cunningham (2010) finds that interventions with third parties pursuing an independent agenda are associated with longer duration. But third parties

could be more likely to pursue goals separate from that of the rebels if the local stakes are particularly high, which in turn reduces the risk of retaliation. These conflicts might then last for longer than if the domestic government chose to expand the war and fight the third party directly. Similarly, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) find that escalation by the third party shortens duration, but that escalation might be in response to retaliation, or retaliation itself for any rebel support in the third party's territory. Many of these conflicts are intertwined. South Africa intervened during the Angolan War of Independence, but could not stop the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) from taking power in 1975. After independence, Angola started supporting rebels in both Namibia and South Africa proper, while South Africa resumed their support for the Angolan rebel group National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and conducted several invasions of Angola throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The duration of these conflicts cannot be explained independently.

3.3.4 Varying levels of intervention

In this section I loosen the assumption that the level of intervention is fixed. Instead, T can choose to conduct either a small or large intervention, which increases R 's chances of winning in an internationalized civil war a little or a lot (proofs in the appendix). To isolate the relationship between the risk of war and varying levels of intervention, I assume T 's costs of intervention stay the same regardless, as does R 's autonomy costs. Furthermore, the level of intervention does not affect payoffs in interstate war, only the probability of ending up in one.

Lastly, the level of intervention is granular rather than continuous to keep the analysis tractable. T therefore does not have the option to optimize the level of intervention, but seeing as how I am interested in how the key parameters affect T 's choice to risk a little or a lot, two levels rather than infinite will suffice.⁸

Varying levels of intervention affect D 's strategies in a straightforward manner. A large intervention reduces the probability of war relative to a small intervention relative to no intervention. Third parties who can set their support can more effectively compel domestic governments into acquiescing to rebel demands. However, a large intervention increases the likelihood of retaliation relative to a small one, because it diminishes the difference between D winning an interstate war and an internationalized civil war, thus making the added benefits of war expansion more attractive.

As for the rebels, a large intervention reduces the risk of war and increases its chances of winning an internationalized civil war, but increases the likelihood of an interstate war. The effect on R 's willingness to challenge therefore depends on its autonomy costs. Higher levels of intervention make rebels with small autonomy costs more likely to challenge, as they increase R 's chances of getting its most and second-most preferred outcomes.

T must choose between helping R or minimizing its own risks. Whether

⁸Granular levels of intervention also correspond with cases of intervention where categories and technologies of support have a lumpy effect on the rebels' chances of winning. For instance, the United States government spent years debating whether to supply the Afghan Mujahideen with advanced weaponry such as the anti-aircraft Stinger missiles because it was believed this would represent a significant shift in the balance of power with an uncertain effect on the likelihood of retaliation against Pakistan.

T conducts a large or small intervention, depends on the distance between the two levels. T chooses a small intervention when a larger intervention helps too much. When escalation is particularly granular, a large jump in rebel support means a large decline in D 's chances of winning an internationalized civil war, which in turn increases the risk of retaliation. Past a certain point, helping R more cannot make up for the increased likelihood of interstate war. An implication of this result is that third parties should be particularly wary of introducing new technology that has a substantial effect on the probability of rebel victory.

Result 3.3.16. *Third parties are more likely to choose a small intervention over a large intervention if a large intervention helps the rebels too much.*

3.3.5 Interdependence, club goods, and coalition warfighting

In the main model, I make some simplifying assumptions about the existence and generation of club goods between the rebels and the third party. The rebels' payoffs never hinge on third-party affinity, and the third party only has an interest in the outcome of conflict in country A if it supports the rebels, but retaliation breaks up the coalition and turns the conflict into an all-against-all war. Therefore, club goods play a fairly small role in explaining rebellion and intervention, but loosening these assumptions and allowing for a broader generation of club goods do not change the actors behavior—except for one possible exception discussed below. Here I discuss two separate extensions to the main model.

The first extension focuses on the interaction of affinity and autonomy costs. Another strong assumption I make in the main model is that R does not

care about who its supporter is. Its autonomy costs do not depend on the affinity between the two actors, but loosening this assumption does not change why and what type of war occurs in equilibrium. If a were a (decreasing) function of b (e.g. $f(a) = \frac{a}{b}$), R would be more likely to challenge D the higher its affinity with T . We would then expect to see rebellion and intervention increase in b , as opposed to just intervention. While this is an intuitive prediction, it does not change the main results of the model.

Relatedly, T might care about R 's type in terms of autonomy costs, because T might benefit more from supporting weaker types that will do its bidding. Let us assume that T 's payoff for an internationalized civil war is then moderated by R 's autonomy costs, so $u_T(\text{ICW}) = (1 - \pi) + (1 - p_D^{\text{ICW}})\pi ba - c_T$. If so, T 's and R 's incentives for fighting in terms of autonomy costs are now opposed. R 's willingness to challenge is decreasing in a , while T 's willingness to intervene is increasing in a . Internationalized civil war and interstate war thus occur when a is in an intermediary range. As I show in the appendix, such a range exists under constraints similar to the ones in Proposition 2. Fighting has to be sufficiently cheap, affinity has to be sufficiently high, and the rebels have to be sufficiently optimistic.

The second extension deals with the broader generation of club goods. I originally assume that T has no interests in the outcome of the domestic conflict in country A if it does not support R . It only receives some influence if it provides support in an internationalized civil war. However, T may care about who is in power in country A, even if it does not get directly involved. Consider then an

alternative set of payoffs for T where it gets some benefit from R either gaining power peacefully or through a local-only civil war, moderated by its affinity for R . Specifically, T gets $(1 - \pi) + \pi b$ and $(1 - \pi) + (1 - p_D^{CW})\pi b$, respectively.

While such a change makes staying out relatively more attractive, *ceteris paribus*, it does not change why T intervenes or stays out. Rearranging the inequality for when T prefers intervening to staying out yields a lower bound of b , $b > b^*$, and this constraint is similar to $b > b^\circ$ from Proposition 2. The more T cares about R , the more it is willing to intervene, despite receiving some benefit without support or civil war. The reason why is simple. Because any level of support for R strictly increases the likelihood of rebel victory, increased affinity increases the benefit of internationalized civil war at a higher rate than the benefit of local-only civil war. Similarly, larger local stakes (π) make intervention more attractive relative to staying out.

Relatedly, I assume that retaliation triggers an all-against-all war where in expectation each actor gets its share of the total stakes as a function of its military strength. However, R and T might instead fight in a coalition. If they receive no club goods in an interstate war, meaning they have no interests in who else wins, their expected payoffs are identical to the main model (assuming they divide up the territory by their relative military strength). However, they might care about who their coalition partner is. Consider a payoff structure where R and T win with some probability, divide up the territory after defeating D , and then has some interest in the partner's domestic politics as a function of affinity (b):

$$U_i(\text{Interstate Coalition War}) = \begin{cases} p_R^{IW} + (1 - p_D^{IW} - p_R^{IW})b - (e \times c_R), & \text{if } i = R \\ (1 - p_D^{IW} - p_R^{IW}) + p_R^{IW}b - (e \times c_T), & \text{if } i = T \end{cases}$$

As I show in the appendix, the introduction of coalition fighting and club goods only makes R and T more willing to challenge and intervene, respectively, because those club goods are a net gain compared to all-against-all fighting. Club goods do not change why they fight, or why civil wars become interstate wars.

3.4 War expansion vignettes

I now turn to cases of expansion and non-expansion to illustrate what this strategic interaction looks like in practice. Since interstate war occurs only following intervention, I focus primarily on the decisions by the third party to intervene and the domestic government to retaliate.⁹ These vignettes are empirical existence proofs meant to demonstrate the empirical relevance of the model (Goertz, 2017, p. 178). The cases below answer two critical questions. First, can domestic governments deter a third party from intervening on the side of the rebels? For the model to be empirically relevant, I have to demonstrate that the threat of retaliation can prevent intervention as proposed by the civil war PBE. I do so by examining the American Civil War and how the U.S. government prevented Great

⁹In most cases, we also lack primary or secondary sources on the rebels' decision-making, so exploring counterfactuals of non-rebellion is challenging. One potential case of non-rebellion is the unrest in Germany in the interwar period, where the transnational wave of communism came close to triggering a civil war. However, state capacity prevented a war from erupting, which might also be an indication of the central government possessing the capacity to deter external rebel support. For more, see: Payne (2011, p. 82).

Britain from intervening on the side of the Confederacy by threatening British territory in North America. Second, when do coercion and deterrence fail, so we observe both intervention and retaliation? I have to show that civil wars do in fact expand through the logic described in Proposition 2. The cases of Angola and Mozambique's interventions in Namibia and South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, and the subsequent retaliation by the apartheid regime, show how uncertainty and the relative size of the local stakes shape the decisions to intervene and retaliate.

3.4.1 The American Civil War

When the local stakes are relatively low, the third party believes retaliation is likely, because the domestic government would rather expand the conflict than tolerate a costly intervention. One example of a domestic government successfully deterring rebel-sided intervention is the American Civil War. During the conflict, Great Britain considered intervening on the side of the Confederacy. While Britain had trade with both sides of the conflict, British manufacturers relied on cotton from the South, and Confederate leaders hoped this dependence would result in recognition of the Confederacy (Jones, 2010, ch. 1). However, the Confederacy overestimated the importance of cotton to diplomacy, and in fall 1861, Prime Minister Palmerston declared that British policy should be to "keep quite clear of the conflict" to avoid war (Carroll, 2012, p. 94).

The so-called Trent Affair early on in the American Civil War illustrates the tension between the two countries, but also why intervention never happened.

On November 8, 1861, a U.S. frigate intercepted a British steamer off the coast of Cuba and apprehended two Confederate envoys who were bound for Europe to lobby for diplomatic recognition. The British government saw the incident as a provocation and believed the United States actually wanted war (Jones, 2010, p. 94). The crisis was eventually resolved when the United States released the diplomats, but it illustrates British thinking about the costs of getting involved in the American war.

Britain knew it was militarily stronger than the United States, particularly at sea, but war would be costly and require significant mobilization at sea and on land. A key concern was Britain's interests on the continent. It had trade with both the Northern and Southern states, and its North American territory was at risk. Canada was particularly vulnerable to a U.S. invasion because of the long border between the two countries, superior American resources in the area, and a weak Canadian militia (Bourne, 1961, pp. 609-611). Canada was not the most important part of an eventual war, and the British government thought the war would be won at sea, because Britain enjoyed naval superiority, but even at sea, the war could endanger British holdings, including its colonies (Bourne, 1961, pp. 621-8). While the British government was willing to go to war over the Trent Affair (Bourne, 1961, p. 629), the United States both initiated and defused the crisis. British concerns over losing its territories ($1 - \pi$), and its hesitance in escalating the crisis, suggests Great Britain would be less willing to risk retaliation by intervening in the local conflict.

In this particular case, retaliation also meant costs outside of the conflict.

While the Southern states were planning to secede, there was already a massive civil war going on in China. The Taiping rebellion threatened British access to Chinese markets (Platt, 2012, p. 233), and so Britain faced a dilemma. Getting bogged down in an American war would diminish British ability to intervene in China. Intervening in the American Civil War therefore meant incurring opportunity costs.

Developments after the Trent Affair further highlight the obstacles to intervention, which included the course of the war in America and domestic political considerations in Britain. Without an interstate crisis to justify war, the British government were more apprehensive about supporting the Confederacy. Even as the conflict intensified in 1862 and the United States suffered significant losses, including the Battle of Richmond, the British maintained neutrality. It did so because it wanted to end a destructive war before it spread, rather than come to the defense of slavery. Public opinion in Britain was opposed to slavery, so the government was hesitant to support the Confederacy, despite the stakes at hand. British Foreign Secretary John Russell hoped they could facilitate mediation between the warring parties and bring the war to an end. However, the Lincoln administration did not see a distinction between mediation and recognition (Jones, 2010, ch. 6). It took a hardline stance on any British involvement, seemingly meant to deter intervention.¹⁰ Following the Emancipation Proclamation,

¹⁰Poast (2015) argues that the Lincoln administration was so worried about British involvement that it escalated the war early on to signal U.S. resolve. Later, in the summer of 1862, Secretary of State William H. Seward threatened to break off diplomatic relations with Great Britain if it became involved in the war (Jones, 2010, p. 160).

the British government, and especially Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, worried that intervention would make Great Britain a de-facto ally of the Confederacy and start a war with the United States (Jones, 2010, p. 185). Thus, the British government kept waiting for developments on the ground to force the warring parties to the bargaining table, but the Confederacy never strung together the enough victories to justify its claim to independence (Jones, 2010, p. 219).

The American case therefore suggests that the threat of retaliation affects decisions to intervene through a combination of political variables and the balance of power, as Results 3.3.2 and 3.3.14 predict. Because of the risks of interstate war and the limited benefits of rebel victory, including low affinity for the Confederacy, the British government took a cautious approach to the war. It was only willing to intervene directly in the conflict if the rebels were successful enough on the battlefield, but that opportune moment never came.

3.4.2 Wars in Southern Africa

The model predicts that interstate war is most likely when the local and international stakes are relatively equal, because both sides have enough to gain in an interstate war. One example of this process is the set of conflicts in Southern Africa during the 1970s and 1980s, when a transnational movement for self-determination and decolonization together upended the politics of the region. The African National Congress (ANC) and the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) had been fighting against apartheid in South Africa and South West Africa, respectively, since 1960. At the same time, Portugal was fighting

rebels in its African colonies. When Portugal decolonized in 1975 following years of rebellion and domestic political upheaval, the new governments in Angola and Mozambique, led by the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), respectively, became staunch supporters of the ANC and SWAPO. While they were Marxist in ideology, these governments also represented the rise of African nationalism and liberation. They provided the ANC and SWAPO with territory, training, and arms to further the liberation movement on the continent and because South Africa posed a threat to these new governments. South Africa had already intervened on the losing side in Angola's war of independence and subsequent civil war in 1975-1976, and so majority rule in South Africa and liberation of Namibia would eliminate an existential threat against the new states.

However, the threat of retaliation loomed over Angola and Mozambique. After losing in Angola, South Africa built up its capacity for overt and covert military operations in the region, so it could punish or deter support for the anti-apartheid cause (Minter, 1994, p. 38). Despite being militarily disadvantaged, the Angolan and Mozambican governments thought any retaliation would be limited to cross-border operations, and on the far southern border in the former's case. Both governments deemed these risks acceptable in the pursuit of African freedom in Namibia and Zimbabwe, but limited their rebel support at first so as not to provoke South Africa too much. Mozambique only gave practical support to the rebels in Zimbabwe (Minter, 1994, pp. 27-28). However, both SWAPO and the ANC had based in Angola, and the latter also depended on clan-

destine networks passing through, amongst others, Mozambique (Minter, 1994, p. 39).

South Africa did not tolerate this external support, nor did it limit its retaliation to small incursions. It engaged in a wide range of military operations against Angola and Mozambique, including sending troops into these countries on several occasions.¹¹ South Africa also provided extensive support to Angolan and Mozambican rebel groups UNITA and RENAMO, which kept the civil wars in those countries running for years and resulting in hundreds of thousands of deaths.

While South Africa had the means to retaliate, political developments on the subcontinent explain South Africa why it expanded these conflicts. In 1980, six neighboring states, including Angola and Mozambique, coordinated diplomatic policy on liberation in the region,¹² and Robert Mugabe's ascent to power in Zimbabwe meant South Africa's "protective shield of friendly states" had disappeared (Minter, 1994, p. 38). Even as SWAPO and ANC kept suffering military defeats throughout the conflict, they gained legitimacy in the region and inter-

¹¹A non-exhaustive list of South African military operations in Angolan territory include a raid into Angola on May 4th, 1978 in direct response to a SWAPO attack in Namibia; air and ground operations against SWAPO targets in southern Angola starting on March 6, 1979; an attack on roads and bridges 190 km inside Angola on October 28, 1979; large-scale operations deep into Angola on June 7, 1980, to attack the operational headquarters of SWAPO; heavy bombing raids on two Angolan towns on August 23, 1981, followed by a South African invasion consisting of two motorized columns, looking for SWAPO forces, and preventing Angola from strengthening its radar missile air defense system; and a wide-ranging attack on more than 150 targets inside Angola, on December 6, 1983. For descriptions of several cross-border raids into Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and Angola, see (Minter, 1994, p. 113).

¹²For a broader discussion of the regional line-up against South Africa, see: (Minter, 1994, pp. 117-120).

nationally (Minter, 1994, p. 109). The rise of African nationalism threatened the apartheid regime's survival, so it had much to gain from stemming the revolutionary tide in Southern Africa by expanding its local conflict.

The model helps explain these tragic events. The civil wars in Southern Africa saw intervention and prompted retaliation not because of one actor or another's preferences, but because the third parties underestimated the domestic government's resolve for fighting and both sides' incentives for fighting aligned to produce interstate war. In these particular cases, the ideological nature of the interstate conflict meant both sides had much to gain from defeating the other, suggesting moderately sized local stakes (π). While the likelihood of retaliation was non-trivial, Angola and Mozambique had much to gain from helping the rebels to victory and they had strong affinity (b) for the liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. The combination of ideologically aligned rebels fighting over moderately sized stakes meant intervention was worth the risk of retaliation. As such, these wars show how uncertainty *and* political variables are necessary to produce such disastrous outcomes.

These wars show how difficult it is to disentangle civil wars and interstate wars when states fight over each other's domestic political arrangements. An alternative analysis could start in 1948, with the beginning of apartheid, but that would predate the existence of the relevant third parties by almost 30 years. I could also take the Angolan and Mozambican wars of independence as starting points, which would imply their support for the ANC and SWAPO were proxy retaliation in response to South African rebel-sided intervention. However, at

least the Angolan war of independence had a clear break in early 1976 with the MPLA consolidating power before another (or the next phase of the current) conflict started later that year. These intricacies require the analyst to make some choices to facilitate clear analysis, so I have bracketed the sequence of events. But regardless of who moved first, the chief characteristics of these conflicts offer broad support for the utility of my model. Both sides were intensely aware of and motivated by the transnational ideological stakes at hand, so they all had substantial gains to make in an interstate war.

3.5 Summary

In this chapter I have presented a model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation. The model explains when and why civil wars expand into interstate wars. In short, civil wars start and third parties intervene when the rebels are optimistic about the domestic government backing down from a challenge, they will not lose much autonomy when they receive external support, and the third party has high affinity for the rebels. Whether the domestic government retaliates, depends on the relative size of the local stakes. The more the government has to gain from war expansion, the more likely it is to retaliate. However, the smaller the local stakes are, the less likely intervention is, so interstate war happens in equilibrium when both sides have something to gain.

The model has implications for civil wars and shows how international competition affects domestic processes and events. The threat of retaliation can

deter intervention, which in turn can deter rebellion. But intervention can have different effects on the chances of war. When the rebels are susceptible to external domination, the threat of intervention deters rebellion. But if the rebels want help, intervention compels some domestic governments into giving up power. The different predictions that fall out of this triadic interaction show that making empirical predictions about the onset of civil wars necessitate accounting for the threat of retaliation, as well as the preferences of the rebels and the third party. Models of civil war duration include international factors or third-party goals on the RHS (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Cunningham, 2010, e.g.), but as I have shown, decisions on intervention are driven by relative stakes between the two states, which in turn has an effect on duration through potential retaliation. Likewise, the characteristics of a rebel group can affect its willingness to fight. Fragmented groups are more likely to fight (Cunningham, 2013, e.g.), but that pattern might be the result of domestic governments successfully deterring intervention and thus encouraging some groups to rebel, rather than strategic problems with multiple factions. Models of rebellion should therefore account for potential intervention, particularly when predictors are potentially spurious to interstate relationships.

The model also helps us understand several cases of (potential) war expansion by focusing on both the costs and benefits of fighting. The ability of the United States government to raise the stakes of the American Civil War affected the British decision not to intervene on the side of the Confederacy. But sometimes deterrence fails, and transnational conflicts over ideology can drive war ex-

pansion. Angola and Mozambique intervened in South Africa and Namibia, and South Africa retaliated extensively, because both sides had much to gain from winning the larger conflict. These cases show that political variables, as well as the balance of power, are necessary to explain why some civil wars stay local, while others expand.

Another implication of my theory is that civil and interstate wars are interdependent and represent different manifestations of the same triadic interaction. These phenomena are driven by similar processes (Cunningham and Lemke, 2013), and treating them as distinct can lead to biased estimates of the causes of war (Lemke, 2003, 2011). One implication for research design is that models of war should integrate both types of war in the data, either on the conflict level or aggregate up to conflict clusters (e.g. treating the wars in Southern Africa as one conflict). Such research designs can then yield less biased estimates for models of onset and duration.

In the next chapter I evaluate my argument and test its implications. Using a new global dataset on civil wars, I show that uncertainty over the domestic government's resolve, the relative size of the local stakes, escalation costs, and autonomy costs affect the risks of rebellion, intervention, and retaliation. These results suggest that my model is useful for explaining identifying and explaining broad patterns of conflict.

Chapter 4

Empirical Patterns of Civil War Expansion

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter I use newly collected data on civil war expansion to test several of the hypotheses derived from the formal model. The new dataset, called Civil War Expansion Dataset (CWED), is the first systematic accounting of retaliation by domestic governments against external rebel supporters. It covers every civil war with rebel-sided intervention from 1975 to 2009, which allows me to uncover global patterns of the international dimensions of civil wars. The data show that retaliation is quite common. Almost half the conflicts in the sample saw the domestic government take direct military action against an external rebel supporter, and many governments also delegated its retaliation to rebel groups in the third-party territory.

Using this data, I test hypotheses that revolve around rebels' and third

parties' benefits of rebellion and intervention, respectively, and the risks posed by these decisions—primarily retaliation and war expansion. While the theoretical model produces predictions on many parameters, I focus on hypotheses related to three core variables in the model. These variables are part of the innovations of the model and produce novel predictions. First, Result 3.3.2 predicts that increased relative stakes make intervention more likely and retaliation less likely. We should therefore expect to see civil wars with higher local stakes relative to potential interveners' territory be more likely to experience internationalized civil war relative to no intervention and war expansion.

Hypothesis 4.1.1. *As the value of winning a civil war increases relative to defeating a potential rebel supporter, the third party becomes more likely to intervene on the side of the rebels and less likely to experience retaliation.*

Furthermore, the formal model assumes that third parties intervene under the shadow of retaliation. We should therefore expect to see the relationship between π and intervention and retaliation be the strongest under periods of uncertainty.

Hypothesis 4.1.2. *Increased local stakes increase the risk of rebel-sided intervention and decrease the risk of retaliation the most right after a leader transition in the civil war country.*

Second, escalation costs (e) and its decomposed forms (e_i) predict rebellion, intervention, and retaliation. In general, increased escalation costs (e) make

retaliation less likely (Result 3.3.7), so we should expect to see civil wars with higher potential escalation costs to be less likely to expand into an interstate war relative to internationalized civil war.

Hypothesis 4.1.3. *Civil wars with higher escalation costs are more likely to become internationalized civil wars than expand into interstate wars.*

T makes its decision about intervening or not based on its beliefs about *D*'s type, and so it should be more optimistic about the chances of retaliation as *D*'s escalation costs go up (Result 3.3.12). We should therefore expect third parties to be more likely to intervene in civil wars and less likely to experience retaliation when the domestic government has higher escalation costs. Conversely, *T* becomes less likely to intervene the higher its escalation costs are (Result 3.3.10), so I get the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4.1.4. *Increased escalation costs for the domestic government increases the likelihood that a third party will intervene on the side of the rebels and decreases the likelihood that it will experience retaliation.*

Hypothesis 4.1.5. *Increased escalation costs for the third party makes it less likely to intervene on the side of the rebels.*

War expansion can be costly to rebels as well, so opposition groups are less likely to challenge the domestic government and risk a civil war the higher their escalation costs are (Result 3.3.11):

Hypothesis 4.1.6. *Increased escalation costs for potential rebels make them less likely to end up in a civil war.*

Lastly, in general, rebellion is more likely the lower the opposition' autonomy costs (a) are (Result 3.3.4), and civil wars with intervention are more likely than civil wars without intervention when opposition groups have low autonomy costs. I therefore derive the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 4.1.7. *Opposition groups with low autonomy costs are more likely to fight a civil war.*

Hypothesis 4.1.8. *Opposition groups with low autonomy costs are more likely to fight with external support than fight alone in a civil war.*

The empirical models provide support for several of my hypotheses. As a civil war country's economy increases relative to a potential intervener (GDP ratio), the risk of intervention without retaliation increases relative to no intervention. Furthermore, I find evidence that the relationship is conditional on uncertainty about the domestic government. The relationship between GDP ratio and intervention and retaliation is strongest right after a leader transition in the civil war country and diminishes over time. Next, I find consistent support for urban population proxying for escalation costs as a predictor of intervention and retaliation. Countries with a larger urban population are more likely to experience intervention and less likely to retaliate, and third parties are less likely to intervene the larger their urban population. Similarly, ethnic groups in highly

developed areas are less likely to rebel, which suggests they are sensitive to escalation costs. Lastly, I find that ethnic groups who self-exclude, which is a proxy for low autonomy costs, are more likely to rebel. These results suggest that third parties and rebels consider the costs and benefits of fighting, beyond the balance of power, when making decisions to intervene and rebel. This has implications for future research. In order to predict the onset, internationalization, and expansion of civil wars, we have to account for political variables and how preferences over domestic and international order interact.

The chapter proceeds as follows. I first describe CWED and provide some key definitions of terminology and the main variables included in the dataset, before offering some descriptive statistics. Next, I specify and analyze various empirical models of local stakes predicting intervention and retaliation in civil wars. Following that, I discuss models of escalation costs and rebellion, intervention, and retaliation, before I examine models that predict ethnic groups' decision to rebel (and receive external support) as a function of their autonomy costs. I conclude the chapter with thoughts about next steps and future research.

4.2 The data

CWED covers every civil war ($n = 47$) in the period 1975-2009 that involved at least one state supporting a rebel group. The sample is constructed from the UCDP External support dataset, which defines the relevant conflicts and identifies the external supporter(s) and recipient group(s) (Högbladh et al., 2011).

For each conflict, I distinguish between different recipients (rebel groups) and their external supporter, so there is a total of 185 observations in the dataset on the conflict-recipient-supporter level (though for the analyses I aggregate up to the conflict-level, the conflict-potential intervener level, or ethnic-group year). The unit of analysis means that the data can distinguish between several concurrent conflicts in the same country, multiple rebel groups, and multiple third parties. While the data is structured in disaggregated form, much of the information coded is at an aggregated level. For instance, a country might support several rebel groups in one country, or support rebels in concurrent conflicts, but we (i.e. myself and the team of coders) could not reliably code instances of retaliation specific to the specific recipients. Governments rarely offer such detailed rationales for the use of force. Therefore, if country *A* retaliates against country *B* in year *t*, then we code in the affirmative for every observation of *B* supporting a rebel group in *A* in periods covering year *t*. In some conflicts with many rebel groups (e.g. the Afghan Civil War during the 1980s), this then leads to an inflated retaliation count. Despite these limitations, the data is disaggregated, because the period of support differs between groups, and sometimes there are year-long gaps between support for two different groups, even if they both belong to the same conflict. For instance, Ivory Coast supported two separate groups in the Liberian civil war; the National Patriotic Front of Liberia from 1989 to 1990, and the Movement for Democracy in Liberia in 2003. Liberia only retaliated in the latter period, supporting rebels against Ivory Coast, so aggregating up to the conflict-intervener level would then conflate two distinct periods

of internationalization.

Table 4.1: Key terms and definitions.

Term	Definition
Civil war state/domestic government	The government of a country experiencing a civil war, fighting an armed rebel group.
Rebel group	A domestic-based armed group fighting for political control over all, or parts of, a country.
Intervener	A third-party state government involved in an ongoing civil war.
Intervention	Intervention can take many forms, ranging from offering sanctuary to a rebel group, to providing arms or other material support to a rebel group, to sending its own troops to fight the domestic government either alongside or in conjunction with the rebels.
Retaliation	The use of military force against an intervener outside the original territory of the civil war . Retaliation can take many forms, but must include the use of force against either population or material targets. The force may be conducted by regular military forces belonging to the domestic government, or it may be conducted by agents or allies of the domestic government. The latter may include other non-governmental armed groups, while the former would be other states allied with or sympathetic to the domestic government.
Threat of retaliation	The implicit or explicit threat of using force against a third-party intervener. Implicitly, a domestic government can mobilize troops on the border or conduct military exercises meant to compel the third party to stop its rebel support. Explicitly, a domestic government can make specific demands of the third party related to its rebel support, threatening to conduct (a type of) retaliation unless support is withdrawn.

4.2.1 Types of retaliation and war expansion

CWED distinguishes between six different types of retaliation, though in the analyses I focus primarily on direct retaliation. For something to be considered direct retaliation, it must involve the use of military force by the domestic government against the third party in or adjacent to the third party's territory (but never in the civil war territory).¹ On March 31, 1978, the Ethiopian Air Force raided two Somali border villages in retaliation for Somali aid to Ethiopian rebels in Ogaden, which started in 1976, according to UCDP. Direct retaliation has to follow rebel support, but it does not require an explicit statement by the domestic government that the action is taken in response to intervention. In September 1991, Indian and Pakistani forces clashed along the cease-fire line in Jammu-Kashmir, resulting in dozens of battle deaths. Prior to the incident, Pakistan had supported Kashmiri insurgents by providing sanctuary in Pakistani territory.

Proxy retaliation occurs when the domestic government begins supporting rebel(s) fighting the third party. While the details of rebel support are often undisclosed, two criteria must be met to establish proxy retaliation: an established relationship, and the use of violence by the proxy. There must be some record, rather than allegations, of the domestic government supporting rebels against the third party, and the rebel group must have conducted at least one violent attack against the third party government after support started. One ex-

¹By adjacent, I mean an area near the third party's territory, but technically not within its borders. This could mean the border area between the third party and some other country. However, there are no examples of retaliation taking place in such an area in the data collected.

ample of proxy retaliation is the conflict between Eritrea and Sudan in the 1990s. Sudan was supporting the Islamic Jihad Movement's efforts to overthrow the Eritrean government, and in response, Eritrea gave shelter to Sudanese opposition groups who attacked both civilian and military targets in Sudan. Sometimes the domestic government's forces fight alongside rebels against the third party. On December 20, 1984, Ethiopian forces and the fighters from the Democratic Front for the Salvation of Somalia (DFSS) attacked the Somali military in the Awdal region of what is now Somaliland.

One challenge with these types of conflicts is that it is not always apparent when the conflict started, which has implications for who is defined as the domestic government and who is deemed the third party intervener. For instance, South Africa first intervened during the Angolan War of Independence, and shortly after the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) took power in 1975, it started supporting the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia. However, Angola also started supporting the African National Congress in South Africa in 1981, according to the UCDP External Dataset. Because South Africa then supported UNITA in Angola during the 1980s, and UNITA conducted at least one violent attack in November 1981 against Angola's largest oil refinery, this rebel support also constitutes proxy retaliation.

CWED also includes measures of other types of retaliation (details in the appendix). Sometimes a domestic government targets an ally or the economic interests of a third party, so I include a variable for indirect retaliation. Governments may also use special forces to conduct covert operations, though because

of strategic censoring, the covert retaliation variable should be used with caution. Governments often threaten retaliation to compel a third party to withdraw support for the rebels, so I include a variable for threat of retaliation. Lastly, I include a variable called ambiguous retaliation, where there is great uncertainty about either who conducted the military action against the intervener or for what reason it was conducted. While I do not include these variables in the analyses in this chapter, the frequency in which these forms of retaliation are used suggest that domestic governments use a wide range of tools to deter, compel, or punish interveners.

4.2.2 Descriptive statistics

CWED has 185 observations at the conflict-recipient-intervener level, covering 47 unique conflicts, as coded by UCDP. While the data covers nearly every region of the world, some countries and conflicts had more rebels and interveners than others. Afghanistan dominates the data. 39% of the disaggregated data is related to the civil war in Afghanistan, which is partly a product of UCDP coding it as a continuous conflict from 1979 to 2001.² The conflict with the next-most observations is the Angolan Civil War with 15 observations, and the sample mean is 3.94.

