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**Speaking Indirectly: Theories of Non-Literal Speech in  
Indian Philosophy**

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**Speaking Indirectly: Theories of Non-Literal Speech in  
Indian Philosophy**

by

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**DISSERTATION**

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*pada-vākya-pramāṇeṣu tad etat pratibimbitam |  
yo yojayati sāhitye tasya vānī prasādati ||*

The communicative function is reflected in words, sentences, knowledge sources;  
The intelligence of the one who employs it in composition becomes bright.  
MUKULABHAṬṬA, *Abhidhā-vṛtta-mātrkā*

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# Speaking Indirectly: Theories of Non-Literal Speech in Indian Philosophy

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How do hearers recognize when someone is speaking figuratively, and how do they recover the content—whatever it is—of an utterance? “Speaking Indirectly” explores this question in Indian philosophy, showing along the way that it is a helpful conversation partner with Western philosophy of language. Focusing on the debate between ninth-century Indian philosophers Mukulabhaṭṭa and Ānandavardhana about competing explanations of non-literal meaning, I argue that Mukulabhaṭṭa’s proposal can be understood in the spirit of Gricean pragmatics, and is broadly successful. I also show that he tacitly appeals to reasoning known as *arthāpatti* to explain the interpretive process, a process which I conclude is a version of inference to the best explanation. I also employ contemporary conceptual tools, such as the theory of sort-shifting, to illustrate the plausibility of Mukulabhaṭṭa’s analysis of non-literal speech. A significant aspect of my dissertation is a new, philosophically informed, English translation of Mukulabhaṭṭa’s Sanskrit text, the *Abhidhā-vṛtta-māṭṛkā* (Fundamentals of the Communicative Function).

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

“The list says...when you are finished in the living room, put out the lights. Oh—I’ll just unscrew all of these bulbs and put them on the clothesline outside.”

*Amelia Bedelia*

“When I use a word,” Humpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it means just what I choose it to mean—neither more nor less.”

“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so many different things.”

“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master—that’s all.”

*Through the Looking Glass*

We frequently use a single expression in multiple ways.<sup>1</sup> A person who doesn’t recognize this capacity of language would quickly find herself in the position of Amelia Bedelia, the literal-minded protagonist of children’s books. Asked to draw the drapes, she sketches a picture; told to dress the turkey, she puts it in fancy clothes. But despite language’s flexibility, it isn’t a magic wand that

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<sup>1</sup>Portions of this chapter appeared as “Mukulabhaṭṭa’s Defense of Lakṣaṇā: How We Use Words to Mean Something Else, but Not Everything Else” in *The Journal of Indian Philosophy*. Keating 2013a.

we can use to convey any and all meanings we'd like, in whichever context we please. Though Humpty Dumpty says he “pays a word extra” when he makes it do a lot of work, his uttering “glory” to mean a “nice knock-down argument” isn't evidence of his mastery of language but a profound confusion. Many factors, not all under the speaker's control, constrain the power of speech to convey meaning. Indian philosophers distinguished between two powers: the primary and the secondary, or ‘*mukhya*’ and ‘*lakṣaṇā*.’<sup>2</sup>

The distinction between primary and secondary capacities of language in classical Indian philosophy is, generally speaking, the distinction between literal and non-literal meaning, respectively. In future chapters, we will see how both of these distinctions are not without complications, but as a first pass, we can say that the literal meaning of a sentence token is composed of ordinary word-referents, properties, and the like with the help of some basic contextual rules. In contrast, non-literal meaning goes beyond ordinary reference—which is grounded in a language that pairs expressions to objects. Another way to get at this contrast is to say that literal meaning is encoded into a particular utterance through linguistic rules whereas non-literal meaning is grounded in broader principles having to do with speaker aims, conventions, and the like. In classical Indian philosophy, primary meaning is usually characterized as be-

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<sup>2</sup>The word ‘*lakṣaṇā*’ is often translated as “indication,” or “secondary meaning.” I will leave it untranslated, in part because no single English word captures the range of its meaning. In addition, *lakṣaṇā* plays a central theoretical role in what is to come, and I prefer to leave open precisely what it is, and allow exposition of the Sanskrit texts to fill in the concept, rather than the connotations attached to an English translation. Throughout the dissertation, I will use English words instead of Sanskrit wherever possible, with footnotes to give more etymological and conceptual background.

ing *direct* whereas secondary meaning is *indirect*, depending in some way upon the primary meaning but going beyond it. We can also apply this distinction to words: when Humpty Dumpty says of “glory” that it means a “nice knock-down argument,” he is stipulating a non-literal meaning. The literal meaning of “glory” is determined by wider conventional use, and not Humpty Dumpty’s personal decision. However, with Alice, we might express doubt that even the non-literal meaning of a word (or a sentence) can be simply stipulated by a speaker. Thus we might like to know how it is that non-literal meanings can be expressed.

In classical Indian philosophy it is *lakṣaṇā* which is the *śakti*, or power which causes a hearer to entertain a non-literal meaning. However, they do not agree on how to explain it. One problem is to avoid the “Humpty-Dumptyfication” of words and to define principled constraints for non-literal meaning, but to do so in a way that does justice to the rich nuances of human language use. In this dissertation, I argue that a plausible, if not completely successful, model of *lakṣaṇā* emerges from the interaction between the Grammarian, Mīmāṃsā, and Alāṅkāra schools found in the work of ninth-century Kashmiri thinker Mukulabhaṭṭa.<sup>3</sup> In the confluence of these traditions we find attention to the lexical and syntactic requirements for sentence meaning, to the interpretive

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<sup>3</sup>In classical Indian philosophy, major philosophical divisions were marked by textual traditions called ‘*darśana*’, or “ways of seeing.” While they are given names like the Grammarian school, the Mīmāṃsā school, and so on, there was dispute within the particular schools and they were not entirely unified. However, insofar as they can be viewed as a history of texts commenting upon earlier texts, and they share major philosophical commitments, they are usefully described as “schools.”

unity guiding a communicative act, and to the nuances of creative language use found in poetry, for instance.

Mukula’s positive arguments for the centrality of *lakṣaṇā* originate as part of an attack on another Kashmiri thinker, Ānandavardhana, who wrote the highly influential *Dhvanyāloka*, or *The Light on Suggestion*.<sup>4</sup> In this text, Ānanda argues that the existing linguistic capacities (which include *lakṣaṇā*) are insufficient to explain the full range of linguistic meanings. He posits a new power, suggestion (*dhvani*), which he claims is responsible for such things as discourse-length figures of speech, implied facts, and emotional moods. His focus is upon poetry, where suggestion is the predominant meaning, the meaning intended by the author or speaker, above and beyond the strictly literal meaning of the sentences. While his arguments for suggestion were not universally compelling—for instance, the philosophical tradition represented by the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Buddhists largely ignored them—in the field of poetic theory (*alankāra-śāstra*), his work was responsible for a paradigm shift. Subsequent thinkers would, on the whole, accept his view that suggestion is a central feature of linguistic communication and the primary aim of poetry, in particular the evocation of something called ‘*rasa*,’ which we will discuss below.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>Throughout the text I will frequently refer to Mukulabhaṭṭa as “Mukula,” and to Ānandavardhana as “Ānanda.” While the latter is less formal, it is common in print, especially when the audience is English speakers, for whom lengthy Sanskrit names can be a mental stumbling block. However, note that while in the original texts, “Bhaṭṭa” is a term indicating respect and separable from “Mukula,” Ānanda’s entire name is “Ānandavardhana.”

<sup>5</sup>At the outset, it’s important to flag that there is a tradition of interpreting Ānanda’s

However, there were early dissenters, including Mukulabhaṭṭa, who argued that suggestion could be understood within the existing framework offered by *lakṣaṇā*. His text is an attempt to build a unifying theory of language which counters the theory of suggestion. Beginning with language's important role in guiding action through knowledge of the world, Mukula then sets out a lexical semantics, distinguishes between two linguistic functions (*vyāpāra*)

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suggested meaning as something that is beyond reason and has religious connotations. One example of this approach is that of Anand Amaldass, who says, "*Dhvani* (suggestion) is not a meaning among other meanings. It is rather a meaning-fulness or Significance attained through meaning...*Dhvani* is not merely an indirect way of conveying a meaning for the sake of charm...not a rational process where meaning and its implications are arrived at in the logical order. *Dhvani* is the Significance that a meaning brings about to a person in the context of a deeper experience (Amaladass 1984, 207, capitalization in original)." Of this "deeper experience," Amaldass says that it is due to suggestion which "enables one to overcome the subject-object duality in cognition and to reach the unity of consciousness and language." (Amaladass 1984, p. 22.) Amaldass is influenced in his analysis by Francis X. D'Sa, whose work finds the notion of "Significance" in the *Mīmāṃsā* as well. See D'Sa 1980 and a critical review by Taber, Taber 1983. However, while Ānanda's commentator, Abhinavagupta, was Kashmiri Śaivite whose own aesthetic theory was explicitly linked to Tantric metaphysics, these elements are not explicitly found in Ānanda. (Kashmiri Śaivism is a term for a group of cultic practices which focus on worship of Śiva (hence "Śaivite"), and emphasize the religious practitioner's personal power and transcendence of ordinary reality. One central metaphysical claims made by many, though not all, Śaivites, is that reality is non-dual, and that the goddess Shakti is part of the god Shiva, and that all of reality emanates from them. See Muller-Ortega 1989 and Sanderson 2004 for discussion of Kashmiri Śaivism and Abhinavagupta and Bäumer 2008 for discussion of the relationship between Abhinava's aesthetics and religious views.) However, as Edwin Gerow has forcefully argued in his comments on Amaldass, this (in his terms) "mystico-religious view of language" runs counter to what Ānanda himself is arguing: "that *dhvani* belongs to the province of ordinary language, and is its most characteristic and expressive function." Gerow 1986, p. 855. While Amaldass' work is useful where he summarizes the *Dhvanyāloka* and its historical context, his missteps in analysis are a warning to those who follow about the pitfalls of comparative philosophical work. Gerow, in his criticism of Amaldass, points out that using ambiguous terms like "hermeneutics" in cross-cultural interpretation is fraught with potential for obfuscation. Thus, in what follows, I strive to clarify in what sense I intend terms such as "meaning," "suggestion," and the like, and carefully distinguish between Ānanda's views (as best as I can reconstruct them), the views of contemporary Anglophone philosophers, and my own.

of language, and systematically, case by case, explains the logical structure of these functions. Along the way, he discusses topics such as what contemporary philosophy would call “the unity of the proposition,” the relationship of frozen metaphors to their primary or literal meanings, the cues that interpreters use to recover what a speaker intends, and how to differentiate between figures of speech such as irony, puns, metaphor, metonymy, and hyperbole. At the heart of his proposal is an exploration of how *lakṣaṇā* functions when the primary meaning of an utterance is blocked. My thesis is that, as Mukula presents it, *lakṣaṇā* is profitably understood as interpretation guided by inference to the best explanation.

In what follows, I argue that not only is Mukula’s attack on the theory of suggestion largely successful, but it is a useful account of how inference to the best explanation explains the simultaneous flexibility and normatively constrained nature of figures of speech and the like. I also argue that Mukula’s arguments in his *Fundamentals* can be understood as an early defense of Gricean pragmatic implicature, coupled with what contemporary linguists would call metonymic sort-shifting. To demonstrate this, I give a careful account of the conceptions of inferential reasoning at play in the Indian debate over non-literal speech. For instance, I demonstrate how Ānanda’s arguments against inferential reasoning in *The Light* implicitly support the role of inference to the best explanation.

The structure of the dissertation is broadly topical. I begin with the historical and intellectual context for Ānanda and Mukula. Along the way I

observe where their inquiries overlap with contemporary philosophical questions. Where classical Indian philosophical inquiries overlap with Western thinkers, I bring their insights to bear on current projects. Where the two are orthogonal, I use the divergence to question presuppositions on both fronts. My final chapter is a brief conclusion of what contemporary philosophy can learn from this ninth-century dialectic where I also lay out avenues for future research.

In the rest of this chapter, I situate the dispute between Ānanda and Mukula historically. I argue that not only has Mukula's treatise been overlooked as an important reply to Ānanda's influential theory, the extent to which Mukula is focused upon epistemology has not yet been recognized. I demonstrate that this focus is important for fully appreciating his arguments. After a survey of the early textual tradition of poetics and dramaturgy to which Ānanda is significantly indebted, I introduce the Mīmāṃsā tradition which informs his and Mukula's work.

## 1.1 Mukulabhaṭṭa: An Overlooked Minority Voice

Despite being one of the earliest substantial replies to the *Light* of Ānandavardhana, Mukula's ninth century *Abhidhā-vṛtta-mātrka*, or, *Fundamentals of the Communicative Function*, has not been addressed in much detail until recently. This is regrettable, since it was influential in Sanskrit poetic theory and is a unique interdisciplinary text. In its original context, the treatise was influential: Mammaṭa, a tremendous figure in Sanskrit poetic theory, borrowed parts



of the *Fundamentals* verbatim for his twelfth century *Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra*. Mukula had at least two students, Pratīhārendurāja and Sahadeva, who both cite their teacher as not only the source of their knowledge, but as responsible for rediscovering the work of Vāmana, an important earlier theorist.<sup>6</sup> Abhinavagupta’s famous commentary on the *Light* indicates his awareness of Mukula’s work, as it deals with the objection that *dhvani* should be understood as *lakṣaṇā*.

Further, not only was the *Fundamentals* influential in the study of literary theory and linguistic communication in South Asia, the text is a unique combination of philosophy, literary theory, grammatical analysis, and incorporates a wide array of natural language examples. As McCrea points out, for a philosophical work to devote this much attention to poetry was unheard of in Mukula’s day.<sup>7</sup> In fact, just how to categorize the *Fundamentals* is unclear. While the degree to which Indian philosophy admits of “schools” with clearly identifiable and firm boundaries has been overstated, typically there are traditional vectors of intellectual effort which originate from a “root” text, or *sūtra*. Members of these schools tend to share certain commitments, as well as a certain set of earlier texts from which they will draw upon, in addition to the root text. Thus, for example, the Mīmāṃsā school, which we will investigate in more detail later, has as its root text the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* of Jaimini, and

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<sup>6</sup>McCrea 2008, p. 265.

<sup>7</sup>McCrea 2008, p. 264. A later work, the *Vyaktiviveka* of Mahimabhaṭṭa, is similar in its philosophical breadth (its author relies upon the work of Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti) and a wide range of sources, including Mīmāṃsā, Grammarian, and possibly Śaivite schools. See Rajendran 1991, p. 47-49.

later works, however original they may be, are typically presented as commenting on Jaimini or his commentators.<sup>8</sup> The Mīmāṃsaka philosopher will cite their opponents, Nyāya or Buddhist as well, but it would be unusual to cite texts from the poetic tradition, for instance. However, Mukula draws on the Grammarians, the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā (two Mīmāṃsā schools with diverging views), as well as the poetic tradition. Further, Mukula does not entirely align himself with any one of these intellectual traditions. Thus, the neglect of his *Fundamentals* is to the detriment of our understanding how disciplinary boundaries in classical Indian intellectual thought were porous.

Those authors who have taken up Mukula's work generally fall into two categories: those who recognize his importance yet give a cursory study of the text, and those who overlook his importance due to the long shadow cast by Ānanda's *Light* in Sanskrit literary theory. Among the latter, there are a few who even mistake Mukula as a supporter of the theory of suggestion, rather than a critic. Unfortunately, the only existing English translation we have of *The Fundamentals* falls into this final group, at least to a large extent. In his 1977 translation, published in the *Journal of Indian Philosophy*, K. Venugopalan recognizes that Mukula's goal is to subsume the putative function of suggestion within *lakṣaṇā*, but he also claims that at some points Mukula

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<sup>8</sup>Even poetry in the Sanskrit tradition has commentaries, and the tradition itself encourages poets to write richly complex works that require some commentary for readers to fully understand. Tubb and Boose 2007, p. 2.

“definitely accepts the view of Dhvani [suggestion] indirectly.”<sup>9</sup> His reason for this interpretation seems to be the following: Ānanda has already established that *lakṣaṇā* and suggestion are “poles apart,” and, since Mukula has not been able to refute this view, his analysis (of a particular sort of suggestion) is an indirect way accepting of suggestion. However, while a translator must do philosophical work in order to understand and faithfully represent a text’s arguments—and perhaps to take a position on the success or failure of those arguments—one’s own philosophical commitments ought not obscure the explicit commitments of a given text. That is, while perhaps Mukula’s view is nuanced to the degree that he accepts suggestion in some areas, and rejects it in others, we must look for textual cues that this is, in fact, his view. (In what follows I argue that this is not his view.) Simply appealing to the (supposed) failure of an author’s argument is insufficient to show that an author is indirectly accepting a contrary view. In any case, whether or not Venugopalan’s work is entirely faithful to Mukula’s project, as it stands the translation has a number of errors.<sup>10</sup> Thus, part of my dissertation is a new English translation, which I hope will do justice to Mukula’s philosophical commitments and be a useful reference for future work.

The other existing editions of *The Fundamentals* are accessible only to Sanskrit and Hindi scholars. The 1973 Sanskrit edition, edited by Dvivedi, is printed in

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<sup>9</sup>Bhaṭṭa 1977, p.262.

<sup>10</sup>The transliteration is also filled with typographical errors, and there are no clues as to which manuscripts or editions guided his decisions for emending the text. I hope to address this problem in future work.

Devanāgarī with a Hindi commentary.<sup>11</sup> There is also a more recent 2008 edition, also printed in Devanāgarī, containing a Sanskrit commentary as well as a Hindi commentary.<sup>12</sup> While Venugopalan’s English footnotes form a helpful, though sparse, commentary, the only other available English commentary is in a short text entitled *Abhidhā*. This 76-page monograph, taken from lectures given by Tapasvi Nandi, outlines the major elements of Mukula’s work in a generally sympathetic and constructive manner.<sup>13</sup> Nandi summarizes Mukula’s text, correctly identifying the central thrust of his work as an attempt to refute Ānanda’s theory of suggestion.<sup>14</sup> However, while Nandi’s summary of Mukula is thorough, it is not analytical, nor does it address in what ways Mukula’s arguments might be understood as directly responding to Ānanda.

Apart from these efforts—and the recent work of Lawrence McCrea—to which I will turn in a moment, few contemporary scholars working in either poetic theory or philosophy took note of Mukula’s criticisms of Ānanda’s theory of suggestion. Among the major early writers on Sanskrit literary criticism—De, Kane, Krishnamoorthy, and Gerow—none spend any significant energy on even summarizing his work. Krishnamoorthy does not mention him at all, Gerow erroneously places him before Ānanda, and Kane and De only mention him briefly.<sup>15</sup> While K.K. Raja does recognize his importance as an early critic

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<sup>11</sup>Mukulabhaṭṭa 1973.

<sup>12</sup>Bhaṭṭa 2008.

<sup>13</sup>Nandi 2002.

<sup>14</sup>He also correctly remarks that, although Mukula uses terms like ‘*abhivyañjatā*’, which might seem as if he is endorsing the existence of the suggestive function of *vjañjanā*, he means simply “making it manifest.” See Nandi 2002, p. 3.

<sup>15</sup>See De 1960, Gerow 1977, Kane 1961, and Kirhsnamoorthy 1968

of Ānanda's *dhvani* theory, he devotes a scant three sentences to Mukula's work.<sup>16</sup> Even Ingalls' translation of Ānanda's *Dhvanyāloka* mentions Mukula only in passing, and not as someone who is responding to Ānanda.<sup>17</sup>

Recently, Lawrence McCrea's chapter in *The Teleological Poetics of Medieval Kashmir* has begun to rectify this relative neglect of Mukula's work.<sup>18</sup> The chapter moves beyond mere summary to analysis that recognizes the role of the theory of suggestion in motivating the text.<sup>19</sup> McCrea establishes the importance of Mukula's work as the first example of a new sub-genre within Sanskrit literary theory. He also carefully distinguishes between Mukula's agreement with Ānanda on the nature of poetry and his disagreement about the explanation for linguistic phenomenon, a distinction not clearly made in earlier efforts.

My own aim in the next few chapters is to continue to contextualize Mukula's philosophical work, focusing in particular on the epistemological implications of his arguments. This has not yet been addressed in any of the literature I have surveyed. However, not only does Mukula's work itself open with an appeal to an epistemic motivation for his work (concerning which, see below),

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<sup>16</sup>Raja 1993, p. 295.

<sup>17</sup>Ingalls characterizes the *Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātrka* as "concerned with the nature of denotation and the secondary use of words," which, while true, misses the dialectical nature of his interest in secondary use, or *lakṣaṇā*. Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 29.

<sup>18</sup>In the same year as McCrea's book was published, another treatment of Mukula was also published in *Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir* (Agrawal 2008, pp. 28-40.) This short piece by M.M. Agrawal is consistent with the earlier discussions of Mukula's work, in that it primarily emphasizes the *dhvani* theorist's response to his arguments (in this case, through the *Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra* of Mammaṭa).

<sup>19</sup>McCrea 2008, pp.260-310.

but more generally, the philosophy of language in classical Indian thought has been part of the study of epistemology. For both of these reasons, I conclude that our understanding of his work would benefit from a careful analysis of the relationship of his arguments to epistemology of language. Not only will this benefit our understanding of this particular text, but insofar as Mukula’s arguments succeed or fail, we can draw general lessons about epistemic access to non-literal meaning.

## 1.2 Linguistic Communication and Interpretation

The central focus of these next chapters is epistemological. Human communicative acts are complex, and hearers recover multiple elements in any given utterance.<sup>20</sup> For instance, one might come to understand the referents of con-

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<sup>20</sup>There is a further complexity: the relevant differences, if any, between oral and written communication. While we might argue that, as a system of representation abstracted from actual speakers or writers, language is indifferent to the medium of transmission, it is plausible that agents recover meaning differently depending on the medium. Further, in the history of Sanskrit literature and philosophy, there were important distinctions drawn between the oral and the written. The Vedas were originally transmitted orally, and, even after they were written down, it was an essential part of their nature (for the *Mīmāṃsā* hermeneuticists, at least) that they were authorless and timeless. In contrast, poetry (*kāvya*) is a quintessential act of a historically-bound author setting intention into written form, even if it is to be performed orally and publicly. (Pollock 2006, pp. 75-76.) However, despite drawing distinctions between the genres of the Vedas and poetry, theorists applied hermeneutic approaches originally meant for Vedic interpretation to the analysis of poetry. (McCrea 2008.) Thus, while it may be correct, as Pollock observes, that poetry was self-consciously understood as a “new phenomenon entirely different from all earlier language uses” (a phenomenon that was said to begin with Vālmīki’s *Rāmāyaṇa*), Sanskrit thinkers employed both new and old conceptual tools for the task of analyzing poetic language. (Pollock 2006, pp. 77.) The reason I draw attention to this distinction—between the oral and the written—is that one might think it is a category mistake to draw upon theories originally intended to explain only the phenomenon of poetic meaning encoded in writing as a way to explain non-literal meaning in general, whether conveyed orally or in writing.

stituent words and expressions, the literal sentence meaning, the meaning the speaker intends to convey with that sentence, as well as other kinds of speaker aims. A speaker could aim for her hearer to enter a certain emotional state, appreciate particular aesthetic features (of the utterance or of the world), or perform a particular action. Whatever we conclude, from a philosophical vantage point, about the status of the elements in this list in a theory of meaning, such human activities are the starting point for our investigation.

In the words of Mukulabhaṭṭa, the certainty (*niścaya*) that we have about, for example, the objects of words is what enables our utterances to be part of everyday use (*vyavahāra*), and this certainty depends upon there being an accessible connection between our words and their meanings.<sup>21</sup> At its most

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However, there are three reasons that I think this is too limited a conception. First, as I've already suggested, the historical philosophical investigation cuts across genre boundaries. This is especially apparent in Mukula's work, where he draws upon more than just poetic examples, appealing to ordinary speech as well as Vedic speech. Such a willingness to cross genre boundaries demonstrates that he thought his explanation was not limited simply to the written texts of *kāvya*. Second, even though there are certain aspects of *kāvya* which may require it being written (for instance, the complex double meanings known as *śleṣa* required multiple readings), it was originally intended for a public audience and was still part of a culture which privileged orality. See, for example, the story of Dhanapāla, whose poem was recited from a manuscript that was subsequently lost, but then partially recovered through the memory of his daughter (Pollock 2006, pp. 87.) The relationship between oral and textual meaning is thus complex, even within the original historical context. Third, even if the original philosophical project did aim to explain a very narrowly understood genre which was grounded in the written word, this is not a principled obstacle to drawing upon insights which may be expanded to other areas. Naturally, we must be careful not to import this expansion into our representation of the original arguments, but the task of the philosopher, as opposed to the historian, is to draw out what is entailed by certain claims. Where it is relevant, I will distinguish between "hearer" and "reader," but on the whole, as my project is the exploration of non-literal meaning in general, I will assume that hearers are readers and vice versa.

<sup>21</sup>See [1.7] in the appended translation: "*ato niścaya eva teṣāṃ pada-arthānāṃ vyavahāra-uparohe nibandhanam. niścayaś ca śabda-sambhedena-artham go-cari-karoti*; And it is

basic level, this amounts to the fact that, without some way for speakers and hearers to converge on the same meanings, language would not be a useful tool. However we want to characterize the object of this convergence (Is it a proposition? A state of affairs?), and however we want to characterize the convergence itself (Do we share the same thought? Merely coordinate our actions?), this observation is a starting point for theorizing about language. The observation brings us to wonder, among other things, how it is that we are able to recover such objects. It is with this principle that Mukula opens the *Fundamentals of the Communicative Function* and from which he develops his model of both literal and non-literal speech.

As I've noted, the Indian philosophical tradition identified linguistic "powers," or '*śakti*', which were responsible for producing in a hearer an understanding of a meaning. Indian philosophers called this understanding a '*viśiṣṭa-jñāna*', or "cognitive state of an entity which is apprehended as qualified."<sup>22</sup> I will

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through knowledge sources that there is the comprehension of things referred to by words—things which are useful for worldly enjoyment or for deliverance from the cycle of reincarnation, and useful for avoiding what is opposed to these. Therefore, it is only on the basis of certainty regarding what things words refer to that there is appropriateness for everyday purposes." The term '*artha*' is used to mean objects, meanings, things, and aims. As a word with a wide semantic range, it can play the dual role of describing the things in the world that words might point to, as well as the "things in the head" which hearers and speakers entertain while speaking.

<sup>22</sup>A qualificative cognitive state, as Matilal calls it (Matilal 1998, p. 19ff), is essentially when a thinker entertains a thought about an object, where the object is thought about as qualified by something else, like a property. Examples traditionally are things like, "a blue pot," which can also be expressed sententially as, "This pot is blue." The Indian tradition puts emphasis on the individual who *has* the qualificative cognitive state as a result of hearing an utterance. However, the cognition has a structure which maybe viewed as analogous to the structure of a proposition. Putting a qualificative cognitive state into formal terms, we can represent it as  $Q(a,b)$ , or, "*a* is qualified by *b*." Note that there is not



use “cognition” as shorthand to refer to this understanding, which can be loosely characterized as the grasping of a proposition on the part of the hearer. Another term for this capacity of language is its “function.”<sup>23</sup> For instance, according to some Grammarians, the denotative function is responsible for our understanding that “cow” refers to a general class of bovine animals, that “white” refers to a quality which inheres in physical objects, that “David” refers to an individual human being, and that “s/he cooks” refers to the action of heating food. Of course, our favorite semantic theories might specify that “cow” doesn’t pick out a general class but an individual instead, and we might have a different analysis of action-words, names, and so forth. Whatever the particulars, the reason for describing denotation as a “function” is that, given a speaker’s uttering a word, a hearer will subsequently entertain the appropriate proposition, or have the correctly corresponding cognition. Given an input (a word), there is an output (a cognition). While there are many interesting questions to do with the referents of words, this is not primary focus in the next several chapters.<sup>24</sup> The focus is, instead, on the times when the cognition associated with the literal sense is problematic.<sup>25</sup> Perhaps it does not cohere

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always a one-to-one correspondence between the qualifier, *b*, and the grammatical predicate of a sentence.

<sup>23</sup>Sanskrit: ‘*vyāpara*’, ‘*vṛtti*’, or ‘*prakāra*’.

<sup>24</sup>As in Western philosophy, there are a variety of theories about reference. Most Indian philosophers of language are direct-reference theorists of a kind. Buddhists, whose views I will only touch upon here, are the exception, arguing for a kind of conceptual intermediary between the speaker and her referent. See Raja 1993 for a broad overview of the territory, and Ganeri 1999 and Ganeri 2006 for a useful introduction to Nyāya philosophy of language with regard to theories of reference.

<sup>25</sup>In fact, as we will see later, given enough difficulty with the literal sense (and here I use “sense” in a rough manner, not as a technical term), it is possible that a hearer may not be

with what we expect from the speaker, given our background knowledge of her character. If Sally says,

(1) Justin Bieber is amazing

but we know that she hates pop music, we might suspect she isn't telling us that Justin Bieber is amazing. The sentence itself, as uttered, is syntactically acceptable, but we are hesitant to accept its apparent meaning.<sup>26</sup>

Alternatively, perhaps there is some problem with the constituent parts in combination with each other. If Justin Bieber sings,

(2) Smile on your face even though your heart is frowning,

the attribution of frowning to someone's heart is a problem if taken literally, since hearts do not have mouths which frown or smile. In the Indian tradition, as said above, the purpose of a sentence is to cause a structured cognition in the hearer. Here, the hearer may be unable to cognize anything, since she needs to have appropriate qualifier-qualificandum relationships communicated. However, in this case, the heart ought to be qualified by frowning, but such a relationship is, *prima facie*, impossible.

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able to entertain a cognition at all.

<sup>26</sup>This hesitation could be explained by any number of reasons. Perhaps we think accepting the sentence's straightforward meaning would require us to explain Sally's utterance by the assumption that she is lying or that she has become irrational. In either case, the mere fact of Sally lying, or of her being irrational is reason to reject the literal meaning against a background of other beliefs we have: that we think Sally is truthful, or we think she is rational.

In the Indian tradition, the function *lakṣaṇā*, referred to earlier, is responsible for generating cognitions which replace or augment the literal meaning.<sup>27</sup> In (1), by *lakṣaṇā*, we may get something like “Justin Bieber is not amazing” from Sally’s utterance. In (2), we may get something like, “(There’s a) smile on your face even though you are sad.”

Just these two examples hint at the complexities involved in an account of *lakṣaṇā*. How, for instance, do we know that Sally means to communicate that Justin Bieber is not amazing, and not to communicate that she has changed her mind about his skills? If she is being ironic, is she wanting to communicate a particular thing (say, the negation of the literal meaning of her utterance) or just to get us to share the distaste for Bieber that she has? In the case of Bieber’s lyrics, are we to understand some specific state of affairs by the phrase “your heart is frowning,” or to experience an emotion, like sadness? Perhaps we are to have an aesthetic experience, like an experience of beauty?

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<sup>27</sup>There is an ambiguity here, which is present throughout the tradition, and which we will explore in more detail as we investigate inferential reasoning in Chapter Three. This is the ambiguity between *lakṣaṇā* as something like a function which yields an output given a certain input, and *lakṣaṇā* as something which hearers actively perform. While Siderits’ claim that Indian philosophy did not have “anything remotely resembling formal semantics” may be overstated, he is right that they paid much attention to “the psychological and social processes involved in language acquisition, production, and comprehension” (Siderits 1991, p. 5). Ganeri emphasizes the epistemological context of the Indian analysis of language (Ganeri 1999, p. 13ff.) He points out that there is a normative aspect to language-processing: understanding language is a matter of obtaining knowledge, given the right conditions. In this sense, one can abstract away from the hearer and speak simply of the conditions necessary for a sentence to yield a proposition (the content of a cognition). However, Indian philosophers are aware, and emphasize, that this language-processing takes place in human interpreters, and that the pairing of meanings with sentences is a human faculty, like perception (and also like inferential reasoning).

This last possibility in particular is part of Ānandavardhana’s motivation in writing the *Dhvanyāloka*. He argues that while denotation in combination with *lakṣaṇā*, can explain some aspects of communication, they leave unexplained how we succeed in a wide swath of communicative goals, including aesthetic aims. These goals are attained through our linguistic activities, so Ānanda thinks they need an explanation that is also rooted in the capacity of language which I will call a “linguistic function.” By this term I intend to distinguish the processes of language comprehension and production from the perceptual and inferential processes on the part of either hearer or speaker. The word “function” is intentionally ambiguous between function *qua* human ability and *qua* abstract relationship between input and output.<sup>28</sup> Ānanda argues for a third function (in addition to denotation and *lakṣaṇā*) called ‘*dhvani*’, or “suggestion.” Suggestion is the function responsible for a hearer understanding a speaker’s aims. These aims can include getting a hearer to have an emotion or aesthetic experiences, perform an action, or other perlocutionary effects, just as has been described already. Ānanda characterizes all these aims as ‘*artha*’, the Sanskrit term whose semantic range encompasses meanings, referents, and objects. He argues that suggestion is a linguistic function in the same sense that word denotation and *lakṣaṇā* are functions, but that it is a distinct function.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>28</sup>These functions are commonly called “semantic powers” by translators, but they include what analytic philosophy would consider semantic as well as pragmatic functions. In a loose sense, one could understand denotation as semantic and *lakṣaṇā* as pragmatic, but as in Western philosophy, this is not a distinction without problems.

<sup>29</sup>See appended translation, DV 3.33o ‘*sarvathā prasiddha-śābda-prakāra-vilakṣaṇatvaṃ*

In response, Mukula rejects this third function, arguing that everything suggestion does can be explained by appeal to *lakṣaṇā*, a function already accepted by all of the major Indian philosophers. His treatise, the *Fundamentals of the Communicative Function*, aims to demonstrate that what Ānanda identifies as being the function of suggestion is really just the function of indication. I argue that Mukula’s response to Ānanda is in many ways successful. He shows that many of the purportedly “suggested” meanings can be understood using the principles which govern recovery of indicated meaning. In the Indian tradition, indicated meaning is understood through hearers relying on what I argue is essentially inference to the best explanation. Thus we can give an explanation as to how interpretations count as rational explanations of non-literal speech. In contrast, the function of suggestion is explanatorily inadequate.

## 1.3 Poetics and Dramaturgy

### 1.3.1 Early Texts: Taxonomies of Emotion and Figuration

To understand the school of Indian poetics which began with Ānandavardhana’s *Light on Suggestion* (*Dhvanyāloka*) in the mid ninth century CE, it is necessary to appreciate the intellectual histories of grammar, philosophy, po-

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*śabda-vyāpāra-viśayatvaṃ ca tasya asti iti na asty eva avayor vivādaḥ*; “What is claimed on our part is there is a word-function whose characteristic mark is possessing suggestion, distinct from the denotative function or secondary function.” *Dhvanyāloka* 3.33 in Ānandavardhana 1990b, translation mine.

etics, and dramaturgy which preceded him.<sup>30</sup> The term ‘*dhvani*’ was originally employed by Grammarians to refer to the sounds of utterances, sounds which “reveal” their meaning.<sup>31</sup> Ānanda uses the word to refer to the specific “suggested sense” or “implied charm” which poetry has and which is predominant in comparison with the literal sense. While suggested meaning as described by Ānanda is often a property of poetry, the function that produces suggested meanings is not unique to poetry. There are two Sanskrit terms used for this operation: ‘*dhvani*’ and ‘*vyañjanā*.’ I translate the first, “poetic suggestion” and the second, “ordinary suggestion.”<sup>32</sup> Analogous to the Grammarian notion of *dhvani*, Ānanda’s *dhvani* reveals the meaning of a poem. The *Dhvanyāloka* by Ānandavardhana was the first Sanskrit text to propose this aesthetic function

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<sup>30</sup> Ānanda lived at the end of Kashmir’s dominant era in Asian history, during the ninth century CE. He wrote his own poetry as well as works on philosophy and Buddhism. We have lost many of these works, but do have some quotations cited in other works. The original title of the *Dhvanyāloka* was probably the *Sahṛdayāloka*, or *A Light for Connoisseurs*, since Abhinavagupta’s commentary is titled the *Sahṛdaya-loka-locana*, and his is the oldest commentary. There is no critical edition of his work. It has three parts: the *Kārikā*, *Vṛtti*, and *Udāharaṇa*. Despite some dispute about whether Ānanda is the author of all three parts, most scholars think that he is, especially since Abhinava quotes all three parts as if they were authored by the same person. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 12.

<sup>31</sup> There are two kinds of *dhvani* according to the Grammarians: *prākṛta-dhvani* and *vaikṛta-dhvani*. The latter refers to the sound patterns of an individual person’s utterance of a word while the former is an abstracted class of typical sound patterns for a word. The two of these together result in knowledge of a letter/word/sentence, understood as something different from the sounds which make up an event of utterance. This is similar to the distinction in modern linguistics between the objects studied by phonetics (individual utterances), and phonology (utterances as an abstract class). See Raja 2000, p. 14-15 and Bhattacharyya 1994, p. 75.

<sup>32</sup> NB: The two are often found interchangeably in Ānanda’s work and elsewhere, and it is contextual cues that indicate which concept is meant. In fact, ‘*vyañjanā*’ is not found in the *Dhvanyāloka* at all, although terms using the verbal root  $\sqrt{\text{vyañj}}$  are. I make another distinction not explicitly present in Sanskrit: the same word, “*dhvani*,” can refer to the function which produces meanings as well as the resultant meaning. To avoid ambiguity, I will say “suggested meaning” to refer to the latter, and “suggestion” to refer to the function.

of poetry.

The early textual tradition of poetic investigation (*alan̄kāra-śāstra*) was primarily concerned with taxonomies of figures of speech and with practical advice on how to make poetry beautiful, which was understood as the goal of poetry. There was also a textual tradition of dramatic investigation (*nāṭya-śāstra*) focused on dramaturgy.<sup>33</sup> Initially, poetic investigation and dramatic investigation had different aims. The goal of drama was to inculcate a certain emotional and aesthetic state in the characters on stage, termed *rasa* (a word literally meaning “taste,” “flavor,” or “relish”). Texts about drama gave instructions for which plays could generate appropriate such emotions on stage, through employing appropriate plot devices, movements, stage settings, and so on. The text called the *Nāṭya-śāstra*, a circa sixth-century text attributed to Bharata, is generally considered the starting place of Indian investigation into aesthetics.<sup>34</sup> Eventually the two goals, the cultivation of *rasa* and the creation of poetic beauty, would be brought together into a unifying theory, but not in early texts. The aesthetic flavor of *rasa* was thought to arise from a precise combination of elements within a play: objects of emotions (circumstances in

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<sup>33</sup>The term ‘*alan̄kāra*’ means “ornament” (literally, “making beautiful”), referring to figures of speech. ‘*Nāṭya*’ means “drama” or “representation.” A ‘*śāstra*’ essentially refers to a textual tradition or school of thought, or a scientific textbook.

<sup>34</sup>We have no firm date for the text, nor any biographical information about its author. The name, “Bharata,” is that of a Vedic tribe. References to a sage of the same name who taught dance are found in Kālidāsa. It is likely that the name is symbolic and not historical. As well, it’s likely that the text is a compilation of earlier texts which are not extant. See Bhattacharya and Sarkar 2004. This text, and later texts like it, cannot be categorized simply as “aesthetics.” Art in general was never an abstract concern, taken independently of its embodiment in drama and poetry.

the plot), bodily manifestations of emotions (on the part of the actors), and temporary emotional moods (attributed to the characters).<sup>35</sup>

The *Nāṭya-śāstra* compares this combination to a cook's recipe which, when followed properly and prepared for persons of culture, yields satisfaction. Thus there is a normative aspect to *rasa* in its creation (one must combine the elements appropriately) and in the requirement of a skillful audience member (not just anyone is satisfied by gourmet food without having a trained palate). Originally, theorists identified eight kinds of *rasa* (the erotic, comic, pathetic, furious, heroic, terrible, repugnant, and wonderful), but eventually added a ninth to the list, the peaceful. Despite there being eight kinds identified, theorists claimed that there is a unified aesthetic experience underlying each case. What differs is the set of components leading to the experience.

The task of dramaturgy was to identify what the appropriate objects of emotions are which yield, in combination with facial movements and other bodily manifestations, a certain temporary emotional mood. This mood would then undergo a transformation into a transcendent universal emotion, incapable of being completely described and oriented at something beyond simply the actors and the plot. Just what constitutes the object of *rasa* is contentious, but all agree that it is not the particular events of a play.<sup>36</sup> In order to create this

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<sup>35</sup>The famous verse defining *rasa* is: ‘*vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād rasa-niṣpattiḥ*’, or “*Rasa* is brought about due to the combination of objects of emotions, manifestations of emotions, and temporary emotional moods.” Translation mine. Bharata 1926, p. 274.

<sup>36</sup>Later theorists, such as Abhinavagupta, would argue that *rasa* is a kind of blissful, transcendent, and even religious experience.



*rasa*, a playwright would need to be careful not to write plots which combine the wrong classes of people with certain gestures, or conflicting emotions. So, for example, the temporary emotion of fear (*bhaya*) is described in this way for women and “persons of the inferior class”:

Fear relates to women and persons of the inferior class. It is caused by determinants (objects of emotions) such as acts offending one’s superiors and the king, roaming in a forest, seeing an elephant and a snake, staying in an empty house, rebuke...It is to be represented on stage by consequents (bodily manifestations of emotions) such as trembling hands and feet, palpitation of the heart, paralysis, dryness of the mouth...<sup>37</sup>

When it comes to men, the text states,

Fear in men arising from terrifying objects should be represented on stage by actors (lit. dancers) with slackened limbs and suspended movements of the eyes.<sup>38</sup>

Other emotional states are identified as relating particularly to “persons of the superior type,” such as the energetic (*utsāha*). Not only were plot and acting techniques part of the *Nāṭya-śāstra*, but so were topics such as music, stage design, and local styles. Dramatic theory was focused on rules for putting on a successful play (which would be embedded in a larger celebration or festival). While the *Nāṭya-śāstra* does discuss figures of speech in one of its thirty-six

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<sup>37</sup>Bharata-Muni 1967, p. 125. Parentheses are my insertions.

<sup>38</sup>Bharata-Muni 1967, p. 125.

chapters, it surveys only four: simile (*upamā*), metaphorical identification (*rūpaka*, referring specifically to the form “A is B”), parallelism (*dīpaka*), and repetition (*yamaka*).<sup>39</sup> It is up to later writers to examine figures of speech in more detail, and in a strictly verbal context as opposed to dramatic.

Like dramaturgy, early reflection on poetry described rules for writing successful poetry, which was understood as creating beautiful figures of speech. If the metaphor for a successful drama was a recipe, the metaphor for a good poem was a beautiful lady.

The words and meanings which make up a poem are described as its “body” (*śarīra*), while those phonetic and semantic factors which, when introduced into poetic language, render it more beautiful are called “ornaments” (*alaṅkāras*).<sup>40</sup>

Emphasis in literature about poetics was on these ornaments, their kinds and relations to one another, and not the structure of the metaphorical body. The concept of *rasa* does not have a central organizing place until the work of Ānandavardhana.

### 1.3.2 Turning Point: Ānandavardhana’s “Light on Suggestion”

Ānandavardhana’s *Dhvanyāloka* proceeds by citing passages which are generally accepted to have various kinds of poetic effects, and then by analyzing how these effects are attained. As said earlier, his major thesis is that there is

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<sup>39</sup>Gerow 1977, p. 227.

<sup>40</sup>McCrea 2008, p. 35-36.

an additional power of words, called “suggestion” (*dhvani*) in addition to the commonly accepted two: denotation and *lakṣaṇā*. When suggestion is a way of conveying the aesthetic emotional state, or *rasa*, described or intimated within a poem, it is called *rasa-dhvani*. Ānanda tries to give an account of when it is that suggestion causes poetic beauty, and argues that *rasa* is the proper aim of all poetry. It is important to mark that, for Ānanda, *rasa* is found within the text, and not the reader. The reader simply comes to have a cognition of the text’s *rasa*. Thus it is easily understood as *artha*, or meaning, and not a reader’s emotional state. After Abhinavagupta’s commentary on Ānanda, the emphasis shifts onto the reader’s emotive experience, and how to understand *rasa* in relation to other kinds of *artha* becomes more difficult.<sup>41</sup>

To recap, denotation is the capacity of words to refer, and/or for sentences to be syntactically unified wholes. There are competing theories of sentence-meaning which we will address later, and they differ over whether words can be said to refer outside of a particular sentence-type. Most broadly, though, denotation has exhausted its meaning, *lakṣaṇā* will sometimes function to provide a meaning that is connected to the denotation (whether of word or sentence), but goes beyond it. The idea is that *lakṣaṇā* functions when it is impossible to take the word’s natural meaning as what is meant, or to combine words to generate a complete, meaningful sentence, despite the sentence’s constituent parts being syntactically acceptable. I will discuss both of these “functions” in more detail later. Denotation would be responsible for the

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<sup>41</sup>See Pollock 2001, especially pp. 200–203.

meaning of this English sentence:

- (3) The pot is blue.

Through denotation, the hearer would come to have a cognitive state which is of the pot as qualified by blue. This cognition, or *jñāna*, is, as noted earlier, a mental state whose content has a structure. However, for sentences where the denotation cannot produce such a cognition, it is through *lakṣaṇā* that a cognition can be arrived at. For instance:

- (4) The newspaper called.

Suppose “newspaper” ordinarily refers to a physical object, and a cognition of this physical object would normally be the result of denotation. We might then say then there is a problem with the hearer coming to have a cognition. This is because while we might be able to conceive of an anthropomorphized newspaper calling someone (presumably with a telephone), it is nonsensical, given what we know about the world. Just how to characterize the problem is an important question, one which Indian philosophers disagreed about, and a question we will investigate in more detail later.<sup>42</sup> The general point here is that, through *lakṣaṇā*, there is a “transfer” of meaning from newspaper as physical object to newspaper as person representing an institution, and that this is the function of *lakṣaṇā*, not denotation.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>See Raja 2000, p. 259-260 for some of the views in play.

<sup>43</sup>How this transfer works is the topic of Chapter Six.

The classic example from Indian philosophy of *lakṣaṇā* is the sentence:

- (5) *gaṅgāyāṃ*      *ghoṣaḥ*  
ganges<sub>MascLocSg</sub> village<sub>MascNomSg</sub>  
The village is on the Ganges.

The literal meaning of this sentence would be that there is a village which is placed directly on top of a river, according to Indian theorists.<sup>44</sup> The word for “river” is in the locative case, and this relationship is part of the meaning of the locative. Because such a sentence would be problematic if taken literally, they argue that *lakṣaṇā* is employed in order to insert “on the bank of,” as below:

- (6) *gaṅgasya*      *taṭe*      *ghoṣaḥ*  
ganges<sub>MascGenSg</sub> bank<sub>MascLocSg</sub> village<sub>MascNomSg</sub>  
The village is on the bank of the river.<sup>45</sup>

Like earlier writers, Ānanda develops a typology of figures of speech (in which metonymy would be included), but unlike his predecessors, he explicitly connects poetics with *rasa*, understanding it as the goal of poetry. Even though many things may be suggested (figures of speech, facts), the ultimate aim of *dhvani* or suggestion in the poetic context is to suggest *rasa*. Returning to

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<sup>44</sup>The locative case is used for a wide range of relationships, and in ordinary Sanskrit is not used only for the “directly upon” relation. However, the sense of “literal” here is not taken to encompass whatever is used in ordinary life, but a much more restricted sense, perhaps only those uses sanctioned explicitly by Pāṇini and other grammarians.

<sup>45</sup>See the introduction to my translation of *The Fundamentals* for more details about this example and my translation choices.

the example of (15), Ānanda argues that there is a reason why someone would choose to utter (15) and not (6). The purpose is to communicate the connection between the holiness and purity of the Ganges river and the village which is situated very nearby.

Now, because *lakṣaṇā* only works to remove the problem with the literal meaning, it cannot also function to communicate these further meanings. This is because of the principle that each function has a single effect. This is why suggestion is required. In the case of (15), suggestion operates after both denotation and *lakṣaṇā*, but both functions are not always necessary for suggestion. Ānanda says that the word ‘*gaṅga*’ itself can communicate purity without being in a metaphorical or otherwise figurative context.<sup>46</sup>

Ānanda’s work, then, presupposes and responds to existing philosophy of language in his argument for suggestion. His thesis is drawn in explicit contrast to the already accepted functions of denotation and *lakṣaṇā*. Not only does he analyze poetry (and some everyday speech) in a manner traditionally acceptable for a literary critic, he engages in philosophical argumentation with views from several prominent classical Indian traditions. It is to these traditions to which I now turn.

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<sup>46</sup>Raja 2000, p 298. Further, whether or not *lakṣaṇā* is employed, suggestion which produces *rasa* is understood to be the final aim of poetic language. And even in non-poetic contexts, where suggestion operates, it is the reason motivating a speaker’s choice of words and sentence construction.

## 1.4 Mīmāṃsā Philosophy

While there were quite a number of philosophical schools focusing on language prior to Mukulabhaṭṭa and Ānandavardhana, I will focus primarily on the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.<sup>47</sup> Philosophy of language in classical Indian traditions was embedded within discussion of epistemology and sources of knowledge. A source of knowledge, or *pramāṇa*, is authoritative because it gives us structured cognitions which are true and have epistemic warrant.<sup>48</sup> These knowledge sources, which vary in number among philosophical schools, include inferential reasoning, testimony, and perception. Consider inferential reasoning, for example, which is a knowledge source nearly universally accepted.<sup>49</sup> Suppose I perceive smoke rising from a mountain, but see no fire. Through inferential reasoning, I am entitled to conclude there is fire on the mountain with the following reasoning:<sup>50</sup>

1. Thesis to prove (*sādhya*): There is fire on the mountain.

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<sup>47</sup>As noted earlier, I am leaving aside the Buddhists. I also do not take up the rich tradition of the Nyāya, or Logic school. While Ānanda does engage with their views of language in the *Dhvaṅyāloka*, they are less relevant to Mukula's primary aims. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, for now I set aside the dispute between the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, although it does play a role in aspects of Mukula's theory. I will address it in detail in Chapter Four.

<sup>48</sup>Skt. *pramāṇa* is from *pra* and  $\sqrt{mā}$ , meaning "to measure". Recall that "cognition," as I am using it here, is short-hand for "cognition of an entity as qualified." It is a "bit of knowledge" which originates from a *pramāṇa*. Also note that instead of adding an "-s" to the end of a Sanskrit term to make it plural, I will use '*pramāṇa*' for both plural and singular.

<sup>49</sup>This is to exclude the Lokayata, who were skeptical about inferential reasoning for what might be understood as generally Humean reasons. They argued we do not have a proper account of causation that allows us to infer the connection required for claims like "If *p* then *q*."

<sup>50</sup>inferential reasoning, or *anumāna*, will also be discussed in more detail later.

2. Reason (*hetu*): This is because there is smoke on the mountain.
3. Pervasion (*vyāpti*): Everywhere there is smoke, there is fire, such as in the case of a kitchen.
4. Application of rule (*upanayana*): This case is like the kitchen.
5. Conclusion (*nigamana*): Therefore, there is fire on the mountain.<sup>51</sup>

These five items are not steps in a proof, but five parts of what could otherwise be presented as a single sentence. The reason for this formulation is that it is thought to be the best way to prompt one’s interlocutor to draw the correct conclusion and come to knowledge herself. Thus, unlike the order of premises in Western formal logic, the order of the elements is important because they have causal efficacy in this structure. The general idea behind inferential reasoning (though there is a vast and sophisticated literature discussing its nuances) is that when I have knowledge of an inferential mark H and knowledge of a pervasion V between the inferential mark H and an object of inference S, I am warranted in my claim to knowledge of the object of inference S. An example of an inferential mark is smoke in the inference above. An inferential mark H is evidence for the presence of an object of inference S if there is an appropriate pervasion relationship between the two, V. So smoke is evidence for fire if there is the right kind of relationship between them. Indian philosophers call this “pervasion” because they talk about the

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<sup>51</sup>These five sentences are understood to form part of a unified mental act on the part of the reasoner (*sva-artha-anumāna*). It is for the benefit of other people that they are broken into five component parts (*para-artha anumāna*).



relationship between properties and property-bearers in terms of loci. Fire is said to be the locus of smoke.<sup>52</sup> “Pervasion” means that in all cases where there is H, there is also S. (It does not necessarily mean the converse, that where there is S, there is also H.)<sup>53</sup> The pervasion of fire by smoke in step (3) is crucial for the efficacy of inferential reasoning. Suppose we object to the reasoning here, pointing out that it is not true that everywhere there is smoke, there is fire. For instance, when heating oil in a pan to a high temperature, there is smoke but no fire.<sup>54</sup> Indian philosophers were aware of the role of such counterexamples in disproving claims of pervasion. They required that, for inferential reasoning to be sound, there must be an invariable, universal concomitance between the inferential mark (such as smoke) and the object of inference (such as fire).<sup>55</sup> This invariable connection is the crux of inferential reasoning, and it also plays a significant role in theorizing about language, to which I now turn.

Language is thought by Indian philosophers to be a valid means of knowledge for a number of reasons. For one thing, words are responsible for causing

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<sup>52</sup>Matilal 1998, pp. 24–30.

<sup>53</sup>The pervasion relationship is not equivalent to the material conditional,  $H \Rightarrow S$ , however. This is because the truth table for  $H \Rightarrow S$  yields true for the statement in cases where H is false. Indian philosophers reject such cases, as they are not concerned primarily with what Western logic knows as “formal validity,” since their context is epistemological. However, Indian philosophers were well aware of the sort of hypothetical reasoning that underwrites these relationships, as is shown by their study of *tarka*, or “speculation,” “conjecture.” See Chakrabarti 1997a for an excellent discussion of misconceptions about Indian rationality.

<sup>54</sup>In fact, the traditional illustration of smoke and fire is more complicated than presented here. Wet fuel is frequently taken to be necessary for the existence of smoke, in addition to fire.

<sup>55</sup>See Mohanty 2000, pp. 21-24 and Stephen H. Phillips 2009, pp. 16-20 for more discussion.

cognitions of the objects of knowledge. Since they do so in a reliable manner, we can use them to make valid inferences. Without the reliable connection between “fire” and fire, “smoke” and smoke—and so on—the sentence “Everywhere there is smoke, there is fire” could not be used to present inferential reasoning to others.<sup>56</sup> The person who hears the inference represented by the five steps above needs to understand for herself the relationship between smoke and fire. If, on hearing the words “Everywhere there is smoke, there is fire,” she did not have the right cognition, of fire being qualified by smoke, she could not come to have knowledge that there is fire on the mountain.

As well, we often come to true beliefs on the basis of trustworthy speakers. I could come to know that there is fire on the mountain if someone who is a reliable witness were to tell me, “There is fire on the mountain.” Such a person would need to be appropriately knowledgeable about the fire, through observation of her own, or reliable testimony of another. To be a cause of knowledge, her utterance would need to be syntactically well-formed, so that her hearer could have a cognition.

Finally, in the Indian context, the Vedic scriptures were thought to be infallible by the Mīmāṃsakas. More specifically, they were an infallible guide to action—both ritually action and right action more generally. These texts were both descriptive and prescriptive, explaining the rituals required of various people,

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<sup>56</sup>Since the Nyāya, for instance, think that even animals are capable of inferential reasoning, the kind of representation involved in at least some kinds of *anumāna* falls short of full-fledged language.

as well as the metaphysical basis for these rituals.<sup>57</sup> Thus we also need an explanation as to how we come to religious knowledge on the basis of language. The case of the Vedas is a bit different than the cases of inferential reasoning and testimony above, since their origin was thought to be supra-human. There was debate about the relationship between the language of the Vedas and the ordinary language of human beings.<sup>58</sup>

For all these reasons, Indian thinkers were concerned with how human utterances can prompt true cognitions. The members of the philosophical school of Mīmāṃsā are also scholars of the Vedas. These scriptures are not always strictly literal in their use of language, and thus the Mīmāṃsā are concerned with the distinction between literal and non-literal speech, metonymy and metaphor, through their efforts to interpret the Vedas. Take for example, a sentence like:

(7) The grass-bedding is the master of the sacrifice.<sup>59</sup>

Given the supposition that the Vedas are inerrant, we cannot *prima facie* accept the literal meaning of the sentence, since it is false to ascribe agency to grass bedding. In writing about this passage, the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila Bhaṭṭa points out that sacrificers are later instructed to throw the grass-

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<sup>57</sup>“The Vedas” refers to a collection of sacred texts transmitted orally and later recorded, somewhere around 600 BCE. See, for example, Gonda 1975 for their history.

<sup>58</sup>See, for example, Chari 1978 and Verpooten 1987 for details.

<sup>59</sup>‘*yaja-mānaḥ prastāraḥ*’ in Bhaṭṭa 1924, p. 441.

bedding into the fire.<sup>60</sup> If this means that we are to throw the master of the sacrifice into the fire, it would bring the entire process to a halt—and the performance of these Vedic sacrifices are the means of obtaining heaven or release from the cycle of rebirths, so this cannot be the correct interpretation.

Therefore the Mīmāṃsā must have a way of assigning a meaning to a sentence that is true and also consistent with the other parts of the scriptural injunctions. In this particular case, Kumārila concludes that the sentence is a metaphorical way of praising the grass-bedding and emphasizing its importance. Crucially, for Kumārila, the metaphor is not just an “ornament” or superficial way of making a truth-conditional statement aesthetically pleasing. Rather, for him, religious persons must understand the metaphor as conveying a truth about the role of the grass-bedding.<sup>61</sup>

Further, Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics are structured around an analysis of verbs (known as *bhāvanā*), and, as this hermeneutic is arguably central for Ānandavardhana’s theory of *dhvani*, we might expect Mukula to take a position on these details, but he does not. The Mīmāṃsā emphasized the continuity between action and linguistic practices. While in part this was due to their philosophical roots in Vedic interpretation (the Vedas seen as instructions for

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<sup>60</sup>The construction “Mīmāṃsaka” from “Mīmāṃsā” is equivalent to adding an “-ist” or “-er” on the end of a word in English. It simply means a member of the Mīmāṃsā school.

<sup>61</sup>Because the Vedas are understood to be authorless, there is an asymmetry between explanations of their meaning (both production and interpretation) and explanations of ordinary language. Intentions cannot play a role either for interpreter or the speakerless text, whereas ordinary, fallible, communication involves them. My reconstruction of Mukula is not focused on the solution to the religious problem, and his own view is a hybrid of Mīmāṃsā and Grammatian philosophical views, so I sidestep this admittedly complex issue.

ritual action), and while they do have differing conceptions of Vedic and human language (the former are authorless and therefore we do aim to understand an intention), the Mīmāṃsā were essentially recognizing that language is a goal-directed action. Speakers have aims and they use language to achieve them. Thus, when interpreting utterances, we are asking about the sentence is aiming to achieve.

While the particulars of this framework are complex, the basic idea is this: a sentence token is unified by the action represented through the verb.<sup>62</sup> (For an overview of Sanskrit grammar, see Appendix 2). Specifically, the verbal affix conveys the aim, and the verbal root (usually) the means by which the aim is to be achieved. Take a simple example,

- (8) *odanaṃ pacati*  
 rice<sub>MascAccSg</sub> cooks<sub>PresIndc3Sg</sub>  
 S/he cooks rice.

The verb “cooks,” or ‘*pacati*’, is made up of the root  $\sqrt{pac}$  and the present indicative third person singular ending, *-ti*.<sup>63</sup> To understand this sentence, we ask three things:

- What is being produced? (aim)
- By what means is it being produced? (instrument)
- How is it being produced? (procedure)

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<sup>62</sup>For much more detail on this topic, see Mazumdar 1977, pp. 37–61, McCrea 2008, pp. 55–97, and Ollett 2013.

<sup>63</sup>See Appendix 3 a basic overview of Sanskrit grammar.

Question 1 is answered through a reformulation of the sentence in which the logically relationship between agent, action, and result is made more explicit. The verbal root  $\sqrt{pac}$  is transformed into an instrumental and the verb replaced with a causative conjugation of the verb  $\sqrt{bhū}$ , meaning “to become,” or “to produce.” The result is that the surface grammar’s case-endings illuminate the logical structure of the sentence:

- (9) *pakena*                      *odanaṃ*              *bhāvayati*  
by-cooking<sub>MascInstrSg</sub> rice<sub>MascAccSg</sub> cause-to-be<sub>PresCaus3Sg</sub>  
Rice is caused to be by cooking.<sup>64</sup>

While we have the instrument of producing rice, we do not have the process, so one might look to the context—perhaps another sentence—or to our background knowledge. This requirement that answer to all three questions must be found is called “expectation,” or “need” (*ākāṅkṣā*), and in some ways parallels the contemporary Western notion of an “unarticulated constituent.”<sup>65</sup> The aim of the speaker, represented by the verb, is what tells us, for instance, what procedure is followed, or what instrument is used. Fully articulating what these expectations are allows us to act upon the sentence.<sup>66</sup> The transforma-

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<sup>64</sup>One might wonder if this view results in an infinite regress, since the verb *bhāvayati* now must be analyzed in a similar manner as *pacati*. Kumārila anticipates and responds to this objection, saying that the suffix *ti* is essentially a placeholder, and that according to convention, it is inappropriate to use only the verbal root without a suffix. Mazumdar 1977, p. 43.

<sup>65</sup>For discussion, see, for instance, Recanati 2002.

<sup>66</sup>McCrea 2008, p. 68. In the contemporary literature, there is an emphasis upon the relationship between so-called “unarticulated constituents” and the truth conditions of a sentence. So, Recanati says that the time of someone’s breakfast, which is not part of the sentence meaning of “I’ve had a very large breakfast” is nevertheless part of the truth-

tion is not totally determined by the syntax of the sentence. For example, if the accusative ‘*odanam*’ were missing, and the sentence were simply “She cooks,” then what is being produced could be the act of cooking—so that the verbal root is transformed into a substantive in the accusative case: ‘*pākam*.’ What the Mīmāṃsā are looking for is the logical structure of the sentence, which may not map directly onto the syntax. (What is in the instrumental case grammatically may not be the instrument of the action, as in “The book is being read by me.”)<sup>67</sup>

In any case, what is essential is that there not be a “sentence-splitting,” or two unrelated actions represented by a sentence. There must be a way to unify all of the sentential elements under a coherent conception of a single purpose. Such unification requires a hierarchical organization, in which a central action

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conditions of that utterance, since without the time of the breakfast being specified, the sentence cannot generate the implicature, “I am not hungry” as a reply to the inquiry whether one would like to eat lunch. Recanati 2002, p. 300. Whether the semantic/pragmatic distinction under dispute in contemporary literature maps onto a distinction made in the Indian literature is a large question. Further, Indian thinkers tend to speak in terms of ability to act upon a sentence, or a sentence being a source of knowledge, and not in terms of truth conditions. Still, the notion of truth-conditions is certainly at play in these other concepts, even if it remains to be worked out precisely how (we might think that a sentence can only be a source of knowledge if it is true, or that acting on a sentence requires its truth.)

