ORANDUM 

THE WHITE HOUSE 
WASHINGTON 
60NFIDENT-fH:fs~:Lt-:--	January 23, 1967 

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT 
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SUBJECT: Letter to Danish Prime Minister Krag £ 
At Tab A, for your signature, is a short note to Prime Minister Otto Krag. His letter {Tab B) reported on his January 3-7 visit to Poland. The proposed reply thanks him for this first-hand report. 
The highlights of Krag' s report are: 
1. 	Viet-Nam. The Poles repeated their line that an uncondi­tional cessation of bombing 11could pave the way for negotiations on a peaceful settlement". In their view, our bombing has had the effect of an ultimatum which --for reasons of prestige has deprived the North Vietnamese of their freedom of action. The bombing has, in effect, strengthened the Chinese position in North Viet-Nam. The Poles also worry that a confrontation may develop between the U.S. and China --even if neither side wants it --which could bring the Soviets in {they cannot let the Chinese collapse.) 
Krag says he explained U.S. disappointment at the North Vietnamese reaction to last year 1s bombing pause, and emphasized that the U.S. must be sure that negotiations will begin if the bombing is stopped. 
European Security. The situation in Europe has improved,
2. 
but this may be only a temporary phase if hostilities continue in the Far East. Relaxation of tensions is a good thing, but if any long-term progress is to be made, effective action must be taken to strengthen security in Europe. That is why Poland has proposed a European security conference. Renunciation of territorial claims and promotion of a non-proliferation agreement must be major elements of such a conference. Poland is ready to sign a non-proliferation agreement, but until other parties are ready, efforts should be made to prevent proliferation in Europe. This is the purpose of the Polish­Czech proposal to place their nuclear facilities under IAEA control if the West Germans will do the same. 
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3. 	Relations with Germany. The Poles wait 11 skeptically1' for solid evidence that the new German Government is better than the old. So far they see no change in German attitudes on nuclear weapons or recognition of the Oder-Neisse frontier. Talk of reunification must wait until Germany is no longer a menace, i.e., when present frontiers have been recognized and a European security system has been established. 
Krag told the Poles there were possibilities for real progress under Germany1 s new leaders. The Federal Republic1 s attempt to improve relations with Eastern Europe was an important step, and the Poles should take advantage of the new atmosphere in Bonn despite Poland1 s 11 old and understandable sentiments11 • 
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Disapprove 
Speak to me 

...GeN'FIDEN 'l'IAL­