The data makes clear that civil war expansion is quite common. Of the 185 observations in the dataset, 38 had direct retaliation (21%), 40 had proxy re-

²Given that Afghanistan or the Soviet occupying force retaliated against several interveners across multiple periods, estimating models on the disaggregated data can yield biased estimates.




Figure 4.1: Count of retaliations by type (conflict-recipient-intervener level).

taliation (22%), and 18 of those had both direct and proxy retaliation (see Figure 4.1). There are 22 observation with indirect retaliation (12%), and 13 with covert retaliation (7%)—both are likely undercounts, however, due to difficulties observing and attributing such actions. Furthermore, there are 44 observations with threats of retaliation (24%), of which 24 occurred in conjunction with direct retaliation. Lastly, there are 26 observations coded as having ambiguous retaliation (14%).

At the conflict level, the pattern is similar, with some exceptions. 47% of conflicts saw direct retaliation, while 38% saw proxy retaliation (see Figure 4.2). The difference in percentages across units of analysis can be attributed in part to the fact that many civil wars have multiple rebel supporters, but domestic governments rarely retaliate against all of them. Furthermore, proxy retaliation is




Figure 4.2: Count of retaliations by type (conflict level).

relatively less common at the conflict level because proxy retaliation occurred in several conflicts with multiple rebel groups. Only 9% of conflicts resulted in indirect retaliation, while 13% had covert retaliation, and over 40% saw the government threaten retaliation. 26% of the civil wars had some instance coded as ambiguous.

Several observations have multiple types of retaliation. At the disaggregated level, only 86 have no retaliation (including ambiguous), while 49 had one and 50 had two or more types of retaliation. If we exclude ambiguous instances of retaliation, there are 97 observations without retaliation (see Figure 4.3). Looking at the conflict-level data, most observations have more than one type of retaliation (see Figure 4.4). There are 12 conflicts with no retaliation, while 11 had one, and 24 had two or more types of retaliation. There is a great deal of variation in




Figure 4.3: Number of observations by count of retaliation types (disaggregated data).

retaliation, much the same way there is variation in intervention. Domestic governments do not retaliate against every intervener, but when they do, they often resort to multiple types of retaliation.

CWED offers a systematic look at war expansion globally over a 35-year period, and as I show in the next following sections, it helps uncover new empirical patterns of civil wars and interstate wars. However, it has certain limitations. The time period covered is a function of the underlying UCDP data on external support, so it misses a large part of the Cold War period. Furthermore, the data cannot say much about the magnitude of retaliation. It cannot distinguish between limited cross-border incursions and full-scale invasions, or between one-off military operations and years-long wars. Future data collection efforts should therefore focus on building more fine-grained data on specific conflicts or re-




Figure 4.4: Number of conflicts by count of retaliation types.

gions that map in time and space rebel support and retaliation.

4.3 Relative stakes and war expansion

Potentially increasing stakes connect civil and interstate war in my theoretical model, and the size of the local stakes relative to the international stakes affect the decisions of the rebels, the domestic government, and the third party. In this section, I test Hypothesis 4.1.1, which states that as the local stakes increase, intervention becomes more likely while retaliation becomes less likely. In other words, conflicts with higher values of π are more likely to become internationalized civil wars and less likely to expand into interstate wars. Because my theoretical model assumes D has private information about its resolve, the relationship between π and war expansion might be conditional on uncertainty about D (Hy-

pothesis 4.1.2).

Testing these hypotheses is challenging, because we need to operationalize a variable that captures how much the conquest of one state is worth to the other. I use the size of the civil war country's gross domestic product (GDP) divided by the potential intervener's GDP to capture the relative size of the local stakes. I estimate a dyadic multinomial model of civil war, intervention, and retaliation that accounts for variation in the value of the civil war country relative to a potential intervener. The unit of analysis is the conflict-potential rebel supporter dyad, where I include every other state in the system as a potential intervener. A dyadic design allows me to directly measure the relative size of the stakes between two states, and I use the ratio of the gross domestic products of the civil war country (D) and the potential intervener (T) to operationalize π . The regression results offer support for Hypothesis 4.1.1.

To test Hypothesis 4.1.2, I estimate a model where the relationship between GDP ratio and war expansion is conditional on uncertainty about the domestic government. I use years since the civil war country experienced a leader transition as a proxy for uncertainty, and my results offer support for my theory. The relationship between GDP ratio and war expansion is the strongest right after a leader transition and diminishes over time.

In the appendix, I also report the results of a conflict-level model of civil war, intervention, and retaliation where government support proxies for increased local stakes. I find limited support for Hypothesis 4.1.1, but not Hypothesis 4.1.2, which suggests that conflict-level models are unsuitable for testing these kinds

of relationships. Because government support can have varying effects on a civil war, I explore these relationships in more depth in chapter 5 by focusing on one specific conflict before and after government-sided intervention.

4.3.1 Research design

To test Hypotheses 4.1.1 and 4.1.2, I estimate multinomial models of rebel-sided intervention and war expansion, on the conflict-potential intervener level ($n = 15,173$), with robust standard errors clustered on the civil war.³ As with the conflict-level dependent variable, civil wars without rebel-sided intervention are coded as 0, while civil wars with intervention but no retaliation are coded as 1, and civil wars with intervention and retaliation are coded as 2. I focus the analysis on the strict Expansion dependent variable (direct retaliation only).⁴ Compared to the conflict-level data, a smaller percentage of observations coded as "ICW" in the strict measure is coded as "IW" in the broader measure (appr. 20%).

³One risk of modeling dyadic interactions is that it inflates the sample size by potentially including irrelevant observations. As I discuss below, imposing scoping conditions on which potential interveners are relevant is necessary for certain tests.

⁴Using the broader measure of expansion changes the results substantively with the GDP ratio model, with larger economy countries more likely to retaliate. This would suggest some relationship between larger countries and the ability or willingness to support other rebel groups not explored in the theory chapter.

Table 4.2: Cross-tabulation of civil war expansion (dyadic data).

Expansion (direct)	Expansion (direct/proxy)			Total
	Civil war	Int. civil war	Interstate war	
Civil war	15067	0	0	15067
Int. civil war	0	66	13	79
Interstate war	0	0	27	27
Total	15067	66	40	15173

My theory predicts that the relative size of the local stakes determine the probability of intervention and the risk of retaliation. Operationalizing what two countries have to gain by defeating the other is challenging, since countries consider a wide range of potential benefits to conquest. To capture the relative stakes in a dyadic setting in a way that applies generally across countries and periods, I assume that countries care about the wealth of their opponents—whether it be to capture their resources or deny them the ability to pose a threat in the future.⁵ I operationalize π by taking the domestic government' (D) gross domestic product and dividing it by the potential intervener's (T) gross domestic product (*GDP ratio*). This measure captures how much larger (or smaller) D 's economy is relative to T 's, so my empirical model tests whether larger economies in D make inter-

⁵Non-material factors can also affect relative stakes in important ways, but are likely to be context-specific and thus ill-suited for a large-n study. For instance, Iran and Saudi Arabia are engaged in a proxy conflict that can be explained by Sunni-Shia relations. Religious conflicts, however, are not universally relevant, so would only be appropriate for studies limited to regions or periods. Operationalizing relative stakes with a binary measure of dyadic relations is also inappropriate for a model of three outcomes. The presence of religious conflict would imply relatively moderate stakes, as both sides have something to gain from defeating the other, so it would be positively associated with the risk of interstate war relative to internationalized civil war. However, religious conflict cannot distinguish between the risk of civil war and internationalized civil war.

nationalized civil war more likely relative to to no intervention, and internationalized civil war more likely relative to interstate war. The explanatory variable is lagged by one year.

Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of GDP ratio model.

	count	mean	sd	min	max
GDP ratio (t-1)	9344	245.0132	5061.014	.0000343	437792.2
GDPpc ratio (t-1)	9336	2.828791	9.317252	.0020361	228.963
Urban population in D (t-1)	13406	20784.54	36177.94	0	161743
Urban population in T (t-1)	14744	7234.292	24258.49	0	612933
Minimum distance	15147	5444.863	4191.733	0	19141.9
Executive constraint in D (t-1)	12707	3.804989	2.168576	1	7
Executive constraint in T (t-1)	12434	4.022921	2.366698	1	7
ln(GDP) in D (t-1)	11188	24.09849	2.473702	19.61884	30.17262
ln(GDP) in T (t-1)	12113	23.62202	2.361025	17.18312	30.32565
ln(GDPpc) in D (t-1)	11188	7.300079	1.25902	5.429144	10.71566
ln(GDPpc) in T (t-1)	12102	8.091818	1.519367	4.748716	11.65271
Growth in D (t-1)	13406	1.387201	6.343066	-22.6	12.1626
Growth in T (t-1)	14744	2.828169	7.024768	-64.0471	149.973
ln(Population) in D (t-1)	13406	9.848306	2.02473	5.950643	13.81356
ln(Population) in T (t-1)	14744	8.548428	1.993055	2.197225	14.09779
CINC ratio (t-1)	13078	588.5542	7022.761	.0001429	471303.6
CINC D (t-1)	13406	.0163873	.0315528	.0000241	.142805
CINC T (t-1)	14744	.0058519	.0188683	2.46e-07	.178778
Rivals	15173	.0052066	.0719712	0	1

I include a set of covariates that predict *GDP ratio* and should be associated with *T*'s willingness to intervene and *D*'s willingness to retaliate. These include various measures of economics and demographics (see Table 4.6), but I also include several dyadic measures. Both intervention and retaliation depend on how close together the two countries are, so I include a measure of their *Minimum distance*. Furthermore, *T*'s willingness to intervene also depends on its

regime type and that of D , so I include an interaction term of the two countries *Executive constraint*.⁶ I also use the country pair's CINC score ratio to distinguish between relative wealth and relative military power, since countries sometimes have to choose between guns and butter. Because previous conflict can affect the countries' relative economic growth and the risk of intervention, I include a dummy variable for whether the two countries are *Rivals* (Thompson, 2001). Lastly, I include dummy variables for the decade the civil war started. For the model without uncertainty, the regression equation is therefore:

$$\begin{aligned}
\eta_{ijy} = & \alpha_y + \beta_{1y} \text{GDP ratio (t-1)}_{ij} + \beta_{2y} \text{GDPpc ratio (t-1)}_{ij} \\
& + \beta_{3y} \text{Minimum distance}_{ij} + \beta_{4y} \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_i \\
& + \beta_{5y} \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_j + \beta_{6y} \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_i \\
& \times \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_j + \beta_{7y} \ln(\text{GDP (t-1)})_i + \beta_{8y} \ln(\text{GDP (t-1)})_j \\
& + \beta_{9y} \ln(\text{GDPpc (t-1)})_i + \beta_{10y} \ln(\text{GDPpc (t-1)})_j + \beta_{11y} \text{Growth (t-1)}_i \\
& + \beta_{12y} \text{Growth (t-1)}_j + \beta_{13y} \ln(\text{Population (t-1)})_i + \beta_{14y} \ln(\text{Population (t-1)})_j \\
& + \beta_{15y} \text{CINC ratio (t-1)}_{ij} + \beta_{16y} \text{CINC (t-1)}_i + \beta_{17y} \text{CINC (t-1)}_j + \beta_{18y} \text{Rivals}_{ij} \\
& + \beta_{19y} 1980s_i + \beta_{20y} 1990s_i + \beta_{21y} 2000s_i.
\end{aligned} \tag{4.1}$$

Because the relationship between local stakes and war expansion might be conditional on uncertainty about the domestic government's, resolve, I estimate a model where GDP ratio interacts with uncertainty. I operationalize uncer-

⁶I use the executive constraint indicator from PolityIV, because it is not affected by the presence of violence (Vreeland, 2008).

tainty as years since the civil war country experienced a leader transition (Rider, 2013, cf.), because theoretical models of leader turnover and war show that private information is introduced each time a new leader enters office (Wolford, 2007, e.g.). We should expect the relationship between my explanatory variables and the outcomes to be strongest right after a transition and then diminish over time. I find support for such conditional relationships with the GDP ratio model. This operationalization of uncertainty assumes that uncertainty diminishes (or increases) as a linear function of time since a new leader came to power, but the results are similar when I use a decay function instead (Clare and Danilovic, 2010, cf.). The uncertainty model is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\eta_{ijy} = & \alpha_y + \beta_{1y} \text{GDP ratio (t-1)}_{ij} + \beta_{2y} \text{Time}_i + \beta_{3y} \text{GDP ratio (t-1)}_{ij} \times \text{Time}_i \\
& + \beta_{4y} \text{GDPpc ratio (t-1)}_{ij} + \beta_{5y} \text{Minimum distance}_{ij} \\
& + \beta_{6y} \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_i + \beta_{7y} \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_j \\
& + \beta_{8y} \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_i \times \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_j \\
& + \beta_{9y} \ln(\text{GDP (t-1)}_i) + \beta_{10y} \ln(\text{GDP (t-1)}_j) + \beta_{11y} \ln(\text{GDPpc (t-1)}_i) \quad (4.2) \\
& + \beta_{12y} \ln(\text{GDPpc (t-1)}_j) + \beta_{13y} \text{Growth (t-1)}_i + \beta_{14y} \text{Growth (t-1)}_j \\
& + \beta_{15y} \ln(\text{Population (t-1)}_i) + \beta_{16y} \ln(\text{Population (t-1)}_j) \\
& + \beta_{17y} \text{CINC ratio (t-1)}_{ij} + \beta_{18y} \text{CINC (t-1)}_i + \beta_{19y} \text{CINC (t-1)}_j \\
& + \beta_{20y} \text{Rivals}_{ij} + \beta_{21y} \text{1980s}_i + \beta_{22y} \text{1990s}_i + \beta_{23y} \text{2000s}_i.
\end{aligned}$$

4.3.2 Analysis

As Hypothesis 4.1.1 predicts, increases in the local stakes make intervention more likely but retaliation less likely. I should therefore expect that increases in the GDP ratio in favor of D will make internationalized civil war more likely and interstate war less likely. Furthermore, the relationship between the local stakes and intervention and retaliation are at its strongest when the domestic government has recently experienced a leader transition (Hypothesis 4.1.2).

Before discussing the results, I will note one thing about the explanatory variable. The distribution of GDP ratio is right-skewed with a long tail. Some civil war countries have significantly larger economies than many potential interveners. The starkest example is the United States, which is coded as being in a civil war because of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. For instance, the United States has an economy 437792.2 larger than that of Tuvalu. Such a disparity in economic power suggests that I have to limit the scope of the analysis to countries who are more closely matched so as not to include irrelevant dyads that might bias the results or inflate the standard errors. I therefore restrict the sample to the 75th percentile, or a GDP ratio of 19.1647, omitting 2,336 observations.

Estimating the model without uncertainty on the restricted sample, I find limited support for Hypothesis 4.1.1 (see Table C.8 in the appendix). I find a statistically significant positive association between economic size and the likelihood of internationalized civil war relative to local-only civil war. The larger the




Figure 4.5: GDP ratio as predictor of internationalized civil war.

economy in the civil war country, the more likely it is to experience rebel-sided intervention (without retaliation), but the confidence intervals get quite large as the ratio increases due to skewed data (see Figure 4.5). In terms of magnitude, the probability of internationalized civil war is about 0.2% for equally sized countries, and that probability increases to 0.5% when D is five times larger, but the point estimates are so uncertain as to render any conclusion difficult. Furthermore, the theory predicts that as civil war countries become more valuable relative to the third party, the risk of retaliation diminishes. I find no evidence of this. Therefore, third parties tend to intervene in larger economies, but these civil war

countries do not seem any more or less likely to retaliate than smaller economies.

When I account for uncertainty below, I get results more in line with the predictions of the model and find support for Hypothesis 4.1.2. As with the model without uncertainty, the coefficient for GDP ratio is positive and highly statistically significant for internationalized civil war when I include *Time* as a predictor (regression results reported in Table C.9 in the appendix). The coefficient for *Time* is not statistically significant when I include it as a linear predictor, but when I interact it with *GDP ratio*, the interaction coefficient is statistically significant, suggesting a conditional relationship. Because it is difficult to interpret the coefficients of interaction terms in a model using logistic regression, I graph the marginal relationship between *GDP ratio* and internationalized civil war and interstate war conditional on *Time*.




Figure 4.6: GDP ratio as predictor of internationalized civil war, conditional on time since leader transition in the civil war country.

As Figure 4.6 shows, GDP ratio is positively associated with the risk of intervention without retaliation compared to no intervention right after a leader transition, but as time goes on, the magnitude of the relationship diminishes to near zero. This result shows that third parties decide to intervene or not based on what they can gain when there is uncertainty about the risk of retaliation. When they are uncertain, they have to make a risk-return comparison based on the costs and benefits of intervening. Because higher local stakes mean a lower chance of retaliation, third parties are more likely to intervene *and* avoid retali-

ation when local stakes are high and third parties are uncertain about the risks of retaliation. When uncertainty is resolved, the decision to intervene is less dependent on the relative size of the local stakes, because other factors come into play when the threat of retaliation is eliminated.

Conversely, GDP ratio is negatively associated with the risk of intervention and retaliation compared to no intervention right after leader change, and as time goes on the relationship goes to zero. Figure 4.7 shows the interplay between uncertainty and what the third party can lose from intervening. When uncertainty is at its highest, third parties pick their targets judiciously (Gartner and Siverson, 1996, cf.). Third parties are less likely to intervene *and* suffer retaliation when local stakes are low and third parties are uncertain about the risks of retaliation. This estimate, however, has wider confidence intervals than the former that overlap with zero across the range, so I cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between GDP ratio and the risk of interstate war conditional on uncertainty.




Figure 4.7: GDP ratio as predictor of interstate war, conditional on time since leader transition in the civil war country.

There might be three related explanations for the partial results on the risk of interstate war. First, GDP is a crude measure of the stakes of the conflict because countries cannot easily absorb each other's economies or extract wealth. Second, GDP is also correlated with a host of other factors, such as political development, which in turn affect countries' underlying risk of civil war and willingness and ability to wage war against others. Third parties might prefer to intervene in larger economies because there are benefits to winning, but these larger economies could be more or less likely to retaliate depending on these

correlated factors. Relatively larger economies should be less likely to retaliate because there is less to gain from war expansion, but they might also possess some capabilities, such as transnational ethnic ties or highly institutionalized militaries or intelligence organizations, that enable them to retaliate more easily. Lastly, because of uncertainty about the domestic government's resolve, third parties pick targets based on what they can gain, but whether the gamble backfires or not depends on specific capabilities and information the government has an incentive to withhold.

Despite the lack of a statistically significant coefficient for GDP ratio when predicting interstate war, the results are encouraging. The empirical model controls for a wide range of political, material, and demographic factors that can confound the relationship between relative economic strength and intervention and retaliation. Furthermore, if GDP ratio was capturing a type of relative state power distinct from these covariates instead of measuring relative stakes, we should expect it to be negatively associated with intervention, as third parties would be deterred from fighting stronger civil war governments. GDP ratio being positively associated with the risk of rebel-sided support then suggests that third parties are considering something besides the costs of war and balance of military power.

Lastly, the role leader transition plays in the relationship between GDP ratio and war expansion is in line with the role of uncertainty in the formal model, which suggests the operationalization is appropriate. It is possible that leader transitions also capture political instability, so third parties exploit vulnerable

governments by supporting the rebels. However, we would then expect to see the reverse conditional relationship. Higher GDP ratio indicates a lower risk of retaliation, so a positive interaction between instability and local stakes would imply that third parties become more likely to target weak targets the less likely retaliation is.

4.4 Escalation costs and war expansion

When civil wars expand, fighting intensifies and the warring parties pay the costs of a larger war. The theoretical model produces several predictions for how escalation costs affect decisions to rebel, intervene, and retaliation. In this section I test four related hypotheses using three different research designs at the conflict-, dyad-, and ethnic group-year level. using novel measures of escalation costs to capture the costs a government could potentially incur in an interstate war.

Hypothesis 4.1.3 states that the probability of retaliation decreases in the actors' escalation costs, because war expansion is not worth it to the domestic government. I test this hypothesis using a conflict-level research design. Next, Hypotheses 4.1.4 and 4.1.5 make predictions about intervention as a function of escalation costs. Specifically, a third party becomes more likely to intervene the higher the domestic government's escalation costs are, because the third party believes retaliation is less likely. Furthermore, a third party becomes less likely to intervene the higher its escalation costs are, because interstate war becomes increasingly costly. To test these hypotheses, I use a dyadic research design. Lastly,

Hypothesis 4.1.6 states that the risk of rebellion is decreasing in the opposition's escalation costs. I test this hypothesis using yearly data on ethnic groups, and I use nightlight emissions as a proxy for the groups' level of economic development and thus the potential destruction groups can suffer in a larger war.

These tests offer consistent and robust support for my hypotheses. Escalation costs predict which civil wars experience rebel-sided intervention, and they predict which third parties intervene against whom. I also find some support for escalation costs affecting the likelihood of rebellion, though these results are not as robust, in part because of limited data availability. Most empirical models of conflict do not directly measure costs of war, but my analysis suggests there are ways of capturing what is often treated as an unobservable variable.

4.4.1 Research design: Conflict model

To test Hypothesis 4.1.3), I specify a conflict-level multinomial logit model with country-clustered robust standard errors. Because I am only interested in rebel-sided intervention and retaliation as outcomes, I code the dependent variable (*Expansion*) as 0 if the conflict does not experience rebel-sided intervention, 1 if there is rebel-sided intervention but no retaliation, and 2 if there is intervention and retaliation at any point during the civil war.⁷

My formal model assumes that war expansion increases the level of destruction resulting from fighting the third party directly in an interstate war, but

⁷In some conflicts, I include acts of retaliation conducted after UCDP codes the intervention as having ended, if the evidence suggests it is tied to the civil war.

operationalizing war costs are tricky. Wealthier countries have relatively more to lose, but they also have more resources to dedicate to war-fighting. Military strength is also a poor proxy for potential escalation. Larger militaries can cause more destruction, but also defend against attacks, so distinguishing between the offensive and defensive dimensions is difficult. Furthermore, military strength is also a determinant of the outcome of the conflict, so a measure such as the CINC score would conflate two separate parts of my theory. One way of capturing escalation costs is to measure what can be destroyed. Many recent and current civil wars show that urban warfare can be particularly costly in terms of resources and lives (e.g. Syrian Civil War). I therefore include a continuous measure of the civil war country's urban population in the year prior to the civil war onset, because this variable capture the potential destructiveness of war separate from power.

Table 4.4: Descriptive statistics of Urban population model (conflict).

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Urban population (t-1)	73	20387.11	36422.06	0	148158
Executive constraint (t-1)	76	3.776316	2.188447	1	7
Population density (t-1)	85	87.15827	100.6927	1.252295	544.5433
ln(Population) (t-1)	85	16.62737	1.995191	12.83729	20.74797
ln(GDP) (t-1)	80	23.5809	2.334687	19.42457	30.07794
ln(GDPpc) (t-1)	80	6.962419	1.213285	5.064293	10.61994
Economic growth (t-1)	77	.5299913	9.638695	-48.77119	12.16261
CINC (t-1)	73	.016683	.0327912	.0000263	.1498416
Neighbor at war (dummy)	83	.6746988	.4713353	0	1

I include a set of covariates that are associated with intervention and can affect a country's level of urbanization (Table 4.4). A country's regime type can

affect its economic development while also making it more or less likely another third party will support the rebels, so I include the *Executive constraint* variable (lagged) from the PolityIV dataset. Demographics can also affect urbanization and intervention, because they affect the costs of intervention and the likelihood of rebel victory. I therefore include variables for *Urban population*, *Population density*, and *ln(Population)* (all lagged). Third parties also care about a civil war country's prosperity and military strength when deciding to intervene, while urbanization is often driven by economic factors, so I include variables for Gross Domestic product (*ln(GDP)*), GDP per capita (*ln(GDPpc)*), *Economic growth*, and their Composite Index of National Capability score *CINC* (all lagged). Lastly, because civil wars can spread across borders, and often times contiguous neighbors intervene in civil wars, I include a dummy variable for whether a contiguous neighbor is at war (*Neighbor at war*).

Heterogeneity in the sample poses threats to inference. Because patterns of intervention and demographics change over time, I account for temporal trends with decade dummies (with 1970s as the base category). Year-fixed effects would account for more unobserved heterogeneity, but the lack of variation in conflict onset years causes separation so several of the models do not converge with such controls. To account for heteroskedasticity, I estimate robust standard errors clustered on the civil war country. The linear component of the regression equation is therefore:

$$\begin{aligned}
\eta_{iy} = & \alpha_y + \beta_{1y} \text{Urban population (t-1)}_i + \beta_{2y} \text{Population density (t-1)}_i \\
& + \beta_{3y} \ln(\text{Population (t-1)})_i + \beta_{4y} \ln(\text{GDP (t-1)})_i + \beta_{5y} \ln(\text{GDPpc (t-1)})_i \\
& + \beta_{6y} \text{Economic growth (t-1)}_i + \beta_{7y} \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_i \quad (4.3) \\
& + \beta_{8y} \text{CINC (t-1)}_i + \beta_{9y} \text{Neighbor at war}_i + \beta_{10y} 1980s_i + \beta_{11y} 1990s_i \\
& + \beta_{12y} 2000s_i
\end{aligned}$$

4.4.2 Analysis: Escalation costs (conflict model)

Using the size of a country's urban population as a proxy for escalation costs, I find support for my hypothesis (see Table C.10 in the appendix). Countries who have higher levels of urban population are less likely to retaliate than tolerate rebel-sided intervention, and the coefficient is statistically significant. The results hold for the broader measure of expansion as well. These results then suggest that third parties choose to support rebels in civil war countries that are more sensitive to escalation and thus less likely to retaliate against a rebel-sided supporter.

The magnitude of the relationship between urbanization and the risk of retaliation appears to be substantial. Using the main model without decade-fixed effects, I calculate the marginal relationship between urban population and the likelihood of retaliation relative to tolerating intervention across the sample. I find that the probability of war expansion drops from about 27% if a country has an urban population of 20,000,000 (the sample mean) to about 2.2% if a country has an urban population of 80,000,000 (appr. 1.65 standard deviations above

the mean). Figure 4.8 shows that countries become substantially less likely to retaliate against external rebel supporters as they become more urbanized.




Figure 4.8: The marginal relationship between urban population and the risk of retaliation.

Because the distribution of urban populations is highly right-skewed with a low mean and a long tail, it is possible that assuming a linear relationship between the number of urban residents and the risk of retaliation is inappropriate. I therefore estimate another model where I replace the continuous variable with a dummy variable coded 1 if the country had an above average urban population,

and 0 otherwise. The results hold, and the coefficient is statistically significant. Predicting the marginal effect of urbanization, I find that countries above the mean are 83% less likely to retaliate than those below the mean.

4.4.3 Research design: Dyadic model

The theoretical model also produces more fine-grained predictions for the decisions to intervene and retaliate, particularly as the third party decides whether to intervene or not based on its beliefs about the probability of retaliation (Hypothesis 4.1.4) and its own sensitivity to retaliation (Hypothesis 4.1.5). To test these predictions, I estimate a multinomial logit model of no rebel intervention, intervention but no retaliation, and retaliation using a dyadic design of every civil war paired with every possible rebel-sided supporter. I use measures of the two countries' urban population to measure their potential escalation costs (*Urban population in D* and *Urban population in T*). Both variables are lagged one year. The formal model assumes the actors share the same escalation costs, but the equilibrium analysis shows that subsetting e is trivial and does not impact the predictions.

A dyadic research design allows me to parse out each actor's sensitivity to the destruction associated with interstate war, but more importantly it allows me to measure T 's beliefs about D 's type. While T intervenes based on its own costs of escalation, it also decides to intervene or not based on its beliefs about D being of a type that retaliates or not. As the size of the urban population in a civil war country goes up (down), a third party becomes more (less) certain the

domestic government is of a type that will not retaliate. I therefore do not have to account for levels of uncertainty in this empirical model, unlike the local stakes models.

The RHS of the model is similar to the GDP ratio model, with some changes. I omit *GDPpc ratio*, *CINC ratio*, and the interaction of the countries' respective *Executive constraint* scores, because the urban population variables are not dyadic, so we should not expect an interaction between these measures and the countries' respective levels of urbanization. I therefore estimate the following model using multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors clustered on the civil war country:

$$\begin{aligned}
\eta_{ijy} = & \alpha_y + \beta_{1y} \text{Urban population (t-1)}_i + \beta_{2y} \text{Urban population (t-1)}_j \\
& + \beta_{3y} \text{Minimum distance}_{ij} + \beta_{4y} \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_i \\
& + \beta_{5y} \ln(\text{Population (t-1)})_i + \beta_{6y} \text{CINC (t-1)}_i + \beta_{7y} \text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_j \\
& + \beta_{8y} \ln(\text{Population (t-1)})_j + \beta_{9y} \text{CINC (t-1)}_j + \beta_{10y} \ln(\text{GDP (t-1)})_i \\
& + \beta_{11y} \ln(\text{GDP (t-1)})_j + \beta_{12y} \ln(\text{GDPpc (t-1)})_i + \beta_{13y} \ln(\text{GDPpc (t-1)})_j \\
& + \beta_{14y} \text{Growth (t-1)}_i + \beta_{15y} \text{Growth (t-1)}_j + \beta_{16y} \text{Rivals}_{ij} + \beta_{17y} 1980s_i \\
& + \beta_{18y} 1990s_i + \beta_{19y} 2000s_i
\end{aligned} \tag{4.4}$$

4.4.4 Analysis: Dyadic model

Because T makes its decision based on its escalation costs and its beliefs about D 's type, I expect that a larger urban population in the civil war country makes

internationalized civil war more likely and interstate war less likely, while urbanization in the third party makes intervention less likely. In short, I find support for my hypothesis (for a full set of results, see Table C.11 in the appendix). Considered alongside the earlier results from the conflict-level model, these results increase my confidence in the role of escalation costs in the internationalization of civil wars.

I start by looking at *D*'s escalation costs. My main model shows a clear negative association between *Urban population in D* and the likelihood of retaliation relative to tolerating intervention. The coefficient is highly statistically significant, suggesting a robust relationship. However, as Figure 4.9 shows, past a certain point, the probability of retaliation is practically null. This is most likely a function of there not being many civil war countries in the sample with very large urban populations, but it could also suggest that highly urbanized countries are uniquely unlikely to retaliate. I also find that highly urbanized countries are less likely to keep a third party out than experience an internationalized civil war (Figure 4.10). This could mean that third parties intervene in urbanized countries because the risk of escalation is lower than in countries with more rural populations, which my theory predicts.




Figure 4.9: Urban population in *D* as predictor of interstate war.




Figure 4.10: Urban population in D as predictor of internationalized civil war.

Next, I look at T 's escalation costs. The results show that third parties with large urban populations are unlikely to intervene in civil wars (see Figure 4.11), in line with my theoretical expectations. I also find that third parties who intervene are more likely to experience retaliation than not as their urban population increases. While outside of the scope of my theory, this result implies that civil war governments are more likely to retaliate when they can impose costs on third parties. If the third party has no urban population to target, then the domestic government might deem war expansion not worth the costs.




Figure 4.11: Urban population in T as predictor of internationalized civil war.




Figure 4.12: Urban population in T as predictor of interstate war.

In sum, I find robust and consistent support for my hypothesis about the relationship between escalation costs and the decisions to intervene and retaliate. Countries with larger urban populations are more likely to attract intervention, less likely to retaliate against rebel supporters, and less likely to intervene in civil wars. These results offer broad support for how I model the decision to intervene in the theory. Third parties care about their own potential escalation costs, but also about the domestic government's escalation costs, because it shapes their beliefs about the likelihood of retaliation. Lastly, these results suggest a new way of operationalizing war costs and predicting conflict. Exist-

ing empirical models capture military strength by measuring realized and latent power, but decisions on war, and especially escalation, are also shaped by costs. Actors care about whether they can win, but also what they might lose.