<sup>67</sup>There is an interesting question as to why the Mīmāṃsā resort to such sentential re-interpretation or transformation, given their strong claim that the Vedic sentences are infallible. While the transformation process is not from natural language into formal language, as often occurs in contemporary philosophy of language, a similar question might be asked of both enterprises. If the meaning of the “surface grammar” is preserved in the transformation into the “deep structure,” we might ask why the transformation is necessary. But if there is a difference in meaning between the two, then why would we prefer the transformed over the original meaning? (This question is especially acute for the Vedic philosophers committed to infallibility.) See Stokhof 2007, p. 13.

is qualified by other actions.<sup>68</sup> So, in the earlier example of rice-cooking, while there may be many actions involved in the process of cooking (lighting the fire, heating the water, putting the rice into the pot, etc.), all of these actions are aimed at the goal of transforming rice into a softened or cooked state. When this unification is impossible with only the literal meaning of the words of a sentence, then we are warranted in making a non-literal interpretation, as in the case of (7) above.

## 1.5 Philosophy of the Grammarians

The other school of thought which was important to both Mukulabhaṭṭa and Ānandavardhana in their theorizing about language was the Grammarian tradition. In Sanskrit, the word for grammar is ‘*vyākaraṇa*’, which also means “distinction,” “separation,” or “analysis.” Grammarians were concerned with explaining the formation of words and sentences that they observed in ordinary language. For instance Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, the world’s first generative grammar text, is a set of rules for constructing Sanskrit words from more basic parts.<sup>69</sup> Pāṇini explains how to form the present tense using a verb root and a

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<sup>68</sup>See McCrea 2008, p. 75ff for a discussion of this point.

<sup>69</sup>While not the first Sanskrit Grammarian (he was pre-dated by others, whose works we do not have), he is certainly the pre-eminent. While his dates are debated, scholars put him somewhere between 350 and 700 BCE. (See Belvalkar 1976 for discussion.) The most recent translation of the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* is Pāṇini 1987, although its transliteration is subject to numerous typographical errors. It is of historical interest that the discovery of Indian grammarians is in large part responsible for Western forays into what is now known as linguistics. For a discussion of the Indian grammarian Pāṇini’s contribution to the syntactic analysis of the sentence, see, for instance, Kiparsky and Staal 1969.



set of endings. He is also concerned with the phonetics of Sanskrit, listing the possible sounds and giving rules for the changes which occur when phonemes come into contact with another (*saṅdhi*).

However, Grammarians were not only interested in descriptive and analytic grammar, but in theorizing about semantics. This is seen in Pāṇini's commentator, Patañjali, in his *Māha-bhāṣya* (*Great Commentary*), a work that is a commentary on Kātyāyana's comments on Pāṇini. There were also earlier theorists such as Vyājayapāyana and Vyāḍi, whose works are not extant.<sup>70</sup> Commenting on Pāṇini's rules regarding the appropriateness of particular forms, Patañjali theorizes about the semantic distinctions at play in these morphological rules. For instance, in the *Āṣṭādhyāyī* 3.1.67, Pāṇini says that 'ya' should be used to mark the impersonal passive, as in 'pacyante odanāḥ' ("Rice grains are being cooked"), or personal passive, as in 'āsyante bhavādbhyam' ("Sitting is being done by you two"). Patañjali focuses upon the verb, asking why verbs can take a dual or a plural number in the impersonal passive, but not the personal passive, where the verb should be singular. His answer has to do with the semantics of action, and moves beyond analysis of morphology.<sup>71</sup>

In addition to Pāṇini and Patañjali, Bhartṛhari is one of the most celebrated

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<sup>70</sup>See Scharf 1996, pp. 124ff. The *Māha-bhāṣya* dates to circa 150 BCE. Vyājayapāyana and Vyāḍi predate Kātyāyana, but it is not clear by how much. As to the dates of Kātyāyana and Pāṇini, it is unclear how much time elapsed between them. Cardona argues that Pāṇini and Kātyāyana likely have a gap of two hundred years, as do Kātyāyana and Patañjali, putting Kātyāyana around the mid-fourth century BC and Pāṇini around the mid-sixth century BC. Cardona 1976, pp. 267-68.

<sup>71</sup>See Scharf 1996 for discussion.

members of the Grammarian school. He lived circa 450–510 CE, and, in addition to a commentary on the *Māha-bhāṣya*, he is known for a three-volume work called the *Vākya-padīya*, or *Work Dealing with Sentences and Words*. This text theorizes about the metaphysics of speech, and the relationship between sounds and meanings. Bhartṛhari’s most famous contribution to Indian philosophy may be his ‘*sphota*’ theory. ‘*sphota*’ means “burst,” and refers to the manifestation of meaning in a hearer’s mind after her hearing an utterance. The basic idea is that sentences are the primary bearers of meaning, and we understand the objects of language in an immediate, non-sequential “flash” of insight. This bursting forth of meaning is caused by a sequence of phonemes, but Bhartṛhari denies that the vehicle of language and its meaning are separable at a metaphysical level. He argues that while we make distinctions between morphemes, words, sentences, and so on for practical, theoretical purposes, such distinctions are ultimately unreal.<sup>72</sup>

Grammatical theory, although a distinct discipline from aesthetic theory, is incorporated into the latter in many ways. After all, for Ānandavardhana and many others, it is the foremost science.<sup>73</sup> In fact, Ānanda appeals to the use of the grammatical term ‘*dhvani*’ for the reverberation of phonemes in part of his opening defense of suggestion. While he uses the term in a semantic sense, he takes the earlier, acoustic sense of the term to be analogous.

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<sup>72</sup>See Chakrabarti 1997a for further discussion.

<sup>73</sup>The Mimāṃsā did not share this position, arguing that the study of grammar is not a true Vedic science or *veda-aṅga*. There were six Vedic sciences: phonology, the study of meter, etymology, astrology, and the study of ceremony. Discussion in Scharfe 1977, pp.83ff.

Further, while Ānanda himself does not directly cite Bhartṛhari—though his commentator Abhinavagupta does, drawing connections between the “flash of insight” in *sphoṭa* and in suggestion—Mukulabhaṭṭa does, commenting on the *Vākyapadīya*. He also sees fit to treat Bhartṛhari’s theory of sentence-meaning alongside the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara views.<sup>74</sup>

That the study of grammar would be related to the study of meaning comes as no surprise to contemporary philosophers who are used to a convergence between linguistics, semantics, and pragmatics. However, prior to Ānandavardhana, Sanskrit grammatical investigation served another social role, a normative one, preserving the purity of the Sanskrit language. Given that the poetry known as *kāvya* was pre-eminently (though not exclusively) written in Sanskrit, knowledge of grammar was essential for poet and poetician alike.<sup>75</sup>

In the *Kāvya-alaṅkāra*, the earliest Sanskrit poetic text we have, Bhāmaha describes how grammatical acuity is essential for refined expressions necessary

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<sup>74</sup>While at some points (such as in his discussion of lexical semantics) he sides with one against the other, in many instances, he is content to allude to a particular text as support for his own position, without considering whether there is a further conflict. The result is that some philosophical questions remain vexingly unanswered. For example, while the Grammarians and Mīmāṃsā both agreed that the verb is the organizing principle of a sentence (against the Nyāya, who take a substantive, typically represented by a noun, to play this role), they disagree in their analysis of verbs. See, for instance, Mazumdar 1977. While Mukula briefly alludes to this conflict in his discussion of the relationship between sentence-meaning and non-literal interpretation, he does no more than briefly state the various options and then put forward his view. Regardless, it is undeniable that the Grammarian tradition, and the work of Bhartṛhari in particular, inform the philosophical investigation into poetry and non-literal speech that emerged in the ninth century in Kashmir. More work needs to be done in illuminating both the textual evidence of this interaction as well as its philosophical results.

<sup>75</sup>See discussion in Pollock 2006.

for poetry.<sup>76</sup> Following explicit grammatical rules for Sanskrit was an essential element of writing proper poetry. The theories of the Grammarians are not used for literary analysis (and, in fact, Bhāmaha criticizes some of them), and the emphasis is on rules of syntax and morphology, not theories about semantics.<sup>77</sup> This interest in the Grammarian school for rules of linguistic purity is characteristic of other literary theorists until Ānandavardhana, who mentions the Grammarians throughout the *Dhvanyāloka*, drawing primarily upon the philosophical/grammatical work of Bhartṛhari.<sup>78</sup> He explicitly makes connections between his theory of *dhvani*, or suggestion, and the concept of *dhvani* original to the grammatical literature—the latter refers to the series of phonemes which are continuously received by a hearer, like the reverberations of a bell, and finally integrated into a semantic whole.

What we find in the theories of Ānandavardhana and Mukulabhaṭṭa is a commitment to this organizational principle of the Mīmāṃsā: utterances are unified by a speaker’s aim, and individual sentences are unified by a speaker’s aim with the entire discourse. Ānanda implicitly drew upon the idea, championed by Bhartṛhari, that we can come to understand certain meanings in a “flash” of insight, for his development of suggestion. As well, Ānanda thought that *rasa* was the best candidate for the overall aim of poetry—and thus the sacred hermeneutic project of the Mīmāṃsā was brought into a more secular context, as a way of interpreting the unified aims of creative human speech.

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<sup>76</sup>Bhāmaha 1991.

<sup>77</sup>Rajendran 2008, p. 497.

<sup>78</sup>Rajendran 2008, p. 498.

Mukula distances himself from Bhartṛhari in his analysis of sentence meaning (rejecting the view that our syntactic and semantic divisions are entirely conventional, and thus unreal), but he does draw upon Grammarian analysis of lexical semantics. Finally, like the Mīmāṃsā, whose hermeneutic project is rooted in a desire to ensure that human beings can come to know what is enjoined by the Vedic texts, Mukula grounds his analysis of poetic utterances in the larger context of human rationality and epistemology.

## 1.6 Mukula’s Epistemological Project

The opening sentences of Mukulabhaṭṭa’s *The Fundamentals of the Communicative Function* say:

In human contexts, it is true that the things words refer to—things which are useful for worldly enjoyment or for deliverance from the cycle of reincarnation, and useful for avoiding what is opposed to these—are not elevated to usefulness in everyday purposes without being known with certainty....Therefore, it is only on the basis of certainty regarding what things words refer to that there is elevation to usefulness in everyday purposes. And certainty requires meaning being accessible through a connection with words.<sup>79</sup>

The point is a familiar one in Indian philosophy, made in terms that all philosophical schools could broadly accept. Whether people are attached to the world (hence the reference to “enjoyment”) or liberated from such attachment

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<sup>79</sup>See appended translation, [1.7].

(“deliverance”), our discourse about the world cannot become acceptable as a means of knowledge (“elevated to usefulness in ordinary contexts”) unless there is epistemic warrant for the cognitions due to language. It is against the philosophical background sketched above that Mukula’s introduction observes that the all the various *pramāṇa*, or knowledge sources, are “enjoy authority because they result in certainty, being grounded as they are in comprehending objects of knowledge.”<sup>80</sup> It is crucial for everyday knowledge, as well as the Mīmāṃsā goal of liberation through religious knowledge, that we give an account of this communicative function.

Mukula shares at least some commitments with the Mīmāṃsā philosophical school, as we will see in the next several chapters, and his approach to language converges in places with theirs. However, the *Fundamentals of the Communicative Function* was written in response to Ānandavardhana’s *Dhvanyāloka*, or *Light on Suggestion*—which is primarily a work of aesthetic theory, not philosophy of language or epistemology *per se*. Therefore Mukula also uses examples from poetic contexts, often the same ones employed by Ānanda. As I’ve said, his aim is to explain the putative verbal power of *dhvani* or suggestion, proposed by Ānanda, in terms of *lakṣaṇā* or indication. Still, Mukula’s introductory appeal to epistemological aims is more than perfunctory. Even though poetic speech may be his central concern, Ānanda’s theory of language has repercussions for more than just the appreciation of art. First, as I have already mentioned, poetic devices are employed in religious contexts to convey

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<sup>80</sup>See appended translation, [1.7].

information and give imperatives, and so are important for this reason. Second, Ānanda thinks that all human communication carries suggested meanings, and so everyday hearers ought to be able to recover what their interlocutors suggest. Mukula's competing theory must explain how we have epistemic access to the content of what Ānanda considers to be suggestion.

Below I sketch the central lines of debate between Ānanda and his predecessors and Mukula to show the importance of epistemology to their analysis of the linguistic functions of indication and suggestion.

Ānanda begins his discussion of poetic suggestion with an analogy. Meaning, he says,

...is praised by sensitive critics as being essential to a poem and therefore what the soul is to a body already charming by the configuration of graceful and appropriate parts...<sup>81</sup>

Meaning is of two sorts, he says, the literal and the implied. Literal meaning has been treated by others, so he does not develop the topic further (although he notes that similes fall under the category of "literal").<sup>82</sup> Now, in contrast to literal and implied meaning,

...the suggested is something different, found in the works of great poets. It is that which appears as [something] separate from the

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<sup>81</sup> *Dhvanyāloka* 1.2, Ānandavardhana 1990a, 79.

<sup>82</sup> *Dhvanyāloka*, §1.3 K. Ānandavardhana 1990a, 77. This introduction is not without interpretive difficulties as Ānanda later says that it is only *dhvani*, or suggested meaning, which is the soul of poetry. Abhinava tries to interpret the passage to avoid this conflict. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 75.

well-known elements [of poetry], just as charm in a woman [is something that appears different from the well-known individual parts of her body].<sup>83</sup>

He continues,

It is that which is well-known to sensitive readers and is separate from the known, ornamented, elements [of poetry], after they have been examined...<sup>84</sup>

For Ānanda, suggested meaning cannot be reduced to any one element of a poem, such as its meter, a figure of speech, or appropriate word choice. Such things do make the poem “charming,” of course. However, without suggested meaning, a collection of words in metered arrangement would not constitute a poem.<sup>85</sup> Ānanda refuses to define what a poem is, but says he will rely on the work of others in this area.<sup>86</sup> Given some intuition about what counts as a poem, then, we are to understand certain poems as having suggested meaning—in particular, those poems written by great poets and recognized by sensitive readers.

Suggestion, whether in poetry or everyday speech, is a “verbal function,” which Ānanda compares to the operations of denotation and *lakṣaṇā*. He identifies two kinds of suggestion: poetic and ordinary. Ordinary suggestion is simply

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<sup>83</sup> *Dhvanyāloka*, §1.4 K. Ānandavardhana 1990a, 79.

<sup>84</sup> *Dhvanyāloka*, §1.4 A. Ānandavardhana 1990a, 79.

<sup>85</sup> Or, arguably, a poem does not exist without meaning of any sort, per the earlier claim that meaning *simpliciter* is the soul of poetry.

<sup>86</sup> *Dhvanyāloka*, §1.3 A. Ānandavardhana 1990a, 78.



the generic intention a speaker has to communicate *something*, and to do so with a certain aim, like commanding, requesting, stating, and so forth. Poetic suggestion can be a figure of speech, a particular meaning, or an aesthetic flavor (*rasa* as described above). There are aesthetic norms in place which govern the production of poetic suggestion, since a poem that possesses a predominance of such suggestion is necessarily beautiful. In contrast, there is no aesthetic concern for ordinary suggestion.

Ānanda's case for poetic and ordinary suggestion depends on the claim that the content of suggested cannot be known through any then-established epistemic instrument. For instance, one possibility which he rejects is that hearers draw an inference from contextual factors, word meanings, speaker intention, etc. to the suggested meaning. However, such an inference requires us to know that whenever a particular word or expression appears, there is a corresponding suggested meaning. Ānanda rejects this as untenable, both because hearers could never come to grasp all such rules, and because he thinks it doubtful that the relevantly specific rules could exist in the first place. However, since hearers do come to know suggested meanings—this he takes to be an indisputable starting point—there must be some epistemic instrument employed. Through this process he rejects several other explanations, concluding that philosophers and poetic theorists must posit something new. Among his arguments, Ānanda argues that *lakṣaṇā* requires some impossibility with the literal meaning in the context of utterance, at which point the audience rejects the literal meaning in favor of the indicated meaning. Ānanda claims

that, in contrast to *lakṣaṇā*, suggestion can function while retaining the literal meaning, simply by appealing to the author’s intention.<sup>87</sup>

Mukula responds by expanding the role of *lakṣaṇā* to include other kinds of “incompatibilities” than simply sentence-internal ones. He identifies incompatibilities between contextual elements and the sentence as triggers for *lakṣaṇā*. As for how hearers understand what is conveyed by indication, Mukula seems to emphasize presumption, which is something like inference to the best explanation. He identifies a variety of possible relationships between a literal sentence meaning (or word denotation) and what is indicated, through irony, metonymy, metaphor, or punning. Thus, while he does not argue that we can use deductive inference to identify non-literal meaning (and in this way apparently agrees with Ānanda), he gives justifications that fall broadly into the category of inference to the best explanation. In this manner, he aims to leave no explanatory room for suggestion, but to reduce this putative operation to the operation *lakṣaṇā*. The epistemic question of how it is that hearers recognize that speech is non-literal, and recover the content of that speech, is therefore central for both thinkers.

## 1.7 Methodology and Précis

In conclusion, I would like to address some methodological questions. This dissertation is in part a work of history of philosophy, in which my goal is to

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<sup>87</sup>Raja 2000, p. 296.

understand the views set forward by philosophers separated from me by both time and culture. This aspect of the project requires close attention to the original texts and historical context, and is not primarily aimed at relating the works to a broad, contemporary Anglophone audience. As Richard Hayes has eloquently put it in the introduction to his study of the Buddhist logician and epistemologist Diinnāga,

I would be very surprised if more than a handful of people from this century would find Diinnāga's conclusions completely satisfactory and his arguments for those conclusions convincing, simply because he was something of a pioneer, and like all pioneers his tools were rather crude and unsophisticated compared to those of the later generations who benefited by inheriting the fruits of the pioneer's labours.<sup>88</sup>

This is the case for Ānandavardhana (and likewise Mukulabhaṭṭa and early critics) as well. He is responsible for a significant shift in the analysis of literary works and non-literal speech. While his theory of suggestion is indebted to the highly sophisticated work of his predecessors in the Mīmāṃsā and Gram-  
marian schools, as the first proponent of suggestion, it is up to his successors, such as his commentator Abhinavagupta and others, to sharpen his insights. Thus, for the reason that Ānanda and Mukula represent the first generation taking on the topic of "suggested meaning," we might expect to find their work not entirely adequate from a contemporary perspective. Further, that their

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<sup>88</sup>Hayes 1988, p. 3.

successors made advances upon their views shows that, relative to the Indian intellectual tradition itself, their works were viewed as insufficient.

Another reason contemporary philosophers might find the arguments of these philosophers lacking is the difference in cultural and religious assumptions between our era and theirs. The importance of Vedic interpretation has already been emphasized and, while we must be careful not to overstate its role in Mīmāṃsā philosophy of language, some of their presuppositions are due to a particular religious standpoint. However, as contemporary philosophers in the Western tradition, we must not forget how indebted our philosophical approach is to such figures as Augustine, whose analysis of language is embedded within a theological text, his *Confessions*. In fact, Augustine and the Mīmāṃsaka would find points of agreement in their attitudes towards their respective scriptures, for instance, that they are infallible.<sup>89</sup> They would not, as we will see, be in agreement over other details, and in fact, Kumārila might find Wittgenstein’s criticism of Augustine’s theory to be quite apt.<sup>90</sup> In any case, the point is that both Western and Indian traditions have presuppositions which, while perhaps jarring from someone unfamiliar with the culture, inform theorizing in often imperceptible ways. Looking at those theories which Hayes calls “counterparts” (for instance, the Augustinian and the Mīmāṃsā)

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<sup>89</sup>There are important differences between their concepts of infallibility, however, as Augustine took the Bible to be infallible *testimony* of a divine speaker. Further, the emphasis on *dharma* or righteous action in the Mīmāṃsaka context may be in contrast to the more fideistic, propositional emphasis in the Christian context.

<sup>90</sup>See Arnold 2006, p. 445-47, where Dan Arnold argues that, in fact, the Buddhist philosophers Diñnāga and Dharmakīrti were more similar to Augustine in their views about language acquisition and what it is to know a language.

together, with attention to historical context, may give us insight into which of those presuppositions cause trouble for a view, and why (and how) certain views must be adjusted.<sup>91</sup>

However, while this project is primarily historical in orientation—that is, my starting point is to understand the debate in its original context—my hope is that it might be useful for contemporary philosophers in the broadly Western tradition. The usefulness of pointing out similarities between Indian philosophers and Western philosophers lies not in the mere fact of cross-cultural agreement (although this may be important data in itself), but in clarifying the arguments on both sides. Thus while the historical aspect to the project described above can be, to some degree, conceptually separated from rational reconstruction, ultimately they are part of the same “hermeneutic circle.” The difference is that I emphasize the initial historical context at one stage, and the contemporary philosophical context at another, being sure to distinguish between claims of what Ānanda or Mukula meant in their texts and how the claims in those texts can be helpfully framed.

Out of this interpretive project, which requires both historical and contemporary conceptual tools, it is my hope that we will be in a position to evaluate both Indian and Western philosophy’s claims. Chapter One has situated Mukulabhaṭṭa and Ānandavardhana historically, arguing that their analysis of figurative language is an epistemological project, in contrast to simply a

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<sup>91</sup>Hayes 1988, p. 2.

work of aesthetic theory, which is where it has been situated previously. In Chapter Two, I develop this thesis by focusing on the major *pramāṇa*, or knowledge-sources in Indian epistemology. Chapter Three focuses on the concept of meaning itself, using contemporary resources to reconstruct the views of two schools of Indian philosophy on how words combine to constitute meaningful expressions. I argue that their dispute can be understood in terms of current pragmatic work on the distinction between what is said and what is meant, and that it displays an interest in what modern contextualists would call “unarticulated constituents” and pragmatic processes.

With the philosophical background in place, Chapter Four presents Ānandavardhana’s argument that an adequate explanation of non-literal meaning requires us to postulate a semantic capacity known as “suggestion.” In contrast to the predominant view, which takes for granted that his position is well-established, I argue that his arguments are only partially successful. Chapter Five focuses in detail on one of his central arguments: that the semantic capacity of suggestion is explanatorily superior to inferential reasoning. I argue that his version of inferential reasoning cannot do the explanatory work he wants.

By demonstrating where Ānandavardhana is correct, and where he has made missteps, I set the stage for Chapter Six, which explores Mukulabhaṭṭa’s response. I explore his project in Gricean terms, and show how his conception of inference to the best explanation, though tacit, forms the backbone for his proposal. Chapter Seven illustrates the plausibility of Mukulabhaṭṭa’s analy-

sis of metonymic non-literal speech, using some formal tools in contemporary semantics. I conclude in Chapter Eight with some lessons that contemporary philosophers can draw from this historical dispute, along with areas of future research in pragmatics. Throughout the dissertation, I will cite my translation of the *Fundamentals of the Communicative Function*, which is appended to the dissertation.

## Chapter 2

### The Problem of Epistemic Access

#### 2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I introduce the epistemological problem that Ānandavardhana and Mukulabhaṭṭa are addressing. Put most broadly, it is, “How do hearers have knowledge of what is communicated through language?” To fully appreciate the answers that Ānanda and Mukula give, we need to understand the *pramāṇa*-theory of classical Indian philosophy and its analysis of testimonial knowledge and sentence meaning, briefly introduced in the last chapter. The inadequacy of the *pramāṇa* of inferential reasoning, or *anumāna*, is central to Ānanda’s positive argument for suggestion. In contrast, the structure of the *pramāṇa* called “presumption” is central to Mukula’s argument against suggestion. The goal of this chapter is to argue for the first claim. The next chapter will take up the second claim. In order to address both of them, we will take up the relationship between Western categories of inference (deduction, induction, abduction) and classical Indian categories of inference (*anumāna*, *arthāpatti*). While not strictly equivalent, I argue that *anumāna* encompasses both deduction and induction and that *arthāpatti* is best understood as abductive inference—or more precisely, inference to the best explanation.



The chapter has two parts. In the first part, I focus on speech acts and Mīmāṃsā philosophy. In this section, I introduce the concept of speech acts in contemporary Western philosophy, as described by J.L. Austin and others. With John Taber, I argue that the Mīmāṃsā analysis of language has much in common with this approach to communication. However, I show that there is a tension in the Mīmāṃsā view between the role of speaker intention and the role of language itself in conveying meaning. Ānanda's proposal is, I argue, a way of addressing this tension by involving both the literal meaning of expressions (interpreted without reference to speaker intention) and the speaker's intention in the communicative act.

In the second section I turn to the concept of *pramāṇa*, or epistemic instruments, analyzed in the Indian tradition. Indian philosophers appeal to such instruments to explain how speech acts can result in knowledge. After a survey of the major *pramāṇa*, I focus on the three most relevant to the communicative act: inferential reasoning, testimony, and presumption. After an exploration of the question of whether testimony is reducible to inferential reasoning, I give an analysis of presumption on which it is understood as inference to the best explanation, defending this view against a recent criticism.

## **2.2 Speech Acts and Mīmāṃsā Philosophy of Language**

People use language to serve a variety of aims. We utter sentences to describe the world, to urge our hearer to act, to prompt our hearer to feel something, to promise we will do something, to smooth social situations with “small talk,”

and so on. Successful communication does not solely consist in decoding the content of a linguistic signal through linguistic rules. Take an ordinary utterance such as:

- (1) The speed limit here is seventy.

Suppose that (1) is uttered by a speaker Sally to a hearer Harriet while Harriet is driving a car at 65 miles per hour. Once Harriet understands the literal meaning of the sentence—which requires determining what the referent of indexical “here” is, knowing that “seventy” stands in for “seventy miles per hour”—she can add the speed limit along this stretch of road to the other things she knows.

However, perhaps Sally also wants Harriet to perform an action: to drive more quickly. Nothing in the literal content of (1) represents this desire. But Harriet, believing that Sally would not have mentioned the speed limit for no reason, reasons that she wants her to drive (at least) seventy miles per hour. Set up the context appropriately, and it is also possible that Sally, irritated that Harriet frequently drives five miles slower than the speed limit, wants Harriet to feel an emotion: specifically, to feel ashamed for her driving habits. Sally knows that pointing out the speed limit emphasizes Harriet’s inattentiveness, but does so in a way in which she herself has not explicitly accused H of being inattentive. Depending upon how she utters (1) and conventions of intonation in Sally and Harriet’s shared speech community, Sally may convey frustration. So not only might Sally want Harriet to feel an emotion, but in uttering the

sentence, she might also want to express an emotion.

Given different contexts, we can vary what sorts of things Harriet might take from the utterance. If Harriet is driving 80, the communicative act might be a warning, with the aim to get her to drive more slowly. If Harriet has just uttered, “What’s the speed limit?,” the sentence might simply be a factual reply, with no further aims on the part of Sally than to inform. Or, if Harriet is driving in a school zone, where she should know the speed limit, perhaps Sally utters (1) sarcastically, and wants Harriet to take her as communicating that the speed limit is *not* seventy.

Since (at least) J.L. Austin, contemporary Western philosophy has recognized that communication is multi-faceted, not strictly a matter of encoding and decoding information contained in the semantics of a statement.<sup>1</sup> Austin, and philosophers after him, have variously distinguished the elements of communicative acts. One distinction is among locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary aspects, corresponding to the several acts a speaker may perform with a single utterance. Here is one way to schematize the relationship between these aspects:

**Utterance Act:** *S* utters *e* from *L* to *H* in *C*.

**Locutionary Act:** *S* says to *H* in *C* that so-and-so.

**Illocutionary Act:** *S* does such-and-such in *C*.

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<sup>1</sup>Austin 1962.

**Perlocutionary Act:** *S* affects *H* in a certain way.<sup>2</sup>

Applying this analysis to (1), the **Utterance Act** is *S* uttering expression *e* (“The speed limit here is seventy”), from language *L* (English) to *H* in *C* (the context of driving a car at 65 miles per hour). The **Locutionary Act** is saying that the speed limit here is seventy. The **Illocutionary Act** is, in our first situation, that Sally urges Harriet to drive more quickly in the context *C*. Finally, the **Perlocutionary Act** is that Sally shames Harriet. We must explain how Harriet is able to recognize not only the content of the locutionary act (how does she disambiguate “seventy,” fix the context for “here,” etc.) but how Harriet can recognize that Sally is *urging* and *shaming*, the illocutionary content and perlocutionary effect. Frequently, philosophers also talk of illocutionary and perlocutionary *force*, as these aspects of the speech act have effects in the world.

However, we can immediately see there are problems with the definitions as offered. Consider the distinction between the definition of **Perlocutionary Act**. If the action depends on affecting *H* in a particular way, does an act of shaming fail to count as shaming if the hearer is not impacted? Suppose Harriet recognizes that Sally wants her to feel badly for driving slowly, but she resists? Or doesn't recognize that this is the goal of Sally's utterance? We might think that including the audience's response to characterize a speaker's action is wrong-headed. Compare the action of offering a gift. That someone

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<sup>2</sup>This analysis is due to Bach and Harnish 1979, p. 3. There are many others, which differ in some details (for instance Hutchby 2008 and Grice 1975).

refuses a gift does not mean that the gift-giver has failed to offer. Analogously, we might think that failure of uptake or the existence of resistance should not mean that a particular **Perlocutionary Act** has not been performed. But then there is no distinction between **Perlocutionary Act** and **Illocutionary Act**.

This first problem has to do with the relationship between speaker and hearer in a speech act. A second problem targets the speaker's role. Is it necessary that it is the *speaker* who is performing an action with an utterance in a given context? Compare Sally's utterance to Harriet with a billboard saying, "Obey the sign or pay the fine." We might characterize this expression as constituting a warning. However, the strict literal meaning of the sentence is a disjunction—one could choose to obey the sign, pay the fine, or both—with no explicit urging to prefer one disjunct over the other. Conventional implicatures could be appealed to in order to make sense of the "or" acting as an exclusive disjunction. Still, we need to explain the implied warning. And on speech-act theory, a warning is an **Illocutionary Act**, performed by a speaker in a context, and there is, strictly speaking, no speaker here. Perhaps there is an implied speaker—a police officer or a judge—in which case we need an account of the relationship between the sentence on the billboard, the unseen speaker, and the various components of the speech act.

Thus both relationships—speaker/hearer and speaker/speech act—are important to clarify to make sense of how non-literal meaning is communicated. Now, the Mīmāṃsā approach de-emphasizes speaker intention and instead

emphasizes the way in which words themselves seem to be expressive. An Ālaṅkāra such as Ānandavardhana, in contrast emphasizes speaker intention and the way in which speakers rely upon the literal meanings of expressions in order to do things with words. Both are concerned with the performative aspect of language, though, and the relationship between expression meanings and hearers. In what follows, I show that there is a tension in the making sense of how the speaker/hearer interrelate. The (Bhāṭṭa) Mīmāṃsā wish to explain meaning *qua* Vedic sentences in purely semantic and syntactic terms. In fact, it is the absence of a speaker which guarantees that the Vedas communicate meaningfully and infallibly. However, they also wish for there to be a continuity between Vedic language and human language, rejecting the Prābhākara distinction between the two. Their analysis, in its reliance on the force or *bhāvanā* of speech, seems to require some appeal to a speaker's intention, as semantics underdetermines distinctions between forces, in much the same way as it underdetermines kinds of speech acts.

For the Mīmāṃsā, future-oriented commands, rather than assertion, are the starting point for thinking about what we do with words.<sup>3</sup> For them, the uniqueness of commands is its ability to give us knowledge of things which are unexperienced. In contrast to assertion, which they take to be grounded in past

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<sup>3</sup>Appendix 3 contains a discussion of the grammatical distinctions relevant to determining whether an expression is a command or an assertion, although the distinction is not purely grammatical. The present tense and indicative mood is a paradigmatic example of an assertion ("The pot is blue.") whereas the present tense and imperative mood is a paradigmatic example of a command ("Paint the pot blue!"). However, one can give commands using the optative mood ("The pot ought to be blue") or the indicative mood in the future tense ("The pot will be blue.")

perception, commands tell us about the unseen future effects of our actions. When the Vedas tell people to perform a sacrifice in order to attain heaven since heaven is unseen by mere mortals, it is language's status as a *pramāṇa* which certifies the (future) results of this command. After all, Kumāṛila points out, unless one had confidence that sacrifice were to lead to heaven, there would be no reason to pursue it (*Śloka-vārttika* IV.106-108).<sup>4</sup> The Mīmāṃsā, in their analysis of ritual utterances, observe that not only straightforward descriptions of states of affairs, but other kinds of utterances are part of the Vedas. This is a recognition of the existence (in different terms) of what Austin would later call "illocutionary force."<sup>5</sup>

John Taber has argued that the Mīmāṃsā defense of the meaningfulness of Vedic *mantras* can be usefully understood in terms of speech-act theory. *Mantras* are priestly utterances of Vedic verses spoken during rituals. Often highly figurative, they allude to the simultaneously occurring actions of the ritual. However, since *mantras* can seem nonsensical or redundant (the priest knows how to perform the rite without them), there is a question as to whether they are a means of knowledge, a *pramāṇa*. The problem is not just whether the *mantra* conveys a meaningful proposition (a question relevant to the figurative *mantras*) but whether they are useful. Taber points at the analysis of the *mantra*, "O *agnīdh*, bring out the fires!" addressed to a priest who knows that he is to bring out the fires. In the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-bhāṣya*, Śabara ob-

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<sup>4</sup>On this, see Arnold 2005, p. 65.

<sup>5</sup>Taber 1989b, p. 150.

serves that since the priest knows his job, this mantra cannot be a command.<sup>6</sup> This is because to be a command, certain conditions must be met, such as that the person being commanded is not already going to do the action being commanded. Śabara concludes that these *mantras* are persuasive in some sense, rather than commanding. While not directly a *pramāṇa*, such *mantras* support the broader text's ability to convey knowledge of *dharma*.

Whether Śabara's particular explanation is adequate (it is difficult to see how a recitation is persuasive), the Mīmāṃsā analyze utterances as acts with effects and constitutive contextual factors. Like Austin, who identifies the perlocutionary effects brought about by performing an illocutionary act with a locutionary act, the Mīmāṃsā talk in terms of what should be brought about, by what, and how. The answers to these questions tell us about the *bhāvanā*, or the "function of words" (*śabda-vyāpara*, a term that has frequently been translated as "force.") Interpreters rely upon force to understand the meaning of an utterance and it is force which impels them to perform Vedic sacrifices.<sup>7</sup> The Mīmāṃsā locate this injunctive force of Vedic commands in the semantics of the verb, or the *bhāvanā* described earlier.<sup>8</sup> However, this does not explain how *mantras* (or other expressions) which lack an optative actually work to persuade, though Taber points out that, since *mantras* were to be spoken by priests, perhaps they can derive illocutionary force from the intentions of the

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<sup>6</sup>Taber 1989b, p. 155.

<sup>7</sup>See Ollett 2013, p 259-61 for some discussion of the analogies and disanalogies with Austin.

<sup>8</sup>Taber 1989b, p. 158.



speaker.<sup>9</sup> (Recall that, lacking a divine or human author, the Veda’s force cannot be explained by intention.)

For Austin and other speech-act theorists in the Western tradition, the distinctions among locution, perlocution, and illocution are in the service of understanding the speech act performed by a speaker. However, the extensive analysis of Vedic injunctions in Mīmāṃsā philosophy of language is undertaken with the presupposition that there is no speaker. Thus grammatical analysis proves central in illuminating how language can have its various effects. The force of Vedic commands is not dependent upon the intentions of a speaker. Mukulabhaṭṭa, Ānandavardhana, and other theorists working in philosophy of language and poetics were, as observed earlier, strongly influenced by Mīmāṃsā interpretive principles. Their focus is primarily human, not Vedic, utterances, and their concern is how to analyze the speech act of a person. Still, we will see that in these theorists there is similar attention to sentence structure, word choice, and discourse context, as in Vedic hermeneutics. They just have an additional feature to incorporate: speaker’s intention.

In fact, we find that there is special focus on speech acts in which speaker’s attention is in tension with a literal analysis of the sentence.<sup>10</sup> I turn now to the resources within Indian philosophy for understanding what the speaker

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<sup>9</sup>Taber 1989b, p. 158.

<sup>10</sup>In what follows, I will typically use “speaker” rather than “author,” even though frequently, what is being discussed are written texts. This is in part because the poetic texts being discussed were intended to be recited, but also because I take it that the analysis was aiming at both spoken and written language. See Pollock 2006, pp. 75-76 for discussion of the orality of Sanskrit written court poetry, or *kāvya*.

intends.

Given just this single utterance, we can identify several things which a hearer H might want to retrieve as part of their understanding of an utterance U of a sentence:

1. The literal meaning of  $p$ .
  - (a) The lexical meanings of the words constituting the sentence.
  - (b) The meaning of the sentence  $p$ , as composed by the words.
2. The speaker's performative aim in uttering  $p$ .
  - (a) An action S wants H to perform.
  - (b) An emotion S wants to express.
  - (c) An emotion S wants H to feel.
  - (d) A different meaning  $q$  that S wants H to understand by  $p$ .

In the contemporary Western philosophical tradition beginning with H.P. Grice, (2d) is called an *implicature*. Implicatures are distinguished from what is *said*, which is the conventional meaning of the sentence, understood literally, without appeal to contextual elements save for what is necessary to resolve indexicals, demonstratives, anaphora, and the like. An implicature, in contrast, is tied to the context of utterance. According to Grice, speakers are committed to the literal meaning of their sentence, but, “strictly speaking,” their utterance would not be false if an implicature fails to hold.<sup>11</sup> Implica-

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<sup>11</sup>Grice 1989, p. 44.

tures are indirect ways of conveying meanings, and philosophers distinguish between varieties of implicatures: conversational or conventional implicatures. Speaker implicatures are those which attach to a certain conversational context in virtue of the speaker’s intention. For instance, someone who says, “I’m sick” in response to the question “Are you coming to the movie tonight?” has implicated that she is not coming to the movie, although she has not said it. In contrast, conventional implicatures are conveyed regardless of the speaker’s intention, simply through the choice of words. Candidates for conventional implicatures include “and” which, strictly speaking, conveys only conjunction, but implicates temporal order: “I came home and went to sleep.”

### 2.3 Epistemology and Language

In this section, I outline the epistemological inquiry of Mīmāṃsā philosophers, in particular the number and nature of the *pramāṇa*. Indian philosophers call something that produces a justified, true cognition a *pramāṇa*, or knowledge-generator.<sup>12</sup> Some common *pramāṇa* include perception, inferential reasoning, and verbal testimony. *Pramāṇa* both generate knowledge-episodes and consti-

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<sup>12</sup>A note on Sanskrit terminology: The object of a *pramāṇa* is called ‘*prameya*’ (“the object known”), though some Buddhist philosophers use the same term, ‘*pramāṇa*,’ for the resultant cognition. Thus it is important to be careful about which sense the word is being used in a given passage. The Sanskrit ‘*prāmāṇya*’ is an abstract noun derived from ‘*pramāṇa*,’ and just means “the state of being a *pramāṇa*” or “what underwrites a *pramāṇa*.” Just what it is that makes a *pramāṇa* authoritative is a philosophical question. Some, like Matilal and Mohanty, translate ‘*prāmāṇya*’ as “truth,” while others such as Arnold, render it as “validity.” I take it that the latter is a better rendering, as what they are after is not the truth of the proposition in question, but how it is that thinkers can arrive at a true proposition. We will address this in more detail below.

tute reasons for accepting such an episode as being knowledge. Within Indian philosophy, there are two broad questions about knowledge, centered on the *pramāṇa*, or sources of knowledge: (1) How many *pramāṇa* are there? (2) What is the nature of each *pramāṇa*?

For a philosophical school to defend its favored set of *pramāṇa* over the set of another school, they might argue in two ways. First, they might claim that a putative knowledge-generator does not generate knowledge; second, they might claim that a putative knowledge-generator is reducible to another knowledge-generator. For instance, while inferential reasoning ( *anumāṇa*) is a nearly universally-accepted *pramāṇa*, one camp (the Cārvāka) reject it, arguing that whatever it produces, those mental states do not count as *knowledge*. Some Buddhists argue that since inferential reasoning relies on a universal rule (“All *x* are caused by *y*, I see an *x*, therefore there must be a *y*”) and, as all objects of perception are unique, no universal rule can be valid. (We will talk more about the particular kind of inferential reasoning, known as  *anumāṇa*, the Buddhists are talking about below.) Thus, since successful inferential reasoning relies on true generalizations, any possible universal rule will be false, strictly speaking.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Mohanty 1957, p. 228 and Arnold 2006, pp. 22ff. Any time we generalize, on the Buddhist view, we are creating a fiction which, while perhaps useful, is not a true representation of reality. Note that precisely how to understand Dharmakīrti and Dignāga, two proponents of this view, is a live interpretive question. The object of our perception might be infinitesimal atoms, or medium-sized objects. The general point is similar to Western empirical foundationalism, which argued that immediate access to something free from concepts (for instance, sense-data), is what secures knowledge “further up the hierarchy.”

Another candidate for a *pramāṇa* is awareness of absence (*abhāva*). When I gesture to my desk and say, “There is no coffee cup,” I am saying that the desk has an absence of a coffee cup. That is, I have knowledge of an absence: the lack of coffee cup. Now, for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, this knowledge consists in my coming into contact with a *vastu*, or a fact: absence.<sup>14</sup> However, cognitive contact with absence is functionally different from the cognitive contact of existing objects which we call “perception.” What happens is that perception of a coffee cup does not happen, nor does any other *pramāṇa* with the coffee cup as its object!<sup>15</sup> Thus, for the Bhāṭṭa, absence-awareness is its own *pramāṇa*, defined as the non-occurrence (*anutpatti*) of the other *pramāṇa*. In contrast, whereas the Prābhākara (and most other Indian philosophical schools) reject it for reductionist motivations, arguing that the knowledge we get from “absence” is in virtue of some other faculty, such as inferential reasoning (Dharmakīrti, the Prābhākara) or perception (the Nyāya school).<sup>16</sup> The basic idea, for those who deny absence, is that when I see a bare patch of ground where I expected a pot, my perception is simply of the patch of ground. The Buddhist

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<sup>14</sup>In what sense absences are *vastu*-s is a complex question. The Bhāṭṭa take them to be real aspects of objects, and important for understanding cause and effect. In his review article of Birgit Kellner’s translation of a Buddhist text dealing with this question (the *Abhāva-vicāra* chapter of Śāntarakṣita’s *Tattva-saṅgraha*), John Taber summarizes the ways in which we might characterize absences as objects of knowledge: (1) prior non-being (lack of curds in milk before curdling), (2) subsequent non-being (lack of milk in curds after curdling), (3) mutual non-being (lack of a horse in a cow and cow in a horse), (4) absolute non-being (lack of horns on a hare). Taber 2001, p. 75.

<sup>15</sup>Kumārila also says that absence-awareness could function from the perception of everything else, which then subsequently leads to the knowledge of what is absent. See Taber 2001, p. 79 for a discussion of how the two definitions work together.

<sup>16</sup>See Phillips 2012 for a discussion of Naiyāyika epistemology.

Dharmakīrti argues that my perception of the patch of ground is basically a non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) of the pot, which lets me infer that the pot is non-existent (at least in this particular place). Of course, we must then address what kind of cognition this inference gives us: on the Buddhist view mentioned above, it is, strictly speaking, a false generalization.<sup>17</sup> In contrast, the Bhāṭṭa argue that my perception is of the absence of a pot. This is not necessarily to say that absences are things, simply that my asserting, “There is no pot on the ground” is asserting a relationship between the lack of a pot and the ground, and not a disguised claim about the ground only.<sup>18</sup>

Even given agreement that something is a *pramāṇa*, philosophical schools disagree on further questions. For instance, even those who accept perception disagree about how we should characterize its intentional structure. Some Buddhists argue that whatever it is that grounds our perceptual judgments must be non-conceptual. In contrast, the realist Nyāya school thinks that every perceptual episode is qualified by some concept, and that we are never perceiving a “bare particular” (*sva-lakṣaṇa*) on its own.<sup>19</sup> As well, philosophers differ about what makes a *pramāṇa* a source of knowledge. (This feature—whatever it is—in virtue of which a *pramāṇa* is knowledge-conducive is called *prāmāṇya*.) Does my cognition C<sub>1</sub> of a pot, count as knowledge that there is a pot, require some other verifying cognition C<sub>2</sub> (which has C<sub>1</sub> as its object)?

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<sup>17</sup>See Taber 2001, p. 82

<sup>18</sup>For more on *abhāva*, see Chakrabarti 1997b, Taber 2001, Freschi 2008 and Freschi 2010.

<sup>19</sup>Note that ‘*lakṣaṇa*,’ meaning “characteristic,” is not the same as ‘*lakṣaṇā*,’ meaning “indication.”

Or, does  $C_1$ , my cognition of the pot, have some feature in virtue of which I can accept it as constituting knowledge? The latter view is that of the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, whereas the first is held by their Buddhist interlocutors, among others.

The dispute among the various philosophical schools over what counts as a *pramāṇa* is a debate about what cognitive processes yield knowledge as well as, given a putative piece of knowledge, which cognitive processes we can appeal to as its justification. Call the first question *enumerative*, and the second *constitutive*. Language is one of many ways that human beings acquire knowledge, and Indian philosophers study how language functions under the broader topic of epistemology. The enumerative question, put to language, is whether it is a *pramāṇa*. The constitutive question is whether knowledge that is generated by hearing utterances (or reading sentences) is grounded in perception, inferential reasoning, or an independent *pramāṇa* of language.<sup>20</sup> On the view that sentences uttered by speakers can lead to knowledge, theories about meaning are taken as part of the constitutive question of how to characterize the structure of a *pramāṇa*. The relevant *pramāṇa* based on language is testimony (*śābda*).

The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā argue that testimony is an independent *pramāṇa*, distinct from perception or inferential reasoning. Kumāṛila, in the *Ślokavārttika*,

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<sup>20</sup>Indian philosophers understand that, for instance, perception will be implicated in reading or hearing sentences. Their concern is about how to characterize what is necessary and sufficient for knowledge, and what kind of causal role perception plays in testimony.

distinguishes between two kinds of testimony: that of the Vedas, which is authorless, and that of ordinary speech, which has an author.<sup>21</sup> The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā and Buddhists argue that testimony is reducible to the *pramāṇa* of inferential reasoning.<sup>22</sup> The dispute over testimony’s status as a *pramāṇa* turns on its nature: in what way can it be characterized as different from inferential reasoning? If testimony gives us true cognitions because we *infer* that *p* from the utterance of “*p*” by a trustworthy speaker, then testimony can be reduced to inferential reasoning. We will have opportunity to discuss testimony and inferential reasoning in more detail below.

On the Bhāṭṭa understanding of how *pramāṇa* generate knowledge, sources such as perception, testimony, inferential reasoning, and the like are intrinsically valid, or ‘*svataḥ prāmāṇya*.’<sup>23</sup> This position, found originally in Kumārila and developed in particular by two later commentators, Uṃveka and Pārthasārathi, was, and still is, contentious. On one interpretation of the view, my knowledge that there is a pot is intrinsically valid because it is caused by the state of affairs that there is a pot—the same state of affairs which makes my belief

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<sup>21</sup>In contrast, the theistic Nyāya (for instance Gautama in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7) define testimony as the speech of an authoritative and trustworthy speaker (*āpta*), and they differ from the atheistic Mīmāṃsā in attributing a divine author to the Vedas. Importantly, despite the importance of a trustworthy speaker in their definition of testimony, the Nyāya do not argue that testimony is ultimately a matter of inference that includes the fact of trustworthiness. Rather, being an *āpta* is a causally relevant condition to the generation of knowledge in the hearer. See Chapter 6 of Phillips 2012 for more detail.

<sup>22</sup>See Śālikanātha 1934.

<sup>23</sup>Others, like B.K. Matilal, translate the term as “intrinsically true.” This translation choice reflects an interpretive choice on which the Bhāṭṭa are offering a causal analysis of justification. I agree with Arnold 2005 and Taber 1992 that this is an untenable philosophical account as well as a less charitable reading of Kumārila’s original position.



true is causally responsible for it. This causal approach, found in Uṃveka, has been dismissed as a sort of fundamentalism which was designed to safeguard the infallibility of the Vedas and, further, as philosophically untenable. However, Pārthasārathi’s interpretation is that we are *prima facie* justified for cognitions which appear to us phenomenologically like bits of knowledge. It is only if such cognitions are subsequently defeated that we should give them up. In other words, rather than waiting on verification of apparently valid cognitions before considering them to be knowledge, we are justified in taking them as knowledge until they are disqualified.<sup>24</sup> It is against this theoretical background that the analysis of inferential reasoning, presumption, and testimony unfolds in the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. I begin with testimony.

### 2.3.1 Testimony

For the Bhāṭṭa, testimony is its own *pramāṇa* because, when a hearer hears a sentence, a true cognition results directly from the utterance. The Bhāṭṭa do not require, in cases where there is a speaker (in contrast to Vedic sentences) that the speaker be known to be trustworthy by the hearer in order to convey knowledge. A speaker’s utterance, in order to constitute knowledge, has two requirements: it must be a unified syntactic entity, or a sentence, and it must cause a cognition which properly represents the world. While the “transmis-

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<sup>24</sup>See Arnold 2005 and Taber 1992 for more discussion. We might compare this to Dretske’s claim that having a reason to believe  $x$  is  $A$  need not require that we also have a reason to believe  $x$  is not  $B$ , where  $B$  is some incompatible predicate. Dretske 1970

sion” model of testimony—on which a speaker conveys knowledge in virtue of her trustworthiness and epistemic standpoint with regard to the proposition she utters—was defended by other Indian philosophers, the Bhāṭṭa reject it, in part due to the view that the Vedas are authorless. Note that this is why, for the Prābhākara, only knowledge through the testimony of Vedic sentences is its own *pramāṇa*. They argue that knowledge through human testimony is reducible to inferential reasoning. Their motivation for this distinction is the fallibility of humans contrasted with the infallibility of the Vedas. They argue we must infer that a speaker’s claim “*p*” is trustworthy from our knowledge that the speaker herself is a reliable witness. After all, sentences which are perfectly linguistically adequate, such as “There is a herd of elephants on the tip of a finger,” do not align with facts. So we need something more than simply the sentence—in the case of human agents, at least. They also seem to argue that the conclusion of our inferential reasoning is the content of a speaker’s intention. In contrast, the Vedas are thought to be infallible and authorless (and thus have nothing like a “speaker’s intention”), so no inference is necessary.<sup>25</sup> For both the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara, the above requirements for sentence meaning must be fulfilled in order for knowledge to occur via human or Vedic sentences.

However, Kumāṛila is motivated by more than just a defense of the Vedas. He has concerns similar to those which move contemporary philosophers (such as

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<sup>25</sup>For more on this, see Bhatt 1962, p. 284-85, Jha 1942, p. 139-41, and Śālikanātha 1934, pp. 25ff.

Jennifer Lackey) to reject this transmission model. Kumāriḷa’s definition of testimony emphasizes its intrinsic validity due to the content of the speaker’s utterance, and its lack of defeaters. He says, “the conception that testimony produces must be intrinsically valid, if it is the case that there is no perception of a fault.”<sup>26</sup> In other words, the deliverances of testimony are *prima facie* justified, unless there is some defeater, or fault. A fault, or ‘*doṣa*,’ could be any conflicting cognition attained through one of the other *pramāṇa*. For such knowledge to count as *testimonial* knowledge, it must not be known through other means. This excludes cases such as where a speaker utters, “I have a soprano voice” in a soprano voice.<sup>27</sup> In fact, the Bhāṭṭa view of testimony is consistent with what Lackey calls the Statement View of Testimony (SVT):

SVT. For every speaker, *A*, and hearer *B*, *B* knows (believes with justification/warrant) that *p* on the basis of *A*’s testimony that *p* only if (1) *A*’s statement that *p* is reliable or otherwise truth-conducive, (2) *B* comes to believe that *p* on the basis of the content of *A*’s statement that *p*, and (3) *B* has no undefeated defeaters for believing that *p*.<sup>28</sup>

She notes that what counts as “reliability” on the part of a statement can be cashed out in different ways, leaving open which particular account is correct. However, the main point is that a speaker’s being sincere or competent

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<sup>26</sup>SV 44.53, ‘...*tasmāc chabdena yā matiḥ tasyāḥ svataḥ pramāṇatvaṃ na cet syād doṣa-darśanam.*’ Bhāṭṭa 1978b, p. 298.

<sup>27</sup>Lackey 1999, p. 476.

<sup>28</sup>Lackey 2008, p. 75.

is not directly at issue. These characteristics are important only insofar as they impact the speaker's ability to be a competent testifier, in contrast to the transmission model of testimony.<sup>29</sup> Lackey's argument against the transmission model of testimony (a model which is shared by the Mīmāṃsā interlocutors, the Nyāya), is based on cases where speakers fail to believe that  $p$  or fail to know that  $p$  due to a defeater for their belief that  $p$ . An example of the first case would be a creationist teacher instructing her students (accurately) in evolutionary theory, despite her belief that it is false. An example of the second case would be of a person in the grips of global skepticism who, when asked where a cafe is, replies (without disclosing her skepticism).<sup>30</sup>

In contrast, the Bhāṭṭa argument focuses on cases where there is no speaker, so there is no agent to believe or know that  $p$ . Thus, a more accurate representation of their view of testimony would be

SVT\*. For every statement  $s$  and hearer  $H$ ,  $H$  comes to know that  $p$  on the basis of  $s$  only if (1) the statement that  $p$  is reliable or otherwise truth-conducive, (2)  $B$  comes to believe that  $p$  on the basis of the content of the statement that  $p$ , and (3)  $B$  has no undefeated defeaters for believing that  $p$ .

Their view of testimony depends upon the content of the utterance, and not the epistemic status of the speaker. This leads us to the question of how we can understand the content of an utterance when the speaker is distant or absent.

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<sup>29</sup>Lackey 2008, p. 74.

<sup>30</sup>The details of these cases are explored in Lackey 2008.

In contemporary Western philosophy, this problem usually is described as the problem of “deferred utterance,” and arises in situations where speakers leave messages with voicemail, notes, and other means. It is typically framed with regard to indexicals such as “I,” “here,” and “now”:

(2) I’m not here right now.

Taking the standard Kaplanian line on which indexicals have both character and content, the sentence (2), when initially uttered at  $t_0$  is false. This is because the *content* of (2) is determined by evaluating the *character* of the indexicals “I,” “here,” and “now” with respect to the context of utterance. Characters are functions which vary according to contextual input, where these inputs are parameters called “indices”—such as agent, world, location, and time. The character maps contexts to content, which is a function from a possible world to an extension. So when I utter the sentence (2) into my iPhone to set up my voicemail, the character maps the contextual parameters of agent, world, location, and time onto the corresponding content: Malcolm, actual world, my apartment, 2:03 pm on April 5, 2013. The result is a sentence/index pair whose truth can then be evaluated. For Kaplan, a sentence like (2) will never come out to be true, because the only indices which he thinks constitute contexts of utterances are ones where the agent is at the location of the world. Thus, when my friend calls my phone from the University of Texas and she hears the sentence (2), it is not a context of *utterance*, since, after all, I cannot

make an utterance in a place where I am not.<sup>31</sup>

The idea that what my friend hears when she listens to my voicemail is something that is necessarily always false strikes many as incorrect. One of the responses is that we ought to take into account not just the speaker's location and world, but also the hearer's context. For instance, Andy Egan proposes that where the speaker's context results in a gappy proposition, the hearer's context comes into play to generate a determinate content. Egan has in mind especially cases like

(3) Jesus loves you!

on a billboard, where each individual, when reading the billboard, understands a different singular proposition, with herself as a member.<sup>32</sup> This is relevant to the Mīmāṃsā theory of testimony, in particular Vedic testimony, since on the Kaplanian account, the speaker's location turns out to be important in some cases for determining the content of the utterance. But without a speaker (such as billboards or the Vedas), there will be cases where we cannot determine the content, or that the predicted content comes apart from what seems right. Note that Egan's suggestion is one that relies on semantics to determine the proposition expressed, rather than pragmatics. It is not that by uttering something strictly false the speaker manages to convey something true by implication.

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<sup>31</sup>Sanderson 1989, p. 509.

<sup>32</sup>Egan 2009.

One last observation about the Mīmāṃsā emphasis on sentences over speakers. Setting aside indexicals, there is a broader problem of determining what the correct context of interpretation is for sentences like

- (4) Close cover before striking (written on the front of a matchbook).<sup>33</sup>

This imperative sentence is not being uttered by any particular person or to any particular person. What is the correct context for us to interpret it with? Stevens argues that this question wrongly presupposes that there is a correct context of interpretation. He claims that there is no pragmatic imperative force here, only the grammatical imperative mood, and that the latter is insufficient for the former.<sup>34</sup> For Stevens, it is incorrect to consider (4) a *command*, as it lacks pragmatic imperative force.<sup>35</sup> However, for the Mīmāṃsā, rather than admit that there is no imperative force to the commands, they appeal to *bhāvanā*, discussed above. Set within the appropriate discourse context, a sentence like (4) can have illocutionary force, despite a distant speaker (in the case of the matchbook) or none (in the case of the Veda).

Since it is the statement and its content which are crucial for generating knowledge, the Bhāṭṭa's analysis of testimony focuses heavily on the necessary conditions for a string of phonemes to count as a syntactic unity within a particular

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<sup>33</sup>Stevens 2009, p. 220.

<sup>34</sup>Stevens 2009, p. 220.

<sup>35</sup>This is his solution to the puzzle about voicemail messages: he denies that the utterances of (2) count as assertions. Instead, while they are cases of uttering a sentence (or the locutionary act of saying) they are not cases of asserting (the illocutionary act). Stevens 2009, p. 217-220.

discourse. To count as a statement (in contrast to a phrase or incomplete fragment), there are three requirements, broadly accepted by all schools, though with some dispute over the details: expectancy (*ākāṅkṣā*), semantic compatibility (*yogyatā*), and contiguity (*saṃnidhi* or *āsatti*).<sup>36</sup> Expectancy, a term in Sanskrit that literally means “desire,” is the anticipation that one word requires another to convey meaning. For instance, hearing the word “bring,” a speaker would expect an object which is to be brought. Whether this expectation is *syntactic* or *psychological* is a matter of debate.<sup>37</sup>

Semantic compatibility (which we will discuss in more detail when we take up Mukula’s positive proposal) is the requirement that a combination of words be meaningful. We can illustrate this concept with Chomsky’s famous example of a syntactically acceptable sentence which is meaningless:

(5) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.<sup>38</sup>

This sentence violates the requirement of semantic incompatibility. The violation of semantic incompatibility is one of the requirements for non-literal interpretation. The Mīmāṃsā allow metaphorical interpretation only of sentences which violate this principle.

Contiguity is the requirement that the words uttered should be close together. There are two ways that the necessary condition of contiguity can fail to be

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<sup>36</sup>For a detailed discussion of these elements, see Raja 2000.

<sup>37</sup>Raja 1990, pp. 157-64.

<sup>38</sup>From Chomsky 1957.



fulfilled. First, words which are not uttered close together temporally will not (ordinarily) constitute a complete sentence. If I utter “bring” on Wednesday, then two days later utter, “the cow,” this does not constitute a sentence. Second, if there is no apprehension of the sentence as connected, contiguity fails. This condition relates to elliptical sentences. In an utterance such as

(6) the door

Kumārila and the Bhāṭṭa say that a hearer will mentally insert the word “close,” for example. Otherwise, we will not entertain a proposition. The Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā argue that what is supplied is not a word, but a meaning. They reason that since we know which word to supply based on which meaning must be supplied, we should just assume we are supplying the meaning. Broadly categorized, the dispute is something like that in contemporary philosophy over the status of unarticulated constituents. The Bhāṭṭa insist that grammatical elements are primarily responsible for contributing to the content of a sentence. While they talk about “words,” we can understand their claim as akin to philosophers who propose that the deep logical form of sentences is what drives our “filling in” what is missing. On the other hand, the Prābhākara are similar to those contextualists who think it unnecessary that our semantics bear the burden for generating propositions which are expressed by sentences, at the level of what is said. Hearers can insert, through pragmatic processes, the appropriate content. We will address this debate in detail in Chapter Three. For the purposes of understanding testimony, the

main point is that contiguity is a necessary condition for a sentence to express structured (propositional) content capable of being known by the hearer. Let us now turn to the question of whether, and how, testimony and inferential reasoning are distinct *pramāṇā*.

### 2.3.2 Inferential Reason

There are two motivations for resisting the reduction of testimony (*śabda*) to inferential reason (*anumāna*). First is the by-now familiar hermeneutic context of the Mīmāṃsā. Kumāriḷa argues that if testimony and inferential reason are the same, then because Vedic testimony would be understood through inference, it would be faulty. It would be faulty because successful inference of knowledge via an utterance requires a trustworthy speaker, and the Vedas are authorless.<sup>39</sup> More generally, we can characterize this as the worry that, in cases where there is sufficient distance between the interpreter and the speaker of an utterance (either temporal or geographical), the hearer will not be in a position to evaluate the competence and trustworthiness of the speaker. On the inferential model of testimony, without such the hearer knowing the speaker's epistemic status, she would not be justified in accepting the statement as true.

A second motivation for distinguishing inferential reason from testimony is the apparent intrinsic validity of testimony which comes immediately upon enter-

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<sup>39</sup>*lakṣaṇena tv abhinnaṭvaṃ yaḁi śabda-anumānaayoḥ veda-jñāna-apramāṇatvaṃ syād atal lakṣaṇatvataḥ*. Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 213.

taining a speaker's utterance.<sup>40</sup> Kumāṛila rejects the idea that, ordinarily, we must have further verification of the truth of an utterance in order for it to constitute knowledge. Regardless of whether we're in a Vedic or human context, we can implicitly trust the deliverance of ordinary sources of knowledge. Generally speaking, unless there is an apparent contradiction from another source of knowledge, rational agents are justified in accepting the content of utterances at face-value as being true. This differentiates testimony from inferential reason in the following way. On the inferential view, a proposition  $p$  that is entertained on the basis of a speaker's saying that  $p$  does not constitute knowledge unless there is a further step: the apprehension of the speaker as trustworthy and competent and the apprehension of the condition that when such speakers utter sentences, those sentences are true. While Kumāṛila, as noted above, thinks that all knowledge sources are intrinsically valid, there is a different structure in inferential reasoning and testimony.

In what follows, I explain Kumāṛila's basic view of inferential reasoning (which is broadly acceptable to most other schools, save the Buddhists), and then clarify how he sees testimony as distinct. This discussion will focus on the pervasion relationship (*vyāpti*) by explaining the natures of the inferential mark and inferential object (*liṅga* and *liṅgin*, respectively), and how they are related by means of a universal generalization.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>See above discussion of '*svataḥ prāmāṇya*.'

<sup>41</sup>While his comment is focused on Nyāya and not Mimāṃsā, it is important what Stephen Phillips notes about inferential reason: "We have to keep in mind that Nyāya is focused not on logic per se, but rather on a psychological process whereby we come to know facts

The traditional example of inferential reasoning, which I introduced in Chapter One, is below:

1. Thesis to prove (*sādhya*): There is fire on the mountain.
2. Reason (*hetu*): This is because there is smoke on the mountain.
3. Pervasion (*vyāpti*): Everywhere there is smoke, there is fire, such as the case of a kitchen.
4. Application of rule (*upanayana*): This case is like the kitchen.
5. Conclusion (*nigamāna*): Therefore, there is fire on the mountain.

