

U.S. INTERVENES IN ANGOLA  
STRIFE

HON. SHIRLEY CHISHOLM

OF NEW YORK  
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
Thursday, December 18, 1975

Mrs. CHISHOLM. Mr. Speaker, certainly all of us are apprised of the current crisis in Angola, the involvement of the U.S. Government in that conflict, and the potential for more unilateral conflict that situation poses because of the forces bearing down in that small African country.

The Black Caucus has uniformly deplored all intervention in the war in Angola not only because of the covert manner of U.S. involvement, but also because the CIA has defied the mandate of the Organization of African Unity opposing all foreign intervention.

Like the War in Indochina, U.S. involvement in the initial stages has relied on an information "black out". We are only learning now of money already spent and of actions already taken because of State Department decisions to interfere to counter actions taken by the Soviet Union.

I would like to submit for review of my colleagues an in depth analysis of the situation in Angola and the role of the United States in it. The history of our covert activity is important in understanding why it is essential that no more aid be approved for any actions in Angola. The following was prepared by the Washington Office on Africa, an invaluable source for information on the topic:

U.S. INTERVENES IN ANGOLAN STRIFE

Since the Portuguese coup of April, 1974, the process of decolonization in Angola has proven far more tortuous and complex than in the former sister territories of Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. In the latter two colonies, power was transferred to single, relatively unified liberation movements which acceded to independence and sovereignty in orderly fashion. In Angola, the presence of three movements divided on political, ideological and geographic and ethnic lines has prevented a simple transition from colony to independence. These divisions, together with strategic considerations and Angola's wealth in natural resources, have invited intervention in the decolonization process by external powers. The United States has been prominent among these outside forces, and recent evidence has provided a clearer, though still very incomplete, picture of the nature of U.S. intervention.

In a front page New York Times article of September 25, Leslie Gelb revealed that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency has been buying arms for two liberation movements, FNLA and UNITA, in an effort to offset the military success of the third movement, MPLA, which has received significant arms support from the Soviet Union. The Times story states that the CIA operations have been approved by President Ford and are being carried out, as prescribed by law, with the knowledge of several Congressional committees. These include the Senate and House Armed Forces and Appropriations Committees, and the Senate Foreign Relations and House International Relations Committees. In each case CIA oversight has been delegated to subcommittees dominated by conservatives, or to individual ranking members.

CIA support for FNLA has a long history: according to Gelb, in 1962 the Agency and

President Kennedy selected FNLA leader Holden Roberto as a man to back for the future, since Portugal could not be expected to retain Angola indefinitely. Support waned in 1969 but the CIA reactivated its Roberto connections last spring, in light of the upsurge in liberation activities following the Portuguese coup.

The CIA interest in UNITA is much more recent. Gelb's report on this connection followed a few days after an announcement by UNITA President Savimbi that he is receiving armaments from "anti-Communist Western nations and their allies" (according to Africa News). Jonas Savimbi, who heads UNITA, is avowedly anti-communist and anti-MPLA—two reasons for the CIA's interest in him. He may also be emerging as a more realistic possibility than Roberto as a future contender for leadership of Angola. Savimbi is a magnetic figure with considerable popular support from the rural peasantry of central and southern Angola, and is personally attractive to some progressive African leaders in other countries.

U.S. aid to the two movements is being disbursed largely through President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. Indeed, it is impossible to approach the subject of Angola and U.S. intervention there without examining Zaire's relationship with both Angola and the United States. Zaire shares a long border with Angola; the BaKongo people, who comprise the bulk of FNLA's supporters, straddle this border. Holden Roberto of FNLA is Mobutu's brother-in-law. It is not surprising, then, that Mobutu's Zaire government has long been an open supporter of FNLA. Mobutu's support for UNITA is much less solid, and seems primarily based on UNITA's shared opposition to FNLA's main enemy, MPLA. An instance of U.S.-Zaire connection with UNITA was reported by an expert eye-witness recently. He saw a Hercules transport plane offloading arms at Silva Porto, UNITA's headquarters. The French-speaking crew was smoking Zairean cigarettes; the U.S. sold the Hercules aircraft to Zaire last year.