4.4.5 Research design: Group-year model

I test Hypothesis 4.1.6 that predicts rebellion as a function of the opposition's escalation costs using yearly data on ethnic groups ($n = 51,883$) from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) project (Vogt et al., 2015). The data covers the period 1946 – 2017, but most of the models only cover a subsample because of limited data availability on key variables. For each observation (group-year), the dependent variable *Onset/intervention* is coded as 0 if the group did not start a civil war in that year (observations with ongoing conflict are coded as missing). If the group started a civil war in that year, per EPR's coding, the observation is coded as 1 for civil war, unless the group received external support within three years (but not the year prior) of onset. In which case, the observation is coded as 2 for internationalized civil war. I use the UCDP External support dataset to measure intervention, but the groups coded in EPR and the armed actors in UCDP are not the same. Some ethnic groups are part of multiple armed groups, and many armed groups consist of multiple ethnic groups. I code an ethnic group as receiving external support in a given year if it was part of an armed group in a year that the armed group received external support. I do not distinguish between internationalized civil wars and civil wars that expand into interstate wars, because my theory does not make direct predictions about rebel group charac-

teristics and the risk of retaliation.

Table 4.5: Cross-tabulation of civil war onset and intervention (group).

Self-excluded	Onset/intervention			Total
	Peace	Civil war	Int. civil war	
No	22321	147	75	22543
Yes	391	20	11	422
Total	22712	167	86	22965

Testing hypotheses of rebellion on the group-year level is challenging, because we do not have a lot of systematic data on groups prior to rebellion—especially for some of the parameters of my theory. EPR is perhaps the most comprehensive dataset available. It covers every known ethnic group in every country in the international system, so it defines the population of interest, and it includes many variables of interest when predicting rebellion. These variables include measures of the groups themselves, but also their political position in the country and their access to power. EPR therefore allows me to directly test hypotheses about rebellion.

EPR does not have a measure of urban population on the group-year level, but it does have a measure of total nightlight emissions in the group's territory by year. Nightlight emissions are a satellite-captured measure of the total amount of light an area (in this case polygons) emits during nighttime. It is commonly used as a proxy for development, because more developed areas have more lights on at night *ceteris paribus*, and so it should capture what the group

has to lose from the destruction of war.⁸ There are two significant limitations with this variable. First, the data is only available for a short time period (1992–2017). Second, within this period, there is a lot of missing data. Of the 16,611 observations of relevant groups in the subsample, 3,995 are coded as missing. EPR documentation does not explain why there is so much missing data, but one plausible explanation might be that many of these groups are not sufficiently concentrated to enable estimation of polygon-based measures. For instance, of those 3,995 observations with missing data, only 17 are self-excluded group-years (groups in Mexico, Serbia, Cyprus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Tajikistan). The missing observations might then not be relevant for predicting rebellion.

I specify the models of civil war and intervention with a set of covariates that should affect a group's level of development, while also predicting rebellion and/or external support. EPR distinguishes between various types of groups in terms of their access to power. I omit groups that either have a *Monopoly* on power or are *Dominant*, but for other groups that have access to central power, I include a dummy variable for whether a group is a *Junior partner*, so the base category is *Senior partner*. For excluded groups, I include dummy variables for *Regional autonomy*, *Powerless*, and *Discriminated*. These variables all affect a group's willingness and ability to rebel.

⁸Using a combination of surveys and satellite imagery, Weidmann and Schutte (2017) show that nightlight emissions are highly accurate predictors of local economic wealth.

Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics of Nightlights model.

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Self-excluded	40784	.0150059	.1215774	0	1
Nightlight total (country)	14528	569276.4	3234118	.0003502	8.37e+07
Junior partner	40784	.1867399	.3897074	0	1
Regional autonomy	35815	.2376379	.4256421	0	1
Powerless	40784	.4278148	.4947679	0	1
Discriminated	40784	.1576353	.3644032	0	1
Group size	47481	.198928	.2929014	.0001	1
Eth. rel. pop.	51879	.8595605	.2464892	0	1.007
Group portion of eth. rel. pop.	44807	.1837323	.2687046	.0001	.9988152
TEK count	51879	3.368492	6.127207	0	33
Upgraded aut. (5y)	40784	.0155698	.1238054	0	1
War history	51879	.1405578	.504902	0	7
Downgraded (5y)	40784	.0432768	.203482	0	1
Executive constraint (t-1)	45313	3.869022	2.194011	1	7
ln(Population) (t-1)	43697	16.655	1.97614	11.44133	21.02882
Urban population (t-1)	37720	19151.36	37535.44	0	240091
Population density (t-1)	40223	106.7813	366.9426	.6322086	7713.143
ln(GDP) (t-1)	39494	24.02296	2.252685	17.82862	30.30174
ln(GDPpc) (t-1)	39496	7.424591	1.455621	3.912867	11.36358
Economic growth (t-1)	39205	4.089789	7.193193	-59.69223	57.81783
CINC (t-1)	37720	.0263531	.051303	6.55e-06	.3838635
Mil. expenditure (t-1)	35873	1.24e+07	4.07e+07	0	3.22e+08
Mil. personnel (t-1)	37360	667.5157	1349.667	0	12500

Because the size of a group determines its strength in a rebellion and the likelihood of being excluded from power, I also include measures of a group's size (*Group size*, the size of the country's ethnically relevant population (*Eth. rel. pop.*), and the group's portion of the ethnically relevant population (*Group portion of eth. rel. pop.*). Groups with co-ethnics abroad are also more likely to receive external support, which can under some circumstances affect their willingness to rebel, while also making them more likely to self-exclude. I therefore include a count variable of the number of transnational co-ethnic groups (*TEK count*). Because prior shifts in autonomy can affect a group's willingness to self-

exclude, rebel, and their economic development, I include dummy variables for whether a group has had its autonomy updated in the last five years (*Upgraded aut. (5y)*) or its access to power downgraded in the last five years (*Downgraded (5y)*). I also include a count of how many wars the ethnic group has fought (*War history*).

The model does not include a covariate for the wealth or economic productivity for the group. In some instances, that is not possible to measure, because some groups are not geographically concentrated (this type of data would then be missing as a function of status as well, causing further threats to inference). But the lack of such a variable can introduce omitted variable bias, because wealth is a robust predictor of civil war and should be correlated with nightlights. In wealthier countries, the opportunity costs for rebellion are higher, so a positive association between nightlights and rebellion could be due to opportunity costs rather than escalation costs. However, the theoretical model predicts that autonomy costs is a better predictor of internationalized civil war than civil war, and nightlights should not be a predictor of intervention, because the civil war is fought over the entire local stakes. Therefore, a multinomial outcome model will distinguish between how nightlights affect rebellion in general and rebellion with expected support specifically.

I also include a set of country-year-level covariates that should be associated with my explanatory variables and the risks of civil war and intervention. A country's regime type is associated with the risk of civil war, self-determination, and development, so I include *Executive constraint* on the RHS. Furthermore,

demographic characteristics such as population size ($\ln(\text{Population})$), urbanization (*Urban population*), and population density (*Population density*) affect my dependent variable as well as self-exclusion and economic development. Economic factors also predict grievances as well as economic development, so I include $\ln(\text{GDP})$, $\ln(\text{GDPpc})$, and *Economic growth* on the RHS. Lastly, opposition groups' willingness to rebel and their likelihood of self-excluding depend on the central government's military strength, so I include measures of the country's *CINC* score, military expenditure (*Mil. expenditure*), and the number of troops (*Mil. personnel*). All country-level covariates are lagged one year.

Because the risk of civil war is a function of time at peace, I employ the time-cubed procedure from Carter and Signorino (2010) to account for the non-monotonic hazard function. To account for unit heteroskedasticity, all standard errors are cluster-robust on countries. The linear component of the empirical model is therefore:

$$\begin{aligned}
\eta_{ijty} = & \alpha_y + \beta_{1y}\text{Nightlight total}_{it} + \beta_{2y}\text{Self-excluded}_{it} + \beta_{3y}\text{Junior partner}_{it} \\
& + \beta_{4y}\text{Regional autonomy}_{it} + \beta_{5y}\text{Powerless}_{it} + \beta_{6y}\text{Discriminated}_{it} \\
& + \beta_{7y}\text{Group size}_{it} + \beta_{8y}\text{Eth. rel. pop.}_{jt} \\
& + \beta_{9y}\text{Group portion of eth. rel. pop.}_{it} + \beta_{10y}\text{TEK count}_{it} \\
& + \beta_{11y}\text{Upgraded aut. (5y)}_{it} + \beta_{12y}\text{War history}_{it} + \beta_{13y}\text{Downgraded (5y)}_{it} \\
& + \beta_{14y}\text{Executive constraint}_{j,t-1} + \beta_{15y}\ln(\text{Population})_{j,t-1} \\
& + \beta_{16y}\text{Urban population}_{j,t-1} + \beta_{17y}\text{Population density}_{j,t-1} \\
& + \beta_{18y}\ln(\text{GDP})_{j,t-1} + \beta_{19y}\ln(\text{GDPpc})_{j,t-1} + \beta_{20y}\text{Economic growth}_{j,t-1} \\
& + \beta_{21y}\text{CINC}_{j,t-1} + \beta_{22y}\text{Mil. expenditure}_{j,t-1} + \beta_{23y}\text{Mil. personnel}_{j,t-1} \\
& + \beta_{24y}\text{Peace}_{it} + \beta_{25y}\text{Peace}_{it}^2 + \beta_{26y}\text{Peace}_{it}^3,
\end{aligned} \tag{4.5}$$

where i indicates ethnic group, j indexes country, and t is year.

4.4.6 Analysis: Escalation costs (group-year model)

My theory shows that the opposition's decision to rebel or not may be increasing or decreasing in escalation costs, depending on whether it deters R more than D . Similar to the dyadic models of escalation and retaliation above, I use nightlights to parse out the opposition's distinct escalation costs, expecting that increases in nightlights are negatively associated with the risk of rebellion (Hypothesis 4.1.6). Furthermore, if the opposition knows intervention is coming, there should be a stronger negative relationship between escalation costs and internationalized

civil war than escalation costs and local-only civil war.

Table 4.7: Nightlights (e) as predictor of civil war onset and intervention

	Civil war	Int. civil war
Nightlight total (country)	-0.00000912* (-2.30)	-0.00000767** (-2.64)
Observations	3636	

t statistics in parentheses. Covariates omitted. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

I find that the likelihood of rebellion is decreasing in nightlight totals, and the coefficients are statistically significant (see Table 4.7, or Table C.12 in the appendix for full results). However, I find no evidence of nightlights making local-only civil wars more or less likely than internationalized civil wars. As Figures 4.13 and 4.14 show, the relationships between nightlight and the two outcomes are strikingly similar in shape and magnitude.




Figure 4.13: Nightlights and rebellion without intervention.




Figure 4.14: Nightlights and rebellion with intervention.

There are several potential explanations for these partial results. Nightlights might simply be capturing the opposition's potential war costs, rather than costs specific to escalation. If so, the model would not be able to distinguish between local-only and internationalized civil wars as a function of nightlight totals. The results might also be a function of missing data. The sample appears to disproportionately omit non-self-excluded groups because of lack of geographic concentration. The groups (and years) in the sample could be more sensitive to war costs because of geographic concentration, but also relatively less sensitive to escalation costs if they have territory near borders. For instance, a self-

excluded group with a large, developed city near a third party would be vulnerable to government offensives, but the distinction between fighting a local-only civil war and an interstate war might be less than for more geographically dispersed groups.

4.5 Autonomy costs and rebellion

Third-party intervention can help rebels win, but external support also comes at a cost. The theory predicts that as rebels' autonomy costs go up, the likelihood of rebellion goes down (Hypothesis 4.1.7). Furthermore, because rebels can anticipate intervention, we should observe more civil wars with intervention than without intervention as autonomy costs go down (Hypothesis 4.1.8).

In this section I test these hypotheses using ethnic group-year level data to predict rebellion with or without rebel-sided intervention. I use a measure of group self-exclusion as a proxy for groups with low autonomy costs. They should therefore be more willing to rebel than others because, and they should be more likely to end up in an internationalized civil war than a local-only civil war. My empirical models show support for the former relationship but not the latter. The partial results could be a product of trends in self-excluded group; since the end of the Cold War, the number of these groups have risen substantially.

4.5.1 Research design: Self-exclusion

To test my hypotheses about the relationship between autonomy costs and rebellion and intervention, I use multinomial logit to estimate a model of peace (0), civil war (1), and civil war with rebel-sided intervention (2). The unit of analysis is ethnic-group year, with data from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset. While this research design excludes non-ethnic groups, EPR offers systematic data on groups' status and access to power, which allows for a more direct test of these hypotheses than a country-year or conflict-level research design would.

A group-year research design is particularly useful for testing the relationship between autonomy costs and rebellion, because measuring *ex ante* a group's level of institutionalization or local support is difficult. Rebel groups often do not reveal themselves until after fighting starts, and the sample for data on rebel groups is defined by those that decided to fight, rather than all those that could fight. EPR distinguishes between four types of groups excluded from central power (*Regional autonomy*, *Self-excluded*, *Powerless*, and *Discrimination*), and one of these is more likely to inhabit these characteristics than the rest: self-excluded groups. Whereas regional autonomy groups have some influence at the substate level, self-excluded groups have declared their territory to be independent from the central government. Unlike regional autonomy groups, self-excluded groups have often chosen to exclude themselves from central power (Cederman et al., 2010, p. 100), and so they should be better able to withstand external domination. I therefore use a dummy variable for self-exclusion as a proxy for whether a group has low autonomy costs.

Table 4.8: Cross-tabulation of civil war onset and intervention (group).

Self-excluded	Peace	Onset/intervention		Total
		Civil war	Int. civil war	
No	22321	147	75	22543
Yes	391	20	11	422
Total	22712	167	86	22965

In the sample (without ongoing conflicts), 1.8% were self-excluded group years (Table 4.8). Rebellion is quite rare, but over a third of the civil wars started by a self-excluded group resulted in external support. There was also a significant increase in the supply of self-excluded groups after the end of the Cold War, as Figure 4.15 shows.




Figure 4.15: Group rebellion and external support.

The empirical model for rebellion and self-exclusion is identical to the nightlights model, except that it omits *Nightlights total*. The characteristics of the ethnic group, its access to power, and the characteristics of the state and country should all affect a group's decision to self-exclude or not. Therefore, the linear component of the model is defined as:

$$\begin{aligned}
\eta_{ijty} = & \alpha_y + \beta_{1y}\text{Self-excluded}_{it} + \beta_{2y}\text{Junior partner}_{it} + \beta_{3y}\text{Regional autonomy}_{it} \\
& + \beta_{4y}\text{Powerless}_{it} + \beta_{5y}\text{Discriminated}_{it} + \beta_{6y}\text{Group size}_{it} \\
& + \beta_{7y}\text{Eth. rel. pop.}_{jt} + \beta_{8y}\text{Group portion of eth. rel. pop.}_{it} \\
& + \beta_{9y}\text{TEK count}_{it} + \beta_{10y}\text{Upgraded aut. (5y)}_{it} + \beta_{11y}\text{War history}_{it} \\
& + \beta_{12y}\text{Downgraded (5y)}_{it} + \beta_{13y}\text{Executive constraint}_{j,t-1} \\
& + \beta_{14y}\ln(\text{Population})_{j,t-1} + \beta_{15y}\text{Urban population}_{j,t-1} \\
& + \beta_{16y}\text{Population density}_{j,t-1} + \beta_{17y}\ln(\text{GDP})_{j,t-1} + \beta_{18y}\ln(\text{GDPpc})_{j,t-1} \\
& + \beta_{19y}\text{Economic growth}_{j,t-1} + \beta_{20y}\text{CINC}_{j,t-1} + \beta_{21y}\text{Mil. expenditure}_{j,t-1} \\
& + \beta_{22y}\text{Mil. personnel}_{j,t-1} + \beta_{23y}\text{Peace}_{it} + \beta_{24y}\text{Peace}_{it}^2 + \beta_{25y}\text{Peace}_{it}^3,
\end{aligned} \tag{4.6}$$

where i indicates ethnic group, j indexes country, and t is year.

4.5.2 Analysis: Self-exclusion

My theory predicts that opposition groups overall become more likely to rebel the lower their autonomy costs. But because opposition groups only pay autonomy costs if they receive external support (and win), we should expect to see a stronger (and negative) relationship between autonomy costs and internationalized civil war than between autonomy costs and local-only civil wars. I estimate multinomial logit models of civil war and internationalized civil war using self-exclusion as a proxy for low autonomy costs. I find partial support for my hypothesis.

I start by estimating the main model on the whole sample (for the full regression results, see Table C.13 in the appendix), first without country-level covariates and then with those additional covariates. Overall, self-excluded groups are more likely to rebel than other groups, and the results are statistically significant. Furthermore, once I include country-level covariates, self-excluded groups are more likely end up in an internationalized civil war ($p = 3.1\%$) than other groups, and more likely to end up in a civil war ($p = 1.78\%$) than other groups, but because the confidence intervals for the two estimates overlap, I cannot conclude whether there is any statistically significant difference between self-exclusion and the two outcomes.




Figure 4.16: Self-exclusion and rebellion and intervention.

As noted above, the number of self-excluded groups rose substantially after the end of the Cold War. We might expect a clearer relationship between self-exclusion and intervention in this period, because self-excluded groups became more common and so states in general might have become more willing to support those groups. I therefore estimate the main model on the post-1991 sample, and the results are quite different (see Figure 4.16 and Table C.14 in the appendix). There is no statistically significant relationship between self-exclusion and local-only civil war relative to peace, but self-excluded groups are significantly more likely to end up in an internationalized civil war relative to local-only

civil war or no war.

These results could indicate that the demand for support went up as more groups self-excluded. Groups might observe other groups receiving support, which in turn encourages them to seek out help too. If these groups can anticipate support, we should expect to see groups with low autonomy costs more likely to rebel if third-party support is coming, but not necessarily if help is not coming. In other words, as demand for help goes up, we should see a clearer relationship between low autonomy costs and observed rebellion with intervention. This pattern could also be a product of the end of the Cold War. The establishment of new states and rise in nationalism made self-exclusion as a political strategy more viable, so third parties became more willing to support them as well.

4.6 Conclusion

In this chapter I have introduced a novel dataset of civil war expansions and presented the results of several empirical models of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation. I tested several hypotheses about the relationship between these outcomes and key parameters of my theoretical model, and I found partial or broad support for several of them.

The results show that:

- Third parties are more likely to intervene in civil wars with larger economies (larger local stakes), but the relationship is conditional on uncertainty about

the domestic government. Larger local stakes and intervention have the strongest relationship right after a leader transition, and then the relationship diminishes over time.

- Civil war governments with larger urban populations (escalation costs) are more likely to attract intervention and less likely to retaliate. Similarly, third parties with urban larger urban populations (escalation costs) are less likely to intervene than stay out of a civil war. Opposition groups with higher levels of development (escalation costs) are also less likely to rebel.
- Opposition groups that are self-excluded (low autonomy costs) are more likely to rebel than those that are not.

Third parties and rebels make decisions on intervention and rebellion based on the costs and benefits of fighting, rather than just the probability of victory. Countries with larger economies should be able to deter intervention, but as I show, those make for attractive targets. Similarly, urbanization is a correlate of economic development and prosperity, but it leaves countries vulnerable to intervention and retaliation. One implication of these empirical patterns is that in order to understand how civil wars and interstate war intersect, we have to account for how preferences over the costly maintenance and revision of political order interact. To do that, we have to model what actors gain and risk from fighting.

While the results offer support for my hypotheses, there are several limitations in the data and research designs. Some variables are crude proxies for

their theoretical equivalent (e.g. GDP ratio), while others suffer from systematically missing data (e.g. nightlights). Future research should therefore be focused on better and more comprehensive measures.

Chapter 5

The International Dimensions of the Afghan Civil War

5.1 Introduction

In the fall of 1991, as the Soviet Union was dissolving, the United States and its Cold War rival finally signed an agreement to end all external support for the warring parties in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union would stop propping up the regime in Kabul, and the United States would cut off aid to the Mujahideen. What had started out as a peasant revolt in 1978 had ballooned into a long and violent internationalized civil war. The local costs, in lives and material destruction, were devastating. Others paid a price, too. The war claimed thousands of Soviet lives during the occupation of Afghanistan, and it caused an international backlash against a declining Soviet empire. For Pakistan, which delivered arms on behalf of the United States to the Afghan rebels, the Soviet Union shelled border posts, provided arms to Baluch rebels, and twice, unsuccessfully, attempted to shoot

down President Zia ul-Haq's airplane. How did this come to be? Why did a local dispute in the Soviet sphere of influence escalate into a protracted conflict between two superpowers and several regional actors that risked expanding into a general war?

In this chapter, I evaluate the usefulness of my formal model of civil war onset, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation by examining the Afghan Civil War. The model predicts that civil wars expand into interstate wars when the rebels and the third party underestimate the domestic government's resolve for fighting. Furthermore, interstate war becomes more likely when the domestic government has much gain from raising the stakes of the conflict by expanding the conflict, the third party has strong affinity for the rebels, and the rebels do not lose too much autonomy when they receive external support.

The conflict is relevant to my theory for two reasons. First, the interveners, primarily Pakistan and the United States, were concerned about the threat of Soviet retaliation against Pakistan, which impacted their decisions on support for the Mujahideen. Second, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 changed both the local and international dynamics of the conflict, which gives me analytical leverage for some of the key parameters of interest, including the relative size of the local stakes and the third parties' affinity for the rebels.

I split the analysis into two parts, because the conflict had two distinct phases. The first phase started in 1978 with an uprising in the countryside. The conflict eventually spread and escalated into a civil war, which in turn drew in several regional actors that provided support to the rebels, such as Pakistan, or

Table 5.1: The phases of and relevant actors in the Afghan Civil War.

	Phase 1 (1978-1979)	Phase 2 (1979-1989)
Domestic government:	Afghan government	Afghan government Soviet occupier
Third-party intervener:	Pakistan	Pakistan United States Saudi Arabia

support for the government in Kabul, primarily the Soviet Union. Despite numerous interveners and rebel advances, the conflict did not spread outside Afghanistan during this phase.

The Soviet invasion in December 1979 marked the beginning of the second phase of the conflict, where the Kabul government and the Soviet occupying force together constituted the domestic government.¹ There were also significant changes on the intervener side. Shortly after Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, the United States formed an intervention coalition along with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to provide extensive material support for the Afghan rebels. Over the next nine years, this coalition would increase its support. The Soviet Union would sometimes threaten to retaliate against Pakistan, and sometimes it would directly strike at Pakistani targets from the Afghan side of the border. The specter of a Soviet invasion hung over U.S. and Pakistani decision-making, even though the civil war never expanded into an interstate war.

The conflict raises several questions. First, if Pakistan was worried about

¹The invasion was a government-sided intervention, so it is exogenous to the model.

Soviet retaliation, why did it form an intervention coalition with the United States and escalate its involvement in the conflict? And given the extent of the rebel support, why did the Soviet Union only retaliate modestly? Typically, explanations for conflicts would consider these decisions as products of the distribution of military power. But if balance of power alone dictated decisions on intervention and retaliation, we should expect to see neither intervention nor retaliation in the second phase of the conflict. If Pakistan made its decision to intervene solely on the basis of the balance of power, the Soviet military presence should have been able to deter intervention, so there would have been no retaliation either. However, Pakistan and its partners did intervene and there was some limited retaliation.

The formal model of this dissertation offers an explanation for why. Following a 1978 coup, the new communist regime in Kabul pursued agricultural reforms that prompted a rural uprising. While the rebels were uncertain of the new government's resolve, they had friendly neighbors, particularly in Pakistan, that could offer support in the event of a civil war. The conflict became an internationalized civil war, with rebel-sided support but only limited retaliation, due to two factors.

First, the size of the stakes in Afghanistan determined the domestic government's willingness to retaliate against a third party and the third parties' willingness to intervene. Before the Soviet invasion, the stakes of the war were relatively small, but it attracted rebel-sided intervention because the Afghan military was not strong enough to pose a credible threat of retaliation to deter its

neighbors. These third parties, and particularly Pakistan, could intervene with few costs. In the second phase, the Soviet occupation strengthened the domestic government, but also raised the stakes of the civil war. While uncertain about the risks of retaliation, Afghanistan became much more valuable to the United States because of the Soviet occupation.² Rebel victory meant potentially inflicting a humiliating defeat on a rival, so the United States partnered with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to form an intervention coalition, which also lowered the costs of intervention. Furthermore, the Soviet Union had little immediate strategic interest in defeating Pakistan, so the size of the local stakes (Afghanistan) relative to the international stakes (Pakistan) increased so much that the threat of retaliation by Kabul and the Soviets against Pakistan lessened. In other words, the Soviets valued Afghanistan more relative to defeating Pakistan so that the threat of retaliation was deemed incredible. The explanations for intervention and non-retaliation are therefore intertwined: the Soviets could defeat Pakistan, but they were deeply invested in Afghanistan and fighting the neighbor directly was not worthwhile, so the benefits of intervening to the United States and Pakistan increased without substantially increasing the costs of doing so.

Second, the Afghan Civil War became international because the rebels preferred external support to fighting alone. Rebel preferences about external support depend on how much autonomy they lose in exchange for help. The Mujahideen lacked formal institutions, but had local support and were organized

²In modeling terms, the Soviet invasion increased the relative size of the local stakes (π), increasing the potential benefits of rebel victory and thus the utility of helping the rebels.

at the tribal level, so they could withstand external domination. Any autonomy costs were also ameliorated by their shared ideologies and political goals with the Pakistani military, as well as the support of co-ethnics on the Pakistani side of the border, particularly in what was formerly known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in northwestern Pakistan. Because Pakistan was running the operation, the introduction of the United States as a supporter did not affect their autonomy costs, despite the lack of a shared ideology between the superpower and the Afghan rebels.

The war in Afghanistan illustrates the relevance of my broader argument, and demonstrates the usefulness of the formal model. The warring parties weighed the costs and benefits of fighting, which includes political as well as military variables. The third parties cared about the rebels' chances of winning, but they were also concerned with the uncertain threat of retaliation (what they could lose) and the stakes of the conflict (what they could win). More broadly, the war illustrates the international dimension of these conflicts. While the rebellion started as a peasant revolt, it started and evolved in the shadow of intervention. Purely domestic theories of conflict would miss the key features of the conflict.

5.2 Methodological Approach

The purpose of this chapter is to use the case study as an empirical existence proof that demonstrates the empirical relevance of the model (Goertz, 2017, p. 178). Combining case studies and formal theory necessitates specific procedures

(Goemans and Spaniel, 2016). I treat each equilibrium of the model as a distinct causal mechanism. I treat the actors, their actions, and beliefs as fixed, but their payoffs as changing, depending on the values of the explanatory variables. That means that when I consider one actor's decision, I consider the potential costs and benefits of the chosen action, holding everything else constant, relative to any other option(s). For instance, if the third party intervenes instead of staying out, then I have to evaluate whether the values of the relevant parameters conform to the constraints of the equilibrium on intervention. Cut-points for decisions are deterministic and they should be considered in their entirety, because actors have to weigh all kinds of factors when making such decisions. However, because these cut-points include multiple parameters, I must first consider each parameter separately before evaluating them together.

5.2.1 Case Selection

The Afghan Civil War has several features that facilitates analysis and makes it useful for evaluating the theoretical model. Besides it being a historically important war involving two superpowers, it provides variation over time and across actors. There were multiple interveners supporting the rebels, which provides some analytical leverage for variation in escalation costs in particular. Furthermore, the war experienced a significant shift in the local stakes when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.³ The Soviet decision to intervene came suddenly

³Spaniel and Poznansky (2018) show how one can leverage exogenous shocks to parameters in a single case to evaluate a formal model.

and changed the value of several key parameters, which allows me to divide the war into two phases, or cases: pre- and post-invasion. In essence, I am doing a comparative case study of one conflict separated by the actions of another actor not included in the formal model. In chapter 4 I discussed some evidence for government support increasing the risk of rebel-sided intervention, but the research design and the lack of variation in the explanatory variable made it difficult to draw conclusions about the relationship.

A historical case such as this allows me to trace the causal links, but because the Soviet invasion was not strictly an exogenous event, the bifurcation of the conflict into two cases poses some challenges to the analysis. The primary concern is that the Soviet invasion and the subsequent changes in behavior by the third parties, primarily the United States and Pakistan, and the Mujahideen, to a lesser extent, occurred due to some other, spurious reason. As I discuss later in the chapter, the decision by the third parties to form an intervention coalition was a direct response to the Soviet invasion, not due to other factors. Furthermore, the United States did not try and lure the Soviets into a quagmire in Afghanistan, contra prevailing myths about U.S. policy under Carter (Tobin, 2020). The variation over time therefore allows me to answer several questions about the conflict. I want to explain why the rebels challenged the Kabul government initially; why conflict attracted third-party intervention, especially after the Soviet invasion; and why we saw only limited retaliation, and only in the second phase.

However, in order to evaluate the usefulness of the formal model by ex-

amining the Afghan Civil War, the latter must correspond with the former in certain key ways. First, the structure of the interaction between the actors in the war must be similar to the structure of the model. As I show below, the Afghan Civil War started locally, with peasants taking up arms against the Afghan government, following the implementation of disastrous policies. It did not start because of external intervention or in the shadow of an interstate dispute. Only after the fighting started did several third parties, notably Pakistan, start supporting the rebels. And post-invasion, the Soviet forces conducted some offensive military operations against Pakistan in response to their intervention.

Second, the facts of the case must be similar to the parameter values of the relevant equilibrium. Before the Soviet invasion, the local stakes (i.e. Afghanistan) were relatively low compared to the international stakes (i.e. Pakistan), but the Kabul government was militarily outmatched by Pakistan, and so retaliation seemed unlikely. While the Soviet invasion made Kabul stronger, it also raised the value of winning Afghanistan relative to defeating Pakistan.⁴ From the perspective of the rebels, external support came with some costs, but local support and tribal structures meant the groups could withstand any outside domination. The fact that many groups shared the political goals and religious beliefs of the Pakistani military only strengthened the benefits of support. As I discuss in chapter 3, autonomy costs and affinity can interact. Rebels might be less sensitive to external

⁴I focus on the stakes in Afghanistan versus Pakistan, because the risk of any direct conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union resulting from the war in Afghanistan was negligible. The coalition partners thus care about the security of Pakistan relative to the prize of winning in Afghanistan, while the Soviets and Kabul cared about the outcome of winning in Afghanistan relative to defeating Pakistan.

Table 5.2: Parameter values in the phases of the Afghan Civil War.

	Phase 1 (1978-1979)	Phase 2 (1979-1989)
Local stakes:	Moderate	High
Affinity:	High	High/Moderate
Rebel autonomy costs	Moderate	Moderate
Third-party escalation costs	Low	High

domination if they are politically aligned with the third party, and this appears to be the case in the Afghan Civil War. Third parties, on the other hand, might prefer to support rebels with higher autonomy costs because they can dictate policy terms. That might have happened, particularly with the formation of the rebel alliance in 1984, but the primary motivation for Pakistan was ideological and religious alignment, whereas U.S. support was more pragmatic in nature.

Third, the choices and dilemmas facing the decision-makers in the war must bear resemblance to the formalized choices of the model, particularly as they pertain to beliefs about the consequences of their actions and potential alternatives (i.e. counter-factuals). The model assumes that civil wars start because the sitting government rejects a challenge from the opposition and fights, and 2) the opposition is uncertain about the government's willingness to fight. These assumptions imply a counterfactual: if the opposition knew about the government's costs of fighting, it would only challenge when the government would certainly acquiesce. Furthermore, the third party would only be willing to intervene if retaliation would certainly not occur. I argue in this section that the Afghan Civil War fits the criteria of the model, and the model thus offers a plau-

sible explanation for why war happened. Furthermore, for the actors where we do have primary sources, we see that the model maps on to their choices well. The United States and Pakistan based their decisions on beliefs about the risk of retaliation by the Soviet Union against Pakistan. They chose the level of intervention in an effort to minimize this risk, and ultimately chose to escalate their involvement when it became clear the Kremlin did not have the appetite for war expansion.

5.2.2 Results and Expectations

Before starting the analysis, it is pertinent to summarize the formal model and the results most relevant to the case. As shown in Figure 5.1, the model starts with the rebels challenging the domestic government for power; if the government rejects and starts a civil war, the third party decides whether intervene or not; and if it intervenes, the domestic government decides whether to retaliate against the third party and start an interstate war, or tolerate the intervention. The rebels are uncertain whether the domestic government will accept or reject the initial challenge, and the third party does not know if the domestic government will retaliate given an intervention.

