cSEGRET 

•2•127 , July 11, 5 PM, from Bonn. 
HAT TH GR ATEST POTENT A~IT FORM SSTEPS ON OUR PAR 
LIES JUST IN THIS AREA. H N HESE PROBLEMS ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH SURFACE ACCESS, WE CAN SIMPLY "WAIT THEM out," AND TRY A NUMBER OF PERMUTATED RESPONSES, AS 
WE RECENTLY DID ON THE AUTOBAHN. IN AIR THREATS, HOWEVER, AS AGAIN ILLUSTRATED BY MOHAWK CASE, WE ARE FACED WITH TH£ 
NECESSITY FOR VERY IMPORTANT DECISIONS, E.G. COMMITING 
THE AIRCRAFT IF IT IS NOT YET IN THE CORRIDORS, ITHIN 

A HIGHLY COMPRESSED TIME PERIOD. 
EMBASSY MOSCOW POINTS OUT THAT IN ALL PROBABILITY THE USSR, " 
PAGE 3 RUFHOL 1682 S E C R E T­EVEN IF IT DECIDED ON SOME INCREASED USE OF FORCE, WOULD HARDLY GO BEYOND FORCING A CIVIL AIRCRAFT TO LAND. SUCH ACTION WOULD PRESUMABLY NOT ENDAGER SO MUCH AS INCONVENIENCE THE PASSENGERS, AND PRESUMABLY WOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY WARNING MOVES SUFFICIENTLY CLEAR TO GIVE THE PILOT A FAIRLY CLEAR CHOICE OF OPTIONS. WE SHOULD NOT, HOWEVER, IGNORE THE FACT THAT LAND NG A DC-8 AT A STRANGE AND POSSIBLY I~~DEQUATE GDR AIRPORT WOULD INDEED INVOLVE CONSIDERAB 6E DANGERS. 
IF WE COULD . CEED ON THE ASSU PTION THAT THIS WOULD 
BT THE' ONLY SOVIET REACTIOJ , 1 L E ARE PERHAPS NO 
FURTHER POLICY DECISIONS REQUIRED AT THIS TIME. ON 

THE OTHER HAND, IF THE SOVIETS ; E SUDDENLY, WHILE THE PLAt E WAS IN FLIGHT AND ABOUT T E.TER THECORRIDORS,
T KE THEIR WARNINGS so co ·s CUOUSLY MORE THREATENING 

GI' E RISE I OUR MINDS TO REAL DOUBTS CONCERNING1 H ~ ~ Y OF THE P SSENGERS, IM~ 4DIATE ACTION WOULD E REQUIRED. IN SUCH A CASE W WOULD OBVIOU L RY 
TO CONSULT WASHINGTON IF THERE WERE TIME. OTH· RWISE, , I TAKE IT THAT I WOULD HAVE TO ACT ON MY OWN BEST JUDGE:MENT • 
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