Establishing and maintaining the stability of Mobutu's staunchly pro-western rule in Zaire has, of course, been a cornerstone of U.S. policy in Africa since the General seized power in 1965. The CIA has long had a principal Africa station in Zaire. U.S.-Zaire relations received a jolt in June of this year when Mobutu expelled U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton, accusing him and the CIA of complicity in a coup plot. Nathaniel Davis, the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs who was travelling in Africa at the time, tried to go to Zaire to repair relations, but was refused entry. (Mobutu had earlier in the year opposed Davis' nomination to his post, precisely because of Davis' implication in CIA activities in Chile.)

The task of patching up things with Mobutu fell to Sheldon Vance, a former ambassador to Zaire, now a senior aide to Kissinger. Vance made two trips to Zaire, and then began to put together a new package of U.S. aid for Mobutu. The package totals \$60 million—4 times the 1975 level, 7 times the 1974 level, and \$20 million higher than the annual average of U.S. aid during the peak years of U.S. assistance in the crisis period of the 1960's. It is divided into \$20 million in Export-Import Bank loans; \$20 million in Food for Peace credit, and \$20 million for "Security Supporting Assistance"—which exists to "support or promote economic or political stability." The State Department rationale for the package has been Zaire's balance of payments problems stemming from a drop in price of its copper exports and a rise in import costs, especially for oil. Vance and other State Department officials have also approached U.S. private creditors to assist in the rescheduling of Zaire's considerable foreign debt.

In July Vance and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa Edward Mulcahy discussed the package with several Senators and Congressmen, hoping that a low-key approach would gain their acquiescence while avoiding publicity. Reaction on the Hill to State's approach was decidedly negative. Although the Ex-Im Bank and Food for Peace portions require no specific Congressional approval, Senators Clark and Humphrey insisted that the Security Supporting Assistance be fully scrutinized. Closed hearings on this part of the package are to be held in the near future.

In short, the Administration is seeking to underwrite the finances of the Mobutu government with a quantum leap in its level of aid. Since Mobutu is actively involved in the Angolan civil war and is the conduit for U.S. involvement, this move seems to have considerable implications for the Angolan scenario.

More evidence of increasing Administration interference in Angola has emerged in the revelation that Nathaniel Davis—according to news reports of September 1—plans to resign shortly from his post as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. The ostensible reason is his inability to establish good relations with African states and their leaders, as his problem with Mobutu demonstrates. A high-ranking source in the State Department, however, contends that the immediate reason for Davis' departure is his disagreement with Henry Kissinger over Angola—i.e., Davis balked at Kissinger's proposals for stepped-up intervention there. Davis may have resisted because he feared yet another CIA blot on his record, which would confirm what was predicted by his opponents at the time of his nomination. Many observers expect Davis' successor to be Sheldon Vance. Whether or not Davis objected to Angolan intervention, he surely could not implement it effectively if he could not work with the other major actors in the Angolan arena.

On another front, when Senators Clark and Brooke proposed an amendment to this year's foreign economic aid bill which would specify \$30 million for assisting the former Portuguese territories, the Agency for International Development suggested that \$25 million of this be earmarked for resettlement of black Angolan refugees. Most such refugees are Bakongo returning to Angola from Zaire. But the Senators caught the political implications of the language and specified in the report accompanying the bill that no aid should go toward "refugee or economic assistance that would constitute political support for any one of the liberation movements in Angola."

A further complication in the Angolan turmoil revolves around Cabinda, the tiny enclave of Angola separated from the rest of the country by a strip of Zairean territory. Cabinda is where Gulf Oil produces 100,000 barrels of oil a day. MPLA currently controls the area, and all the Angolan liberation movements favor keeping Cabinda part of Angola. But a Cabindan separatist organization, FLEC, has recently emerged into the limelight. FLEC is presently located in and is heavily backed by Zaire, which is known to have an interest in the oil; some experts predict Zairean attempts to dominate or even annex Cabinda in the future. Clearly Cabinda is also a focus of external interests, both private and governmental.

The United States is not, of course, the only external power involved in Angola. The Soviet Union has given considerable support, especially in arms, to MPLA. China has provided some assistance to FNLA, including military advice. Numerous indications and allegations of intervention have been aired concerning other countries such as France, Tunisia, Zambia and South Africa.