There are several results relevant to the Afghan Civil War. First, interstate war occurs when there is much to gain from war expansion for the domestic government, which third parties consider when deciding whether to intervene. Specifically, the more valuable what the third party controls (i.e. international stakes) is relative to what the domestic government controls (i.e. the local




Figure 5.1: Civil war in Afghanistan (AFG) with the Soviet Union (USSR), the United States (USA), and Pakistan (P).

stakes), the more the domestic government has to gain from starting an interstate war. So anything that would make the Afghan conflict more valuable relative to the third parties' territories, would make intervention more likely, but retaliation less likely (Result 3.3.2). In the first phase, I have to consider how much did the Afghan government have to gain by defeating Pakistan, and how costly would it would be to fight an interstate war (i.e. escalation costs). In the second phase, I have to consider the Soviets' corresponding incentives for war expansion, and how the risk of retaliation affected the cost-and-benefits calculus of the third parties.

Second, if intervention is coming, the rebels' willingness to challenge is decreasing in their autonomy costs (Result 3.3.4). I therefore have to consider whether the Mujahideen were susceptible to domination by external supporters, because if so, that should make them reluctant to fight in the first place. Third, per Proposition 2, a third party has to have sufficiently high affinity for the rebels in order to intervene. Pakistan is the most relevant third party here because it was in charge of supplying the arms and funds directly to the rebels, so I have to consider whether and how overarching political and ideological preferences shaped the decision to intervene. Lastly, if the third party can set the level of intervention, it will choose a higher level of support when doing so does not escalate its involvement too much (Result 3.3.16). Marginal increases help the rebels more than they increase the risk of retaliation, whereas increases that are too large increase the risk of retaliation more than it helps the rebels. Any endogenous changes in the level of support for the Mujahideen should therefore

be a function of the relationship between the threat of retaliation and the particular technology of support available. In this chapter, I therefore examine the decisions of Pakistan and the United States to intervene and of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union to retaliate by focusing on four key parameters: the relative size of the local stakes, the rebels' autonomy costs, the third parties' affinity for the rebels, and the actors' escalation costs.

5.3 Explaining the Afghan Civil War

In this section I apply the formal model to explain the origins and development of the Afghan Civil War. I start with the origins of the conflict and the Afghan resistance to give context. I then discuss the first phase of the Afghan Civil War, beginning with the initial outbreak of civil war and ending with the Soviet invasion in December 1979. This phase provides a baseline for the key parameters of interest. Next, I analyze the second phase, discussing how the Soviet occupation affected Pakistan's and the United States' decisions to intervene, particularly in light of the risk of retaliation.

5.3.1 Origins

Although the Afghan conflict grew into this large, internationalized civil war, the origins of the conflict lie in deepening political and social divisions within Afghan society. Amin (1984, pp. 375-376) argues the Afghan resistance movement dates back to the politics of the constitutional period of 1963-1973 in Afghanistan,

when modernization spurred conflict between several groups, including leftists and the fundamentalists. After the successful overthrow of the Shah in 1973 by Prince Mohammed Daoud Khan, the conflict between the leftist government and the fundamentalists intensified, spurred by government attacks against the fundamentalists, and in 1975 it escalated into an insurgency.

Pakistan started supporting the fundamentalist groups, including training about 5000 Afghan rebels in Peshawar. It did so for two reasons. First, it wanted to prevent Daoud from pursuing a policy of Pashtun reunification, which would include parts of Pakistan. Second, it wanted Daoud to support Islamabad's stance on the Durand line. The fundamentalist groups were split on fighting. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hizb-i-Islami, which is still active today, actively sought out Pakistani support in 1975, while Burhanuddin Rabbani, who went on to become president of Afghanistan, and his group Jamiat-e Islami did not think the time was right for an armed conflict (Amin, 1984, pp. 384-385).

The insurgency was short-lived. It never spread to a popular revolt, in part because the resistance groups could not persuade the larger population that the government in Kabul was run by communists (Amin, 1984, p. 378). Furthermore, Daoud recognized the threat posed by the fundamentalists and their external supporters, so in 1976 he reached an agreement with Pakistan as well as Iran that included acceptance of the Durand Line and mutual non-intervention into each other's domestic affairs (Amin, 1984, pp. 378-379).

The prelude to the Afghan Civil War suggests the country had potential for a broader conflict. The government was in conflict with large parts of the

population, and the 1975 insurgency gave the fundamentalists experience fighting and formed expectations about external support. Finally, the key lever of war and peace was the government, and Afghanistan's political instability would three years later precipitate a much broader conflict.

5.3.2 Phase 1: 1978-1979

The civil war in 1978 started as a peasant revolt. In April of that year, the communist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power after the ouster of Daoud. Following the coup, the PDPA instituted a wide range of agricultural reforms, and due to a set of existing economic, cultural, and political factors, these reforms caused widespread discontent, which in turn triggered rebellion in the countryside (Gibbs, 1986). One particular source of tension between the center and the periphery was the implementation of the reform, which disrupted local structures and ignored existing relationship between peasants and landlords (Halliday, 1980, p. 24) The PDPA was ill-prepared for implementing these reforms and they lacked a political strategy for including the peasantry in its coalition (Gibbs, 1986). As the upper class was fading, this left a power vacuum, which the fundamentalist then filled.

While the insurgency in 1975 was limited, 1978 saw a spontaneous and widespread resistance (Amin, 1984, p. 380). Parts of the rebellion was unorganized, and drew on primordial loyalties such as family and tribe. The unorganized part of the rebellion counted 200 or more small, local groups. The organized part, which would eventually form the basis of the Mujahideen, consisted

of fundamentalist groups from the Daoud era, as well as traditionalists formed after the 1978 coup. The former sought the establishment of a theocracy, while the latter drew support from the dominant classes such as conservative religious elite, tribal chiefs, and landlords, and wanted the old status quo restored (Amin, 1984, pp. 382-384). As such, it was a broad but disparate rebellion.

The conflict did not stay local for long. Soviet sources suggest the first Mujahideen training camp in Pakistan was established in May or June 1978, and Muslim-led rebellion had spread to most parts of Afghanistan by the winter of 1978/79 (Mitrokhin, 2002). Additionally, the Carter administration approved the supply of non-lethal aid from the United States to the Mujahideen in the summer of 1979 (Gates, 1996, pp. 131-146). It is unclear whether local Afghan groups anticipated this external intervention, but the fighting appears to have spread in conjunction with external support.

Hardliners in Kabul

During this first phase, there is no evidence of notable retaliation or expansion of fighting beyond Afghanistan. Instead, the Afghan government and military were focused on defeating the rebellion and keeping control over the country. The Soviet leadership followed developments and provided aid to shore up the Kabul regime. Aid consisted of Soviet military advisors and lethal aid, and it was based on the assumption that the Afghan army itself would defeat the rebels. However, the rebellion was growing, and the leadership in Kabul kept pursuing policies that were detrimental to the war effort.

These concerns are reflected in Soviet documents during the uprising and mutiny of Afghan army troops in Herat in March 1979. The rebels held the town for a week, before finally being defeated in a bloody military operation. It was arguably the most significant event in the early stages of the civil war, and the transcript of a Politburo meeting on March 17th, in the middle of the uprising, illustrates Soviet thinking at the time.⁵ Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko worried that the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated sharply, in part due to insurgents infiltrating from Pakistan. Furthermore, Premier Alexei Kosygin blamed Afghan leaders Nur Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin, who both belonged to the Khalq faction, for purging the government of their Parcham partners: "they have continued to execute people that do not agree with them; they have killed almost all of the leaders - not only the top leaders, but also those of the middle ranks - of the "Parcham" party."⁶

As the conflict worsened throughout the year, the situation within the government became increasingly dire. Moscow appealed to Amin and Taraki to be more inclusive, but the Afghan leadership continued to pursue a hard line against the rebels, and Amin consolidated power at the expense of his rivals, especially Taraki.⁷ The Soviet leadership held back some military aid as a signal to

⁵"Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan," March 17, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 25 dok.1, ll. 1, 12-25. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113260>.

⁶Ibid.

⁷"Record of Conversation between L.I. Brezhnev and N.M. Taraki, 20 March 1979," March 20, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 14, Dok. 25 [cited by Archive-Information Bulletin, 1993 as RGANI, op. 14, d. 25, ll. 8, copy, special file, CC]. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111282>; "CPSU CC Politburo Deci-

Kabul to curb the purges, but it does not appear to have had much restraining effect.⁸

Despite the deteriorating situation, the Soviet leadership was concerned about the risks of direct intervention in Afghanistan. During the March 17th Politburo meeting, Gromyko worried that a direct intervention would endanger detente with the United States. Taraki and Amin repeatedly asked for Soviet troops to assist with the war, but were rebuffed by a wary Politburo. During a meeting on August 25th between the Soviets and the Afghans, Amin was explicitly told that more Soviet troops might trigger increases U.S. assistance for the rebels.⁹ The international implications and costs of the Afghan conflict would remain a theme of Soviet decision-making throughout the war.

Assessing the model in Phase 1

These documents suggest that the civil war could have been avoided, in line with the counter-factual of the formal model. While there is little direct evidence of the rebels' decision-making, we know the situation facing the opposition, par-

sions on Afghanistan (excerpts)," September 13, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRE, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. Westad, Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by D. Rozas. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111561>.

⁸"CPSU CC Politburo Decision with report by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Tsvigun," September 15, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRE, f. 3, op. 82, d. 173, ll. 72-75 <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111565>.

⁹"Report from Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Army Gen. Ivan Pavlovskii, during visit to Afghanistan," August 25, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, As cited in Znamya, no. 4, 1991, from the Archives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111559>.

ticularly in the countryside, in 1978 and 179. The PDPA had recently come to power and quickly pursued unpopular policies. The opposition was faced with a choice between accepting a new and costly status quo or challenge a hardline government. Given that many of the Afghan tribes outside of Kabul had ethnic and religious brethren across the border in Pakistan, it is plausible they might have thought it was worth rolling the die, especially if they thought the PDPA were bluffing.

Consider again the equilibrium constraints for *Proposition 2*. R challenges when fighting is sufficiently cheap ($c_R^\circ > c_R$) and it is sufficiently optimistic that D is of a type that will acquiesce ($\bar{c}_D > p_D^{ICW} \pi = \bar{c}_D^{IW}$). Given that the local stakes were relatively low, and Pakistan could provide direct support, it is likely that the Afghan opposition was optimistic about its chances. Furthermore, external support would come with some autonomy costs, and while the rebels lacked formal institutions, they had local support and were often organized on the tribal level, which should have enabled them to withstand outside domination. Furthermore, those groups with prior experience, such as Hizb-i-Islami, had both expectations of support based on the 1975 insurgency, and the organization to fight independently.

The intervention and lack of retaliation also fit the predictions of the formal model. The model predicts that increased affinity for the rebels makes intervention more likely:

$$b > \frac{c_T(c_D^\ddagger(1-e) - c_D^\circ) + c_D^\ddagger(\pi - p_D^{IW} - p_R^{IW})}{(p_D^{ICW} - 1)\pi(c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger)} = b^\circ. \quad (5.1)$$

The strong ethnic and religious ties between the Pakistani government (and military) suggest that it had a strong interest in the Mujahideen winning the civil war and was thus willing to carry the costs of intervention to help make that happen. A credible threat of retaliation could have deterred Pakistan from intervening. While Afghanistan had much to gain from defeating Pakistan, it was militarily weaker. In 1979, Pakistan spent roughly 22 times as much on its military as Afghanistan did, and had more than six times as many military personnel, so Afghanistan did not have a credible threat of retaliation.¹⁰

5.3.3 Phase 2: 1979-1989

The civil war in Afghanistan changed fundamentally in late 1979. On December 24, Soviet forces crossed the northern border into Afghanistan, and three days later, Soviet forces stormed the presidential palace in Kabul and assassinated President Amin. Shortly thereafter the occupying power installed Babrak Kamal as successor, transforming the domestic government in Afghanistan into a puppet regime propped up by an initial force of 30,000 Soviet troops. While the Kabul government had for months requested Soviet military support to fight the rebellion, the Politburo decided quickly, and quietly, in December to take control

¹⁰These numbers are from version 5 of the National Military Capabilities dataset. See: Singer et al. (1972).

over the government rather than simply provide military support.¹¹ By then, the rebels controlled 23 out of 28 Afghan provinces (Amin, 1984, p. 380).

The turning point in Moscow appears to be concerns about Amin. In November, Moscow became concerned that Amin was planning to do a "Saddat" and turn towards the West (Westad, 1997). Furthermore, the situation in Afghanistan had deteriorated by the time of the invasion. Taraki was deposed and then ordered killed by Amin in September, which damaged the government's stability and cohesion. These developments were troubling to the Politburo because they were worried about foreign actors gaining a foothold right on the Soviet Union's southern border.¹² Together, these factors suggested that Amin was turning into a weak and unreliable partner, necessitating intervention.¹³

¹¹For details on the decision, see: "Alexander Lyakhovskiy's Account of the Decision of the CC CPSU Decision to Send Troops to Afghanistan," December, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" (The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan) (Moscow, 1995), p. 109-112. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115531>.

¹²Westad 1997. For more on the specific concerns of the Politburo and the decision to invade, see: "Alexander Lyakhovskiy's Account of the Decision of the CC CPSU Decision to Send Troops to Afghanistan," December, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" (The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan) (Moscow, 1995), p. 109-112. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115531>.

¹³"Report on the Situation in Afghanistan, Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to CPSU CC," November 29, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRE, f. 3, op. 82, d. 173, s. 118-127. As cited in A. A. Lyakhovskiy, The Tragedy and Valor of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 102. Partially published in CWHIP Bulletin 8-9, pp. 157-58 and CWHIP's Afghanistan Dossier, pp. 52-53. Points 2, 7, and 10 were added by Lyakhovskiy's Plamya Afgana ("Flame of the Afghanistan veteran") [Iskon, Moscow, 1999]. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111576>; "Personal memorandum Andropov to Brezhnev," December 01, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, APRE, from notes taken by A. F. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWHIP by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Nobel Institute; trans. for CWHIP by Daniel Rozas. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113254>.

While members of the Politburo, including Gromyko, had expressed concerns about the United States' reaction to Soviet troops in Afghanistan earlier in the year, those had seemingly dissipated by December when the invasion plans were made. Descriptions of the initial meetings in December suggest that only Nikolai Ogarkov, the Chief of the General Staff, raised concerns about a potential backlash.¹⁴ In his memoirs, Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States, claims neither he nor anyone at the embassy were consulted by Gromyko beforehand about potential U.S. reactions to an invasion. As he writes, "Gromyko...must have believed that the already hostile relations between Moscow and the Carter administration could hardly be made any worse by what they planned to do in Afghanistan" (Dobrynin, 1995, p. 439). It turned out, the foreign minister's optimism was unfounded.

Forming an intervention coalition

The Carter administration observed growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan with concern throughout 1979, and the reaction to the invasion was swift.¹⁵ On Jan-

¹⁴"Alexander Lyakhovskiy's Account of the Decision of the CC CPSU Decision to Send Troops to Afghanistan," December, 1979, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, A. A. Lyakhovskiy's "Plamya Afgana" (The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan) (Moscow, 1995), p. 109-112. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya for the National Security Archive. <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115531>.

¹⁵The conventional wisdom that the United States was completely caught off guard by the invasion is only partially correct. According to Robert M. Gates, who served at the CIA at the time, U.S. intelligence was alarmed by growing Soviet influence in Afghanistan, and National Intelligence Officer Arnold Horelick wrote to Director of Intelligence Stansfield Turner on March 28, 1979, about the potential scenarios that could play out in Afghanistan, one being a risk of direct Soviet intervention (Gates, 1996, p. 133-134)(Gates, 1996, p. 131). By August, another CIA report warned that the Soviet Union might have the resources to stage a coup in Kabul (Gates, 1996, p.

uary 2nd, 1980, the U.S. president asked the Senate to postpone actions on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) Treaty, signaling that renewed détente at risk. In his State of the Union address on January 23rd, Carter claimed the invasion was a threat to the Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia,¹⁶ and warned that any threat to the Arab oil-producing world would be met with diplomatic, economic and military responses—a policy later dubbed the Carter Doctrine.¹⁷

A direct U.S. response in Afghanistan took longer. While the Carter administration approved of initial non-lethal support to the Mujahideen prior to the Soviet invasion (Gates, 1996, pp. 131-146), it was not until the election of Ronald Reagan that the United States became deeply involved in the conflict. Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq wanted more aid and closer ties with the United States, so he turned down the initial offer from Carter to serve as an intermediary in the covert operation. Following the election of Reagan, a broad deal was struck where the Pakistani intelligence service ISI would receive arms from the United States and Saudi Arabia, which was matching the contribution, and then distribute them to various Afghan groups. In fact, the United States was not allowed to enter Afghanistan or to circumvent the ISI and unilaterally supply rebels under the agreement (Kux, 2001, p. 252). In terms of monetary value, the United

132), but according to Gates, analysts “just couldn’t believe that the Soviets actually would invade” (Gates, 1996, pp. 133-134). Other reports also suggest that U.S. intelligence were skeptical of a major Soviet operation in the spring of 1979, but as Soviet troop deployments increased in the fall, worries of an invasion increased (Coll, 2004, pp. 44-50).

¹⁶Dobrynin describes Carter’s reaction as “feverish” and claims the U.S. president exaggerated the threat posed by the invasion to the broader region (Dobrynin, 1995, p. 443).

¹⁷*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977-1980, Volume I, Foundations of Foreign Policy*, ed. Kristin L. Ahlberg (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014), Document 138.

States and Saudi Arabia ended up giving billions of dollars in arms and aid to the Mujahideen, as the Afghan rebels came to be known, over the course of the 1980s and early 1990s.

In order to understand why these three states formed an intervention coalition, we first have to understand the goals and perceived risks of intervening in the war. U.S. goals were initially modest, in part because the rebels' chances of winning were perceived to be slim. In a memo to President Carter shortly after the invasion, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski warned that "we should not be too sanguine about Afghanistan becoming a Soviet Vietnam" because the Mujahideen were badly organized, with no sanctuary or central government, limited foreign support, and the Soviet Union were likely to "act decisively."¹⁸ In the covert operations finding first signed by Carter and then reauthorized by President Reagan, the CIA's goal with the operation was described as one of "harassment" (Coll, 2004, p. 58.), suggesting that the objectives were modest at best. Despite these concerns, U.S. interests in Afghanistan increased following the Soviet invasion. Carter and Reagan especially made the war a top priority, and as I discuss later, U.S. efforts in Afghanistan increased dramatically during the decade, as it became part of the broader U.S.-Soviet rivalry.

Pakistan's goals in Afghanistan were more long-term, and arguably more ambitious. The two countries had fought a proxy war, supporting rebels against each other, between 1973 and 1977. The countries represented two distinct vi-

¹⁸See: "Reflections on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan," Memo to President from Zbigniew Brzezinski, December 26, 1979.

sions for the region: Afghanistan supported ethnic nationalism and Pakistan was seeking leadership in the Muslim world (Haqqani, 2010, ch. 6). Supporting the jihad in Afghanistan became one of the defining foreign policy goals under President Zia ul-Haq, and the threat of Soviet expansionism made the war more salient.

The main concern for both the United States and Pakistan was the threat of direct Soviet military action against Pakistan, and so escalation control became an essential part of the operation. Zia famously said to then Director of Central Intelligence William J. Casey that the objective in Afghanistan was "to keep the pot boiling, but not boil over" (Gates, 1996, p. 252). Both states shared this perception of carefully managing the risk of escalation.¹⁹ The report also noted that the Soviet Union often violated Pakistani airspace with reconnaissance flights and even conducted occasional bombing and strafing attacks across the border. The CIA believed that these actions were done deliberately to put pressure on Pakistan.²⁰ By getting direct control over the operation, Pakistan was therefore in a better position to manage the risks of retaliation. While the deal stopped short of a U.S. security guarantee, it brought the two states closer together and set in place a structure for security cooperation.

¹⁹A CIA intelligence assessment from July 1982 stated that Pakistan would not be able to withstand large Soviet military operations, and unless it was given more U.S. support, it might have to make concessions to Moscow. See: "An Intelligence Assessment, July 1982," 1982. "Pakistan: Tough Choices on Afghanistan," NES 82-10366. Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000534961.pdf.

²⁰Ibid., p. 5

The interveners also sought to consolidate the disparate groups in Afghanistan. The rebellion spread throughout the early 1980s, but they lacked coordination and some groups even fought amongst themselves. As Amin (1984, pp. 392-393) puts it, the groups were militarily strong but politically weak. Some groups, particularly the rebels in the Hazarajat region with the aid of Iran, had political and administrative organizations. However, the Mujahideen were primarily focused on war-fighting rather than state-building, leaving their institutions primarily "transient and temporary" (Amin, 1984, pp. 392-393). The Pakistani military first tried to facilitate the establishment of a rebel alliance between the seven main groups in 1984, but intergroup bickering prevented this. Eventually, President Zia demanded they join together. While Zia did not make an explicit threat, it was enough to get the groups together, and being part of the alliance became a precondition for receiving support from the ISI (and thus the United States) (Yousaf and Adkin, 2001, pp. 38-40).

Sporadic retaliation and covert operations

The Soviet Union and the government in Kabul never escalated the local conflict into an interstate war against Pakistan. However, they conducted limited retaliation and threatened escalation against Pakistan several times during the decade. As the Mujahideen gained momentum with external support, Soviet and Afghan government forces responded by conducting punitive air strikes against targets on the Pakistani side of the border to signal their displeasure at Pakistani involve-

ment.²¹ The retaliation was always short of invasion, and border crossings were rare.²²

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan also conducted extensive covert operations against Pakistan. In the early 1980s, Moscow started funding various insurgents in Baluchistan and Sindh, Furthermore, Soviet and Afghan agents conducted information operations within Pakistan, but also more serious ones, including the hijacking of a Pakistani flight and two unsuccessful assassination attempts against President Zia himself.²³ As Carson (2016) argues, covert actions can be better at managing escalation, and it appears the Soviet Union used covert means to compel withdrawal without risking full war. In sum, the modest scope of retaliation and the reliance on covert operations suggest that the Soviets and the Afghans were not willing to start an interstate war.

While limited retaliation was commonplace, it raises the question of what would trigger a military operation across the border, particularly since this was often raised as the worst-case scenario for Pakistan. An incident in April 1987 points to a red line for the Soviet Union, when the threat of full war was credible. A group of Afghan fighters crossed the border into Soviet territory and attacked

²¹Early examples of the assessment of cross-border intimidation can be found in: "An Intelligence Assessment, July 1982," 1982. "Pakistan: Tough Choices on Afghanistan," NESA 82-10366. Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000534961.pdf; "Soviet Policy Toward the United States in 1984," SNIE 11-9-84. Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000518055.pdf.

²²Unfortunately, there is no systematic accounting of these incidents. Description of one example can be found in Grau and Ahmad Jalali 2005.

²³Andrew and Mitrokhin 2005, pp. 355-67.

an industrial area, about 20 kilometers from the border. It is unclear how much damage the attack caused, but the Soviet response was swift and clear. The Soviet ambassador was instructed to deliver an unequivocal message to Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqoob. Any further operations into Soviet territory would put Pakistan at risk of direct military attacks. The Pakistani government ordered the immediate halt of such operations, and even the CIA was shaken by the Soviet response, according to the Pakistani intelligence officer in charge of managing the Mujahideen program (Yousaf and Adkin, 2001, pp. 202-7). This incident suggests that Moscow and Kabul would respond under certain circumstances, but were restrained from starting a full war.

An opening for escalation

The threat of retaliation did not force a withdrawal by the intervention coalition. Instead, the United States expanded its aims and support for the rebels during the decade. During its first term, the Reagan White House set out more ambitious policy objectives in Afghanistan than had the Carter administration. In a speech at Eureka College on May 9, 1982, President Reagan signaled a shift in U.S. foreign policy by articulating an aim to ensure Afghan self-determination.²⁴ This pledge would later be called the "Reagan Doctrine," and it meant the United States would try to roll back Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Global South (Kux, 2001, p. 261). According to Secretary of State George

²⁴Ronald Reagan, "Address at Commencement Exercises at Eureka College, Eureka, Illinois," Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, 9 May 1982, <https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/128700/eureka.pdf> (accessed October 30, 2019).

P. Shultz, the Reagan Doctrine was a response to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which dictated that once a country was in the Soviet sphere of influence, it would not be allowed to leave (Shultz, 1993, 1086).

The shift in U.S. policy and goals in Afghanistan was formalized in National Security Decision Directive 166.²⁵ Signed in March 1985, the directive stated that the United States' overarching goal in Afghanistan was the removal of Soviet troops, a far cry from mere "harassment." In order to enable rebel victory, the United States would supply advanced weaponry and communications technology, intelligence and surveillance data, and training to the Mujahideen to help them defeat the Soviet forces (Coll, 1992). The policy shift would eventually culminate in the decision to supply Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen in 1986. In monetary terms, the change in support was substantial. In 1980, the United States provided \$ 30 million in aid to the Mujahideen. By 1989, that number had increased to \$ 700 million, before tapering off until all aid ended at the end of 1991 (Coll, 2004; Rubin, 2002b; Crile, 2003). As such, U.S. support was increasing in both quantity and quality.

The policy process for escalating U.S. involvement was both complicated and contentious within administration, in large part because of concerns about risks to Pakistan (Kuperman, 1999; Lundberg, 2009). The Mujahideen had become stronger on the battlefield, so military victory became a realistic goal, but the Soviet Union responded by increasing its military presence and using more

²⁵National Security Decision Directive 166, March 27, 1985, <http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/nsdd-166.pdf>.

aggressive tactics, including the use of the special forces Spetsnaz and Hind attack helicopters.²⁶ The threat of retaliation against Pakistan therefore had to be weighed against the possibility of imposing a defeat on its superpower rival. The transcript of a meeting of U.S. principals in August 1984 illustrates the administration's dilemma. Director Casey noted that joint Soviet- Afghan pressure was an imminent problem, given "a spate of border incidents in the wake of high level Soviet warnings to the Government of Pakistan."²⁷ Backing down, however, was not a desirable option, as President Reagan pointed out during the meeting:

Before we leave this subject, I just want to say that I worry about the possibility the Soviets may think we are idle in the face of their pressure on Pakistan. The Soviets could misread us and be tempted to do something serious leaving us the choice of not responding or going to war.

Given the increased Soviet presence in Afghanistan and threats against Pakistan, why was the United States not deterred from escalating its support to the Mujahideen? The short answer is that the Reagan administration became convinced that the Soviet Union lacked resolve (Cogan, 1993, p. 80). There was some disagreement amongst Reagan officials whether the escalation, particularly the Stinger missile decision, was driven by the ascension of Mikhail Gor-

²⁶In 1983, there was still a real concern that the Soviet Union would invade Pakistan in response to continued support for the Mujahideen. See (Kuperman, 1999, p. 223).

²⁷Memo, Philip A. Dur to Robert C. McFarlane, September 5, 1984, folder "NSPG 0094 08/31/1984 (India/Pakistan/Afghanistan)," box 91307, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group: Records, Ronald Reagan Library.

bachev as the new Soviet leader or just part of a gradual escalation strategy.²⁸ However, documents from the White House and the National Security Council show that the perception of a weakening Soviet Union started well before 1985.

Already in 1980 the Soviet Union was signaling publicly that it was willing to negotiate a withdrawal.²⁹ In private, the United States was also receiving signals that a Soviet withdrawal was possible. During a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the Foreign Minister "conceded that the USSR had made [a] serious mistake in Afghanistan and said [the] USSR wanted to find basis for getting out," according to a Department of State telegram.³⁰ This quote was repeated in multiple memos and documents around this time, and on this particular telegram the claim was underlined with the notation "?! " in the margin, most likely made by Deputy National Security Advisor James W. Nance.

Other memos and documents leading up to NSDD166 show how a perception of weakness took hold.³¹ An NSC memo titled from November 1983

²⁸Kuperman 1999, pp. 242-3.

²⁹Cordovez and Harrison 1995, p. 63.

³⁰Telegram, Secretary of State to American embassy in Moscow, October 1981, folder "Afghanistan (07/14/1981-12/26/1981)," box 34, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Country File, Ronald Reagan Library.

³¹The administration's perception of weakness is somewhat at odds with intelligence estimates of the time, which did not see the Soviet Union as likely to fundamentally change its policies or behavior in the near future. For example, see: "Special National Intelligence Assessment, 14 August 1984," 1982. "Soviet Policy Toward the United States in 1984," SNIE 11-9-84. Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000518055.pdf; "Special National Intelligence Assessment, March 1985," March 1985. "Soviet Problems, Prospects, and Options in Afghanistan in the Next Year," SNIE 11/37-2-85/L. Central Intelligence Agency Electronic Reading Room. http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000518057.pdf.

highlighted the uncertainty surrounding the leadership situation in Moscow, particularly because of Yuri Andropov's faltering health but also due to a larger uncertainty about the future of the empire.³² These assessments continued the following year. In March, when work on expanding U.S. support was well underway, an NSC memo noted that the Soviet Union had not incurred large costs because of the occupation, but increased and more effectively tailored support for the Afghans could increase the resource problems facing the Soviets.³³ Another report also noted that the material costs were not substantial yet put much emphasis on social costs, such as declining troop morale, drug abuse and corruption due to smuggling (as a result of narcotics stemming from Afghanistan), and class tensions because it was easier for middle-class Soviets to avoid military service.³⁴

At a more senior level, National Intelligence Council Vice Chairman Herbert E. Meyer described the Cold War rival as a decaying empire. While the leadership in the Kremlin could choose several courses of action in the next few years, ranging from wholesale reform to a use-it-or-lose-it aggressiveness, he argued that the U.S. goal "is to make absolutely certain that at no time during the coming years do Soviet leaders conclude that they can somehow save themselves by de-

³²Memo, C. Hill to Robert C. McFarlane, November 29, 1983, folder "Soviet Project," RAC box 14, Donald Fortier Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library.

³³Memo, Donald R. Fortier to Robert C. McFarlane, March 5, 1984, folder "Afghanistan (11/14/1983- 03/13/1984)," box 34, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Country File, Ronald Reagan Library.

³⁴Report, "Domestic Costs to the Soviet Regime of Involvement in Afghanistan," folder "Afghanistan (10/03/1984-10/25/1984)," box 34, Executive Secretariat, National Security Council: Country File, Ronald Reagan Library.

stroying us."³⁵ This appears to be the crux of U.S. thinking, both on Afghanistan and more generally on the larger conflict; the Soviet Union was facing significant challenges, and the United States should keep up the pressure but be wary of escalation by a declining superpower. Therefore, the administration kept considering the risk of retaliation against Pakistan in its decision-making, but saw an opportunity to crank up the pressure as Moscow appeared less and less willing to incur and inflict the costs of international conflict.³⁶

The growing perception of Soviet weakness appears to have influenced one of the key policy decisions of the period, namely the decision to supply Stinger missiles to the Mujahideen in 1985. The Reagan administration had been hesitant about supplying such advanced weaponry to the rebels, in part because sending U.S.-made weaponry would make it difficult for the United States to maintain plausible deniability, a key component of covert operations warfare (Lundberg, 2009, p 27). However, as the war progressed, there was growing support within the Reagan administration for taking this escalatory step. According to Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Fred Iklé, the Reagan administration believed that the Soviet leadership was tired of the war, and this belief was perhaps the most important reason for the Stinger decision (Kuperman, 1999, p. 227).

Other concerns not directly related to Afghanistan constrained the Soviet

³⁵Memo, Herbert E. Meyer to William J. Casey, June 21, 1984, folder "Soviet Union - US Policy Toward the Soviet Policy," RAC box 15, Donald Fortier Subject File, Ronald Reagan Library.

³⁶Charles Cogan, chief of the Near East and South Asia Division of the CIA's Directorate of Operations from 1979-1984, says it eventually became clear that U.S. concerns about Soviet retaliation against Pakistan were "exaggerated" (Cogan, 1993, p. 80), though he does not specify when this realization occurred.