A crucial aspect of inferential reasoning is the existence of a pervasion relationship, or *vyāpti*. This is the relationship between the inferential mark and the inferred object. An inferential mark, or “prover,” “indicator” is the observed property which indicates the existence of what is being inferred. In the example above, smoke is the inferential mark (*liṅga*), and fire is the inferred object (*liṅgin*). The inferential mark is described as being “pervaded” by the inferred object. Smoke is pervaded by fire. The inferred object (fire) is necessary for the inferential mark (smoke). This allows us to infer from smoke that there is fire. However, fire is not sufficient for smoke. The traditional Indian counterexample to the sufficiency of pervasion is molten ball of iron which is fiery but not smokey.

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indirectly, by way of a sign, *liṅga* or *hetu*, an indication of something currently beyond the range of the senses, whether at a distance spatially or temporally or of a sort (such as atoms and God) that by nature cannot be perceived. Phillips 2012, p. 52.

We must be careful here to distinguish between inferential reasoning and inference. I have been calling this *pramāṇa* “inferential reasoning” because it requires an agent with a particular mental state (that of grasping a pervasion relationship), and because it occurs at a particular time. In contrast, what I will call “inference” is a formal structure in which the truth of certain propositions (premises) necessitate the truth of another proposition (conclusion).<sup>42</sup> Also, for any given case of inferential reasoning, if it is to be a *pramāṇa*, the premises must be true. While counterfactual reasoning from false premises was certainly a concept familiar to Indian philosophers, the *pramāṇa* of inferential reasoning, by definition, deals with true premises.

As well, inferences can be valid regardless of the order in which the premises appear, and they do not require the existence of a person who entertains them for this validity. The *pramāṇa* of inferential reasoning, on the other hand, has a specific order in which the cognitions are said to occur. First, an agent has repeated observations of an inferential mark and associated inferential object: there is smoke in the kitchen, and in the same place there is fire. Then she comes to recognize that there is a pervasion relationship relating them: everywhere there is smoke, there is fire. At a later point, she observes the inferential mark: there is smoke on the mountain. Entertaining the fact that the inferential mark exists in a certain place causes her to remember the universal rule, from which she concludes that there is fire on the mountain.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>42</sup>See, for instance, Harman 1996 and Siderits 2003 for more discussion of this distinction.

<sup>43</sup>The details of inferential reasoning in the Indian tradition are a subject of significant

While the Indian tradition has a certain way of representing this process (as above), it is possible to represent the inference itself in any order and maintain its validity. We could reverse (1) and (2) below and the syllogism would still be valid.<sup>44</sup>

1. There is smoke on the mountain.
2. If there is smoke in a locus, there is fire in that locus.
3. Conclusion: There is fire on the mountain.

Quite a lot has been written on the pervasion relation, or *vyāpti*, by both philosophers in the Indian tradition and contemporary philosophers reflecting on these texts. Indian philosophers argued over just what kinds of relationships constitute pervasion, and whether there is, to all of them, some underlying commonality. This particular problem need not concern us directly, but it

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dispute. For instance, see Matilal 1998, Mohanty 1957, Siderits 2003, and Taber 2004, to name just a few contemporary discussions of the topic.

<sup>44</sup>J.N. Mohanty makes sense of this by appealing to the distinction (found in some Indian philosophers) between “inference-for-oneself” and “inference-for-another.” The first is “a causally necessitated sequence of inner episodes” which does not have logical necessity, only a causal sequence. Mohanty 1957, p. 118. But inference-for-another is sentential and in this structure, there is a kind of logical necessity. Mohanty 1957, p. 119. Inference-for-another is characterized as sequential cognitive moves, which the speaker prompts in her hearer. He also observes that Indian philosophers are not concerned with abstract entities like propositions. Therefore, the logical necessity that holds between propositions may not be the same as the necessity which holds between “structures of the cognitive episodes which the component sentences express” Mohanty 1957, p. 119.

However, it is not clear if Kumārila distinguishes between these two forms of inference. He does say that if someone has gotten knowledge from inferential reasoning, in order to prove that her knowledge is valid, she should first put down the inferential object: ‘*tas-māt vyāpyatva-rūpeṇa vācya hetutva-sammataḥ*,’ Jha 1983, 272. See Bhatt 1962, 255–56 for a discussion of this question. He points out that on the Mīmāṃsā view, knowledge by someone’s statements is verbal testimony, not inferential reasoning, even if someone is communicating what she has learned from inferential reasoning herself.

is worth observing that although the smoke–fire relationship is one of causation, this is not the only pervasion relationship accepted. Kumāriila gives the example of inferring from  $x$  being a cow that  $x$  is a horned animal.<sup>45</sup> However, being a horned animal does not cause something to be a cow. Rather, the relationship between the inferential object and inferential mark between, respectively, a universal and a characteristic of a particular object in which that universal inheres.

Finally, an important aspect of inferential reasoning is that it moves from a universal rule (the pervasion relationship) to a particular claim. The thesis to be proved (*sādhya*) is a particular observational claim (*viśeṣa*) whereas the pervasion relationship (*vyāpti*) is a general law-like claim (*sāmānya*).<sup>46</sup> We can formalize the pervasion relationship as

$$\forall(x)[S(x)\rightarrow F(x)]$$

(For all places  $x$  which are occupied by smoke, that place  $x$  is also occupied by fire)

This universal pervasion rule is at the heart of inferential reasoning. The observation of a particular instance of smoke on a mountain,  $S(m)$ , allows us, by universal instantiation, to conclude there is fire on the mountain,  $F(m)$ . Kumāriila argues that these universal rules are known by observation.<sup>47</sup> For

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<sup>45</sup>See [p. 183]jha1983.

<sup>46</sup>*viśeṣe hi sādhye āmanya-hetutā*. Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 256

<sup>47</sup>There are two categories for Kumāriila, either particular observations (*viśeṣata-udrṣṭa*) or general observations (*sāmānyata-udrṣṭa*). For a discussion of different Mīmāṃsā views, see Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 258ff.

Kumārila, these observations are due directly to the *pramāṇa* of perception, not, as Western philosophers might surmise, inductive generalization. This is because he argues it is possible to perceive general class properties as they inhere in objects (for instance, a fire has the property of fireyness).

In order for testimony to be reducible to inference, two requirements need to be met: there must be an inferential mark and an object of inference and there must be a pervasion relationship between these two, where the pervasion relationship must be a universal rule which allows a particular conclusion to be drawn. The inferentialist about testimony claims that we come to know the inferential object (meaning) by the presence of an inferential mark (words) through the pervasion relationship between words and their meanings. However, Kumārila objects first, that neither words nor sentences can be suitable inferential marks and second, that there is no pervasion relationship between expressions and expression meanings. We will find this argument echoed by Ānandavardhana in the *Dhvanyāloka*, though marshaled in support of the linguistic capacity of suggestion.

Kumārila says that words are not inferential marks because the denotation of a word is a general class, while inferential mark must be a particular qualified object. For example, the inferential mark in the case of fire and smoke is smoke qualified by a particular place. But the denotation of “smoke” is “smokiness” (or whatever the general class property is that all smokes possess). Without some kind of qualification which links the inferential mark to its object, like the mountain which is the locus of both smoke and fire, no inference can be made.



Immediately, one might object that the object of a sentence is a qualified thing—a proposition. Kumāriḷa takes up this possibility in the section on sentences. He says,

Sentence meaning is understood as influenced by the meaning of the words. The words do not communicate the sentence meaning separate from their own meanings, like in the case of smoke and fire.<sup>48</sup>

In other words, since the sentence-meaning is composed of word-meanings, it would be a mistake to say that the word-meanings are the basis for inferring the sentence-meaning. Metaphorically, perhaps, it would be like saying that one infers a building’s existence from observing the presence of a collection of blocks in a building shape. Kumāriḷa wants to say that this is not inference.

Second, Kumāriḷa argues that the relationship between a sentence and its meaning cannot be one of pervasion. One problem is that the pervasion relationship is ascertained by perception, and since there is an infinite number of constructable sentences in a given language, there is no way to know the pervasion between every sentence and its meaning. He argues that this would require infinite knowledge, of all sentences and their meanings.<sup>49</sup> Further, the pervasion relationship is one of necessity: only if fire is necessary for smoke can we reason “Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.” However, we cannot

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<sup>48</sup>*‘pada-arthair anurakto ’sau vākya-arthaḥ sampratīyate, na ātmanā gamayanty-enaṃ vinā dhūmo ’gnimattvavat.’* Bhaṭṭa 1978a, p. 642.

<sup>49</sup>Bhatt 1962, 284 and Jha 1983, p. 530.

reason “Wherever there is the word ‘cow,’ there is the meaning COWHOOD” in the same way, since it is possible to entertain the requisite concept without the word prompting it.<sup>50</sup>

Finally, Kumāriḷa argues that any knowledge we have of the pervasion relationship between, say, “cow” and its the meaning COWHOOD, must come through someone uttering the word and our grasping its referent. Put another way, the pervasion relationship which is supposed be the inferential “trigger” by which we come to know the meaning of “cow” relies on knowing the meaning of “cow” in the first place. He concludes that we must assume the capacity of verbal testimony in order to make sense of inference.

### 2.3.3 Presumption

The last *pramāṇa* I will discuss is presumption, which is crucial to understanding Mukula’s account of indication and how hearers have access to non-literal meaning in general. I argue that presumption (as understood by the Mīmāṃsā) has a structure analogous to what Western philosophers call inference to the best explanation. First, I survey several examples of presumption in the original Sanskrit literature. I then reconstruct these to make the structure of the reasoning apparent. Finally, I discuss a particular form of presumption which relies upon testimonial knowledge, and which will be crucial to Mukula’s discussion of non-literal speech.

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<sup>50</sup>SV 44:85–86. See Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 303 and Jha 1983, p. 219.

In the Indian tradition, presumption, or *arthāpatti*, was accepted as an independent *pramāṇa* only by the Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta.<sup>51</sup> The other schools of thought either reduced presumption to inferential reasoning or denied that it held the status of a knowledge source.<sup>52</sup> The Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara schools within Mīmāṃsā differed over their analysis of presumption, although they both accepted it as a *pramāṇa*. While (as for many Mīmāṃsā concepts) the earliest reference is in Śabara, it is Kumārila who is responsible for developing the concept more thoroughly. In the *Śloka-vārttika*, Kumārila defines presumption as

When an object is known through the six *pramāṇa*, which otherwise could not be,  
Another, unexperienced object is imagined—this is presumption exemplified.<sup>53</sup>

Presumption is, like inferential reasoning, something that rational agents *do*, although from what rational people do we can abstract away certain formal conditions for knowledge. Psychologically speaking, however, what an agent requires before she is in a position to gain knowledge by presumption, is an episode of knowledge generated by a *pramāṇa*. This can be any *pramāṇa*,

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<sup>51</sup>Among the *nāstika* or “unorthodox” schools, the Jaina also accepted *arthāpatti*.

<sup>52</sup>For an overview in English of how each school understood presumption, see Simha 1991, the only book-length treatment of *arthāpatti* to date. I have benefited tremendously in conversation with Nirmalya Guha, whose unpublished thesis is also on *arthāpatti*.

<sup>53</sup>*pramāṇa-ṣaṭka-vijñāto yatra artho na anyathā bhavet, adṛṣṭam kalpayed anyam sa-arthāpattir udāhṛatā*, Bhāṭṭa 1978b, 320. Thanks to Elisa Freschi for her comments on this translation at the Indian Philosophy Blog. While I translate ‘*na anyathā bhavet*’ as “which otherwise could not be,” there is controversy over how to understand the ‘*anyathā bhavet*.’ For instance, the Prābhākara argue that it should be taken as referring to inexplicability.

including presumption itself. Kumarila gives examples of presumptive knowledge based upon each of the knowledge sources:

1. *Perception*: from the perception of fire burning, we can presume that fire has a power, that of burning.
2. *Inference*: from inferring that it is the same sun which appears in different places in the sky, we can presume that the sun has the power of mobility.
3. *Analogy*: from the fact that it is possible to understand that a cow is similar to a *gavaya* (a kind of buffalo), we presume that the cow has a capacity which triggers analogical understanding.<sup>54</sup>
4. *Presumption*: from the presumption that words have an expressive power, we can presume that words are eternal.
5. *Absence*: from the absence of Caitra, whom we expect to see in his home, we can presume that he is alive and outside.
6. *Testimony*: from the statement, “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the

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<sup>54</sup>Analogical understanding is the *pramāṇa* which is responsible for our learning new words. In this example, a forester is asked by townspeople what ‘*gavaya*’ means. He replies that a *gavaya* (a kind of buffalo) is like a cow. Armed with this comparison, on encountering a *gavaya* for the first time, the townspeople (who were already familiar with cows) see the *gavaya* and truly understand what the word ‘*gavaya*’ means. What is understood—discussed later in the chapter on analogy—is the *gavaya*-as-qualified-by-similarity. Analogy is taken to be its own *pramāṇa* since although the similarity between cow and *gavaya* is known by sense-perception and the cow is known through memory (not a *pramāṇa* for any Indian philosophers), what is left over (*gavaya*-as-qualified-by-similarity) must be known by analogy. In a similar way, later, on returning to the cow, what is understood is the cow’s similarity to the *gavaya*. The presumption seems to be that the cow itself has some power or capacity that is responsible for this new understanding.

day,” we can presume the statement, “he eats at night.”

We can make a few observations about this list. First, in each, while it is clear which is the object “ascertained by means of...the six *pramāṇa*,” it is less apparent how presumption is required, on pain of things being impossible to exist otherwise (*‘na anyathā bhavet’*). So what is at issue in each of these cases? Kumārila does not expand on all of them in detail (though he does for 4 through 6), but we can surmise that there is background piece of knowledge which is apparently inconsistent with new knowledge. This is made explicit in the view, though slightly different, of the philosopher Prābhākara Śālikanātha, in which he points out that the incompatibility is between something just observed, and another thing already known.<sup>55</sup> (We’ll look at his account of presumption below.) The conflict is between a piece of knowledge just attained through a *pramāṇa* and a piece of knowledge one already has in one’s background beliefs.

A second observation we can make about this list of cases is that most of them are *explanatory*. Cases 1 through 4 are what we would today consider scientific or natural hypotheses, presuming powers or regularities belonging to phenomena now studied by fields such as chemistry, astronomy, cognitive psychology, and linguistics. Cases 5 and 6 are more ordinary explanations: the former is an explanation as to why Caitra is surprisingly absent, and the latter is a psychological/linguistic explanation as to what a speaker means by

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<sup>55</sup>Śālikanātha 1934, 241.

her statement.

The category in contemporary philosophy closest to presumption is inference to the best explanation (IBE), often also called “abduction.”<sup>56</sup> Abductive inference is described as “reasoning that no other explanation which accounts for all the facts is plausible enough or simple enough to be accepted.”<sup>57</sup> Typically, what is emphasized is that what is abductively inferred needs to play an explanatory role. We must then give an account of what constitutes an explanation and what determines the *best* explanation of a set of facts.

Kumāriḷa and those who also accept *arthāpatti* in the Indian tradition couple explanation with removal of apparent inconsistency or “inexplicability otherwise.”<sup>58</sup> As noted earlier, the apparent inconsistency is between a fact and background knowledge, which is going to be agent- or context-relative (in presumption, we are not working with the set of all truths and drawing inferences, but with the set of what is known to a rational agent).<sup>59</sup> The example of Case 5, where a presumption is made from an earlier presumption highlights the fact that once a presumption has been made, that piece of knowledge is now part of the background, and it may “trigger” a new presumption.<sup>60</sup> To sum up, for an agent to make a presumption, she (1) must acquire a piece of knowl-

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<sup>56</sup>I will distinguish between IBE and abduction in what follows.

<sup>57</sup>Harman 1996, p. 89.

<sup>58</sup>The Sanskrit is ‘*anyathā anupapatti*.’

<sup>59</sup>This aligns with work in contemporary philosophy. It is implicit in Pierce’s idea of a “surprising fact,” and has been made more explicit by others such as Josephson and Josephson 2003.

<sup>60</sup>Compare Mackonis 2013, 978.

edge through a *pramāṇa*, and (2) must consider that piece of knowledge to be apparently inconsistent with her background knowledge.

Before moving on to discuss some of these cases in detail, let us first examine the Prābhākara analysis of presumption, since they have a different formulation of (2). Śālikanātha Mīśra was an important proponent of the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā system. His dates are not well-established, perhaps around 700 CE. We only have a few extant Prābhākara texts, and three of those are written by Śālikanātha (the *R̥juvimalā*, *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, and *Bhāṣyadīpa*). In his *Prakaraṇa-pañcikā*, he gives an overview of the major views of the Prābhākara, on the topics of Vedic injunctions, sentence meaning and communication, perceptual error, the existence of universals, and the various *pramāṇa*. In his analysis of presumption, Śālikanātha identifies the presumptive trigger as the removal of doubt, not just apparent incompatibility. He says that in presumption, an agent acquires a piece of knowledge and this throws something into doubt which was earlier taken to be knowledge. To illustrate this, he uses the example of Caitra's absence at home.<sup>61</sup>

The example of Caitra's absence is one of the most common, and contentious, examples of presumption in Indian philosophy. This is a typical example taken to be reducible to inferential reasoning. The case is described as follows: I go to see Caitra at his home, with the expectation that he will be there, since

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<sup>61</sup>As a Prābhākara, he does not accept that perception of absences constitute a *pramāṇa*, so he must explain this instance of knowledge through another means, in this case, inferential reasoning.

it is part of my background knowledge that he is alive. Finding him absent, I presume that Caitra is alive and present somewhere other than his house. On Kumārila's analysis, this presumption removes the apparent inconsistency between Caitra's not being at home and Caitra's being alive. For Śālikanātha, presumption removes the doubt that I now have that Caitra is alive, since he is not where I expect him to be.

On Kumārila's analysis, we reason presumptively as follows:

1. Caitra's house is absent of Caitra.
2. Caitra is alive.
3. (1) and (2) appear inconsistent because we expect Caitra at home.
4. Caitra is alive and outside the house.

I put (1) as I do to highlight the fact that Kumārila understands this piece of knowledge to originate from the *pramāṇa* of absence. We perceive that Caitra is absent from the house. However, this isn't necessary for the case, since we could also infer that he is absent given our perception of an empty house and knowledge that Caitra is alive. In any case, the apparent inconsistency between (1) and (2) is that someone not being found at their house is common to dead people (since when you are dead, your body is put elsewhere). Kumārila argues that it is only because we also know that Caitra is alive that this, in conjunction with (1) can lead us to presume he is alive and elsewhere. This is because (1) on its own is compatible with Caitra's being dead, and Caitra's being alive (2) is compatible with his being in the house. Put together, however, these two facts



lead us to the presumption that Caitra is alive and outside the house.

On Śālikanātha's analysis, we reason in this way:

1. Caitra's house is absent of Caitra.
2. Caitra is alive.
3. (1) causes (2) to be doubtful.
4. Caitra is alive and outside the house.

While the premises are the same, the presumptive trigger is not an apparent incompatibility between (1) and (2), but the doubt that (2) is true, given the new piece of knowledge (1). Kumārila explicitly rejects this account, since it is only (1) and (2) together which form the basis for presuming (3), and if there is doubt about (2), he thinks we cannot presume (3).

I believe a hidden assumption in the analysis of presumption is that accepting that Caitra is alive is true is a better explanation than updating to the belief that Caitra is not alive. Compare Pierce's famous definition of abduction:

The surprising fact, C, is observed;  
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,  
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.<sup>62</sup>

Something like this is how presumption is represented: the surprising fact that Caitra is not home is observed, but if Caitra were alive and not at home, this

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<sup>62</sup>Peirce 1934, p. 189.

would be normal. Thus we *presume* that it is true that Caitra is alive and not at home. The fact that Caitra is not at home is surprising given the agent's belief that he is at home and alive. However, to separate the knowledge-generating presumption from simply guessing, we need to insert a constraint, like Mackonis does, who distinguishes between abduction as defined by Pierce and inference to the best explanation (IBE):

The surprising fact, C, is observed;  
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,  
No available competing hypothesis can explain C as well as A does.  
Hence, A is true.<sup>63</sup>

Of course, now we must identify why it is that presuming Caitra is alive and well outside explains his absence in the house better than presuming, for instance, that he has died and his body been moved somewhere, that he has temporarily vanished into a parallel quantum universe, that he has become invisible, that he is a time-traveler, that he is hiding in a box in his home, and so on. This may involve such things as the costliness of updating background beliefs already accepted as true, information we have about Caitra's well-being, the time since we've last seen him, and so on.

It is worth noting that the interpretation I have given of presumption is not shared by everyone, although it is common.<sup>64</sup> Within a larger analysis of

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<sup>63</sup>Mackonis 2013, p. 977

<sup>64</sup>See, for example, Shida 2011 who analyzes Udayana's Naiyāyika version of *arthāpatti* in order to compare it to Charles Pierce's abduction. Mark Siderits mentions same comparison off-handedly in a review of Chakrabarthi Ram-Prasad's *Indian Philosophy and the*

Indian epistemology in general, they argue that presumption (which they call “postulation”) differs from IBE. In what follows, I briefly lay out a response to their view, a reply which will form a concluding summation of what I’ve argued above. Kasturirangan et al claim that IBE and presumption are different for the following reasons:

1. The question of “inconsistency otherwise” or “inexplicability otherwise” does not arise in cases of IBE.
2. IBE is a “full-fledged inference in the sense of *anumāna*” in that it depends on inductive reasoning and observation, whereas presumption requires only “inexplicability otherwise,” and does not depend on observation.
3. Presumption (whether correct or not) has a phenomenology that leaves the reasoner with the feeling she cannot know anything more, but this “procedural closure” is lacking in IBE, as there is the feeling that it could be invalidated by future empirical data.
4. Presumption is non-defeasible on the basis of perceptual inputs.<sup>65</sup>

Their first claim, that IBE lacks the feature of “inexplicability otherwise” which is so central to presumption, seems dependent upon the single example they use for IBE. As a definition of IBE, they give

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*Consequences of Knowledge* as if the equivalence between abduction and *arthāpatti* was obvious and non-controversial (Siderits 2009). The most notable criticism of the claim that presumption is, or resembles, IBE, comes from Rajesh Kasturirangan, Nirmalya Guha, and (ironically enough) Chakrabarthi Ram-Prasad himself. Kasturirangan et al. 2010.

<sup>65</sup>Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223-24

If E is an inference to the best explanation of a set of events O according to a theory T, then (1) O must be a consequence of E according to T, and (2) T and E must be consistent.

As their paradigmatic case, they give a situation where we are drawing red balls from an urn:

1. All balls in this urn are red.
2. All balls in this particular random sample are red.
3. Therefore, all balls in this particular random sample are taken from this urn.<sup>66</sup>

They then claim that the pervasion relationship central to Indian inferential reasoning (which we discussed earlier) is present in this case. It is:

Any case of “having only red balls both in a random sample and in a particular population” is a case of “drawing the random sample from the particular population.”

That there is a pervasion relationship makes abduction different from *arthāpatti*, they argue. Further, they note the pervasion relationship which *arthāpatti* lacks has an observational basis.

I grant that, if this case is paradigmatic IBE, it would be strange to characterize presumption as IBE. The problem is that how to characterize abduction and inference to the best explanation is far from settled. Kasturirangan et al rely on Lipton’s view, which is only one of many attempts to formalize

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<sup>66</sup>Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223.

IBE, and who observes himself that IBE is “more a slogan than an articulated philosophical theory.”<sup>67</sup> Further, as I alluded to above, there are those like Mackonis who argue that abduction is not the same as IBE. The difference is essentially that abduction is a first step, a procedure that gives us a set of possible explanations, and IBE is a process which narrows to what ought to be (though is not guaranteed to be) the correct one. Given this distinction between abduction and IBE, my claim in this chapter is a broad one: presumption is a form of inference to the best explanation, although it may turn out to be non-identical to some varieties of IBE if IBE is not a unitary concept. Second, as I noted above, many philosophers distinguish between abduction and IBE and do so in a way that supports my thesis. What characterizes IBE in contrast to abduction is the requirement (see above) which states that no other explanation is sufficient to explain what has just been observed. This claim, I argue, just is what Indian philosophers mean when they use the Sanskrit term “*anyathā anupapatti*” or “inexplicability otherwise.”<sup>68</sup>

Three examples from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy support my contention that the kind of cases typically subsumed under IBE are analogous to those described in the Indian literature under the concept of presumption:

You happen to know that Tim and Harriet have recently had a terrible row that ended their friendship. Now someone tells you

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<sup>67</sup>Lipton 2004, p. 2.

<sup>68</sup>

that she just saw Tim and Harriet jogging together. The best explanation for this that you can think of is that they made up. You conclude that they are friends again.

One morning you enter the kitchen to find a plate and cup on the table, with breadcrumbs and a pat of butter on it, and surrounded by a jar of jam, a pack of sugar, and an empty carton of milk. You conclude that one of your house-mates got up at night to make him- or herself a midnight snack and was too tired to clear the table. This, you think, best explains the scene you are facing. To be sure, it might be that someone burgled the house and took the time to have a bite while on the job, or a house-mate might have arranged the things on the table without having a midnight snack but just to make you believe that someone had a midnight snack. But these hypotheses strike you as providing much more contrived explanations of the data than the one you infer to.

Walking along the beach, you see what looks like a picture of Winston Churchill in the sand. It could be that, as in the opening pages of Hilary Putnam's (1981), what you see is actually the trace of an ant crawling on the beach. The much simpler, and therefore (you think) much better, explanation is that someone intentionally drew a picture of Churchill in the sand. That, in any case, is what you come away believing.<sup>69</sup>

In all of these cases, a new piece of knowledge triggers formulation of an explanatory hypothesis. While it is implicit in these cases, rather than explicit,

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<sup>69</sup>Douven 2011

this new piece of knowledge is in some way surprising against one or more pieces of background knowledge. Otherwise, there would be no need for a hypothesis, as you could simply accept the knowledge into your existing set of beliefs.

The other three points which Kasturirangan et al make have to do with the role of empirical evidence in presumption. Let's take claim (4) first. On their analysis, presumption is not defeasible since the conclusion of presumptive reasoning follows necessarily from known concepts that the reasoner already has. This is what they call "cognitive mapping." In the case of Caitra, they argue that "the concept of not-at-home is 'cognitively mapped' onto the concept of being-somewhere-else."<sup>70</sup> Thus (2) observation is not required, only accessing concepts, (3) nothing more can be learned once the mapping is complete, and (4) further perceptual information could not impact the cognitive mapping.

However, in the cases above as well as the cases in the Indian literature, observation is important. First, in many cases observation is the way in which the new piece of information is acquired. This is explicit in Kumārila's *SV*, as well as other texts, which identifies the various *pramāṇa* which precede presumption. However, while Kasturirangan et al would accept this, what they would reject is the claim that further observation could impact the presumptive conclusion. The problem is that this assumes that the set of background

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<sup>70</sup>Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223.

beliefs an agent has is rich enough to have accounted for all possible other conclusions.

In the case of the absent Caitra, this is more or less plausible. It seems unlikely that another observation would lead us to the conclusion that Caitra is, in fact, in the house, as we have seen that he is not there and we know he is alive. Given our background knowledge about this world—people don't just disappear, etc.—the conclusion seems firm. However, it is not immune to further evidence. Let's assume this is a modern case. Now, consider the possibility that, having concluded Caitra is not in the house, I then notice that the window through which I am looking has a very thick frame. It turns out that I am looking through a series of lenses which form a "cloaking device."<sup>71</sup> This casts my previous conclusion into doubt, since it is consistent with this new piece of evidence that Caitra is inside the house.

As for claim (3), while the phenomenological "procedural closure" would ordinarily be present, I argue such a feeling could also be present in the three cases given above. Normally, my conclusion that someone drew Winston Churchill in the sand is not experienced with the sense that further information would invalidate it. At least, I don't think such a sense would be present unless someone were to challenge my reasoning, in which case I might be open to other explanations. But this seems to be so with presumption as well—as

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<sup>71</sup>The device is intended to be similar to the one recently designed by Rochester University, which lacks the kind of phenomenological tells that would alert us to the presence of such a device. <http://www.rochester.edu/newscenter/watch-rochester-cloak-uses-ordinary-lenses-to-hide-objects-across-continuous-range-of-angles-70592/>



in the case of Caitra and the cloaking device. Whether or not such a phenomenology is present or absent in presumption (or IBE) also seems to be highly agent-relative. Consider the phenomenology of a geologist and an ordinary person when finding that there are perfectly spherical objects on Mars. A geologist familiar with the process of concretion would likely conclude that natural processes acting on Martian sediment was responsible. She would, I suspect, have a sense of “procedural closure” given her extensive background knowledge. In contrast, an ordinary person might conclude that intelligent beings are responsible, and that this is evidence for life on Mars. She may or may not have a sense of procedural closure about this. And, returning to claim (4), such a sense of procedural closure is irrelevant to whether the conclusion is a good one, and whether further empirical evidence can impact it.

Finally, Kasturirangan et al argue that IBE has a pervasion relationship or *vyāpti*, which they provide for the case of the red balls, whereas presumption does not. For this reason, they claim that IBE is inferential reasoning (*anumāna*) but presumption is not. At this point, it’s important to note that they are taking sides in a historical debate about presumption. The Nyāya or “Logic” school of Indian philosophy would differ on this point, claiming that presumption is reducible to a kind of inferential reasoning known as negative-only concomitance.<sup>72</sup> On the assumption that the Mīmāṃsā have the correct

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<sup>72</sup>This kind of inference relies on reasoning of the form: “whatever is not X is not Y.” So, to take a famous example, we reason from “whatever is not omnipotent is not the creator” to “God is omnipotent because God is the creator.” We cannot observe God and so cannot reason positively from God’s omnipresence being co-located with his being the creator.

view against the Nyāya, it is because presumption lacks a pervasion. In contrast, Kasturirangan give the pervasion statement above (which I reproduce below):

Any case of “having only red balls both in a random sample and in a particular population” is a case of “drawing the random sample from the particular population.”

Such a pervasion is based on the presence of a positive example (*sahacāra-darśana* and lack of a negative example (*vyabhicāra-adarśana*). In the red ball case, there is the observation that all balls taken from the urn are red and no balls taken from the urn are non-red. However, they go on to note that it is possible that, “unknown to us, there are two urns each of which has a billion red balls, and we are aware of the first one only while the random sample is actually drawn from the second urn.”<sup>73</sup> This caveat is intended to show that the red ball case does not involve “inconsistency otherwise” (by which they mean, and subsequently say, “inexplicability,” or ‘*anyathā anupapatti*’). Why? Because, they argue,

But we cannot say that: A case of ‘having only red balls both in a random sample and in a particular population’ must be a case of ‘drawing the random sample from the particular population,’ otherwise it is inexplicable.

Since we could be in a position with the hidden urn, unbeknownst to us, the case is not otherwise inexplicable. There is another explanation. But this

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<sup>73</sup>Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223.

cuts against their example as well. We could be a situation, where Caitra is absent, where there is a hidden cloaking device, or Caitra has an identical twin brother, or Caitra has the power of invisibility, or we are hallucinating, etc. The possibilities range from the ordinary to the unlikely, but this does not mean there are no other possibilities.

The reason that Kasturirangan et al think that there is a necessity to presumption is that they characterize it as: “A case of not-being-here-while-existing must be a case of being-somewhere-else; otherwise it is inexplicable.”<sup>74</sup> Similarly, in the case of Caitra’s absence from the house, we move from Caitra-is-not-here to Caitra-is-somewhere-else. They deny that these relations are analytic, since they say that the meaning of “Caitra is somewhere else” is not part of the meaning of “Caitra is not at home.”<sup>75</sup> Instead, the relationship is the one of “cognitive mapping” between not-at-home and being-somewhere-else.

However, as they describe presumption, it is difficult to see the explanatory quality to the explanans, “a case of being-somewhere else” for the explanandum “not-being-here-while-existing.” Let’s represent the explanans, “a case of being somewhere else” with  $\neg H$ , for “not here.” The explanandum is then  $\neg H$  and  $E$ . I would not say that  $\neg H$  is an explanation for the compound statement  $\neg H$  and  $E$ . I think a better representation of the presumptive schema is below,

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<sup>74</sup>Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223.

<sup>75</sup>Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223. Perhaps they mean to characterize the move as being from Caitra-is-not-at-home to Caitra-is-somewhere-else, but this is not how it is written in the text, which makes the response to their interlocutor difficult to understand.

Caitra is known to be alive.

The surprising fact, Caitra is not home, is observed;

But if Caitra is alive and outside were true, Caitra is not home  
would be a matter of course,

No available competing hypothesis can explain Caitra is not home  
as well as Caitra is alive and outside does.

Hence, Caitra is alive and outside is true.

Now, the third claim, about competing hypotheses is not made explicit in the Indian discussion of presumption, though something like it is discussed in Mukula's text, as we will see. Caitra's being alive is important, since the fact that he is not at home might cause us to doubt our earlier knowledge that he is alive, and suppose that he is dead, and his body has been taken somewhere. This constitutes a competing hypothesis, but we take it to be less plausible than the alternative, that Caitra is still alive and is outside of the house. Rather than take the surprising fact as reason to reject our earlier belief (Caitra's being alive), we reason that he is gone on an errand (and not invisible, behind a cloaking device etc).

I think Kasturirangan et al, in their analysis of presumption, assume that agents presumptive capacities are too tightly connected to the world as it is. They come close to postulating an omniscient reasoner, saying that "a world where beings can vanish for a while and emerge back from the ether is not a world where [presumption] of the form, 'X that exists and is not here must be

somewhere else' will work."<sup>76</sup> The reason is, they say, that human epistemic systems would have different phenomenological structures. However, there is not guarantee that our phenomenological structures map onto the way the world is—take, for instance, inverted goggles, which flip the wearer's perception upside down. Eventually, persons wearing such goggles adjust, but not because the world itself becomes inverted.<sup>77</sup>

A similar, though not identical, worry is that if Kasturirangan et al are right, and presumption is simply the exploitation of an automatic mapping process, it is difficult to see where to fit the phenomenology of the initial doubt or apparent conflict with our background knowledge. As Mackonis points out, omniscient creatures would not experience an abductive trigger, as they wouldn't have any reason to ask for an explanation. Mackonis 2013, pp. 977-78 And yet, on the cognitive-mapping model of presumption, the background knowledge already has the explanation at the ready—so why would there be a feeling of "inexplicability in explaining it any other way"? Why would our agent be tempted to explain it in another way? The answer is that she wouldn't. She might be worried that her initial belief—for instance, that Caitra is alive—is false. But this is not the phenomenological aspect emphasized by Kasturirangan et al.

In conclusion, presumption or *arthāpatti* is equivalent to inference to the best explanation. The Mīmāṃsā view is that presumption is a *pramāṇa*, that is,

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<sup>76</sup>Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 224.

<sup>77</sup>I owe this example and point to conversation with Josh Dever.

that it is a means of knowledge. This does not require that every apparent case of presumption invariably results in true beliefs or that its deliverances cannot be overturned by later evidence. Such a claim is far too strong, and inconsistent with the way the Mīmāṃsā understand the other *pramāṇa*, which are sources of knowledge if undefeated. Instead, there are false-but-apparent cases of presumption, perception, and so on—these are *pramāṇa-ābhāsa*, which turn out to be faulty. When the explanation turns out not to be the best, we no longer have knowledge, and indeed, never really did.

## 2.4 Conclusion

The Mīmāṃsā view language as an epistemic instrument, a means by which we can acquire knowledge that is a basis for our actions. This knowledge comes from the *pramāṇa* of testimony, which derives its validity not from facts about a speaker’s authority, but in a *prima facie* manner similar to perception and inference. Testimony “grips” us until we encounter defeaters. The Mīmāṃsā were also sensitive to the fact that language is not merely, or even primarily, used for asserting propositions. In ways that resonate with contemporary speech-act theory, they were concerned with the “force” of statements. Again, such force was not inherently parasitic on a speaker’s intention, but could be cashed out in terms of grammatical structure. However, there are outstanding questions of how non-literal interpretations can be retrieved. When semantic compatibility fails, how does a hearer know what is meant? While the Mīmāṃsā argue that testimony is not reducible to inferential reasoning or

other *pramāṇa*, this does not entail that inferential reasoning (or presumption) is not involved. After all, perception and memory are necessary for inferential reasoning, although it is not reducible to either. The next chapter focuses on this problem.

## Chapter 3

### Knowing What is Meant

#### 3.1 Introduction

We are now in a position to evaluate some of the answers given by Indian philosophers to the question introduced in the last chapter. How do hearers understand what is communicated, and thereby come to have testimonial knowledge? In this chapter I will examine two Mīmāṃsā accounts which are frequently taken to be, if not contradictory, at least in tension. These are the accounts given by the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara schools, two accounts which Mukulabhaṭṭa claims to have reconciled in his *Fundamentals of the Communicative Function*. These accounts, in particular the Bhāṭṭa account of lexical semantics, are part of the background against which Ānandavardhana proposes his theory of suggestion. I argue that the dispute between the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara, while similar in some ways to contemporary debate over contextualism, cuts across distinctions important to Western philosophers, such as the distinction between mandatory and optional processes. Ānanda's objections to the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara are the subject of the end of the chapter. Specifically, he thinks that neither group can explain how hearers come to understand additional meanings which are intended in addition to (rather than instead of) the literal sentence meaning. Foremost among these meanings is



the suggested meaning known as *rasa*, which I clarify is propositional in nature in contrast to how it is conceived of in later Indian philosophers. I also introduce some epistemological concerns about how hearers can come to understand *rasa*, although these will be developed more thoroughly in later chapters, as they are the target of Mukulabhaṭṭa’s reply to Ānanda.

## 3.2 The Bhāṭṭa Theory: Words as Sentential Building Blocks

### 3.2.1 The Organizing Principle of Bhāvanā

To understand the Bhāṭṭa analysis of sentences, metaphors will be helpful—for instance, that words are building blocks. In this metaphor, the building blocks are used to to construct a structure which is a unified speech act. This could be a text such as the Vedic texts, understood as a “great sentence” whose aim is to communicate *dharma* or human duties. Everything from phonemes to words to sentences to larger discourse units are taken as fitting together with an eye towards the purpose of the speech act.<sup>1</sup> In this sense, their analysis of meaning is “bottom-up.” That is, since language functions by assembling words together in a potentially infinite number of ways, the Bhāṭṭa emphasize the principle of compositionality. Further, as we have seen earlier in the discussion of “linguistic force” (*bhāvanā*), they emphasize the constituent parts of words as well.<sup>2</sup> For instance, in the sentence

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<sup>1</sup>For a more detailed discussion of this hierarchical hermeneutics, see Chapter 3 of McCrea 2008.

<sup>2</sup>See Chapter 1.

- (1) *svarga-kāmo*                      *yajeta*  
 heaven-desirer<sub>Masc.Nom.Sg.</sub> ought to sacrifice<sub>Pres.Optv.3s</sub>  
 ‘The heaven-desirer ought to sacrifice.’

since the Sanskrit verb is recognized as having in the optative mood by the ending ‘-eta’, we know that the force of this sentence is a directive.<sup>3</sup>

However, this bottom-up principle is coupled with a top-down principle, in which the “assembly” of constituent parts into meaningful units is guided by the presumption that there is a purpose (*prayojana*) for the communicative speech act. This purpose may be, as is frequently the case in the Veda, to urge someone to act. Or it may be to describe a state of affairs, to express an emotion, and so on. Whatever the case, the purpose of the speech act governs the interpretation of the constituent parts.

An extended example will clarify how these two principles, compositionality and unity of purpose, are mutually supportive. Take the sentence

- (2) *gam*                      *ānaya*  
 COW<sub>Masc.Acc.Sg.</sub> you    should bring<sub>Impv.causative.2s</sub>  
 ‘You should bring a/the cow.’<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup>There is not always a distinction between the optative and imperative in Sanskrit, and the optative can be used as a “soft imperative”; see Whitney 2005, p. 215 for discussion. What I have translated as “heaven-desirer” is a *bahuvrīhi* or possessive compound made up of the word ‘*svarga*’ (heaven) and ‘*kāmaḥ*’ (desire), where phonological processes called ‘*saṃdhi*’ change the ‘*aḥ*’ ending to an ‘*o*.’ As a *bahuvrīhi* compound, the expression ‘*svarga-kāmaḥ*’ is taken adjectivally, despite its component parts being nouns. Thus, instead of “desire for heaven” it is “one who desires heaven.” See Whitney 2005, pp. 480–85.

<sup>4</sup>At this point, we do not have enough contextual information to know whether there is a particular single cow which should be brought, or whether anything, so long as it is a cow, is suitable. Sanskrit lacks definite articles.

The Mīmāṃsā (both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara) take the verb as the starting point for their analysis. The force (*bhāvanā*) of the verb is understood as having two parts: a linguistic force (*śābdī-bhāvanā*) and an objective force (*ārthī-bhāvanā*).<sup>5</sup> The first refers to the force that is applied to the hearer, and is close to what speech-act theorists refer to as “illocutionary force.”<sup>6</sup> The objective force is targeted at the results of the utterance in the world, in contrast to the mental states of the speaker.<sup>7</sup> We will have more to say about both of these below. Each kind of force has three aspects, which were introduced in Chapter 1:

- **Aim.** What is being produced?
- **Instrument.** By what means is it being produced?
- **Procedure.** How is it being produced?

These questions are heuristic tools for interpretation insofar as they help us get at what contemporary theorists might call the “deep structure” of a sentence.

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<sup>5</sup>In what follows, I am simplifying an analysis which is contested among the Mīmāṃsā themselves, both between the two traditionally opposing camps of Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara and within them. See Chapter Two of Freschi 2012 for a discussion of the debate which is summarized in the *Tantra-rahasya* and *Śāstra-prameya-pariccheda* of Mīmāṃsaka Rāmānujācārya, which Freschi’s work translates. A recent overview is found in Ollett 2013. For introductory Sanskrit texts, either the *Mīmāṃsa Nyāya Prakāṣa* by Āpadeva or the *Arthasaṃgraha* by Laugakṣibhāskara are useful primers, intended as introductions to the Bhāṭṭa hermeneutic system. See Edgerton 2012 and Gajendragadkar and Karmarkar 2007. I am grateful to Donald Davis for his willingness to read earlier versions of this chapter and provide feedback on my discussion of Mīmāṃsā topics.

<sup>6</sup>But again, note that in the Vedic context there is no speaker whose intention grounds such a force. The words themselves are responsible.

<sup>7</sup>Note that “objective” here is not in the sense of a contrast to “subjective,” but translates the abstract noun *ārthī*, that which relates to an object or purpose. In other words, objective force is a force which has an object or aim.

The term “deep structure” has been variously within the literature in contemporary generative syntax and semantics. As Kiparsky and Staal note in their paper situating Pāṇini’s grammar in relation to contemporary thought, for Chomsky, both so-called “deep” and “surface” structures share formal properties, where deep structures (such as Sentence, Noun Phrase, etc.) are a subset of surface structures.<sup>8</sup> However, Pāṇini and many grammarians after him, distinguish between the deep and surface structures, keeping them apart. For them, the deep structures mediate between semantic representations and surface structure. These deep structures are built up through relations between, for instance, actors and the objects acted upon.<sup>9</sup> The actor may or may not be the grammatical subject of the sentence (for instance, in a passive construction, it would not be). They are thus not identical to syntactical structure. Nor are they the same as semantic representations. Pāṇini’s grammar, the *Aṣṭhādhyāyī*, maps out relations between deep structure, syntactic form, and semantic content, and is frequently appealed to by Indian philosophers in their analysis of sentences, the Mīmāṃsā being no exception. A contrasting pair of sentences will help with this conception before moving on to the Mīmāṃsā context in particular.

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
<sup>8</sup>Kiparsky and Staal 1969, p. 106. Their argument is that Pāṇini’s grammar operates a conceptual space unoccupied in contemporary generative grammars, although it shares many affinities with them.

<sup>9</sup>The word for “deep structure,” ‘*kāraka*’, literally means “doer of an action,” and Abhyankar suggests it is extended to mean “the capacity in which a thing becomes instrumental in bringing about an action” and that this capacity “is looked upon as the sense of the case-affixes which express it.” Abhyankar 1961, p. 110-11.

- (3) He plays dice.  
 (4) He plays with dice.<sup>10</sup>

The deep structures posited by Pāṇini and others are used to connect semantic representations to syntactic ones (and finally to phonological ones, but that level does not concern us here). The tree below, from left to right, represents the relationship between semantic representation to deep structure to syntax for sentences (3) and (4).

Figure 3.1: Example of Deep Structure



The “Acted Upon” relationship (See Figure (3.1)), which is the same in both sentences, is represented in (3) by the accusative case, which is frequently how the deep structure of being an object is represented.<sup>11</sup> In (4), the semantic relationship is represented by the instrumental case, frequently how the deep structure of being an instrument is represented. Thus the same semantic relationship can be represented with two different deep structures (and syntactic structures). However, one should not confuse case endings with deep structure—that is, being marked as an nominative is not a guarantee that a

<sup>10</sup>Kiparsky and Staal 1969, pp. 85-86.

<sup>11</sup>Kiparsky and Staal call the semantic relationship “Instrument” but I think it is not quite clear that this is a relationship of instrumentality. As well, I want to make clear the distinction between the three levels.

sentence constituent is expressing the deep structure of being an actor. Take, for instance, the passive construction

- (5) *kumbah kriyate*  
pot<sub>Masc.Nom.S.</sub> is made<sub>Pres.Pass.3s</sub>  
'The pot is made.'

In this sentence, while “the pot” is declined as a nominative, its referent is not the actor but is the object of the action.<sup>12</sup>


Let us now return to how the tripartite nature of the linguistic and objective forces is used for sentence interpretation. The analysis begins with taking the verb as consisting of two parts: a verb root (*dhātu*) and a conjugational ending (*pratyaya*). The conjugational ending is then further analyzed into (1) “verbality,” or whatever it is that conveys the sense of action (in contrast to nouns and substantives), (2) a mood marker, (3) the verb’s number, tense, and person. The tree below illustrates this analysis. Note that it is not purely a *syntactic* analysis, as will be made clearer in discussion of the objective and linguistic force. (Boxes indicate that a fuller diagram for a node will be presented later.)

The three parts of the two forces (linguistic and object) have “expectation” (*ākāṅkṣā*), introduced in the last chapter, which force the interpreter to look for an answer in the form of a complement somewhere within the sentence or

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<sup>12</sup>See Kiparsky and Staal 1969, p. 86 for a discussion of how Pāṇinian rules allow for these variations. This general picture of thematic relations is one familiar to contemporary linguists. See, for instance, Jackendoff 1976, for early work.

Figure 3.2: Two Kinds of Force



surrounding discourse units.<sup>13</sup> Both of the forces are taken to cause something to come into existence. The linguistic force acts upon the hearer. In other words, one aspect of words having “force” is the creation of an action on the part of the hearer (even if the action is understood as a mental event).

<sup>13</sup>There is a dispute over what this “expectation” is, similar to the debate over unarticulated constituents in contemporary philosophy of language. Given a word like “bring,” is there an argument required for all of the following: object, instrument, time, place, color, shape, size, etc.? If so, then a sentence like “Bring the cow” is incomplete. This incompleteness could be due to a syntactic failure, or the hearer’s psychological expectation that more information be given. For contemporary discussion of this problem, see for example Perry 1998 and Recanati 2002.

In Figure 3.2.1 (on page 117), the arrow between the linguistic force and the objective force represents the relationship between the question “What is being produced?” and its answer, “A desire for the object force.” In other words, the force of the words in an imperative has as its aim the impelling of a person to act. This is the aim of the linguistic force (*sādhya*), shown in Figure 3.2.1 above. To the question, “By what means is desire being produced?” the answer is: through the hearer’s knowledge of the mood of the verb. In this instance, since the mood is optative, the hearer knows that whatever action is to be produced, she is being commanded or impelled. Finally, to the question, “How is the desire being produced?” the Mīmāṃsā respond: through the linguistic force, or the mood. In other words, there is something about hearing a command and recognizing that it is a command which impels a hearer to act. Further, frequently other exhortative sentences (*arthavāda* in the Veda) act as encouragement to the hearer. For instance, if one urges “Go out with us tonight!,” other sentences, like “We’ll have fun!,” “You don’t need to do your work!” and so on may inculcate a desire to go out.<sup>14</sup>


Given that the aim of the linguistic force is to bring into existence a desire for whatever thing the objective force aims to bring into existence, then we must analyze the objective force. (See Figure 3.2.1 on page 121.) Again, we pose the same three questions to determine the three aspects. At this point, the

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<sup>14</sup>See, for instance, the *Artha-samigrahaḥ* of Laugākṣibhāskara: ‘*iti-karttavayatā-ākāṅkṣāyām arthavād jñāpya-prāśastyam iti-karttavayatātvena anveti.*’ English translation (mine): “With regard to the expectation of what should be done, the praise that is learned from exhortations has a logical connection with what should be done.” Gajendragadkar and Karmarkar 2007, p. 6.



Figure 3.3: Linguistic Force




verbal root becomes relevant. Up to this point, only the mood and fact that the verb conveys action in general are taken into account. All that has been relevant is that an action is being commanded, not what the action is.

Now we ask, “What is being produced?” The Mīmāṃsā answers: a cow is produced, by being brought. In other words, the goal of the command is for there to be a cow, through some means. To answer “By what means is it being produced?” the Mīmāṃsā transform the verb root into an instrumental: “by bringing.” Third, in answer to the procedural question, “How is it being produced?” this particular short sentence does not tell us anything. The cow is to be produced by bringing, but on whether it is brought by leading it with a rope, prodding it with a stick, or so on, this sentence is silent. In fuller context, a more precise answer might be given through the surrounding sentences in the discourse. Without answering the procedural question, the Bhāṭṭa argue that we are unable to bring the result about, since we don’t know how to engage

in the action.

Figure 3.4: Object Force



### 3.2.2 Assembling Lexical Meanings

Finally, let's look at the lexical meaning of "cow."<sup>15</sup> We have focused on the analysis of verbs as being composed of a verb root plus "verbalty" plus a conjugational case ending (containing mood, tense, number, and person). The verb's mood impels the hearer to bring something, and we have said that this object is communicated by *cow* in the diagram above. But we have not identified what *cow* refers to. Is it a single particular cow (Bessie) or any *x*

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<sup>15</sup>An objection might be raised at this point, that nouns and other parts of speech also have the kind of property the Mīmāṃsā describe by the term '*bhāvanā*.' In fact, this objection is raised by an interlocutor in the section of the *TV* focused on force (Jha 1924, pp. 495-96). In reply, Kumāṛila first observes that nouns function differently than verbs, in that when we hear a word like "cow," we immediately have cognition of their denotation. In this way, the object of nouns are already accomplished, or complete. Verbs, however, especially their root, Kumāṛila argues denote something which is to be accomplished. They represent an activity, and because of this, they require an instrument. This discussion echoes contemporary discussion of argument structure, which is not restricted to verbs. See Comrie 1993 for an introduction to the topic.

such that  $x$  is a cow?

According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, the lexical entry for “cow” is something like COWHOOD, since nouns refer to universals or class properties. Now, however, we have a problem, which is that the objective force of the sentence seems to require that someone bring COWHOOD. This is untenable, since whatever class property all cows have in common, it is infeasible for a human being to produce it in response to a command.<sup>16</sup> Further, unless “cow” can be qualified by the verb “you should bring,” we have a fault which the Mīmāṃsā call “sentence-splitting” (*vākya-bheda*). By definition, a sentence is a syntactically unified utterance, and if “cow” cannot be the object of “you should bring,” then what we have is not a sentence, but something close to, in English:

(6) Furiously sleep green ideas colorless.

This example, due to Chomsky, illustrates syntactic deviance (which in English is frequently a matter of word order, in contrast to Sanskrit, which has more flexible word order due to its being a case declined language). The Mīmāṃsā appeal to *lakṣaṇā* to explain how the sentence (2) “*gam ānaya*” is not syntactically deviant. *Lakṣaṇā*, which was briefly introduced to in Chap-

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<sup>16</sup>We might wonder, why don’t the Mīmāṃsā simply assume that the customary reference of nouns is an individual? The reason is their emphasis is upon how language must be a means of knowledge: “If again, a word were to denote that individual alone to which it has been actually applied in usage, then the word “cow” could not be used in reference to the new-born calf.” From Śabara’s *Bhāṣya*, translated and cited in Jha 1942, pp. 115. In other words, if “cow” refers to a specific cow Bessie, then we have no way to use it for another cow, Daisy. “Cow” must refer to something which all cows have, in order for us to use it for different cows and be understood.

ter 1, is often translated as “indication” or “secondary meaning.” *Lakṣaṇā* is a concept crucial to the debate over suggestion and poetic meaning, but it is not limited in its relevance to metaphor and aesthetic speech acts.

Briefly, the solution to the problem with (2) is to posit a metonymical shift from a universal to a particular.<sup>17</sup> *Lakṣaṇā* is the power (*śakti*), activity, or function (*vyāpara*), by which this shift occurs. From one standpoint, this is a function of words (*śabda-vyāpara*) and so can be represented formally without requiring conscious inferential activity on the part of the hearer. However, the classical Indian philosophical tradition, as we have seen, is very interested in the psychological reality of language processing. From this perspective, the authors frequently talk as if hearers themselves first understand the referent of “cow” as COWHOOD and then, finding their understanding of the sentence blocked, settle upon an interpretation of “cow” as a particular cow.

This shift is understood by indication, introduced in the last chapter. This is because there is an apparent conflict between literal word-denotation of “cow” (COWHOOD) and the command to bring something. To avoid sentence-splitting, hearers must understand what is meant by “cow” to be a particular cow. We will see later how Mukula draws on this very example and develops it in his defense of the adequacy of *lakṣaṇā* for a wide array of linguistic phenomenon. For now, the general point is that for the Bhāṭṭa indication is

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<sup>17</sup>Note that this is not a *metaphorical* shift, contra Siderits 1991, because the relationship between a universal and a particular is part–whole, and not similarity in characteristics. The universal COWHIDE does not have a dewlap, horns, etc. or properties which are metaphorically similar to the dewlap, horns, etc. of a particular cow.

necessary for speakers to understand what is meant even in putatively “literal” sentences like (7) above.

### 3.3 The Prābhākara Theory: Words as Arrows Flying to their Mark

If the Bhāṭṭa analysis of sentence meaning is that words are building blocks to construct sentences, the Prābhākara understand words as arrows on their way to a target.<sup>18</sup> The target, a particular sentence meaning, delimits how far the word ranges, and so in this metaphor word meanings are not cognized by hearers as the same in every context, but as different, qualified by their relationship to the sentence in which they are found. We find the Prābhākara view articulated by Śālikanātha Mīśra in his *Prakarāṇa-pañcikā*, or *Elaborative Exposition* (henceforth *PP*).<sup>19</sup> In what follows, I begin with the Prābhākara rebuttal to the Bhāṭṭa view and then give the general contours of their positive account. Along the way, I argue that the position of contextualism in contemporary philosophy of language can be a useful way to understand the

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<sup>18</sup>This analogy is due to the *Kaumudī*, and is mentioned by Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka*: ‘yo ‘py anvīta-abhidhāna-vādi yat-paraḥ śabdaḥ sa śabda-artha itī hṛdaye gṛhītvā śaravad abhidhā-vyāpāram eva dīrgha-dīrgham icchati.’ Ingalls’ translation: “Now the school of *anvītabhidhāna* holds dearly to the doctrine that ‘the word’s meaning is that to which the word [finally] leads,’ and would have it that the denotative operation continues longer and longer, like the course of an arrow.” Amaladass 1984.

<sup>19</sup>For Sanskrit text and English commentary, see Śālikanātha 1934. For a lengthier analysis of the text, see Sarma 1990. As Sarma notes (p.5), Śālikanātha’s work was cited by later thinkers such as Bhavanāthamīśra, Bhoja, Rāmānuja, Udayana, Vācaspati, and others, as an authoritative source of Prābhākara views. While Śālikanātha, being approximately the 10th century CE, post-dates Mukulabhaṭṭa, the Prābhākara views in the *PP* were being discussed in his day, as shown by their being quoted as the opponent, or *pūrva-pakṣin*, in earlier texts (such as the *Bhāvanā-viveka* of Maṇḍanamīśra).

central insights of the Prābhākara.<sup>20</sup>

The Prābhākara, as discussed above, see a distinction between the way Vedic texts and human language convey meaning. For them, only the former is obtained via the *pramāṇa* of testimony. Human utterances are understood through an inference to speaker intentions, relying on semantic content as “inferential marks.” That said, both the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa are writing in a polemical context against nominalist Buddhists, who view language much more skeptically, arguing that it does not make contact with reality in the way that humans ordinarily think it does.<sup>21</sup> So the Prābhākara are concerned to show that in both the Vedic and the human contexts, we can come to know the world through speech.<sup>22</sup> They have two central objections to the Bhāṭṭa analysis, one to do with how we learn language, and the other with how we

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<sup>20</sup>For some earlier work on this topic, especially its relationship to contemporary Western philosophy, see Siderits 1991 and the reply and positive proposal in Taber 1989a, as well as Prasad 1994. Siderits’ book focuses upon lessons Western philosophers can draw from the Bhāṭṭa–Prābhākara dispute that are relevant to the sense–reference distinction, in particular that the Prābhākara have an account which is superior to the Bhāṭṭa in accounting for such a distinction. Taber argues that, in fact, both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara can be read claiming that words have both a sense and a reference. Further, Taber (I think successfully) argues that the real importance of the Prābhākara view is that they recognize the mutability of word-meanings from context to context. Taber concludes his analysis by saying that, on the Prābhākara view, “The referent of a word, thus, changes somewhat from sentence to sentence. That is to say, it is not even the same *type* of thing in every case. And I believe that is a slightly different understanding of reference than is found in modern Western philosophy of language” (p. 423). I will argue in Chapter Seven that, in fact, the concerns of the Mīmāṃsā are accounted for in contemporary theories of type-shifting, a theory not countenanced by Taber.

<sup>21</sup>See, for instance, Taber 2002, p. 163ff for a short discussion of the dialectic, as well as Siderits 1991.

<sup>22</sup>The Sanskrit term I’m glossing as “human contexts” is ‘*laukika*’, which strictly speaking means ordinary or worldly.

understand a particular utterance meaning.

### 3.3.1 Learning Meaning through Action

The Prābhākara object first that if the Bhāṭṭa are correct, we would have no explanation for how we come to master the relationship between a word and its referent. As children, we learn language by watching other people use words associated with actions. The Mīmāṃsā take injunctions as the basis for language-learning. So, for instance, a child learns words from hearing

(7) Bring me a cow.

and seeing someone bring a cow. In another situation, she hears

(8) Bring me a goat.

and watches someone retrieve a goat. By observing the correlation between sentences uttered and the subsequent (correct) actions performed, children learn how words function in sentences. Now, both the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa agree that it is this process that grounds acquisition of language skills. Where they disagree is on the implication for a philosophical theory of meaning. From this process the Prābhākara conclude that words alone cannot cause the sort of cognitive act we consider “meaning,” but that they do so only in sentence context.<sup>23</sup> If the Bhāṭṭa were correct and words, on their own, could convey meaning, there would be no need for this sort of language-learning process.

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<sup>23</sup>Jha 1942, p. 136-137.

We could use “cow” on its own, outside of any context, in order to convey its meaning. However, the Prābhākara argue that this is not how language works, and that this is evident from observing children learning word-meanings.

In response, the Bhāṭṭa argue that we recognize the different uses of “cow” only because the word has some stable, core meaning in each of the various contexts of learning. Otherwise, I would have to learn that “cow” means something different for each of the following sentences:

(9) Go milk a cow.

(10) A cow is a four-legged animal.

(11) Don’t have a cow, man.

Given that there are a vast number of possible contexts and sentences in which one could use “cow,” if what’s required to know the meaning of “cow” is to know its meaning in each particular case, the Bhāṭṭa complain that language-learning would never get off the ground.

In contrast, the Prābhākara argue that what is meant by “cow” in (9) is the class-property of cowhood which inheres in some (though not any particular) single cow, in (10) is meant all those things which have the class property of cowhood, and in (11) is meant (perhaps) an emotional state which is metaphorically similar to that which occurs when birthing a cow. The class property of cowhood is never understood on its own, but always as qualified.

How should we assess the dialectic here? First, an observation: it is unclear what we ought to conclude about our theory of meaning from observing



language-learning. Take, for instance, the case of proper names. We cannot settle the dispute over whether the meaning of a proper name like “Devadatta” is a definite description (“the fat man who eats at night”) or its referent (Devadatta) by appealing to the way in which we come to know how to use “Devadatta.” After all, there are many ways that I could come to learn how to use “Devadatta” successfully. What we’re interested is knowing in what such success consists, if that success involves coming to know a *meaning*. This is a further theoretical question.<sup>24</sup> To illuminate the way in which the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara dispute is similar to one in contemporary philosophy language, I now turn to the work of François Recanati, who is a proponent of contextualism.

### 3.3.2 Contextualism and “What is Said”

There are many varieties of contextualism.<sup>25</sup> In general, contextualists claim that *what is said* by a speaker with a sentence in a context is determined by contextual processes.<sup>26</sup> These processes include, but are not limited to, the as-

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<sup>24</sup>In Indian philosophy, the meaning of a name was often understood just to be its referent, broadly along the lines of Millianism in contemporary Western philosophy. However, this was not the only position (some philosophers were more akin to descriptivists). Further, even the direct-reference position was made more nuanced in order to address problems similar to the classic Frege puzzle of co-referring terms. See Chapter 8, “*Pāribhāṣiki*: The Meaning of Names” in Ganeri 2006 for an introductory overview in comparison with Western thought.

<sup>25</sup>For instance, the relevance theoretical approach could be characterized as “contextualist,” although relevance theorists do not draw distinctions between sub-sentential processes in the same way as Recanati. See Chapter 3 in Recanati 2004 for a discussion of the differences between Recanati and Robyn Carston, Dan Sperber, and Deirdre Wilson.

<sup>26</sup>I use *what is said* in a technical sense, hence my use of italics.

signment of values to indexicals and other semantically mandatory processes. Contextualists argue that contextual processes which are unnecessary for generating a complete proposition—processes that are frequently characterized as “pragmatic” and “optional,”—do in fact inform *what is said*. The concept of *what is said* can be initially grasped by reflecting on the intuitive distinction between what one is and is not committed to by uttering a sentence.

To motivate his version of contextualism, Recanati gives the example of

(12) I am French.<sup>27</sup>

Recanati claims that if he utters this in response to the question, “Can you cook?” he is only committed to the claim that he is French. As we saw in the last chapter, where to draw the line between *what is said* and what is implicated is a crucial question. In this example, Recanati argues that he, the speaker, has conversationally implicated that he can cook, trading on the stereotype of the French as good cooks. While the sentence is used as an answer (in the affirmative), he has not *said* “Yes, I can cook” in this technical sense of said. Another way to distinguish between *what is said* and other aspects of an utterance is by asking what the truth conditions are for (12). In the mouth of Recanati, this sentence expresses a true proposition if and only if Recanati is French. Thus, *what is said* is more robust than what a sentence-type means, since the sentence-type makes no reference to Recanati (“I” picks out whoever utters the sentence). His hearers understand his implicature via

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<sup>27</sup>Recanati 2004, p. 5.

inferential reasoning—in a broad sense, not necessarily in the stricter sense Indian philosophers have of the term as a *pramāṇa*. However, this implicature is defeasible, as he could continue to add, “And, sadly, despite this, I cannot cook,” canceling the implicature.