The Soviet Union's arms deliveries to MPLA make opposition to U.S. intervention more difficult. It can be cogently argued that

a "Soviet-engineered takeover" of the Angolan government is no more desirable than a similar CIA effort. The problem, however, is that any Soviet presence in a particular country is so often exaggerated, and used as justification for significant American subversion of the internal political process. Furthermore, warnings of dangerous Soviet intervention from American officials should hardly be taken at face value, when accompanied by pious denials of U.S. interference. In a major Africa policy statement on September 23, Secretary Kissinger stated that one of the three major U.S. concerns was "that the continent be free of great power rivalry or conflict." He added a "cautionary word" specifically about Angola: "We are most alarmed at the interference of extra-continental powers who do not wish Africa well, and whose involvement is inconsistent with the promise of true independence."

One task, then, is to judge the degree of Soviet support for, and control over, the movement they are backing—MPLA. Soviet arms have been used to some extent by MPLA for several years; but according to the respected British journalist David Martin, the principal arms shipments came last spring, in response to a massive movement of FNLA troops from Zaire to Angola. It is notable that MPLA has sought good relations with China (despite the latter's moderate support for FNLA) by sending two top level MPLA delegations for visits: hardly the behavior expected from a Soviet puppet. MPLA also is maintaining good relations with Gulf Oil, and has recently softened its position on post-independence nationalization.

The evidence, then, that MPLA is completely under the Soviet thumb is unconvincing. Such a figure as Senator Dick Clark, Chairman of the Africa Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who visited Angola and met with the presidents of all three movements in August, came away firmly convinced that nothing in the situation justifies U.S. intervention. The problem may be best expressed by one of Leslie Gelb's government sources: "It's just that we can't keep our hands out of anything."

In general, we feel any effort to stop U.S. intervention in Angola should be supported. Several amendments are being considered to the military aid bill, which the Administration has yet to submit and which Congress will probably pass on by mid-November. Specifically, the Security Supporting Assistance to Zaire should be opposed, since there is too much possibility that Angola movements will be the beneficiaries of it. We should support an amendment which Clark may propose stipulating that no aid should go "directly or indirectly" to the liberation movements in Angola. Another possibility is to back a possible Clark "sense of Congress" resolution urging negotiations with the Soviet Union on mutual restraint in Angola. An aide to Congressman Diggs has suggested that such negotiations include not only the major powers of East and West but those on the African continent as well.

There is a persisting doubt, however, that steps such as these will affect only the proverbial "tip of the iceberg" of U.S. policy in central and southern Africa. Significant policy operations have proceeded and are proceeding covertly under the rubric: "CIA". The American people have not been informed of these actions and have, in fact, been deliberately misled concerning them. The whole range of policy, covert and overt, appears to amount to an unwarranted and immoral intrusion to guarantee a government friendly to the U.S. interests. But it will be impossible to debate U.S. policy, and to propose effective alternatives to it, when so much remains hidden from public view.

In a situation so murky we need your ideas and analyses concerning these issues. We welcome your response.

## A LESSON IN QUESTIONNAIRE-MANSHIP

HON. ABNER J. MIKVA

OF ILLINOIS

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, December 18, 1975

Mr. MIKVA. Mr. Speaker, the first lesson which every new Member of Congress must learn is to carefully scrutinize their list of constituents for the names of any former Members of Congress. The second lesson is to omit those names from the list of recipients of questionnaires, because ex-Members of Congress invariably respond with more information than you expected. I would like to demonstrate the dangers of failing to master these lessons by inserting the response to Congressman DAVE EVANS' questionnaire submitted by Judge Andrew Jacobs, Sr., a former Member of this House of Congress. The depth and lucidity of Judge Jacobs' response should come as no surprise to those of us who have witnessed the sagacity of his son, our colleague, Congressman ANDREW JACOBS, JR., or to those fortunate enough and senior enough to remember the distinguished service of Congressman Andrew Jacobs, Sr.

The questionnaire follows:

INDIANAPOLIS, IND.,  
December 1, 1975.

Re Crime Poll.