Union from retaliating. Developments in U.S.-Soviet relations suggest a link between the local and the international levels of the conflict. As discussed above, the risk to detente was on the minds of Soviet leaders when they considered invading Afghanistan. By partnering with Pakistan, the United States had linked a local conflict to the broader Cold War. The prominence of Afghanistan in U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union suggests as much.³⁷ This linkage was communicated to the Soviets. In a meeting at the White House in 1985, Reagan suggested to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin that the conflict was an obstacle to progress on broader issues (Dobrynin, 1995, p. 603). It is therefore possible that the Soviet Union was in part restrained from retaliating in full against Pakistan because of the United States' role as benefactor.³⁸

These documents show that the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States shaped the key developments of the Afghan Civil War. Throughout the 1980s we saw the Reagan administration pursuing increasingly aggressive policies in and related to Afghanistan, and the purposeful escalation coincided, and often followed, internal pronouncements about Soviet weakness or lack of resolve. As such, the Soviet invasion and U.S. decision to intervene were setting the stage for a much more complex and volatile interaction, and the

³⁷National Security Directive Decision 99 and related working documents show that the administration viewed Afghanistan in a broader regional context. See: National Security Directive Decision 99, July 12, 1983, folder "NSDD 99 (United States Security Strategy for the Near East and South Asia)," RAC box 5, Ronald Reagan Library; Report, "NSDD 99 Work Program Conclusion Paper," undated, folder "NSPG 0094 08/31/1984 (India/Pakistan/Afghanistan)," box 91307, Executive Secretariat, NSC: National Security Planning Group: Records, Ronald Reagan Library.

³⁸The involvement of the Soviet Union and the United States also complicated the UN-led diplomatic process to achieve a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. See: (Khan, 1991; Cordovez and Harrison, 1995).

history of the war must include how the actors evolved over time.

Assessing the model in Phase 2

The intervention on the side of the rebels and subsequent escalation of support imposed significant costs on the Afghan government and kept the Soviet Union mired in the civil war. As with the previous phase, in order to evaluate the theory, we have to consider the counterfactuals of the war. Could the Afghan Civil War had been prevented, or at the very least contained, after the Soviets invaded? Answering this counterfactual is more difficult than the first, because 1) there might have been reputational costs for backing down once fighting begun, which the formal model does not account for; and 2) the U.S.-Soviet relationship influenced both sides' behavior.

The invasion strengthened the Kabul government, which should have led the rebels to update their beliefs about its resolve. However, the Mujahideen did not back down, and it does not seem the various rebel groups sought a peaceful settlement. Instead, they persisted, which can be attributed to the coalition intervention increasing the rebels' chances of winning. The rebels might have believed the intervention would compel the Kabul government into acquiescing, but we lack direct evidence of how rebel decision-making shifted, if at all, after 1979. It is therefore difficult to say to what extent uncertainty over the domestic government's resolve contributed to the continued conflict post-invasion.

The model does shed more light on third-party decision-making and the risk-return trade-off. In 1979, Pakistan faced a credible threat of retaliation by

Moscow and Kabul, because Islamabad had limited ability to impose escalatory costs across the border, but also had strong affinity for the Mujahideen. The United States, however, was not the subject of credible threats of retaliation, yet lacked strong ties with the rebels. It had relatively less than Pakistan to gain from a new government in Kabul, which would imply a low likelihood of intervention.

The coalition changed both states' intervention costs, making intervention more attractive to both. The United States and Pakistan principally, with assistance from Saudi Arabia, set up an operational structure that represented a significant change in their intervention costs, which Kabul and Moscow did not anticipate. Pakistan was given an influx of resources and a superpower benefactor, while the United States obtained access and expertise on the ground, coupled with matching funds from Riyadh.³⁹

The intervention proved a boon to the rebels. The influx of cash and arms helped the Mujahideen fight the Soviet forces, which would have compensated for their somewhat weak political position and lack of a central organization. The model tells us that we should expect disorganized rebels to be wary of fighting in the shadow of intervention, but the picture is more nuanced with the Mujahideen. It was a disparate rebellion, even after the 1984 alliance formation, but many of the groups had strong local footing, prior conflict experience and a fighting organization, or both. If autonomy costs are ameliorated by third-party affinity, then support from Pakistan should have been even more welcome.

³⁹For a more detailed discussion of the operational relationship between the CIA and Pakistani intelligence, see: Yousaf and Adkin (2001, ch. 5).

The model suggests that the Soviet invasion ensured the conflict would remain an internationalized civil war, with limited retaliation. The invasion strengthened Afghanistan's military power and raised the costs of escalation to Pakistan, but it also increased the relative size of the local stakes. As such, the benefits of winning *in* Afghanistan grew, making intervention more attractive. The ability of the third parties to form a coalition further ensured that these states with varying levels of affinity found common cause.

The expansion of aid to the Mujahideen can also be explained by the model extension allowing third parties to pick different levels of intervention. Third parties weigh the risk of retaliation against the benefits of increasing the likelihood of rebel victory, and the United States was following this logic when it increased monetary support and started providing advanced weaponry. In the course of Reagan's first term, the administration lowered its estimation of the Kremlin's willingness to retaliate, so the baseline risk of interstate war decreased. The United States could then increase the chances of rebel victory, which became a stated goal by Reagan's second term, at reduced risk of retaliation. This marginal increase in the benefits of external support then explains why the United States escalated its support in the mid-1980s.

5.4 Findings

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had a significant impact on Pakistani and U.S. decision-making. The two partners, along with Saudi Arabia providing ad-

ditional funding, formed an intervention coalition that would keep the conflict rolling and escalating for almost a decade. Comparing the two phases of the civil war suggest that the decision to form this coalition was prompted by the Soviet invasion, specifically because the Soviets changed several key parameters relevant to the questions of intervention and retaliation.

From a Soviet perspective, it certainly wanted to end external support to the rebels. Tens of thousands of Soviet troops meant the domestic government became much more powerful militarily, and with its professionalized army raised the third parties' escalation costs, especially for Pakistan. However, unlike the Afghan government, the Soviet Union did not have a long-standing rivalry with Pakistan. Fears of Soviet expansionism in the region turned out to be overblown, and the Kremlin's hesitation about retaliation against Pakistan support the notion that there was relatively little to gain from an interstate war. While there was more retaliation in the second phase than in the first, there was no interstate war between the Afghan forces and Pakistan. The limited retaliation was coercive in nature, but ultimately ineffective, as the coalition continued to increase its involvement.

The Soviet invasion affected Pakistan's and the United States' incentives for supporting the rebels, offering support for Result 3.3.2 and in line with Proposition 2. For Pakistan, Afghanistan became more valuable now that victory there also meant imposing a defeat on a superpower. Indirectly, but more importantly, Afghanistan became more valuable to the United States as well, which laid the foundation for the intervention coalition and provided Pakistan with a powerful

patron. Working together lowered the intervention costs for both states. Pakistan could support the Mujahideen with U.S. (and Saudi) resources, while the United States got a local partner that could help disperse the funds and guns, with little risk to U.S. personnel.

The benefits of an intervention coalition also help explain why two states that initially had very different interests in Afghanistan ended up as partners. From the beginning, the Pakistani military had ideological, religious, and political ties to several rebel groups, so it had a strong interest in the outcome of the conflict. Furthermore, Afghanistan was important in a regional context, as it could provide "strategic depth" in Pakistan's conflict with India.⁴⁰ The United States, however, had seemingly no common ideology or interest with the Mujahideen other than sharing the same enemy.

The model's predictions on affinity for the rebels suggests a two-fold answer as to why these states' incentives aligned. First, the coalition brought the two countries closer together, potentially raising Soviet and Afghan escalation costs against Pakistan, which in turn made retaliation less likely. As retaliation against Pakistan became less likely under the coalition deal, intervention became increasingly appealing. For the United States, retaliation was unlikely. However, as the Mujahideen became a viable fighting force, potentially capable of ousting the Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the United States' interests in the conflict grew. In model terms, it seems the affinity for the rebels increased, thus making

⁴⁰Rubin 2002b, p. 247-8.

intervention increasingly attractive.

Moving on to the rebels' part of the story, my theory predicts that civil wars with intervention are more likely the lower the rebels' autonomy costs are (Result 3.3.4). While we lack primary documents from the various Mujahideen groups, we can infer some things about their capabilities and organization. Despite, or perhaps because of, the rebellion's decentralized nature, the rebels appear to have enjoyed strong popular support in many areas, and many of the groups were organized on the tribal level. They should therefore have been able to withstand external domination. Furthermore, there were strong ties between many of the groups and the Pakistani army and intelligence, which ameliorated the costs of external support.⁴¹ There is no direct evidence that the rebels' autonomy costs changed between the two phases of the war, but it is possible that as the war went on and the groups became better at fighting, they formed stronger organizations that were better able to withstand external pressure. Alternatively, the rebels might have become more dependent on aid as the fighting spread, which the Pakistanis took advantage of when forcing the establishment of an alliance. But I have noted above, the rebels were intent on fighting, even at terrible odds, so strings attached to the help did not deter rebellion.

⁴¹The theoretical model assumes no relationship between a rebel group's autonomy costs and third-party affinity. However, if autonomy costs are a function of affinity, we should assume that autonomy costs are diminishing in affinity. Rebels should therefore be willing to tolerate larger autonomy costs if they share ideology or political goals with the third party. Given that the Mujahideen and the United States did not share such preferences, fears over external domination therefore provides a complementary explanation for why Pakistan assumed the role as quartermaster.

Lastly, the model explains when third parties pick smaller or larger levels of support to rebels (Result 3.3.16). The third parties were unsure about the threat of retaliation against Pakistan and initially provided modest support to the Mujahideen. As the United States updated its beliefs about the Soviet Union's willingness to retaliate, it started increasing its support, in quantitative and qualitative terms.

5.5 Implications

The purpose of this chapter has been to evaluate the formal model by applying it to an important historical case. Whether it is useful depends on whether it helped us better understand the conflict. Secondly, we should consider whether the assumptions of the model correspond with how decision-makers view these situations. In this section, I argue in the affirmative on both counts. The costs and benefits of fighting, particularly the role of endogenous stakes, coupled with uncertainty over the domestic government's resolve explain why the conflict became an internationalized civil war. The evidence we have of the actors' decision-making support my modeling of this interaction. I also discuss some ways the model comes up short and ways to extend the theory.

The model predicts that uncertainty plays an important part in the onset of civil war. In the first phase, opposition groups, primarily in the countryside, took up arms against the Kabul government in response to unpopular agricultural reforms. While we lack primary sources on the rebellion, there is

circumstantial evidence that the opposition should have expected external support. Furthermore, the PDPA government was new, and it is possible that the opposition saw their hardline policies as posturing and so a challenge could be successful. Assessing the role of uncertainty in the second phase is more difficult, because the war was already raging. On the one hand, potential reputational losses could have prevented the Mujahideen from backing down, despite now facing a government with direct Soviet support. But on the other hand, the United States was getting more involved as part of an intervention coalition, thus potentially coercing Kabul into acquiescing. However, this is where the analysis is the least conclusive (or convincing), in part because we do not have primary documents from rebel groups, and in part because these are inherently difficult counterfactuals to answer. The model therefore shows a potential explanation for civil war onset, but also exposes a gap in the historiography of the conflict.

Once the fighting began and third parties supported the Mujahideen, the Kabul government did not retaliate during the first phase, but the Soviets did conduct some limited retaliation in the second phase. The model helps explain the lack of retaliation in both phases, and it is particularly useful in explaining why the Soviets never invaded Pakistan and launched an interstate war, despite possessing military superiority, during the 1980s. The Soviets were more concerned with avoiding defeat in Afghanistan than defeating Pakistan, and the international costs of expanding the war would have been substantial, especially as the leadership pursued renewed detente.

My argument hinges on invasion being an uncertain but plausible out-

come. If invading Pakistan was never possible, for logistical or political reasons, then the model is inappropriate for this case. We know that the Soviet Union made numerous compelling threats against Pakistan. Furthermore, The gradual escalation by the intervention coalition illustrates the role of uncertainty in decisions on intervention, and how less uncertainty can lead to relatively more fighting. Lastly, the reaction to the 1987 incursion into Soviet territory was deemed credible enough to spook both Pakistan and the United States into reigning in their proxy forces. Per Result 3.3.16, the incident resolved uncertainty about where the Soviet red line was for the conflict. With high levels of rebel support, an increasingly costly rebellion made war expansion more attractive, and thus the threat of retaliation more credible.

The decision to intervene or not (and later expand support) is where the model is most useful, and the assumptions are best supported by primary sources. We have direct evidence that the United States and Pakistan considered the threat of retaliation carefully when making decisions on external support. They weighed the benefits of a rebel victory (at least in the second phase) against the potential costs of retaliation. Furthermore, we see that the Soviet invasion changed the stakes of the conflict and prompted a stronger interest in intervention from the United States. While the rebels' chances of winning did factor into these decisions, the primary concerns were what could be achieved supporting the rebels and at what cost. Lastly, the evidence also shows how the Reagan administration updated its beliefs about Soviet resolve throughout the conflict, and made decisions on escalation in line with what the model predicts.

The model offers some predictions on the rebels' preferences over external support, but because there were so many groups and there is scant evidence for their decision-making processes, we do not know how useful it is in explaining their preferences. While the Mujahideen were not highly institutionalized, the tribal structure of peripheral Afghanistan helped cement local support for these groups.⁴² Furthermore, their autonomy costs were ameliorated by strong affinity between the groups and the Pakistani quartermasters.

The model then shows us how the costs and benefits for an internationalized civil war aligned for all relevant parties. The Soviet Union had less to gain from defeating Pakistan than Afghanistan did, and the Soviet invasion made intervention more desirable for both Pakistan and the United States. Relatedly, the rebels had similar-minded neighbors that would help them fight. The military strengths of each actor played some part in the decision-making, but an alternative theory of war expansion that considers only the chances of winning a military conflict would fail to explain most of the war. The rebels were at first weak, yet received external support; the Soviet forces significantly strengthened the government in Kabul, yet that only made intervention more likely. Therefore, this case shows that a theory of war expansion must account for the relative stakes between the two states and the relationship between the rebels and any third parties.

⁴²Barfield (2010) argues that Afghanistan has a long history of being conquered by outside forces, but have typically only been able to control the center of the country, while the periphery has remained independent because of the way Afghan society has been structured.

While the model is useful in understanding this particular war, the analysis also reveals some shortcomings. First, the Soviet Union and Afghanistan conducted some retaliation, but it was limited and never escalated to full war with Pakistan. The model does not explain partial retaliation, but we see from U.S. documents that they interpreted the actions as coercive, meant to stop Pakistani support to the Mujahideen. If this was signaling behavior, the continued intervention suggests that the Soviets failed to make a credible threat of full war. Such an explanation would fit with U.S. perceptions of Soviet weakness, but it would fall outside the scope of my theory.

Second, the model assumes that the opposition group is satisfied with the status quo. In other words, it prefers the status quo to a costly war. However, the Afghan rebellion started because of policy changes the PDPA enacted, which suggests that the actual onset of the crisis happened prior to rebellion. If so, then the model cannot explain why the government chose to initiate the crisis in the first place. Perhaps it underestimated the peasants' resolve for fighting, which would suggest a model of two-sided uncertainty, with both a signaling and a screening phase. Under this alternative model, the rebels would then challenge if and only if it surmised the domestic government was bluffing. That explanation for rebellion is not substantively different from the existing model, so the key change is the selection into crisis.

Lastly, and relatedly, the duration of the Afghan Civil War raises a trickier question about one of the core assumptions of the model: If the war broke out because of uncertainty about the government's willingness to fight, why did

it take a decade of fighting to end it? Especially in the second phase, once the intervention coalition formed, why did the Soviet Union not reach a peaceful settlement with the rebels? The historical record suggests a possible answer.

The Soviet Union early on pursued a diplomatic solution to the conflict, but there were several obstacles to peace. Given the international dimensions of the conflict, any settlement would have to involve multiple actors, so the United Nations-led track focused on an agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan directly, with the United States and the Soviet Union as background players. An early UN proposal in 1983 covered four issues: withdrawal of Soviet forces, non-interference from the Pakistani side (which implied U.S. participation too), guarantees of implementation from the superpowers, and the opportunity for refugees to return to Afghanistan.⁴³ Any peaceful settlement between the parties therefore required the participation of the superpowers, because they had to agree to a withdrawal. However, this became a sticking point in the negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union insisted on policy symmetry, meaning either both sides would pull out or neither would. Unilateral withdrawal was seen as unacceptable.

The issue of symmetry was further complicated by another concept, namely "act versus process." What this meant was that a Soviet withdrawal would be a process playing out over an extended period of time, while Pakistan (and by extension the United States) would cut off aid to the rebels immediately. Pakistan

⁴³For a more comprehensive history of the UN process, see: Cordovez and Harrison (1995).

was also unwilling to agree to noninterference before the Soviet Union agreed to a withdrawal (Khan, 1991, p. 99). The actors' inability to credibly commit to withdrawal from the conflict thus prolonged the peace process by several years. The actors finally settled the four issues and signed the Geneva Accords on April 14, 1988, with the Soviet military withdrawal starting on May 15 the same year. But as to illustrate how difficult it was to keep their commitments, it still took over two years for the United States and the Soviet Union to pull out of the conflict. U.S. weapon shipments continued after the Soviet withdrawal, peaking in fiscal year 1989 with roughly \$700 million worth of weapons and equipment sent to the Mujahideen (Coll, 2004, p. 216). The superpowers finally reached an agreement to cut off all support to the warring parties in the fall of 1991, but only after a coup in Kabul displaced President Najibullah, who the Soviets had long insisted remain in power after a withdrawal (Rubin, 2002b, 266-267).

The protracted end of the international era of the Afghan Civil War suggests that after the Soviets invaded and the Americans intervened, the conflict changed. Uncertainty over the domestic government's resolve was no longer the only obstacle to peace, because the superpowers' rivalry drove the peace process, but could not reach an agreement to mutually withdraw. This case thus suggests that the duration of these nested conflicts are driven by both information asymmetries and commitment problems.

More broadly, the case illustrates one of the key takeaways of my formal model. These conflicts are the product of international competition. While the origins of the Afghan Civil War are domestic, its subsequent development was

shaped by competition: first between Kabul and Islamabad, and then between the Kremlin and Washington. Explaining the 1978 uprising as a peasant revolt is therefore accurate, but also obfuscating to the broader processes at play.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

6.1 Introduction

This dissertation has sought to explain why some civil wars become interstate wars while others do not. I focused on retaliation by the domestic government against external rebel supporters, because governments vary in how they respond to third-party intervention. Existing models of retaliation cannot explain war expansion, because they do not account for how domestic and international politics interact. These conflicts are civil wars nested within an international context, and so the decisions to rebel, intervene, and retaliate are interdependent and depend on the actors' incentives for maintaining or remaking the status quo.

I developed a general model of civil war, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation to answer my research question. In short, civil wars expand when rebels and third parties underestimate the government's resolve. Rebels challenge the government because they believe the threat of intervention will compel the government to give up power, and the third party intervenes once

fighting starts because it believes the government will tolerate an intervention. Three factors help predict interstate war. First, the size of the local stakes relative to the international stakes determine the risk of intervention and retaliation jointly. As the local stakes increase relative to the international stakes, the domestic government is less likely to retaliate and the third party is more willing to intervene. However, relatively larger local stakes make it less likely that the domestic government will acquiesce to a challenge in the first place. Second, the rebels give up some autonomy when third parties intervene, so they must weigh the risk of rejection against the costs of intervention. If external support is particularly costly, the promise of intervention can actually deter rebellion. Third, the third party is trying to help the rebels win, which means the benefits of rebel victory depend on how closely aligned the two actors' political goals are. Therefore, intervention becomes increasingly the more affinity the third party has for the rebels.

I evaluated my argument in two chapters. In chapter 4, I introduced new data on retaliation covering all civil wars with rebel-sided intervention from 1975 to 2009. I used those data to test several hypotheses from my theory, focusing on three core parameters. I found that third parties are more likely to intervene in civil wars with larger economies (larger local stakes), but the relationship is conditional on uncertainty about the domestic government. I also found consistent support for the role of escalation costs in these conflicts. Civil war governments with larger urban populations are more likely to attract intervention and less likely to retaliate. Similarly, third parties with urban larger urban popu-

lations are less likely to intervene than stay out of a civil war. Opposition groups with higher levels of development are also less likely to rebel. Lastly, I showed that opposition groups who have self-excluded (low autonomy costs) are more likely to rebel than those that are not.

In chapter 5, I evaluated the formal model by examining the Afghan Civil War across two distinct phases. The war started as a peasant revolt, but the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at the end of 1979 changed the conflict in several ways. It prompted the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia to form an intervention coalition to support the Afghan Mujahideen, and during the 1980s, these third parties significantly increased their support in quantitative and qualitative terms. Despite this influx of arms and cash, the Soviet occupier and the Kabul government only conducted sporadic retaliation. The formal model explains why. The Soviet invasion raised the size of the local stakes (i.e. Afghanistan) relative to the international stakes (i.e. Pakistan), because victory in the former now meant defeating a superpower too, while the Soviets had little interest in the latter. The United States' decision-making correspond to the dilemmas presented in the model, and in particular how it increased its rebel support as it updated its beliefs about the Soviet Union's (lack of) resolve.

I round out this dissertation discussing some implications of my theoretical argument and analyses. I start by discussing implications for models of war, and how my work informs our understanding of interstate war, as well as rebellion and intervention. Next, I discuss implications for peace, and what my theory says about how disinterested states can prevent the onset of conflict. I then dis-

cuss implications for U.S. grand strategy and foreign policy, because existing debates neglect the role of international competition in patterns of conflict. Lastly, I offer some concluding thoughts about avenues for future research.

6.2 Implications for war

My theory has a wide range of implications for theoretical and empirical models of conflict, and the implications result from several of the formal model's innovations. The structure of the model ties together three actors and link civil war to interstate war, but the conceptualization of the actors' costs and benefits for fighting is what substantiates their connections. The act of retaliation allows the domestic government to raise the stakes, and so the threat of interstate war conditions the third party's decision to intervene and the rebels' decision to challenge.

This innovation provides an indirect explanation for war between states. Instead of the contested issue being borders, for instance, it is about the internal politics of a state. States' interests in others' political arrangements can cause civil war, but also interstate war. As I have shown in this dissertation, these nested conflicts are not interstate conflicts that just happen to start with some rebels in one state; they are contests over domestic political order that cannot be understood absent international competition. This is not to say that we need *another* category of conflict; rather, it shows the distinction between civil and interstate war can obscure more than it reveals.

6.2.1 Intervention and rebellion

Rebels challenge and third parties intervene in the shadow of retaliation, and failing to account for this interaction can lead to incomplete, or at worst erroneous, explanations or predictions. For instance, the greed explanation for civil wars suggests that economic growth generates opportunity costs for rebellion, which explains why richer countries are less likely to experience civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, e.g.). However, economic development can have varying effects on the risk of civil war. It can discourage young men from taking up arms, but it can also strengthen the government and allow redistribution (if it is so inclined). In an international setting, growth can have varying effects. It raises the stakes of any civil war by increasing the domestic pie, which strengthens the government's resolve towards the opposition, but makes retaliation less likely, which invites intervention. The negative correlation between economic growth and rebellion might then be attributed to the uneven distribution of growth among states. Some developing countries experience sudden and steep growth, which can make them attractive targets for intervention, thus encouraging rebellion. Conversely, richer countries tend to experience more sluggish growth, and they also have governments who are loathe to give up power, because the local stakes are so high, deterring rebellion, if not intervention. A monadic research design cannot recover these conflating relationships. Instead, empirical models of civil war with predictors that capture internationally relevant factors, should account for the threat of intervention. How so would depend on the specifics of the research question, but the presence of potential interveners nearby, similar to spa-

tial correlation models of conflict contagion could be a solution.

Predictors of rebellion can also be affected by retaliation, and the shadow of retaliation poses a threat to statistical inference if those predictors are also correlated with the risk of war expansion. For instance, fragmented groups are more likely to fight a civil war, and the explanation given by Cunningham (2013) is that internal division introduces bargaining friction with the government. However, the characteristics of opposition movements are partially a function of their opponent. Governments can repress, cajole, or otherwise influence the trajectory of these movements, which increases their autonomy costs by making them less able to withstand external domination. Because those same governments might also possess the military capabilities to deter third-party intervention, we would observe weaker opposition groups who might be deterred from rebelling in the shadow of intervention, take up arms because the government has deterred intervention. Such a strategy could be risky for a government, as it encourages some groups to fight that otherwise would not. But if the government does not know whether a given group will fight, it might prefer fighting a divided movement for sure than risk fighting a united opposition with third-party support. Models of rebellion should therefore account for the government's ability to fight two opponents at once and the potential tradeoffs raised.

My theory makes some simplifying assumptions about what war expansion looks like for the rebels. They pay no autonomy costs, and while they face two rather than one opponent, there are potential benefits from remaking the total stakes. However, we know little about the rebels' decision-making, as dis-

cussed in chapter 5. We can infer some reasons for rebellion, but we often lack primary sources for their internal deliberations like we have for governments, particularly as they pertain to intervention and the threat of retaliation. This shortcoming raises a broader point about evaluating models. When we combine formal models with case studies, not every part of the equilibrium can be empirically substantiated, and sometimes these gaps can be helpful in pointing the way towards future research. My theory and empirical analyses suggest there is much work to be done understanding rebel decision-making under the dual shadows of intervention and retaliation.

6.2.2 Duration

War expansion can also affect how conflicts develop and how long they last. The act of retaliation can prolong fighting by spreading it over a larger territory or complicate prospects for peace by introducing more actors (Cunningham, 2010, e.g.), if the domestic government conducts proxy retaliation. Alternatively, retaliation might shorten fighting by increasing destruction and expanding the bargaining range. If the factors that drive intervention are also associated with the risk of retaliation, then omitting expansion from empirical models of duration can yield biased estimates.

The first step towards assessing the relationship between retaliation in conflict duration is to look for patterns in the data. I estimate a Cox proportional hazard model of civil wars between 1975 and 2009 ($n = 89$), examining whether there is any systematic difference in the durations of civil wars, internationalized

civil wars, and civil wars that expand into interstate wars. The unit of analysis is conflict, with duration counted in days. For explanatory variables, I include dummy variables for whether the conflict saw any rebel-sided intervention but no retaliation, or rebel-sided intervention and retaliation (with no intervention as the base category). I control for factors that affect the decisions to intervene and retaliate and can also prolong or shorten duration. Furthermore, because there are some civil wars that lasted much longer than expected (India, Mozambique, and Sri Lanka), I omit those from the analysis (see the appendix for full regression results and diagnostics).

I find that intervention is associated with longer duration, and civil wars with intervention and retaliation last even longer. Intervention without retaliation reduces the likelihood of the war ending by 45%, while intervention and retaliation reduces the likelihood of cessation by 71%. The coefficient for the former is not statistically significant, but plotting the survival rates for the three types of conflict show a clear difference between them (Figure 6.1).




Figure 6.1: The relationship between intervention, retaliation, and civil war duration (by days), excluding influential outliers.

These results suggest that civil wars with intervention and retaliation tend to last longer than others. While I control for some factors that would make intervention and retaliation more or less likely, I cannot draw inference about the

effect of retaliation on duration. My formal model shows that conflicts that experience intervention and retaliation are systematically different from those that just experience intervention, or no intervention at all. For instance, third parties are wary of supporting stronger rebels because if the war expands, the rebels can wrest away territory from them. But if retaliation is unlikely, a third party may be less discriminating in who it supports. Internationalized civil wars might have stronger rebels compared to those that expand into interstate wars, which in turn leads to the former group ending quicker because stronger rebels and third-party assistance defeats the government. Another potential explanation is that war expansion happens when escalation costs tend to be low, which can affect the actors' willingness to continue fighting. If fighting is relatively cheap, they might be more willing to keep going or not update their beliefs about the chances of winning as quickly as with destructive wars. Models of duration, or other relevant outcomes such as intensity and indiscriminate killings, should therefore account for both intervention and war expansion.

6.3 Implications for peace

My theory shows that war happens when the rebels underestimate the domestic government's resolve, and the third party's beliefs and willingness to intervene can make a rebel challenge more or less likely. My explanation for war has implications for how we think about peace, either through prevention or resolution through fighting. I will focus here on the former, by a disinterested third party, because the analysis in chapter 5 suggests that interventions, especially on op-

posing sides, can complicate the domestic actors' ability or willingness to reach a peaceful settlement by introducing commitment problems.

The model results imply two (if not more) avenues for averting war. First, the role of private information in the breakdown of peace implies that solving the information problem prevents war. However, it is not obvious how we solve such a problem. There will always be some weaker governments who will have an incentive to misrepresent its costs of war, so the ability to signal resolve would prevent some challenges, but not all. A third-party mechanism for revealing information, through an international organization for instance, might facilitate credible signaling, but both weak and strong governments would have reasons not to sign up for such monitoring *ex ante*. Weak governments, for obvious reasons, would prefer not to have private information divulged, while strong governments would not want to pay the costs of monitoring when they can probably credibly signal their resolve regardless of third-party involvement.

One potential solution to the information problem is to render it irrelevant by reducing the costs of losing power. Leaders go to war when the costs of losing office are prohibitively high (Debs and Goemans, 2010), especially if it means imprisonment or death. Bashar al-Assad did not acquiesce to opposition demands, because doing so would entail the loss of his own life, or at the very least the loss of his ability to extract rents from the Syrian state. However, as I discuss in chapter 2, domestic politics generate commitment problems because one side has to unilaterally disarm, and those in power often cannot credibly commit to renege on a peaceful settlement. Those states that are most likely to

offer credible commitments through rule of law, are those least likely to experience civil war in the first place.

My theory suggests another way of (potentially) preventing war, by directly affecting the rebels' or the third party's expected utility for fighting. One of the key results of the formal model is that rebel groups with low autonomy costs are more likely challenge the government than rebels with high autonomy costs. Efforts by third parties to strengthen opposition groups through institutional development or economic aid can therefore have the unintended consequence of making them more willing to risk a war with the government. The problem would be particularly acute if there are potential supporters should a group take up arms.

Rebellion can also be prevented by discouraging rebel support beyond the threat of retaliation. Third parties intervene because they have an interest in who governs in the civil war country, but if they are indifferent, then costly and risky intervention is strictly suboptimal. Third parties might be indifferent if they have no long-standing policy disagreements with the domestic government, or the country in general, but that is the product of previous interactions and not easily engineered on short notice. Instead, potential intervention can be dissuaded through some agreement between the states. Of course this presents the challenge of finding either a self-enforcing agreement or some guarantor, and the challenges associated with the former at least are likely to correlate with the third party's interest in who governs in the first place, while the latter requires someone to assume the costs of enforcing such an agreement. Nonetheless, my

theory suggests that any solution would hinge on interstate relations, because limited sovereignty implies the existence of incentives to intervene, which in turn can encourage rebellion.

These implications suggest that promoting peace when political disagreements exist is challenging. I have sketched out some potential mechanisms for conflict prevention, but which are feasible would depend on the international context, and particularly the distribution of political preferences. Under certain circumstances, managing conflict rather than preventing it might be the most likely outcome. In the next section I discuss how international competition over ideology drives conflict and the implications this has for grand strategy and policy.

6.4 Implications for grand strategy and policy

My theory has implications for grand strategy and policy, because it shows how local wars can expand and how international competition can spur those conflicts. The current debate about U.S. grand strategy is marked by disagreement about the United States' role in international politics today, and particularly investment in and use of military force. Avey et al. (2018) identify four ideal-type grand strategy positions and argue their disagreements stem from different concepts of the role of power and institutions in international politics. I will focus on the former, where the so-called restrainers adapt a balance-of-power realism approach to argue that less is more, while the other groups adopt variants

of hegemonic stability theory to argue that the United States should maintain or improve upon its preponderance of power.

This debate tends to focus on force structure and posture, because direct military confrontation is the main threat to core U.S. interests (Posen, 2014, e.g.). However, my work shows that there are two issues with this narrow scope. First, interstate war can come from civil wars. Even if the United States were to maintain a strategy of restraint, civil wars in other countries can expand, destabilizing regions and affecting U.S. interests indirectly. The First and Second Congo Wars caused millions of deaths and destabilized Central Africa, but started initially with Rwanda trying to root out rebels next door. Similarly, the Syrian Civil War prompted a massive refugee crisis that increased right-wing sentiments and populism in Europe.

Second, and more importantly, U.S. military power, and thus security, hinges on wealth and a favorable international environment. Restrainers especially presuppose that the United States will retain its power position because it will continue its trade relations with other states (Posen, 2014, pp. 2-3), but that is not a given if the distribution of power in the system changes. The United States' position can decline, because international competition may shift other states' preferences towards another state, thus resulting in less favorable terms for the United States.