Recanati contrasts his variety of contextualism with what he calls “Minimalism.” He characterizes Minimalists as holding the view that only those contextual processes necessary for a sentence-type to express a meaning are involved in *what is said*.<sup>28</sup> The process of assigning semantic values to the components of a sentence is called “saturation.” For instance, sentences containing indexicals require assignments, but once the mandatory saturation process is complete—or once a proposition, no matter how general, is available—the resulting proposition is *what is said* by the sentence, on the Minimalist account. While Recanati and the Minimalist might agree, in the context above, on *what is said* by a speaker in uttering (12), they disagree in the case of sentences like

(13) I’ve had breakfast.<sup>29</sup>

Minimalists claim that (13) expresses the proposition that the speaker has had breakfast at a time before the time of its utterance. However, when used in response to the question “Do you want something to eat?” the speaker uses it to convey that she isn’t hungry because she’s had breakfast recently. The

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<sup>28</sup>He characterizes Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Ernie Lepore, as belonging to this camp.

<sup>29</sup>Recanati 2004, p. 7-8.

truth conditions of *what is said*, on the Minimalist account ,are satisfied if the speaker has eaten breakfast once, twenty years ago. All that is *said* is that the speaker has had breakfast, once, prior to the time of the utterance. Further, there is nothing mandatory in the sentence structure that requires sharpening the temporal space within which the breakfast-eating occurs. This is unlike the case of indexicals, which require a semantic value, for instance, corresponding to the speaker. Minimalists conclude that (13) is like (12), in that optional contextual processes are what get us to the further proposition that the speaker has had breakfast recently. This is a matter of implicature (whether generalized or particularized).<sup>30</sup>

The Minimalist picture is similar to the Bhāṭṭa account, in that a sentence such as (2) ‘*gam ānaya*’ (“Bring a cow”) has as its content, prior to *lakṣaṇā*, a proposition involving COWHOOD.<sup>31</sup> Like the Minimalists, there is a gap between the intuitive satisfiability conditions of the sentence before *lakṣaṇā* and after *lakṣaṇā*.<sup>32</sup> Strictly speaking, the command is satisfied if someone brings the universal class property of COWHOOD. However, the Bhāṭṭa require that the sentence communicate something actionable, and as we’ve seen, understood in this way, the request is nonsensical.<sup>33</sup> Thus the hearer relies

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<sup>30</sup>See Recanati 2004, p. 12.

<sup>31</sup>Arguably, before *lakṣaṇā*, there is no proposition at all, but something more like a propositional radical, since we do not yet have a structured thought. In either case, the Bhāṭṭa are committed to words having successfully prompted us to have a mental cognition of things like COWHOOD, and in this lies the denotative capacity of words.

<sup>32</sup>The paradigmatic cases of the Mīmāṃsā are commands, and so we cannot talk in terms of truth conditions.

<sup>33</sup>Or the command has underdetermined satisfiability conditions. There are a variety

on something like inference to the best explanation (*arthāpatti*, as described earlier) to recover the more appropriate content of the command: bring a particular/individual cow. In one sense, this process is not required by the syntactical structure of the sentence. Words, in the metaphorical image used by Indian philosophers, expend their “power” once they have communicated their referent, a universal. While *lakṣaṇā* is essentially required for any utterance of a string of words to be a coherent sentence, *lakṣaṇā* is grounded in the hearer’s sense that something is amiss.

Recanati’s response to the Minimalists and the Prābhākara response to the Bhāṭṭa are strikingly analogous. They both emphasize what is consciously available to the hearer. Take Recanati on the sentence

(14) John has three children.

Suppose for example that I am asked how many children John has and that I reply by uttering [“John has three children”]. Clearly, in this context, I mean that John has (exactly) three children—no more and no less. This is standardly accounted for by saying that the proposition literally expressed, to the effect that John has at least three children, combines with the ‘implicature’ that John has no more than three children...as a result of this combination, what is globally communicated—and what I actually mean—is the proposition that John has exactly three children. Now *this is the*

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of ways in which we could satisfy the command to bring COWHOOD, depending on one’s metaphysics. One could bring a cow-shaped-thing (on the view that the class property is a shape, or *ākṛti*), a dead cow, a group of cows, etc.

*only proposition that I am conscious of expressing by my utterance...*<sup>34</sup>

Recanati goes on to criticize the Minimalist willingness to accept *what is said* as being frequently unavailable to consciousness. Why, he asks, would we in some cases, as in (12), be able to distinguish between *what is said* and what is implicated, and in others, like (13), conflate the two? His solution, what he calls his **Availability Principle** is to claim that *what is said* is consciously available to hearers and speakers, and that this conscious availability is a mark of meaning.<sup>35</sup> The illustrations of language-learning invoked earlier by the Prābhākara are better understood as eliciting an intuition along the lines of Recanati's **Availability Principle**.

Śālikanātha says,

Wise people recognize that the meaning of a sentence is just word meanings, which are a mutually interconnected sequence that has been obtained (by those words), related as subsidiary (words) to primary (sentence)...

...As to how the primary (sentence) meaning is something which can be conveyed as a particular qualified meaning, (we say) it is in fact the communication of the subsidiary meaning, since they have

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<sup>34</sup>Recanati 2004, p. 11, italics original.

<sup>35</sup>Specifically, conscious availability is a mark of *non-natural* meaning, a concept due to Grice. Non-natural meaning is a broader class than linguistic meaning, as it can be communicated through gestures, pictures, and so on. Non-natural meaning is contrasted with natural meaning. For instance, spots on a patient “means” measles in a natural sense.

as their aim (*tātparya*) just this very thing. The sentence meaning is the object of knowledge (*prameya*).<sup>36</sup>

In this passage, Śālikanātha describes the relationship between word-meaning and sentence-meaning as between a subsidiary and a primary. What is known to us, or, in Recanati's terminology, what is consciously available, is the sentence meaning. Word-meanings are instrumental, insofar as they relate to one another (in what we might characterize as subconscious processes). They are not the object of our knowledge (*prameya*). What the example of language-learning points out, then, is that what is available to us for acquiring competence in a language is not, as the Bhāṭṭa might suggest, that “cow” always picks out COWHOOD. Rather, “cow” is used in a number of ways, and in order for us to act upon a speaker's utterance, we have to know what it means in that particular context. Further, this is what the speaker wants us to recognize, and this is the purpose of words (their *tātparya*). The goal of words is to be qualified by other words to the point where we have a complete sentence that is actionable. For the Prābhākara, on the Bhāṭṭa view, we are left with (at best) a minimal proposition and (at worst) a string of disconnected words.

Take the earlier example of (2) “Bring the cow.” For the Bhāṭṭa, in the terms of the diagram above, before *lakṣaṇā* operates, *what is said* is what is denoted

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<sup>36</sup>Translation mine, text found in Śālikanātha 1934, p 352. *pradhāna-guṇa-bhāvena labdha-anyonya-samanvayān, pada-arthān eva vākya-arthān saṅgirante vipaścitaḥ...yad-dhī pradhāna-bhūtaṃ tad eva katham nāma viśiṣṭaṃ pratīyatām ity evam arthaṃ guṇānāṃ pratīpādanam, tena tatra eva tātparyam. tad eva prameyam.*

by the words: COWHOOD, is-to-be-brought. But what is communicated is understood through an interpreter relying upon *arthāpatti*, through the force of *lakṣaṇā*, described above. Thus what is communicated is “Bring a cow.” For the Prābhākara, the capacity of words is to designate in relation to other words, and so *what is said* is simply, “Bring a cow.” The word “cow,” through the fact of its being related to the Sanskrit imperative, comes to mean a particular cow without *lakṣaṇā*.

### 3.4 Contemporary and Indian Theories of Sentence Meaning

Despite the broad similarities I’ve sketched between the contemporary approaches and the positions advocated by the two Mīmāṃsā camps, there are some important distinctions. On the Minimalist/Bhāṭṭa side, these are the differences between optional processes and *lakṣaṇā*. On the Contextualist/Prābhākara side, the distinctions are between primary and secondary pragmatic processes and word-meaning in relation.

First, it is worth noting that the Mīmāṃsā did have a concept somewhat equivalent to saturation in the case of indexicals. Śabara observes in two places that pronouns (*sarva-nāma*) refer to objects previously mentioned in the discourse.<sup>37</sup> What pronouns express is the meaning of the prior (*pūrvaukta*) word. So, while the Bhāṭṭa may not be conceiving language in terms of free or bound variables and the like, they do distinguish between what

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<sup>37</sup>Devasthali 1997, p. 93.



is the innate capacity of a word (*śakti*) and what is due to *lakṣaṇā*, which picks up where the word's capacity ends. I suggest that by "capacity of a word," they are intending something like what contemporary philosophers call "mandatory" processes.

What makes the Bhāṭṭa view less easily categorized is the question of whether *lakṣaṇā* is truly optional or not. In one sense it is. Throughout the Bhāṭṭa exposition of hermeneutic principles, in example sentences, the aim is to construe a sentence meaning without resorting to *lakṣaṇā*. Reliance upon *lakṣaṇā* is, in a sense, a last resort, useful when there is a problem in construing the sentence as a single, syntactically unified thing which makes sense. We can understand plenty of sentences without it, and these sentences are ones that have truth-conditions (or satisfiability conditions) and cause us to have knowledge. Thus we do not need *lakṣaṇā*, and it is optional.

There is a tension in the Bhāṭṭa account, however, and that is due to the fact that nouns will denote universals, as we have seen above. Thus while *lakṣaṇā* is described as optional, a last resort, and an interpretive process aiming to remove apparent inconsistency, in reality, it is resorted to frequently to yield something truth-evaluable. The Bhāṭṭa often speak as if this is a conscious process, where cognition of something truth-evaluable is blocked (*bādha*), and then the interpreter must use *arthāpatti* to discern what the right reading should be. This is an implausible account of our language-processing, however. We frequently are not aware of any initial interpretation, even in highly metaphorical cases, let alone cases of metonymy. Whether we characterize

them as “inferential” (in the Indian sense of *anumāṇa*) or not, our linguistic processes function rapidly and without conscious awareness of them. In any case, this is a point we will return to below in Ānandavardhana’s criticism, and again as Mukulabhaṭṭa attempts to salvage the view.

I conclude this discussion by addressing some remaining questions about the Prābhākara proposal. On their analysis, words designate their meanings only in combination with other words, and they do this to the fullest extent possible. Should this be understood as a semantic or a pragmatic process? If by “semantic process” we mean, with Recanati, a mandatory process which relies upon contextual values to fill empty “slots” or variables, then the answer is, yes, sometimes. Anaphoric pronouns, as we saw above, were observed by the Mīmāṃsā, and must be assigned values for there to be a sentence, or *vākya*.

The real difficulty is getting clear on the Prābhākara conception of words acquiring their meaning in context. One reason to describe the process as mandatory is because they describe it as being part of the designative capacity of words. For instance, Siderits interprets the Prābhākara as holding the view that all words are “semantically incomplete” and in this way, what the word “cow” means is: “cowR(*x*)” where the *x* is some entity or relational complex and “R” represents some relationship.<sup>38</sup> Understood in this way, they would

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<sup>38</sup>Siderits 1991, p. 48. Importantly, the Prābhākara would argue that we do not comprehend this incomplete semantic contribution of a word but only understand it as related to other aspects of the sentence.

not draw a distinction between so-called “optional” and “mandatory” processes (such as free enrichment and saturation, respectively). Since the designative capacity of words just is to convey an appropriately context-specific meaning, the entire process is “mandatory.”

However, as Taber points out, and as is clear in Śālikanātha’s presentation, the Prābhākara do admit that there is some “core” or “own-meaning” that is invariant across contexts, and which hearers are reminded of when they hear a sentence.<sup>39</sup> Śālikanātha describes the process of comprehension as requiring the interpreter’s having a memory of what objects the words typically are paired with, though he rejects this memory as constituting the “meaning” of words.<sup>40</sup> This suggests some distinction between the capacity of words to remind us of objects and their designative capacity.

Ultimately, whether the Prābhākara’s analysis is to be construed as consisting (in contemporary terms) of mandatory or optional processes may be unanswerable, given that these distinctions are not the relevant ones for the Mīmāṃsā conceptual space. It does seem, at least, that the Prābhākara would admit that there is a distinction between how words “remind” us of their objects and how they convey their related meanings, and this could be taken as admitting of a distinction between different kinds of processes. However, what we can conclude is that the Prābhākara reject the role of *lakṣaṇā* in constituting *what is said*, whereas the Bhāṭṭa accept *lakṣaṇā* as, if not necessary by

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<sup>39</sup>See footnote 20 on Taber 1989a, p.429. Also, Śālikanātha 1934, p.380-81.

<sup>40</sup>Śālikanātha 1934, pp. 381-82.

definition, at least required in practice. I now to turn to Ānandavardhana's reason for rejecting both of these views as insufficient accounts of what is communicated by language.

### 3.5 Emotions and Implicatures in Ānandavardhana

As I have said, one of the reasons that Ānandavardhana proposes a new linguistic function is that he believes the richness of speaker intentions has been overlooked by the Indian tradition. When a speaker utters a sentence or writes a poem (the latter is certainly Ānanda's primary focus), she has chosen particular words based upon her intention. For example, there seems to be some subtle difference between:

(15) John invited Mary to the ball.

(16) Mary was invited to the ball by John.

One explanation is that the active voice connotes the subject's sense of responsibility and agency, whereas the passive voice avoids culpability and de-emphasizes the subject's role. However, there is also a difference in topic between the two sentences, a difference which is sometimes reflected in their prosodic profile (the intonation and stress speakers put into words)—when we're talking about sentences uttered rather than written.<sup>41</sup> As we saw earlier, in terms of the underlying *kāraṅka* or what Kiparsky calls “deep structure,” the

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<sup>41</sup>I owe this point and example to Hans Kamp.

passive and active constructions represent the same qualified relationship. The truth conditions of the two sentences are identical. However, Ānanda is concerned with more than just this aspect of utterances. He thinks that, particularly in the provenance of poetry, philosophers have overlooked the ways speakers convey additional meanings such as (1) figures of speech, (2) implied statements or facts, and (3) *rasa*, or aesthetic quality. He argues that neither the Prābhākara nor the Bhāṭṭa can account for what is communicated, if what is communicated includes these three phenomena. In his analysis of these phenomena, Ānanda’s concern turns out to be with what are widely known as “implicatures” in the Western tradition. Some of these phenomena, such as *rasa*, will turn out to fall beyond the boundaries of what contemporary philosophers take as implicatures, however.

### 3.5.1 Implied figures of speech and other meanings

The problem of retrieving implicatures is especially vexing against the models of sentence understanding described above. As we saw in the example of (2) above, the Bhāṭṭa appeal to *lakṣaṇā* to allow the word “cow” to be qualified by “you should bring.” This is because words must have semantic “fit” (*yogyatā*). When this is lacking, then we resort to *lakṣaṇā*. This occurs, for instance, in the grammatically correct, but semantically unfit sentence:

- (17) *agnir māṇavakah*  
       fire<sub>MascNomSing</sub> student<sub>MascNomSing</sub>

‘The student is fire.’<sup>42</sup>

is taken metaphorically by *lakṣaṇā*.

However, this Bhāṭṭa analysis fails to account for what is communicated in all cases of figurative speech. Since Ānanda is working with poetic utterances, let’s take Billy Joel’s song lyrics as an example:

(18) We didn’t start the fire.

In contrast with (17) “The student is fire,” where there is a violation of semantic fit, this sentence is grammatically and semantically acceptable. There is a literal interpretation available to us: Billy Joel didn’t start a particular (literal) conflagration. However, when Billy Joel says “We didn’t start the fire” in the 1989 hit of the same name, he is not speaking literally. Instead, he is referring to a metaphorical conflagration characterized by lyrics such as

Harry Truman, Doris Day, Red China, Johnnie Ray,  
South Pacific, Walter Winchell, Joe DiMaggio,  
Joe McCarthy, Richard Nixon, Studebaker, television  
North Korea, South Korea, Marilyn Monroe,  
Rosenbergs, H-bomb, Sugar Ray, Panmunjom  
Brando, “The King and I” and “The Catcher in the Rye”

On the Bhāṭṭa analysis of sentence meaning, a hearer would be guided in her interpretation by the verb “start.” As with the case of cow, a particular fire,

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<sup>42</sup>Bhāṭṭa 1924, p. 440.

rather than the universal class of fires, is best understood as the object of the action.<sup>43</sup> However, in his treatment of non-literal meaning, Kumāṛila does not take up metaphors where an acceptable literal meaning is available. Instead, he accounts for metaphors such as (17). Regarding this sentence, he argues in the *Tantravārttika*,

...we are not cognisant of any sort of invariable concomitance of the *student* with the *fire* (italics original); what we are cognisant of in this sentence is that, (1) the word ‘fire’ denotes the class ‘fire’; (2) this class indicates the qualities of fire, such as the peculiar colour, brightness, etc.; and (3) the presence of these qualities in the student gives rise, through similarity, to the idea of his being fire itself.<sup>44</sup>

However, in the case of (18) there is no explicit, attempt at identification of the sort ‘A is B’ that causes an apparent failure of semantic fit, which is how Kumāṛila explains non-literal interpretation in the following sections of the *Tantravārttika*.<sup>45</sup>

The Prābhākara account, in contrast, would be that “fire” simply extends its meaning to fit into what is most appropriate for the context. Their view might be able to account for cases like (18) as well as (17), but it is less suited

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<sup>43</sup>This is especially likely to be true given the use of the definite article in English, although definite descriptions can be understood generically. As noted earlier, Sanskrit does not use definite articles but philosophers and grammarians did distinguish between generic and particular as well as between specific and non-specific readings of nouns.

<sup>44</sup>Bhaṭṭa 1924, p. 440.

<sup>45</sup>See Adihkaraṇa 12, Bhaṭṭa 1924, p. 441ff.

for situations where there is a tension between the literal sentence meaning and the meaning the speaker wants to convey with it. For example, in the metaphor above, there is some residual impact that the literal meaning of “fire” has on the interpreter. Metaphorical use of words strikes us, often, as different from simply exaggerated use.<sup>46</sup>

For instance, Ānanda discusses a case where the literal meaning is a prohibition, but there is another meaning the speaker wishes to convey (which he argues is gotten through suggestion) that is an invitation. The example he uses is

- (19) Mother-in-law sleeps here, I there:  
Look, traveler, while it is light.  
For at night when you cannot see  
You must not fall into my bed.<sup>47</sup>

Here there is no problem with semantic fit. The utterance is acceptable and has an easily understood literal meaning: “You must not fall into my bed.” But Ānanda argues that the speaker (a woman whose husband is away is inviting the traveler) is using a prohibition to disguise an invitation to adultery. Ānanda’s commentor, Abhinavagupta, points to word choice such as ‘*rātry-andha*’, as an explanation for how we can know this is the case. This compound

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<sup>46</sup>There is the question of what to do with conventionalized expressions like “on fire,” where this tension is not felt, in ordinary contexts, at least.

<sup>47</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 98. In what follows, I treat the poem as an actual utterance from a woman to avoid having to analyze the intention of the poet in addition to the intention of the (fictional) speaker.



word means “blind at night,” and Abhinava takes it as hinting at the traveler being out of his senses with desire.<sup>48</sup> A Gricean explanation might point to the unnecessary prolixity of the woman as failure of the Maxim of Quantity, “Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.” This would prompt the hearer to reason (through some manner which we have not yet specified) to conclude she has a purpose in being this informative—otherwise, why the need to emphasize not falling into her bed?

The other kind of additional meaning that Ānanda is interested in explaining, is discourse-level figures of speech. Take, for example,

- (20) The reddening moon has so seized the face of night  
 With her trembling stars,  
 That all her cloak of darkness in the east  
 falls thus unnoticed by her in confusion.<sup>49</sup>

In this case, while *lakṣaṇā* could explain the lack of apparent semantic fit between “moon” and “seized” and the night’s having a face, being confused, having a cloak, and so on, there are multiple levels of figurative language being employed. There is the sentence-level personification of the moon and the night, which hearers might grasp through the Bhāṭṭa’s method of indication, or the Prābhākara’s contextualism. In addition, the stanza describes a moon-rise through picturesque and indirect language. Finally, the personification of

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<sup>48</sup> Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 99.

<sup>49</sup> Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 137.

the moon and the evening correspond to the movements of male and female lovers. This interpretation is available in part by double-meanings to words such as “reddening,” which in Sanskrit can mean either love or red, and “stars,” which can also mean “pupil.” The grammatical genders of the moon and night (masculine and feminine, respectively) also support this interpretation.<sup>50</sup>

While these kinds of interpretive layers are common in poetry, they are also present in ordinary speech. Speakers frequently make use of irony, implicit analogies and imagery, indirect invitations, and so forth, in ways that their hearers do come to understand. Ānanda’s claim is that existing explanations, which would rely upon some combination of inferential reasoning, *arthāpatti*, and testimony (understood as word-denotation and *lakṣaṇā*) are insufficient. The Bhāṭṭa cannot account for cases where a literal interpretation is available and yet a different meaning is communicated as well. The Prābhākara cannot account for cases where there is an interpretation relying on two simultaneously available readings. Yet, Ānanda argues, both situations are common to how speakers communicate. Therefore, he concludes, something is missing from both analyses, which he claims is the suggestive capacity of expressions. His positive proposal is the subject of the next chapter. Before turning to this, I briefly take up the topic of emotional content in communication.

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<sup>50</sup>As Ingalls notes, it is possible to read the entire stanza with a different meaning: “The lover, with aroused passion, kisses the face of his beloved, whose eyes tremble, so that she drops her robe entirely before him without noticing what she has done in her confusion.” However, the usual interpretation is that these two versions are separate and the one suggests the other. Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 138.

### 3.5.2 The Metaphysics and Epistemology of *Rasa*

The above examples of (11) and (20) are notable because they convey emotional content or prompt emotional responses. As mentioned earlier, Ānanda argues that *rasa*, or an aesthetic experience which is grounded in emotion, is the proper aim of all poetry, and that this is what suggestion conveys. Recall that in the Indian tradition, there are eight kinds of *rasa*: the erotic, comic, pathetic, furious, heroic, terrible, repugnant, and wonderful (with a ninth, the peaceful, added later, along with others). The sentences of (20) above are characterized as suggesting the erotic *rasa*. We might put it this way: What good is a poem if it doesn't move us? After all, if someone reads (20) and comes away impressed by the wordplay, but without an experience of *rasa*, they have misunderstood the passage.<sup>51</sup> However, it is only with Abhinavagupta, Ānanda's commentator, that *rasa* comes to be a response on the part of the reader. For Ānanda, *rasa* is linguistic, as he emphasizes in arguing that suggestion is a linguistic *vyāpara*, or function, as Sheldon Pollock has shown.<sup>52</sup>

The fact that Ānanda does characterize *rasa* as meaning, rather than a reader's emotional response, understanding it alongside of the other, ordinary linguistic functions, raises two questions. First, what is the metaphysical status of

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<sup>51</sup>Alternately, we could say that the poet has done her job poorly. Ānanda focuses on this possibility in several sections of the *Dhvanyāloka* in which he prescribes ways that poets ought to write in order to convey *rasa*. However, if a poet has written well, then the fault lies at the feet of the interpreter. This view strongly emphasizes that there is a normative dimension to even poetic interpretation.

<sup>52</sup>Pollock 2012.

*rasa*? That is, should we understand it to be propositional in nature? Second, what is the epistemology of *rasa*? That is, how do hearers understand *rasa*? Whether or not Ānanda himself emphasized these two questions, they arise from the subject–matter itself. Thus while Pollock may be right to say that Ānanda himself “shows no interest whatever in *rasa* as an epistemological problem let alone in the subjective experience of *rasa*,” since it is “the viewer/reader who is always the one making the judgments about the successful or unsuccessful manifestation of *rasa*,” we his readers can (and indeed, ought to) address the problem.<sup>53</sup> And, in fact, the Sanskrit literary tradition, in reading Ānanda’s *Dhvanyāloka*, did take up the metaphysical and epistemological problems, viewing them as intimately connected. Further, since Ānanda himself considered the status of suggestion alongside other *pramāṇa* such as inferential reasoning, I think it is fair to say he did have some interest in *rasa* as an epistemological problem, even if it was up to later generations to spell out these issues more explicitly.

One criticism of Ānandavardhana’s theory is put forward by Dhanañjaya in his *Daśarūpika* and explicated by Dhanika in his *Avaloka*, around 975 CE. Again, Pollock:

...what Dhanika’s comment suggests is that any given theoretical position on the location (or, generally, ontology) of *rasa*—whether it exists in the text or in the receiver—was intimately connected with a particular modality of its cognitive genesis (or, generally,

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<sup>53</sup>Pollock 2012, p. 235.

epistemology)...<sup>54</sup>

In other words, we can draw conclusions about what epistemic process allows us to cognize an object in virtue of its ontological status. With regard to *rasa*, what Dhanañjaya argued was that it could be *reproduced* but not *manifested* (meaning “illuminated” or “made visible”). Manifestation is defined through example: a pot is made manifest by light after it has been created by clay. Crucially, the pot cannot be created by the clay as well as light, and certainly not simultaneously. Suppose we start with the assumption that *rasa* is a feature of a character in a poem or play. If this is so, then it must be created in the character by certain narrative events which are responsible for the character’s having a particular emotional response. By definition, the same causal process (narrative events) cannot give rise to the manifestation of *rasa*. So it is by the textual features (figures of speech, phonemes, etc.) of the poem that *rasa* is made visible or apparent—in the character, on the analysis.

But Dhanañjaya notes that the character is not alive, and so cannot experience *rasa*. Further, he observes that poetry’s goal should be understood as aimed at its readers, not at its characters. Finally, unless we attribute *rasa* to the reader, we cannot make sense out of the responses readers do have to poetry. After all, when reading love poetry, we are not embarrassed at overhearing intimate conversation between lovers, nor jealous, and so on. So we ought to conclude that *rasa* is found in the reader, and not the character. Given this, we

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<sup>54</sup>Pollock 2012, p. 237.

must then reconsider the epistemic process which leads us to it. In the Indian aesthetic tradition, then, consideration of *rasa* becomes a question of mental processes (*citta-vṛtti*), not linguistic ones (*śabda-vṛtti*). The process proposed by Dhanañjaya is reproduction (*bhāvakatva*), a way to apprehend aesthetic objects—which are distinguished from linguistic objects insofar as the former are psychological and the latter, *qua* referents, are part of the extra-mental world.<sup>55</sup>

While the debate over *rasa*'s ontology is fascinating and complex, for our purposes, we are concerned with how it helps us understand Ānanda's original position. What we can conclude is that (1) Ānanda was understood to be arguing for a character/text-centered metaphysics of *rasa*, and (2) the epistemic and metaphysical questions were viewed as mutually related. We will see that (2) is evident in Ānanda's own analysis as we take up his discussion of inferential reasoning and *rasa* in the next chapter.

If *rasa* is a variety of meaning just like primary meaning and *lakṣaṇā*, then how should we characterize its form in the example given earlier, of the erotic *rasa*?

(20) The reddening moon has so seized the face of night  
With her trembling stars,  
That all her cloak of darkness in the east

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<sup>55</sup>Pollock 2012, p. 236-37.

falls thus unnoticed by her in confusion.<sup>56</sup>

Perhaps its suggested meaning is just:

(21) That poem has the character of erotic *rasa*.

However, as we will see more clearly in the next chapter, Ānanda talks about *rasa-dhvani* as belonging not only to a poem, but to individual words, figures of speech, and even phonemes. These various levels work together in order to form a unified *rasa*. So the suggested meaning might need to include all of these elements.

We will also see that Ānanda distinguishes between what is suggested and what is expressed by the sentence-meaning (both directly and indirectly). On his view, suggested meaning, whether *rasa* or its other varieties, is, while part of what is communicated, but not what is expressed. As part of the content of the communicative act, *rasa*, like implicatures or perlocutionary aims, can be understood or missed by the hearer. Ānanda does not dwell on this problem too much, however, since his focus is on the text. In later thinkers, such as Abhinavagupta, something called “apparent” or “specious *rasa*” (*rasa-abhāsa*) turns up as a defect in the reader’s experience. This is because of the new emphasis on the reader’s reception of *rasa*, something that is not developed in Ānanda, though he does describe the normatively best reader, the *sahṛdaya*, or “sensitive critic.”<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 137.

<sup>57</sup>The term ‘*rasa-abhāsa*’ predates Abhinavagupta, and is found in Ānanda as well as

It is against the background of the competing sentence-meaning theories above that Ānanda proposes the existence of suggested meaning, especially *rasadhvani*. He accepts the Mīmāṃsā principle that sentence-meaning must be unitary, although he does not take a stand on the debate between the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara (except to say they have both missed the centrality of suggestion.) In a way, suggestion becomes the *bhāvanā*, or the organizing “force” of a sentence—except that it is not a force centered on the reader, as we have explained above. However, if suggested meaning is to be analyzed as a capacity of language alongside of word- and sentence-meanings, Ānanda must situate it in relationship to syntax and semantics, as well as the *pramāṇa*-s (is suggested meaning known through testimony or or something else)? This project—situating suggested meaning conceptually—is the topic of the next chapter, which allows us to begin evaluating Ānanda’s epistemological claims in earnest.

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earlier Ālaṅkārikas. However, there it seems to be a certain kind of figure, something like “inappropriate *rasa*” which is found in narratives that violate propriety. From Abhinavagupta on, the sense is of a reader’s response to poetry being inauthentic because of being grounded in improper textual matter. This, as Pollock argues, is a stronger sense, as it means to exclude *rasa-abhāsa* from poetry rather than simply categorize it. Pollock 2001.



## Chapter 4

### On Knowing the Non-Literal

#### 4.1 Ānanda's Theory of Suggestion: Motivations and Overview

Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka* argues that the Sanskrit intellectual tradition up to his time had put forward impoverished theories of language. In particular, Ānanda claims that they overlooked the communicative function he calls 'dhvani' (suggestion). The word 'dhvani' can be used for (1) the suggested content of an utterance or (2) the capacity of an expression to convey such content.<sup>1</sup> In what follows, I will use 'dhvani' for the latter, and "suggested meaning" for the former. There is a third conceptual distinction that is important to make. While Ānanda speaks in terms of hearers understanding what is suggested simply by being receptive to the capacity of *dhvani*, we can distinguish between the process of interpretation and the semantic properties of expressions. What I wish to consider is the epistemological question of how what Ānanda calls "sensitive hearers" (*sahṛdaya*) can have access to (1) by

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<sup>1</sup>In actuality, there are other ways the word can be used: Abhinavagupta, in his commentary on the text, the *Locana*, gives five possible senses of the term: (1) a word that is the basis for a suggested content, (2) the meaning that is the basis for a suggested content, (3) a function or process (*vyāpārah*) that produces a suggested content, (4) the suggested content, (5) the discourse unit that includes (1)-(4). Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 47-48, 131-132.

means of (2).

While my ultimate aim is to show that Mukulabhaṭṭa's rejoinder to Ānanda is largely successful, I think that Ānanda's observations about suggested content have merit in pushing Indian philosophers to think more carefully about language's capacity. In what follows, I lay out these observations by discussing the varieties of suggested content that Ānanda's analysis is concerned with. He draws a number of subtle distinctions, many of which cross-cut one another, forming a complex picture of the results of our expressive capacities as language users. Ānanda must then explain what it is that hearers are sensitive to when they are receptive to *dhvani*—the expressive capacity that conveys such a wide variety of things: figures of speech, aesthetic moods, narrative facts, etc.

According to Ānanda, the reason that *dhvani* should be accepted as a unique communicative function, alongside denotation and indication (*lakṣaṇā*) is that *dhvani* cannot be subsumed under either of these functions. In addition to being distinct from denotation and indication, he argues that *dhvani* is also distinct from convention, which I introduce and address in this chapter. Denotation and indication are, as shown in previous chapters, linguistic capacities. Convention, in contrast, is, roughly, agreement among language-users. In the *Dhvanyāloka*, each of these three candidates—denotation, indication, and convention—is raised as a possible explanation for the effects Ānanda has

identified.<sup>2</sup> I demonstrate that his arguments fail, although he has pointed to some important difficulties for our account of understanding, in particular the vexed distinction between knowledge of the world and knowledge of language.

## 4.2 What is Suggested Meaning?

Ānanda divides the content of what is suggested into implied meanings, implied figures, and aesthetic moods (*rasa*). However, Ānanda also distinguishes among varieties of suggested meaning according to other criteria such as the speaker's intention, how rapidly the hearer recovers the suggested content, and whether expressions or phonemes are the basis for what is suggested.

Below, I give, and briefly gloss, examples of the distinctions Ānanda is making. These distinctions are important because he claims that it is through suggestion, and not another language function, that hearers come to understand suggested meaning. As I develop the distinctions between varieties of suggested meaning, I represent their relationship through a branching tree structure. This is to help the reader visualize the relationships. However, the tree should not be taken as a complete representation of the varieties of suggestion. While one can, as does Ānanda's commentator Abhinavagupta, count the terminal nodes of a branching structure and present a definitive number of varieties (he says there are thirty-five), Ānanda himself says there are an

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<sup>2</sup>A fourth, inferential reasoning, is the subject of the next chapter, as it merits a lengthier treatment.

endless number of combinations if we take into account all of the facts involved in creating suggested meaning. Whether this should be taken literally or as a rhetorical flourish, the point is that Ānanda does not view his analysis as a complete taxonomy of suggested meaning.

#### 4.2.1 Speaker's Aim with Regard to Literal Meaning

Ānanda subdivides *dhvani* in two ways based on two kinds of intentions a speaker has with regard to the expression she utters. This is consistent with his view that underlying all cases of suggestion there is a purpose (*prayojana*) the speaker has in choosing a particular expression.<sup>3</sup> In particular, these intentions are defined in terms of the speaker's attitude towards the literal meaning of an expression. First, a speaker may intend to convey the literal meaning plus some suggested meaning.<sup>4</sup> I will call this **Intended Literal Suggestion**. Second, she may not intend to convey the literal meaning, but only have an intention to convey a suggested meaning.<sup>5</sup> The negation in the second variety takes wide scope. That is, the speaker does not have any intention to convey the literal meaning, but this does not mean she is expressly blocking, or trying to not convey the literal meaning. Let's call this **Unintended Literal Suggestion**. This category subdivides further into cases where the literal meaning is "set aside" (*'atyanta-tiras-kṛta*) and cases where the literal meaning is "shifted"

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
<sup>3</sup>This excludes purely conventional, or "frozen" figures, where the suggested meaning is conveyed regardless of the speaker's aims.

<sup>4</sup>The Sanskrit for this category is *vivakṣita*, or "what is desired to be said."

<sup>5</sup>The Sanskrit term for this category is *avivakṣita*, or "what is not desired to be said."

(‘*artha-antara-saṃkramita*’). I will call these **Literal Set–Aside Suggestion** and **Literal Shifted Suggestion**. Below, I illustrate these divisions in turn along with verses from Ānanda. The diagram below illustrates how these distinctions are related:

Figure 4.1: First Major Division of Suggestion



As an example of **Intended Literal Suggestion**, Ānanda cites verses by the Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti:

- (1) On what mountain peak, for how long,  
and what were they called—the meditative practices he performed?  
Young lady, I mean this little parrot’s,  
that he bites into a bimba-fruit as red as your lip?

*śikharīṇi kva nu nāma kiyac-ciraṃ*  
*kim abhidhānam asāv akarot tapaḥ*  
*taruṇi yena tava adhara-pāṭalam*

*daśati bimba-phalaṃ śuka-śāvakaḥ*<sup>6</sup>

Ānanda observes that the poet aims for both a literal reading of his text and for a grasping of something suggested. Even without the cultural background original to Dharmakīrti's time, a reader can recognize that the sentences are literally intelligible. To understand what is suggested, let's look at these two verses in more detail.

The verses are from a love poem, and the poet's voice is that of a (male) lover speaking to his (female) beloved. It is implied that he is watching a young parrot (*śuka-śāvakaḥ*) bite into a reddish bimba-fruit. Alluding to a common belief that one's asceticism in a previous life is rewarded with sensual pleasures in later lives, the poet asks what kinds of meritorious meditation and penitential observances (*tapah*) the parrot could have done to earn the reward of a succulent fruit. He compares the redness of the bimba-fruit to the redness of his beloved's lips, noting that they are the same reddish hue (*adhara-pāṭalaṃ*).

The scene I've just described can be understood with the literal meaning of the verses (plus some relevant world knowledge). So far, there is no need for *dhvani*, or even *lakṣaṇā*, the indicative function which underwrites metonymy and metaphor. Even the comparison of the bimba-fruit to the beloved's lips is within the range of ordinary, literal communication. However, the poet

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<sup>6</sup>Translation mine. Where the translator is not noted, I use Ingalls' 1990 translation of the *Dhvanyāloka*.

asks about the parrot nibbling on a fruit not merely to speculate about past lives and religious merit. Implicit in the verses is his own desire for his lover's lips. McCrea says that the comparison with the parrot's many years of religious effort for a mere fruit is meant to evoke the high privilege of kissing the beloved's lips.<sup>7</sup> Whatever the particular suggested meaning is, it is not possible without the literal meaning being in place.<sup>8</sup> Thus these verses are an illustration of **Intended Literal Suggestion**.

This phenomenon is similar to what Ted Cohen calls "twice true" metaphors. He cites utterances like

- (2) Jesus was a carpenter.
- (3) Mondrian's *Composition in a Square* is flat.

as counterexamples to the common claim that metaphors require literal falsity.<sup>9</sup> Example (2), uttered about Jesus of Nazareth, is true in a straightforwardly historical sense.<sup>10</sup> However, in a religious context, the utterance could be used to talk about Jesus' work in putting people spiritually "back together." Likewise, (3) is true in the sense that Mondrian's painting is a flat surface. However, it could be uttered to point out that the work of art is lacking in artistic qualities that would give it, metaphorically speaking, a "third dimension." Remarking on this phenomenon of twice-trueness, Elizabeth Camp theorizes

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<sup>7</sup>McCrea 2008, p. 380.

<sup>8</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 173-74..

<sup>9</sup>Cohen 1976, p. 752.

<sup>10</sup>Assuming the veracity of the New Testament accounts, that is.

that metaphors like these are importantly similar to “literary metaphors” such as

- (4) Juliet is the sun.
- (5) The hourglass whispers to the lion’s paw.

All four of these examples, according to Camp “involve an intuitively felt gap between literal and intended meaning, where the first provides the perspective for constructing the second.”<sup>11</sup> She has a particular analysis of what a “perspective” is, the details of which need not concern us here.<sup>12</sup> The reason for highlighting Camp’s analysis of metaphors is that her approach is analogous to Ānandavardhana’s, but with at least one important difference: she connects two concepts that Ānanda keeps distinct. As we will see below, the “intuitively felt gap” that Camp describes is captured in Ānanda’s category of suggestion that “reverberates.” However, for Ānanda, this felt gap need not always accompany metaphor. For Camp, it is this tension between what a speaker says and what she means that makes metaphor different from exaggeration and other kinds of talk.<sup>13</sup> For Ānanda, this tension is one of many

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<sup>11</sup>Camp and Reimer 2008, p. 14.

<sup>12</sup>Camp 2003. The general idea is that a perspective is a non-propositional frame from which hearers come to recover propositional content relevant to the metaphor.

<sup>13</sup>Camp says, “Metaphors are importantly discontinuous from utterances in which the speaker means what she says, insofar as they rely on a felt gap between what is intuitively said and what is meant, and insofar as they retain a kind of deniability about the specific content of the speaker’s assertoric commitment that is unavailable for literal, direct, and explicit speech.” Camp and Reimer 2008, p. 17. The element of deniability does not play a prominent role in Ānanda’s account, as far as I can see.



features involved in suggestion, but it does not play the central role that it does for Camp.

Let's return to Ānanda's taxonomy of suggestion and take up the category of **Unintended Literal Suggestion**. As noted above, this category sub-divides into **Literal Set–Aside Suggestion** and **Literal Shifted Suggestion**. In both of these categories, the speaker does not aim to communicate the literal meaning of her utterance. However, the categories reflect different relationships between the literal meaning and what is suggested.

As an example of the first case, **Literal Set–Aside Suggestion**, Ānanda cites the *Rāmāyaṇa*:

- (6) The sun has stolen our affection for the moon,  
whose circle now is dull with frost  
and like a mirror blinded by breath  
shines no more.  
*ravi-saṅkrānta-saubhāgyas*  
*tuṣārā-vṛta-maṇḍalaḥ*  
*niḥśvāsa-andha iva adarśas*  
*candramā na prakāśate*<sup>14</sup>

The expression that Ānanda says is a case of **Literal Set–Aside Suggestion** is the compound '*niḥśvāsa-andha*,' "blinded by sighs." The term '*andha*' means

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<sup>14</sup>The verses are from the *Rāmāyaṇa* 3.15.13. The *Rāmāyaṇa*, by the poet Valmīki, is taken as the beginning of the *kāvya* tradition in Sanskrit poetry.

blind, but is not literally true of a mirror (*‘adarśa’*), which is an insentient piece of glass without any eyes. Thus the literal meaning is displaced, set aside, rejected, in favor of a suggested meaning, which is that the mirror is obscured or fogged up by the drops of condensation coming from a breath. By itself, however, this metaphorical meaning, is not the full extent of *dhvani*. What is suggested in these verses are a special kind of beauty, which is the reason that the poet chooses these particular words, rather than stating directly that the moon is like an obscured mirror.<sup>15</sup>

As another example of **Literal Set–Aside Suggestion**, Ānanda gives

(7) These seven are the kindling sticks of royalty.<sup>16</sup>

Here, the word “kindling sticks” literally refers to the sticks at the bottom of a sacrificial fire discussed in the Vedas. It is understood as a metaphor for a king’s characteristics which make him successful.<sup>17</sup> The fuller context, cited in Abhinavagupta’s *Locana* makes clearer what the “seven” are:

Firmness, forbearance, self-control,  
purity, pity, kindness of speech,  
and constant faithfulness to friends:  
these are the seven kindling sticks of royalty.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>As McCrea notes, the principle that indirect expression is aesthetically preferable to direct expression is a presupposition of the Sanskrit poetic tradition that is nowhere argued for. McCrea 2008, p. 195.

<sup>16</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 173.

<sup>17</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 371-72.

<sup>18</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 372.

To illustrate the second major subdivision, **Literal Shifted Suggestion**, Ānanda cites an anonymous poem which Mukulabhaṭṭa also cites, later, in his arguments against *dhvani*:

- (8) White cranes are moving, the cloud is stretched,  
 Smear'd with radiantly dark color  
 Winds sprinkle water.  
 The friends of the clouds joyfully make melodious cries.  
 Let it be. The vessel of my heart is hard. I am Rāma. I  
 bear it all.  
 But Vaidehī, how will she live? Oh, alas, queen, be resolute!

*snigdha-śyāmala-kānti-lipta-viyato vellad-balākā ghanā  
 vātāḥ śikriṇaḥ payod-suḥṛdāmāna-ānanda-kekāḥ kalāḥ  
 kāmam santu dṛḍaṇ kaṭora-hṛdayo rāmo 'smi sarvaṇ sahe  
 vaidehī tu bhaviṣyati ha hā hā devi dhīrā bhave 'ti*


#### 4.2.2 Interpreter's Phenomenology

While the previous three categories are distinguished by the speaker's aims, the next two categories are distinguished by the hearer's experience. Ānanda says that when hearers come to understand the suggested meaning of a poem, they can do so instantaneously, or after a "reverberation"—some experienced temporal gap between recovering the literal meaning and recovering the suggested meaning.<sup>19</sup> Call these subdivisions **Reverberation** and **No Reverberation**.

<sup>19</sup> Ānandavardhana's use of "reverberation" is a play on the sense of "poetic suggestion" ('*dhvani*') which refers to sound.

This subdivides the earlier variety of suggested meaning, where the literal meaning is unintended, as shown in the diagram below.

Figure 4.2: Second Major Division of Suggestion



The suggested content characterized by **Reverbertation** is, as I’ve noted, similar to what contemporary philosophers talk about in terms of the metaphorical “felt gap” between literal and metaphorical meanings in particular. However, it also includes the idea of a temporal gap between understanding the literal and suggested meaning. The phenomenological observation can, and should, be distinguished from a claim about content recovery. For instance, Elizabeth Camp claims, “even though we do usually process metaphors more or less automatically, they still depend on a felt gap between what the speaker says and what she means.”<sup>20</sup> It is possible to hold that we recover (what Ānanda calls) suggested meaning relatively quickly, but that there is still a felt tension between the literal and figurative. Ānanda does not appeal to the phenomenology of suggested meanings as evidence that they are recovered in a certain way, though such a move was certainly available to him (Indian philosophers discussed the phenomenology of inference and other *pramāṇa* at

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<sup>20</sup>Camp and Reimer 2008, p. 4.

length). While I do not want to argue from silence, I think it is noteworthy that he does not make this move and I take it that Ānanda’s overall case for suggestion should not be taken to depend upon these phenomenological observations.

An example of **Reverberation** is a verse from the *Harṣa-carita* (*The Life of Harṣa*). The verse can be read in two ways, as shown in the table below.

Table 4.1: Example of Reverberation

| <b>Sanskrit</b>                                | <b>Reading 1</b>   | <b>Reading 2</b>   |
|--|--|--|
| <i>vr̥tte ’smin<br/>mahā-pralaye</i>           | In this great<br>destruction which has<br>happened         | In this final destruction<br>of the cosmos                               |
| <i>dharaṇī-dhāraṇāya<br/>adhunā tvaṃ śeṣaḥ</i> | You are now the only<br>thing left to support<br>the earth | You are now the<br>world-serpent Śeṣa for<br>the support of the<br>earth |

This double-meaning is known as *śleṣa*, a word which means “connection” or “combination,” but is typically translated into English as “pun.” The Sanskrit use of double-meaning, however, is highly complex and not necessarily used for humorous effect, as puns typically are in English.<sup>21</sup> This particular *śleṣa* has two words used in a dual manner. The Sanskrit ‘*mahā-pralaye*’ literally means “in the great destruction” and could refer to any large destructive

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<sup>21</sup>Perhaps the most well-known instance of *śleṣa* occurs in Śrīharṣa’s *Naiṣadha-carita*, or *Life of Naiṣadha*, a twelfth-century retelling of the story of Nala, found in the *Mahābhārata*. In this poem, the goddess Sarasvatī (the goddess of poetry and language) speaks using a *śleṣa* which can be understood in five different ways, in a speech which simultaneously describes the protagonist Nala and four of his rivals. See Bronner 2010, pp. 82ff.

event. However, in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* and other religious texts it refers to a particular destruction—the one which comes at the end of a cosmic cycle and dissolves all of reality in order for it to be created anew (and then destroyed in another *mahā-pralaya*). The other word used for double-effect here is ‘*śeṣa*’ (“remainder,” or “only thing left”), meant as the name of a thousand-headed serpent that is described as supporting all of the cosmos.

Ānanda categorizes this case of *śleṣa* as **Reverberation**, as both meanings do not occur to the reader simultaneously. Further he describes this as a case where the sentence (rather than individual words) suggests a second meaning, which comes like a “reverberation” or some time after the first.<sup>22</sup> This supports the idea that **Reverberation** is about processing time, rather than (or in addition to) a felt tension. Elsewhere, Ānanda points out that for many kinds of suggestion, hearers do not have a “reverberation” or awareness of a gap between the literal meaning and what is suggested.<sup>23</sup> This is because the temporal interval is very short. Ānanda’s commentator, Abhinavagupta gives

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<sup>22</sup>There are many philosophical questions about *śleṣa* in Sanskrit poetics and Ānanda touches upon a few here. First, there is the question of whether a compound expression such as ‘*mahā-pralaya*’ has two meanings (polysemy) or whether there are two expressions which have the same sound (homonymy). Ānanda distinguishes between suggestion based on meaning and sound, and depending upon how we understand *śleṣa*, as polysemy or homonymy, it would be categorized differently. As well, in the Sanskrit tradition, the two meanings found in *śleṣa* have some relationship between one another. Thus, King Harṣa, the subject of the verses above, is being compared to the world-serpent Śeṣa, in which case a third meaning is suggested, a simile. For further discussion of Ānanda’s analysis of *śleṣa*, see McCrea 2008, p. 141-147 and Bronner 2010, p. 195ff. Bronner makes the case that Ānandavardhana’s divisions of *dhvani* are parallel to the divisions of *śleṣa* presented in earlier thinkers such as Rudraṭa and Udbhata, belying his claim that he is presenting a novel set of categories (pp. 211-212).

<sup>23</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 540.

an analogy to explain cases where there is no such reverberation. He says that when someone has taken to heart the universal concomitance between smoke and fire, she will be able to reason inferentially to the existence of fire simply on the perceptual basis of smoke. There need not be any awareness of inferential processes on the part of the thinker.<sup>24</sup>

In some ways, Ānanda's phenomenological observations about how the varying speeds with which hearers and poetic interpreters come to understand what he calls "suggestion" fit with contemporary observations about metaphorical processing. For example, Gentner and Bowdle gave participants in an experiment two sentences with roughly the same meaning but different metaphors:

- (9) Was Anna still boiling mad when you saw her? No, she was doing a slow simmer.
- (10) Was Anna still a raging beast when you saw her? No, she was doing a slow simmer.

In their experiment, sentence (10) was processed more slowly than (9), and Gentner and Bowdle hypothesize it is because there is a consistent discourse-level metaphor in the first, but the second includes two distinct metaphors which require new "conceptual mappings."<sup>25</sup> Ānanda does not give an explanation in terms of conceptual mappings, but simply says that some cases

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<sup>24</sup>As with many other comments made by Abhinavagupta, it is unclear whether Ānanda himself would agree with the extrapolation. Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 546.

<sup>25</sup>Gentner and Bowdle 2001, p. 212-16.

of suggestion are immediately cognized while others “reverberate.” However, he does argue that in cases where the difference between the literal sentence meaning and the suggested meaning is great, there is an obvious temporal sequence.

### 4.2.3 The Basis for What is Suggested

Ānanda makes yet another distinction relevant to the varieties of suggested content. This, however, is a distinction between the various bases for what is suggested. Suggested meaning can be grounded in expressions or in phonemes. For instance, the meaning of a poem may suggest an aesthetic mood, such as the heroic, the erotic, the peaceful. We saw this above in (1), where the poet’s description of the parrot’s past life suggested the lover’s desire for his beloved. The sounds of the poem may also suggest an aesthetic mood, through particular combinations of phonemes (*varṇa*). As an example of suggestive phonemes, Ānanda cites the palatal fricative *ś*, retroflex fricative *ṣ*, and retroflex aspirated *ḍh*, which are all suggestive of the *rasa* of cruelty.<sup>26</sup> He gives these examples as part of a response to the objection that “phonemes are meaningless and therefore cannot suggest anything.”<sup>27</sup>

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
<sup>26</sup>The palatal fricative *ś* is pronounced with the tip of the tongue against towards the front of the roof of the mouth, like “shove” or “sugar.” The retroflex fricative *ṣ* is pronounced with the tongue further back, and isn’t easily distinguished from *ś* by English-speakers. The middle and retroflex aspirated *ḍh* is similar to the pronunciation of a “d” in English, except that the tongue is not pressed against the front of the palate, but the middle and there is a simultaneous aspiration of a breath of air.

<sup>27</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 390. Sanskrit: ‘*varṇānām anarthakatvād dyotakatvam asambhavitī āśaṅkyedam,*’ in Ānandavardhana 1990b, p. 114. While Ānanda conceptually distinguishes between expression meaning suggestion and phonemic suggestion, he notes



As far as expressions are concerned, Ānanda observes that what is suggested can be based on a single word or a sentence. Further, the literal meaning or the indicated meaning may serve as the basis. The examples we have already discussed can serve as illustrations for these differences. In the case of double-meaning (*śleṣa*), (4.1), it is the individual words which are the basis for suggestion, as they carry the punning meanings. In the case of (1), it is the sentences which are the basis for suggestion, as they are the source of the hearer's cognition of states of affairs (like the parrot eating a pink cherry) which suggest other states of affairs (the lover desiring his beloved's lips). Thus, we have the distinctions below:<sup>28</sup>

Figure 4.3: Third Major Division of Suggestion




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
that poetry usually incorporates both.

<sup>28</sup>For the sake of space, I omitted the bifurcation between words and sentences which would fall under expression meaning, each of which would be subdivided into denotation and *lakṣaṇā*.

#### 4.2.4 What is Suggested

Finally, Ānanda distinguishes among the kinds of things which are suggested, or suggested meanings. We have already touched upon the three major categories of suggested meaning: states of affairs/facts, figures of speech, and aesthetic moods. In addition to these categories, Ānanda distinguishes between ways in which what is suggested can be possible, and whether what is suggested is due to the author of a poem or the words of a character within the poem. Below, I take up all these categories in turn.

Figure 4.4: Fourth Major Division of Suggestion



Ānanda uses the word ‘*vastu*,’ “thing” or “fact,” for a wide range of phenomena. He distinguishes this variety of suggestion, which I’ll call **Suggested Fact**, from two others: **Suggested Figure** and **Suggested Mood**. **Suggested Fact** occurs where, for example, the literal meaning of a sentence is a prohibition, and there is an implied invitation, as in:

- (11) Mother-in-law sleeps here, I there:  
Look, traveler, while it is light.  
For at night when you cannot see

You must not fall into my bed.<sup>29</sup>

Here, what is suggested by the (female) speaker is an invitation to the (male) traveler to fall into her bed when it is dark. This is the reason she points out the location of her bed, which would otherwise be unnecessary. This kind of suggested content may sound analogous to Gricean conversational implicature. We might think that the speaker's unnecessary prolixity violates the Maxim of Quantity, being more informative than is necessary for conversational purposes. However, a problem that plagues Gricean accounts of implicatures is lack of precise guidelines to know when maxims have been violated. After all, if the stakes are high—and accidentally falling into the wrong bed might constitute high social stakes—reiterating just where things are in a dark room might be appropriate.

Another instance of a **Suggested Fact** is not from an implicature related to a direct assertion, but an implicature arising out of an overheard conversation. Ānanda remarks that this shows the suggested meaning can be aimed at someone different than the person that the literal meaning is directed to:

- (12) Who wouldn't be angry to see  
his dear wife with her lower lip bitten?  
You scorned my warning to smell the bee-holding lotus.  
Now you must suffer.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 98.

<sup>30</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 103.

Here, the verses are being uttered by a woman's (female) friend; let's call her "A." A knows that her married friend, B, has been having an affair and has some telling marks. B's husband, C, is nearby and A, pretending not to know he is within earshot, speaks these lines for his benefit, in order to suggest her friend's innocence. Ānanda does not comment on this verse, but Abhinavagupta's *Locana* notes that what is suggested is that the woman, B, is innocent of adultery.

This case is interesting from the perspective of speech-act theory since it is difficult to categorize. First of all, A's utterance would, ordinarily, be categorized as a question and a pair of assertions. However, the question is clearly rhetorical—a pretense of a question, not one genuinely asking for a response. Its form conventionally implicates that everyone would be angry to see what is described. And the assertions are also not made with sincerity, since both A and B know they are speaking for the sake of a third-party, who mistakenly thinks they are genuinely asserting. We might say, then, that A is *lying*. However, speech-act theory runs into a difficulty at this point:

If a speaker produces an utterance which is a lie, it is necessary for the success of that lie that the illocutionary act of assertion be successful. But if the perlocutionary act of lying is successful, then the illocutionary act of assertion is not successful.<sup>31</sup>

In other words, to have the effect of lying (the perlocutionary act), one has to be taken seriously despite being insincere. Further, by the liar being taken

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<sup>31</sup>Reboul 1994, p. 297.

seriously, and having her interlocutor think she is genuine, the act of assertion is thereby successful. And yet, by lying and failing to be sincere, there is, in truth, no act of assertion. We seem to face a paradox.

An additional complication arises in that while the two assertions may be false, the force of the deception arises from their respective implicatures. There is significant debate about how to define “lying,” especially in relationship to other categories such as “deception,” but for the purposes of this example, let’s stipulate that a lie is when a speaker asserts  $p$  and simultaneously believes not- $p$ .<sup>32</sup> Now, while it is false that B scorned A’s warning, the deception occurs because there is a further implication: visible marks are not due to another person. Thus we might say that A lied through implicature, since she implicated  $q$  by asserting  $p$  and simultaneously believed not- $q$ .<sup>33</sup>

Finally, the suggested content’s character relationship to Gricean implicature is complicated. For Grice, recovery of conversational implicature from an utterance occurs from the hearer recognizing the speaker’s intention to communicate the implicature using the utterance. Here, if the husband were to recognize such an intention, the purpose of the conversation would be foiled, since she is speaking as if he is not nearby. However, if we step out of the fictional world, what is suggested to the reader by the poet could be character-

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<sup>32</sup>Here I follow Meibauer 2005.

<sup>33</sup>She lied doubly, since she also believed not- $p$ , but it is certainly possible to mislead through a true assertion. Meibauer gives the example of a child who truthfully replies “ I didn’t kick the ball into the window” when her father asks, “Did you kick the ball into the window?” but the statement is true because she *threw* it.

ized as an implicature. **Suggested Facts**, then, can include what we might call “conversational implicatures” but we needn’t restrict to them to this description. Nothing in the illustrations given as paradigms precludes us from including conventional implicatures as **Suggested Facts**. After all, Ānanda is careful to qualify his discussion, noting that the few examples he has given only give a sense of what this kind of suggested content is.<sup>34</sup>

Turning to **Suggested Figures**, one example is:

- (13) The fragrant moth prepares,  
       but gives not yet for his use against young maids,  
       the arrows, pointed with mango bud  
       and feathered with new leaves, to the god of love.

In these verses, a moth is described as preparing arrows (whose tips are mango buds and whose feathers are leaves) for the god of love to use against young women, like Cupid in Roman mythology. As moths are not human beings, they cannot, in reality, make arrows. However, they are described as doing so, and the result is that there is a figure of speech known as “imaginative expression.” The term for this is ‘*praudhokti*,’ a word which does not literally mean imaginative expression but something like bold, elevated, or impressive speech. This kind of figure is contrasted with the **Inherently Possible** (‘*svataḥ sambhavin*’). While (13) is an **Imaginative Expression** because it is an anthropomorphizing of a moth, which, in our experience, is incapable of

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<sup>34</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p.105.

making arrows, the verses below are **Inherently Possible** since they describe a scene which actually could occur:

- (14) The hunter’s wife strolls proudly  
with a peacock feather behind her ear.  
She strolls amid fellow wives  
who are decked with pearls.<sup>35</sup>

The **Imaginative Expression** can be of two sorts. First, there are expressions which are due to the poet, as in (13). Second, there are those which are put in the mouths, so to speak, of characters in the poem, and are not the voice of the poet. We have seen a case of this in (1), earlier. Ānanda spends little time discussing how we can distinguish between what is **Imaginative Expression** and **Inherently Possible**. While Ingalls, in a footnote, defines the first as “arising from the poet’s imagination rather than from the data directly presented by the everyday world,” this is not quite right. After all, the poet may have imagined the hunter’s wife and never directly observed a situation as described. Further, even if the poet has never directly observed a moth nocking a mango-bud arrow to a bow, he has directly observed moths, young maids, arrows, mango buds, etc. Out of these data, he has constructed

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<sup>35</sup>From a Prakrit collection of love poetry, the *Sattasaī*. The character of the hunter appears often in Prakrit poetry and as a stock character, he is used to illustrate how his work is in conflict with his marriage. About these verses, ... says, “The peacock feathers worn by his young wife are a token of his love, but the pearls worn by his less-favored wives are a reminder that he once had the strength to kill elephants (whose foreheads are thought to secrete pearls).” Khoroché and Tiekén 2009, p. 162.

the imagery in the poem.

One way to think about the distinction here is in terms of possible worlds and counterfactuals. We could say that while the situation in (14) is one that may not have occurred in the actual world, thus making it fictional, it is one that could have occurred in the actual world. In contrast, (13) is one that could not have occurred in the actual world. This leads us to the question, however, of what sense of possibility we are after. Is the difference between (14) and (13) one of logical possibility, conceptual possibility, physical possibility, or metaphysical possibility? Ānanda's definition of **Inherently Possible** is "The 'inherently possible' is that situation being considered as suitable (*aucityena*) to the external world, and the situation's substantial appearance is not merely through the whims of speech."<sup>36</sup> There is some way in which the **Inherently Possible** is appropriate or suitable (*acuity*) to the actual world, in a way that the **Imaginative Expression** is not, and this suitability is something that withstands some reflection. The question of the relationship between fact and fiction in Sanskrit literature is a difficult one, and one which merits further investigation. A summary of the modal status of the suggested figures is below.


While Sanskrit thinkers distinguished between fact and fiction, genres of history (*ākhyāyikā*) and others, Sheldon Pollock notes that facts were "mal-

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<sup>36</sup>*svataḥ sambhavī ya aucityena bahir api sambhāvya-māna-sad-bhāvo na kevalaṃ bhaṇiti vaśena eva abhiniṣpanna-śarīraḥ.*



Figure 4.5: Fifth Major Division of Suggestion



leable.”<sup>37</sup> The way in which matters of fact were treated was guided by poetic aims and a sense of propriety (*‘aucitya’*) to cultural and ethical norms. Further, for Ānandavardhana and the *dhvani* theorists after him, *rasa* was an important guide for how fact and fiction were treated. He argues that the poet’s responsibility is not to set out a “chronicle of events” but to identify patterns in stories that are consistent with the aims of *rasa*, and include these. The poet should excise anything which will not lead to *rasa*.<sup>38</sup>

This kind of suggested content, *rasa*, is the centerpiece of Ānanda’s theory. *Rasa*, what I have called **Suggested Mood** is more than “mood” in the sense of an emotion. It is a heightened form of an emotion. As noted in Chapter One, the idea of *rasa* originates from the dramaturgical tradition, but Ānanda identifies as an organizing principle for poetry in general. The goal of a poet is to write a poem which will manifest *rasa*, and all other varieties

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<sup>37</sup>Pollock 2003, p. 58.

<sup>38</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 435-36.

of suggestion ought to support this aim. Ānanda characterized *rasa* in terms similar to thinkers that preceded him—it was Abhinavagupta who took *rasa* to be something beyond ordinary human perception, as discussed in the last chapter.

In terms of the distinctions we've laid out so far, *rasa* in the sense of a **Suggested Mood** is a content which the hearer understands through *dhvani*. Many of the examples we've looked at earlier can also be examples of suggested *rasa*—for instance, excellent love poetry gives rise to the aesthetic mood of the erotic (*śṛṅgāra*). Multiple kinds of suggestion can be present in the same verse, but Ānanda says that the best poetry aims at a predominance of *rasa* or suggestion. In this way the distinctions above are not part of an exhaustive, determinate model—which is why I have not tried to represent them all in a single diagram. The aim is for these varieties of suggestion to work together in order to generate *rasa*. This requires skill on the part of the poet, both in terms of language—what sounds, words, and meanings are appropriate together?—and in terms of world knowledge—what fictions are appropriate to cultivate the right emotions?

