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Rousseau's Political Philosophy: An Exposition and Interpretation. by Ramon M. Lemos

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ture. Its rich insights can be applied with confidence to only one parliament, the rather unusual one lasting from 1968 to 1972. The scope of the research needs, therefore, to be extended both over time and with respect to enriching substantially the contextual (Current Political Environment) variable. Such an extension will not remove all problems posed by this kind of research design (the occasional discovery of the obvious, for instance), but it would provide a generally more applicable, accurate and politically realistic model explaining parliamentary influence. Still, except for the limitation just noted, *Influence in Parliament* is an exemplary, illuminating work, making a major contribution to both legislative and Canadian studies.

JOHN MEISEL, *Queen's University*

*Rousseau's Political Philosophy: An Exposition and Interpretation.*

By RAMON M. LEMOS. (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1977. Pp. x, 262. \$14.50.)

Lemos is an earnest scholar who tries to give a serious account of the "timeless philosophical significance" of Rousseau's political thought. The results are disappointing.

There are, to begin with, some omissions that greatly reduce the importance and utility of this book. (1) The *Émile* is altogether ignored, the *First Discourse* is dismissed as a "*cri de coeur*" that contains "more passion and heat than reason and light" (pp. 1-2), and the *Discourse on Political Economy* is discussed only briefly. In effect Lemos gives us an exposition of the *Second Discourse* and the *Social Contract*; it is very doubtful that an adequate understanding of Rousseau's political thought can be built on such a narrow foundation. (2) There is no recognition of existing scholarship on this question. Lemos announces that the attempt to deal with it directly would lead to digressions and prevent him from presenting his own interpretation (p. viii). Even if this were true (it need not be), it is not an argument for ignoring the range of existing interpretations when formulating and defending one's own position. But Lemos does just this. He poses many issues naively, as though they had never been discussed before, and when his pro-

posed answers are in fact choices from a range of alternatives, he can rarely be explicit about what he is rejecting, or why. (3) The discussion lacks a context. It is perhaps defensible (though hardly as unique as Lemos implies) to detach Rousseau's thought from the details of his biography. But it is most unwise to proceed without some systematic consideration of the religious, scientific, and metaphysical problems he was compelled to confront, or of prevailing opinions against which he defined his own position. Lemos is able only to characterize Rousseau as one of the three "classic representatives" (along with Hobbes and Locke) of the "natural law, natural right, social contract approach to political philosophy" (p. viii). But this point of departure leads Lemos into error after error; Rousseau's contractualism rests on a rejection of both natural law and natural rights doctrines. For example, in Lemos's view, Rousseau posits a "natural right to life" that is transferred unimpaired into civil society. But it is difficult to reconcile this view with Rousseau's endorsement (here diverging from Hobbes) of the binding character of the death penalty.

Substantively, Lemos presents a hyper-Kantian interpretation. Rousseau is a "moralist." When nature, civilization, and morality come into conflict, the claims of morality are unequivocally to be preferred. But the conflict can ultimately be resolved in a manner that satisfies all human needs, through the egalitarian republicanism of the *Social Contract*. The unnuanced simplicity of this interpretation makes it difficult to find a place for the reservations against civil society Rousseau expresses in the *Social Contract*, let alone his constant search for non-political antidotes to the evils of collective existence—family life, love, and individualism, quasi-Stoic (as in the *Émile*) or quasi-Epicurean (as in the *Rêveries*). And a more careful examination of the *First Discourse* might have enabled Lemos to consider Rousseau's distinction between the political effects of civilization (mass "enlightenment") and the moral status of the extraordinary philosophers and scientists whose discoveries advance civilization.

Lemos insists that insofar as Rousseau is a moralist, he is a "Christian thinker." This claim is more misleading than illuminating, because the content of the morality Rousseau defends is not Christian to any significant degree. Rather, it is a selective interpretation of the political morality of classical antiquity—the tradition of the Spartans, of Cato, and of Tacitus. Lemos himself is ultimately

compelled to grant that Rousseau is if anything more hostile to the moral content of Christianity than was Machiavelli (pp. 199-201). Lemos's defense of Christianity against Rousseau's attack manages not to mention the post-Reformation wars of religion that crucially affected three centuries of European political thought.

Space will not permit a detailed examination of all the problems of interpretation raised by this book. One more example must suffice. Lemos grasps the central importance of Rousseau's distinction between *amour de soi* and *amour-propre*. But his analysis of *amour-propre* transforms it into a variant of Aristotle's *pleonexia*: the desire to have more than others or more than one's fair share, even at the expense of others. There is some truth to this, but it omits the crucial point. The core of *amour-propre* is the desire to be recognized as superior by others. There is thus an unbroken line from Hobbes's discussion of pride, through Rousseau, to Hegel's famous discussion of the life-and-death struggle for recognition.

This book is not wholly without merit. It contains a clear (if unoriginal) account of the different senses of "freedom" in Rousseau, and its discussion of the relation between Rousseau and Marx, though inadequate, reminds us that a satisfactory full-length treatment of this important problem has yet to be written. But, considering everything, this book is too idiosyncratic to serve as an introduction to Rousseau's political philosophy and too general to be a significant scholarly contribution.

WILLIAM A. GALSTON, *University of Texas at Austin*

*Reaching the Peasant Farmer: Organization Theory and Practice in Kenya.* By DAVID K. LEONARD. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977. Pp. xxi, 297. \$19.00.)

This study of the effectiveness of the agricultural extension service in Kenya is written for the use of the extension practitioner and for students of organization behavior. Both audiences are well served, although this review discusses only those aspects of most interest to scholars.

Leonard has devised several "partial" measures of extension agent productivity (agricultural informedness, for example) which he be-