My theory implies that when states have an interest in others' domestic politics, this can lead to intervention and rebellion. If states are not disinterested in who governs other states, there is a risk of civil war, which can manifest it-

self in different ways depending on the relative stakes at hand. Therefore, states who disagree on policies have an interest in intervening in each other's domestic politics, and this problem is particularly acute when states disagree on how to organize themselves internally (i.e. ideology and institutions).

States often disagree on some things or another, and usually this does not lead to conflict. However, the risk going forward is that ideological competition between the United States and a peer rival, such as China, will create incentives for intervening in other states. The Cold War may be defined by the absence of direct military confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, but it was a warm war elsewhere. As Westad (2005) argues, competition between these superpowers manifested itself in conflicts throughout the Global South, and laid the foundation for many conflicts we see today.

A pivot towards Asia can intensify this competition by signaling that the United States is engaging in ideological competition, but an exit is not necessarily possible either. As I have shown in this dissertation, the presence of potential rebel supports shape the risk of civil war. Even if the United States disengages, China and its rivals in the region might support rebellion in other states, potentially resulting in expansion and destabilization, because they seek like-minded neighbors. China might intervene to force bandwagoning, while others intervene to achieve balancing against China.

However, these factors do not imply that the United States has to pursue a confrontational policy towards China by spreading its sphere of influence in the Asia-Pacific region. My theory and analyses show that there are risks and costs

associated with interventions. Rebel support can cause retaliation, most likely against U.S. partners in the area, and government support can invite rebel-sided intervention from other third parties. Therefore, the debate about U.S. grand strategy should take into account what undergirds U.S. power in the system and how international competition is likely to manifest itself. The specific policy implications then depend on the costs and benefits of intervening versus staying out.

6.5 Concluding thoughts

The collision of domestic and international politics can manifest itself in many ways, and this dissertation has focused on one specific interaction: when civil wars become interstate wars. I have offered a general model of rebellion, intervention, and retaliation, but the broader theme of my theory is that war depends on the distribution of political interests within and across borders. I have focused on competition and cooperation as drivers of conflict, because the constellation of domestic and international actors determine what type of conflict we see in equilibrium. When the incentives of third parties and rebels align, we can get internationalized civil war or interstate war, but if their interests diverge, we see peace or mere civil war. If we broaden the scope, we can imagine different constellations, such as two-sided intervention or civil wars with only government support. But the lessons would remain the same: actors consider the costs and benefits of fighting, and those depend on shared interests, autonomy, and the stakes at hand.

My model explains what type of conflict results from a particular set of constellations, but some of these conflicts grow to become exceedingly complex. While explaining their origins requires some simplification and bracketing, as I do in chapter 5 with the Afghan Civil War, explaining or predicting their duration and outcome requires quite a bit more work. Interventions can shorten or prolong fighting, depending on which side gets support, but often times both sides get support, and those interventions are interdependent. When we also consider that third parties are discerning actors and domestic actors fight based on expectations about support, estimation of duration as a function of intervention becomes a herculean task.

This is not an appeal to throw our hands up in the air. Instead, a first step towards recovering the effects of intervention on conflicts would be a more systemic accounting of how these conflicts develop over time and shifting the unit of analysis towards conflict complexes. Take the wars in Southern Africa for instance. Do we treat the civil wars in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, and South Africa as separate conflicts? Or do we treat them as a set of interdependent conflicts? The answer depends on the research question, but it is something an analyst should consider. These particular conflicts overlap in key ways because of international cooperation on both sides, as well as the overarching issue of African nationalism and liberation, so analysts should consider the stakes at hand.

I hope this dissertation furthers discussions about the relationship between domestic and international politics, and how conflict and cooperation occur at their intersection. Explaining these conflicts has implications for theoretic-

cal and empirical models of war, but more importantly, they cause suffering and destruction on a massive scale. Understanding why they happen might help us prevent them.

Appendices

Appendix A

Appendix for Chapter 2

A.1 Proofs for crisis game with and without intervention

Here I describe three version of a simple crisis game. The basic sequence is the same for all three: R starts by either challenging D or not. However, D has private information about its resolve. If it challenges, D either gives up power or fights, resulting in a civil war. The first version stops there, whereas the second and third end with an astrategic third party intervening on the side of the rebels and the government, respectively (payoffs in Table A.1).

Table A.1: Payoffs for crisis game with intervention

	Rebels	Domestic government
Status quo	0	1
Government concedes	1	0
Civil war	$\frac{m_R}{m_D+m_R} - C_R$	$\frac{m_D}{m_D+m_R} - C_D$
Rebel-sided intervention	$\frac{m_R}{m_D+m_R+s} - C_R$	$\frac{m_D}{m_D+m_R+s} - C_R$
Government-sided intervention	$\frac{m_R}{m_D+m_R+s} - C_R$	$\frac{m_D+s}{m_D+m_R+s} - C_R$

I identify three Perfect Bayesian Equilibria across these three versions of the game where R risks war, and then compare the effect third-party intervention has on the likelihood of war. In the first equilibrium, D plays a cut-point strategy and is indifferent between acquiescing to R 's challenge and fighting a civil war when $\frac{m_D}{m_D+m_R} - c_D = 0$, which simplifies to $c_D = \frac{m_D}{m_D+m_R} = c_D^1$. Therefore, R believes D fights with probability $\frac{c_D^1}{\bar{c}_D}$ and gives up power with probability $\frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^1}{\bar{c}_D}$. R risks civil war when:

$$\frac{c_D^1}{\bar{c}_D} * \left(\frac{m_R}{m_D + m_R} - c_R \right) + \frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^1}{\bar{c}_D} * (1) \geq 0, \quad (\text{A.1})$$

which simplifies to $c_R \leq \frac{\bar{c}_D m_R}{m_D} + \bar{c}_D - \frac{m_D}{m_D+m_R} = c_R^1$. R 's willingness to challenge is strictly decreasing in m_R because $\frac{\partial c_D^1}{\partial m_R} > 0$ and $\frac{\partial u_R(\text{Civil war})}{\partial m_R} > 0$.

The second PBE, with T supporting R , follows the same logic. D is indifferent between acquiescing and fighting when $\frac{m_D}{m_D+m_R+s} - c_D = 0$, which simplifies to $c_D = \frac{m_D}{m_D+m_R+s} = c_D^2$. Therefore, R believes D fights with probability $\frac{c_D^2}{\bar{c}_D}$ and gives up power with probability $\frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^2}{\bar{c}_D}$. R risks civil war when:

$$\frac{c_D^2}{\bar{c}_D} * \left(\frac{m_R + s}{m_D + m_R + s} - c_R \right) + \frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^2}{\bar{c}_D} * (1) \geq 0, \quad (\text{A.2})$$

which I rearrange as $c_R \leq \bar{c}_D + \frac{\bar{c}_D(m_R+s)}{m_D} - \frac{m_D}{m_D+m_R+s} = c_R^2$.

Last, the third PBE, with T supporting D , D is indifferent between acquiescing and fighting when $\frac{m_D+s}{m_D+m_R+s} - c_D = 0$, or $c_D = \frac{m_D+s}{m_D+m_R+s} = c_D^3$. R believes D fights when $\frac{c_D^3}{\bar{c}_D}$ and gives up power when $\frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^3}{\bar{c}_D}$. R then challenges when:

$$\frac{c_D^3}{\bar{c}_D} * \left(\frac{m_R}{m_D + m_R + s} - c_R \right) + \frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^3}{\bar{c}_D} * (1) \geq 0, \quad (\text{A.3})$$

which I rearrange as $c_R \leq \bar{c}_D + \frac{\bar{c}_D(m_R)}{m_D+s} - \frac{m_D+s}{m_D+m_R+s} = c_R^3$.

To show that T increases the risk of civil war when it supports R and decreases the risk when it supports D is straightforward. If we treat R 's cut-points as probabilities of a challenge, then the difference in probability from PBE2 to PBE1 is $c_R^2 - c_R^2 \Rightarrow \frac{\bar{c}_D s}{m_D} + \frac{sm_D}{(m_D+m_R)(m_D+m_R+s)}$, so R is more likely to challenge if it gets support. The difference in the probability of D rejecting is $c_D^1 - c_D^2 \Rightarrow \frac{sm_D}{(m_D+m_R)(m_D+m_R+s)}$, so T 's rebel support decreases the likelihood of rejection. Because $\frac{\bar{c}_D s}{m_D} + \frac{sm_D}{(m_D+m_R)(m_D+m_R+s)} > \frac{sm_D}{(m_D+m_R)(m_D+m_R+s)}$, T 's rebel support increases R 's willingness to challenge more than it compels D into acquiescing.

Similarly, comparing PBE1 to PBE3, T 's support for D deters civil war overall. Because $c_R^1 - c_R^3 \Rightarrow c$, government support deters R . Conversely, $c_D^3 - c_D^1 \Rightarrow \frac{sm_R}{(m_D+m_R)(m_D+m_R+s)}$, so T 's presence encourages D to fight. Because

$$\frac{sm_R}{(m_D + m_R)(m_D + m_R + s)} > \frac{sm_R}{(m_D + m_R)(m_D + m_R + s)} \quad (\text{A.4})$$

by assumption, government support deters R more than it encourages D .

A.2 Models of political distance and intervention

To estimate models of intervention, I use data from the UCDP External Support dataset, which covers all civil wars, recipients, and interveners in the period

1975-2009. I aggregate the data up to the conflict-intervener level, omitting non-state interveners, such as diaspora groups. Furthermore, I generate the sample of potential interveners by using the Correlates of War list of states. Because I use the first year of the conflict as reference point for RHS variables, interventions by states that did not exist at the time of the conflict onset are dropped from the sample. This applies primarily to long-running conflicts, such as the civil war in Afghanistan, which is coded as a continuous conflict from 1978 to the end of the sample. Some countries, including several East Block countries, that intervened post-9/11 are therefore not included in the sample of interveners.

The dependent variable is categorical, but sometimes states intervene on both sides over the course of a conflict. I code intervention depending on which side the third party supported first, so it is 0 if the third party did not intervene at all in the conflict ($n = 26,528$), 1 if it supported the government only or before supporting rebels ($n = 401$), 2 if it supported the rebels only or before supporting the government ($n = 202$), and 3 if it started supporting both sides in the same year ($n = 4$).




Figure A.1: Distribution of Liberal democracy distance (left) and Ideal point distance (right).

To measure political distance, I take the absolute difference between each country pair's value from several indicators to generate distinct measures of distance in the year a conflict starts. Liberal democracy distance captures the difference in liberal democracy between two countries, while Polyarchy distance measures differences in electoral democracy (both from the V-Dem dataset). Polity2 distance measures the difference in level of democracy, which is primarily a measure of democratic institutions. Ideal point distance is the difference in policy preferences based on states' voting in the United Nations General Assembly,

while Trade openness distance captures the difference in trade policies between states. Figure A.1 shows that the distributions of Liberal democracy distance and Ideal point distance are both right-skewed, but the former has a fatter tail. In other words, there are more observations of large distance in Liberal democracy than Ideal point.

I include a set of covariates on the RHS that are common predictors of intervention and can affect political distance between a given state and other states (descriptive statistics in Table A.2). First, I include the unit-level subcomponents of the distance measure, because 1) a country's level of Liberal democracy affects its distance to other states, 2) democracies and autocracies can differ in attractiveness as targets of intervention and propensity to intervene in civil wars (as third parties). Second, regime types and conflicts can cluster in time and space, so I include a measure of the minimum distance between country pairs (using the Cshapes package). Third, a history of rivalry is likely to be correlated with political distance, because political differences can spur conflict and rivalry, and thus also predict intervention. Fourth, I include a set of unit-level covariates that are consistent predictors of civil war (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), which should affect decisions on intervention by determining the costs and opportunities of external support. These covariates can also affect political distance. Population size can affect political development, so the size of the civil war and the third party countries can make them more or less alike. Military strength can drive conflict and increase distance between neighbors, while economic indicators are correlated with political development and thus political distance.

Table A.2: Descriptive statistics of Liberal democracy model

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Liberal dem. distance	24895	.2529506	.235081	0	.873
Liberal democracy (D)	26813	.1903217	.1855187	.009	.77
Liberal democracy (T)	25203	.3052518	.2776349	.003	.891
Ideal point distance	24082	.8456197	.7480293	.0001007	4.747638
Ideal point (D)	25301	-.2694403	.6773559	-1.726377	2.677345
Ideal point (T)	25825	-.0634526	.8935829	-2.4777	3.0603
Polyarchy distance	25045	.274151	.2341168	0	.894
Polyarchy (D)	26813	.3022789	.2163195	.018	.854
Polyarchy (T)	25355	.3955983	.2920128	.013	.923
Polity2 distance	23053	7.298529	5.841705	0	20
Polity2 (D)	26128	-.8407456	6.343742	-10	10
Polity2 (T)	23928	-.0885155	7.491918	-10	10
Trade openness distance	17216	1.385308	1.304054	0	4.278005
Trade openness (D)	21253	-.7024234	1.134518	-1.903586	2.374419
Trade openness (T)	21859	-.2256079	1.448087	-1.903586	2.374419
Minimum distance	27120	6281.04	4252.651	0	19299.44
Rivalry (Thompson)	27135	.0070757	.0838208	0	1
Population (D)	26737	101404.4	241239.8	91	1174660
CINC (D)	26737	.012247	.0262737	1.00e-05	.141457
GDP (D)	26737	2.30e+11	1.11e+12	0	1.28e+13
GDPpc (D)	26737	2622.19	5329.385	0	45047.5
Growth (D)	26737	1.034304	10.92851	-44.9	57.8178
Population (T)	26605	29241.2	107353.8	0	1342730
CINC (T)	26605	.0059584	.0192955	0	.189375
GDP (T)	26605	1.86e+11	7.79e+11	0	1.51e+13
GDPpc (T)	26605	7681.203	13537.48	0	115003
Growth (T)	26605	2.751988	6.81855	-64.0471	149.973

The results of the Liberal democracy model show a consistent and robust relationship between Liberal democracy distance and intervention (Table A.3). Liberal democracy distance is positively associated with an increased likelihood of rebel support relative to government support, and the coefficient is highly statistically significant. The model estimates also show that third parties are more likely to stay out of civil wars the more democratic the civil war government is, relative to supporting the government. Conversely, democratic third parties are more likely to support the government than stay out or support the government, though that result could be a function of the number of democracies in the sam-

ple. Nonetheless, these results suggest that liberalism and democracy play a role in who intervenes where and who gets support.

The Ideal points model (Table A.4) also shows that increased distance is positively associated with the risk of rebel support relative to government support, and the coefficient is highly significant. This result suggests that policy differences play a role too in decisions on intervention. However, when I include both Liberal democracy distance and Ideal point distance in the same model, the former coefficient remains highly statistically significant while the latter becomes statistically insignificant ($p = 0.1$) (Table A.5). The inclusion of Ideal point distance does not reduce the magnitude of the relationship between Liberal democracy distance and rebel support. The combined model does not include the region dummies, because of non-convergence of the maximum likelihood estimator, so a direct comparison is not possible.

The Liberal democracy distance result is also robust to other specifications (Table A.5). The coefficient remains positive and statistically significant when I limit the sample to politically relevant dyads (contiguous neighbors and major powers). Similarly, including dummies for major powers or decade-fixed effects instead of the region dummies does not change the result.

Lastly, I estimate models with alternative measures of distance (Table A.6). Polyarchy distance is based on the polyarchy measure from V-Dem, and captures the degree of electoral democracy in a given country. The coefficient for rebel support over government support is positive and highly significant, though the magnitude of the relationship is smaller than for Liberal democracy distance.

There is no statistically significant relationship between Polity2 distance and intervention, for any of the outcomes. Similarly, the Trade openness model produces no statistically significant coefficients for staying out or rebel support. As such, I find no evidence that differences over trade policies drive decisions on intervention.

Table A.3: Liberal democracy distance as predictor of intervention

	Stay out	intervention Reb. supp.	Both	Stay out	intervention Reb. supp.	Both	Stay out	intervention Reb. supp.	Both	Stay out	intervention Reb. supp.	Both
Liberal dem. distance	-0.0274 (-0.05)	4.706*** (4.33)	10.77* (1.97)	-0.157 (-0.35)	5.121*** (4.44)	20.77* (2.08)	0.177 (0.38)	4.908*** (4.38)	18.79 (1.40)	0.184 (0.39)	4.394*** (4.08)	47.28*** (3.30)
Liberal democracy (D)	1.631*** (3.53)	-2.279* (-2.29)	-7.087 (-1.15)	4.813*** (6.84)	1.113 (0.96)	-10.55 (-0.85)	4.788*** (6.91)	1.500 (1.35)	-7.530 (-0.46)	4.338*** (5.97)	1.832 (1.67)	-28.26 (-1.74)
Liberal democracy (T)	-1.337*** (-3.00)	-6.742*** (-6.60)	-10.42* (-2.24)	-1.290** (-3.16)	-7.046*** (-6.45)	-19.21* (-2.14)	-0.816 (-1.85)	-6.293*** (-5.71)	-18.17 (-1.52)	-0.956* (-2.16)	-5.901*** (-5.42)	-32.29* (-2.00)
Minimum distance	0.000195*** (10.18)	-0.000129* (-2.42)	-0.000517 (-1.45)	0.000216*** (10.29)	-0.000124* (-2.24)	-0.000636 (-1.33)	0.000233*** (9.90)	-0.000113* (-1.98)	-0.000688 (-1.20)	0.000240*** (9.15)	-0.000113* (-1.96)	-0.00390** (-3.12)
Rivalry (Thompson)	-0.983** (-2.96)	1.476*** (3.80)	-12.94*** (-17.26)	-0.902* (-2.58)	1.587*** (3.97)	-21.20*** (-27.72)	-0.934* (-2.54)	1.528*** (3.66)	-13.35*** (-13.75)	-0.555 (-1.49)	2.120*** (4.90)	-36.04*** (-31.21)
Population (D)				0.00000664 (0.47)	0.0000408* (2.26)	-0.000109 (-1.23)	0.00000974 (0.63)	0.00000375 (1.86)	-0.0000751 (-0.50)	0.00000205 (1.61)	0.0000145 (0.79)	-0.000263 (-1.06)
CINC (D)				17.45*** (4.33)	-59.25** (-2.92)	-1717.4 (-0.90)	19.62*** (3.95)	-54.51* (-2.53)	-2194.3 (-1.00)	0.300 (0.04)	-30.23 (-1.67)	-9807.8 (-1.81)
GDP (D)				-6.26e-13*** (-10.05)	2.63e-14 (0.11)	1.13e-11 (0.25)	-6.80e-13*** (-10.50)	-3.39e-14 (-0.13)	2.10e-11 (0.30)	-6.42e-13*** (-7.33)	-5.39e-13* (-2.26)	8.65e-11 (0.37)
GDPpc (D)				-0.00000793 (-0.68)	0.0000252 (1.60)	0.0000870 (1.08)	-0.00000614 (-0.51)	0.0000255 (1.59)	0.0000135 (0.10)	0.0000624*** (3.69)	0.000135*** (5.37)	0.00397** (3.28)
Growth (D)				-0.0132 (-1.86)	-0.0113 (-1.39)	-0.0505 (-1.93)	-0.0132 (-1.73)	-0.0115 (-1.35)	-0.0545 (-1.64)	-0.00565 (-0.93)	-0.0230* (-2.52)	-0.326*** (-3.79)
Population (T)				0.00000687 (1.85)	-0.00000281 (-0.46)	-0.0000438 (-0.98)	0.000000542 (1.38)	-0.000000542 (-0.46)	-0.00000328 (-0.98)	0.000000542 (1.38)	-0.00000328 (-0.52)	-0.000262 (-1.41)
CINC (T)				-20.19*** (-11.26)	-6.209* (-2.24)	75.59 (1.15)	-20.19*** (-11.26)	-6.209* (-2.24)	75.59 (1.15)	-19.56*** (-10.10)	-5.771* (-1.99)	458.9 (1.65)
GDP (T)				-9.99e-14** (-2.69)	1.23e-13 (1.57)	5.83e-13 (1.52)	-9.99e-14** (-2.69)	1.23e-13 (1.57)	5.83e-13 (1.52)	-1.26e-13*** (-3.34)	7.65e-14 (1.02)	7.75e-13 (0.57)
GDPpc (T)				-0.0000119*** (-3.71)	-0.00000174 (-1.88)	-0.0000894 (-1.31)	-0.0000119*** (-3.71)	-0.00000174 (-1.88)	-0.0000894 (-1.31)	-0.0000109** (-3.24)	-0.0000137 (-1.58)	-0.000126 (-0.66)
Growth (T)				-0.00276 (-0.42)	0.0109 (1.07)	-0.0764*** (-6.98)	-0.00276 (-0.42)	0.0109 (1.07)	-0.0764*** (-6.98)	0.00195 (0.25)	0.0117 (0.99)	-0.182*** (-4.41)
Observations	24892			24548			24429			24284		

t statistics in parentheses

Region dummies omitted

* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.4: Ideal point distance as predictor of intervention

	intervention		Both		intervention		Both		intervention		Both	
	Stay out	Reb. supp.	Stay out	Both	Stay out	Reb. supp.	Stay out	Both	Stay out	Reb. supp.	Stay out	Both
Ideal point distance	-0.729*** (-10.56)	-0.274* (-2.12)	-0.577*** (-6.20)	0.236 (0.67)	0.847 (1.93)	-0.0335 (-0.23)	-0.125 (-1.26)	-0.660 (-0.95)	-0.0972 (-0.97)	0.354* (2.33)	0.428** (2.79)	0.598 (0.26)
Ideal point (D)	-0.0383 (-0.40)	0.141 (0.96)	0.215 (1.85)	-0.234 (-0.78)	0.388 (0.68)	0.570** (3.11)	0.372** (2.89)	0.932 (1.45)	0.0799 (0.57)	0.740*** (3.79)	0.789*** (3.42)	4.725 (1.94)
Ideal point (T)	-0.249** (-3.24)	-0.476*** (-4.30)	-0.314*** (-3.30)	-0.514 (-0.76)	-0.693 (-0.96)	-0.534*** (-4.34)	-0.328** (-3.18)	-1.405*** (-3.35)	-0.343** (-3.26)	-0.513*** (-3.54)	-0.481** (-3.17)	-1.976 (-1.60)
Minimum distance	0.000235*** (10.22)	-0.000296*** (-3.65)	0.000250*** (10.45)	-0.000538 (-1.51)	-0.000699 (-1.68)	-0.000309*** (-3.56)	0.000259*** (10.00)	-0.000760 (-1.44)	0.000273*** (9.67)	-0.000305*** (-3.53)	-0.000350 (-1.67)	-0.00350 (-1.67)
Rivalry (Thompson)	-0.866* (-2.25)	1.437*** (3.36)	-0.777 (-1.79)	-13.77*** (-17.54)	-13.63*** (-14.50)	1.546** (3.26)	-0.916* (-2.10)	1.316** (2.69)	-13.77*** (-10.81)	1.740*** (3.48)	1.740*** (3.48)	-31.68*** (-14.24)
Population (D)			0.00000338* (2.53)	0.00000711*** (4.73)	-0.0000341 (-0.32)	0.00000375* (2.49)	0.00000375* (2.49)	0.00000700*** (4.19)	-0.000120 (-0.81)	0.00000492*** (3.54)	0.00000720*** (3.44)	-0.000457 (-1.05)
CINC (D)			9.811* (2.43)	-61.26*** (-4.25)	-1794.1 (-1.51)	-61.26*** (-4.25)	13.24* (2.54)	-56.34*** (-3.83)	-766.4 (-1.12)	-5.825 (-0.68)	-72.97* (-2.51)	-5462.3 (-1.10)
GDP (D)			-5.09e-13*** (-7.48)	1.26e-13 (0.60)	1.95e-11 (1.65)	-6.39e-13*** (-8.46)	-1.02e-14 (-0.05)	-4.44e-12 (-0.08)	-5.65e-13*** (-5.38)	5.96e-15 (0.02)	5.96e-15 (0.02)	1.31e-10 (1.11)
GDPpcc (D)			0.0000378 (1.72)	0.00000539 (0.18)	0.0000374 (0.23)	0.0000290 (1.39)	0.00000138 (-0.05)	0.0000649 (0.49)	0.0000722** (2.63)	0.00000945 (0.22)	0.00000945 (0.22)	0.00209** (2.84)
Growth (D)			-0.0365*** (-7.17)	-0.0394*** (-4.87)	-0.0712*** (-6.24)	-0.0391*** (-7.27)	-0.0418*** (-5.06)	-0.0984*** (-4.41)	-0.0330*** (-6.27)	-0.0550*** (-4.76)	-0.0550*** (-4.76)	-0.262 (-1.33)
Population (T)			0.00000694 (1.64)	0.00000562 (0.81)	0.00000694 (1.64)	0.00000694 (1.64)	0.00000562 (0.81)	-0.0000608 (-1.74)	0.00000594 (1.36)	0.00000330 (0.45)	0.00000330 (0.45)	-0.0000362 (-0.39)
CINC (T)			-24.48*** (-9.73)	-17.71*** (-4.60)	-24.48*** (-9.73)	-24.48*** (-9.73)	95.40 (1.85)	-18.49*** (-4.65)	-23.30*** (-8.99)	-18.49*** (-4.65)	-18.49*** (-4.65)	100.9 (0.85)
GDP (T)			2.78e-14 (0.57)	2.51e-13** (2.85)	1.27e-12* (2.26)	2.78e-14 (0.57)	2.51e-13** (2.85)	1.27e-12* (2.26)	-1.06e-14 (-0.22)	2.18e-13* (2.24)	2.18e-13* (2.24)	5.81e-13 (0.29)
GDPpcc (T)			-0.00000962* (-2.53)	-0.0000244 (-1.64)	-0.00000962* (-2.53)	-0.00000962* (-2.53)	-0.0000244 (-1.64)	-0.0000754 (-0.77)	-0.0000102** (-2.72)	-0.0000217 (-1.47)	-0.0000217 (-1.47)	0.0000641 (0.42)
Growth (T)			0.00254 (0.31)	0.0254* (2.19)	0.00254 (0.31)	0.00254 (0.31)	0.0254* (2.19)	-0.0738*** (-4.72)	0.00486 (1.80)	0.00486 (1.80)	0.00486 (1.80)	-0.129 (-1.89)
Observations	24080		23698		23698		23698		23698		23698	

t statistics in parentheses
 Region dummies omitted
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.5: Robustness tests for Liberal democracy model

	intervention			intervention			intervention			intervention		
	Stay out	Reb. supp.	Both	Stay out	Reb. supp.	Both	Stay out	Reb. supp.	Both	Stay out	Reb. supp.	Both
Liberal democracy distance	0.810 (1.48)	4.758*** (3.75)	18.10 (1.56)	0.302 (0.70)	3.525** (2.83)	35.00 (1.81)	0.359 (0.77)	5.116*** (4.55)	20.39 (1.45)	0.110 (0.23)	3.003** (3.27)	17.62 (1.79)
Liberal democracy (D)	3.763*** (4.85)	0.0192 (0.02)	-6.898 (-0.49)	1.600* (2.31)	-1.404 (-1.20)	-24.02 (-1.02)	4.644*** (6.05)	1.438 (1.22)	-8.945 (-0.53)	4.904*** (4.11)	4.602*** (4.11)	-7.528 (-0.57)
Liberal democracy (T)	0.0966 (0.17)	-4.990*** (-3.84)	-15.87 (-1.78)	-1.262** (-2.58)	-4.455** (-3.25)	-35.47 (-1.83)	-0.797 (-1.79)	-6.359*** (-5.66)	-19.97 (-1.52)	-0.774 (-1.73)	-4.510*** (-4.85)	-19.03* (-2.32)
Ideal point distance	-0.219 (-1.94)	0.278 (1.65)	-1.152 (-0.97)									
Ideal point (D)	0.236 (1.62)	0.598** (2.64)	0.339 (0.32)									
Ideal point (T)	-0.449** (-3.69)	-0.383* (-2.37)	-1.340* (-2.44)									
Minimum distance	0.000265*** (9.60)	-0.000271** (-3.22)	-0.000682 (-1.14)	0.000182*** (6.00)	0.0000375 (0.49)	-0.000426 (-1.76)	0.000233*** (9.53)	-0.000113* (-1.96)	-0.000671 (-1.22)	0.000231*** (9.64)	-0.000124* (-2.17)	-0.000784 (-1.36)
Rivalry (Thompson)	-0.778 (-1.80)	1.291** (2.64)	-15.60*** (-12.53)	0.257 (0.60)	1.495** (3.23)	-27.74*** (-30.05)	-0.650 (-1.71)	1.793*** (4.16)	-15.86*** (-15.60)	-0.948* (-2.55)	1.521*** (3.61)	-14.46*** (-14.75)
Population (D)	0.000000955 (0.67)	0.00000517** (2.75)	-0.000102 (-0.71)	-0.00000338** (-3.19)	0.00000466* (2.15)	-0.00000102 (-0.01)	0.00000138*** (3.88)	0.0000151*** (3.93)	-0.00000772 (-0.51)	0.00000210 (0.85)	0.000000869* (2.47)	-0.000144 (-0.62)
CINC (D)	24.44*** (4.33)	-54.78** (-2.65)	-962.6 (-1.23)	70.99*** (4.52)	-54.00 (-1.67)	-1892.7 (-0.72)	-170.9*** (-4.41)	-224.4*** (-4.87)	-2231.5 (-1.06)	15.48* (2.33)	-114.9** (-3.00)	-1936.7 (-1.51)
GDP (D)	-7.78e-13*** (-9.17)	-4.22e-14 (-0.15)	-1.86e-11 (-0.20)	-8.91e-13*** (-5.94)	1.34e-13 (0.43)	-2.26e-12 (-0.02)	-7.04e-13*** (-6.75)	-1.62e-13 (-0.59)	1.94e-11 (0.28)	-6.35e-13*** (-9.31)	8.26e-13 (1.93)	2.51e-11 (0.57)
GDPpcc (D)	0.00000314 (0.21)	-0.0000116 (-0.50)	0.000121 (0.92)	-0.00000276 (-0.12)	0.0000180 (0.70)	-0.0000796 (-0.42)	0.0000573* (2.30)	0.0000852** (3.18)	0.0000561 (0.42)	0.00000458 (0.04)	-0.00000652 (-0.04)	-0.0000363 (-0.21)
Growth (D)	-0.0384*** (-6.97)	-0.0421*** (-4.69)	-0.117*** (-3.89)	-0.0342** (-3.28)	-0.0364* (-2.48)	-0.0331 (-0.24)	-0.00421 (-0.78)	-0.00252 (-0.38)	-0.0444 (-1.40)	-0.0124 (-1.09)	-0.0107 (-1.03)	-0.0303 (-1.09)
Population (T)	0.000000570 (1.28)	0.000000319 (0.43)	-0.0000496 (-1.43)	0.000000443 (1.08)	-0.00000483 (-0.81)	-0.00000460 (-1.33)	0.000000820* (2.06)	-0.000000320 (-0.50)	-0.0000479 (-1.19)	0.000000746 (1.91)	9.46e-08 (0.14)	-0.0000327 (-1.44)
CINC (T)	-22.58*** (-8.49)	-17.23*** (-4.16)	78.97 (1.63)	-11.44*** (-5.41)	-8.841** (-2.81)	83.61 (1.66)	-10.68*** (-4.42)	-3.683 (-0.69)	66.81 (1.27)	-20.55*** (-11.21)	-8.432** (-2.85)	60.92 (1.70)
GDP (T)	1.07e-14 (0.21)	2.81e-13** (3.11)	1.44e-12* (1.97)	-4.90e-14 (-1.03)	9.33e-14 (0.73)	4.70e-13 (1.03)	-1.17e-13** (-3.00)	9.58e-14 (1.21)	6.78e-13 (1.42)	-9.56e-14* (-2.45)	2.02e-13* (2.32)	1.04e-12 (1.93)
GDPpcc (T)	-0.0000112** (-3.00)	-0.0000158 (-1.50)	-0.000107 (-1.10)	-0.00000778 (-1.17)	-0.0000484 (-1.90)	0.0000267 (0.04)	-0.0000104** (-2.98)	-0.0000168 (-1.73)	-0.000120 (-1.12)	-0.0000112*** (-3.51)	-0.0000150 (-1.80)	-0.000123 (-1.25)
Growth (T)	0.00397 (0.49)	0.0229 (1.93)	-0.0798*** (-4.63)	0.00922 (0.57)	0.0427 (1.93)	-0.226 (-1.95)	-0.00707 (-1.12)	0.00729 (0.74)	-0.0828*** (-7.78)	0.00178 (0.25)	0.0142 (1.18)	-0.0595*** (-4.87)
Observations	21625	21625	21625	2681	2681	24429	24429	24429	24429	24429	24429	24429
Politically relevant dyads	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Major powers dummies	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No	Yes
Decade dummies	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	No

t statistics in parentheses
Region, decade and major power coefficients omitted
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Table A.6: Polyarchy, Polity2, and Trade openness distance as predictors of intervention