In summary, we can ask five questions about suggestion, according to Ānanda's analysis. (These questions correspond to the figures above.)

1. What is the speaker's intention concerning the literal meaning and the suggested meaning?
2. Does the hearer experience a delay between understanding the literal

meaning and the suggested meaning?

3. What is the basis of the suggested meaning: expression meanings or phonemes?
4. What is the object of suggestion, a fact, figure, or *rasa*?
5. What is the modal status of the object of suggestion, possible or imaginative?

There are other, finer distinctions which Ānanda makes in his analysis of the varieties of suggestion which would unnecessarily complicate the picture for our purpose, which is simply to get a sense of his project. Whether he is correct that the varieties are infinite, as he understands suggestion its varieties are numerous.

After enumerating the varieties of suggestion, Ānanda argues that it is not possible for a reader or hearer to understand them in the same way as she might other kinds of meaning. We now turn to the epistemological aspect of his project. In the rest of the chapter, I focus on Ānanda's claim that suggestion is distinct from the linguistic capacities and epistemic instruments accepted by thinkers in his day. He raises four possible candidates which could give rise to suggested meaning: denotation, indication, convention, and inferential reasoning. In what follows, I take up his arguments in turn, demonstrating that they do not completely succeed, although they highlight some inadequacies in the approaches to language of his day. The fourth candidate, *anumāna*, or inferential reasoning, will be treated in the next chapter, due to the argument's

importance and complexity.

### 4.3 Suggestion is Not Like Lexical Meaning

Ānanda contrasts the function of suggestion with the function of denotation. As for the latter, he says the relationship between the composition of words in a sentence and its denoted meaning is a “natural relation.” The sense in which the word–referent relation is “natural” is that it is fixed (*niyata*). A word’s denotation is that meaning which is cognized in every single instance the word is employed. Suggestion, in contrast to denotation, is an “artificial relation,” since it is a meaning that is “not denoted by its natural word,” and the relationship between suggested meaning and a suggestive word is not one to one.<sup>39</sup> (Of course, as we have seen above, sentences as well as words are suggestive, so by “denotation” is meant the literal meaning of any expression.)

One might instead argue that the Prābhākara analysis, which is a decidedly contextualist account of word-meaning, is a better candidate than Ānanda’s. On this view, what hearers come to understand is the most appropriate (however we precisify “appropriate”) word meaning given the context of utterance. Thus, whatever the conventional or literal meaning of a word might be, hearers do not come to understand that, but they understand the so-called “suggested” meaning. However, Ānanda has observed that there are cases where hearers grasp two meanings (and are meant to), such as in (4.1), where ‘*śeṣa*’ means

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<sup>39</sup>*Dhvanyāloka*, §3.33o A. Ānandavardhana 1990a, 588.

“what is left” as well as the proper name of a serpent. On the Prābhākara account, the word-function will give as its output the most contextually appropriate meaning for the words. The problem is that there are two appropriate meanings here, depending upon which context we focus on.<sup>40</sup>

One response open to the Prābhākara is to say that there are two instances of the word-function operating here. After all, Ānanda has said that this kind of suggestion has a felt interval between the first and second meanings. We can surmise that what happens is simply that there are two interpretive acts occurring, and the reader recovers different meanings, but through the same process in both instances. The outcome is different because the context is different in each case. Ānanda’s case is therefore strongest for examples such as (11), where the woman surreptitiously invites a traveler into her bed. Here, unlike (4.1), there are no individual words which can be taken as conveying the disguised invitation. Instead, there is something about the utterance as a whole which prompts the reader to understand that the warning is actually an invitation. Since the basis for what is suggested is not a word, but a sentence (or, more strictly, an utterance), the Prābhākara account fails for these kinds of suggested content. Thus Ānanda’s argument that at least some cases of suggested content cannot be recovered like lexical meanings succeeds.

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<sup>40</sup>A further complication is that *śleṣa*, the term for this kind of double-meaning, usually also results in a third meaning, an analogy or metaphor that unites the two (or more) distinct punning interpretations.

#### 4.4 Suggestion is Not Like *Lakṣaṇā*

However, it is unlikely that we would want to attribute our understanding of the phenomena above to understanding word-meanings. A likelier candidate is *lakṣaṇā*, or indication. Indication is where there is a failure of semantic fit—or some other failure, as we shall see later—among the words composing a sentence, and so a speaker must be understood to be saying something else. Ānanda gives the example, referenced earlier:

(15) “The village is on the Ganges.”

In Sanskrit, the word for “Ganges” is in the locative case which (read strictly literally) means that the village is resting upon the surface of the river. This example is found in several places in Ānanda and is a traditional example of indication for Indian philosophers.<sup>41</sup>

In this sentence, “Ganges” is understood by Ānanda to change its meaning to “the bank of the Ganges” by metonymical association. As briefly mentioned in Chapter 3, because the literal referent of words is understood to be a universal by the Mīmāṃsaka, there must typically be a metonymic shift in order for sentence constituents to refer to particulars which can then be brought into relationship with the action word in the sentence (often but not always a verb).<sup>42</sup> He says this shift occurs by indication operating on the literal referents

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<sup>41</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, 555, 562-563, 569..

<sup>42</sup>See Scharf 1996, for instance, for discussion. Note that the “sentence operation” or “*tātparyā*” is sometimes counted as a distinct verbal operation, along with denotation and indication. However, frequently, early Indian philosophers focus upon the referents of words

of the words in the sentence. Ānanda claims that the literal meaning of the sentence is replaced by “the bank of the Ganges,” which is distinct from the meaning of “Ganges” (as a river is not the same thing as its bank). The suggested meaning of (15) is the coolness and purity of the village, a suggestion which does not replace the literal meaning of the sentence, nor contradict it. Thus, for Ānanda, the multiple meanings of (15) could be glossed as:

**Denotation:** The village is on the current of the Ganges river.

**Indication:** The village is on the bank of the Ganges river.

**Suggestion:** The village which is on the bank of the Ganges river is cool and pure.

Relying on the denoted meanings, a hearer can recover what is indicated. On Ānanda’s view, the suggested meaning is a further step beyond this indicated meaning, but is not understood through what is indicated. Instead, it is through the denotation of “Ganges,” since it is the river, and not the bank, which is associated with purity and coolness.<sup>43</sup> The crucial aspect of Ānanda’s argument is that while *lakṣaṇā* requires a failure of semantic fit, suggestion does not. A hearer’s understanding of “on the Ganges” as meaning “on the bank of the Ganges” is necessary in order for the sentence not to cause a

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at the expense of the meaning of sentences (using “*artha*” as a term for both referent and meaning). Mīmāṃsā scholars were known for their analysis of sentence meaning, but for them indication and the so-called sentence operation are the same. Ānanda spends little time discussing *tātparyā*, though his later commentator, Abhinavagupta, discusses it more as later theorists develop the topic further. See McCrea 2008 on *tātparyā* and Ānanda.

<sup>43</sup>We will see later how Mukulabhaṭṭa explains this same example in terms of *lakṣaṇā*, or indication in a way that tries to account for this fact.

cognition of a village as floating upon the Ganges. In contrast, the suggested sense does not rectify any apparent semantic incompatibility in the literal meaning of the sentence.

This point is especially pertinent for cases of suggestion where the literal meaning is said to be intended, as in (11) above. There is nothing semantically unfit about the verses where the speaker warns the traveler as to the location of her bed. There is thus no justification for *lakṣaṇā*, taken as recovery through presumption of another meaning that resolves an incompatibility. Yet, Ānanda says, hearers know that the speaker is actually inviting the traveler, and not warning him. Further, the aesthetic nature is due to its being disguised. The effect of the warning being implied is that the hearers recognize the illicit eroticism of the encounter. A flat-out invitation would not have this effect, or this suggestion.

If *lakṣaṇā* requires a sentence-internal incompatibility, then Ānanda's argument that cases like (11) cannot be cognized by *lakṣaṇā* clearly succeeds. However, if *lakṣaṇā* requires only incompatibility in general, then we can preserve it as a means of resolving incompatibilities, perhaps those between sentence meanings and other contextual elements. This is what Mukulabhaṭṭa argues, and in Chapters Six and Seven I take up his solution in more detail.



## 4.5 Suggestion is Not Like Convention

So far, the claim is that we do not understand suggested meaning by either denotation or indication—the two linguistic capacities accepted by Indian philosophers. However, Ānanda has stated that *dhvani* is linguistic in nature. In what way, then, can hearers rely on linguistic capacities to recover what is suggested, if not through these? The answer for Ānanda involves being a ‘*sahṛdaya*,’ or sensitive listener. A sensitive listener knows the aim of poetry is to generate a particular “taste” or “flavor” (*rasa*) through suggestion.<sup>44</sup> There is an element of circularity to this concept: if someone understands the suggested meaning, they count as a “sensitive listener” and if sensitive listeners enjoy a set of verses, the verses count as “poetry.” However, there is also, as we’ve observed before, a strong undercurrent of normativity to Sanskrit poetry and its appreciation. Not just anyone is a sensitive listener, and not just any poem counts as good.

What Ānanda is gesturing at through this concept is that, in contrast to knowledge of the denotations of words or the patterns leading to indication, knowledge of poetry involves skill. This skill is *linguistic*, since sensitive listeners are attuned to verbal phenomena. However, it is not a skill which can be reduced to a set of algorithms. There is no way to entirely formalize the rules for appreciation of art. If this is what he is getting at, we’re still left with a problem. After all, sensitive listeners are described as having knowledge of

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<sup>44</sup>*Dhvanyāloka* 1.1, in Ānandavardhana 1990a, 48.

poetry. They are not simply generating interpretations, any one of which will do as appropriate. So what is it that sensitive listeners have knowledge of, when they understand what is suggested by poetry?<sup>45</sup>

Ānanda gives two possible definitions of a sensitive listener in virtue of possible objects of their knowledge:

**Definition 1** Is one whose knowledge<sup>46</sup> is of an object that is poetic convention (*samaya*) regardless of *rasa*, *bhāva* and the like?<sup>47</sup>

**Definition 2** Or is one whose skillful knowledge<sup>48</sup> is of the nature of poetry the measure of which is *rasa*, *bhāva* and the like?<sup>49</sup>

Ānanda argues that if we accept Definition 1, since conventions are arbitrary, the beauty of certain words would be relative to a community of readers:

On the first view, it would be impossible for there to be a constraint on particular words having beauty as such qualities of beauty are established by sensitive readers. Moreover, this impossibility is due to the possibility of establishing another, different convention.

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<sup>45</sup>Later thinkers in the poetic tradition will take up the problem of *rasa-abhāsa*, or “apparent *rasa*” in an attempt to further fill out the conceptual space of knowing *rasa*. This idea becomes especially important as *rasa* comes to be something felt or experienced by the reader. Some experiences are genuine and some are not, and thinkers will distinguish between these experiences in light of such things as their causal origin (excellent and mediocre poetry).

<sup>46</sup>“Knowledge” = ‘*abhijñā*,’ or recollection, memory, recognition.

<sup>47</sup>The term ‘*samaya*,’ or “convention,” refers to a mutual agreement or an established custom.

<sup>48</sup>“Skillful” = ‘*naipuṇya*,’ “knowledge” = ‘*parijñā*,’ or understanding, recognition.

<sup>49</sup>Translation mine, Dhvanyāloka, 3.16. Full context is appended to this chapter.

The term I translate as “convention” is ‘*samaya*,’ which is used for agreement among people in an ordinary context, and often prefaced with ‘*kavi*’ to mean “poetic convention.” One element of poetic convention is the use of certain imagery—the adulterous woman, liaisons on riverbanks, lotuses, peacock feathers, and etc.—to suggest meaning. These images are embedded in a broader social context, which fixes their significance for the reader, who is assumed to be familiar with them. However, what Ānanda seems to argue is that insofar as these images (and, more broadly, the poetry which employs them) are based on agreement about social practices and their attendant values, poetic conventions are able to be undermined. For instance in the case of (15) “The village is on the Ganges,” The use of the term “Ganges” might not suggest purity and coolness for every community, since it would be possible to set up a different convention where the Ganges is associated with these qualities. The problem for him is not that there actually are multiple conventions in existence, but simply the possibility of a different convention.

Another feature that could be meant by “convention,” is that of poetic style or *riti*. Theorists before Ānanda, such as Daṇḍin and Vāmana, emphasized regional distinctions (the Vaidarbhī, Gauḍī, and Pāñcālī) in their analysis of poetry. An example of a quality found in one style and not in another is the presence of lengthy compounds. This was a quality of Gauḍī poetry in particular, and it is a quality that Ānanda discusses in the *Dhvanyāloka*. The discussion, which takes up several possible relationships between qualities, style, and *rasa*, occurs in 3.6. The conclusion of this section (which is

quite detailed in its consideration of earlier views) is that styles and qualities have a subordinate relationship to *rasa*. Simply put, a poet selects particular compounds for the goal of generating *rasa*. Regional conventions are not the proper final analysis for thinking about poetry. In fact, these conventions are misleading since they distract us from the true purpose of poetry.

While Ānanda is clear that convention—imagery and style—is insufficient as the basis for a sensitive listener’s knowledge of suggested meaning, it is unclear why the existence of a convention would threaten our apprehension of beauty in poetry. The problem is that Ānanda seems to understand convention as being deeply arbitrary in a worrisome way. In what follows, I briefly employ David Lewis’ analysis of convention as a starting point for thinking through Ānanda’s rejected Definition 1.

Lewis thinks about convention in terms of solving coordination problems. We want to travel on escalators quickly and efficiently. Thus we converge on (in some cities, at least) the solution that people who stand will stay to the right while those who prefer to treat escalators as stairs will walk to the left. This solution allows for everyone to travel in their preferred manner and, once the convention is established, its existence becomes a self-perpetuating reason to follow it. In New York City, the existence of this convention is a good reason for me not to stand with my luggage on the left side of an escalator in the subway at rush hour.

Lewis characterizes conventions this way:

A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in any instance of S among members of P,

1. everyone conforms to R;
2. everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;
3. everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible combinations of actions;
4. everyone prefers that everyone conform to R, on condition that at least all but one conform to R;
5. everyone would prefer that everyone conform to R , on condition that at least all but one conform to R ,

where R' is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of P in S, such that no one in any instance of S among members of P could conform both to R' and to R.<sup>50</sup>

Poetic convention among the various regional groups would then describe the preferences for conforming to general stylistic approaches. On Lewis' understanding, there must be an R , or an alternative convention, available which is incompatible with R. Put into linguistic contexts, not only actions, but beliefs are the target of conventional regularities. For assertoric speech acts, then, conventions guide what it is that we come to believe as a result of certain expressions. We converge on a language that pairs propositions with sentences.

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<sup>50</sup>Lewis 1969, p. 76.

But Ānanda is not just describing converging on believed propositions or actions. He takes it as given that a sensitive listener understanding good poetry recognizes an aesthetic fact about the world in addition to understanding the denoted and indicated meanings of poetry. And aesthetic properties, he thinks, are simply not the kind of thing that can be relative to a community. He might agree with Immanuel Kant who says, centuries later, “But if (someone) proclaims something to be beautiful, then he requires the same liking from others; he then judges not just for himself but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things.”<sup>51</sup> Ānanda is not just speaking of beauty “as if” it were property of things, but he thinks that it is a property of things.

Suppose a group of poets in population P agreed that a set of words are beautiful and proceeded to make poetry using them. They all conform to this R, all expect each other to conform to it, etc. Ānanda’s claim (echoed by Abhinavagupta) is that this makes the idea of a criterion for beauty empty. Abhinavagupta complains that it makes the criterion dependent on “unregulated individual whim.”<sup>52</sup> This is to oversimplify how it might be that suggested meaning is conventional, in particular, to conflate conventionality with capriciousness. Ānanda’s argument against convention relies on a counterfactual: if suggested meaning were conventional, then we could choose a different set of words to have a specific poetic effect, simply on the basis of agreement. We cannot simply choose a different set of words to have a specific poetic effect,

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<sup>51</sup>Kant 1987, p.47.

<sup>52</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 475.

and therefore suggested meaning is not conventional. But in the Lewisian sense of convention, the regularities are not random, though they may be arbitrary in the strict sense of the word.

Agreement among language-users sets the stage for continued use of the same words in the future. While there is some choice in convention, it is not at the level of the individual—conventions emerge at the societal level, and one’s “opting out” of a convention does not make it not a convention. Were I to consistently stand to the left on an escalator, that does not establish a new convention—it only makes me get in the way of my fellow travelers. Further, not everyone recognizes conventions as being conventions. This does not undo their status as such, although the degree to which such exceptions can exist is an open question.<sup>53</sup>

Ānanda is pointing to a difficult problem here: how do we distinguish between aesthetic qualities of words and aesthetic qualities of the world that the words represent? Suppose a modern United States citizen, hearing “The village is on the Ganges,” visualizes throngs of people bathing in a muddy river in the heat of the day. She believes that the expression suggests dirtiness and heat. Is this a matter of her not knowing what “Ganges” means, or not knowing that the Ganges river has the properties of purity and coolness? Ānanda in

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<sup>53</sup>Lewis talks about “children” and the “feeble-minded” as being exceptions, but surely there are plenty of conventions that many people, perhaps even the majority, take as being natural when they are not. I think of conventions regarding gender in particular—what certain persons ought to wear or how they ought to act may be demonstrably conventional since history bears out the existence of incompatible alternatives, even if people are unaware of this fact.

Definition 2, accounts for the (mis)understanding by saying that the US citizen lacks knowledge of aesthetic properties. But he goes on to say that sensitive listeners are aware that certain *words* have a property, whatever it may be, which transmits *rasa*, or taste. He also says that it is having knowledge of *rasa* itself, or the aesthetic moods at which poetry aims, that determines whether someone is a sensitive listener. Thus, he argues against conventionality and for something like aesthetic perceptibility. Or, perhaps she does not know that “Ganges” has the power to suggest an aesthetic mood (possibly the mood of “peacefulness”).

I take it, then, that Ānanda’s argument against convention is not very successful. (Even if Ānanda is correct about convention, Jeffrey Masson notes another problem for Definition 2, which is that nothing he says demonstrates that *rasa* is the feature to which sensitive listeners are attuned. One must already accept his theory in order for Definition 2 to be accepted.)<sup>54</sup> There is another problem in the argument that is more fundamental to Ānanda’s theory. Even if he could show that linguistic conventions are in some way constrained by facts about aesthetic properties, once he admits that the sensitive listener’s knowledge of suggestion is a knowledge of *rasa*, he has opened the possibility of using inferential reasoning to recover it. This is because knowledge of *rasa* is not precisely the same thing as the knowledge of suggested meaning, although the two are related.

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<sup>54</sup> Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 474, fn. 4.



Consider an utterance intended to suggest the *rasa* of the erotic:

(16) Pārvatī counted the petals of the lotus in her hand.<sup>55</sup>

Ānanda claims that a sensitive critic hears this and directly comes to know the literal meaning of this sentence. She knows that in a poetic context, the point of any sentence is to contribute to an aesthetic mood. The suggested meaning is related to the particular context—just any mention of lotus petals will not guarantee the erotic *rasa*. So could a sensitive critic get the suggested meaning? Ānanda maintains she could understand it in a “flash of insight” (*pratibhā*) through the distinct process of *dhvani* which he believes he has established. However, we might think that *dhvani* is sophisticated inferential reasoning that involves the specialized knowledge of the sensitive listener. After all, Ānanda denies that suggested meanings are ineffable, and throughout the text he explains what these meanings are in detail. Through rapid inferential reasoning, one might understand quickly what is meant. As we saw earlier, we are frequently unaware that we are reasoning from the perception of smoke to the existence of fire. Perhaps this is what *dhvani* is—a rapid inferential process that only the highly skilled are capable of making.

Nothing in what Ānanda has said about denotation, indication, or convention has excluded this possibility, and since *anumāna* or inferential reasoning, was a prominent and widely accepted epistemic instrument, he needs to directly

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<sup>55</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 562 and Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 311-312.

address this possibility. It is this alternative to *dhvani* to which I turn in the following chapter.

## Chapter 5

### The Irreducibility of Suggestion

#### 5.1 Introduction

Ānandavardhana argues in *Dhvanyāloka* 3.33 that suggestion cannot be equated to *anumāna*, or inferential reasoning. Below I examine his argument and show that he is largely successful. However, given that there are some readily available emendations to the inferentialist's position that would rescue his opponent, I reconstruct the debate in a way slightly different than is presented in his text while preserving the basic insights of each position. This requires drawing a distinction between concepts which are brought together in the Indian model of *anumāna*. While Ānanda is successful against both reconstructions of the inferentialist argument, his analysis of *anumāna*'s failure points us to another *pramāṇa*, presumptive inference. This will put us in the position to appreciate Mukulabhaṭṭa's views in the next chapter, which centers on presumptive inference, or *arthāpatti*, which I argued earlier is inference to the best explanation.

In what follows, I first introduce the inferentialist's position as presented by Ānanda, clarifying in what sense the interlocutor is claiming that suggestion can be known through the *pramāṇa* of *anumāna*. I then briefly present

Ānanda's response, which is that unlike what is known through *anumāna*, interpreters disagree over the identification of suggested contents. In the second part of the chapter, I consider a possible response on the part of the inferentialist: that there would be no disagreement over suggested content once the correct pervasion relationship is identified. This response is strengthened by the fact that it can take on board the existence of skillful interpreters (the *sahṛdaya*) that Ānanda emphasizes. Finally, on behalf of Ānanda, I develop a rebuttal in the spirit of the *Dhvaṅyāloka*. This rebuttal to the inferentialist is two-pronged, arguing that not only can interpreters not employ *anumāna* qua epistemic tool but they cannot appeal to *anumāna* qua justificatory argument, either. This response to the interlocutor emphasizes the defeasible nature of suggestion and its non-necessary relation to the expressions employed by speakers. Both of these features must be accounted for in a successful account of suggestion. In the next chapter I will show that Mukulabhaṭṭa's view can accommodate them.

In *DV* 3.33, Ānanda introduces the dispute between himself and the inferentialist as follows. He says that suggested meaning is an accidental attachment to words ('*aupādhika*'), conditioned by context.<sup>1</sup> In other words, an expression alone is insufficient for generating a particular suggested content, but it requires additional factors, called '*upādhi*.'<sup>2</sup> In this way, suggestion is differ-

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<sup>1</sup>I have appended this section to the end of the chapter for reference.

<sup>2</sup>The term '*aupādhika*' is a derivative created by strengthening the initial '*u*' in '*upādhi*' to '*au*' and the ending '-*ka*,' resulting in a word which means "related to additional factors (*upādhi*)."

ent from denotation, where an expression's use in a language  $L$  is sufficient for its meaning to be understood by an ordinary speaker of that language. Ānanda goes on to add that his proposal of suggested content is theoretically neutral, and can be accepted by any of the contemporary theories of linguistic communication. Further, while philosophers can argue over semantic theories, he says they cannot disagree that there is the phenomenon he is calling "suggestion."

It is at this point that *anumāna* becomes relevant. Ānanda inserts the voice of an interlocutor, who says that in fact, suggestion is open to derision by philosophers. The reason is because what Ānanda calls "suggestion" is merely *anumāna*. Why is this a reason for philosophers to deride his suggestion? Well, Ānanda has already said that poetic suggestion is something which a speaker intends to communicate. On a widely accepted view of natural language, we use *anumāna* to determine what a speaker intends. Thus, his opponent concludes, the linguistic capacity of suggestion is nothing more than *anumāna* and Ānanda is not proposing any new phenomenon. He is simply pointing out the obvious and giving it another name. Here is how Ānanda presents the inferentialist:

The fact that words have the capacity to suggest something means that words have the capacity to cause understanding, and having the capacity to cause understanding is being an inferential mark; therefore, understanding what is suggested is simply understanding the object of the inferential mark. And the relationship between

a suggestive expression and its object is simply the relationship between the inferential mark and the thing to be inferred, and not anything else. And therefore, necessarily, this inferential relationship surely should be recognized by you, since you have just now claimed that suggestiveness is recognized by the speaker's intention and that the nature of speaker's intention is something which is to be inferred.<sup>3</sup>

The interlocutor argues that suggestion relies upon a claim of identity between something having the capacity to cause understanding and something being an inferential mark. Recall that an inferential mark, in the Indian conception of *anumāna*, is some characteristic or property *H* whose existence is invariably connected with another characteristic or property *S*, where *S* is the thing we are trying to establish through *anumāna*.<sup>4</sup> The inferential mark is given to us through another means of knowledge such as perception. One paradigmatic inferential mark is smoke, whose visible presence (under the correct perceptual conditions) in a certain place guarantees the existence of fire in that same place. Thus, the interlocutor claims that words function for speaker's intention like smoke does for fire: given (the right kind of) words, we can identify the corresponding speaker's intention.

Ānanda responds first by saying that even were the opponent correct, this would not harm his broader claim that suggestion is a distinct function of

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<sup>3</sup>The word for "capacity to cause understanding" is '*gamaka*,' which is the term frequently used for a reason, or *hetu*.

<sup>4</sup>Recall the traditional choice of *H* and *S* represent the *hetu* and *sādhya*, Sanskrit terms for inferential mark and probandum respectively.

language, different from denotation and indication. On the view that neither denotation nor indication are equivalent to *anumāna*, the claim that suggestion is equal to *anumāna* does not touch Ānanda's claim of distinctness. Further, the interlocutor accepts that suggestion requires words, and so Ānanda is safe in characterizing suggestion as "verbal." He goes on to argue that, in fact, the relationship between words and their suggested content cannot be equated with the relationship between an inferential mark and an object of *anumāna*.

The first stage in Ānanda's defense against his opponent is to present his analysis of the content of a communicative act. He distinguishes between two aspects of linguistic communication: what can be understood through *anumāna* (*anumeṃya*) and what can be conveyed (*pratipādyā*). From the observation that a speaker has uttered words in a particular language, there are two things we can conclude: a speaker desires to perform a speech act and a speaker desires to perform a speech act with certain sounds.<sup>5</sup> Crucially, for Ānanda, we cannot understand the content of the speech act (what is said, what is requested, etc.) through *anumāna*. See Figure 5.1.


Ānanda says that the content ascertained through *anumāna* is also "suggested" (*vyāñjya*), but this is not the same kind of suggestion as accompanies poetry. I have called the first "ordinary suggestion" to distinguish it from the intentional sort, which I call "poetic suggestion."<sup>6</sup> According to Ānanda, poetic suggestion is something which the speaker wants to communicate, whereas ordinary

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<sup>5</sup>In what follows, I use "intention" and "desire" interchangeably.

<sup>6</sup>See earlier discussion in 1.3.

Figure 5.1: Ānanda's analysis of communication



suggestion includes such things as the fact that someone is an English speaker. This would be known on the basis of an utterance just by virtue of its being in English, through *anumāna*. Likewise, ordinary suggestion includes that I am trying to say something (rather than humming or making random noises), and that I am trying to say something with those sounds (rather than humming while I communicate with hand gestures). Thus, suggestion is not only found in poetic contexts, but in every instance of communication. However, this kind of suggestion does not include the content of the speaker's intention.

What Ānanda calls “ordinary suggestion” would probably be characterized as entailment by contemporary philosophers. Take an example due to Searle, the utterance of



(1) Kennst du das Land...<sup>7</sup>

From the fact that (1) is an utterance in the German language, a hearer can infer that the speaker of (1) is German, or that she speaks German. Ordinarily, neither of these propositions are what is intended by the speaker who uses (1). For this reason, contemporary philosophers frequently do not characterize such entailments as “meaning,” on the principle that meanings must be effects which a speaker intends to produce in a hearer “by means of [the hearer’s] recognition of [the speaker’s] intention to produce just that effect.”<sup>8</sup>

At this point, it’s worth recalling the notion of *anumāna* at play.<sup>9</sup> When Ānanda says that we can conclude things like that someone has a desire to perform a speech act by observing that she has spoken using words in natural language, he is referring to a reasoner employing this form:

1. **Thesis to prove** (*pratijñā*): The speaker has a desire to perform a speech act.
2. **Reason** (*hetu*): This is because she has spoken words in natural language.
3. **Pervasion rule** (*vyāpti*): Every time someone speaks words in natural language, there is a desire to perform a speech act, such as the case of [example].

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<sup>7</sup>Hutchby 2008.

<sup>8</sup>Hutchby 2008, p. 8.

<sup>9</sup>See earlier discussion in 1.4 on pages 30ff and 2.3.2 on pages 81ff.

4. **Application of rule** (*upanayana*): This case is like [example].
5. **Conclusion** (*nigamana*): Therefore, the speaker has a desire to perform a speech act.

The pervasion which allows us to conclude a speaker's desire to perform a speech act from her utterance is grounded in ordinary observation. To avoid the fallacy of "too wide a definition" (*ativyāpti*), we need to restrict the case of "speaking words in natural language." We don't want to include nonsense utterances, but we want to allow for malapropisms and at least some kinds of ungrammaticality. Assuming that such a line can be drawn and stipulating that our pervasion only refers to the appropriate sorts of utterances, it seems initially plausible that intentions to perform a speech act invariably accompany the right sorts of linguistic acts.

But why think that what is expressed (directly or indirectly) by someone's speech act is *not* recoverable by *anumāna*? This claim may strike contemporary philosophers as unusual, as it is widely acknowledged that some form of inference to speaker's intention is essential for successful communication to take place. There are two general motivations here. First, take denotation, or the content of what is literally said. The picture (made simple) is something like this: look up the lexical entries for the words in the sentence and combine these meanings using the appropriate rules of syntax. We do not need to infer the speaker's intention to get denoted meaning, as a finite list of terms and rules gives us our semantic content.

Second, take indication, or the content of *lakṣaṇā*, non-literal speech. Often, *lakṣaṇā* is characterized as operating through *arthāpatti*, or presumption. This is a defeasible form of reasoning, similar to inference to the best explanation. However, while we might call it “inference,” presumption is very different from *anumāna*. The crucial difference is that in *anumāna* the existence of a pervasion relationship secures the conclusion as a piece of knowledge. Given the inferential mark *H*, we can conclude *S*. In presumption, we assume our conclusion in order to resolve an apparent contradiction. More than one way exists to resolve conflicts, and so presumption lacks the necessity that characterizes *anumāna*.

The traditional example of presumption, discussed earlier, is: if we are given the facts that (1) Devadatta is fat and (2) Devadatta does not eat during the day, we must presume (3) that Devadatta eats at night.<sup>10</sup> There is no pervasion relationship between the non-observation of someone eating during the day and their eating at night, but given the background assumption that fat people eat, we can assume that if Devadatta does not eat during the day, he does at night.<sup>11</sup> However, we could also explain the fact that he does not eat during the day by assuming he only has a liquid diet and eats during the day, or that he is an exception to the general rule that fat people must eat,

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<sup>10</sup>See 2.3.3 on page 89.

<sup>11</sup>Some Indian philosophers argued that there is such a pervasion relationship, and that presumption is a specific kind of inference known as “negative-only concomitance.” The Nyāya, for example, made this claim. Abhinavagupta points this out in his *Locana* on 2.27, discussing a variant of this example (in which the person is Caitra, not Devadatta). Ānanda does not address how he would respond to the Naiyāyika’s analysis of indication.

and so on. On this view, the utterance

(2) Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day

is interpreted as meaning, through *lakṣaṇā*,

(3) Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day, he eats at night.

But since the interpretive method is presumption, Ānanda says that we do not understand non-literal meaning through *anumāna*.

Ānanda claims that suggested meaning, like denoted and indicated meaning, is also not recovered by *anumāna*. Again, for *anumāna* to be the means for a hearer to access what is suggested, she would need to have knowledge of a pervasion relationship, such as in the smoke/fire example. This would mean that, given the appropriate inferential mark, an interpreter can conclude there is necessarily a certain suggested meaning present. But, as we will now see, Ānanda argues that this is not possible.

### 5.1.1 Against suggestion as *anumāna*

Ānanda's argument against his opponent is simple. He says:

For if it were true that cases of the [suggestive] word-function are inferential marks, then, for the meaning of words, there would be agreement regarding their falsity and the like, and there certainly would not be disputes—just like instances of what is inferred from

an inferential mark such as smoke.<sup>12</sup>

The argument can be represented as a simple *modus tollens*:

**Argument against *anumāna*: Version 1**

1. If words are inferential marks for suggested meaning, then there is no dispute over the suggested meaning of words.
2. Implied: There is a dispute over the suggested meaning of words.
3. Therefore, words are not inferential marks.<sup>13</sup>

To support his case, Ānanda presents the paradigmatic example of *anumāna*: reasoning from the presence of the inferential mark smoke to the presence of fire. Ānanda asserts that, like this instance, in true cases of *anumāna*, there is no disagreement. An initial response might be to reject the argument as unsound because the first premise is false. After all, it is obviously open for people to (erroneously) disagree with the conclusion of a valid deductive inference, for instance. Any first-year logic instructor is familiar with students disagreeing when presented with a sufficiently complex, yet deductively valid argument. If suggestion is recovered by a deductive inference, we need not expect that the inference is so patently obvious that no one would disagree about its conclusion (the suggested meaning).

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<sup>12</sup>There is a peculiarity in the formulation of his argument. Much of the content that Ānanda characterizes as “suggested” is not the sort of thing that would, in principle, be true or false. Figures of speech, aesthetic moods, or implied requests are not true or false, although perhaps one could characterize them as more or less apt. Charitably, that is how I read the appended “and the like” (Sanskrit: ‘*ādi*’) to mean.

<sup>13</sup>Recall that inferential marks, as described in Chapter 2, are the indicators or “provers” that give us a reason (*hetu*) to think another, unobserved property, is present.

However, the Indian *pramāṇa* tradition, as discussed in Chapter 2, closely connects psychological processes of  *anumāna* to formal patterns of reasoning. A cognition due to  *anumāna* can be described (following Mohanty) as having the form:

For any knower *S*, if *S* has a perceptual cognition *Fx*, and then remembers the rule, ‘Wherever there is *F*, there is *G*’ as instantiated in the uncontroversial case *O*, and then perceives in *x* the same *F* as before but this time as figuring in the remembered rule ‘Wherever there is *F*, there is *G*,’ then *S* will experience an inferential cognition of the form *Gx*, provided there is no relevant hindrance.<sup>14</sup>

When someone draws a fallacious conclusion, on the Indian analysis one reason they might do so is because they are employing a defective inferential mark. To do so is to employ an incorrect universal rule, but to still follow the universal rules of  *anumāna*.<sup>15</sup> For example, if I (incorrectly) reason “This lake possesses fire, because it possesses water,” I am relying upon a universal rule, “Wherever there is water, there is fire,” which turns out to be a defective as it relies on an improper inferential mark—water. The presence of water does not indicate the presence of fire. Should I come to learn this fact, I would not draw such an conclusion. So when Ānanda appeals to the impossibility of disagreement in cases of  *anumāna*, he is appealing to the impossibility of dispute once the correct inferential marks and pervasion relationship are identified. If we all

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<sup>14</sup>Mohanty 1957, p. 111. Here “*Fx*” is to be read as “*x* qualified by *F*.”

<sup>15</sup>Mohanty 1957, p. 113.

agree about these things, then disagreement is impossible. Thus Ānanda's position is, more explicitly, as below:

**Argument against *anumāna*: Version 2**

1. If words are inferential marks for suggested meaning, then once the correct inferential mark(s) and pervasion relationship are identified there is no dispute over the suggested meaning of words.
2. Implied: There is a dispute over the suggested meaning of words once the correct inferential mark and pervasion relationship are identified.
3. Therefore, words are not inferential marks.

Given this reading, the objection now shifts to the second premise. Recall, within the framework introduced earlier, that there must be a pervasion relationship between what is observed and what is to be concluded. In the case of suggestion, the pervasion relationship likely involves not only the words of the utterance, but a number of contextual factors. Varying these contextual factors would change what is suggested, so that there could be a number of very similar pervasion rules:

1. Where there is utterance  $U$  and contextual factors  $C_1, C_2, C_3$ , there is suggestion  $S_a$ .
2. Where there is utterance  $U$  and contextual factors  $C_1, C_2, C_3, C_4$ , there is suggestion  $S_b$ .
3. Where there is utterance  $U$  and contextual factors  $C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n$ , there is suggestion  $S_x$ .

If the right contextual factors are not taken into account, it is to be expected that there would be disagreement about the suggested meaning. But, Ānanda's opponent can argue, the dispute is actually grounded in what pervasion relationship competing interpreters are (tacitly) relying upon. So many of the subtle suggestions we generate as skillful language users are one-off and highly context-dependent. It would be easy to overlook a relevant contextual factor. While it is true that once we have established the pervasion relationship and the inferential mark, everyone can agree about what is suggested, difficult interpretive projects are characterized by disagreement over what to take into account. This, concludes the opponent, does not mean the project is any less a matter of  *anumāna*. In other words, the second premise is false, because the dispute is not over the meaning of words, given agreement on the pervasion. Rather, the dispute is really over which of the pervasion rules is at play. This move requires giving up the claim that words  *alone* are the inferential mark relevant for determining what is suggested.

Further, this response to Ānanda's argument is supported by his own emphasis on the  *sahr̥daya*, or "skillfull interpreter" (and recall that, dialectically, the opponent is charging Ānanda with a view that entails he should accept that suggestion is  *anumāna*). One might think that part of what makes an interpreter skillful is her ability to determine what contextual factors are relevant to recovering what is suggested by a speaker. Given that not everyone has such skills, we should expect disagreement, minimally between the skillful and



the unskilled, but also among the unskilled interpreters themselves.<sup>16</sup> The fact of this disagreement alone does not require that the suggested is understood by a means other than  *anumāna*.

Finally, Ānanda emphasizes the contextual conditions which influence the content of what is suggested. In an earlier discussion of how suggestion is like  *anumāna* (though he is careful not to claim suggestion *is* identified with  *anumāna*), he observes that suggestion is “conditioned by context” and this is why the same word can yield different suggested meanings in different instances.<sup>17</sup> Ingalls remarks, in a footnote on this passage, that being suggestive and being an inferential mark are similar in that

They are not properties essential to an entity but properties that appear in an entity under certain conditions, or when the entity is set in a certain relation. The entity smoke possesses  *liṅgatva* (the property of being a signpost or middle term) to fire only under the double condition that (a) we do not already know of the presence of fire and (b) we wish to infer the presence of fire. The word  *gaṅgā* possesses suggestiveness of coolness and purity only under certain conditions...but when the conditions are present, it invariably gives those suggestions.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, the opponent’s possible objection as I have presented it above seems not only independently plausible, but consistent with Ānanda’s own observations

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<sup>16</sup> Ānanda himself points out that knowing what is suggested is not just a matter of knowing grammar and dictionary meanings.

<sup>17</sup> The term for “conditioned by context, etc.” is  *prakaraṇa-ādy-avacchedena*, in DV 3.331.

<sup>18</sup> Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 579.

about how suggestion works. Even if we expand the “inferential mark” to include the contextual conditions, the recovery of suggestion could still be a case of *anumāna*.

## 5.2 Recontextualizing the argument

Despite these responses to his argument, Ānanda’s objection to characterizing suggestion as deductive inference can still be rehabilitated. There are a couple of intuitive reasons we might agree that our understanding of discourse-level figures of speech, emotional moods accompanying poetry, and the like are not best explained by *anumāna*. These reasons rely on distinguishing between two senses of the general concept of “inference.” The first sense is inference *qua* argument. An argument is a set of propositions or statements in which there is a relationship of implication between two or more of them. Arguments are formal representations, abstracted away from a particular thinker who might claim belief in one or more of the propositions in the argument. The second sense of inference, inference *qua* reasoning, does not abstract away from thinkers. Reasoning often involves arguments, in that a reasoner may conclude  $q$  from her belief that  $p$  and her belief that if  $p$ , then  $q$ . However, as Gilbert Harman has demonstrated, it is not apparent that the principles of implication which drive arguments are identical to the principles of reasoning which govern actions, belief revisions, and so on.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>See Harman 1986. For instance, the principle of *modus ponens* requires that in an argument, given  $p$  and  $p \rightarrow q$ ,  $q$  necessarily follows. In contrast, if I as a reasoner accept  $p$

The category of  *anumāna*  in Indian philosophy straddles both argument and reasoning. On the one hand, the five-fold structure of  *anumāna*  can be represented using the familiar notation of predicate logic, even if the constituent parts should not be taken to be abstract propositions.<sup>20</sup> On the other hand,  *anumāna*  requires a thinker to have mental states whose contents are such things as the pervasion relationship, the knowledge that the inferential mark exists. The thinker then brings these mental states together in such a way as to generate knowledge of the conclusion, through reflection ( *parāmarśa* ). There is thus both a causal structure (a certain collection of mental contents causes knowledge) as well as a normative logical structure (one ought to believe the conclusion given the facts represented by the mental states).

While these two aspects of inference (argument and reasoning) are integrated within the Indian tradition into the single category of  *anumāna* , they are conceptually distinct.<sup>21</sup> We can, in the spirit of Ānanda's objection, reconceive of

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and also accept  $p \rightarrow q$ , it is open to me, upon reflection, to reject  $p$  rather than conclude  $q$ .

<sup>20</sup>This is  *para-artha-anumāna*  or "inference for others." As Phillips puts it in his (forthcoming), "In an "inference for others," there are five "members" ( *avayava* ) to be construed as a single statement governed by grammatical and semantic rules and designed to provoke inferential knowledge in another." Siderits is quite correct to say that these constituents are "not the sorts of things which, like propositions, could be either true or false" since if one of the constituents turns out to be false, we have a case of pseudo-inference, and not inference. Siderits 1991, p. 305. He takes this as a reason to deny that  *anumāna*  is an argument. However, I think this is to over-emphasize the gulf between Indian and Western logic and epistemology. A better approach might be to distinguish between the conditional in Indian logic and the conditional in Western logic, for instance. The first is false if the antecedent is false, regardless of the truth of the consequent, in contrast to the material conditional. Phillips 5.

<sup>21</sup>The tradition itself does distinguish between  *tarka* , or counterfactual reasoning, and the kind of factive arguments present in  *anumāna* . Thus it is not as if the notion of formal validity was entirely alien to Indian philosophy, simply less useful given their projects.

his argument in two ways. First, we can ask if it is plausible that suggested meanings are recovered through an inferential epistemic event. This is to ask whether the process of reasoning illustrated by the if-smoke-then-fire example would be sufficient to get an interpreter to what is suggested. Second, we can ask if it is plausible that a given suggested meaning is justifiable by an inferential argument. This is to ask whether, regardless of how interpreters actually recover suggested meanings, they can appeal to a deductive argument as justification for that particular meaning being what is suggested in a context.

Frequently the inferential reasoning which leads to a particular interpretation and the inferential justification are not distinguished, since, as Bach and Harnish put it, “that the hearer arrives at a plausible candidate [for the speaker’s illocutionary intent] is, and is taken to be, good reason to believe it to be the correct one.”<sup>22</sup> However, since Grice, philosophers of language have been engaged in debate over how it is that hearers can recover what speakers implicate by way of their utterance. One of Grice’s requirements for a conversational implicature is that the speaker believes that her hearer can either work out or grasp intuitively what is being implicated.<sup>23</sup> However, even if the hearer simply “grasp[s] intuitively” what is implicated, Grice thinks that there must be some way in which the implication is derivable from the utterance. This is important for conversational implicatures since these are implicatures that

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Phillips, forthcoming.

<sup>22</sup>Bach and Harnish 1979, p. 91.

<sup>23</sup>Grice 1989, pp. 30-31.

rely upon general principles of communication and rationality, and they are not, like *conventional* implicatures, arbitrarily stipulated.

As shown earlier, Ānanda rejects the proposal that suggestion is a matter of convention.<sup>24</sup> Ānanda's view, while at odds with those who think what is suggested is inferable, is in agreement with contemporary philosophers who reject deductive inference as a plausible account of this working-out process, either psychologically or formally. For instance, Levinson distinguishes implicatures from logical inferences, saying the former "cannot be directly modeled in terms of some semantic relation like entailment."<sup>25</sup> Bach and Harnish, whose Speech Act Schema (SAS) is intended to be a psychological (as well as formal) account of inference to speaker intentions, observe that "the SAS is not deductive, but what might be called an inference to a plausible explanation, namely of the speaker's utterance."<sup>26</sup> These philosophers emphasize the defeasibility, flexibility, and generally hypothetical nature of the inferences involved in communication. As I understand Ānanda, this is part of why he rejects *anumāna* as a suitable account of how we recover suggestion.

For both of these questions—the psychological and formal—rather than taking the fact of a dispute over what is suggested as being part of a strong *modus tollens* argument, as earlier, we might take it, instead as an observation requiring explanation.<sup>27</sup> While this is not how Ānanda's case is presented in the

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<sup>24</sup>See 4.5 on pages 184ff.

<sup>25</sup>Levinson 1983, 115-116.

<sup>26</sup>Bach and Harnish 1979, p. 92.

<sup>27</sup>This suggestion is due to Josh Dever.

*Dhvanyāloka*, I think it is in the spirit of his project, which is to show that the linguistic capacities already identified by the Indian tradition are insufficient to account for the full scope of language's effects. We observe that there are other phenomena, such as suggested facts, discourse-level figures of speech, and aesthetic moods, and yet our existing framework cannot explain them. Further, there is an element of interpretive skill involved in determining just what is suggested, leading to controversy, especially in highly creative and poetic cases. Given these facts, what sort of explanation ought we give for how interpreters succeed? *Anumāna* is an epistemic instrument which gives us a necessary conclusion given certain facts already known and the application of a universal rule. As such, it is implausible, thinks Ānanda, that it could be the way in which we come to know what is suggested.

### 5.2.1 Recovering what is suggested through inferential reasoning

In this new context, suppose Ānanda's opponent claims that we recover what is suggested through inferential reasoning, where the form follows the five-fold framework of *anumāna*. The proposal is that an interpreter reasons as follows:

- (4) There is an heroic mood suggested in this poem, *Raguvamśa*.

For there is the word 'rākṣasa' and contextual factors  $C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n$ .

(Wherever there is 'rākṣasa' and contextual factors  $C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n$  there is the heroic mood), as in the *Māhabhārata*.

This is such a case (*Raguvamśa*).

Therefore it is so, i.e., there is an heroic mood suggested in this poem,  
*Raguvamśa*.

Now, one way to understand the claim made here is that there are at least some cases in which we recover suggested meaning through *anumāna*. It need not be the stronger claim that we can only understand what is suggested by *anumāna*. This weaker claim is alluded to by Ānanda a little later, where he notes that we sometimes check word meaning, for example, by other means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) than testimony, but this does not mean that words are not paradigmatic instances of the *pramāṇa* of testimony.<sup>28</sup> To elaborate, suppose I am told the word “vermillion” means a shade of red. I may verify this in an encyclopedia, where I see an image of the particular shade next to the word. This would be using the knowledge source of perception (*pratyakṣa*), but that I have used perception to verify the meaning of “vermillion” does not mean that the word should now be classified as conveying its meaning by perception.

Applying this analogy to suggestion, it is open to Ānanda to admit that we could verify what is suggested by using *anumāna*, without thereby having to conclude that suggestion is identical to *anumāna*. However, Ānanda does not make this move, and in fact, explicitly rejects it, saying that since we do not check for the truth of suggested meanings, inference does not apply. He essentially characterizes such an enterprise as a category mistake, possibly implying

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<sup>28</sup> *DV* 3.33p.

that suggested content is not true or false.<sup>29</sup> Whether his opponent is making a universal claim about the relationship between *anumāna* and suggestion, Ānanda certainly is: for him, there is no instance in which it is appropriate to say that the content of what is (poetically) suggested is recovered by *anumāna*, here understood as inferential reasoning.<sup>30</sup>

I take it that a stronger reason for rejecting inferential reasoning, given Ānanda's observations and the model of inferential reasoning available in the Indian tradition, is that it is impossible for interpreters to have access to the kind of pervasion relationship which would prompt the conclusion as illustrated above. The premises that are crucial to inferential reasoning—in a genuine case of *anumāna*—are veridical. Further, not only are the claims true, but the reasoner *knows* they are true. So, for an interpreter to be prompted to conclude that there is an heroic mood suggested in this poem, *Raguvamśa*, she would need to know that wherever there is 'rākṣasa' and contextual factors  $C_1, C_2, \dots, C_n$ , there is the heroic mood.

While the literature on how we come to know such a connection is complicated, in general, observation of similar cases is what grounds such a claim of pervasion between two features. Pervasion means that given an inferential mark  $H$ , if  $x$  is an  $H$ , then  $x$  must also be an  $S$ . The pervasion relationship is one that

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<sup>29</sup>He calls this employment of inference useless ('*nirupayoga*) and 'a "laughable occupation" ('*upahāsyā eva sampadyate*') without saying exactly why. Abhinavagupta's *Locana* does not clarify further, only adding that the practice of applying inference to poetry is laughable because it demonstrates such a person's heart has been so hardened by logic that they do not understand pleasure. Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 592.

<sup>30</sup>This would be inference-for-oneself, or *sva-ārtha-anumāna*.



is said to obtain without additional conditions, or *upādhi*. In contemporary parlance, to have an *H* is to be sufficient for having an *S*. So, for instance, one could challenge the paradigmatic relationship between smoke and fire, arguing that fire is not actually sufficient for smoke, since the presence of wet fuel is required (and hence an *upādhi*). Here, we have already seen that it is unlikely that a word on its own could be an inferential mark for suggested meaning, but other contextual factors act as *upādhi*, or sufficient conditions.

The problem for ascertaining the pervasion relationship between a word and a set of contextual factors is the complexity involved. On this reconstrued account, the inferentialist argues that hearers have knowledge of a pervasion rule which they apply for each instance of suggestion. However, while it may be conceptually possible to formulate complex rules of pervasion between words and contextual factors to a suggested content, that a human interpreter could grasp such rules is unlikely. Further, even assuming she could observe enough uncomplicated cases to form rules, this does not account for how we come to understand unique cases of suggestion. One of the capacities of the poet is to use words in a new manner, breaking established literary conventions to generate a surprising insight, or a profound aesthetic experience. If this is part of what we understand through suggestion, inferential reasoning of the form described above does seem inadequate to generate an experience.

### 5.2.2 Justifying what is suggested through inferential argument

Suppose instead that Ānanda's opponent claims that we merely must be able to *justify* what is suggested through inferential arguments. The proposal is that an interpreter, who has somehow come to understand that a poem has a heroic mood, gives justification for that belief through the argument above. Some of the same problems touched upon earlier resurface here, albeit in a different context. How can the hearer come to have knowledge of the pervasion rule to use as justification for her interpretation? And will there be a pervasion rule for all instances of creative poetry, or are these applications of a more general rule?

Further, the role of  *anumāna*  is to provide us with a basis for actionable knowledge, in such a way that the strong knowledge claim which secures the premises transmits to the conclusion. So, from the fact that I  *know*  there is smoke on a mountain, and the fact that I  *know*  that where there is smoke, there is fire, I can then  *know*  that there is fire on that mountain. One way to read Ānanda's good-natured jab at the "laughable occupation" of using logic in the context of poetry is to understand him as saying interpretation of creative utterances is not a matter of  *knowledge* . This is especially salient for cases of poetry, where one might argue that it is a mistaken endeavor to ask after reading a poem, "What have I come to know?" and answer by enumerating a list of what the poem suggests.

Certainly some poetry has as its central effects the prompting of a particular emotion, or the coming to picture some beautiful scenery in the "mind's eye."

However, as David Hills points out, poetry is still linguistic, and as such is a medium “designed for the formulation of determinate propositions and the presentation of determinate arguments.”<sup>31</sup> Of course, Ānanda might restrict this to the literal content of a poem, and exclude it from the domain of suggestion.<sup>32</sup> However, we might think that from the discourse-level metaphor present in *As You Like It*, we can come to have knowledge about the way in which social roles are like acting parts in a play.<sup>33</sup> Finally, even if we want to reject this suggestion, it still seems open for someone who has read a poem to say, “I know *that* this poem suggests the heroic mood,” or “I know *that* the author is suggesting social roles are like acting in a play.”

The objection that knowledge is an inapplicable concept in the context of creative utterances becomes even more implausible in ordinary situations. After all, indirect speech is frequently a way of prompting someone to act. The infamous case of the taciturn letter-writer who says of her student,

(5) Jones has good handwriting

is a situation where what is communicated through implicature, that Jones is not a good student, is something which the letter reader will subsequently act upon. We can theorize about how certain the letter reader is about a particular proposition: “Jones is not a good student” versus “Jones should

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<sup>31</sup>Hills 2008, p. 14.

<sup>32</sup>This is not entirely satisfactory, of course, as he has argued that not even the denoted content is accessible by *anumāna*.

<sup>33</sup>“All the world’s a stage, And all the men and women merely players; They have their exits and their entrances...” *As You Like It*.

not be admitted to your institution.” This is to admit, however, that even the domain of creative or indirect speech, admits of rational principles.

Still, whether Ānanda overstates the case in dismissing *anumāna* applied to poetry as “laughable,” the Jones case points to a serious problem in using *anumāna* to justify a given interpretation: defeasibility. The argument form above is understood to necessitate the conclusion, once it is accepted that the premises are true. Yet, in a sense, it is central to suggestion (and to conversational implicature in contemporary Western philosophy) that its content is not necessarily entailed by the expression. Take the example of (5). Suppose we think that the utterance (or the utterance plus contextual features) necessitates that the speaker must mean

(6) Jones is not a good student.

Were this the case, it would be a contradiction for the letter-writer to say something like

(7) Jones has good handwriting. He is also the best student I have ever seen.

However, the fact that it is not—that, in contemporary parlance, the implicature (6) is cancellable—must mean that an argument from (5) to (6) cannot be deductively valid and sound. It could be trivially valid, and simply entail a contradiction, both (6) and (7). However, in the Indian context, only sound arguments count as *anumāna*, so a trivially valid argument would be a

pseudo- *anumāna*. In the Western context, from a contradiction, one can infer anything at all. On neither perspective do we want this sort of thing as our justification for an interpretation.

### 5.3 Beyond *anumāna*: concluding remarks

At this point, we might conclude that while Ānanda has won the day against those who want to reduce suggestion to  *anumāna*, his victory is a small one. After all, why would we expect that our interpretive process, or our justification for our favored interpretation (regardless of how we arrive at it), is necessitated in such a strong manner as  *anumāna* predicts? Further, the initial claim, that we can arrive at what is suggested from the expression itself as an inferential mark, is far too implausible an account of the nuanced manner in which communication works.

Let us remind ourselves of Ānanda's overarching project. We use language creatively, in ways that generate implied facts, discourse-level figures of speech, and aesthetic moods. These creative uses of language are difficult for interpreters to agree upon, although there is some fact of the matter about what poets and other language-users mean. In addition to basic linguistic competence, excellent interpreters seem to have some skills which enable them to have access to these suggested contents. The linguistic capacities of denotation and  *lakṣaṇā* seem insufficient to account for what is suggested, as does stipulation by convention. What could account for the skillful access to these varieties of what is suggested? The epistemic instrument of  *anumāna* is one of

the last remaining answers that theorists of Ānanda's day can give. However, this proposal fails in the several ways described above.

What this exploration of *anumāna* does give us, however, is a clearer picture of the sort of thing our access to suggestion might be, on Ānanda's view. We need an interpretive process which does take into account the expression meaning, but not it alone. We want the outcome of our process to be rationally constrained (by what, we have yet to determine). Based on cases like the Jones' handwriting, we might think our interpretation could yield more than one potential suggested meaning. The hearer might even have different credences towards them, perhaps. Finally, while the five-fold framework of *anumāna* may not turn out to be the best model for access to suggestion, it does incorporate both psychological and normative elements in a way that we might expect of our communicative endeavors.

Much of our language processing is rapid and, even in cases of highly creative and non-literal speech, we generate interpretations without much effort. Yet while there is a causal element in play (recall Davidson's "bump on the head" analogy for metaphor), at the risk of unmooring our linguistic abilities from rationality, we want a model that also includes why we typically take our linguistic cognitions as justified. Further, we'd like some explanation of why *some* interpretations are ill-conceived. As it turns out, the Indian tradition has some of the scaffolding for just such a model, and it involves a closer examination of the way in which presumption functions in the linguistic capacity of *lakṣaṇā*. We've already described this form of reasoning as being closer to

the hypothesis-generating, defeasible, inference to the best explanation familiar to contemporary philosophers. The arguments above, in highlighting how *anumāna* falls short as a way to access what is suggested, point us in the direction of presumption. In the next chapter, I argue that this is the solution that Mukulabhaṭṭa presents, in a largely successful manner.

## Chapter 6

### Recovering Meaning through Presumption

Mukulabhaṭṭa's thesis is that indication, or *lakṣaṇā*, is responsible for the effects of the function of suggestion identified by Ānandavardhana. He is a reductionist about suggestion, claiming in his monograph that "what is described here is what is included in the proper account of indication, but is considered by the sensitive readers to be a novel classification, due to *dhvani*."<sup>1</sup> The term "sensitive readers" is Mukula's way of picking out those who subscribe to the theory of *dhvani* put forward by Ānanda. He claims that there are multiple kinds of incompatibility that hearers attempt to resolve through *lakṣaṇā*, and that the sub-varieties of *lakṣaṇā* correspond to Ānanda's purported varieties of suggestion. I argue that Mukula's analysis is, in some ways, a Gricean account of pragmatic features of language. However, his theory is not straightforwardly comparable to a single Western model, which I demonstrate in discussion of Mukula's theory of sentence-meaning. Still, his view does share a potential problem with Gricean theories: the failure of calculability. Essentially, calculability is the requirement that interpreters could reason to the meaning indicated by the literal meaning. I offer a possible solution on Mukula's behalf,

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<sup>1</sup>See appended translation, 367.



which is to weaken the requirement for calculability. However, I note that, in the context of the epistemological goals of Mukula’s work, this solution may be costly.

### 6.1 *Lakṣaṇā* as removing incompatibility

Mukula’s argument against Ānanda and the “sensitive readers” is embedded within a larger proposal for how communication works as a whole. He begins *The Fundamentals of the Communicative Function*, as described earlier, with a discussion of the epistemic role of the function of language. He then discusses competing views about the function of denotation, settling upon a view which is closely related to the Grammarian tradition in Indian philosophy. In brief, he claims that instead of having as their primary denotation a universal or generic class property (as the Bhāṭṭa claim), words denote qualities, generic class properties, actions, or objects which bear names. While he spends a relatively small amount of time discussing lexical semantics, this section is important in demarcating the boundaries of *lakṣaṇā*. This is because *lakṣaṇā* picks up where the denotative function, or “word’s function,” ends: “that meaning understood by reflection on the meaning conveyed by the word’s function: this is the indicatory function.”<sup>2</sup> Thus, our theory of *lakṣaṇā* is in part circumscribed by our theory of denotation.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>See appended translation, 306

<sup>3</sup>Despite Ānanda spending a portion of the *Dhvanyāloka* discussing the form of suggestion which is dependent upon the sound of particular phonemes, Mukula does not address this at all but starts with denotation. He gives no explanation as to why he omits phonemes,

In his analysis of the varieties of *lakṣaṇā*, which he takes to explain the putative function of suggestion, Mukula makes several distinctions, represented in the table below.

Table 6.1: First Analysis of Indication

| Pure                   |                     | Mixed Transfer                         |                                       |   |                                     |
|------------------------|---------------------|--|---------------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| Inclusive:             | Indirect:           | Pure Transfer                          |                                       | Qualitative Transfer                                  |                                     |
| A cow is to be tied up | ‘ <i>dvirepha</i> ’ | <b>Super-imposed:</b><br>Ghee is life. | <b>Established:</b><br><i>pañcālā</i> | <b>Super-imposed:</b><br>The Punjabi peasant is an ox | <b>Established:</b><br><i>rājan</i> |

Mukula’s first example of *lakṣaṇā* is the traditional example also cited by Ānanda: (15) “The village is on the Ganges.” He observes, agreeing with Ānanda, that *lakṣaṇā* conveys “bank of the Ganges” because the river, which is the literal denotation of “Ganges,” is not appropriate as a basis of support for a village. Moving on from this case, which is metonymic, Mukula then cites an example of a (pejorative) metaphor:

- (1) The Punjabi peasant is an ox.<sup>4</sup>

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but it is likely that he considers phonemic suggestion to be a phenomenon outside of the purview of an explanation of communication, his central topic. While the text is silent as to why this might be, I speculate that it is because whatever a phoneme may contribute to cognitions that arise from language, its contribution is essentially explicable by other features, such as a speaker’s overall communicative aim. In any case, his main concern is suggestion dependent upon words and sentences as units, which, in either case, is actually *lakṣaṇā*.

<sup>4</sup>See appended translation, 315

He again observes that there is an obstacle for the denotative function, saying that the literal meaning is “blocked” (*bādhita*). Due to this obstacle, he says, we transfer qualities to the Punjabi peasant which are similar to those belonging to the ox, namely dullness and laziness. *Lakṣaṇā* is also taken as the explanation for these two sentences:

(2) A cow is to be tied up.

(3) Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.

The first example, (2), is consistent with the Bhāṭṭa formulation of *lakṣaṇā*. Recall that, wherever a noun is to be qualified by an action word, the Bhāṭṭa claim that hearers understand the sentence meaning through indication as described earlier. In this case, Mukula observes:

The property of being a cow is not appropriate for sacrifice without the implication of an individual based on the word; therefore for this property to be established as the meaning there is implication of a particular.”<sup>5</sup>

He will later call this kind of *lakṣaṇā* “appropriation” since the meaning which is understood through *lakṣaṇā* is part of the denoted meaning. In other words, the generic class property of COWHOOD is present in the individual cow, which is understood through *lakṣaṇā*. In contrast, in the case of (15), the bank of the river is not part of the denotation “river,” and so is called “pure” *lakṣaṇā*.

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<sup>5</sup>See appended translation, 316

Pure indication can be inclusive or indirect. The latter simply pick out another meaning, without the denoted meaning being part of the indicated meaning. For example, ‘*dvirepha*’ literally means “two-r’s” and thereby refers to the word ‘*bhramara*’, the Sanskrit word for bee. Therefore, ‘*dvirepha*’ indirectly indicates “bee,” but a bee is not a thing with two-r’s, and so the relationship is unlike that between cowhood and a cow. In contrast to pure indication, mixed transfer indication is as in (1) “The Punjabi peasant is an ox,” a metaphorical slur. In this kind of *lakṣaṇā*, properties of one object are taken to to be properties of another object. The metaphorical target, the peasant, is understood to have the properties of the vehicle, in this case the ox. Here the properties are things such as being dull and lazy.

In contrast, in the sentence (2) “A cow is to be tied up,” the particular cow is not understood as having the qualities of the universal of cowhood, but there is simply a shift from universal to particular. There is inclusion because the universal COWHOOD inheres in the particular cow which is denoted. But cognition of the universal as related to the particular is not necessary to understand the point, as in the case of metaphor. Mixed transfer divides between pure and qualitative, each of which subdivides further into superimposed and established. Briefly, the difference between pure mixed transfer and qualitative mixed transfer is in the way in which the properties are shared between the two objects. In qualitative mixed transfer, the relationship is of similarity, but pure mixed transfer can be any other sort of relationship, such as cause and effect. Thus, in

(4) Ghee is long life,

, the vehicle, ghee, is the cause of long life, the metaphorical target.<sup>6</sup> There is no similarity in the properties of ghee and the properties of a long life.