Congressman DAVE EVANS,  
Congress of the United States, House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

DEAR CONGRESSMAN EVANS: Interrogatories never afford built-in space for adequate answers. Hence I will comment upon yours seriatim:

1. Do you favor any type of strict gun control legislation? Yes—No—Please explain.—  
Every firearm should be registered with identifying ballistics data and other indicia. This is a proper subject for Federal jurisdiction, although penal enforcement could be concurrent with State Courts as a clear exception provided to 18 U.S. Code 3231. But constitutionally, I believe, enforcement must be optional, not mandatory upon State Courts. Licensing, to carry guns, thusly registered, intra-state, should be left to states, while carrying beyond the registrant's state would have to be by Federal authorities. No distinction between "Saturday Night Specials" and better guns has any validity. One is as deadly as the other. Possession of an unregistered firearm should carry a penalty of imprisonment with mandatory destruction of the unregistered weapon. When and if we have recovered virtually all illegally held weapons, and experience affords a method of preventing replenishment, we might consider gun abolition.

2. Should first time purchasers of any type of firearm be required to participate in a firearm training course? Yes—No—

I have serious doubts. Before instituting such a program we should await the experience afforded by the registering and licensing program. Eventually such training might prove wise. I am undecided at this time. Generally, I oppose creation of new public jobs.

3. Should there be mandatory sentencing for offenders who commit a crime with a firearm? Yes—No—

I think you refer to what is euphemistically called an "executed sentence." The fact that you ask this question (vis a vis firearms) manifests the debasement of our language regarding criminal jurisprudence. The

other kind (suspended sentences or probation) are merely threats to sentence at a later date, under certain conditions.

I do not use probation, which merely requires the convicted accused to slip on his Sunday britches and come to the Department and tell a few concocted fibs about what he did during the interim of visits. On two occasions I gave a suspended sentence (on condition of no future penal violation) when the State petitioned me to do so upon verified showing that the accused had effectively and truthfully aided authorities in meeting criminals more highly placed. Otherwise, everyone convicted, before me, has been given an executed sentence, within the prescription of the law. Studies have revealed that supervised parolees do not better than the unsupervised. Unfortunately, neither do too well.

Experience also shows that certain, and better still, prompt punishment reduces crime, especially crimes of profit.

This is a rough business, and no place for the faint-hearted.

4. Do you believe juvenile delinquents who are either repeat or first time offenders should be tried as adults provided the crime involves bodily harm, i.e. assault, rape, murder? Yes—No—

Tentatively, yes. But I would prefer that the original court be empowered to impose appropriate sentencing without such transfers. Almost without exception when I read one pre-sentence report I re-read what I have previously read, with monotonous regularity; early and constantly repeated criminal conduct with no punishment.

Recently, as I was sentencing a convicted accused with such a juvenile record, I asked him if he thought he would have committed the crime of which he then stood convicted if the juvenile court had actually punished him for his earlier transgressions.

He replied that he thought it quite unlikely. I recently received a letter from a young man I had sentenced to prison for a year. He thanked me, saying that had I released him upon an unexecuted sentence, he would be doing the same thing again, but that he had learned his lesson and was resolved to go straight hereafter. I receive many such letters, which always before had closed asking that, since they had learned their lessons, would I now order them released. But not this one. He resolved to finish his sentence without infraction of institutional rules and go straight, no favors asked. His battle is half won. I wrote him to come and see me when he is released. I intend to try to help him find employment, if he does as he promised.

5. Should parents be held financially responsible for crimes committed by their juvenile delinquent children? Yes—No—

Only where their knowing and understandingly negligent conduct was clearly a proximate cause. I could not favor holding the parents of teenagers too strictly responsible when the governing institutions shrink from effective law enforcement, especially in the drug culture of this era. Beware of such pat remedies.

6. Should "hard-core" drug addicts who commit crimes receive medical treatment as part of the legal process? Yes—No— Please explain.

Such helpful treatment, if any, should be available to such criminals in the prisons to which they are committed. I am opposed to the "King's X" laws whereby the accused says:

"Yes, Judge, I did it, but, King's X. I also violated the drug laws, and I want to be sent to the drug program instead of prison."

and the judge must engage in that charade.

Occasionally a convict may fit into the prescriptions stated under No. 3 above. If "bigger fish" can thusly be netted, I am willing to evaluate possibilities, with due