	Stayout	intervention Reb. supp.	Both	Stayout	intervention Reb. supp.	Both	Stayout	intervention Reb. supp.	Both
Polyarchy distance	-0.541 (-1.35)	3.202*** (3.35)	23.07* (2.52)						
Polyarchy (D)	3.370*** (6.50)	1.146 (1.31)	-1.340 (-0.34)						
Polyarchy (T)	-0.385 (-1.11)	-4.375*** (-5.26)	-8.520* (-2.24)						
Polity2 distance				-0.0136 (-1.12)	0.0142 (0.70)	0.112 (1.66)			
Polity2 (D)				0.0766*** (6.38)	0.0843*** (4.74)	0.298*** (4.80)			
Polity2 (T)				-0.00345 (-0.32)	-0.0736*** (-4.06)	0.0892 (1.58)			
Trade openness distance									13.73*** (4.88)
Trade openness (D)									-176.7*** (-12.40)
Trade openness (T)									-13.46*** (-5.19)
Minimum distance	0.000248*** (9.28)	-0.000110 (-1.88)	-0.00342** (-2.70)	0.000248*** (9.52)	-0.000123* (-1.99)	-0.000728 (-1.31)	0.000311*** (9.98)	-0.000374*** (-17.74)	-0.0850*** (-17.45)
Rivalry (Thompson)	-0.550 (-1.44)	2.164*** (4.91)	-20.76*** (-11.39)	-0.841* (-1.97)	1.747*** (3.67)	-11.28*** (-9.54)	-0.347 (-0.76)	1.719** (3.14)	-66.27*** (-25.29)
Population (D)	0.00000217 (1.93)	0.00000153 (0.87)	-0.000670** (-3.00)	0.00000219 (1.82)	0.00000466** (2.66)	-0.00000788 (-0.07)	0.00000615* (2.55)	0.00000842 (1.72)	0.00320*** (20.76)
CINC (D)	-1.266 (-0.19)	-32.96 (-1.82)	-4375.3 (-1.27)	16.26** (3.15)	-33.33* (-2.13)	-2800.3 (-1.40)	-16.94 (-0.62)	-31.20 (-0.49)	-41202.0*** (-22.59)
GDP (D)	-6.09e-13*** (-7.02)	-4.34e-13 (-1.79)	1.13e-10 (0.78)	-6.75e-13*** (-9.38)	-2.02e-12* (-2.16)	1.85e-11 (0.15)	-5.63e-13* (-2.19)	-5.47e-12*** (-3.50)	-2.59e-10*** (-17.18)
GDPpc (D)	0.0000718*** (4.40)	0.000137*** (5.62)	0.00177 (1.25)	0.0000341* (2.06)	0.0000786*** (3.58)	0.0000908 (0.74)	0.0000914** (3.12)	0.000146*** (3.52)	0.0558*** (19.22)
Growth (D)	-0.00387 (-0.63)	-0.0232* (-2.52)	-0.236** (-2.94)	-0.0396*** (-8.73)	-0.0385*** (-6.14)	-0.0464 (-1.90)	-0.0316*** (-6.47)	-0.0475*** (-4.72)	-8.281*** (-12.74)
Population (T)	0.00000537 (1.36)	-0.00000525 (-0.82)	-0.000236 (-1.07)	0.00000682 (1.67)	-0.00000333 (-0.52)	-0.00000555 (-1.01)	0.00000270*** (3.76)	-0.00000336* (-1.99)	-0.00224*** (-5.60)
CINC (T)	-19.36*** (-10.07)	-4.299 (-1.48)	418.1 (1.21)	-20.81*** (-11.00)	-5.304 (-1.84)	122.6 (1.29)	-44.48*** (-7.97)	14.08 (0.93)	9080.3*** (25.40)
GDP (T)	-1.37e-13*** (-3.62)	7.98e-14 (0.99)	8.95e-13 (0.66)	-1.33e-13*** (-3.43)	6.87e-14 (0.92)	4.48e-13 (0.87)	1.32e-13 (1.79)	-1.30e-13 (-0.57)	-2.47e-11*** (-3.28)
GDPpc (T)	-0.0000117*** (-3.62)	-0.0000250* (-2.40)	-0.000181 (-0.92)	-0.0000148*** (-3.51)	-0.0000216* (-2.29)	-0.000171 (-1.35)	-0.0000276*** (-7.52)	-0.0000403** (-3.03)	-0.00742*** (-3.75)
Growth (T)	0.00154 (0.20)	0.0106 (0.86)	-0.141** (-2.85)	0.00255 (0.34)	0.0200 (1.88)	-0.0920*** (-3.82)	0.0119 (1.43)	0.0344* (2.35)	-6.761*** (-13.12)
Observations	24433			22606			16804		

t statistics in parentheses
Region dummies coefficients omitted. Polity2 model does not include region dummies
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001

Appendix B

Appendix for Chapter 3

B.1 Civil war

Proposition 1. *When $\pi < \min(\pi^{IW}, \pi_T^\dagger)$, $e > e_{CW}$, $\bar{c}_D > \bar{c}_D^{CW}$, $c_R < c^\dagger$, and $b < b^\dagger$ there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which:*

- *R challenges.*
- *D rejects and retaliates when $c_D < c_D^\dagger$, rejects and tolerates when $c_D^\dagger \leq c_D < c_D^\dagger$ and accepts when $c_D \geq c_D^\dagger$.*
- *If D rejects, T believes $c_D \sim U(0, c_D^\dagger]$ and stays out; otherwise T believes $c_D \sim U(c_D^\dagger, \bar{c}_D]$*

Proof of Proposition 1. I start by identifying D 's cutpoint strategy. D 's type is drawn from a uniform, continuous distribution, defined by $c_D^* \in (0, \bar{c}_D)$, and it is indifferent between acquiescing and fighting a civil war when $0 = p_D^{CW} \pi - c_D$, or $c_D^\dagger = p_D^{CW} \pi$. D is indifferent between tolerating and retaliating when $p_D^{ICW} \pi -$

$c_D = p_D^{IW} - (ec_D)$, or $c_D^\ddagger = \frac{p_D^{IW} - p_D^{ICW}\pi}{e-1}$. D is a plausible type that retaliates after rejecting R 's demand when $0 < c_D^\ddagger < c_D^\dagger < \bar{c}_D$, which is true when:

$$\pi < \frac{p_D^{IW}}{p_D^{ICW}} = \pi^{IW}, \quad (\text{B.1})$$

$$e > \frac{p_D^{IW} + \pi * (p_D^{CW} - p_D^{ICW})}{p_D^{CW} \pi} = e_{CW}, \quad (\text{B.2})$$

and

$$\bar{c}_D > p_D^{CW} \pi = \bar{c}_D^{CW} \quad (\text{B.3})$$

Next, R believes $c_D \sim U(0, \bar{c}_D]$ and challenges when $\frac{c_D^\dagger}{\bar{c}_D}((1 - p_D^{CW})\pi - c_R) + \frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^\dagger}{\bar{c}_D} \pi \geq 0$, which simplifies to $c_R \leq \frac{\bar{c}_D \pi}{p_D^{CW} \pi} - p_D^{CW} \pi = c_R^\dagger$. $c_R^\dagger > 0$ is ensured when $\bar{c}_D > p_D^{CW} (p_D^{CW} \pi)$, which is true as long as Equation 3 holds. I assume that war is costly for R , so $(1 - p_D^{CW})\pi - c_R < 0$, or $c_R > (1 - p_D^{CW})\pi$. There is a range of c_R where R challenges without being undeterrable when $0 < 1 - p_D^{CW} \pi < c_R^\dagger < \frac{\bar{c}_D \pi}{p_D^{CW} \pi} - p_D^{CW} \pi$. This is always true as long as $\bar{c}_D > \bar{c}_D^{CW}$, which holds as long as Equation 3 holds.

Following D 's rejection, T stays out of a civil war when $(1 - \pi) \geq \frac{c_D^\ddagger}{c_D^\dagger}((1 - p_D^{IW} - p_{R|W}) - (ec_T)) + \frac{c_D^\dagger - c_D^\ddagger}{c_D^\dagger} * ((1 - \pi) + (1 - p_D^{ICW}) * b - c_T)$, which simplifies to $b < -\frac{c_T(c_D^\dagger + c_D^\ddagger(e-1)) + c_D^\ddagger(p_D^{IW} + p_R^{IW} - \pi)}{(p_D^{ICW} - 1)\pi(c_D^\dagger - c_D^\ddagger)} = b^\dagger$. $b^\dagger > 0$ is ensured when $\pi < p_D^{IW} + p_R^{IW} = \pi_T^\dagger$.

B.2 Internationalized civil war and interstate war

Proposition 2. *When $\pi < \pi^{IW}$, $e > \max\{e_{IW}, e_T^\circ\}$, $\bar{c}_D > \max\{\bar{c}_D^{IW}, \bar{c}_D^\circ\}$, $c_R^\circ > c_R$, $b > b^\circ$, and $c_T < c_T^\circ$, there exists a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in which:*

- *R challenges.*
- *D rejects and retaliates when $c_D < c_D^\ddagger$, rejects and tolerates when $c_D^\ddagger \leq c_D < c_D^\circ$ and accepts when $c_D \geq c_D^\circ$.*
- *If D fights, T believes $c_D \sim U(0, c_D^\circ]$ and intervenes; otherwise T believes $c_D \sim U(c_D^\circ, \bar{c}_D]$.*

Proof of Proposition 2. I start by defining D's cutpoint strategy. D is indifferent between tolerating intervention and retaliating at cut-point c_D^\ddagger , and is indifferent between tolerating intervention and acquiescing to R's challenge when $p_D^{ICW} \pi - c_D = 0$, which simplifies to $c_D^\circ = p_D^{ICW} \pi$. Incentive compatibility requires the cutpoints be ordered $0 < c_D^\ddagger < c_D^\circ < \bar{c}_D$, which is true when $\pi < \pi^{IW}$ (as above), $e > \frac{p_D^{IW}}{p_D^{ICW} * \pi} = e_{IW}$, and $\bar{c}_D > p_D^{ICW} \pi = \bar{c}_D^{IW}$.

R challenges D when it prefers fighting an international conflict to accepting the status quo. Given a challenge from R, there are three potential outcomes. D fights and retaliates against T, fights and tolerates an intervention, or acquiesces. R therefore challenges when:

$$\frac{c_D^\ddagger}{c_D} (p_R^{IW} - (ec_R)) + \frac{c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D} ((1 - p_D^{ICW})(\pi - a) - c_R) + \frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^\circ}{\bar{c}_D} \pi \geq 0, \quad (\text{B.4})$$

which simplifies to $c_R < \frac{a(c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger)(p_D^{ICW} - 1) + (\bar{c}_D + c_D^\ddagger)(p_D^{ICW} - 1) - c_D^\circ p_D^{ICW} \pi + c_D^\ddagger p_R^{IW}}{c_D^\circ + c_D^\ddagger(e-1)} = c_R^\circ$. $c_R > 0$ is ensured when $\bar{c}_D > \frac{-a(c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger)(p_D^{ICW} - 1) + c_D^\circ p_D^{ICW} \pi - c_D^\ddagger((p_D^{ICW} - 1)\pi + p_R^{IW})}{\pi} = \bar{c}_D^\circ$.

To ensure war does not happen because R is undeterrable, R prefers the status quo to fighting, so $(1 - p_D^{ICW})(\pi - a) - c_R < 0$ and $p_R^{IW} - (e * c_R)$, or $c_R > (p_D^{ICW} - 1)(a - \pi)$ and $c_R > \frac{p_R^{IW}}{e}$, respectively. For there to be a range of types R that risk war despite war being costly, $c_R^\circ > \max[(p_D^{ICW} - 1)(a - \pi), \frac{p_R^{IW}}{e}]$. This is true as long as $c_R^\circ > c_R > 0$, because if

$$\frac{c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D} u_R(IW) + \frac{c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D} u_R(ICW) + \frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^\circ}{\bar{c}_D} \pi \geq 0 \quad (\text{B.5})$$

and

$$0 > \frac{c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D} u_R(IW) + \frac{c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D} u_R(ICW), \quad (\text{B.6})$$

then $\frac{c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D} (p_R^{IW} - (e * c_R)) + \frac{c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D} ((1 - p_D^{ICW})(\pi - a) - c_R) > \frac{c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D} u_R(IW) + \frac{c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D} u_R(ICW)$ is true.

Following D 's rejection, T intervenes when $\frac{c_D^\ddagger}{c_D^\circ} ((1 - p_D^{IW} - p_R^{IW}) - (e c_T)) + \frac{c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger}{c_D^\circ} ((1 - \pi) + (1 - p_D^{ICW})b - c_T) \geq (1 - \pi)$, which simplifies to

$$b > \frac{c_T(c_D^\ddagger(1 - e) - c_D^\circ) + c_D^\ddagger(\pi - p_D^{IW} - p_R^{IW})}{(p_D^{ICW} - 1)\pi(c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger)} = b^\circ. \quad (\text{B.7})$$

$0 < b^\circ < 1$ is ensured when $e > 1 - \frac{p_D^{IW} - \pi + p_R^{IW}}{c_T} - \frac{c_D^\circ}{c_D^\ddagger} = e_T^\circ$ and

$$c_T < -\frac{c_D^\circ(p_D^{ICW} - 1)\pi + c_D^\ddagger(p_D^{IW} + p_R^{IW} - p_D^{ICW}\pi)}{c_D^\circ + c_D^\ddagger(e - 1)} = c_T^\circ. \quad (\text{B.8})$$

B.3 Varying levels of intervention

If T is given the option of intervening small ($p_D^{ICW^s}$) or large ($p_D^{ICW^l}$), where $p_D^{ICW^s} > p_D^{ICW^l}$, there exists at least one PBE where T provides a small amount of support and R rebels. Since R 's strategy follows the same logic as Proposition 2, I focus here on T 's strategy. T intervenes when it is not too costly (as above), but chooses the level of support depending on how much intervention helps R win and how this affects the risk of retaliation. D is indifferent between tolerating a small intervention and acquiescing to R 's challenge when $p_D^{ICW^s}\pi - c_D = 0$, which simplifies to $c_D^\otimes = p_D^{ICW^s}\pi$, and indifferent between tolerating a small intervention and retaliating when $p_D^{ICW^s}\pi - c_D = p_D^{IW} - (ec_D)$, or $c_D^\star = \frac{p_D^{IW} - p_D^{ICW^s}\pi}{e-1}$. D is indifferent between tolerating a large intervention and retaliating when $p_D^{ICW^l}\pi - c_D = p_D^{IW} - (ec_D)$, or $c_D^\bullet = \frac{p_D^{IW} - p_D^{ICW^l}\pi}{e-1}$. Therefore, T provides a small level of support when:

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{c_D^\star}{c_D^\otimes}((1 - p_D^{IW} - p_{R|W}) - (ec_T)) + \frac{c_D^\otimes - c_D^\star}{c_D^\otimes}((1 - \pi) + (1 - p_D^{ICW^s})b - c_T) \\ & \geq \frac{c_D^\bullet}{c_D^\otimes}((1 - p_D^{IW} - p_{R|W}) - (ec_T)) + \frac{c_D^\otimes - c_D^\bullet}{c_D^\otimes}((1 - \pi) + (1 - p_D^{ICW^l})b - c_T) \end{aligned} \quad (\text{B.9})$$

Setting the two utility functions as equal and solving for $p_D^{ICW^l}$ yields two solutions: $p_D^{ICW^s}$ and $\frac{\pi(b(-e)p_D^{ICW^s} + b - 1) + (b+1)p_D^{IW} + (e-1)c_T + p_R^{IW}}{b\pi}$. Because the RHS of the inequality is a concave function of $p_D^{ICW^l}$, two cut-points imply a range of $p_D^{ICW^l}$ where defection to a large intervention is profitable, but the first solution is a trivial constraint, because $p_D^{ICW^l} < p_D^{ICW^s}$ by assumption, so $p_D^{ICW^s}$ must be

an upper bound for defection. The second solution is therefore a lower bound for defection, which implies that T does not defect to a larger intervention when the gap between a small and a large is too great, because doing so will surely provoke retaliation.

B.4 Interdependence, club goods, and coalition warfighting

For the first extension, showing that R 's willingness to challenge is increasing in affinity is trivial, because the change only affects its payoff in an internationalized civil war, and $\frac{\partial u_R(ICW)}{\partial b} > 0$.

If T 's payoff in an internationalized civil war is an increasing function of R 's autonomy costs, then T intervenes when:

$$\frac{c_D^\ddagger}{c_D^\circ}((1-p_D^{IW}-p_R^{IW})-(ec_T)) + \frac{c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger}{c_D^\circ}((1-\pi) + (1-p_D^{ICW})ba - c_T) \geq (1-\pi), \quad (\text{B.10})$$

which simplifies to: $\frac{c_T(c_D^\ddagger(e-1)+c_D^\circ)+c_D^\ddagger(p_D^{IW}-\pi+p_R^{IW})}{b(p_D^{ICW}-1)\pi(c_D^\ddagger-c_D^\circ)} > a = a_T^*$. This is then the lower bound for a in equilibrium.

If T is intervening, R challenges when:

$$\frac{c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D}(p_R^{IW} - (ec_R)) + \frac{c_D^\circ - c_D^\ddagger}{\bar{c}_D}((1-p_D^{ICW})(\pi - \frac{a}{b}) - c_R) + \frac{\bar{c}_D - c_D^\circ}{\bar{c}_D}\pi \geq 0, \quad (\text{B.11})$$

which I rearrange as $\frac{b(-c_R(c_D^\dagger(e-1)+c_D^\circ)+\pi(\bar{c}_D+c_D^\dagger(p_D^{ICW}-1)-c_D^\circ p_D^{ICW})+c_D^\dagger p_R^{IW})}{(p_D^{ICW}-1)(c_D^\dagger-c_D^\circ)} < a = a_R^*$. R challenges and T intervenes when $a_T^* \leq a \leq a_R^*$, which holds when b and \bar{c}_D are sufficiently high, and c_T and c_R are sufficiently low.

Proving the second extension is straightforward. To show that T receiving club goods without intervening, it is sufficient to compare the comparative statics of T 's payoffs for internationalized civil war and civil war in terms of b and show that the former is greater than the latter. By assumption, $\frac{\partial u_T(ICW)}{\partial b} = \pi - p_D^{ICW} \pi > \frac{\partial u_T(CW)}{\partial b} = \pi - p_D^{CW} \pi$.

It is trivial to show that R and T are strictly better off fighting in a coalition together rather than an all-against-all, so this change does not affect why they fight. For R , $p_R^{IW} + (1 - p_D^{IW} - p_R^{IW})b - (e \times c_R) > p_R^{IW} - (e \times c_R)$ by assumption. Similarly, for T , $(1 - p_D^{IW} - p_R^{IW}) + p_R^{IW}b - (e \times c_T) > (1 - p_D^{IW} - p_R^{IW}) - (e \times c_T)$ is always true. While coalition fighting offers club goods, it does not change why they fight, because b is bound between 0 and 1, so neither of the actors prefer the other to win at the expense of themselves.

Appendix C

Appendix for Chapter 4

C.1 Codebook

C.1.1 Scope and aim

Why do some civil wars turn into interstate wars? I argue in this project that domestic conflicts must be considered in an international context. Specifically, third parties can cause civil wars by preventing local actors from reaching a peaceful settlement. However, governments might also have an incentive to expand the original conflict; the threat of retaliatory attacks against external actors can deter intervention, and by extension the onset of civil war in the first place. In order to evaluate the theory underpinning this project, we need systematically collected data on retaliation and civil war expansions. However, the available data on interstate disputes and conflicts are either inadequate or inappropriate for this project. In short, the purpose of this coding project is to identify if, how, and when civil war governments retaliate against third-party states that provide

support for rebels. This document spells out the data to be collected and the variables to be coded.

C.1.2 Key definitions

1. **Civil war state/domestic government:** The government of a country experiencing a civil war, fighting an armed rebel group.
2. **Rebel group:** A domestic-based armed group fighting for political control over all, or parts of, a country.
3. **Intervener:** A third-party state government involved in an ongoing civil war.
4. **Intervention:** Intervention can take many forms, ranging from offering sanctuary to a rebel group, to providing arms or other material support to a rebel group, to sending its own troops to fight the domestic government either alongside or in conjunction with the rebels.
5. **Retaliation:** The use of military force against an intervener **outside the original territory of the civil war**. In most cases, retaliation will incur in or adjacent to the intervener's territory. Retaliation can take many forms, but must include the use of force against either population or material targets. The force may be conducted by regular military forces belonging to the domestic government, or it may be conducted by agents or allies of the domestic government. The latter may include other non-governmental

armed groups, while the former would be other states allied with or sympathetic to the domestic government.

6. **Threat of retaliation:** The implicit or explicit threat of using force against a third-party intervener. Implicitly, a domestic government can mobilize troops on the border or conduct military exercises meant to compel the third party to stop its rebel support. Explicitly, a domestic government can make specific demands of the third party related to its rebel support, threatening to conduct (a type of) retaliation unless support is withdrawn.

C.1.3 Unit of analysis

The unit of analysis for the data is conflict-intervener-recipient, as seen in Table C.1. This means that for every civil war, there may be multiple interveners on the side of the rebels, and each intervener may support multiple groups within each conflict. However, distinguishing between different recipients is only relevant if the data indicates that a third party shifted support during a conflict, so its involvement in the conflict can be split into different periods. The coder must then check every conflict-intervener pair for the relevant period(s) to see if in the course of that conflict, there was retaliation against a specific intervener.

Table C.1: Excerpt of data.

Conflict ID	Domestic government	Intervener	Direct retaliation	Proxy retaliation
1	Afghanistan	USA	0	0
1	Afghanistan	Pakistan	1	1
1	Afghanistan	Saudi Arabia	0	0

C.1.4 Variables

CWED distinguishes between several types of retaliation. At the most extreme end, domestic governments can take direct military action against the third party, or they can provide support for other rebel groups that are fighting the third party (proxy retaliation). Furthermore, CWED captures instances of indirect retaliation, covert retaliation, threats of retaliation, and ambiguous retaliation. Most variables are not mutually exclusive, but rather represent the range of actions that can be taken to expand a civil war beyond its borders, either to increase the stakes of the conflict or simply compel withdrawal.

Direct retaliation (binary) *Did the civil war government take direct military action against the intervener after intervention started?*

This measure captures whether the civil war government used **military force** to strike against the intervener **outside of the local conflict**, specifically targets in or adjacent to the intervener's territory (but outside of the domestic government's territory). The use of force must have been initiated **after intervention started**.

Example: After the Tutsi ousted the Hutu government following the 1994 Hutu-led genocide, many Hutu fled Rwanda to Zaire and Tanzania. Hutus soon began to conduct cross-border raids, and the Tutsi government responded by attacking both the Hutu forces and the Zaire government.

Proxy retaliation (binary) *Did an ally (government or non-governmental armed group (NGA)) of the civil war government take direct military action against the intervener after intervention started?*

This measure captures whether another actor allied with the civil war government, be it another state or a non-governmental actor such as a terrorist organization or militia, used **military force** against the intervener **outside of the local conflict**, specifically targets in or adjacent to the intervener's territory. The use of force must have been initiated **after intervention started**.

There are two criteria for proxy retaliation: an established relationship, and the use of violence by a proxy. The relationship between the civil war government and the proxy is confirmed through news sources or existing datasets. Furthermore, there must be at least one instance of the proxy using force against the target in the relevant period.

Example: In the mid to late 1990s, Eritrea broke off relations with Sudan in December 1994, accusing Sudan of supporting the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement's efforts to overthrow Eritrean president Isaias Afewerki. On its part, Sudan has accused the Eritrean government of giving shelter to armed Sudanese opposition groups, which use Eritrean borders as a springboard in attacking Sudanese military and civilian targets in a bid to topple the Sudanese Islamic government.

Indirect retaliation (binary) *Did the civil war government take indirect military action against an ally or other economic interests of the intervener after interven-*

tion started?

This measure captures whether the civil war government used **military force** against an **ally** of the intervener or against some **economic interest** of the intervener, such as a corporation or organization. The use of force must have been initiated **after intervention started**.

Example: In 1990, Senegal shot at and seized a Soviet fishing boat in disputed waters off Guinea-Bissau's coast. The maritime feud corresponds with Senegalese rebel group Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance taking sanctuary in Guinea-Bissau, and appears to have been aimed at Guinea-Bissau's economic interests. Because it occurred outside of Guinea-Bissau's mutually accepted sovereign territory, it counts as an act of indirect retaliation.

Covert retaliation (binary) *Did the civil war government take covert military action against the intervener after intervention started?*

This measure captures whether the civil war government used **covert military force** against the intervener **outside of the local conflict**, specifically in or adjacent to the intervener's territory. This includes the use of special operations forces or other agents to cause harm against the intervener or its interests. Types of operations include assassinations, acts of terrorism, or other violent attacks.

This variable should be used with caution for two reasons. First, these incidents are usually done in secret and by definition go unacknowledged, so any count based on open sources would be an undercount of the frequency of covert interventions. Second, states can strategically censor or divulge this information,

so any correlation between state characteristics and observed use of covert retaliation can be the product of spurious relationships. For instance, powerful states can selectively leak, without publicly acknowledging, capabilities or operations in order to deter or compel lesser states.

Example: In response to Pakistani interference in the ongoing Afghan Civil War, the Soviet intelligence service KGB conducted several covert operations in retaliation, including an assassination attempt of the Pakistani president.

Threat of retaliation (binary) *Did the civil war government threaten retaliation against the intervener after intervention started?*

This measure captures whether the civil war government **threatened to use military force** against the intervener **outside of the local conflict**, specifically in or adjacent to the intervener's territory. The threat must have been made **after intervention started**. The threat itself does not need to be explicit; it may be transmitted through explicit communication or through public displays of force such as military maneuvers or mobilization (i.e. the definition used by Militarized Compellent Threats project).

Example: During the American Civil War, Great Britain was considering intervening on behalf of the Confederacy in order to protect the cotton trade. Concerned about any foreign intervention or recognition of the Confederacy, U.S. Secretary of State William H. Seward declared in a diplomatic dispatch, which he also made public in U.S. newspapers, that the United States would go to war with any country that did so (Jones, 2010, p. 42). For the British, war with the

United States constituted a direct threat to Canada and its other territories in the hemisphere.

Ambiguous retaliation (binary) *Is there ambiguous evidence of retaliation?*

This measure captures whether there is ambiguous evidence of retaliation by the civil war government against the intervener. This coding is used as a last resort when there is great uncertainty about either who conducted the military action against the intervener or for what reason it was conducted.

Example: During the U.S. occupation of Iraq, Iran intervened with militias and troops to aid parts of the Iraqi insurgency. There is no evidence of direct U.S. retaliation, but there were several assassinations of Iranian nuclear engineers in the period. It is unclear if this was conducted by the United States (or an ally, such as Israel), and whether it was connected to the Iraq Civil War or whether the Iranian nuclear program was treated completely separate from the conflict.

C.1.5 Sources and existing datasets

To collect data on war expansions, we relied on a wide range of sources, including existing datasets and news sources.

1. Existing datasets:

- MID: The Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset captures a wide range of actions taken by states against other states, ranging from

threats to direct military confrontation. This dataset was particularly useful for identifying direct retaliation.

- GSS: Gleditsch et al. (2008) identify which MIDs relate to ongoing civil wars for the period 1946-1997 (hereby referred to as GSS). This dataset provided additional background material and evaluated the relationship between ongoing civil wars and the interstate dispute. This dataset was useful for identifying direct retaliation (and sometimes proxy retaliation) for the years covered.
- ICB: The International Crisis Behavior dataset collects narratives on 455 crises, 35 protracted conflicts, and 1000 state actors for the period 1918-2007. The ICB narratives helped in the CWED coding.
- UCDP: The UCDP External Support dataset, captures external support for all warring parties on a yearly basis and includes detailed information about the type of support provided. This dataset helped identify instances of proxy intervention.

2. **LexisNexus:** This news database was used to conduct broad searches during the civil war-intervention period to identify any instances of retaliation not covered in existing datasets or verify existing coding.

CWED offers several advantages over existing datasets, with the closest being GSS. While GSS captures some, but not all, disputes that arise from civil wars, it does not specify who is escalating or expanding the conflict. It therefore cannot distinguish between cases of domestic governments retaliating against

third parties and cases of third parties escalating their support to include sending troops. Furthermore, in some cases it is restrictive in whether a MID counts as civil war-related, so it misses some instances of retaliation. For instance, MID #2571 involved South Africa launching ground and air strikes against African National Congress (ANC) facilities in the capital of Zambia in 1986, but this dispute is not covered by GSS. In CWED, this instance is coded as direct retaliation by South Africa against Zambia in response to its support for the ANC. Lastly, CWED captures more forms of retaliation. Of particular note is the prevalence of proxy retaliation against third parties. As I show below, this form of retaliation is quite common, and omitting it from empirical analyses would mean undercounting war expansions and miss an important link between civil wars and interstate conflicts.

C.2 Research design: Government support

I estimate a conflict-level multinomial logit model to test Hypotheses 4.1.1 and 4.1.2. I do so to see whether some of the theory's implications can be tested using a simpler research design. Dyadic or triadic empirical models rely on assumptions about which other actors are relevant, so a conflict-based test can, if successful, enable easier interpretation and predictions. I employ two versions of the dependent variable; the first counts only direct retaliation, whereas the second also includes instances of proxy retaliation (*Expansion direct/proxy*). As Table C.2 shows, the broader measure of retaliation includes 7 more war expansions, or 50% more.

Table C.2: Frequency of intervention and retaliation on conflict level.

Expansion (direct)	Expansion (direct/proxy)			Total
	No rebel support	Int. civil war	Interstate war	
No rebel support	50	0	0	50
Int. civil war	0	14	7	21
Interstate war	0	0	20	20
Total	50	14	27	91

The challenge with a monadic research design is finding a measure that can capture increases in the local stakes. While π is a relative variable, an absolute increase in the local stakes will increase π as long as it does not affect any international stakes as well. One way the local stakes can increase is if the domestic government receives external support. Government support can raise the stakes because rebel victory means not only defeating the domestic government, but also whoever is supporting the government in the conflict. Government support can also increase the military strength of the domestic government, thus increasing deterrence, so any test of the relationship between government support and intervention and retaliation would be a conservative test.

Using the UCDP data, I construct a dummy variable for whether the civil war government has received any kind of unambiguous support from another state during the civil war (*Government support (strict)*). However, because I am worried about potential endogeneity with rebel support causing government support, I only code conflicts as having experiences government-sided support if it started in one or more years prior to the start of any rebel-sided intervention. If there is no rebel-sided intervention at all, the variable is coded 1 if there is any

government-sided support. I code an alternative variable where I also included instances of government support starting in the same year as rebel-sided support (*Government support*). The number of positive cases is more than double that of the stricter coding (see Table C.3).

Table C.3: Frequency of government-sided intervention prior to any rebel support.

Government support (strict)	Government support		Total
	No	Yes	
No	48	22	70
Yes	0	21	21
Total	48	43	91

One concern with using government support as a proxy for higher local stakes is that a third party supporting the government has its own interests. Third parties might support governments who are unlikely to retaliate in the first place, so any correlation would be due to selection bias. Using the strict measure of government support should lessen this concern as those third parties intervene on the side of the government before any rebel support commences. Alternatively, third parties could restrain governments from retaliating for reasons other than the relative size of the local stakes. A cross-sectional study cannot identify such a relationship, so in the next chapter I use the Afghan Civil War to examine how government support affects the incentives for intervention and retaliation.