Finally, in either qualitative or pure mixed transfer, Mukula distinguishes between superimposed and established cases. The relevant difference here is how salient the vehicle of the metaphor is for conceptualizing its target. In (4) the vehicle is superimposed upon the target and the interpreter is said to be aware of its role in understanding long life. Established cases are in contrast to this, since we do not conceive of the target as being related to the vehicle. Examples include ‘*rājan*,’ which is used to refer to a ruler who is not of the royal class. Although there are similarities between the literal denotation of ‘*rājan*’ (which picks out a royal person) and its indication (which picks out a lower class ruler or important person), hearers do not conceive of the lower class person as a royal person. Likewise for pure mixed transfer, ‘*pañcālā*,’ the word indicates a geographical place, by way of the location where the descendants of the Pañcālā tribe lived, but there is no awareness of this on the part of the hearer. The word is said to (literally and originally) denote the Pañcālā people, but through *lakṣaṇā*, indicates their territory.

Mukula goes on to gloss (3), which is an example of the form of reasoning called *arthāpatti*, or presumption. As said earlier, if we are given the facts

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<sup>6</sup>The metaphor relies on the belief that ghee, or clarified butter, was thought to be an important element of diet contributing to health and longevity.

that (1) Devadatta is fat and (2) Devadatta does not eat during the day, we must presume (3) that Devadatta eats at night. Mukula adds that

...the possession of fatness, because of its being an effect, is simply being understood as characterized by an absence of eating, an absence which has its existence during the day. By possessing a self-established meaning, the existence of a cause (of the fatness) is caused to be included because of the implication that there is eating at night.<sup>7</sup>

He explicitly identifies (3) as being parallel to (2), by calling them both “appropriation,” by transitioning between (2) and (3) with “and likewise” (*yathā ca*’), and describing the denoted word-meanings in each case as ones which are “established by itself” (*sva-siddhi*). As shown earlier, (2) is a traditional example of *lakṣaṇā* by presumption, and (3) is a traditional example of the *pramāṇa* of presumption. This is the most explicit identification of how hearers come to retrieve the content of *lakṣaṇā* in his text, although, as we will see, the method of presumption undergirds his conception of *lakṣaṇā* in general.

What indication does, by means of presumption, is to remove an apparent conflict. However, so far, the examples that Mukula has given are ones which Ānanda might accept as being instances of *lakṣaṇā* and not suggestion. Mukula must expand the role of *lakṣaṇā* to account for the hard cases given in the *Dhvanyāloka*. These cases are the ones where Ānanda argues there is no failure of semantic fit and yet hearers recover something which is not re-

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<sup>7</sup>See appended translation, 317

ducible to denotation or *lakṣaṇā*. My claim is that Mukula expands the role of presumption in *lakṣaṇā* to removing incompatibility that is not only sentence-internal, but between, for example, the sentence meaning and facts about the speaker, or the sentence meaning and facts about the circumstance.

Mukula rejects Ānanda's claim that indication only operates when there is an obvious incompatibility among the *literal meanings of the words* within a sentence. Instead, there may be an inconsistency between any number of factors (speaker intention, sentence meaning, contextual facts). A hearer must first identify where the tension lies and then which interpretive method will best resolve it—although she need not be conscious of this process.<sup>8</sup>

The section where Mukula makes it clearest that *lakṣaṇā* does not operate strictly on the basis of conflict between sentence internal word-meanings is his comments on Verse 8, where he says,

From reflection upon the distinct forms of: speaker, sentence, and utterance, the six kinds of indication are able to be judged correctly by the thoughtful.<sup>9</sup>

After defining the terms “speaker,” “sentence,” and “utterance,” Mukula argues that it is from these “categorized as each on its own, or in combination, or in conjunction with place, time, and circumstance—each on its own, or

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<sup>8</sup>One could posit a mental module which processes these interpretations, or any number of explanations. While Mukula seems to describe a conscious, reflective process, this is not necessary for my reconstruction of his view and, indeed, it is implausible that hearers always engage in such reasoning to interpret utterances on the fly.

<sup>9</sup>See appended translation, 329.

in combination—that the essential six kinds of indication are distinguished by skillful scholars.”<sup>10</sup> He then goes on to take up several cases which would be identified as suggestion by Ānanda, and to explain how they are cases of *lakṣaṇā*.

For instance, he cites a set of verses belonging to the genre of Sanskrit love poetry:

- (5) Neighbor, watch our house here for a little while,  
This child’s father will not even at all drink the tasteless  
well-water.  
Now I go by myself to that forest stream which is bordered  
by *tamāla* trees,  
Let the reed’s dense joints, being broken long before, scratch  
my body.<sup>11</sup>

In (5), there is no lack of semantic fit among the constituent parts of the sentences. And yet, Mukula notes, readers would understand this young woman as lying, and saying that she will be scratched by reeds to mask the fact that she will bear “telling marks” from an adulterous encounter. On Ānanda’s conception, if there is no lack of semantic fit, there is no trigger for hearers to retrieve a non-literal meaning through *lakṣaṇā*. However, on Mukula’s view, this second meaning—the actual goal of the young woman, not her ly-

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<sup>10</sup>See appended translation, 329.

<sup>11</sup>The verse is from the *Subhāṣita-ratna-kośa* of Vidyākara. These lines are not found in the *Dhvanyāloka*, but Ānanda does comment upon a similar set of verses, in which a woman deceives a monk into leaving the location of her rendezvous. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p.83ff.



ing representation—is “understood through consideration of the speaker as unvirtuous.”<sup>12</sup> He says little about the process of understanding, simply that untruth has a “capacity to convey the opposite of a true meaning” and so by the untrue meaning (the literal meaning of the verses), the “truth which is uttered is indicated by possessing a meaning which establishes itself.” He describes this kind of meaning as appropriation, like the earlier clear instances of presumption. Further, Mukula describes this understanding as arising through reflection (*‘paryālocanayā’*) on the speaker’s nature, showing that the process of reasoning (implicitly: presumption) requires facts about the speaker.<sup>13</sup>

While not explicit in Mukula’s text, I think a helpful reconstruction of how hearers come to understand *lakṣaṇā* is by means of presumption based upon the elements he identifies (speaker, sentence, utterance, place, time, circumstance).

We can generalize the form of presumption as follows:

**Presumption**  $q$  is presumed from  $p$  and  $m$  iff:

1.  $p$  and  $m$  are two already-established facts
2. The presumption of  $q$  is required to make  $p$  compatible with  $m$ .

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<sup>12</sup>See appended translation, 336.

<sup>13</sup>This case is more complicated than Mukula recognizes, due to the poetic frame. Are we to think that the young woman herself is intending her neighbor to recognize that she is hinting at an erotic encounter? If not, then perhaps we as readers assume based upon literary devices that the woman is lying, and thereby come to recognize what she plans through the poet’s attributing words to her. What counts as a background assumption and what counts as an implied, secondary meaning, is not obvious here.

Applying this general structure to example (5), we have:

*implied meaning* is presumed from *speaker's nature* and *literal meaning* iff:

1. *speaker's nature* and *literal meaning* are two already-established facts
2. The presumption of *implied meaning* is required to make *speaker's nature* compatible with *literal meaning*.

The knowledge of the speaker's nature as a lying woman could be part of the background knowledge that a reader well-versed in the tropes of Sanskrit poetry would have. The literal meaning would be understood through the denotative function of words.<sup>14</sup> Through presumption, a hearer comes to reconcile the apparent incompatibility between a woman who is unvirtuous and her apparently literal description of a trip to the river bank. The incompatibility is not obvious, however, unless supplemented with some additional assumptions, to which I now turn, in the context of developing Mukula's view as Gricean.

## 6.2 Mukula's hybrid view as Gricean

On Grice's account of implication, first an interpreter must be able to recognize that the speaker intends something beyond the strictly literal sentence meaning. That is, we must have accessible to us some kind of "trigger" or

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<sup>14</sup>Arguably, this literal meaning might require *lakṣaṇā*, as in the case of "A cow is to be tied up." More on this below in the discussion of sentence meaning.

“clue” that the speaker wants us to understand more than, or something other than, the literal sentence meaning. Then she must have a way to recover the implicated speaker meaning based on her knowledge of such things as the sentence meaning, context, and conversational principles. Grice claims there are general conversational maxims in place when speakers and hearers engage in cooperative conversations. He proposes a general principle which he takes to guide the rationality of contributions to such a conversation:

**Cooperative Principle (CP)** Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.<sup>15</sup>

The CP functions in conjunction with these more specific maxims:

**Maxim of Quantity.** Make your contribution as informative as required.

**Maxim of Quality.** Try to make your contribution one that is true.

**Maxim of Relation.** Be relevant.

**Maxim of Manner.** Be perspicuous.<sup>16</sup>

The “trigger” for interpreters to look for an implicated speaker meaning is some incompatibility between the sentence meaning and these Gricean conversational principles. Grice’s original proposal is as follows:

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<sup>15</sup>Grice 1989, p. 26.

<sup>16</sup>Some of these are further divisible into submaxims, which I do not include here. See Grice 1989, p. 26, for details.

**Conversational Implicature** *S* conversationally implicates that *q* in saying that *p* iff:

1. *S* is presumed to be observing the conversational maxims (or the Cooperative Principle),
2. The supposition that *S* thinks that *q* is required to make saying that *p* consistent with this presumption,
3. *S* thinks, and expects *H* to think that *S* thinks, the hearer can work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition that *q* is required.<sup>17</sup>

The structure of Gricean conversational implicature is strikingly parallel to the *pramāṇa* of presumption, save for the assumption of the conversational maxims and Cooperative Principle. While Mukula does not explicitly appeal to the existence of such principles, he relies on something analogous in his reasoning to his preferred interpretation. We see this clearly in his analysis of the case of Fat Devadatta, though such assumptions tacitly guide his analysis of other cases, too. As said earlier, in the case of (3) “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day,” there is an inconsistency between the sentence meaning and contextual facts (or background knowledge), namely, being fat and not eating. It is accepted that one cannot be fat if one does not eat. Mukula characterizes the inconsistency as related to cause and effect. In this sentence, fatness is the effect of not eating during the day. The meaning obtained by *lakṣaṇā* is that eating at night is required in order to explain the otherwise

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<sup>17</sup>Quoted verbatim from Grice 1989, p. 30-31.

inexplicable existence of fatness.

However, one might suggest that instead of focusing upon the *time* at which he is said not to eat, an interpreter could focus upon the lack of *eating*. This solution would be to understand the sentence as implicating that Devadatta drinks during the day. Mukula says this solution is not satisfactory because the speaker has mentioned the time of not eating. Implicit here is something like the Gricean Maxim of Quantity—make your contribution as informative as required. The time period is in some way informative, or it would not have been mentioned. If the sentence were “Fat Devadatta does not eat,” then perhaps the speaker meaning “Fat Devadatta drinks” would be more salient. Mukula does not address the possibility that (at least) two solutions to the tension are possible, even if the interpreter might have different credences towards each as what the speaker meant. Instead, Mukula says that the “Devadatta drinks” solution is “blocked” (*bādhita*) by the presence of the words “during the day.” However, there would be nothing infelicitous about uttering, “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day, he drinks at night,” so “blocked” is too strong a claim, if taken to mean necessity.

While Mukula does not explicitly identify every instance of indication as being connected to presumption, I think a case can be made that this general structure is shared in the other cases, too. Returning to the case of (15) “The village is on the Ganges,” Mukula gives an explanation that accounts for not only the metonymic shift from “Ganges’ to “bank of the Ganges,” but for the suggestion of properties associated with the river. His explanation, in full,

is:

Here is a case of indication by relationship, as in the example, “The village is on the Ganges.” For in this case, where the primary meaning of the word is blocked, since the particular stream denoted by the word “Ganges” is inapplicable as the locus of a village, the meaning, whose relationship is that of contiguity–and–contiguous things, indicates the bank as being a support of the village. And here, the purpose of indication with regard to the bank is to communicate things such as holiness and beauty, which the words do not convey but which are inherent in things related to the Ganges. For the words are unable to contact things such as holiness and beauty, because there is the unwanted possibility of under- and over-extension.<sup>18</sup>

In keeping with his style, Mukula is characteristically terse regarding how the intention and the unified meaning of “Ganges” work together to convey holiness and beauty. One important point, in the context of making comparisons with Grice, is that Mukula does identify the indicated meaning with the speaker’s intention. He seems to disagree with Ānanda that intention consists in a particular communicative aim, but not content. This claim is more apparent in the Sanskrit structure of this sentence, where the word for intention (*‘prayojanam’*) matches case, gender, and number with the clause “communicating of things such as holiness and beauty...”<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>See appended translation, 355.

<sup>19</sup>*gaṅgātva eka-artha samaveta asaṃvijñānā pada-puṇyatvamana uharatva-ādi-pratipādanam.*

We might think that in this case, presumption has a form as below:

*the speaker's intention* is presumed from the *literal meaning of "Ganges"* and *the inapplicability of the Ganges as a substratum* iff:

1. *literal meaning of "Ganges"* and *the inapplicability of the Ganges as a substratum* are two already-established facts;
2. The presumption of *the speaker's intention* is required to make *literal meaning of "Ganges"* compatible with *the inapplicability of the Ganges as a substratum*.

In this analysis, Mukula argues that cognition of the holiness and beauty is a result of the inapplicability of the Ganges river as a substratum of the village. So, like Ānanda, he thinks that (at least in some cases) a speaker would not have a reason to use the locative case for "Ganges" unless she wants to convey something more than just that the village is proximately situated to the Ganges. However, he does not explain why it is that in some cases what is presumed is the speaker's intention to convey holiness and beauty, and in other cases, what is presumed is simply a metonymic shift to "bank of the Ganges."<sup>20</sup> While this is a problem for Mukula's taxonomy of varieties of *lakṣaṇā* (the same example is subsumed under two different, seemingly contrary varieties), it points to a larger problem regarding the role of presumption: the non-necessary nature of its conclusions.

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<sup>20</sup>See McCrea 2008, p. 298-300 for more discussion. McCrea observes that Mukula does not seem especially concerned to address this, nor is Mukula's discussion of *prayojana*, or the speaker's intention, always as clear as we would like.

### 6.2.1 Mukula on sentence meaning

Before I discuss this problem regarding presumption, I briefly digress to address an important, but previously unexamined, aspect of Mukula’s arguments. He recognizes that while the Bhāṭṭa may be content with sentences such as (2) “A cow is to be tied up” explained as due to *lakṣaṇā*, the contextualist Prābhākara will not. Further, since he is working within the broader context of the prevailing *pramāṇa* theories which emphasize the role of sentences in generating true cognitions, he has a burden to explain how his view of *lakṣaṇā* fits theories not only of lexical semantics (as he does early in the text) but of sentence meanings. To this end, he makes an apparent digression into theories of sentence meaning. The discussion, however, has an important connection with the implicit claim that Mukula’s own hybrid view of sentence meaning is superior to the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara, in large part due to his theory of *lakṣaṇā*.

Mukula describes the the Bhāṭṭa theory of sentence meaning in [47.11]:

And in the case where there is first *connection-of-the-denoted*, then through the words’ natural sense, word-meanings which are referred to are subsequently denoted (together) due to the operations of syntactic expectancy, semantic fit, phonetic contiguity. Given this, indication is accepted as functioning upon word meanings which are universals when there is a mutual unifying relationship of qualified and particular. Because of the force of the word meanings, what possesses an expressed meaning does so on account of



its being later, when the meaning of the sentence is being understood.<sup>21</sup>

Here, Mukula explicitly appeals to the requirements of syntactic expectancy, semantic fit, and phonetic contiguity. Throughout his text, he describes indication as coming into play when semantic fit is blocked. For the Bhāṭṭa, this happens frequently, any time we require a particular instead of a universal as an object of a verb, as we've seen.

Mukula explains why the Prābhākara view initially seems not to require indication:

This is because the (word) meaning, which is grounded in a universal form that has an unwavering relationship with the native meaning, is understood in harmony with the sentence meaning as a whole entirety. In the case of such a view being understood, the six kinds of indication according to their distinctions—indication which is the object of this or that sentence meaning—would not appear.<sup>22</sup>

The kinds of indication which Mukula analyzes in his text are not part of the Prābhākara's account, because word meaning is radically contextual. In this way, the Prābhākara are like contemporary relevance theorists such as Robyn Carston, who has argued that hearers construct *ad hoc* concepts online in the course of utterance comprehension.<sup>23</sup> While this contextualist explanation

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<sup>21</sup>See appended translation, 349.

<sup>22</sup>See appended translation, 349.

<sup>23</sup>For details, see Chapter Five of Carston 2002.

does not preclude (as with the Prābhākara) there being a lexical entry for a word, hearers construct word meanings on the basis of such factors as relevance in a context. The Prābhākara go further than theorists like Carston, claiming we never know the lexical entry, but that it is still the basis for contextual meaning.

However, Mukula argues that, in fact, there is indication at a certain stage. While the Prābhākara do not need indication to bring universals into relation with one another, since on their view, words will extend their meaning to whatever is contextually, necessary, there may be cases where indication is still required. These are cases in which indication acts upon a sentence meaning. Mukula is terse, saying only “In connection to what is the expressed meaning, we say there is (something) *preceding*. Indication is situated in the stage which is the ground prior to this expressed meaning.”<sup>24</sup> I take him to be arguing that while all varieties of indication are not part of the Prābhākara view, it may be present in a case such as irony. Take a case like:

(6) One with a handsome face.<sup>25</sup>

where what the speaker wants to convey is that it is not the case that the person has a handsome face. On the Prābhākara view, hearers could understand what the constituent parts of the sentence mean through context, and then by indication, they come to understand that the speaker is intending the opposite

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<sup>24</sup>See appended translation, 349.

<sup>25</sup>See translation, 357.

of the sentence meaning.

Mukula argues, in contrast, that on the “hybrid” view (*samuccaya*), which seems to be his own:

Now in the combined view of *connection-of-the-denoted* and *denotation-through-the-connected*, by the act of combining the two-fold rule earlier described, we have, from the perspective of words, indication occurring at a time subsequent to the words expressing meaning. And from the perspective of sentences, it occurs after the sentence meaning and before there is an utterance meaning.<sup>26</sup>

Mukula recognizes that we need to explain how speakers understand metonymical shifts which occur within sentence as well as meaning which operates on an entire sentence meaning (such as irony putatively does). So he proposes that the Bhāṭṭa have things right from the “perspective of words,” but that the Prābhākara have things right from the “perspective of sentences.”

### 6.3 Failure of calculability and a solution

However much Mukula’s explanation draws attention to failures of existing theories of sentence meaning, as we have observed, it still seems to fall short as a viable explanation of non-literal interpretation. This problem has been noted by Sanskrit literary theorist Sheldon Pollock, although I think he overstates the difficulty. Pollock’s central thesis is that “the semantics of Sanskrit literary theory requires supplementation not only by a general linguistic

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<sup>26</sup>See appended translation, 351.

pragmatics but by a specific social pragmatics.”<sup>27</sup> In other words, whichever position you might align yourself with in regard to suggestion, Pollock argues that Sanskrit literary theory is incomplete as an explanation of how interpreters understand the meanings of poetry. Whether suggestion is counted as something additional to denotation and indication, or reduced to one of them, neither view will give us an adequate account of pragmatics. This is because, he says, we need a “specific social pragmatics,” something that can explain to us the significance of thickets on riverbanks, in the sense of what people do there, why they need privacy for it, and etc.<sup>28</sup> Pollock’s argument is based on the same intuition that some have argued generates a problem for Grice: we an explanation as to how a hearer can reasonably infer as being what is speaker-meant.<sup>29</sup>

According to Grice, a hearer ought to be able to “work out” what is implicated by a speaker in the case of a conversational implicature. The expectation that a hearer can do so is *constitutive* of a conversational implicature. The speaker must think the hearer can either work out or intuitively grasp the necessary implicature. For reference, I reproduce the definition of conversational implicature above.

**Conversational Implicature** *S* conversationally implicates that *q* in saying

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<sup>27</sup>Pollock 2001, 206.

<sup>28</sup>Pollock 2001, 207. These examples are based on the background of one of Ānanda’s poetic examples, which relies on the knowledge that men and women have illicit rendezvous in the thickets of riverbanks, and that this is commonly a theme in Prakrit poetry.

<sup>29</sup>See, for example, Davis 2007.

that  $p$  iff:

1.  $S$  is presumed to be observing the conversational maxims (or the Cooperative Principle),
2. The supposition that  $S$  thinks that  $q$  is required to make saying that  $p$  consistent with this presumption,
3.  $S$  thinks, and expects  $H$  to think that  $S$  thinks, the hearer can work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition that  $q$  is required.<sup>30</sup>

However, there is an epistemological problem: Grice seems to think that there is a single necessary conversational implicature  $q$  required to make sense out of the (apparent) inconsistency between what is said,  $p$ , and the Cooperative Principle and its attendant maxims. Further, not only is there such an implicature, but it must be in principle, capable of being deduced through application of conversational principles and reason. Grice gives an example of such a working-out:

He has said that  $p$ ; there is no reason to suppose that he is not observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he could not be doing this unless he thought that  $q$ ; he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that he thinks that  $q$  is required; he has done nothing to stop me thinking that  $q$ ; he intends me to think, or is at least willing to allow me to think, that  $q$ ; and so he has implicated that  $q$ .<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup>Quoted verbatim from Grice 1989, p. 30-31.

<sup>31</sup>Grice 1975, p. 31. I have reversed “p” and “q” to match my usage in the definition of

This principle, that a hearer is at least capable of (although not required to actually engage in) such a working-out, is called the **Principle of Calculability**. On **Calculability**, there must be some traceable relationship between the implicature and the literal meaning.<sup>32</sup> However, even relying on the Cooperative Principles and maxims, a hearer’s reasoning to any given implicature is defeasible. If Grice is instead committed to a non-deductive inference to the best explanation, then we must ask what constitutes the “best explanation.” In either case, the general problem is while there is putatively a single implicature which the speaker intends, the hearer must be in a position to, in principle, reason to that very same implicature.<sup>33</sup>

This is related to Pollock’s concerns in that the Sanskrit tradition, though it has a set of principles governing poetic interpretation (which we will explore below), does not have an account of why thickets on riverbanks in poetry “mean” what they do. There is no calculation we can employ from facts about Sanskrit grammar, poetic principles, and background knowledge, to determine what is indicated (or suggested) without a more detailed account of social facts. And, going beyond Pollock to the worry for Grice, even were the Sanskritists to give such a social pragmatics (perhaps a detailed catalog of social symbols and

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conversational implicature.

<sup>32</sup>Grice only requires **Calculability** for conversational implicatures, but in principle, it seems that conventional implicatures ought to also be calculable, although not necessarily by reliance on the Cooperative Principle.

<sup>33</sup>The constitutive role of working-out and the epistemological role must be kept separate, at the risk of making the hearer’s interpretation determine the content of the speaker’s implicature!

their origins), it might still underdetermine what is implicated.<sup>34</sup> However, I think there are resources to fill in Mukula’s account and, further, that Pollock is wrong when he claims we need to give a social pragmatics. Below, I sketch a reply to Pollock which also forms the basis of a reconstruction of Mukula that, while it does not solve the problem of calculability, is preferable to the Gricean story.

### 6.3.1 Convention, indication, and calculability

For Pollock, the problem is that whatever explanation the Sanskrit critic gives, he leaves out crucial material that’s required to determine what has been implicated. To take the example of the Ganges river again: while Mukula and Ānanda say that the river cannot be the locus of a village, they do not make explicit that villages are typically built upon dry land, as they think it obvious. However, in some fishing cultures, villages may be built directly upon the river on stilts which reach down to the riverbed.<sup>35</sup> That the sentence “A village is on the Ganges” cannot literally be true and ought to be interpreted as metonymy requires background knowledge of the fact that villages are not ordinarily built upon rivers.

Pollock’s complaint at first blush is that the Sanskrit literary critics did not

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<sup>34</sup>Interestingly, in a brief footnote, Pollock mentions speech-act theory and Gricean conversational implicatures, noting that what is missing in Sanskrit poetics is also missing in the Western tradition, although he does not elucidate this claim.

<sup>35</sup>Wikipedia lists this as occurring in places such as Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. It isn’t necessary for the cogency of my point that this actually occur in human culture, however, just that it is a piece of background knowledge. [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fishing\\_village](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fishing_village).

include these facts (which he calls “social”) in their explanation of interpretation. However, while perhaps Ānanda can be faulted—he simply appeals to “contextual factors” and leaves it at that—Mukula has made an attempt to cite such things as “place, time, and world.” The term ‘*sthita*’ or “world” is something like “circumstance” which would include facts about one’s social context. Further, if Pollock’s complaint is that everything must be made explicit, he is asking for too much. After all, in any inference, we can continue making assumptions explicit until we reach the bottom of logical analysis and the law of non-contradiction, or the like.

What Pollock is asking for, however, is more than just the explicit inclusion of general background knowledge. He says “Aesthetic suggestion presupposes and reproduces social knowledge of, and *correspondingly assent to*, a structure of social action, and without this knowledge suggestion itself often remains all but incomprehensible.”<sup>36</sup> This claim picks out the central role of *rasa* theory and its analysis of certain emotions as being suitable for some persons and actions and unsuitable for others (see Chapter One). That is, there are aesthetic, emotional, and ethical norms that hearers must know in order to draw proper interpretive conclusions. Pollock’s point recalls Ānanda’s protestation that a *sahṛdaya* cannot be relying upon knowledge of convention to understand poetic suggestion. For Ānanda, the reason is that conventions are arbitrary and this might threaten knowledge of *rasa*. For Pollock, the problem is deeper. Not only does suggestion presuppose a “structure of social action” which is also

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<sup>36</sup>Pollock 2001, 223, italics mine.



conveyed by the content of what is suggested, but suggestion also presupposes and reproduces *assent to* this structure. Being a *sahṛdaya*, Pollock suggests, is about “learning what is normative in the everyday world.”<sup>37</sup> He argues that Sanskrit literary critics and philosophers were blind to this presupposition in their theorizing, as evidenced by the fact that they do not make it a target of inquiry.

Pollock is asking for an account of how (contra Ānanda’s position) knowledge of normative conventions play a role in interpretation. Pollock’s claim in the above passage that aesthetic suggestion presupposes “assent to” a structure of social action is too strong if read as requiring actual assent (as an outside interpreter of Sanskrit poetry, he need not assent to its implicit social structure to understand its meaning). However, his point is well-taken that an interpreter can “take on board” the putative appropriateness of a certain emotion as being appropriate for person X and not person Y in her retrieval of meaning. Further, in the Sanskrit poetic tradition, she likely does so by a presupposition that it is a non-arbitrary feature of the world that X ought to have emotion E, and not Y. And yet, it seems that it certainly is conventional that, for example, women in the Prakrit poetic tradition arrange the location of adulterous affairs, and not the men. Even if no one in Ānanda’s time knew of an alternative, since they might deny that men arranging the location was natural and claim that it could work out in practice, this does not mean that the practice is not conventional. It could have been the case that men ar-

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<sup>37</sup>Pollock 2001, 215.

ranged affairs, and it is not in fact true that this alternative practice would not fulfill the relevant aims.<sup>38</sup>

What Pollock is asking for, then, is an account of the relationship between inference, presumption, and convention in the communication of suggested meanings. While one could subsume conventions to “background knowledge” and claim that Mīmāṃsā presumption runs on knowledge of these facts, we would be in no better position to explain how interpreters have access to speaker meanings, especially if we accept calculability.

Mukula’s use of presumption as the means by which hearers recover indicated meanings is good evidence that he thinks indicated meaning can be calculated. Further evidence for this is found where he discusses the word ‘*rājan*’ which, literally, applies to members of a particular caste (the *kṣatriya*) who are rulers. The word came to be applied metaphorically to members of another caste, the *śūdra*, who shared similar properties with a king who protects a city.<sup>39</sup> He observes that, over time, the qualitative relation between the literal and metaphorical application, was not “cognized.” People directly understood ‘*rājan*’ in certain contexts to apply to lower-caste, *śūdra*. However, the relationship can be understood by “reflection” (‘*vicāraṇa*’). He does not explicitly state that the relationship between literal and non-literal meaning must be capable of being understood by reflection, as Grice does. However, that he can explain what is indicated and how is evidence for the fact that he

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<sup>38</sup>See Burge 1975, especially p. 254.

<sup>39</sup>See appendix, 6.2.

does think indicated meaning is in fact capable of being worked out in some way.

The list which Mukula gives is due to a much earlier Mīmāṃsā philosopher, Bhartṛmitra. He is a Mīmāṃsā philosopher writing after Śābara (350 and 400 CE) and before Kumārila (600 and 700 CE) who argues against the his views. We do not have his works except through citations in other texts. Mukula accepts these relationships on the authority of Bhartṛmitra and offers no justification for the selection.<sup>40</sup>

In fact, Mukula spends a significant portion of his text detailing the relationship between the literal (or primary) and indicated meaning. It seems likely that interpreters could use these principles to work out indicated meanings. There are five possible relationships that he identifies: connection with the literal meaning, similarity, association, opposition, and connection with an action. Now, his discussion of these relationships is the context of identifying the constitutive conditions for indication, and not epistemic principles hearers use to understand indicated meaning. However, throughout the treatise—as the opening emphasis on epistemology suggests—he seems to think that these principles will map onto the constitutive conditions. Mukula’s definition of the tripartite nature of indication is:

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<sup>40</sup>According to Verpooten, Bhartṛmitra was considered “a positivist and an irreligious thinker” who was rejected from the orthodoxy due to his views. Verpooten 1987, p. 22. Abhinava quotes the same passage from Bhartṛmitra in the *Locana*, using two different versions of the quote, neither of which is identical with Mukula’s quotation. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 67, fn 4 for discussion.

1. Due to an inconsistency in primary meaning—that is, its being obstructed as another knowledge source;
2. And due to the dependence on the primary meaning on the part of the meaning which is being indicated;
3. And due to grasping another meaning because of an intention.<sup>41</sup>

It is the dependence relationship which admits of five possible relationships (which he goes through in detail with examples for each).<sup>42</sup>

Yet if indicated meaning is calculable in the Gricean sense, there is a problem: Mukula’s explanations often give the equivalent of open disjunctions as an interpretation for metaphors and other figures. Take, for instance, his discussion of the metaphor (1) “The Punjabi peasant is an ox.” He says that the ox and the Punjabi both have the properties of dullness and laziness, using the Sanskrit term ‘*ādi,*’ found at the end of compounds to indicate a list of similar things. A similar use of the equivalent to *et cetera* is found in many of his analyses. But if an open disjunction is the content of *lakṣaṇā*, there are problems for using reflection to come to understand it. For one thing, there is the problem of whether it counts as understanding the metaphor if a hearer understands dullness, but not laziness, as what is indicated. Further, there is the question of whether a speaker would intend to communicate such an open

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<sup>41</sup>These three reasons, ‘*evaṃ vidha-kāraṇa-tritaya-ātmaka-sāmagrī*’ are all together necessary as a collection for indication.

<sup>42</sup>See translation, 9. This definition is not Mukula’s originally, but from Kumāri. The five relationships originate with Bhartrmitra, another Mīmāṃsaka, but one whose works we only have in citations, not in their original.

disjunction.

There is thus a tension in Mukula's work. At the outset, he situates his theory of indication in an epistemological context. A successful account of indicated meaning would explain how interpreters have epistemic access to the speaker's meaning, so that they can further judge whether an inference is valid, or a testimony is true. But if presumption cannot deliver a determinate meaning, how can an interpreter have the certainty/warrant, or *niścaya*, that Mukula claims she needs to reason about worldly and other-worldly things?

### 6.3.2 Giving up calculability

One promising answer is for Mukula to give up calculability, understood in the strong sense of there being one interpretation that is necessarily required. In fact, if he is to be consistent with the Mīmāṃsā perspective on presumption, we cannot conflate presumption with inference in which we can spell out the major and minor premises and deductively guarantee our conclusion. This position—that presumption is not reducible to inference—is one of the major differences between the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya schools in Indian philosophy. The Mīmāṃsā, as Stephen Phillips puts it, “vindicate the educated guess,” and do not require that we are warranted in drawing a conclusion only when we can construct a deductive inference.<sup>43</sup> The conclusion to presumptive reasoning would leave the hearer with knowledge, insofar as she arrives at the

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<sup>43</sup>See, for example the debate between Gaṅgeśa and his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor in the *Tattva-cintā-maṇi*. Phillips 2012.

best possible explanation of the utterance in context.

What counts as the “best” explanation is a notoriously difficult problem and not one that Mukula has explicitly addressed. However, a preliminary account of best explanation that is consistent with Mukula’s views would look for content which is in line with the three conditions noted above. Such content would be able to “repair” the apparent inconsistency between the sentence token and its context. It would be categorizable into one of the five relationships between primary and indicatory meaning. And it would make sense out of a putative speaker’s intention. Now, this still leaves questions—for instance, what ought one do when two interpretations repair the inconsistency, make sense out of a speaker’s intention, but fall into two different relationships? Mukula in fact addresses such a case, in the sentence:

(7) The umbrella-holders go.<sup>44</sup>

This stock example describes a situation in which a single umbrella-holder accompanies a royal person, attended by a retinue. Mukula explains this sentence in two ways. First, he says, we could reason that because “umbrella-holders” is in the plural, that word indicates all of the people associated with the single umbrella-holder, despite knowing as part of our background knowledge, that there is just a single person. (Association is one of the five relationships between primary and indicatory meaning that Mukula identifies.) On this understanding, the speaker’s intention is to express literally that there is an

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<sup>44</sup>See translation, p.363.

umbrella-holder and, thereby through association, also that there is a crowd of people along with him. There is also a second analysis given. On this analysis, we reason that the referent of “umbrella-holders” must have a plural referent, and so it refers to the entire (umbrella-less) collection around the single umbrella-holder, including him. The individual umbrella-holder is therefore not the intended referent, but he “comes along for the ride,” so to speak, as he is part of the collection. The crucial difference is whether the speaker intends to directly convey the crowd or the umbrella-holder with “umbrella-holders.” However, Mukula gives no evaluation as to which is a better interpretation (and under what circumstances).<sup>45</sup>

Accepting presumption as an interpretive method like inference to the best explanation leaves Mukula with several options. First, one could agree with Ānanda that there is a determinate fact about what single meaning is given by a sentence in a given context. An ideal agent might be able to narrow the range of possible interpretations, but, with presumption as her method, she can never be sure she has gotten the correct one. This leaves us with a significant epistemological problem, given the goal of establishing *nīścaya* or certainty. While such a solution in the realm of poetry might not be too costly, Mukula has explicitly situated his project in the realm of human action and epistemology. Insofar as he agrees with the other orthodox philosophers

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<sup>45</sup>In Keating 2013a, I argue that, in fact, the interpretation on which the single umbrella-holder is the primary referent is untenable, since we would expect to be able to construct sentences such as “The umbrella-holders go and is carrying a blue umbrella” but cannot. Thus determining the best interpretation might require similar kinds of tests.

wanting to uphold the Vedic texts as a source of knowledge, he has a burden to explain how textual meanings are ascertainable. I take it that he would reject this kind of skepticism about meaning.

Second, one could deny that what is suggested or indicated by a sentence in a context is a determinate meaning. Instead, one could stipulate that the suggested or indicated meaning is what the ideal interpreter would arrive at through presumption. I take it that this pseudo-Gricean move is closer in spirit to Mukula's analysis. This avoids the epistemological gap between meaning and presumption, but it strips intention away from the concept of meaning since the interpretive process itself determines what counts as meaning, not the speaker's aims. In some ways, this is consistent with the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā analysis of Vedic texts, at least in the sense that these texts are supposed to be authorless and thereby immune to doubt. An ideal interpreter who is versed in Vedic interpretive principles could then be the touchstone for the textual meaning. However, Mukula's project does not seem to accept such a distinction between Vedic and human language. At least, he is agnostic on this point, including both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara philosophy within his text. And moreover, given his emphasis on the speaker as part of the contextual elements which help interpreters ascertain meaning, it is doubtful that he would be content setting speaker intentions aside.

Finally, a third approach, which would be a departure from the Mīmāṃsā philosophical tradition influencing Mukula's efforts, is to reject the requirement that there is a single meaning necessitated. Instead, the ideal interpreter



would need to have epistemic access to at least one of the meanings intended by the speaker. While this is a departure from the philosophical tradition, which emphasizes a “single idea” or “single aim,” the principle of a unified sentence meaning need not necessarily be abandoned. Especially since the *Mīmāṃsā* and *Alaṅkāra* both emphasize discursive unity, and a hierarchy of hermeneutics, it might be possible for Mukula to identify a way in which a multiplicity of meanings are unified, though not unitary.<sup>46</sup> Recall the case of the sentence, “The Punjabi peasant is an ox,” where the shared properties are said to be dullness, stupidity, and the like. An interpreter might understand (1) only dullness, or (2) only stupidity, or (3) dullness and stupidity together, or (4) some other property like stubbornness. Mukula needs to explain which of options (1) through (4) count as understanding the meaning, and why. The resources for this account are not available in this text.

## Conclusion

On my reconstruction of Mukula’s analysis, all that is required is that the sensitive reader come up with an interpretation that makes apparently incoherent, established facts coherent. Not only might there be multiple solutions, but, as we have seen, there might be multiple candidates for the source of the tension which triggers interpretation. At a historical level, Mukula’s thesis, and

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<sup>46</sup>As McCrea puts it, for the *Mīmāṃsā*, the multiple parts of the Vedas are structured in such a way as to form a “single, functionally unified structure” that has an organization aiming at a “single end.” McCrea 2008, p. 90. We might think of the multiple meanings of a metaphor as a microcosm of such a structure.

Ānanda's, are attempts to justify particular interpretive practices and, as their views became common in literary theory, poets relied on them, making the interpretive practice self-perpetuating. This might strengthen the likelihood that—especially in a poetic context—an interpreter could converge upon the suggested meaning(s) that a poetic had intended. However, neither Mukula nor Ānanda are able to give a convincing explanation of how it is that an interpreter ought to be able to converge upon a definite range of propositions (or whatever we understand suggested meaning to be). Mukula's appeal to presumption is in tension with his claim that there be a single required meaning recoverable from an utterance in a given context.

However, in contrast to Ānanda's function of suggestion, Mukula's function of *lakṣaṇā* draws upon a widely accepted means of reasoning in Indian philosophical traditions. He identifies contextual factors such as place, time, and circumstance, and observes, if not as clearly as one might hope, that *lakṣaṇā* is not only an intra-sentential phenomenon which happens when a literal sentence-meaning is unavailable. He further identifies major ways in which there are apparent incompatibilities which might “trigger” the method of presumptive reasoning at the basis of *lakṣaṇā*. While his account is not without its problems, it is a philosophically satisfactory rebuttal to Ānanda's proposal. Mukula's intuition, that non-literal speech is a pervasive part of communication, and a central way in which humans come to know things, whether for spiritual or mundane purposes, is appreciable centuries later, while we continue to grapple with the same problems. In the final chapter, I argue that

Mukula's analysis can fruitfully be read as a kind of metonymic sort-shifting, filling out his model with some contemporary philosophical resources.

## Chapter 7

### Sort-Shifting, Lexical Semantics, and *Lakṣaṇā*

#### 7.1 Introduction

While Mukula’s argument that suggestion (*dhvani*) is equivalent to *lakṣaṇā* may be successful, I conclude that his claim must be precisified: suggestion is equivalent to only a sub-variety of *lakṣaṇā*, which I call “pragmatic *lakṣaṇā*.”<sup>1</sup> I show this by analysis of a few of the many examples surveyed in the text. I utilize two concepts from modern analytic philosophy in my reconstruction of Mukula’s arguments: metonymic sort-shifting and Gricean pragmatic implication. I argue that there is an important distinction between sentence-internal and sentence-external *lakṣaṇā*, although they both can be understood as employing *arthāpatti*, or the epistemic instrument/*pramāṇa* of presumption.

#### 7.2 Mukula’s Challenge

As we’ve seen, Ānanda argues that suggestion is distinct from *lakṣaṇā*. He has three major reasons for drawing such a distinction:

*Argument from Primariness*

“...[S]econdary usage is a non-primary (*amukhya*) operation of a

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<sup>1</sup>Much of this chapter has been published in Keating 2013a and Keating 2013b.

word whereas suggestiveness is a primary (*mukhya*) operation, for not the slightest hint of a non-primary nature can be observed in our apprehension of any of the three types of suggested sense...”

*Argument from Kind of Operation*

“...secondary usage may be called a denotative operation applied in a non-primary way, whereas suggestiveness is entirely different from denotation...”

*Argument from Transformation*

“...in secondary usage a meaning that indicates a secondary meaning becomes transformed into that indicated meaning, as in *gaṅgāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ* (“a village on the Ganges”); whereas in the process of suggestion the meaning that suggests a second meaning is apprehended to reveal that second meaning only by revealing itself at the same time...”<sup>2</sup>

*The Argument from Primariness* is that *lakṣaṇā* functions by operating on the results of the operation of denotation, and that suggestion operates on the word itself. Thus they have different domains. For example, according to Ānanda, if I say “A village is on the Ganges” (an example which we will investigate in more detail later), denotation operates to yield the denotations of the words “village” and “Ganges.” *Lakṣaṇā* operates on the resultant meanings, and I come to know that the river is on the bank of the Ganges, and not directly upon the river. The suggested meaning is that the village is cool and pure, because the Ganges river, the literal denotation of “Ganges,” actually has these

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<sup>2</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 122.

properties.

*The Argument from Kind of Operation* is that the coolness and purity of the village is suggested and not denoted. The indicated statement is true only if the village is on the bank of the river. Thus, *lakṣaṇā* is like a kind of denotation. In contrast, the suggested meaning in this statement aims at a particular aesthetic experience. There are suggested facts and suggested figures, but Ānanda is primarily concerned with the kind of suggestion that, when predominant in a poem, forms the basis for an experience of beauty.

Finally, Ānanda claims in the *Argument from Transformation* that in process of *lakṣaṇā*, the literal meaning is replaced with the indicated meaning, whereas suggestion allows for the cognition of both a suggested meaning and a literal (or indicated) meaning at the same time. There can be the suggestion of beauty at the same time as the understanding of the truth-conditional content of a statement.

Mukula's goal is to show that purported instances of suggestion can be reduced to *lakṣaṇā*. Thus, in response to Ānanda's *Argument from Primariness*, Mukula must show that suggestion shares the same domain as *lakṣaṇā*. To counteract the *Argument from Kind of Operation*, he must show that the kind of suggestion whose function is the generation of aesthetic experience can be explained by *lakṣaṇā*. Finally, Mukula must show that *lakṣaṇā* does not always replace the literal meaning, as in the *Argument from Transformation*.

In this chapter, I focus on Mukula’s replies to the *Argument from Primariness* and the *Argument from Transformation*. I think that his responses to these first two arguments are stronger than to the last (*Argument from Kind of Operation*), in large part because I think it is a misstep for Mukula to grant Ānanda’s assumption that aesthetic experience should be considered “meaning” in the same way as the other two sub-varieties of *lakṣaṇā*. The problem of whether aesthetic experience can be counted as “meaning” in the same way as indicated and denoted meanings is too complex to investigate in this short space.

### 7.3 Mukula’s Analysis of *lakṣaṇā*

As we’ve already seen, to explain the function of *lakṣaṇā*, Mukula distinguishes between a speaker, a sentence meaning, and an utterance meaning. A speaker is simply someone who speaks a sentence (*vākya*) in order for a hearer to understand something. The term ‘*vākya*’ refers to a syntactically unified expression expressing a meaning (*eka-arthaḥ*). In contrast, the gerundive ‘*vācya*,’ literally, “that which is to be said,” refers to the meaning conveyed by either *mukya* or *lakṣaṇā*. Mukula also distinguishes between contextual factors: place (*deśa*), time (*kāla*), and circumstance (*avasthā*).

With these distinctions in hand, Mukula argues that *lakṣaṇā* is a matter of deriving the utterance meaning from the sentence meaning, by making use of these contextual factors. In terms contemporary philosophers would recognize, utterance meaning is determined by the context, which consists of a speaker,

place, time, and world (what Mukula calls “circumstance”). Mukula’s notion of circumstance evidently goes beyond simply the place at which an utterance is taking place, since it is mentioned as being separate. The term means something like “condition,” “state,” or “situation” and is used in Sanskrit dramaturgy to describe stages of development in a plot, but he says nothing more about this contextual factor.

I have argued that Gricean conversational implicature and Mukula’s notion of indication are analogous. We’ve seen this in the traditional example where, if we come to know, through a statement, the facts that (1) Devadatta is fat and (2) Devadatta does not eat during the day, we must presume that Devadatta is eats at night. The general form is:

**Presumption**  $q$  is presumed from  $p$  and  $m$  iff:

1.  $p$  and  $m$  are two already-established facts
2. The presumption of  $q$  is required to make  $p$  compatible with  $m$ .

What *lakṣaṇā* does, by means of *arthāpatti*, is to remove the apparent inconsistency between, for example, the sentence meaning and facts about the speaker, or the sentence meaning and facts about the circumstance. I argue that this is analogous to Grice’s analysis of conversation implicature, operating with the Cooperative Principle in the background.

**Conversational Implicature**  $S$  conversationally implicates that  $q$  in saying that  $p$  iff  $S$  implicates  $q$  when:



1. *S* is presumed to be observing the conversational maxims (or the Cooperative Principle),
2. The supposition that *S* thinks that *q* is required to make saying that *p* consistent with this presumption,
3. *S* thinks, and expects *H* to think that *S* thinks, the hearer can work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition that *q* is required.<sup>3</sup>

In a case of *lakṣaṇā*, we are presented with a sentence meaning *p* and we must presume that *S* is implicating *q* by saying that *p*. The inconsistency arises between the sentence meaning *p* and some facts about the speaker, place, time, or circumstance, represented above with *m*. On this reconstruction, *m* stands in for the conversational maxim(s) which have to do with these contextual facts. Thus, *lakṣaṇā* is essentially a form of implicature which reconciles the sentence meaning with contextual factors. If this were indeed the case, we could neatly distinguish between the literal meanings of the constituent words in a sentence (such as universals, qualities, actions, and objects of proper names) and *lakṣaṇā*, what is implicated by the utterance of a sentence in a given context. Unfortunately, things are not so simple.

In what follows, I survey several examples of *lakṣaṇā* given by Mukula. I demonstrate that this distinction cannot be maintained, at a detriment to Mukula's claim that he has given a unified account of the domain of *lakṣaṇā*. However, I argue that he still has a cogent reply to Ānanda's argument that

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<sup>3</sup>Quoted verbatim from Grice 1989, p. 30-31.

a new linguistic power must be assumed.

#### 7.4 Sentence-Internal *Lakṣaṇā*

The first example of *lakṣaṇā* that Mukula analyzes is:

- (1) *gaur anubandhyaḥ*. (The cow is to be tied up.)

This sentence in Sanskrit consists of a noun (‘*gaur*’) and a gerundive (‘*anubandhyaḥ*’). According to Mukula’s lexical semantics, these are a universal-denoting term and an action-denoting term, respectively. The denoted meaning of the words in composition is that COWHOOD is the object of the action of tying. However, Mukula observes it would not make sense to instruct someone to fasten the universal of COWHOOD to a stake in order to make a sacrifice (the context for this sentence). Further, he adds that the referential function of ‘*gaur*’ has been exhausted by denoting COWHOOD. This means that we have what is essentially a list: <COWHOOD, to be tied up>. On the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view, in order for ‘*gaur*’ to have a syntactic relationship with ‘*anubandhyaḥ*,’ we must understand it as indicating a particular (though perhaps not a definite) cow, by *lakṣaṇā*. Kumāriḷa makes a similar observation about the sentence:

- (2) *gam ānaya*. (Bring a cow.)

Kumāriḷa says that “bring” simply gives us the general act of bringing, not the tense or injunctive mood. He also understands “cow” as denoting a universal. In this context, a single cow is required, though maybe not Bessie

as opposed to another cow, hence the English translation “a cow.” Kumāṛila concludes that *lakṣaṇā* is responsible for words having meanings (like particulars or temporally defined actions) that can be related to the other words in a sentence. Mukula only asserts that there is indication of the particular cow, not the particular action. The text is characteristically terse in its analysis, so it is unclear if this is due to his Grammarian notion of word reference, or if he thinks that the process of *lakṣaṇā* is clear enough that he need not deal with the gerundive. One thing is clear: where a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka would appeal to *lakṣaṇā* to explain a universal-denoting word being used as a quality, Mukula would not need to make such a move. In either case, *lakṣaṇā* here follows the typical structure of a *arthāpatti*. There is a conflict between the known fact that “*gaur*” refers to cowhood (taken to as given by Mukula) and the fact that the referent of “*gaur*” must be the thing tied up:

**Presumption of a particular cow.** *a particular cow* is presumed from *the fact that “cow” refers to COWHOOD* and *the fact that the referent of “cow” must be the object of being tied up* iff:

1. *the fact that “cow” refers to COWHOOD* and *the fact that the referent of “cow” must be the object of being tied up* are two already-established facts
2. The presumption of *a particular cow* is required to make *the fact that “cow” refers to COWHOOD* compatible with *the fact that the referent of “cow” must be the object of being tied up*.

While the solution—“cow” indicates a particular cow—initially seems to give up COWHOOD as the referent of “cow,” Mukula explains that this is a kind of *lakṣaṇā* known as *upādāna*, or “inclusion.” The particular cow which is indicated does not replace the universal COWHOOD, but the initial, literal referent is now included within the meaning of the indicated referent. We have indicated a particular cow, but all cows possess in the universal of COWHOOD, and so the universal is still included in the referent of “cow.”

Here, *lakṣaṇā* functions in order to obtain the appropriate syntactic relations between words, and is not pragmatic. In fact, on Kumārila’s view, sentence meaning is invariably attained in this manner, or else we’re left with a string of disconnected words, referring to universals but not doing much else. There would be no sentence meaning as a basis for our pragmatic *lakṣaṇā* described above. The speaker has not said that *p* because, until we construe the words by *lakṣaṇā* as being in relationship, there is no *p*. I suggest that a model for this kind of *lakṣaṇā* could be found in the theory of sort-shifting.

## 7.5 Type- and Sort-Shifting

In contemporary Western linguistics and philosophy of language, models of sort- and type-shifting are used to represent the relationship between the semantics of expressions and assumptions about the world’s ontology. “Type” refers to a coarse-grained distinction between such categories as entities, truth-values, and relationships. “Sort” is a further, fine-grained distinction between such categories as universals, particulars, groups, collections, masses, persons,

things, and so forth. Type-shifting is an approach intended to explain the flexibility of semantic expressions. Expressions change their meanings as contexts change, but it is implausible that there is a large number of lexical entries for every single word. How would speakers learn all of these definitions? How would they know what to do with a novel instance? Further, contexts seem to underdetermine the meaning for many ambiguous expressions. We need an explanation of how hearers “narrow down” the range of possibilities.

Rather than multiple lexical entries, type-shifting proposes a mechanism that takes contextual values, ontological commitments, and principles of compositional semantics to generate the appropriate type for an expression in the given context. Sort-shifting operates with the same principles, but at a more fine-grained level. Type-shifting might function to resolve the conflict between the types in the conjunct below:

(3) John and every woman arrived.

In this sentence, “John” is an individual entity, but “every woman” is a quantifier expression. They fill the same argument position of a single verb, and so must be of like types. When someone utters the sentence (3), there is no inferential process that a speaker must go through in order to resolve ambiguity between John as an entity or John as a quantifier (intuitively, most speakers aren’t even aware that such ambiguity exists). Type-shifting functions automatically to resolve the ambiguity for the speaker. The benefit of the theory is its flexibility—the same expression can refer to various types without sacrificing

compositional semantics.

In formal terms, an entity is represented by “e.” One way of representing “every woman” is by using brackets,  $\langle \rangle$ , to indicate its status as a function. The quantifier expression is a function of type  $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle$  where “t” represents the primitive notion of a truth-value. Thus, “every woman” is a function which takes as input a function from entities to truth-values,  $\langle e, t \rangle$ , and returns a truth-value, t. We are unable to conjoin two non-like types, but this is necessitated by the verb, and so we shift “John” from type e to the type  $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, t \rangle$ .

These types are taken from Montague’s generative semantics which allows for individuals in the discourse, possible worlds, and moments of time. A noun such as “cow” might be understood as type  $\langle e, t \rangle$ , or a function from an individual (the cow) to a truth-value (which is true when the individual is a cow). Such a function might itself be the input for another function, such as an adjective, of type  $\langle \langle e, t \rangle, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$ . For example, “white” would take “cow” (a function from an individual to a truth-value) and yield a function from an individual to a truth-value. The function would map to “true” where there is a white cow, and “false” where there is not. The motivation for this model fits with the (implausible) Mīmāṃsā claim that all words denote universals. Instead of multiple lexical entries for verbs which can take multiple kinds of complements there is a single entry which shifts under contextual constraints, coerced by the presence or absence of various compositional factors.

However attractive such a sparse ontology of types may be for set-theoretic

modeling, recent approaches refined the kind and number of inhabitants in the discourse model to sorts, as described above. Axiomatic relations are then drawn between the entities in the discourse. (It is possible that the commitments upon which speakers rely for meaning construction admit entities which we would not want in our final ontology.) Shifting models are employed to explain phenomena such as metonymy, ambiguity in genitive constructions, and so forth. The aim of sort- and type-shifting models is to represent the various interpretive possibilities available to a hearer for a given expression in a context. These possibilities are understood as models which are consistent with the context and syntax.

Below, I develop an example of sort-shifting in a genitive modifier phrase before returning to Mukula. Genitive modifier phrases have a head noun (N) in the nominative case and a noun phrase (NP) in the genitive case. Take the Russian example:

(4) *stakan moloka* (glass of milk)<sup>4</sup>

The N is glass (*stakan*), in the nominative case, and the NP is of-milk (*moloka*), in the genitive case. The problem with a genitive construction is how to construe the “of” relationship between the N and NP. The glass is not constituted by milk as its material, but is filled by the milk. Borschev and Partee understand the genitive case in Russian as being a type which seeks out a relationship

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<sup>4</sup>I use the Russian examples because they are original to the article by Borschev and Partee which is illuminative of the model of sort-shifting I employ.

with the head N. Which relationship is appropriate is given through the sortal information in the lexical entry of the head N. When this fails, that same lexical information, plus ontological commitments and context allow us to shift sorts.

What the relationship is between  $x$  and  $y$  depends upon the semantic sort of the head noun, N. The meaning of “leg” as “part of the table” is made straightforwardly available by the context, where the reference to a piece of furniture makes the part-whole-relationship salient. The problem is explaining how we move from one meaning for *stakan* (a physical entity that is a container) to another meaning for *stakan* (a quantity of something contained by such a container). These are two different types: the first is  $\langle e, t \rangle$  and the second  $\langle e, \langle e, t \rangle \rangle$ , where the entity underlined,  $\langle e \rangle$ , is what Borschev and Partee call a “relational entity.” Since noun phrases in genitive constructions are always “looking for” a noun to relate with, their referent is an entity having some kind of relationship to another entity. One solution would be to propose multiple lexical entries for *stakan*. The word is simply polysemous. In addition to this simply pushing the problem back another level (how do we select which lexical entry is appropriate?), this puts a cognitive load on the interpreter. Further, as Borschev and Partee point out with their imaginative example, “full hat of mushrooms” (meaning a hat made out of mushrooms), we need an explanation of novel uses. Proposing that there is a lexical entry for “hat” which has it as a container burdens our lexicon unduly.

What Borschev and Partee suggest is that sorts such as container or quantity



function as their own quasi-lexical entries, or what they call “theories.” A theory for the sort container might be as shown below:

**Container** (y)(x)

**sort:** physical object x

**usage:** x can be used to hold/keep substances of the sort y

**form:** x has an inner part and when it is used to keep a substance y, y is  
inside of x

**volume of x:** the volume of x’s inner part and so the volume of substance x  
can contain

Given such a theory, a shift-operator which Borschev and Partee call *Quant*, can be invoked to shift the meaning of words from the sort container to be of the sort quantity.

In the proper context, the shift-operator will take a semantic value which is of the sort container and output the sort quantity. A sort shifting approach to metonymic and other phenomena identifies distinctions within a given type, rather than trying to multiply types. It is ontologically sparse, since sorts are reducible to the standard types in Montague semantics. Thus we might distinguish between plural individuals and groups, institutions and things, aggregates and stuff—even though each of these pairs could together belong to the same type. The result is that for each sort, we have a theory, like the theory of container above. There are relationships between the sorts,

and internal relationships within the sorts (allowing for part-whole metonymic shifting).

Sort-shifting is governed by axioms which give us the possible available moves as well as which are most likely for a given sort (for example, there is a close relationship between individual persons and institutions). The trigger for such a shift could be explained by the lexical value of a word itself. Certain verbs may take only specific sorts as their direct object, or certain adjectives may only modify specific sorts, and so on. When there is a mismatch, what Borschev and Partee call “sortal incorrectness,” the result is a presupposition failure or, where possible, a coerced meaning shift.

It is important to reiterate that Mukula is not working with this framework and we should not shoehorn his four categories of *upādhi*, or ontological kinds, too tightly into a type- or sort-shifting theory. It may be possible to reconstruct a formal semantics from the texts of the Grammarians (after all, Pāṇini developed the world’s first generative grammar) but this particular text is sparing with the details that would be required. My claim is simply this: that in sentences like (1) *gaur anubandhyah* above, the way that Mukula describes *lakṣaṇā* as functioning is much more like sort- or type-shifting than Gricean pragmatic implication.

To illustrate this, I suggest a folk ontological theory of what a particular is:

**Particular** (y)(x)

**sort:** particular object x

**usage:** x is the locus of y's inherence, where y is a universal

**form:** x has a spatio-temporal location

There could be a sort-shifting mechanism, *Particular*, which, when sentence (1) is uttered in a context suitable for a particular cow, shifts a semantic value of the sort universal to the sort particular. Because Mukula postulates that at least one category of words refers to universals, many sentences we utter will involve a shift from universals to particulars.

## 7.6 Mukula on Metaphoric Transfer

These conceptual tools in hand, I now return to Mukula's analysis of instances of *lakṣaṇā*. After introducing the distinction between denotation and *lakṣaṇā* with (1), he goes on to introduce the example analyzed in terms of suggestion by Ānanda:

(5) *gangāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ*. (The village is on [the bank of] the Ganges.)

Mukula categorizes this case as *lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā*, or indirect indication, in contrast to (1), which he describes as *upādāna-lakṣaṇā*, or inclusive indication. In *upādāna-lakṣaṇā*, the universal of cowhood is included as part of the new meaning of "cow," which is a particular cow. Cases of *lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā*, however, do not have such an inclusive nature, but rather are instances of replacement.

In (5), the word “*gangāyāṇ*” or “on the Ganges” is in the locative case. Therefore, since the sentence would literally mean that the village is directly on top of the Ganges river, we must understand by *lakṣaṇā* that “Ganges” means “bank of the Ganges.” As Mukula puts it, a particular stream cannot be the substratum of a village. We must understand something different: “bank.” In contrast to (1), where cowhood is included as part of the meaning of a particular cow, a riverbank is not part of the meaning of “Ganges.” Therefore, this is indirect indication. On Ānanda’s view, in the *Argument from Transformation*, this demonstrates that *lakṣaṇā* requires replacement of meaning, and suggestion cannot be cognized. Mukula goes on to argue against this, in an illustration of what I am calling “pragmatic *lakṣaṇā*”:

**Presumption of the bank.** *the bank* is presumed from *the fact that the speaker must be saying something true* and *the fact that the word “Ganges” refers to a particular river* iff:

1. *The fact that the speaker must be saying something true* and *the word “Ganges” refers to a particular river* are two already-established facts
2. The presumption of “*Ganges*” as *instead referring to the bank of the Ganges* is required to make the two consistent.

In this case, the fact that the speaker is taken to be saying something true is a case of Grice’s Maxim of Quality and it is implicitly appealed to by Mukula. Later, Mukula explicitly appeals to something like the Maxim of Manner to

explain why a speaker might not simply say “on the bank of the Ganges.” The reason is that the Ganges is associated with sanctity and beauty, and the speaker wants to convey that the village, by proximity, shares in these properties. The indication of bank as the referent of “Ganges” is made salient because of the bank’s close proximity to the river. On Ānanda’s account, in his *Argument from Primariness*, we cannot derive the suggestion of holiness from the meaning of “bank of the Ganges” because it is the river, and not the bank which is holy. Mukula argues that because there is a relationship of nearness between the bank and the river, our understanding of the bank is influenced by our cognition of the river. Note, however, that the properties of purity and beauty—which are what Ānanda argues is given by suggestion—are a consequence of the cognition of the referent of “Ganges,” not its indicated meaning, “bank.” Thus there is, as Mukula presents things, a mismatch between the domains of *lakṣaṇā* and suggestion. However, Mukula concludes that the property of holiness, shared between the bank and the river, can, contra the *Argument from Kind of Operation*, be understood through *lakṣaṇā*. Further, this means that even when *lakṣaṇā* replaces the literal meaning, there can be what is putatively “suggested,” contra the *Argument from Transformation*.

However, there is a further complication. Before we can employ *arthāpatti* to recover the indicated meaning, we need to have a sentence meaning. This, as we have seen already, must also be generated by *lakṣaṇā*. Even if Mukula does not think that all words refer to universals (like the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā),

“village” will not refer to a particular village until there has been a metonymic or similar shift. The Ganges is the object of a proper name, but without understanding an implicit action (“is”), there is no way for the words to have syntactic unity.

One obvious approach would be to argue that *lakṣaṇā* does all of this: it functions to unify the words in a sentence and recover something truth-evaluable and then it functions to recover something which is not only truth-evaluable but the likeliest candidate for what the speaker meant by the sentence in that context. There has been scant discussion, either in the original Mīmāṃsā textual tradition, or in modern commentaries, about this problem. An exception is a short series of paragraphs in a brief essay written by K.K. Raja, primarily to compare Buddhist apoha theory and Mīmāṃsā *lakṣaṇā*. Raja observes:

If an operation can effect only one result, we may have to accept two *lakṣaṇā*-s. But nobody has spoken about two *lakṣaṇā*-s while explaining verbal comprehension of the sentence-meaning, and the law of parsimony (*lāghava*) requires the simpler approach in solving the problem. Hence it seems preferable to assume that only one *lakṣaṇā* is needed to explain the two effects...<sup>5</sup>

In support of this view, he cites the mid-seventeenth century Mīmāṃsaka, Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, who says that the shift from universals to particulars is required for there to be a unified sentence meaning, and that the resultant

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<sup>5</sup>Raja 1993, p. 200.

syntactic relations are also the result of *lakṣaṇā*. However, what Raja omits is that *lakṣaṇā* is also appealed to in cases where we have syntactic unity, but there some other inconsistency between the sentence and context. If we accept the principle that a power is exhausted when it has attained its aim, then we must pair each operation of *lakṣaṇā* to a single effect. While perhaps we could plausibly understand a single operation that aims at an intelligible syntactic whole as consisting in several shifts in word-meaning, the aim of intelligibility in a context is of a different sort. And in fact, Mukula himself, in his appeal to the difference between sentence meaning (*vākya*) and speaker meaning (*vācya*) has admitted as much.

## 7.7 Fat Devadatta and *arthāpatti*

Complicating the situation for Mukula is the example of Fat Devadatta who does not eat during the day. This sentence is a traditional illustration of *arthāpatti*:

- (6) *pīno devadatto divā na bhunkte.* (Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.)

Mukula identifies this as another case of *upādāna-lakṣaṇā* or inclusive indication, just like (1) above. He says that the denotation of “fat” is fatness as qualified by not eating during the day. In this context, fatness as qualified by eating at night is indicated by *arthāpatti*. The fatness includes eating at night in itself in order to establish itself (*sva-siddhy-arthatvena*). For this reason,

we have a case of inclusive indication, because we are not understanding a new meaning for “fat” other than fatness. Instead, we simply include within fatness the appropriate cause. Further, Mukula suggests that we understand eating at night rather than drinking during the day because the speaker has said “does not eat during the day.”

As with (4), Mukula has ignored the necessity of generating a syntactic unity from a list of unconnected words. He does not have the same problem as the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, since “fat” can refer to a quality, “Devadatta” to the object of a proper name, and “eat” to an action (with the caveat that it is unclear whether the action is general or particular). However, “day” is plausibly a universal-denoting term, and *lakṣaṇā* may be required to quantify over a particular range of days.

The initial problem here is in Mukula’s analysis of the case as analogous to (1) “The cow is to be tied up.” It looks more like a case of Gricean implicature, where an additional proposition (Devadatta eats at night) is generated from the sentence meaning. If this is so, then Mukula classifying this case with (1) has made a mistake. This would demonstrate that he has not carefully distinguished between what I’m calling “semantic” and “pragmatic” kinds of *lakṣaṇā*.<sup>6</sup> In fact, while I do think that while it is conceptually better to under-

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<sup>6</sup>I argued for this in a paper published from an earlier version of this chapter: “Mukula appeals to something like Grice’s Maxim of Manner in his observation that we get “eats at night” instead of “drinks a tonic” because the speaker has mentioned the time during which Devadatta does not eat. Therefore, we presume that she is implicating that Devadatta eats at night and expects us to recognize that this is the reason for her speaking in such a way. However, as we have seen, (1) is a case of what I am calling “semantic indication,” which



stand this as a case of implicature, Mukula might have a way of maintaining the analogy between the two cases that is grounded in presumption. Originally I suggested that the structure of presumption fits nicely with Grice’s definition of a conversational implicature, which would be a case of “pragmatic” *lakṣaṇā*, but now it seems that the same interpretive method can be employed in what I’m calling “semantic” *lakṣaṇā*.

While Mukulabhaṭṭa does not give a detailed explanation of the mechanisms at play in the Devadatta case, his idea is close to the generative lexicon of James Pustejovsky.<sup>7</sup> Pustejovsky’s goal is to explain the creativity and systematicity of phenomena such as polysemy through rich lexical representations, but without resorting to a lexicon with multiple entries to explain the ambiguities in natural language. So, for example, we might propose that the lexical item “fat” represents such things as the fact that fatness is caused by eating. The lexical item eats would then represent such things as that food is typically

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functions to unify the words in an uttered sentence in such a way as to recover a truth-evaluable sentence meaning. It is likely, though not necessary, that, in Mukula’s theory, semantic *lakṣaṇā* functions for all sentence types (as it does for the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā). Now, sentence (7) is a case of “pragmatic indication,” which functions to remove incompatibility between a sentence meaning (*vākya-artha*) and contextual elements, relying on conversational norms akin to Gricean maxims. The result is that there is an implication that Fat Devadatta eats at night, in order to resolve what might, prima facie, be an incoherent, though syntactically unified, utterance. Part of the motivation for Mukula’s strained interpretation may be his commitment to the principle of *eka-vākyatā* or the requirement that there must be a unified meaning for every sentence. Without inserting, so to speak, the eating at night somewhere into the *vākya*, there is a problem: the speaker seems to mean two things. Further, Mukula does not want the result that the speaker is only saying that Fat Devadatta eats at night, since the literal meaning of the sentence must be preserved.” Keating 2013a, p.326-27.

<sup>7</sup>Pustejovsky 1995.

what is eaten, that eating is an event (not a state), that agents are the subjects of the verb, and etc.

In context, although sentence (7) is perfectly grammatical, it could be taken to be unsemantical. Pustejovsky describes his notion of semanticality this way:

I will introduce a notion of semanticality, analogous to the view of grammaticality...but ranging over semantic expressions rather than syntactic structures. Semanticality refers to the semantic well-formedness of expressions in a grammar...<sup>8</sup>

Pustejovsky's notion of semantically is analogous to the concept of *yogyatā*, or semantic compatibility, violations of which trigger *lakṣaṇā*. Importantly, Pustejovsky's semanticality and the Indian concept of *yogyatā* are not reducible to grammaticality or syntacticality.<sup>9</sup> The test is not whether an expression can yield a truth-conditional proposition, but whether there are easily available interpretations which make the sentence acceptable.<sup>10</sup> This approach is consistent with the Bhāṭṭa school's view, that it is incompatibility with speaker's intention in a context (*tātparya-anupapatti*) that triggers *lakṣaṇā*.

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<sup>8</sup>Pustejovsky 1995, p. 40.

<sup>9</sup>For Pustejovsky, semanticality admits of degrees, but in contrast, as Mukula uses the term, it seems that an expression either possesses *yogyatā* or does not. However, this is a subject of debate in classical Indian philosophy of language.

<sup>10</sup>Pustejovsky 1995, p. 41.

While Mukulabhaṭṭa does not explicitly identify the kind of incompatibility operating for the Fat Devadatta case, the most obvious candidate is a conflict between facts we know about the *avasthā* (the world and the causes of fatness) and the *vākya* (expressed meaning). Here’s how an interpreter, call her “A,” might use *lakṣaṇā* to understand “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day” as including the meaning that Devadatta eats at night, with lexical entries in bold:

1. A recovers the denotation of the lexical items in context, yielding the *vākya*. For example, on Mukulabhaṭṭa’s lexical semantics, **fat** denotes a quality. Understanding what fat denotes might include knowing such things as that it is a state which applies to biological entities, and is caused by eating. **Devadatta** refers to a named thing, perhaps one which speakers know is human and thus part of the larger class of biological entities, allowing it to be modified by the lexical item **fat**. The action **eats** might be understood to take a biological entity as its subject and a kind of foodstuff as its object. As eating is a process, it can be qualified by the temporal span (“during the day”) as well as a negation (“does not”).<sup>11</sup> For example: **Fat** = *event*(state), *argument*(biological entity); *qualia*[formal(mass); *constitutive*(biological property); *agentive*(act of eating)]  
**Devadatta** = *argument*(x:human); *qualia*[formal(x)]

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<sup>11</sup>I leave technical issues of quantification and negation aside for the purposes of this example.

**does not eat** = *argument*(physical object); *event*(process); *argument*(x:biological entity, y:foodstuff); *qualia*[agentive(event of x’s eating y)]

**during the day** = *argument*(x:action, y:day); *event*(process); *qualia*[formal(during(x,y)), agentive(temporal span)]

2. A observes that there is an incompatibility between the *vākya* and what she knows about the causes of fatness.<sup>12</sup> More specifically, this incompatibility makes the sentence unsemantical since fat is caused by the act of eating and the negation of eat means that there is no event such that *x* eats *y*.
3. To rectify this unsemanticality, A includes “eats at night” as part of the meaning of the sentence. More specifically, A might understand the lexical entry fat to include the eating at night. Or, she could insert the expression “eats at night.” Mukulabhaṭṭa is explicitly agnostic on which is the correct account, saying, “Let there be verbal presumption or implication of simply the cause—of the eating at night.”

In cases of semantic *lakṣaṇā*, the interpreter and speaker may not be aware of making any inference: language processing occurs rapidly and phenomenology

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<sup>12</sup>It is not necessary that this process is a conscious one. Mukulabhaṭṭa’s account does not require that interpreters are conscious of all cases of inexplicability. For example, it is inexplicability that forces a shift from the lexical item **cow** as a universal to a particular, but unless speakers and interpreters are well-versed in metaphysics, they would not be aware of these views about word reference. These processes are likely occurring below the level of phenomenal consciousness. Better tests for what kind of inexplicability is involved will include analysis of lexical semantics, syntax, and etc.

is a poor guide to underlying mental modules. But we can still understand the information given by the sentence as filling in an inference.

Pustejovsky gives an example of this for the ambiguity in the verb “began.” He describes the process as *enthymemic abduction*, as an *enthymeme* is an argument containing two propositions, where a third is elliptical or implicit and, when added to the other two, a categorical syllogism results. In enthymemic abduction, the implicit premise is not analytic, in contrast to enthymemic deduction. In other words, there’s nothing in the explicit premises which contains the assumption that the speaker or hearer makes. Take the example, “Stephen King began a new novel.” If we suppose “began” paired with “novel” literally means “began to read” then it is most coherent (given other background conversational principles) that the speaker wants to convey, instead, that Stephen King began the writing of a novel. However, as this inference is not deductive, but abductive, it’s not a necessary inference. It’s possible that the speaker could be describing Steven King beginning to read a new novel by a friend; nothing in the syntax or semantics prevents this reading. Pustejovsky makes this explicit:

A Steven King began a new novel.

B (Steven King is a writer.)

C **Agentive**(novel) =  $\lambda z \lambda x.y \lambda eT[\text{write}(eT, z, x.y)]$

D Steven King began to write a new novel.

Above, A is the sentence uttered, B is the implicit non-analytic assumption, and C is the lexical information projected by the word “novel.” This lexical information is that novels have agents (z) who participate in an event at time T (eT) of writing them, and that novels are objects that can be understood as both a physical thing (x) and information (y), which he represents as x.y, or a “dot object.” Since we assume that Steven King is a writer, the word “novel” coerces the interpretation that “began” means “began to write” rather than “began to read,” as in C’. This process may be one a speaker or hearer is never conscious of, although we can often be brought to awareness of such ambiguities.<sup>13</sup>

This inference can be classified as *arthāpatti* as there is a presumption of D, that Steven King began to write a new novel (rather than to read one), as a way to reconcile A and B. For Mukulabhaṭṭa, apparent inconsistency between A and B arises because of privileging one reading of a word as literal.

## 7.8 Conclusion

As presented, Mukula’s analysis of the overlap between suggestion and *lakṣaṇā* is compelling. Using the examples which I have surveyed, Mukula targets Ānanda’s arguments from *Primariness*, *Kind of Operation*, and *Transformation*. He has shown that the underlying mechanism of presumption can ground both a semantic and pragmatic kind of *lakṣaṇā*. I’ve argued that if he is to

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<sup>13</sup>Pustejovsky 1995, p. 237-238.

be successful in bringing suggestion completely into the sphere of *lakṣaṇā*, he must show that suggestion shares precisely the same function and domain. By Mukula’s own criteria for the demarcation of linguistic “powers,” he has more than one kind of *lakṣaṇā*: a semantic *lakṣaṇā* which works within sentences to repair incompatibilities, and a pragmatic *lakṣaṇā* which functions like Gricean implication on the *vākya*, or expressed sentence meaning. In his paradigmatic examples of *lakṣaṇā*, he appeals to both powers. In effect, the proponents of *dhvani* could agree with Mukula that their power is pragmatic *lakṣaṇā* by another name, since the reductive strategy only succeeds if Mukula can show that he is not adding a new power to the two already-accepted powers.

However, since the *dhvani* theorist has, as I have shown previously, argued that suggestion cannot be understood as an inferential process, it seems unlikely that they would make such a dialectical move.<sup>14</sup> If they identify suggestion with Mukula’s conception of *lakṣaṇā*, they are admitting that inference—although presumptive reasoning, not deductive—can lead us to recover what is suggested. And this is something which I think they would avoid. In this way, then, I conclude that Mukula has given a plausible rejoinder to the *dhvani*-theorist, one which extends the incompatibility–repairing process of *lakṣaṇā* to the sorts of cases with which Ānanda is concerned.

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<sup>14</sup>In fact, there are thinkers after Mukula who argue against *dhvani* and propose that suggested meanings are a matter of *anumāna* or deductive inference. While Mukula’s work is taken up by Mammaṭa, as noted in the introduction, there is no textual evidence that *dhvani* theorists directly replied to his treatise.

## Chapter 8

### Conclusion

In the first chapter, I drew the contrast between Amelia Bedelia and Humpty Dumpty, two characters who are deficient in their linguistic abilities. Amelia Bedelia is hyper-literal, thinking that for every word, there is a single, invariant meaning. She is clueless when it comes to context's influence on meaning. Humpty Dumpty, on the other hand, thinks that language can be molded into any form that he desires. He, too, ignores context, but for the sake of emphasizing his intentions as a speaker. I think both Mukulabhaṭṭa and Ānandavardhana would have appreciated the lessons that these analogies have for our theorizing about language. They both want to explain how language can convey a wide variety of meanings through context and speaker intention. In this dissertation, my goal has been to examine their debate over how we recover meaning, both to contribute to our understanding of this exciting period in Sanskrit poetics and to contribute to our understanding of human linguistic capacities in general.

Ānanda revolutionized Sanskrit poetics with his theory of suggestion. Mukula, while taking on board some of Ānanda's observations, rejected this proposed explanation, preferring to expand the scope of an already-accepted linguistic



capacity: *lakṣaṇā*, or indication. I have argued that while a minority voice, Mukula, through his *Fundamentals of the Communicative Function*, presented a substantial philosophical opposition to Ānanda's view. While terse and lacking in some important details, this text presents its own unified theory—and not just of *kāvya*, or poetry, but communication as a whole. I've tried to show that Mukula's insights are epistemological as well as linguistic. Further, I've argued while the topics in his monograph might initially appear to be unrelated—lexical meaning, the varieties of indication, sentence meaning, etc.—in reality, each piece is part of a broader model. The structure of his work, though it does not state this outright, can be read as arguing for the interrelation between our theorizing about literal and non-literal meaning.

I've argued that epistemology—the *pramāṇa* theory of Indian philosophy—played a larger role in these discussions than has been appreciated. Given the continuity between Sanskrit-language philosophy and literature, this is not surprising, but much more remains to be said on the topic. For instance, while I have examined Mukula's identification of *lakṣaṇā* and the epistemic instrument of presumption, further questions linger. Just how revolutionary was this claim? Venugopalan, in his translation, argues that Mukula was not only wrong, but unusual.<sup>1</sup> However, recently some have argued that the Naiyāyika philosopher Gaṅgeśa makes a similar move in his work.<sup>2</sup> Here and there in the secondary literature, scholars like Edwin Gerow and K.K. Raja, offhandedly

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<sup>1</sup>Bhaṭṭa 1977.

<sup>2</sup>Das 2011.

remark that *lakṣaṇā* and *arthāpatti*, or presumption, are connected.<sup>3</sup> But this connection is not made explicit in Kumārila or others writing on presumption, and in fact, if *lakṣaṇā* is understood as part of the *pramāṇa* of testimony, this would threaten its non-inferential nature (at least for the Bhāṭṭa).

Not only is there fruitful historical work that can be done surrounding this identification, there are important philosophical questions. If interpretation requires presumption or inference to the best explanation—assuming I am correct in identifying these as roughly equivalent— what is the status of knowledge generated by it? Typically, both IBE and implicatures are taken to be defeasible in the contemporary philosophical tradition. However, as we saw in the discussion of the content of metaphors, there is a question as to how certain we must be about what is implicated, especially if implicatures convey multiple propositional contents. Further, is there a clash between inference to the *best* explanation and an implicature consisting of several propositions? Finally, while I have argued that presumption and IBE are roughly the same in Mukula’s text, this may not be the case on other views. Not only do the Mīmāṃsā have two different approaches, but the Jainas have their own analysis, as do the Advaita Vedāntins.

It is not just Mukula’s monograph which merits further philosophical exploration. In my analysis of Ānanda’s varieties of suggestion, I noted that there are some thorny questions still unanswered, not only about how to understand

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<sup>3</sup>In Gerow 1977, p. 255, he says of *lakṣaṇā* that “an a fortiori augment (*arthāpatti*) seems to be involved.” K.K. Raja says similar things in Raja 1993.

what he is arguing for, but whether what he argues for is correct. This is the case in particular in his discussion of *śleṣa*, or double meaning. Recently Yigal Bronner has written some on Ānanda's analysis within a chapter about Sanskrit theories of *śleṣa*, but he notes in the introduction to his book that very little has been written on the topic in general—and that, in fact, most Indologists have spent their time dismissing it as merely punning verbosity.<sup>4</sup> This is a shame, because Sanskrit theorists had a particular interest in the explanation of polysemy and interpretation because of the prevalence and complexity of polysemy in poetry. Western philosophy has likewise spent little effort on punning, although more attention has been given to polysemy in general. However, the phenomenon of double (and multiple) meanings raises important questions about how we distinguish between homonymy and homophony, how we process meaning, and, most broadly, how it is we distinguish between varieties of non-literal speech.<sup>5</sup>

While I argued that Ānanda makes some unfortunate confluences—mistaking conventionality for an arbitrariness based on individual whims, classifying emotional effects with communicated propositional meanings—his analysis does prompt important questions about how our emotive and aesthetic experiences might be instrumental in understanding what is meant by the author or speaker. Take the case of a discourse-level metaphor, such as the identification of Juliet with the sun in *Romeo and Juliet*. Perhaps our emotive experience

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<sup>4</sup>Bronner 2010, p.7-13.

<sup>5</sup>See Bronner 2010, pp. 205-210 for a discussion of these topics in classical Indian literature.

brings to salience certain features of Juliet which Romeo considers comparable to the sun. Or, given our aesthetic appreciation of the work, we might reject certain interpretations in favor of others which preserve that aesthetic sense. This is consistent with Ānanda's *rasa* theory, even if some of the details of his particular view are debatable.

Contemporary philosophers have a formidable set of technical tools with which they can model the structures of language and the relationship between expressions and the world. Ānanda and Mukula were working with a similarly analytic tradition whose aim was modeling (shown, for instance, in the work of Pāṇini), although their work comes early in classical Indian philosophy, before more nuanced distinctions were made. This does not mean that their work is devoid of lessons for us, however. In pointing out some comparable debates where different distinctions were made, we may come to question some of our own presuppositions, such as our distinction between “mandatory” and “optional” processes—or at least, work to make them more precise. Further, insofar as we become familiar with the taxonomy of figurative speech that characterizes Sanskrit poetic theory, we may become more sensitive ourselves to the nuances of English speech, questioning some of the ready-made categories that we subject to analysis. Many are already wondering whether “metaphor” is a useful natural kind—the varieties of indication and suggestion may prompt more such reflection.

As Mukula concludes in his *Fundamentals*, the challenge to understand the complexities of speech is a large one, and it is not one easily confined to

a single discipline. It pervades “the whole of ordinary use”, he says. Understanding communication involves thinking about grammar, hermeneutics, logic, poetry—and we might add today it probably also requires reflection on epistemology, psychology, and cognitive science. The result of this reflection clarifies more than just the communicative function, but quite a lot about human activity in general. Thus, while there is still work to be done, and they may disagree about theoretical details, contemporary philosophers and Ānandavardhana himself would likely agree with Mukulabhaṭṭa’s conclusion:

That communicative function is reflected in words, sentences, and  
knowledge sources;  
The intelligence of the one who employs it in composition becomes  
bright.

## Chapter 9

### English Translation of the *Fundamentals of the Communicative Function*

#### Translator's Introduction

The *Abhidhāvṛttamātrkā* (*Fundamentals of the Communicative Function*) of Mukulabhaṭṭa, written in Kashmir during the late ninth to early tenth century BCE, is not easily situated within a single genre.<sup>1</sup> On the one hand, Mukula is responding to the great aesthetic theorist Ānandavardhana, and insofar the topic of figurative language is the provenance of Sanskrit poetic theory, we might consider it a work of *alaṅkāra-śāstra*. On the other hand, Mukula's self-stated aims go beyond analysis of *kāvya*—Sanskrit verse—and are grounded in epistemology and philosophy of language in general. In this way it reads like a philosophical treatise, part of *darśana-śāstra*. We see this from the opening sentences, in which he observes that certainty (*niścaya*) in our ordinary linguistic practices is bound up with language having a consistent denotative capacity. However, although Mukula draws on Mīmāṃsakas

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<sup>1</sup>The title of this work has been given as both '*Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātrka*' and '*Abhidhā-vṛtta-mātrka*'. The difference is whether we read the second term as referring to a *mātrka* (fundamental text) which is an author's '*vṛtti*' (a style of commentary) or to the *vṛtta* (function) of *abhidhā* which is the broad term for communication. Both variants are found in the concluding lines of the text. I have chosen the reading '*vṛtta*' because it is in keeping with the stated purpose of the text.

philosophers such as Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Śabarasvāmin, he also engages with Grammarians such as Bhartṛhāri and Patañjali. In his concern with word reference and *sphoṭa* theory, his work could be understood as belonging to *vyākaraṇa-śāstra*, or the study of grammar. However we categorize the *Fundamentals* (and it is probably best to resist too firm a classification, but consider it yet more evidence that genre distinctions are rough and ready), it is a work which introduces the readers to a variety of classical Indian debates in a short space. Mukula addresses word reference, sentence meaning, varieties of metaphor, the status of *dhvani* or suggestion, and touches upon figures of speech including puns, irony, and metonymy.

While Mukula's monograph could serve as a kind of introductory text to these topics in language, its rhetorical aim is to argue against the position of Ānandavardhana regarding *dhvani*, or suggestion. He does this through an account of how *lakṣaṇā* or indication accounts for the properties of poetic language described in Ānanda's ninth-century work, the *Dhvanyāloka*. Mukula does not quibble with Ānanda's claim that poetry has "suggestive" capacities, if by this term we simply mean that it conveys, among other meanings, *rasa*, a particular aesthetic "flavor." However, he differs in his account of how poetry manages to convey its meanings, rejecting the newly postulated capacity of *dhvani* as explanatory. Instead, he argues that in the same way as words and sentences have meanings from *lakṣaṇā*, so do poems and figures of speech. To support his claim, Mukula surveys linguistic expressions taken from Vedic sources, *kāvya*, as well as stock examples used by poetic theorists and philoso-

phers. For each example, he specifies how its meaning fits into his conception of the communicative function, *abhidhā*, a function which includes *mukhya*, primary meaning, and *lakṣānika*, indicatory meaning.

Mukula's only extant work, the *Fundamentals* is influential within the discipline of poetics, although not elsewhere. The *Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra* of Mammaṭa includes sections of Mukula's text verbatim, although the work argues for *dhvani*, and Mammaṭa's interpretation of *dhvani*, especially in the *Kāvya-prakāśa*, is the *de facto* view for Sanskrit aesthetic theorists after him. Further, Mukula is known to have had at least two students who studied poetics: Sahadeva and Pratīhārendurāja. They authored commentaries on Ālaṃkārikas—Vāmana's *Kāvya-alaṅkāra-sūtra-vṛtti* and Udbhaṭa's *Kāvya-alaṅkāra-sāra-saṃgraha*, respectively—both mentioning their teacher.<sup>2</sup>

Given the wide range of topics and the influence of the text, it is unfortunate that the only existing English translation, that of K. Venugopalan, is relatively inaccessible to non-specialists.<sup>3</sup> While the translation style is transparent with regard to the underlying Sanskrit syntax, the result is at times cumbersome in English. Further, Venugopalan misconstrues the relationship of Mukula to Ānanda, claiming that Mukula tacitly accepts the *dhvani* theory, which contradicts Mukula's own arguments.<sup>4</sup> While authors can be internally incon-

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<sup>2</sup>Sahadeva notes that Mukula was responsible for bringing Vāmana's work out of obscurity. See McCrea 2008, p. 265, footnote 11 for a discussion—Sahadeva's commentary is not printed.

<sup>3</sup>Bhaṭṭa 1977.

<sup>4</sup>Footnotes 92 and 96 in Bhaṭṭa 1977 on pages 262 and 293.



sistent, it is the translator’s task to be as charitable as possible in reading a text. So, for instance, rather than interpreting the identification of *arthāpatti* with *lakṣaṇā* as being “confusing,” as Venugopalan does, I prefer to understand why Mukula might have thought this identification was helpful for his goal—the replacement of *dhvani* with *lakṣaṇā* in an analysis of language. Once this reading is in place, it is a further question whether he is correct. Finally, Venugopalan notes that the manuscripts and editions he has consulted have different readings at certain places, but he does not inform the reader which manuscripts and editions he is relying on, nor always what the different readings are. Thus, this translation is an attempt to make Mukula’s work accessible to generalist readers interested in philosophy of language and poetics, as well as to Sanskritists who might want to look at the original text more closely.

In my efforts, I have relied upon a printed editions of the text in Devanāgarī, since the 1882 manuscript is written in Śāradā.<sup>5</sup> I primarily rely upon the 1973 Dvivedi edition.<sup>6</sup> Throughout, I have checked my readings against Venugopalan’s transliteration and footnotes, although his transliteration is fraught with typographical errors.<sup>7</sup> As well as comparing my translation against Venugopalan, I have compared it against the excerpts translated by McCrea in his

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<sup>5</sup>For details, see entry 1164, Keith and Winternitz 1905, p. 143.

<sup>6</sup>In addition to Mukulabhaṭṭa 1973, there is a more recent edition, Mukulabhaṭṭa 2007, which differs only slightly.

<sup>7</sup>I have not included my own transliteration here, as I prefer not to contribute another version with similar issues. It is my goal to publish an independent translation and commentary of the text, at which point I will include a polished transliteration with appropriate critical remarks.

2008 book and Ingalls' translation of the *Dhvanyāloka*, for verses cited by both Ānanda and Mukula. Variant readings are noted throughout in footnotes. The numbers in square brackets correspond to the Dvivedi edition page number and line.

As I've said, my aim in this translation has been to produce a text which is readable by an audience unfamiliar with Sanskrit. Thus, while I have striven to be faithful to the Sanskrit syntax where possible, I have also avoided introducing copious parenthetical insertions which interrupt the fluidity of the reading. As Sanskrit is an inflected language, information is conveyed in the case endings, number, and gender of pronouns which, while not strictly speaking "on the surface" of the syntax, can be rendered in an English translation without doing injustice to what is being communicated by the author. So, for instance, in [24.22], where Mukula describes the three forms of "speaker, sentence, and utterance," I make explicit what is implicit in the subsequent uses of 'vāktr-ādi' (meaning "et cetera"), rather than translating it as "speaker and etc."

It is appropriate to grapple with how translation impacts what is communicated when translating a treatise on *communication*. Given that linguistic expressions convey more than just their strictly literal meanings, but also carry along non-literal meanings (perhaps intended by an author) as well as connotations (perhaps more like cultural accretions), what should translators aim to capture? Should the goal be to convey the literal meaning strictly without regard to the secondary or figurative meaning? Should the translator aim to

introduce double-meanings where present in the original text? To what extent may the translator leave the literal meaning to reproduce a bitextual effect, even if it is not the same semantic effect as in the original? Given that the semantic range of Sanskrit does not always neatly overlap with the semantic range of English, no single translation may reproduce bi-textuality neatly. Further, to aim for the *literal* as opposed to the *non-literal* requires one to make a decision about what constitutes literal meaning—which is no small matter. That Mukula uses poetic language with multiple shades of meaning, and does so as motivating examples for his argument poses an additional problem. For the reader to track his arguments, the translator needs to ensure that the reader has sufficiently understood the linguistic data upon which Mukula is relying.

All of this is to say that I have had to make choices in translation which serve my primary aims—readability by a philosophical audience and fidelity to what is being communicated (literally and non-literally) by Mukula. One case in point is the—by Mukula’s time, conventionalized—example of *lakṣaṇā*, ‘*gaṅgāyām ghoṣhaḥ*.’ This sentence is a prominent example in discussion of *lakṣaṇā*, and considering its translation highlights methodological issues. Further, in so doing, this illustrates important elements of the relationship between literal and non-literal meaning which is the topic of Mukula’s treatise. Throughout the translation, I will rarely spend so much time laying out the various readings for a particular expression, although I will point out places where I diverge with other translations. An examination of this sentence,

however, can serve as an introduction to the topic at hand.

The Sanskrit ‘*gaṅgāyām*,’ meaning Ganges, is in the locative case, where ‘*ghoṣaḥ*,’ meaning village, is in the nominative and the subject of the sentence (with an implied predicative “is”). Pāṇini describes the function of the locative as ‘*ādhāro’adhikaraṇam*’ or “‘location’ means locus.”<sup>8</sup> The term ‘*adhikaraṇa*’ used to gloss ‘*ādhāra*’ is defined as having three meanings, according to Patañjali: *aupaśleṣika*, *abhivyāpaka*, and *vaiṣayika*. In order, the three are contact, pervasion, and context. Those theorists who say that ‘*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*’ is an example of *lakṣaṇā* do so because the the locative case ending cannot be understood literally. According to them, strictly speaking, the locative should be taken as one of these:

- (1) The village is on (*aupaśleṣika*) the Ganges.
- (2) The village is in (*abhivyāpaka*) the Ganges.
- (3) The village is about (*vaiṣayika*) the Ganges.<sup>9</sup>

Defenders of *lakṣaṇā* say that the current of a river is inappropriate as the *adhikaraṇā*, or locus, of a village. Because of this obstacle (*bādha*) to the literal meaning, through *lakṣaṇā* there is inserted the word “bank” to resolve the difficulty. Thus the sentence ‘*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*’ can convey that the village is resting upon the bank of the Ganges (‘*gaṅgasya taṭe ghoṣaḥ*’ or ‘*gaṅga-taṭā*’

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<sup>8</sup>See Pāṇini 1897, 1.4.45.

<sup>9</sup>As far as I know, there is no specification as to which kind of *adhikaraṇa* this instance of the locative would be read as, strictly literally. From context clues, numbers (1) and (2) are the most likely. For reasons I will explain below, I think it is probably (1).

*ghoṣaḥ*’). Now comes the problem for the translator: how can this illustration, so commonly used to motivate metonymy, be translated into English so as to remain faithful to the Sanskrit and yet also serve as an illustration of the phenomena of *lakṣaṇā*?

Part of the answer to this question depends on how we understand *lakṣaṇā*. Just how present to the hearer’s phenomenology is the obstacle to the literal meaning? *Lakṣaṇā*, according to Mukula, operates in sentences as ordinary as “The cow is to be tied up,” in order to convey an individual cow and not merely the class of all cows, which he takes as the literal meaning of “cow.” Such a sentence would not, to the ordinary hearer sound inapt. Likewise, cases of *nirudha-lakṣaṇā* (frozen or conventionalized *lakṣaṇā*) like the word ‘*rāja*’ applied to a person of a non-royal caste, are felt to be literal by ordinary persons, and it is only through reflection that their being non-literal is understood. Other, more metaphorical instances are would probably seem non-literal, such as “The Punjabi peasant is a bull.” The problem is that, to an English speaker, the sentence “The village is on the Ganges” does not *feel* non-literal. Indeed, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the preposition “on” also means “In proximity to; close to, beside, near, just by, at the bank or coast of (a river, lake, sea, etc.)”<sup>10</sup> So translation (1) leaves the English speaker mystified as to why this is an example of non-literal meaning, or why “bank” must be implicitly understood.

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<sup>10</sup>“on, prep.” *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2014. Web. 4 February 2015. This use for rivers dates back to 1009 CE.

In contrast, translating the sentence as in (2) conveys the image of a village submerged into the Ganges river. This is how Ingalls explains the phrase (which he still translates as “on the Ganges” in his version of the *Dhvanyāloka*), saying that “the Sanskrit phrase means literally ‘a village situated in the Ganges,’ so that if we take the phrase literally, we will suppose that the inhabitants are drowning.”<sup>11</sup> This certainly gives an English speaker the feeling of an obstacle to a literal reading, and she would easily see that some adjustment to the sentence is necessary to make sense of it. However, such a translation tips the scale too far in this direction. This sentence was not interpreted as nonsensical or obviously false—at least not unanimously. On Pāṇini’s view, ordinary use allows for extension of the meaning of the locative.<sup>12</sup> The existence of conflicting intuitions means that ‘*gaṅgāyām ghoṣah*’ would not necessarily strike a Sanskrit speaker as odd as “The village is in the Ganges” would strike an English speaker. And even those who think the sentence is an example of *lakṣaṇā* distinguish it from bizarre sentences like ‘*agninā siñcati*,’ or “She/he/it wets with fire,” which is supposed to strike the Sanskrit speaker as obviously false (and even nonsensical).<sup>13</sup>

Thus neither English translation of the locative is perfect as a translation

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<sup>11</sup>Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 93, footnote 6. I have not found mention of a submerged village anywhere in the Sanskrit texts—such a discussion would help narrow the interpretation of the locative. K.K. Raja takes it as a village being on top of the stream (Raja 1990, p. 232).

<sup>12</sup>See Pāṇini 1897, 1.4.42, for the citation. For more discussion, see Raja 1990.

<sup>13</sup>Of course, just as Chomsky’s famous “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously” is now the subject of contests for the best poetic interpretation, so this example came to be employed metaphorically.

which captures both the literal semantic range of the locative (a range which is, given Pāṇini’s remarks, perhaps not clearly bounded) and the intuitions of a Sanskrit speaker which serve as evidence for *lakṣaṇā*. Given the imperfection of translation in this case, I have chosen to translate the sentence as the first option, for several reasons. First, since the metonymical shift requires the insertion of ‘*tate*’ or “on the bank,” I have chosen a rendering which allows for a simple insertion without prepositional change. Rendering the sentence “The village is in the Ganges” means construing the locative (now attached to “bank”) differently after the insertion of “bank,” unless we want to read it “The village is in the bank of the Ganges” (but this leaves our hapless villagers drowning in mud). However, no one defending *lakṣaṇā* mentions any change other than the insertion of a word.<sup>14</sup> Second, I think that while “on” now ordinarily conveys the sense of “next to” quite easily (whether or not this is a literal meaning or not), such a reading is consistent with how *lakṣaṇā* works. It is, after all, a *vyāpāra*.<sup>15</sup> Not all cases of *lakṣaṇā* are ones where the linguistic obstacle is present to consciousness. Finally, since I think there is room for debate about whether ‘*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*’ is a case of secondary meaning (or whether it is a frozen cases), this is analogous to the English translation of “on the Ganges.” Dictionaries tell us what usage is common, and so the “next-to” sense of “on” in English is certainly familiar. But this doesn’t yet solve the question of whether “on” is, strictly speaking, restricted to a single literal

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<sup>14</sup>Of course, there must be some other changes, including the addition of the genitive case ending.

<sup>15</sup>I thank David Buchta for emphasizing this point in conversations on the topic.

meaning, from a philosophical standpoint, once we've established what it is for a meaning to be literal. And it is precisely this question—the distinction between literal (*mukhya*) and non-literal (*lakṣaṇā*) which Mukula takes up in detail.



## The Fundamentals of the Communicative Function

[1.7] In human contexts, it is true that the things words refer to—things which are useful for worldly enjoyment or for deliverance from the cycle of reincarnation, and useful for avoiding what is opposed to these—are not elevated to usefulness in everyday purposes without being known with certainty.<sup>16</sup> Thus all knowledge sources enjoy authority because they result in certainty, being grounded as they are in comprehending objects of knowledge.<sup>17</sup> And it is through knowledge sources that there is comprehension of things referred to by words—things which are useful for worldly enjoyment or for deliverance from the cycle of reincarnation, and useful for avoiding what is opposed to these. Therefore, it is only on the basis of certainty regarding what things words refer to that there is elevation to usefulness in everyday purposes. And certainty requires meaning being accessible through a connection with words. And, as the word is the cause of understanding meaning by its communicative function—either by the primary function or indicatory function—therefore a distinction is here made between two functions of communication, the primary function and indicatory function.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>16</sup>The term '*pada-artha*' is translated here loosely as "things words refer to" in an effort to maintain theoretical neutrality at the outset of just what kind of objects the referents of words are.

<sup>17</sup>Here I follow Venugopalan in correcting '*prāmāṇyam*' for the Dvivedi edition's '*prādhāṇyam*,' which would mean "supremacy" or "primacy." It is common to say that *pramāṇa* enjoy authority. Sanskrit: *tathā hi sarvāṇi pramāṇāni prameya-avagati-nibandhana-bhūtāni nīscaya-paryavasāyitayā prāmāṇyaṃ bhajante*.

<sup>18</sup>'*Abhidhā*,' which I translate as "communicative function," is used by other writers to mean literal or primary in contrast with the non-literal, but here Mukula is subsuming both literal and non-literal under this term. Mukula uses '*mukhya*' ("primary") to denote the

This is the question to be raised: “What is the communicative function: the primary function on the one hand and indicatory function on the other?” The author writes in order to delineate these two functions of words—primary and indicated meaning—through explanation of the topic:

**Verse 1**

*It is said: The primary function is what is apprehended from the word’s function,*

*The indicatory function is apprehended in addition to that meaning being understood.*

[2.18] “The primary function is what is apprehended from the word’s function.” Just as the face is perceived before all the limbs—like hands—likewise, the primary meaning is understood before the comprehension of all other meanings. So that which is understood by means of word’s function is the primary meaning. Therefore, by the word “face” is meant “primary like a face,” through the ending ‘*ya*’ used for words like ‘*śākhā*.’<sup>19</sup> An example of this:

(4) A cow is to be tied up.<sup>20</sup>

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literal meaning of words, and ‘*lakṣaṇā*’ (“indicatory”) to denote the non-literal. Translating ‘*lakṣaṇā*’ with “indication,” while imperfect, is to convey that these meanings rely on an intermediate step.

<sup>19</sup>Mukula is explaining why he uses the Sanskrit term ‘*mukhya*’ for “primary” and its relationship to the word ‘*mukha*.’ The latter means “face,” and with the ending of ‘*ya*’ added onto it comes to have the meaning of “like” a face. Mukula’s explanation refers to the Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini. In the *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, rule 5.3.103, Pāṇini says ‘*śākhā-ādibhyaḥ yat*,’ or “The affix *yat* is used after “branch” and similar words.” Pāṇini 1987, p. 609. An explanation similar to Mukula’s for why ‘*mukhya*’ should mean “primary” is given by Kumārilabhaṭṭa in *Tantravārttika*, 3.2.1, where he says that *mukhya* is, like the human fetus, the first to appear.

<sup>20</sup>The sentence could be translated as “The cow is to be tied up” or “A cow is to be tied

Here, from the function of the word “cow” is conveyed the class whose identifying feature is cowhood, which is the efficient means for completing the sacrifice.<sup>21</sup> This class is the primary meaning. In this way, what is conveyed by the word’s function is the primary meaning.

[2.24] Now, the indicatory function is that meaning understood by reflecting on the meaning conveyed from the word’s function. This is just as in the earlier example, since a particular is understood.<sup>22</sup> This meaning is not understood from the word’s function.<sup>23</sup> This is because of the maxim,

*“Denotation whose power is expended in qualification cannot reach the property-bearer.”<sup>24</sup>*

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up.” On the first interpretation, there is a particular cow, say, Bessie, who is the target of the gerundive. On the second interpretation, any (single) cow will do as the target of the tying. Mukula’s account of indication needs only that a single cow is the denotation of ‘*gaur*’ in contrast to the class of cows. So the definite or indefinite article will do equally well for his argument.

<sup>21</sup>The sacrifice cannot be completed unless something is tied up which has the properties of a cow, so cowhood is the means by which the sacrifice is completed. Mukula echoes Pāṇini and Patañjali in his use of this example, which is part of a longer injunction originally found in the *Aitareya-brāhmaṇa* 2.24. Pāṇini cites this as a case that demonstrates words cannot denote only individuals. If only a particular cow were denoted by “cow” here, he argues, then once we have tied up that cow in a ritual, we would be failing to follow the command correctly were we, in a later ritual, to tie up a new cow. For a translation of the *Āṣṭhādyaī* 1.2.64 and discussion of this section, see Scharf 1996. We will see below that cowhood alone cannot be the efficient means to complete the sacrifice but must always be instantiated. However, as the ritual calls for a cow, it is in virtue of being a member of a class of cows that the particular thing is efficacious.

<sup>22</sup>The example being referred to is (4) above.

<sup>23</sup>The term ‘*ava-sīyate*,’ or “derived,” describes a strong relationship, like determination. The idea may be that the individual cow as the referent of ‘*gaur*’ is not required by the lexical semantics, but the universal/class of cowhood is. The same root (*ava* +  $\sqrt{so}$ ) is used below, in explaining the maxim about denotation: ...*chabdasya jāti-mātra-paryavasītatvāt*. Here, the sense is that of the determinate conclusion, or aim, expressing the fact that the denotation of a word has as its aim the *jāti* and nothing further.

<sup>24</sup>Venugopalan notes that this quotation is not found in earlier texts than this one, but

This is because a word has as its definitive aim simply a class of objects. But a class of objects without a particular cannot be understood as the efficient means for completing the sacrifice. Thus, that which is the substratum of the class—in this instance the individual—is implied on account of the class designated by a word.<sup>25</sup> Therefore in this case there is the indicatory function.

In conclusion, this two-fold communicative function of a word is explained through a description of the objects of the primary and indicatory functions: an object which is uninterrupted by a meaning and an object which has an intermediary meaning.

[4.26] Now, the four-fold rule of primary meaning is described:

## Verse 2

*Now, here the four divisions of primary meaning are to be investigated: for example, general classes.*<sup>26</sup>

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it is quoted in many *Alaṅkāra* texts, and by Kumāriḷa in his *Tantravārttika*. Bhaṭṭa 1977, fn 7 on p.246. McCrea has traced the quotation further; see his McCrea 2008, p. 269, footnote 17.

<sup>25</sup>“Implied,” or ‘*ākṣīpyate*’ is a term often used in connection with the kind of reasoning known as *arthāpatti*. I choose to translate ‘*arthāpatti*,’ which will appear later in the text, as “presumption.” It is a sort of reasoning similar to abductive inference, where something must be assumed to be the case in order to explain the truth of other, already known, facts.

<sup>26</sup>The term ‘*jāti*,’ which I have translated as “general class” is used with varying metaphysical implications by the different Indian schools. In some instances, it means a “class” in the sense of a collection of things (Deshpande 2003, p. 13 suggests this is how Pāṇini uses the term). In *Mīmāṃsā* contexts, it typically refers to a class property or universal which is instantiated by a particular thing (Deshpande 2003, p. 15). So, for instance, Kumāriḷa says in the *Ślokaivārttika*: ‘*jātim eva-ākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā*’ (“What is called ‘kind’ is just the ‘class property’ by which distinctions are made”). (Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 346.) Since Mukula is here following the traditional Grammarian four-fold distinction between *jāti*, *guṇa*, *kriyā*, and *yad-ṛccha*, I do not translate ‘*jāti*’ as “universal,” but “class.” Below,

[4.28] Of these two meanings, primary and indicatory, the primary sense has four divisions, such as “general classes.” According to the examples in the renowned work, the *Mahābhāṣya*, there are in fact four uses of words: general-class-denoting words, quality-denoting words, action-denoting words, and proper names.<sup>27</sup> Accordingly, for all words which are conducive to conveying their natural meaning,<sup>28</sup> the use is dependent on distinguishing features, since there are distinctions among objects which are determined by their attributes.

[5.3] And there are two kinds of distinguishing features: those which are speaker-imposed and those which are due to the nature of things. In some cases, a speaker stipulates that something possesses a distinguishing feature and, at other times, there is a property truly belonging to something.<sup>29</sup> In the case where it is by according to the speaker’s desire, the name is fixed by the power whose object is this or that named thing. For example, in the case of

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he explicitly rejects the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view that the primary meaning of all words is a universal.

<sup>27</sup>The term, ‘*pravṛtti*,’ which I translate “use,” is often combined with ‘*nimitta*’ to mean the “basis of linguistic practice” (Ganeri 2006) or “the property whose possession by an object is the necessary and sufficient condition for the use of a given word to refer to that object” (Deshpande 2003). The term ‘*nimitta*’ does not appear here, but Mukula instead uses ‘*upādhi*’ to describe the external basis for the employment of particular syntactic categories. Here Mukula is deviating from the Mīmāṃsā school, which argues for only universals and actions, in favor of the Grammarians. He is citing Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya*, written circa the 2nd century BCE, which is a commentary on Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭadhyāyī*.

<sup>28</sup>The term ‘*sva-artha*,’ here translated as “natural meaning,” is literally “own-meaning” and refers to the primary or literal denotation of a word.

<sup>29</sup>The major distinction is between internal boundary conditions and *ad hoc* or accidental boundaries for classes. The term ‘*yad-ṛcchā*’ literally means “that which is by chance or accident,” and thus indicates a word which is contingently related to its object, in contrast to being fixed (*nitya*) by essential characteristics.

a word like “Ḍittha,” its own meaning is grasped by cognition of the last in collected series of phonemes.<sup>30</sup> In this case, through the manifestation of the denotative power upon such (a cognition), there is imposed by a speaker the possessing of an attribute upon this or that named thing.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, proper names such as “Ḍittha” are dependent upon this (attribute).

[5.10] And, moreover, even among those whose view is that the true nature of the phonemic pattern of words like “Ḍittha” cannot be determined with respect to named things—because there is no true nature of the phonemic pattern, apart from the sound of the individual phonemes like “ḍ”—even among them, it is entirely suitable that a word such as “Ḍittha” has the property of being speaker-imposed.<sup>32</sup> This is because a word such as “Ḍittha,” whose unified character is conceptually imposed, is being used for the purpose of being the name of this or that thing, by the various customary word capacities, which manifest the speaker’s desires. In conclusion, as the Grammarians have

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<sup>30</sup>The word ‘Ḍittha’ is a made-up proper name in Sanskrit, used as an example of giving an arbitrary name, with no associations, to an object. Mukula is echoing Jaimini’s view in the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* I.1.5. According to him, the impressions of each phoneme in a word are held in the mind of the hearer and the final phoneme triggers an *artha-jñāna*, or cognition of meaning. This is in contrast to the *sphoṭa* theorists like Bhartṛhari, who argue that the final phoneme triggers an understanding of the meaning which does not require the sequence of previous phonemes to be cognized. See Devasthali 1997, p. 14 and also Raja 2000, p. 95-148.

<sup>31</sup>Although one might be tempted to understand the meaning of a proper name as fixed by the person “baptizing” the one named, the text is clear that it is the desire of the person speaking to call something “Ḍittha” that is responsible. See also Deshpande 1972, p. 43. Mukula is in agreement in his analysis with Mammaṭa, who also follows the Grammarians and rejects the *Mīmāṃsā* view that words refer only to *jāti*-s. See McCrea 2008, p. 270.

<sup>32</sup>This is the *sphoṭa* theory of Bhartṛhari, mentioned earlier, which postulates that there is no phonemic pattern which prompts the understanding of a word’s meaning, but that word meaning is understood in an “explosion” (*sphoṭa*) all at once, without sequence. Mukula is arguing that this category of words is theoretically neutral.

previously explained, the true nature of the distinguishing feature imposed by the speaker, is explained as being the basis of that feature.

[5.16] Now, there also are two kinds of distinguishing features based on a thing's properties. This is due to the difference between properties which are yet to be accomplished and properties which already exist. In these cases, action-denoting words are dependent upon an attribute which is yet to be accomplished, as in the case of "s/he cooks."<sup>33</sup> Now, the attribute which already exists has two forms, due to the difference between classes and qualities. Further, some already existing distinguishing features—such as the class—have a life-giving quality with respect to the objects of words. For no objects ever obtain their form without having a connection to a class. It was said in the *Vākyapadīya*:

*"In fact, a cow is not a cow or non-cow because of its form, but it is a cow because of its relationship with cow-hood."*<sup>34</sup>

Further, some attributes are the basis for employing a specific word for an object whose property already exists, for example, the quality of whiteness. For something like a cloth does not depend upon a quality like whiteness for its form, rather it is simply on the strength of the class alone that it has

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<sup>33</sup>This division, between things and actions and, correspondingly, between nouns and verbs, dates back to the Grammarian Yāska in his *Nirukta* and is also found in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* II 418, 14-16. However, this division is only rough, since qualities can be communicated with nouns. *Mahābhāṣya* II 356, 18f. For more discussion of the historical development of Sanskrit grammar, see Scharfe 1977

<sup>34</sup>The *Vākyapadīya* was a philosophical text written by Bhartṛhari, part of the Grammarian school, in the 5th century CE. He expands upon the doctrine of *sphoṭa* described earlier.

obtained a form of “thingness.” Therefore, in this case the class is the basis for employing a specific word for an object that has obtained a form. As well, with regard to eternal qualities—for example, something having the property of the most basic atomicity—even with regard to all these qualities, just by their belonging to the class of qualities, they have the attribute of being a quality.<sup>35</sup> In conclusion, a general-class-denoting word, such as the word “cow,” is dependent on the attribute which gives it life.<sup>36</sup> Since the referent of the word “white” is the basis for employing a specific word for an object which has already obtained a form, the word “white” is a quality-denoting word.

[8.25] (**Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā Objection.**) It may be said: rather, all these words which express qualities, actions, proper names, are grounded in universals.<sup>37</sup> For instance, quality words such “white” signify a universal inherent in multiple things, a universal whose quality is a characteristic like whiteness, and which is inherent in substances such as milk, shells, cranes, and etc. It is likewise, even in the case of action-denoting words, where particular actions are established as mutually different from one another. These actions have their locus in things such as a bit of sugar, a kernel, or rice, as in the case of “cooking.” What should be said is just that a universal is in-

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<sup>35</sup>The example here of eternal atomicity is intended to show that even fundamental qualities which seem to precede the things in which they inhere still count as qualities, and not as universals.

<sup>36</sup>The term translated as “life” is *prāṇa*, quite literally “breath.”

<sup>37</sup>Mukula is here referring to the Mīmāṃsā view of language, so I translate ‘*jāti*’ as “universal” rather than “class” to highlight the ontological commitments in place and distinguish their view from Mukula’s. This is not to imply that all Mīmāṃsakas are committed to the same view of what constitutes a universal.



herent in these actions. Now with regard to speaker-imposed-words such as “Ḍittha,” there is a universal which has the property of being a Ḍittha-word that inheres in various Ḍittha-words, in distinct utterances which are from a parrot, a Sārikā bird, or a human.<sup>38</sup> And the universal is denotatively applied to named things as is appropriate.<sup>39</sup> Or, suppose that “Ḍittha”-named things are different at various times, through their growth and decay. On the strength of what is non-different between the tokens of “Ḍittha, Ḍittha,” there is a non-differentiated thing which is the ground of saying “Ḍittha,” which is lacking contradiction, and by whose form Ḍittha is named. Therefore, it is plausible there there is a universal for “Ḍittha” inherent in objects which are understood by Ḍittha-words. And, therefore, it is not appropriate to say that the linguistic employment of words is fourfold with regard to quality-denoting words, action-denoting words, and proper names, because these are actually universal-denoting words.

[10.17] (**Author’s Response.**) To this we respond that individuals, proper names, qualities, and actions do depend on a cognition of a single form experiencing distinctions dependent upon this or that attribute, but which is not a universal. This is the position of the revered author of the *Mahābhāṣya*. For just like a single face is reflected in various ways in oil, a sword, water, or a mirror because of differences that are grounded in how we cognize the reflection,

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<sup>38</sup>The motif of birds speaking is frequent in Sanskrit literature, and sometimes is used as an example to appeal to the importance of speaker intention. It is not clear why Mukula is including parrots and Sārikā birds (also known as Myna birds) in his example here.

<sup>39</sup>Dvivedi has ‘*abhidheyam*’ (“denotatively applied to”) where Venugopalan has ‘*avaseyam*’ (“understood as”).

in the same way, a single particular—for instance, white—as it is delimited by different places and times since it has distinct substrates, such as a conch shell, which are produced according to the collection of this or that cause, might be variegated, having its in location in manifestations whose forms are different.<sup>40</sup> And, therefore, words such as “white” are not universal-denoting words having a singular particular nature of “white,” since the supposed universal has inherence in different substances and because there is no universal corresponding to the property of whiteness. In a similar way, “cooks,” words like “Dittha,” and Dittha-named-things are to be explained. Also, in these cases, there is just one individual action of cooking, one individual Dittha-word, and one named thing that is Dittha. Just as cookings which occur in sequence appear to be a single form and what is distinct about these individuals distinguishes them, in the same way there are the multiple utterances of “Dittha” and particular stages of life, such as childhood, of the person Dittha. So we have established that the primary meaning is four-fold because it is grounded in linguistic use which has four kinds of word-meanings.


[11.18] Now, with regard to indicatory meaning, the author continues in order to survey its two divisions.

### Verse 3

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<sup>40</sup>Mukula here uses ‘*śukla-ādi-vyaktir*,’ or “a...particular—for instance, white...” even though he has just distinguished between individuals (*vyakti*) and qualities (*guṇa*), arguing that white is a quality. Since I take it he is not changing his mind in such a short space, nor is he being contradictory, I take ‘*vyakti*’ to be used to emphasize the particularity of the whiteness as distinct from its substrates.

Figure 9.1: Distinguishing Features which Ground Varieties of Primary Meaning



*Indication is thought to be two-fold due to being transfer-less and mixed transfer.*<sup>41</sup>

Because of transfer-less indication<sup>42</sup> and mixed transfer, indication is of two

<sup>41</sup>The term ‘*upacāra*’ is used by some authors as a general term, synonymous with ‘*lakṣaṇā*.’ Gautama, in the *Nyāya-sūtra*, uses it for cases where the primary meaning is close to the indicated. (Raja 2000, p. 233.) The word is often translated as “transfer.” With the addition of the term ‘*miśra*,’ which means “mixed,” the sense is that the target, indicated meaning has carried with it some of the initial, primary meaning.

<sup>42</sup>Mukula uses ‘*śuddhā*’ (strictly speaking, meaning “pure” or “free of,” which I am translating here as “-less.”) in a few different ways. The first instance is here, in contrast to “mixed transfer” (‘*upacāra-miśra*’), where the word picks out indication that has a clear conceptual difference between the primary meaning and what is indicated, and there is no comparison or metaphorical identification between the two. The second instance is for a sub-variety of mixed transfer where there is an identification, but the identification is free from qualitative similarity. An example is where ghee is identified as long life because of the relationship of cause and effect. The third instance is in the second analysis of indication, which analyzes the distinctness of the primary and indicated meaning. Here, “pure” is used in the same sense, with the same divisions as the first use: transfer-less. Mukula characterizes these as cases where there is no “conceptual coloring” between the primary and indicated meanings. Finally, “pure” is used as a sub-variety of both superimposition and absorption. Here, “pure” is used in the same way as the second instance, as free from qualitative similarity. While what *śuddhā* modifies (mixed transfer and qualities) is implicit,

sorts. Firstly, there is transfer-less indication:

- (5) The village is on the Ganges.<sup>43</sup>

[11.21] Here, the particular river is not appropriate as a support for the village, therefore the words “on the Ganges,” whose primary denotation is the particular river, which is near to the bank, convey the bank by indication.

[11.23] Now, *mixed transfer* is where one thing is designated as another thing, as in,

- (6) The Punjabi peasant is an ox.<sup>44</sup>

In this case, it is not possible to construe the word “ox” with the word “Punjabi peasant” as having a common subject. The primary meaning being blocked, there are transferred to “Punjabi peasant” qualities such as such as dullness and laziness which are similar to qualities of dullness and laziness understood in the ox. This is done through indication of qualities such as dullness and laziness which are understood in the Punjabi peasant and similar to the ox.<sup>45</sup> This is

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rather than explicit in the original Sanskrit, to avoid confusion, I include them in my English translation.

<sup>43</sup>See translator’s introduction for a discussion of why I have translated the locative ‘*gaṅgāyām*’ as “on the Ganges” here rather than “in the Ganges.”

<sup>44</sup>The word I translate as “Punjabi peasant,” ‘*vāhika*,’ literally means “one who carries,” but may also connote the Vahika area in Punjab. The metaphor is an ethnic slur against the people in the area.

<sup>45</sup>The mention of the three pairs of qualities (rather than two) is important. The ox has dullness and laziness *qua* ox (call them dullness<sub>O</sub> and laziness<sub>O</sub>). The peasant has dullness<sub>P</sub> and laziness<sub>P</sub>. Because the way in which an ox and a peasant are dull and lazy are different, the two qualities cannot be equated, nor can the adjectives “dull” and “lazy” be applied in the same way to both ox and peasant. Therefore, there must be the indication of a third

*mixed transfer* indication. In this way, by the division belonging to transfer-less and mixed transfer, the two-fold nature of indication, is explained.

[12.22] Thus the author demonstrates that there is also a two-fold nature to transfer-less indicated meaning.

#### Verse 4

*Transfer-less indication is thought to be of two kinds: due to appropriation and indirect indication.*<sup>46</sup>

[12.25] What is explained as transfer-less indication has been said to be of two kinds. Now, in some cases, by appropriating another meaning, indication occurs. In others, (it occurs) by indirectly expressing another meaning.

[12.26] **(Objection)** “But how is there appropriation of another meaning? Or how is there indication of (another meaning)?” Therefore the author continues:

#### Verse 5

*Where, for the purpose of a meaning which is already established by itself, there is implicated another thing, that is appropriation. Now, indirect indication is thought to be the opposite of this.*

[13.3] Where another thing is implied for the sake of a meaning which is already

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pair of qualities, dullness<sub>I</sub> and laziness<sub>I</sub>. In this way, dullness<sub>I</sub>, for instance, is similar to dullness<sub>O</sub> and dullness<sub>P</sub>, but and can be understood as metaphorically applying to both the ox and the peasant.

<sup>46</sup>These two kinds of *lakṣaṇā* correspond generally to the terms ‘*ajahal-lakṣaṇā*’ and ‘*jahal-lakṣaṇā*,’ respectively. As Mukula will explain, the first is where the primary meaning is partially retained and becomes part of the indicated. When the primary meaning is largely rejected, this is ‘*lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā*.’

established by itself, this is appropriation, as in the case

(4) A cow is to be tied up.

For in this case, the word whose aim is the ceremony is not appropriate without the implication of an individual based on the word; therefore, there is a particular implied in order for this property to be established as the meaning. And likewise:

(7) Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.

[13.6] Now in this case, the possession of fatness, since it is an effect, is understood as characterized by an absence of eating, an absence which has its existence during the day. In order to establish itself (as what is meant), “fatness” incorporates, through the implication that there is eating at night, the existence of a cause of the fatness. For it cannot be the case that the fatness is brought about by consuming a tonic or the like, because this is an example of indicatory meaning only when we can determine that there is an absence of a cause through another knowledge source.<sup>47</sup> And the fatness is the reason that something such as consuming a tonic is blocked as the thing which lack of daytime eating qualifies.<sup>48</sup> Further, because there is the completion of an

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<sup>47</sup>Devadatta’s drinking would be potentially observable, but we resort to *arthāpatti* to postulate  $x$  only when we cannot observe  $x$ .

<sup>48</sup>Mukula is alluding to the requirement that in order for our knowledge of Devadatta’s eating at night to be through language, we should not be able to appeal to perception or inference, for instance, to explain the missing cause. If Devadatta is fat because he drinks something with sustenance, we would be able to see this and the sentence would make sense without indication. But, since we do not see Devadatta eating *or* drinking, the sentence is strange. Thus indication fills in the cause of Devadatta’s fatness, which is otherwise

incomplete means of knowledge, there is here the previously presumed phrase, “eaten at night.” This can be verbal presumption or presumption of the cause alone, viz, the eating at night.<sup>49</sup> Whichever is the case, appropriation is a suitable explanation because there is another, earlier, meaning implied for the sake of a meaning which is already established by itself.

[13.15] In contrast, there is indirect indication for combinations which have a structure opposite from appropriation, which is described earlier. This happens when no other meaning is implied for the sake of establishing the natural meaning, but instead there is a giving up of the natural meaning to establish another meaning. This is just as in the earlier example, (5) “The village is on the Ganges.” Now in this case, since the riverbank supports the village, the word “Ganges” gives up its natural meaning for sake of the riverbank related to the action of support. Therefore, in order to understand another meaning, “bank,” the word “Ganges,” whose natural meaning is a particular stream, is


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inexplicable. The fact that Mukula says that we can use another *pramāṇa*, or knowledge source, to determine that there is such an absence, is another illustration of his affinity with the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, who claim that knowledge of absences is an irreducible knowledge source. This is in contrast to the Prābhākara, who deny such an independent *pramāṇa* and explain knowledge of absences through inference, or *anumāna*.

<sup>49</sup>In addition to the previous reason why we refrain from the interpretation that Devadatta drinks a tonic, Mukula now adds another. He tacitly relies on a principle that the phrase “eating at night” is relevant to the presumption of what is indicated. There are two ways to understand how this presumption works. The first is that a phrase like “he eats at night” is presumed as part of the utterance meaning. This is *śruta-arthāpatti*, one of two kinds of presumption recognized by the Mīmāṃsā. The other possibility is that what is presumed is the fact that Devadatta eats at night, a presumption which then makes sense out of the sentence. In contemporary terms, the distinction is between the implicature of a sentence that is uttered and a presupposition of a sentence that is uttered. Mukula is agnostic about which is the correct explanation, concluding that both fall under indicatory meaning, demonstrating that he has a broad conception of *lakṣaṇā*.

given up in this instance, since there is the giving up of the primary meaning for the sake of a meaning which establishes another one. And therefore, here, indirect indication has a nature opposite from appropriation which was earlier discussed. Therefore, transfer-less indication is classified into two kinds.

Figure 9.2: Two Kinds of Transfer-less Indication



[15.27] Now, in order to delineate the four divisions of mixed transfer, the author says:

**Verse 6**

*Mixed transfer has four kinds due to the two kinds of transfer, quality-free transfer and qualitative transfer, each being divided into superimposition and absorption.*<sup>50</sup>

[16.1] Mixed transfer is divided into two: quality-free transfer and qualitative transfer. There is quality-free transfer where, through indication, the subject of comparison is transferred onto the object of comparison—for instance because

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<sup>50</sup>Absorption, or ‘*adhyavasāna*’ is classified in Gerow 1971, p. 98 as a variety of *atiśaya-ukti*, or “expression involving an exaggeration,” a hyperbole. He characterizes it as a kind of hyperbolic comparison in which, “one thing is characterized as another so as to exaggerate a quality which they in some degree share.” The examples which Mukula need do not involve explicit comparison, as in “Pañcāla,” nor do they require shared qualities, as this variety can be either quality-free or qualitative. The crucial point is that there is a lack of distinction between the two compared objects.



of the relationship of cause and effect. This transference occurs because of the impossibility of indication based on qualities understood as similar between the subject and object of comparison, since there exists no such relationship. For example:

(8) Ghee is long life.

Now here, where ghee is the cause of long life, both the cause of long life and the word for the cause, “ghee,” are applied as an instance of the above-described indication characterized by the relationship of cause and effect, and are understood as long life. Therefore this is quality-free transfer.

[16.6] In contrast, qualitative transfer is where there is indication based on a conjunction of similar qualities with qualities understood to be in the standard of comparison, through an existing relationship between a subject and object of comparison. Now this transfer is denoted by the word “qualitative” because it is understood by qualities. For example, (6) “The Punjabi peasant is an ox.” Here there is transfer onto the Punjabi peasant of the nature of an ox and the word “ox,” because of the conjunction of dullness and laziness in the peasant with the similar qualities, such as dullness and laziness, of an ox.