Table C.4: Descriptive statistics of Government support model.

	count	mean	sd	min	max
Government support (strict)	91	.2307692	.4236593	0	1
Government support	91	.4725275	.5020106	0	1
DCA (dummy)	75	.2666667	.4451946	0	1

I include a set of covariates that are associated with intervention and can affect a country's likelihood of experiencing government-sided support. I include a lagged dummy variable to indicate whether the civil war country had at least one Defense Cooperation Agreement (*DCA*) with another state (Kinne, 2020), because states with these agreements should be more likely to help each other in the event of a civil war, while also affecting other third parties' willingness to support the rebels. A country's regime type can affect its likelihood of getting government support while also making it more or less likely another third party will support the rebels, so I include the *Executive constraint* variable (lagged) from the PolityIV dataset. Demographics can also affect third parties' willingness to support either the government or the rebels, because they affect the costs of intervention and the likelihood of rebel victory. I therefore include variables for *Urban population*, *Population density*, and $\ln(\text{Population})$ (all lagged). Third parties also care about a civil war country's prosperity and military strength when deciding to intervene, so I include variables for Gross Domestic Product per capita ($\ln(\text{GDPpc})$) and their Composite Index of National Capability score *CINC* (all lagged). Lastly, because civil wars can spread across borders, and often times contiguous neighbors intervene in civil wars, I include a dummy

variable for whether a contiguous neighbor is at war (*Neighbor at war*). I also include decade dummy variables, so the linear component of the regression equation is:

$$\begin{aligned} \eta_{iy} = & \alpha_y + \beta_{1y}\text{Government support}_i + \beta_{2y}\text{DCA}_i + \beta_{3y}\text{Executive constraint (t-1)}_i \\ & + \beta_{4y}\ln(\text{Population (t-1)})_i + \beta_{5y}\text{Urban population (t-1)}_i \\ & + \beta_{6y}\text{Population density (t-1)}_i + \beta_{7y}\ln(\text{GDPpc (t-1)})_i + \beta_{8y}\text{CINC (t-1)}_i \\ & + \beta_{9y}\text{Neighbor at war}_i + \beta_{10y}1980s_i + \beta_{11y}1990s_i + \beta_{12y}2000s_i \end{aligned} \quad (\text{C.1})$$

To test the role of uncertainty, I interact government support with time since a leader transition in the civil war country, similar to the research design in the dyadic GDP-ratio model.

C.3 Analysis: Government support

I use *Government support (strict)* as a proxy for relatively higher local stakes to predict intervention and retaliation, and the empirical model offers some support for my hypothesis (see full regression results in Table C.6). Domestic governments that received third-party support first are less likely to retaliate against a third-party rebel supporter than those that did not. The coefficient for the explanatory variable is highly statistically significant, which suggests that this difference is unlikely to be due to random chance. Furthermore, the magnitude of the relationship appears substantial. A conflict with government support first is 25% less likely to expand than remain an internationalized civil war.

The coefficient is not statistically significant for a civil war staying local relative to becoming an internationalized civil war. The model suggests that countries with government support first are neither more or less likely to experience rebel-sided intervention without retaliation. This is counter to the model's prediction, which predicts that increases in π make intervention more attractive while reducing the risk of retaliation.

I also estimate the model using the broader measure of retaliation, with no statistically significant results. One explanation for this null result can be that proxy retaliation, which is quite common, does not carry the same escalatory costs as direct retaliation, and T knows this. There might be less of a tradeoff between capturing the international stakes (i.e. T 's territory) and the additional destruction, so the local stakes will not be as strong of a predictor of broader sets of retaliation.

One important caveat to the above results is that most civil wars do not experience government-sided support in year(s) prior to rebel support (see Table C.5). Usually, government- and rebel-sided interventions start in the same year. Furthermore, those civil wars that do experience government-sided intervention, are much less likely to experience rebel-sided intervention in the years that follow. Only four civil wars experienced government-sided intervention first and then rebel support (Central African Republic in 2001, Djibouti in 1991, Algeria in 1985, and Afghanistan in 1975), of which only one (Afghanistan) resulted in retaliation. Therefore, the results hinge on a select few observations.

Table C.5: War expansion by government support.

Gov. support (strict)	Civil war	Expansion (direct)		Total
		Int. civil war	Interstate war	
0	33	18	19	70
1	17	3	1	21
Total	50	21	20	91

Because D has private information about its resolve, we should expect the relationship between the local stakes and retaliation be conditional on uncertainty, per Hypothesis 4.1.2. However, I find no support for such a conditional relationship when I estimate an empirical model of government support and war expansion (see Table C.7 in the appendix). One explanation for the lack of a conditional relationship is that the measure of π is weak, and another is that there simply is not enough variation in the explanatory variable to generate any reliable estimate of its relationship with retaliation over time.

C.4 Tables

Table C.6: Government support (π) and war expansion (conflict)

	Expansion (direct)		Expansion (direct/proxy)	
	Civil war	Interstate war	Civil war	Interstate war
Government support (strict)	4.883 (1.23)	5.45e-08*** (-10.82)	4.128 (1.06)	0.356 (-0.71)
DCA (dummy)	1.001 (0.00)	0.437 (-0.58)	1.115 (0.09)	0.888 (-0.11)
Executive constraint (t-1)	0.940 (-0.22)	0.808 (-0.63)	0.861 (-0.51)	0.677 (-1.22)
ln(Population) (t-1)	2.272 (1.58)	6.276** (2.62)	1.138 (0.29)	1.148 (0.22)
Urban population (t-1)	1.000 (1.02)	1.000* (-2.08)	1.000 (1.67)	1.000 (-0.46)
Population density (t-1)	1.025* (2.32)	1.030** (2.60)	1.021 (1.46)	1.019 (1.36)
ln(GDPpc) (t-1)	0.187** (-2.58)	0.331* (-1.97)	0.187* (-2.23)	0.377 (-1.41)
CINC (t-1)	0.00163 (-0.11)	9.40799e+53* (2.33)	1.27e-08 (-0.39)	2.44226e+37 (1.88)
Neighbor at war (dummy)	0.458 (-0.62)	2.174 (0.44)	0.383 (-0.65)	1.945 (0.44)
Observations	52		52	

Exponentiated coefficients; *t* statistics in parentheses

Base category is Internationalized civil war

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.7: Government support (π) and uncertainty and war expansion (conflict)

	Civil war	Interstate war	Civil war	Interstate war
Government support (strict)	4.866 (1.23)	0.000000141*** (-9.28)	9.217 (1.72)	7.08e-08*** (-7.46)
Time	0.991 (-0.12)	0.985 (-0.11)	1.024 (0.19)	1.010 (0.06)
Government support (strict) \times Time			0.905 (-0.55)	0.953 (-0.20)
Defense cooperation agreement (dummy)	0.955 (-0.03)	0.395 (-0.47)	1.018 (0.01)	0.420 (-0.46)
Executive constraint (t-1)	0.924 (-0.29)	0.786 (-0.57)	0.930 (-0.27)	0.792 (-0.57)
ln(Population) (t-1)	2.260 (1.55)	6.406* (2.50)	1.810 (0.85)	5.422* (2.00)
Urban population (t-1)	1.000 (1.02)	1.000* (-1.98)	1.000 (1.25)	1.000 (-1.77)
Population density (t-1)	1.025* (2.28)	1.030** (2.59)	1.025* (2.16)	1.031* (2.46)
ln(GDPpc) (t-1)	0.185** (-2.61)	0.329* (-2.04)	0.182** (-2.64)	0.323 (-1.92)
CINC (t-1)	0.000795 (-0.12)	8.12787e+53* (2.28)	0.00000837 (-0.21)	2.90443e+52* (2.39)
Neighbor at war (dummy)	0.433 (-0.55)	1.960 (0.35)	0.614 (-0.26)	2.588 (0.41)
Observations	52		52	

Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses

Base category is Internationalized civil war

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.8: GDP ratio (π) and war expansion (dyadic)

	Expansion (direct)			Expansion (direct)		
	CW	ICW	IW	CW	ICW	IW
GDP ratio (t-1)	0 (.)	0.247*** (3.73)	0.539 (1.18)	-0.247*** (-3.73)	0 (.)	0.292 (0.64)
GDPpc ratio (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.321* (-1.99)	-3.447 (-1.16)	0.321* (1.99)	0 (.)	-3.126 (-1.05)
Minimum distance	0 (.)	-0.000567* (-2.29)	-0.0938 (-1.29)	0.000567* (2.29)	0 (.)	-0.0932 (-1.29)
Executive constraint in D (t-1)	0 (.)	0.264* (2.01)	-0.476 (-0.84)	-0.264* (-2.01)	0 (.)	-0.740 (-1.25)
Executive constraint in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.148 (-0.84)	-0.163 (-0.26)	0.148 (0.84)	0 (.)	-0.0143 (-0.02)
Exec. const. in D \times Exec. const. in T	0 (.)	-0.00286 (-0.07)	0.0163 (0.11)	0.00286 (0.07)	0 (.)	0.0191 (0.13)
ln(GDP) in D (t-1)	0 (.)	10.69* (2.50)	20.05 (1.04)	-10.69* (-2.50)	0 (.)	9.359 (0.48)
ln(GDP) in T (t-1)	0 (.)	1.085 (0.52)	12.42 (1.04)	-1.085 (-0.52)	0 (.)	11.34 (0.98)
ln(GDPpc) in D (t-1)	0 (.)	-10.16* (-2.37)	-16.98 (-0.99)	10.16* (2.37)	0 (.)	-6.818 (-0.39)
ln(GDPpc) in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-1.569 (-0.75)	-15.44 (-1.17)	1.569 (0.75)	0 (.)	-13.87 (-1.08)
Growth in D (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.0101 (-0.34)	-0.0258 (-0.46)	0.0101 (0.34)	0 (.)	-0.0157 (-0.24)
Growth in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.0149 (-0.64)	0.0361 (0.53)	0.0149 (0.64)	0 (.)	0.0510 (0.71)
ln(Population) in D (t-1)	0 (.)	-11.08* (-2.56)	-19.17 (-1.02)	11.08* (2.56)	0 (.)	-8.088 (-0.43)
ln(Population) in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.560 (-0.26)	-11.52 (-0.96)	0.560 (0.26)	0 (.)	-10.96 (-0.95)
CINC ratio (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.178 (-1.34)	-0.176 (-0.67)	0.178 (1.34)	0 (.)	0.00159 (0.01)
CINC D (t-1)	0 (.)	-12.64 (-0.84)	-115.0 (-1.85)	12.64 (0.84)	0 (.)	-102.4 (-1.64)
CINC T (t-1)	0 (.)	-7.391 (-0.37)	-19.81 (-1.31)	7.391 (0.37)	0 (.)	-12.42 (-0.52)
Rivals	0 (.)	1.412 (1.55)	-0.171 (-0.08)	-1.412 (-1.55)	0 (.)	-1.583 (-0.71)
Constant	0 (.)	-85.97* (-2.49)	-238.3 (-1.29)	85.97* (2.49)	0 (.)	-152.3 (-0.81)
Observations	5941			5941		

t statistics in parentheses

Coefficients for decade dummies omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.9: GDP ratio (π) and time and war expansion (dyadic)

	Expansion (direct)			Expansion (direct)		
	CW	ICW	IW	CW	ICW	IW
GDP ratio (t-1)	0 (.)	0.250*** (3.92)	0.528 (1.18)	0 (.)	0.342*** (4.75)	-0.288 (-0.78)
Time	0 (.)	-0.0295 (-0.55)	0.0582 (1.03)	0 (.)	0.0189 (0.29)	-0.139* (-2.25)
GDP ratio (t-1) × time				0 (.)	-0.0209* (-2.07)	0.0514*** (4.47)
GDPpc ratio (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.310 (-1.90)	-4.031 (-1.08)	0 (.)	-0.279* (-2.15)	-5.515 (-1.21)
Minimum distance	0 (.)	-0.000560* (-2.32)	-0.0880 (-1.30)	0 (.)	-0.000554* (-2.39)	-0.0527*** (-3.36)
Executive constraint in D (t-1)	0 (.)	0.219 (1.62)	-0.384 (-0.83)	0 (.)	0.229 (1.53)	-0.935 (-1.38)
Executive constraint in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.160 (-0.95)	-0.251 (-0.34)	0 (.)	-0.186 (-1.13)	-0.418 (-0.44)
Executive const. in D (t-1) × Executive const. in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.00129 (-0.03)	0.0114 (0.08)	0 (.)	0.00589 (0.15)	-0.0359 (-0.14)
ln(GDP) in D (t-1)	0 (.)	10.84* (2.50)	17.22 (0.96)	0 (.)	11.78* (2.46)	32.29 (1.86)
ln(GDP) in T (t-1)	0 (.)	1.262 (0.62)	12.12 (0.95)	0 (.)	2.323 (1.16)	5.178 (0.34)
ln(GDPpc) in D (t-1)	0 (.)	-10.35* (-2.37)	-13.39 (-0.88)	0 (.)	-11.23* (-2.34)	-26.39 (-1.88)
ln(GDPpc) in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-1.732 (-0.84)	-15.66 (-1.09)	0 (.)	-2.812 (-1.38)	-10.23 (-0.61)
Growth in D (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.00454 (-0.13)	-0.00376 (-0.07)	0 (.)	-0.0198 (-0.51)	0.107 (1.95)
Growth in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.0148 (-0.64)	0.0295 (0.43)	0 (.)	-0.0142 (-0.62)	-0.0909 (-1.53)
ln(Population) in D (t-1)	0 (.)	-11.28* (-2.55)	-16.26 (-0.93)	0 (.)	-12.12* (-2.50)	-30.55 (-1.83)
ln(Population) in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.742 (-0.36)	-10.96 (-0.87)	0 (.)	-1.814 (-0.91)	-3.718 (-0.25)
CINC ratio (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.178 (-1.38)	-0.137 (-0.67)	0 (.)	-0.152 (-1.69)	-0.250 (-1.03)
CINC D (t-1)	0 (.)	-9.779 (-0.64)	-128.4 (-1.52)	0 (.)	-17.38 (-0.96)	-55.52 (-0.93)
CINC T (t-1)	0 (.)	-7.518 (-0.38)	-24.81 (-1.53)	0 (.)	-6.017 (-0.32)	-54.72** (-3.19)
Rivals	0 (.)	1.389 (1.49)	-0.0422 (-0.02)	0 (.)	1.263 (1.42)	-1.429 (-0.42)
Constant	0 (.)	-87.15* (-2.51)	-221.6 (-1.20)	0 (.)	-102.5** (-2.65)	-285.3 (-1.62)
Observations	5941			5941		

t statistics in parentheses

Coefficients for decade dummies omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.10: Urban population (*e*) and war expansion (conflict)

	Expansion (direct)		Expansion (direct/proxy)	
	Peace	Interstate war	Peace	Interstate war
Urban population (t-1)	-0.00000669 (-0.16)	-0.000184** (-2.79)	0.0000219 (0.62)	-0.000128** (-2.88)
Population density (t-1)	0.00156 (0.28)	0.00848 (1.43)	-0.000690 (-0.15)	0.00351 (0.82)
ln(Population) (t-1)	-43.18 (-1.85)	-4.802 (-0.83)		
ln(GDP) (t-1)	43.49 (1.85)	5.848 (1.02)	0.0773 (0.20)	0.423 (1.24)
ln(GDPpc) (t-1)	-43.64 (-1.85)	-5.756 (-0.98)	-0.401 (-0.64)	-0.830 (-1.90)
Economic growth (t-1)	0.0204 (0.43)	0.0455 (0.81)	-0.0467 (-0.48)	-0.0754 (-0.77)
Executive constraint (t-1)	-0.0930 (-0.39)	-0.154 (-0.65)	-0.0896 (-0.40)	-0.159 (-0.75)
CINC (t-1)	21.25 (0.34)	146.2* (2.16)	1.619 (0.04)	119.3** (2.85)
Neighbor at war (dummy)	-0.146 (-0.15)	0.549 (0.48)	-0.0654 (-0.07)	0.631 (0.60)
1980s	2.302 (1.49)	0.684 (0.62)	2.388 (1.66)	0.641 (0.67)
1990s	2.860 (1.84)	1.821 (1.37)	2.383 (1.54)	0.331 (0.26)
2000s	2.408 (1.37)	-2.267 (-1.16)	1.860 (1.01)	-2.808 (-1.84)
Constant	-5.157 (-0.78)	-18.40** (-2.60)	0.324 (0.05)	-3.565 (-0.55)
Observations	61		61	

t statistics in parentheses

Base category is Internationalized civil war

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.11: Urbanization (*e*) and intervention and retaliation (dyadic)

	Expansion (direct)			Expansion (direct)		
	CW	ICW	IW	CW	ICW	IW
Urban population in D (t-1)	0 (.)	0.0000630*** (3.39)	-0.000165** (-2.84)	-0.0000630*** (-3.39)	0 (.)	-0.000228*** (-3.74)
Urban population in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.0000828** (-2.94)	-0.0000189 (-1.17)	0.0000828** (2.94)	0 (.)	0.0000639* (2.26)
Minimum distance	0 (.)	-0.000703* (-2.52)	-0.0617 (-1.66)	0.000703* (2.52)	0 (.)	-0.0610 (-1.65)
Executive constraint in D (t-1)	0 (.)	0.238* (2.52)	0.0131 (0.60)	-0.238* (-2.52)	0 (.)	-0.225* (-2.42)
ln(Population) in D (t-1)	0 (.)	-12.64* (-2.51)	-12.49 (-1.57)	12.64* (2.51)	0 (.)	0.151 (0.02)
CINC D (t-1)	0 (.)	-96.61** (-3.02)	93.70 (1.58)	96.61** (3.02)	0 (.)	190.3** (2.96)
Executive constraint in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.00602 (-0.76)	-0.0311* (-2.15)	0.00602 (0.76)	0 (.)	-0.0251 (-1.43)
ln(Population) in T (t-1)	0 (.)	3.277* (2.44)	-0.265 (-0.08)	-3.277* (-2.44)	0 (.)	-3.543 (-1.13)
CINC T (t-1)	0 (.)	51.02** (3.12)	11.63 (0.80)	-51.02** (-3.12)	0 (.)	-39.39 (-1.76)
ln(GDP) in D (t-1)	0 (.)	12.24* (2.45)	13.63 (1.66)	-12.24* (-2.45)	0 (.)	1.388 (0.18)
ln(GDP) in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-2.617* (-2.19)	0.500 (0.16)	2.617* (2.19)	0 (.)	3.117 (1.05)
ln(GDPpc) in D (t-1)	0 (.)	-12.21* (-2.47)	-13.70 (-1.66)	12.21* (2.47)	0 (.)	-1.493 (-0.19)
ln(GDPpc) in T (t-1)	0 (.)	2.318* (2.08)	-0.577 (-0.17)	-2.318* (-2.08)	0 (.)	-2.895 (-0.92)
Growth in D (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.000401 (-0.01)	-0.0104 (-0.24)	0.000401 (0.01)	0 (.)	-0.0100 (-0.18)
Growth in T (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.0337 (-1.26)	-0.0363 (-1.10)	0.0337 (1.26)	0 (.)	-0.00256 (-0.06)
Rivals	0 (.)	1.999*** (3.29)	0.208 (0.23)	-1.999*** (-3.29)	0 (.)	-1.791 (-1.81)
Constant	0 (.)	-70.45* (-2.10)	-110.7 (-1.66)	70.45* (2.10)	0 (.)	-40.27 (-0.65)
Observations	7909			7909		

t statistics in parentheses

Coefficients for decade dummies omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.12: Nightlights (*e*) and rebellion (group-year)

	Civil war	Int. civil war
Nightlight total	-0.0000808* (-1.99)	-0.0000895* (-2.50)
Self-excluded	0.486 (0.31)	18.04*** (10.85)
Junior partner	-0.575 (-0.66)	16.59*** (13.71)
Regional autonomy	0.202 (0.23)	0.943 (1.04)
Powerless	0.547 (0.63)	15.65*** (16.03)
Discriminated	0.0509 (0.05)	17.46*** (12.32)
Group size	1.331 (0.15)	8.997 (1.17)
Eth. rel. pop.	-1.991 (-0.71)	-2.368 (-0.59)
Group portion of eth. rel. pop.	-1.291 (-0.15)	-0.639 (-0.09)
TEK count	0.0574* (2.54)	0.0599 (1.23)
Upgraded aut. (5y)	-16.63*** (-11.73)	0.431 (0.30)
War history	0.684 (1.95)	-1.021* (-2.06)
Downgraded (5y)	0.847 (1.10)	1.337 (1.82)
Executive constraint (t-1)	0.260 (1.83)	0.131 (0.56)
ln(Population) (t-1)	-64.20 (-1.12)	-27.23 (-0.93)
Urban population (t-1)	0.000183** (2.68)	0.000101 (1.22)
Population density (t-1)	-0.00388 (-1.03)	-0.000728 (-0.45)
ln(GDP) (t-1)	64.87 (1.14)	28.01 (0.95)
ln(GDPpc) (t-1)	-65.37 (-1.14)	-27.80 (-0.95)
Economic growth (t-1)	-0.0253 (-1.14)	-0.00354 (-0.10)
CINC (t-1)	-419.2* (-2.46)	-250.7 (-1.33)
Mil. expenditure (t-1)	8.85e-08 (1.54)	3.89e-08 (0.78)
Mil. personnel (t-1)	0.00265 (0.96)	0.00372 (1.34)
Constant	-10.90 (-1.16)	-32.71** (-2.62)
Observations	3284	

t statistics in parentheses

Time variables omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.13: Self-exclusion (*a*) and rebellion (group-year)

	Onset/intervention		Onset/intervention	
	Civil war	Int. civil war	Civil war	Int. civil wars
Self-excluded	2.888*** (3.95)	3.119*** (3.54)	2.788* (2.29)	5.102** (3.17)
Junior partner	0.881* (2.04)	0.351 (0.68)	0.195 (0.24)	2.142 (1.86)
Regional autonomy	0.297 (0.74)	0.156 (0.26)	-0.591 (-0.76)	-0.0333 (-0.03)
Powerless	1.107* (2.49)	0.585 (1.13)	1.197 (1.61)	2.306* (2.14)
Discriminated	1.880*** (3.99)	1.726** (3.17)	2.165** (2.68)	3.771** (3.15)
Group size	9.208 (1.56)	7.600 (1.87)	10.39 (1.17)	2.819 (0.65)
Eth. rel. pop.	-2.693 (-1.86)	-2.841* (-2.24)	-3.482** (-3.01)	-2.567 (-1.53)
Group portion of eth. rel. pop.	-8.200 (-1.48)	-5.071 (-1.30)	-9.081 (-1.05)	0.526 (0.13)
TEK count	0.00780 (0.35)	0.00493 (0.16)	0.00811 (0.32)	-0.00229 (-0.07)
Upgraded aut. (5y)	-0.515 (-0.80)	-0.202 (-0.22)	-1.024 (-0.87)	0.365 (0.45)
War history	0.993*** (8.76)	0.648*** (5.29)	0.0958 (0.39)	-0.197 (-0.48)
Downgraded (5y)	0.564 (1.64)	1.160** (2.98)	1.086* (2.26)	0.820 (1.48)
Executive constraint (t-1)			0.306* (2.40)	0.129 (1.05)
ln(Population) (t-1)			-4.963* (-2.41)	-7.380** (-2.65)
Urban population (t-1)			0.0000266 (1.34)	0.0000535 (1.94)
Population density (t-1)			-0.00327* (-2.15)	-0.000735 (-0.58)
ln(GDP) (t-1)			5.642** (2.77)	7.796** (2.80)
ln(GDPpc) (t-1)			-6.167** (-3.02)	-8.345** (-2.95)
Economic growth (t-1)			0.00131 (0.05)	0.0167 (0.88)
CINC (t-1)			3.677 (0.10)	-100.4 (-1.63)
Mil. expenditure (t-1)			-3.44e-08 (-0.60)	3.84e-08 (1.86)
Mil. personnel (t-1)			-0.00225** (-2.70)	0.000256 (0.23)
Constant	-3.646** (-2.78)	-3.955*** (-3.33)	-9.706** (-2.64)	-7.673 (-1.90)
Observations	14266		8536	

t statistics in parentheses

Time variables omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table C.14: Self-exclusion (*a*) and rebellion (post-Cold War) (group-year)

	Post-Cold War			Post-Cold War		
	Peace	Civil war	Int. civil war	Peace	Civil war	Int. civil war
Self-excluded	0 (.)	0.267 (0.17)	17.73*** (11.72)	-0.267 (-0.17)	0 (.)	17.46*** (7.49)
Junior partner	0 (.)	-0.869 (-0.80)	16.11*** (16.55)	0.869 (0.80)	0 (.)	16.98*** (11.11)
Regional autonomy	0 (.)	0.187 (0.23)	0.820 (1.06)	-0.187 (-0.23)	0 (.)	0.633 (0.48)
Powerless	0 (.)	0.335 (0.37)	15.52*** (19.17)	-0.335 (-0.37)	0 (.)	15.18*** (12.71)
Discriminated	0 (.)	-0.738 (-0.67)	17.01*** (13.17)	0.738 (0.67)	0 (.)	17.74*** (10.24)
Group size	0 (.)	-0.586 (-0.06)	6.104 (0.85)	0.586 (0.06)	0 (.)	6.690 (0.66)
Eth. rel. pop.	0 (.)	-2.274 (-1.14)	-2.305 (-0.53)	2.274 (1.14)	0 (.)	-0.0306 (-0.01)
Group portion of eth. rel. pop.	0 (.)	-1.549 (-0.16)	-0.0499 (-0.01)	1.549 (0.16)	0 (.)	1.499 (0.16)
TEK count	0 (.)	0.0429 (1.41)	0.00284 (0.03)	-0.0429 (-1.41)	0 (.)	-0.0400 (-0.46)
Upgraded aut. (5y)	0 (.)	-15.10*** (-12.83)	0.822 (0.66)	15.10*** (12.85)	0 (.)	15.92*** (10.72)
War history	0 (.)	0.683* (2.17)	-1.123* (-2.16)	-0.683* (-2.17)	0 (.)	-1.806** (-2.96)
Downgraded (5y)	0 (.)	0.703 (0.96)	1.566* (2.47)	-0.703 (-0.96)	0 (.)	0.863 (0.92)
Executive constraint (t-1)	0 (.)	0.295 (1.94)	0.147 (0.70)	-0.295 (-1.94)	0 (.)	-0.149 (-0.64)
ln(Population) (t-1)	0 (.)	-92.39 (-1.72)	-37.43 (-1.58)	92.39 (1.72)	0 (.)	54.95 (1.08)
Urban population (t-1)	0 (.)	0.000130* (2.33)	0.0000852 (1.18)	-0.000130* (-2.33)	0 (.)	-0.0000453 (-0.57)
Population density (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.00251 (-1.11)	0.000126 (0.18)	0.00251 (1.11)	0 (.)	0.00263 (1.18)
ln(GDP) (t-1)	0 (.)	92.99 (1.73)	37.76 (1.60)	-92.99 (-1.73)	0 (.)	-55.23 (-1.09)
ln(GDPpc) (t-1)	0 (.)	-93.88 (-1.74)	-38.06 (-1.62)	93.88 (1.74)	0 (.)	55.81 (1.10)
Economic growth (t-1)	0 (.)	-0.0248 (-1.26)	0.00204 (0.07)	0.0248 (1.26)	0 (.)	0.0269 (0.78)
CINC (t-1)	0 (.)	-296.8* (-2.26)	-169.9 (-1.17)	296.8* (2.26)	0 (.)	126.9 (0.74)
Mil. expenditure (t-1)	0 (.)	7.55e-08 (1.43)	4.05e-08 (1.10)	-7.55e-08 (-1.43)	0 (.)	-3.50e-08 (-0.55)
Mil. personnel (t-1)	0 (.)	0.00156 (0.79)	0.00204 (1.13)	-0.00156 (-0.79)	0 (.)	0.000482 (0.19)
Constant	0 (.)	-6.839 (-1.14)	-21.36* (-2.53)	6.839 (1.14)	0 (.)	-14.52 (-1.40)
Observations	4055			4055		

t statistics in parentheses

Time variables omitted

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix D

Appendix for Chapter 6

D.1 Model of civil war expansion and duration

I use the UCDP data on conflict duration to assess whether intervention and retaliation are associated with differences in conflict duration. There are 89 conflicts in the period 1975-2009, and survival rates differ based on whether intervention and retaliation happened (Figure D.1).

Because there are numerous factors that affect intervention, retaliation, and duration, I estimate a semiparametric Cox proportional hazard model, which also allows me to account for right-censoring in the data. I include several covariates on the RHS that my theoretical model predicts will affect the risks of intervention and retaliation that might also affect how long actors fight. Domestic governments who receive external support might attract external rebel supporters because of raised local stakes (*Gov. support*), but that support might also help the governments fight for longer. Similarly, larger ($\ln(GDP)$) economies, richer countries ($GDPpc1$), and countries experiencing growth (*Growth*) might

make for more attractive targets for intervention, but they can sustain fighting for longer. Lastly, larger urban population means higher escalation costs (*Urban pop.*). More urbanized countries are more likely to experience intervention but not retaliate, and they are also vulnerable to urban guerrilla warfare, which can force the government into making concessions. I lag all control variables to avoid simultaneity bias, resulting in the following regression equation,

$$h(t|X) = h(t)\exp[\beta_1(IW) + \beta_2(ICW) + \beta_3(\text{Gov. support}) + \beta_4(\ln(\text{GDP})) + \beta_5(\text{GDPpc}) + \beta_6(\text{Growth}) + \beta_7(\text{Urban pop.})], \quad (\text{D.1})$$

where the hazard function characterizes the probability that a civil war will end on day t . Because this estimation technique rests on the assumption that variables have a similar effect on the hazard at any time, I test for potential violations of the proportional hazard assumption. The test indicates that only one variable ($\ln(\text{GDP})$) might have violate the assumption ($p = 0.05$), so I do not adjust for non-proportional hazards.

Table D.1: Cox proportional hazard model of intervention, retaliation, and civil war duration.

	coef	exp(coef)	se(coef)	z	p
IW	-1.14	0.32	0.42	-2.72	0.01
ICW	-0.95	0.39	0.45	-2.10	0.04
Gov. support	-1.25	0.29	0.38	-3.29	0.00
$\ln(\text{GDP})$	-0.34	0.71	0.13	-2.70	0.01
GDPpc	0.00	1.00	0.00	3.75	0.00
Growth	-0.01	0.99	0.02	-0.48	0.63
Urban pop	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.46	0.65

I first estimate the model on the whole sample, and find that both internationalized civil wars and interstate wars tend to last longer than other civil wars (Table D.1). The results are statistically significant, and interstate wars appear to last longer than internationalized civil wars. However, plotting the fitted survival curves show that internationalized civil wars and interstate wars follow similar hazard rates (Figure D.2).

Because of the variation in duration length, I test to see whether the sample has any influential outliers. A plot of the residuals show that there are indeed several observations outside of the expected duration, and several who lasted much longer than they were expected to (Figure D.3), indicated by how much below the fitted line they fall on the graph. I therefore drop the three largest outliers (all internationalized civil wars with more than 10,000 days of fighting), and reestimate the model. The results are shown in Table D.2, and show that without the three outliers, interstate wars last longer than civil wars and internationalized civil wars.

Table D.2: Cox proportional hazard model of intervention, retaliation, and civil war duration, without outliers.

	coef	exp(coef)	se(coef)	z	p
IW	-1.24	0.29	0.42	-2.95	0.00
ICW	-0.60	0.55	0.44	-1.37	0.17
Gov. support	-1.26	0.28	0.37	-3.40	0.00
ln(GDP)	-0.37	0.69	0.12	-2.94	0.00
GDPpc	0.00	1.00	0.00	3.78	0.00
Growth	-0.00	1.00	0.02	-0.09	0.93
Urban pop.	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.29	0.77




Figure D.1: Survival rates for civil wars, internationalized civil wars, and interstate wars (by days).




Figure D.2: The relationship between intervention, retaliation, and civil war duration (by days).




Figure D.3: Distribution of residuals and influential outliers.

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