[16.11] Now it is thought by some that when there is a transfer, there is no transfer of meaning, but only a transfer of words.<sup>51</sup> This is incorrect. After

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<sup>51</sup>This comment is terse and it is not clear precisely what the view is, nor who would have held it. Mukula has been explicit that both the words and their meaning are transferred in the examples of both the peasant and the ghee. He has not explained whether, and how, the transfer of words and meaning differ. One clue to this is the contrast between these two

all, transfer of words does not occur without transfer of meaning. Therefore, this has been shown: transfer has a two-fold division into quality-free transfer and qualitative.

Figure 9.3: Two Kinds of Mixed Transfer



[18.1] And each category is divided into superimposition and absorption. Where one thing (call it  $x$ ) is transferred onto another (call it  $y$ ), without  $x$ 's distinction from the object of superimposition being concealed, there is superimposition since the true form of the second thing which is being superimposed on the first is not concealed. This is just like the earlier discussed example, (8) "Ghee is long life." After all, in this case, since ghee is understood simply by the word's natural meaning, there is no apprehension of ghee—the cause—as inherent in its characteristic effect—life. Ghee is understood as long life simply by the word's natural meaning, because it is understood as the cause of long life. Therefore, this case is superimposition. It is the same thing, too, in the case of (6) "The Punjabi peasant is an ox" because the true form of the subject being compared (the peasant) with the object of comparison (the

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cases and the ones which follow, which are single words. For the cases of the peasant and the ghee have the sentence structure, "X is Y," in which one thing is predicated of another. In the cases which follow, a single word is described as containing a suppressed relationship between two meanings. Here, there is only a transfer of meaning.

ox) is not concealed. In this way, where the word's natural meaning, which is being superimposed by the superimposing meaning, is not concealed, then there is superimposition.

[18.9] But there is absorption where a word's natural meaning is concealed because what is intended to be expressed is a subject of superimposition merged together with an object that is being superimposed.<sup>52</sup> In the case of quality-free transfer, there is an example of absorption:

(9) Pañcālā

[18.11] For here the word “Pañcālā” is uttered as an intermediated indirect indication for the Pañcāla people, based on the location where the Pañcāla descendants dwell.<sup>53</sup> By “Pañcālā” is meant, through indication, the descendants and the location inhabited by the people's descendants. And here there is no awareness of the object of superimposition (the place) through distinction from that which is being transferred. This is because the awareness of the object of superimposition is simply absorbed in that which is being superimposed (the people). In this way, that which has been superimposed upon (the place) is regarded to be, as it were, lost through prevalent conventional use.

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<sup>52</sup>Mukula uses, for the first time, the term ‘*vivakṣita*,’ or “what is intended to be expressed.” This is a term used by the *dhvani* theorists for a category of *dhvani*. Here and other instances, Mukula is alluding to these categories and explaining them in terms of *lakṣaṇā* instead.

<sup>53</sup>The kind of ‘*lakṣaṇā*’ described by “intermediated indirect indication” (‘*lakṣita-lakṣaṇayā*’) is where the primary meaning and the non-literal meaning are related via an intermediate word or concept. Traditionally, ‘*dvirepha*’ is an example of this, since the word literally means “word having two r’s” and has come to mean “bee” because the Sanskrit for “bee” is ‘*bhramara*.’ Raja 2000, p. 254.

Therefore, this is an instance of quality-free transfer in which superimposition is embedded.

[18.16] Now for the case of qualitative transfer, there is an example of superimposition.

(10) Ruler

After all, the word “ruler,” through observing its use—which is the use whose primary meaning is ‘*kṣatriya*’—is used qualitatively, as seen earlier, for a *śūdra*, as indication which is used for someone who guards a community like a *kṣatriya* who guards a community.<sup>54</sup> And here its being qualitative is not understood instantly because its meaning is caused to be established through reflection. Therefore the qualitative relation is not understood instantly since it has disappeared, and it is rightly understood by careful reflection. Therefore this is an instance of qualitative transfer in which superimposition is embedded.


[18.23] In this way there are four divisions of transfer. By the four-fold division of transfer, with the earlier two divisions of *lakṣaṇā*, the classes to be spoken of are collected into six distinctions.

[20.11] And indication has three branches because of being transfer-less, superimposed, and inclusive. The transfer-less branch has two parts: appropriation

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<sup>54</sup>The term ‘*kṣatriya*’ and ‘*śūdra*’ refer to different castes within the social order of Mukula’s time. The idea here is that ‘*rājan*,’ or “ruler,” is literally applicable to someone from the warrior class, *kṣatriya*, but only derivatively to the lowest, laborer class, the *śūdra*.

Figure 9.4: First Analysis of Indication



and indirect indication, already discussed. The branches absorption and superimposition are also, each one, divided into two as has been explained, because of quality-free transfer and qualitative transfer. The author goes on in order to explain the differences in scope with regard to these three branches.

**Verse 7**

*In cases of extreme distinction, indication is transfer-less. It is superimposed in the cases where it is not far. In the cases where it is swallowed, it is absorbed because of being conventional and nearer in meaning.*

[20.17] That which is transfer-less indication is of two sorts, which is explained as having the natures appropriation and indirect indication. Transfer-less indication is to be considered as such when the indicated meaning is understood as extremely distinct, due to there being no conceptual coloring from the in-

dicating meaning.<sup>55</sup> For in this case, there is no cognition of the indicated meaning as being conceptually colored by the indicating meaning. Take the example (5) “The village is on the Ganges.” Here, by connection to the indirect indication of the bank as the supporting locus of the village, when employing the word “Ganges” in the sense of

(11) The village is on the Ganges, not the Vitasta,

no conceptual coloring is understood by its use, just the implication of a particular stream through (the village) being right on a bank, since there is a conception of the bank. It is the same way in the case of appropriation, as in the sentence (7) “Fat Devadatta does not eat by day.”

[20.24] Now, when what is intended to be expressed is the bank as being conceptually colored by the particular stream whose own nature is not concealed, and as not being far from the particular stream that is denoted by the word “Ganges”, then in the earlier example there is superimposition. The village is on the bank, which, having a form related to that particular stream, is understood as conceptually colored by the particular stream.

[21.1] But when used to make us understand the close proximity of the village with respect to the particular stream, and “bank,” having been concealed through incorporation into the particular stream, the sentence is understood as

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<sup>55</sup>The “indicating meaning,” or *lakṣaka*, is the primary meaning.

(12) The village is on the Ganges itself directly and not anywhere else,

and this is appropriation. Now, just as the examples of superimposition and absorption based upon transfer-less indication have been so discussed, we must also discuss qualitative transfer.

[22.18] Now just like (6) “The Punjabi peasant is an ox” is the sentence

(13) This one is a ox.

and

(14) This one is really directly an ox.

Now in (13), through connecting qualities similar to the qualities understood in a ox, due to the intention to express that the peasant is not much different from a ox, there is superimposition of “oxness” in (6). But in (13), as the qualities understood in a ox are much greater, there is absorption on the part of the peasant into oxness.<sup>56</sup> And as the earlier (cases of) absorption were distinguished according to their proximity, in this same way conventional use is distinguished.


[22.23] It is the same with the two examples seen earlier, (9) “Pañcālā” and (10) “ruler.” Because of this it is said: “because of nearness and conventional

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<sup>56</sup>Venugopalan and Dvivedi differ in their Sanskrit editions of these few sentences. Venugopalan omits ‘*vivakṣitatvād*,’ “due to the intention to express,” but Dvivedi includes it, and given the earlier mention, I do as well. Further, Venugopalan’s text reads ‘*gotva-ādavasānam*’ (“established”) rather than Dvivedi’s ‘*gotva-ādhyāropa*’ (“superimposed”). Because the gloss is that the peasant is not much different (‘*adūrage*’) than the ox, I accept Dvivedi’s reading. Finally, the last sentence is found only in Dvivedi’s edition.

use.” This means: because of “lengthy conventional use” meaning is swallowed in absorption.

Figure 9.5: Second Analysis of Indication



[24.4] **(Objection)**<sup>57</sup> “Your position is not correct. Where there is the primary meaning, it is correct that the word has the capacity to communicate meaning because there is a determinate relationship (between word and meaning). But this is not in the case of the indicatory function, since it is the opposite of that. For in discerning the determinate relationship between word and meaning, to the extent that the two agents (speaker and hearer) understand the object through the word’s employment, it is first as based in the sentence meaning and the sentence, described as non-distinct, that there is an awareness of their being in the relationship of cause and effect.”<sup>58</sup> Later, after three or four observations,

<sup>57</sup>The objection is not obviously identifiable with any particular philosophical school, though it could be the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, who deny *lakṣaṇā*, arguing instead for a kind of contextualism. In any case, the central point is that unlike the primary meaning, where there is a direct relationship between word and meaning (where meaning is a referent which is one of four major types), indication does not admit of such a direct relationship. But if indication is understood derivatively from the invariant primary meaning, it seems that it, too, should not vary, and thus in every context the indicated meaning would be the same. This is not the case.

<sup>58</sup>This is a description of how people learn language, first by hearing words in context



using inference based upon positive and negative correlations, in understanding the difference between what is referred to by the meaning of the sentence and the sentence, which are understood as a meaning which is connected with a word, based upon this knowledge there is the restrictive application of cause and effect.<sup>59</sup> And in the later stage, by the agent's understanding otherwise being inexplicable, there is cognition of the relationship between word and meaning. And this cognition is only primary, in the case of meanings such as universals and etc., in the four divisions, but not as in the six kinds of indication. For there is not a relationship with the meaning from an indicatory function of the word. Meaning is observed simply by the primary meaning function. Therefore, in this way there is only the primary meaning function and not an indicatory function.

[24.14] Now, what is denoted would be thus: a relationship is observed between two meanings—the meaning which is being indicated and the primary meaning of a word. From the word, through this relationship, there is understanding of the indicated meaning. In this way, it would be the case that if the word is an independent thing, by its denoting the primary meaning, then the indicated meaning would be understood all the time! But indicated meaning is

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and observing to what things they can and cannot be applied. there is no awareness that the sentence, as object, is anything distinct from its meaning, which is the cause for the utterance, initially.

<sup>59</sup>Inference based upon positive and negative correlations (*anvaya-vyatireka*) is a process of determining what particular words mean by comparing sentences uttered in context and extrapolating to determine which word refers to what thing. For details, see Raja 2000, p. 196-98 and Staal, 14. Raja translates it as “mental process of inclusion and exclusion” and Staal calls this “distributional analysis.” The process is described as one that children employ in learning a language, albeit without awareness of the inferential patterns.

dependent, so on what does it depend?”

[24.17] To this doubt, the author replies:

**Verse 8**

*From reflection upon the distinct forms of speaker, sentence, and utterance, six kinds of indication are able to be judged correctly by the thoughtful.*

[24.20] The one who utters a sentence to make another to understand something is a *speaker*. That combination whose single meaning is made up of words with syntactic expectancy is a *sentence*. That which is within the scope of dependence on the communicative function—either the surface or indicatory function of words—is an *utterance*.

[24.22] It is from these three (speaker, sentence, and utterance)—categorized as each on its own, or in combination, or in conjunction with place, time, and circumstance that the essential six kinds of indication are distinguished by reflective and skillful scholars. Thus, merely by dependence on the collection of speaker, sentence, utterance, etc., words which convey their natural meaning have a relationship with the meaning which is being indicated, considering the conventional use of elders. This is what is said: It is not the case that words, whose relationship with the indicated meaning is unknown (by the speaker) can cause understanding of the indicated meaning. And neither is the relationship grasped directly. Then how? It is by dependence upon the collection of such things as the speaker, sentence, utterance, etc., indirectly through the word’s

natural meaning.<sup>60</sup>

[25.5] That is what is said by Ācārya Śābarasvāmin:<sup>61</sup>

*“How does one meaning change into another? We say: It is through the natural meaning’s denotation.”*

For in this case, there is said to be an entering into the meaning which is being indicated through the *natural meaning* of words.

[25.8] And again, on this very topic, the author (Śābara) says:

*“Further, indication is just customary speech.”*<sup>62</sup>

Now, here, what is said is that there is use of words which depend on understanding the relation (between word and meaning) in the case of meaning being indicated. Further, by *custom* is implied those valid sources of evidence such as perception which gain their status as proof through people’s conventional use. This means that *just* custom is the *customary* understood through

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<sup>60</sup>Mukula now begins to explain how it is that indication can convey a meaning indirectly, through the primary meaning in combination with contextual factors. The presence of these contextual factors will allow him to avoid the charge that given a certain word, it must in every context convey the same indicated meaning if this meaning is to be related to the denoted meaning, which is context-invariant.

<sup>61</sup>Śābara was a Mīmāṃsaka living somewhere between 350 and 400 CE, famous for the *Śābara-bhāṣya*, a commentary on various citations from the Vedic and post-Vedic eras. These include commentary on the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*-s of Jaimini and extensive discussion of exegetical problems regarding the sentences of the Veda. It is in this context that he presents three interpretive constraints on the sentence, or *vākya*: *eka-vākyatā* (treat syntactically related words as a single sentence), *anuṣaṅga* (sentences can be extended by ellipsis to maintain their unity), and *vākya-bheda* (sentences which have more than a single aim must have a hierarchical relationship between these aims to preserve their unity). See Verpooten 1987, p. 8ff.

<sup>62</sup>Quotation is from Śābara’s commentary on MS I.2.22

people's conventional use grounded in words whose relationship (with their meaning) is grasped.<sup>63</sup>

[25.12] This is said by Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa:

*“Some figures are conventional because they have a capacity like the primary denotation; Some are made in the present time (novel), some are even without (indicative) power.”*<sup>64</sup>

The cases of *conventional* figures are like (10) “ruler.” The *novel creations* are those which are dependent on such things as the conventional use of elders and the speaker. These are observed in other cases of a suitable nature, such as:

- (15) *White cranes are moving, the cloud is stretched,  
Smearred with radiantly dark color  
Winds sprinkle water.  
The friends of the clouds joyfully make melodious cries.  
Let it be. The vessel of my heart is hard. I am Rāma. I  
bear it all.  
But Vaidehī, how will she live? Oh, alas, queen, be reso-*

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<sup>63</sup>Mukula explains here that indication is “customary speech,” He will go on to explain that this does not preclude novel uses but only shows that indication is grounded in knowledge of the conventional meanings of words.

<sup>64</sup>Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa lived sometime between 600 and 700 CE, and is the author of the seminal Mīmāṃsā works the *Śloka-vārttika* and the *Tantra-vārttika*, both commentaries on Śabara's *Śābarabhāṣya*. See Verpooten 1987, p. 22ff. This quote is found in Kumāriḷa Bhaṭṭa's *Tantravārttika*, 3.1. He uses different examples than Mukula for the three categories. For conventional, he gives *śukla* (white) and *aruṇa* (red); for novel, *ratha-anganāman* (for the *cakra-vāka* bird, since ‘*ratha-anga*’ is the wheel of a chariot and ‘*cakra*’ means “wheel”); for without potency, *rūpa* and *rasa*. See Bhaṭṭa 1924, p. 977ff.

*lute!*<sup>65</sup>

[27.28] Now, here, the word

(16) smeared

with regard to the splendor (of the sky) has its primary meaning blocked because of (the sky's) ineffectiveness for smearing (things) like saffron and etc. Therefore, this indicates a meaning incorporated into *splendid* because its relationship with the property of slightly removing the brilliance is similar to what is conveyed through the primary meaning, which is here “slightly removing the brilliance.”

[28.3] In this way, also, with the word

(17) friends

the primary meaning of the word is blocked, as the non-sentient clouds have no relationship with friendship. In this case, qualities like “fondness” understood by “friend” indicate peacocks whose faces are turned towards the clouds. They are related to qualities like “fondness” since they are similar to the qualities in friends.

[28.5] It is likewise with regard to the word

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<sup>65</sup>This is an anonymous verse also quoted in the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana. Ānanda describes it as an example of *artha-antara-saṅkramita-vācya dhvani*, or suggestion where the primary meaning is shifted. He identifies only “Rāma” as the locus of suggestion, but the *Locana* of Abhinavagupta discusses the examples that Mukula analyzes. He post-dates Mukula. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 204-206.

(18) *Rāma*

because the primary meaning is blocked for the named thing.<sup>66</sup> Therefore, by this word also is indicated things such as the loss of a kingdom, being a forest dweller, kidnapping Sīta, or the death of a father, since they are incorporated into the specific causal collection with properties whose causes are an unusual sorrow, and are understood as one meaning with the primary meaning.<sup>67</sup> Therefore, in this way cases of novel indication are to be explained.

[29.11] However, the following cases are not novelly-created indication, since they lack the functional capacity (of indication): those cases of indication which are not seen to be conventionally used by elders, those words which are not seen to be like (10) “ruler,” and, further, those which are not in the class of words like (16) “smeared.”

For example:

(19) *From the middle of the ocean,  
The brilliance of the gold earth seeming like reddish peaks,  
It jumps out, having pierced the water  
Like the oblation fire with the face of my beloved mare.*<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>66</sup>According to the *Dhvanyāloka*, the suggested meaning of “Rāma” includes “various suggested qualities.” (Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 204). The person speaking here is Rāma, but what is intended is not a tautologous claim (“I am me”) but a reference to Rāma’s character (“I am like this...”).

<sup>67</sup>These are events which happen to Rāma in the famous Sanskrit epic poem, the *Rāmāyana* of Valmīki.

<sup>68</sup>This is an excerpt from the epic poem, the “Śīsupālavadhā,” written by Māgha, who lived in the 7th century CE. His work is frequently quoted by treatises on poetry, and he is well-known not only for his skill in meter, but his punning word play. The verse itself

[29.16] **(Objection)** Now, here, the words *oblation fire with the face of my beloved mare* mean by indication, “sacrificial fire with the face of a horse.”<sup>69</sup>

[29.17] **(Author’s Response)** But here, “sacrificial fire with the face of a horse” is not a conventional figure. Further, it is not a word belonging to that class of words that by being penetrated by the causal complex responsible for the qualified meaning, is seen to absorb a meaning, either penetrated or not penetrated.<sup>70</sup>

[29.19] **(Objection)** From words such as

(20) two-r’s (meaning “bee”)

by means of indication, a word like ‘*bhramara*’ (bee), is understood, as it has two r’s.<sup>71</sup> As in the application of the six divisions (of indication), in the same

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is taken from III.33 of the “Śiśupālavadhā.” See Winternitz and Winternitz 1987, p. 722ff. The term ‘*turaṅga-kānta-ānana-havyavāha*’ refers to the fire below the ocean with the face of a mare, a fire which is described by some as due to Aurva throwing his anger into the ocean.

<sup>69</sup>The text lacks very explicit marks that would distinguish between an author and an interlocutor, but as Venugopalan points out, Mukula cannot be saying that there is indication in this passage, since he agrees with Kumārila that this is a case without indicative power. Thus I have made explicit that he is replying to another viewpoint.

<sup>70</sup>The idea is that this is not a case of conventional metaphor like ‘*rājan*’ or “ruler,” where the meaning has been absorbed, nor is it a novel metaphor. The words in Mukula’s gloss are simply synonyms for the terms in the compound. There is a difficulty in the text here. Venugopalan’s printed text reads ‘*viddha-aviddha-artha-avagāhitvam*’ which he says “means nothing,” although it literally means “possessing the property of being absorbed in a meaning which is penetrated (*viddha*) or not penetrated (*aviddha*).” He notes that a manuscript which he consulted reads ‘*tathā-vidha-artha-avagāhitvena*’ which he takes to mean “the implication of such (i.e., previously described) Secondary Sense.” Bhaṭṭa 1977, p. 255, fn. 55. The Dvivedi edition reads ‘*viddha-aviddha-artha-avagāhitvena*’ or “as possessing the property of being absorbed in a meaning which is penetrated or not penetrated.”

<sup>71</sup>The text is terse and trades on the a single word as both used and mentioned: *bhramara*.

way why couldn't it be that through indication from words like *oblation fire with the face of my beloved mare* "horse" and "face" are understood by means of indication of a word like "mare"? For in classes of words like "two-r's," words which indicate secondarily are seen.

[29.24] (**Author's Response**) This is not so. That (word) which is understood as possessing indicative properties is this way since it is observed to be a word belonging to that class of words accepted as part of the conventional use of the elders—but it is not so in all instances. Otherwise, in fact every word would have the capacity to convey all meanings, as words which indicate by means of some tiny property. There would not be any word which could not convey any meaning. But when, due to acceptance or rejection of the conventional use of the elders, a distinction regarding the intended object is made, "oblation fire with the face of my beloved mare" is simply defective when there is no motive that is apparent.<sup>72</sup> But when there is a motive—for example, the communication of a hidden meaning in the speech—then, in contrast, these kinds of indication are not defective. Therefore, due to their being accepted as part of the practice of the conventional use of elders, these words are in the scope of these kinds of indication.

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The term '*bhramara*' means "bee," and as a word which has two r's, the word becomes the referent of "two-r's" (*dvirepha*), as does, by extension, the insect.

<sup>72</sup>This is the first instance of '*prayojana*,' translated as "motive," in the text. Mukula now addresses the motive for employing various expressions in order to distinguish between uses which involve indication and those which do not. I do not translate the term '*prayojana*' as "intention" to avoid confusion with Gricean speaker intention, which is (broadly) the meaning of an utterance. Mukula's concept here is not identical to intention in this sense.



[30.7] In this way, this is demonstrated: words which give up their natural meaning for another meaning by their being totally permeated by a collection of causal features such as the speaker and etc., when employed with the conventional use of elders—either by their own character or by the word as being part of a certain class—it is established that they possess the indicatory function.

[31.22] A case where indicated meaning is understood by a relationship with the speaker is in this example:

- (21) *O neighbor, will watch our house here for a little while?  
This child's father will not at all drink the tasteless well-  
water.  
Now I go by myself to that forest stream which is overrun  
with tamāla trees,  
Let the reed's dense joints, having been broken long before,  
scratch my body.*<sup>73</sup>

[31.27] Now, here, a young woman whose desire is for an erotic encounter with a another woman's husband, who is wandering to the arranged location, has a motive for the utterance which is having an agreed-upon location for an erotic encounter with another woman's husband, because she suspects she will bear telling marks from the encounter—wounds from teeth and fingernails. So, she

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<sup>73</sup>The verse is from the *Subhāṣita-ratna-kośa* of Vidyākara. These lines are not found in the *Dhvanyāloka*, but Ānanda does comment upon a similar set of verses, in which a woman deceives a monk into leaving the location of her rendezvous. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p.83ff.

speaks this way for the purpose of dissembling, that she is bringing drinkable water from the river fit to quench her husband's thirst and that there will be marks of injury on her limbs caused by the hollow points of the dense reeds, broken long before. And here, the dissembling is understood through consideration of the speaker as unvirtuous.<sup>74</sup> And because the dissembling's nature is communicating untrue things and because of untruth's having the capacity to convey the opposite of a true meaning, now by an untrue meaning, the truth which is uttered is indicated by possessing a meaning which establishes itself.<sup>75</sup> Therefore, here understanding occurs because of indication whose nature is inclusive of the true meaning, which is gotten by reflection on the character of the speaker. For certainly in this case neither the sentence nor the utterance have the capacity (to convey the true meaning). If the speaker were a virtuous woman, these two (the sentence nor the utterance) would not be able to imply this kind of meaning.

[33.9] Now, an indicated meaning can be grasped through reflection on the particular form of the sentence, as in this example:

(22) *“As one whose glory [whose wife Śrī] is already obtained,  
why must he, even again, press churning affliction upon*

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<sup>74</sup>Dvivedi's edition reads '*sā ca art apahnutir asādhyā...*' (32), or "incomplete," but Venugopalan emends it to '*asādvya*' (210), or "unvirtuous," as does McCrea (288). I follow this emendation because a later line describing what the woman might have been like (but is not) describes her as '*sādhvyā*.'

<sup>75</sup>Dvivedi edition's edition reads '*tv asatya-uktaḥ*' ("said by a false woman") which Venugopalan emends to '*satya-arthaḥ*' ("the true sense"), because he says the sentence has no subject. I emend Dvivedi's edition to '*satya-uktaḥ*' or "the truth which is uttered." The Hindi commentary in Dvivedi supports this emendations.

*me?*<sup>76</sup>

*Nor can I believe that one whose mind is active would seek  
his earlier sleep.*

*And why, when attended by the lords of all the islands,  
would he again build a bridge?"*

*It is as if the ocean's tremblings holds doubts, when your  
Majesty comes nearby.*<sup>77</sup>

[33.15] For here, the king is addressed in poetic composition by a flattering verse. That which is described exaggeratedly by *tremblings* is the ocean's natural condition of agitation because of the king's own great army. The word "*trembling*," which is characterized as hyperbole, is the cause of the ocean's holding doubting actions in the ascriptive comparison here: "*as if...holds doubts.*"<sup>78</sup> And the *doubts*, by such (phrases as) *one whose glory / wife Śrī*

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<sup>76</sup>There is a double-meaning in the text, which I have indicated by use of the square brackets.

<sup>77</sup>This verse is in the *Dhvanyāloka*, in the context of figures of speech which are suggested. Ānanda calls this '*rūpaka-dhvanī*,' or the suggestion of metaphor. The original author of the verse is not known. For a discussion of this poem's meaning, see Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 330-31 and McCrea 2008, p. 107-108. In brief, the doubts are those that the personified ocean has, regarding the deity Viṣṇu. The first three lines describe Lord Vāsudeva's actions towards the ocean: drawing Śrī from it with churning waters, sleeping upon the ocean, and building a bridge over it to Lankā. The poem is written to praise a king, and so the king is implicitly identified with Viṣṇu, who is also known by "Vāsudeva."

<sup>78</sup>The term "ascriptive comparison" translates '*utprekṣā*,' a figure which is something like a metaphor. There are many kinds of *utprekṣā* distinguished by aesthetic theorists. Gerow's definition is "a figure in which a property or mode of behavior is attributed to a subject literally incapable of sustaining that property..." He says that this figure "probably comes closer than any other to capturing the sense of the vague term metaphor." These figures are constructed usually by there being "a noun, representing the subject of comparison, followed by a verb or predicate which literally must be understood with the objects of comparison." He also notes that in *utprekṣā*, the subject of comparison "remains explicit, usually as the subject of the sentence." See Gerow 1971, p. 131ff for details.

*is obtained*, are the objects which are characterized as the specific actions of Lord Vāsudeva. And while there is no equality between lord Vāsudeva and the king, then how can there be doubt regarding the content of Lord Vāsudeva’s actions? Therefore, where the trembling of the ocean being crossed by a great army has been superimposed because of its similarity to the meaning of “trembling”—although it is not trembling—there is a qualitative transfer of the kind “superimposition which embeds qualitative transfer.” Although the ocean is not trembling, because of superimposition it is understood as an object which is trembling.<sup>79</sup> And therefore, this is said to be a hyperbole whose nature is such: where (things) that really have a distinction (are understood as) without distinction. Due to their doubts, in sentient beings a head-tremble is often seen. Because of its similarity with head-shaking which is caused by doubt in sentient beings, there is transfer of the nature of the ocean’s trembling. And thus, here, also, the transfer is of the sort “superimposition which embeds qualitative transfer.”

[33.26] And as well, although these are two kinds of trembling, because of superimposition this is said to be a hyperbole whose nature is such: where (things) that really have a distinction (are understood as) without distinction. That hyperbole is connected with this ascriptive comparison: *as if it holds doubts*.<sup>80</sup> Now, here, because of the perception of trembling as the effect,

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<sup>79</sup>Mukula uses ‘*artha*’ here, a word which can be translated as “meaning” or “object.” Since he is talking about the ocean as cognized through indication, I use “object” for clarity, even though meanings can be objects, on a realist conception of the referential function of language.

<sup>80</sup>The figure identified as “poetic fancy” is in Sanskrit *utprekṣa*, which is a figure of speech

the bearing of doubts as a cause is employed figuratively as an impossible comparison whose form is a false conception. And here too, the holding of doubt belonging to the ocean—because of the connection with the holding of doubt—is said to be a hyperbole whose nature is such: where (things) having a distinction (are understood as) without distinction.

[34.5] As it has been said in defining ascriptive comparison:

*When there is an utterance whose intention is to express that (two things have) a similar form, by words such as “like,” because there are not qualities or actions shared by the things, there is joined with hyperbole the figure of ascriptive comparison.*<sup>81</sup>

[34.8] Due to the *qualities or actions shared* on the part of the thing which is pointed out, therefore, here, too, there is “superimposition which embeds qualitative transfer.”<sup>82</sup> But in words such as *one whose glory [whose wife Śrī] is already obtained*, in the three doubts, and in the character of Lord Vāsudeva, since it is appropriate that these things are included as reasons in contradiction to this or that action (of the king), it is implied that the king is the Lord Vāsudeva. Therefore here indication has the nature of absorption.<sup>83</sup> And here,

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attributing qualities of *x* to *y*, usually when it is impossible for *y* to have such qualities (as in the case of anthropomorphizing inanimate objects). See also Gerow 1971, p. 131ff.

<sup>81</sup>This is found in Udbhaṭa’s *Kāvya-alankāra-saṃgraha* III.3. Udbhaṭa was prior to Ānandavardhana and Mukula, living circa 800 CE, also in Kashmir. See Gerow 1977, p. 233ff.

<sup>82</sup>Mukula takes Udbhaṭa’s definition as evidence for his claim that there is hyperbole and ascriptive comparison in these verses in the identification of the ocean’s movement with trembling. He then adds that the identification between Viṣṇu and the king being addressed is qualitative because they do share qualities, in contrast to the ocean and trembling.

<sup>83</sup>There is indication in these verses because we must presume that the king is being identified with Lord Vāsudeva, as the descriptions in the poem are in conflict with the

by means of the nature of Lord Vāsudeva, due to the superimposition on the part of the king, there is superimposition which embeds qualitative transfer. And therefore, what is understood here is the inapplicability—otherwise of the syntactic relation of words employed in sentences taken as a whole; therefore, indication is here grounded in sentences.

[37.18] Now, here follows indication grounded in an utterance:

- (23) *The arrows of passion are hard to resist.*  
*Spring blossoms here and there.*  
*The moon's bright splendor makes the heart intoxicated.*  
*The cuckoos captivate the mind.*  
*This young age is a hard burden to bear, having swollen*  
*breasts.*  
*these difficult-to-bear five fires—how now, my friend, are*  
*they to be endured?*<sup>84</sup>

[37.23] For here, that the enlivening experience of the remembered arrows which are sacrificial fires superimposed on the five (fires), have an intolerable character—this is the meaning of the sentence. Therefore, this is the utterance

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king's actual actions.

<sup>84</sup>There is no clear origin for these verses, nor are they found in Ānandavardhana. The “five fires” allude to a myth which describes the origin of human beings. Each fire changes a particular substance into an element important for the human life-cycle. The fires are identified as the sun, thunder, earth, man, and woman. Discussion of these fires is found in the *Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa*, the *Śabara Bhāṣya*, as well as other places. For a lengthy discussion of the myth and its importance in Vedic ritual, see Hayakawa 2014, pp. 93ff. Further, there is an aesthetic practice involving the five fires, which is also likely being invoked by the poem. Pārvatī, a goddess, is said to have performed such a practice and as a result, won the heart of the god Śiva.

meaning. And due to the illuminating capacity of the sentence purport, the erotic sentiment, “love in separation,” is implied. Therefore indication has the nature of absorption, being grounded in the utterance meaning.<sup>85</sup> For here there is no engagement in the study of the speaker’s nature apart from the words, nor further, on the part of the words of the sentence, could there be the possibility of sentential connection without the implying of love in separation. Through reflection on the utterance’s own nature, indication occurs with the nature of absorption, grounded in the utterance meaning.<sup>86</sup> And although it is being implicated, the love in separation is predominant as the implicated utterance meaning, because it is implicated as the predominant cause of refreshing the sensitive listener’s heart.<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>85</sup>Here, Mukula appeals to ‘*tātparya*,’ or “sentence purport” for the only time in his text. The term can mean “speaker’s intention,” and is used in this way frequently by the Naiyāyika-s. For the Mīmāṃsāka-s, this term refers to the meaning conveyed by the collection of words together, independent of a speaker. See Raja 2000, p.180. Since Mukula uses ‘*prayojana*’ elsewhere to refer to speaker’s motive, and he is influenced strongly by Mīmāṃsā theory, I translate this as “sentence purport.” The term “love in separation,” or ‘*vipralambha-śrīgāra*,’ refers to one of the *rasa*-s, or aesthetic sentiments which are said to be produced by works of art.

<sup>86</sup>Unlike the earlier example, (21), where we have access to the speaker’s character as an unvirtuous woman as an interpretive guide, here the sentence meaning tells us about the speaker. In turn, this sentence meaning is what is being expressed (in contrast to (5), where what is expressed is its opposition). However, Mukula further claims that without assuming the fact of love in separation as an interpretive guide, we could not understand the sentence meaning.

<sup>87</sup>Mukula here addresses the predominance (*prādhānyam*) of the indicated meaning. Ānanda has argued that where the suggested meaning, is not the predominant meaning, we should not say there is *dhvani* present. (For example, Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 137). Mukula does not directly engage with this claim, but he does characterize indication as what is predominant and what refreshes the sensitive reader’s heart. Grammatically, the term “sensitive reader” or *sahṛdaya* derives from ‘*sa*,’ meaning “with,” and ‘*hṛdaya*,’ meaning “heart.” The idea is that the “heart” of the reader aligns with the poet. It is the term Ānanda uses for literary critics and readers who are sensitive to the presence of *dhvani*. Thus, in this passage Mukula has displaced *dhvani* with *lakṣaṇā*.

Now, concerning *makes the heart intoxicated*, the letter  $\bar{i}$  is not employed (to signify feminine gender) because there is an *ac*-affix instead of a *ṭa*-affix, although *moon's bright splendor* has a feminine gender.<sup>88</sup> This is because there

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<sup>88</sup>Here, Mukula is trying to explain why what appears to be a grammatical error is actually an acceptable use. To elaborate: the apparent error is that the compound ‘*unmāda-karā*’ (“makes the heart intoxicated”), which qualifies ‘*śaśāṅka-rucīnām*’ (“moon’s bright splendor”) should have an ‘ $\bar{i}$ ’ to mark the feminine gender, not an ‘ $\bar{a}$ .’ Mukula refers to affixes (*pratyaya*) from Pāṇini’s *Āṣṭādhyāyī*, a collection of *sūtra*-s which describe the morphology of Sanskrit. In essence, these affixes are shorthand ways of referring to morphological changes. There are two *sūtra*-s in the *Āṣṭādhyāyī* which would be used to determine the ending for ‘*kara*’: 3.2.1 and 3.2.20. In both of these *sūtra*-s, ‘*kara*’ is formed from ‘ $\sqrt{kr̥t}$ ’ as an *upapāda*. Further, both of these *sūtra*-s are governed by another *sūtra*, 4.1.15, which explicitly mentions the root from which *kara* is formed and says it should take a long  $\bar{i}$  ending. Thus, Mukula explains why the ‘*kara*’ found here is not governed by either of them. Mukula’s first observation is that there is no *ṭa*-affix, which is the affix in 3.2.20. Pāṇini says this affix is found ‘*hetu-tāt-śīlyā-anulomyāneṣu*,’ or in cases where the object of ‘ $\sqrt{kr̥t}$ ’ denotes final causation, habitual action, or acquiescence. According Mukula’s interpretation, then, the moon’s bright splendor is not the final cause (*hetu*) of the heart’s madness. Nor is it usually the cause (*tāt-śīlyā*) of the heart’s madness. Finally, the heart is not acquiescing (*anulomyāna*) to the moon by becoming mad, in the way that someone who does what they are directed would (see examples in Pāṇini 1897, p. 416ff).

Mukula next alludes to 3.2.1 with his mention of the *aṇ*-affix. He says that there is no intention to express a connection between the cases (‘*karma-saṃbandhasya*’). This refers to situations where a verbal root (such as ‘ $\sqrt{kr̥t}$ ’) is in composition with another word, and is an *upapada*. (However, the changes which occur in 3.2.1 would yield *kāra*, not *kara*, so this *sūtra* could not explain the form in the poem, even if it did allow for an ‘ $\bar{a}$ ’ ending.)

The solution is to take *kara* as being a word on its own, not an *upapāda*. This is what Mukula is alluding to in his mention of the *ac*-affix. In *sūtra* 3.1.134, certain words which occur in a list (a *gaṇa-pada* referred to by ‘*paca-ādi*’) will take the *ac*-affix. This *ac*-affix is not listed in 4.1.15, and so does not take the ‘ $\bar{i}$ ’ ending for the feminine. Thus, if *kara* is in this particular list of words, there is a Pāṇinian justification for it taking a long  $\bar{a}$  ending. Unfortunately, it is not listed. However, the list is an ‘*ākṛti-gaṇaḥ*,’ which means it is a partial list of examples, not an exhaustive list. So it is still possible that *kara* could be formed like the words in this list. For evidence that it is, Mukula says ‘*śiva-śamariṣṭasya kare*,’ which is an allusion to Pāṇini using *kara* as a word, not an *upapada*, in 4.4.143. So, even though there is no explicit rule allowing for *karā* as a feminine form for *kara*, that Pāṇini has used *kara* as a word means that it could be declined as *karā* rather than the expected *karī* for an *upapada*.

Finally, Mukula says that even if the poet were aiming to describe final causation, habitual action, or acquiescence, because this is not an *upapada* with a *ṭa*-affix like in 3.2.20, there is no grammatical fault in using ‘ $\bar{a}$ .’ This observation is probably because the moon’s bright



is no intention to express final causation, habitual action, or acquiescence. And earlier here, since there is no intention to express a connection between the cases, therefore there is no *aṅ*-affix. There is instead an *ac*-affix, just as in “...the words *śiva*, *śam*, *ariṣṭa* in the genitive when meaning “he does.”<sup>89</sup> And for just this reason, where there is an intention to express such things as final causation, habitual action, or acquiescence, still, because there is no *ṭa*-affix there is no grammatical fault.

[40.26] Thus, by that relationship of each one to another—speaker, sentence meaning, and utterance meaning—there are three divisions, so much has been illustrated so far. And also, there are others. Combining the speaker together with one or the other of them—speaker with sentence meaning and speaker with utterance meaning—just like combining sentence meaning with utterance meaning, there are three divisions, each division consisting of two. In the same way, there is the threefold division consisting of the triple: speaker, sentence meaning, utterance meaning, also by mutual combination—and therefore the triple is understood as one. In this same way, the four divisions are delineated and are to be illustrated as within the scope of the six kinds of indication by the knowledgeable person’s own understanding.

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splendor is regularly described as a cause of emotional distress in Sanskrit poetry, and so denying that it is ‘*tāt-śilyā*’ is a strained interpretation. I thank Jo Brill for illuminating the subtleties of Pāṇini in conversation, and for R.K. Sharma’s helpful introduction to the work of Pāṇini at Ananda Ashram.

<sup>89</sup>This partial quote is from the *Āṣṭādhyāyī*, IV.4.143. In its entirety: “The affix ‘*tātil*’ comes in the Chandas after the words *śiva*, *śam*, *ariṣṭa*, in the sixth case (genitive) in construction when the sense is “he does.” Pāṇini 1987, p. 849. The idea is that an abstract suffix (‘*tātil*,’ as the ‘*l*’ is a Pāṇinian marker) is added to some words in certain contexts—

Figure 9.6: Analysis of Contextual Factors

| Factor 1 | Factor 2         | Factor 3          | Example |
|----------|------------------|-------------------|---------|
| Speaker  | –                | –                 | (21)    |
| –        | Sentence Meaning | –                 | (23)    |
| –        | –                | Utterance Meaning | (22)    |
| Speaker  | Sentence Meaning | –                 | N/A     |
| Speaker  | –                | Utterance Meaning | N/A     |
| –        | Sentence Meaning | Utterance Meaning | N/A     |
| Speaker  | Sentence Meaning | Utterance Meaning | N/A     |

[41.1] And with regard to these divisions, their use—which has been laid out in combination and separately as having its characteristics of place, time, and circumstance—should be sought out with regard to its characteristics. Thus, the four divisions of primary meaning have been delineated.<sup>90</sup> And indication has been explained as six-fold.

[42.9] Now, there is connection-of-the-denoted, there is denotation-through-the-connected, there is the combination of these views, there is the rejection of both views.<sup>91</sup> The author continues in order to elucidate the range and structure of indication among these four alternative views.

### Verse 9

these are words from the Vedic Samhitas.

<sup>90</sup>Mukula is summarizing what he has shown so far in the text. He is not saying that the past few examples have been to delineate the divisions of primary meaning.

<sup>91</sup>Mukula now begins to address the question of sentential relation in connection to word meaning, presenting several major views on the topic. The terms I translate as “connection” and “the connected” are *anvaya* and *anvita*, respectively. Derived from *anu* and the verb root  $\sqrt{i}$ , these terms can be used to refer to syntactic, semantic, or logical relationships, as well as mere association. How this relationship functions for the two views of *anvita-abhīdhāna* and *abhīhita-anvaya* is explained by Mukula in what follows. I choose relatively broad terms rather than translate the entire theory into the label for the view.

*When there is connection among those things designated by words, indicated meaning is thought to be after this expressed meaning.<sup>92</sup> But when what is connected constitutes the expressed meaning, indicated meaning is at the stage preceding the expressed meaning.<sup>93</sup>*

### **Verse 10**

*Now in the two-fold view, indication is of two kinds. But for the unified whole view, the sentence is what is ultimately the bearer of meaning, and there is no indication. But when there is a postulated meaning, indication cannot be distinguished, as on the earlier views.<sup>94</sup>*

[42.12] Now, according to some, when words are exhausted simply by their natural meanings—which are the universals understood by the process of inference from positive and negative correlations—through the power of semantic fit, contiguity, and syntactic expectancy applied to the meanings of words, then the sentence meaning is not something which refers, but is to be understood only as, for example, joy and sorrow. For this is like the examples: “O priest, your son is born,” and “O priest, your unmarried daughter is preg-

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<sup>92</sup>On the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view, indication functions to unify words denoting universals into a syntactically connected sentential unity.

<sup>93</sup>On the Prābhākara view, words do not denote except within a particular context of utterance, and so indication is unnecessary to generate a sentential unity, but it operates on a sentence before we understand the expressed meaning. “Expressed meaning” (*vācya*, literally “to be expressed”) is ambiguous here, depending upon what is being qualified by it. In the first line, it describes the meaning to be expressed by the words (universals et al). In the second line, it describes the meaning to be expressed by the sentence (such as an ironic utterance).

<sup>94</sup>This is the view of the *sphoṭa* theorists, on which divisions between words and phonemes are merely hypothetical fictions.

nant.” While what is occasioned by, respectively, the birth of a son and the pregnancy of an unmarried daughter, viz, joy and grief, is undenoted by these very words (of the examples), there is, however, implication (of joy and grief) due to the capacity of the thing which is expressed by the word.<sup>95</sup> In this way it is apparent that the very thing undenoted by the sentence-meaning is what is implied by the meaning of the words. And among those with this view, their opinion is that for those things which are denoted, because of the mutual connection of one constituent to another, subsequently there is *connection-of-the-denoted*.

[44.1] But others say: there is understanding of the relationship between word and meaning from the conventional practices of elders. And this conventional practice is characterized by use and non-use (of words).<sup>96</sup> And application and non-application are grounded things as qualified entities.<sup>97</sup> Therefore, the relationship among words in the (sentence) meaning is understood simply as that thing which is qualified. And therefore, word meanings are simply qualified entities, and there does not need to be relationally of the word meanings.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>95</sup>The word for young woman, ‘*kanyā*,’ typically denotes someone who is single. It is tacitly understood that in a default context the birth of a son would be the cause of joy and the pregnancy of an unmarried woman would be grievous. The sentences themselves make no reference to joy or grief; it is the state of affairs denoted by the sentence which brings about the emotional response.

<sup>96</sup>Use and non-use, or ‘*pravṛtti*’ and ‘*nivṛtti*’ are terms used by Pāṇini refer to application/suspension of a rule. More broadly the idea is of voluntary acting and refraining from acting—we apply words in some situations and not in others, and from these regularities can determine what words mean.

<sup>97</sup>This points to the realism in Indian philosophy of language in general, where the objects of words, or *artha*, are qualified by properties.

<sup>98</sup>In other words, a word attains its status as having a “meaning” or “referent” only by

And thus, there is *denotation-through-the-connected* due to the words causing to make known the relationships of mutual connection of one constituent to another, whose native meanings are grasped by means of their being clothed with this or that universal.

[45.15] But in the view of others, words have an expression meaning which is the universal of this and that thing. But sentence meaning has the meanings of the words in mutual connection one to another. This is *connection-of-the-denoted*, seen from the standpoint of words, but it is *denotation-through-the-connected* from the standpoint of the sentence. And thus, there is a combination of the two, *connection-of-the-denoted* and *denotation-through-the-connected*.<sup>99</sup>

[46.17] Now those with the view that sentence meaning is a unified whole say: Suppose it is agreed to that a sentence meaning is a qualified entity. A particular does not possess a sentential connection because a particular is contrasted with universals which is the opposite of it. It is impossible to grasp this connection by the native meanings of the qualified entities, since their nature is clothed with the universal meaning which is their actual meaning.<sup>100</sup> There-

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denoting an entity understood as qualified. It does not first denote something unqualified (the universal in the Bhāṭṭa view) which is then understood, though indication, as qualified in relationship with another word. It is important to remember that in the realist conception of meaning under discussion, the meaning of a word is a thing in the world. Thus what is qualified is an entity, as having certain properties, etc.

<sup>99</sup>This seems to be Mukula's preferred view.

<sup>100</sup>The interlocutor here is a follower of Bhartṛhari, who argues that if we take the Bhāṭṭa view that a sentence meaning is a single qualified entity, we are unable to understand sentence meaning. As support for this view, the opponent notes that particulars are not unified in a sentence (*viśeṣasya ananvitatvena*) and that a particular is different from, or opposed

fore, because of indivisibility of the meaning of a sentence and the sentence, the thing which ultimately is “meaning,” is not *connection-of-the-denoted*, nor is it *denotation-through-the-connected*, and neither is it as a combination of these brought together, because the meanings of the words are unknown.<sup>101</sup> Both views, by being dependent upon word meanings which are hypothetically posited, are useful hypothetically posited—separately or together.

[47.11] And in the case where there is first *connection-of-the-denoted*, then through the words’ natural sense, word-meanings which are referred to are subsequently denoted (together) due to the operations of syntactic expectancy, semantic fit, phonetic contiguity. Given this, indication is accepted as functioning upon word meanings which are universals when there is a mutual unifying relationship of qualified and particular. Because of the force of the word meanings, what possesses an expressed meaning does so on account of its being later, when the meaning of the sentence is being understood.

[47.15] Now in the case of the *denotation-through-the-connected* view, what

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to, a universal (*tad-viṣarīta-sāmānya-viruddhatvāt*). In his translation, Venugopalan notes that, “The meaning of the sentence is not quite clear” but that somehow the argument is intended to refute both the other views simultaneously. I translate ‘*avachādita*’ in this context as “clothed” (MacDonell 96) because the universal contains the particular (perhaps as the member of a class, depending on one’s ontology), and it is this universal which is said to be the true meaning. However, there is a problem in a hearer understanding how the particulars in a sentence might be related to one another if all we have access to are the particulars as “clothed” with universals.

<sup>101</sup>The reason here, ‘*pada-arthānām avidyamānatvāt*,’ could also be translated as “because the meanings of words are non-existent,” depending upon how one takes ‘*√vid*.’ As the above argument is epistemological, I have translated it as “unknown,” but since the context is a Bhartṛharian view, “non-existent” would also be plausible, since they deny the existence of words as anything other than useful abstractions. Perhaps Mukula is playing on both meanings.

is unified in mutual qualification is just the expressed meaning of the word-meanings possessing denotation. It is not the case that there is mutual qualification of what has already been denoted, as the word-meanings are universals. In this view, the things undergoing qualification do not attain the condition of being word meanings. This is because the (word) meaning, which is grounded in a universal form that has an unwavering relationship with the native meaning, is understood in harmony with the sentence meaning as a whole entirety. In the case of such a view being understood, the six kinds of indication according to their distinctions—indication which is the object of this or that sentence meaning—would not appear.<sup>102</sup> Therefore, on the *denotation-through-the-connected* view, the word-meanings as qualified are the sentence-meaning. In connection to what is the expressed meaning, we say there is (something) *preceding*.<sup>103</sup> Indication is situated in the stage which is the ground prior to this expressed meaning.<sup>104</sup>

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<sup>102</sup>The conclusion of the argument is that qualified constituents of a sentence—universals—are not yet what we could call “word meanings” because we need something that is, unlike a universal, going to be contextually appropriate. A universal is “unwavering” (*avyabhicarita*) but a word meaning needs to be understood as in relationship with other parts of the sentence. “Cowhood” cannot be the object of the verb “to tie,” and so another meaning must be inserted which can undergo qualification. Therefore, even if the meaning of the word “cow” in a sentence depends on “cowhood” (as the Prābhākara would admit), the meaning cannot simply be “cowhood,” full stop. Mukula does not here explain why it is that the six kinds of indication would not appear if we took the Prābhākara view. I take it that the understood reason is that examples like “A village is on the Ganges” would not need to be understood through indication as meaning “A village is on the bank of the Ganges,” since “Ganges” would in context denote “bank of the Ganges” simply through the power of *mukhya*.

<sup>103</sup>Mukula is citing Verse 9 above when he says ‘*purah*’ or “preceding.”

<sup>104</sup>For the Prābhākara, indication does not function, as it does for the Bhāṭṭa, as a way of bringing together words which first denote universals into a particular-qualified relation.

[47.23] Now in the combined view of *connection-of-the-denoted* and *denotation-through-the-connected*, by the act of combining the two-fold rule earlier described, we have, from the perspective of words, indication occurring at a time subsequent to the words expressing meaning. And from the perspective of sentences, it occurs after the sentence meaning and before there is an utterance meaning.<sup>105</sup> Therefore it has been said: *In two, there is two. In two* means having the nature of a combination of *connection-of-the-denoted* and *denotation-through-the-connected*. *There is two* means the indication meaning occurs after and before there is an expressed meaning.<sup>106</sup>

[48.3] Now in the case of the view that the sentence meaning is undivided, there is no indication as far as the ultimate meaning. This is because divisions among word meanings do not really exist—with regard to what is ultimately the denoted meaning—and indication is dependent upon such divisions. However, in dependence on hypothetically posited word meanings, indication is based in constituents which are to be distinguished, by hypothesizing, as in the earlier views, *connection-of-the-denoted*, *denotation-through-the-connected*, or their combination, according to one’s theoretical liking.<sup>107</sup> This is because

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Words do not truly denote universals, but they denote whatever is appropriate for the context. Subsequent to this single stage, but before the utterance meaning, indication functions. Indication works to produce such things as ironic speech acts, which have an utterance meaning opposed to the sentence meaning.

<sup>105</sup>The phrase, “And from the perspective of sentences” is inserted into the Dvivedi text, and I accept the interpolation for clarity.

<sup>106</sup>The “combined view” appears to be Mukula’s attempt to expand the role of indication to account for metonymic uses (as in “The village is on the Ganges”) as well as metaphorical uses (“The Punjabi is an ox.”)

<sup>107</sup>The phrase translated as “theoretical liking” is ‘*yathā-ruci*’ or “according to taste.” The



there is convention (regarding division constituents) established by the speech community and established by the factors of place and time which interact mutually one with another.

[48.9] In this way, the range and structure of indication in the four views—*connection-of-the-denoted*, etc.—has been explained.

Figure 9.7: Figure 5: Views Regarding Sentential Unity

| View                                    | Word Meaning                     | Sentence Meaning                               | Role of Indication                 |
|---|----------------------------------|--|------------------------------------|
| <b>Connection-of-the-Denoted</b>        | Directly refers to universals    | Cognition indicated by collection of referents | Secure sentential unity            |
| <b>Denotation-through-the-Connected</b> | Qualified by the verb in context | Cognition of combined words and relations      | Indication based upon the sentence |
| <b>Combination</b>                      | Both of the above                | Both of the above                              | Both of the above                  |
| <b>Indivisible Unity</b>                | Hypothetical construct           | Cognition of indivisible unity                 | None except hypothetical           |

[49.29] In cases where there is an impossibility in primary meaning there is an intentional object directed at something dependent upon the primary meaning, when there is a purpose.<sup>108</sup> The author continues in order to present an

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theorist who denies words as having a status as meaning-bearers can still allow for word divisions to be useful in theoretical pursuits (like lexicography or aesthetics).

<sup>108</sup>I understand the ‘*evam abhīhita-anvaya-ādi-pakṣa-catustāye lakṣaṇāyāḥ*’ as a kind of dittography from the line above, and so exclude it, as does Venugopalan. However, Venugopalan inserts ‘*idānīm etasyā*’ before ‘*yatra*’ and as Dvivedi lacks this, I omit. Also, Dvivedi has ‘*viśayāṃ*’ where Venugopalan has ‘*viśaye*’ (“object”). The latter is locative singular masculine, but the first does not match any declensions, unless corrected to ‘*viśāyāṃ*,’ in which

illustration.

**Verse 11**

*Because there is an inconsistency in primary meaning, because of a cause which is dependent on the primary meaning, or because of established convention or because of a particular intention, indication is found to obtain in conventional practice.*

[50.3] And the previously discussed indication of six kinds is observed in the conventional use of the elders because it is grounded in a collection which has the nature of three kinds of reasons:

1. Due to an inconsistency in primary meaning—that is, its being obstructed as another knowledge source;
2. And due to the dependence on the primary meaning on the part of the meaning which is being indicated;
3. And due to grasping another meaning because of an intention.<sup>109</sup>

[50.9] And that dependence the primary meaning is shown by the teacher Bhartṛmitra to be fivefold:<sup>110</sup>

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case it is locative singular feminine, or ‘*viṣayam*’ accusative singular masculine. I take it as the last.

<sup>109</sup>These three reasons, ‘*evaṃ vidha-kāraṇa-tritaya-ātmaka-sāmagrī*’ are all together necessary as a collection for indication.

<sup>110</sup>Bhartṛmitra is a Mīmāṃsā philosopher writing before Kumārila (600 and 700 CE) who argues against the Mīmāṃsaka Śabara (350 and 400 CE). We do not have Bhartṛmitra’s works except through citations in other texts. According to Verpooten, Bhartṛmitra was considered “a positivist and an irreligious thinker” who was rejected from the orthodoxy due to his views. Verpooten 1987, p. 22. Abhinavagupta quotes the same passage from Bhartṛmitra in the *Locana*, using two different versions of the quote, neither of which is identical with Mukula’s quotation. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 67, fn 4 for discussion.

*Because of the relationship with that which is to be denoted, because of being similar, because of being associated, because of being opposed, because of relationship to an action, indication is thought to be five-fold.*<sup>111</sup>

[50.14] By this verse intention is further divided into two.<sup>112</sup>

[50.15] In some cases, when a different meaning is grasped, because it has a nature following convention which is grounded in the beginningless, conventional use of the elders, the intention has the nature suitable to convention, as in the case of (20) “two r’s.” For by the term “two r’s,” by its being connected to having two r’s, through indication of the word ‘*bhramara*,’ in this manner, compliance with convention is generated.

[50.18] Now, different from what was described as a motive whose nature follows convention, is when a word for the named thing conveys another object which is distinct from it, and yet causes understanding of the particular’s form, just as in the earlier mentioned example, (18) “I am Rāma.”<sup>113</sup>

[50.21] And therefore, two kinds of intention should be understood according

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<sup>111</sup>While ‘*samavāyah*’ can mean “inherence,” the sort of perpetually existing relationship between a substance and its qualities, the later example is of a collected assembly of persons, so the meaning here is of a (not necessarily permanent) combination, conjunction, association, or collection.

<sup>112</sup>The Dvivedi edition has ‘*tena prayojanasya api dvaividhyam*’ but the ‘*tena*’ does not make sense as a discourse marker connecting the five-fold relationship to the two-fold division of intention. Venugopalan omits it on the authority of one of the manuscripts. Rather than omit it, I read the punctuation in the Dvivedi edition as being incorrect and take ‘*tena*’ with ‘*ślokena*’ as a reference to a part of the *śloka* that Mukula is paraphrasing.

<sup>113</sup>Mukula explains this example in detail below. It is a case where “Rāma” denotes the person of Rāma but by way of descriptions of his character. One might characterize it as “Rāma” used as a definite description rather than a name.

to their contents—in the case where there is an impossibility of primary meaning, by close dependence upon the primary meaning, and when the indicated meaning is understood to have five kinds of relationship which has been shown earlier.

[53.17] Here is a case of indication by relationship, as in the example, “The village is on the Ganges.” For in this case, where the primary meaning of the word is blocked, since the particular stream denoted by the word “Ganges” is inapplicable as the locus of a village, the meaning, whose relationship is that of contiguity—and—contiguous things, indicates the bank as being a support of the village. And here, the purpose of indication with regard to the bank is to communicate things such as holiness and beauty, which the words do not convey but which are inherent in things related to the Ganges. For the words are unable to contact things such as holiness and beauty, because there is the unwanted possibility of under- and over-extension.<sup>114</sup>

[53.26] An example of indication by similarity:

- (24) *Bee, in all your buzzing about the spacious sky,  
Have you anywhere touched, seen, or heard  
—now speak the truth without bias—*

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<sup>114</sup>Mukula uses an unusual turn of phrase in this sentence: ‘*na...sva-śabdaiḥ spraṣṭum śakyate.*’ The infinite ‘*spraṣṭum*’ literally means “to touch” He could easily have used other words for denotation such as ‘*abhidyaate.*’ He is speaking figuratively or loosely. Perhaps this is to avoid making the self-negating claim that words cannot denote holiness and beauty. His point seems to be that the word “Ganges” cannot strictly, speaking, denote holiness, since the river is not co-extensive with holiness. Under— and over—extension in Indian philosophy are flaws that make, for instance, a definition invalid when it does not apply to a ll cases or applies to too many cases, respectively.

*If there is a flower which is equal to the jasmine blossom?*

[54.3] Now here, the words “bee” and “flower,” due to their being impossible otherwise in the vocative case indicate another meaning, one which is connected to qualities similar to the qualities understood by the words.<sup>115</sup> This is because there is a similarity with the primary meaning’s denotation—the denotation which is blocked. And here, the purpose is to communicate the understood actions and qualities of the words “bee” and “flower,” which are similar to actions and qualities belonging to the bee and the flower.

[54.7] Indication by inference is just as in the example,

(25) The umbrella-holders go.<sup>116</sup>

In this case, the the primary meaning of the word is blocked by the use of the person plural. For in the case of a single umbrella-holder the use of the plural is not appropriate. Therefore, here, where there is an action which indicates “going” with the umbrella-holder, even the ones without an umbrella are understood through indication by the word “umbrella-holders.” This is on account of the person associated with the umbrella-less collection. And here,

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<sup>115</sup>There is nothing grammatically infelicitous about the use of the vocative in the verse, but one might think that there is something inappropriate about addressing unspeaking bees and flowers with a question. For example, “bee” literally means an unspeaking insect, but the word indicates an anthropomorphic insect, which shares qualities of the ordinary bee.

<sup>116</sup>This sentence, a stock example of *lakṣaṇā* also used by Kumāriḷa and others, describes a royal retinue in which the important person has an umbrella-holder to shield them from the sun. Following along in the process are other, umbrella-less people. Therefore, there is only one umbrella-holder, despite the plural noun.

the purpose is to communicate through their connectedness to the royal person near the umbrella all those who are umbrella-less.

[56.6] Indication which is due to opposition is just as in,

(26) One with a handsome face.

Because here, due to its being used when face is not handsome, the natural meaning of “handsome face” is blocked. Therefore because the utterance meaning consists of what has the opposite of an unhandsome face, that is, handsomeness, the utterance implies the face as being unhandsome through the relationship of opposition. And here, indication’s purpose is to convey the hidden true meaning. For these kind of cases, the hidden truth is ordinarily communicated by speakers on account of their having some such aim.

[56.13] An example of indication which is from being joined with an action is as in,

(27) You are ‘Enemy-Killer’/‘Śatru-ghna’ in the great battle.<sup>117</sup>

This is because here there is an obstruction of the primary meaning due to the use of the word “Enemy-Killer” in the case of one who is not Śatru-ghna.

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<sup>117</sup>The example here is of a pun, or *śleṣa*. The proper name of the youngest Rāma’s brothers in the *Rāmāyana* is “Śatru-ghna” which means “Enemy-Killer.” In the verses Mukula cites, the word is being used, along with other proper names, to refer figuratively to the central character who is not the original Śatru-ghna. While describing punning as “connection with an action” seems inapt, McCrea points out that one might take ‘*kriyā*’ in a broad sense to mean “being and/or becoming.” McCrea 2008, 297. Whether this is how Bhartṛmitra understood the term is impossible to know without his original texts.

And the word “Enemy-Killer” in the case of one who is not Śatru-ghna is said to be indication because of the relationship which an agent possesses with the action of killing an enemy. And the speaker’s intention here is to communicate the nature of a king which is denoted by the word “Enemy-killer.” And in this way:

- (28) *You are Pṛthu in qualities. In fame you are Rāma, You are Nala and Bharata in character, You are Śatrughna in the great battle, from your standing in the world, you are Janaka, Since by your good deeds you bear renown born by the ancients How is it you are not lord Māndhātā, from being victorious over the three worlds also?*<sup>118</sup>

The one who is painted as a king is being extolled as having kingliness in the nature of Śatrughna. Thus has been described the tripartite indication which arises out of the three kinds of relationships.

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<sup>118</sup>All of the proper names in this verse have double meanings and refer to famous figures in Sanskrit literature. “Pṛthu” = the earth as well as greatness. The god Pṛthu is said to have subdued the earth, and is the first king. “Rāma” = beauty. He is the central figure in the Rāmāyana, idealized as a perfect human being. “Nala” and “Bharata” are likely not trading on the literal meanings of the names, but the famous characters in the *Mahābhārata*. “Janaka” = ‘one who begets as well as father. He is a famous king in the *Rāmāyana* who rules a great empire. Lord Māndhātā = he will suckle me. He was named by the god Indra, who gave him his finger to suckle as a youth. He was said to be very powerful, and the “three worlds” is a way of indicating the expansiveness of his reach. Venugopalan translates Māndhātā as derived from ‘*mad*’ (in compound for first person pronoun) and ‘*dhā*,’ meaning “to sustain” or “to bear,” but the gloss in the *Mahābhārata* is of ‘*mad*’ and ‘*dhe*,’ or “to suckle.” Possibly a further play on words is intended in the verse, incorporating all of these meanings.

[58.11] Now, as for the the very close connection (between indicated and primary meaning) which consists of the five kinds of relationship described earlier in detail, in some cases the utterance meaning is entirely displaced, in some cases it is intended, and in some cases it is unintended. In this way there are the three kinds which the sensitive reader perceives.<sup>119</sup> The author continues in order to demonstrate the classification of its objects:

**Verse 12**

*In cases of similarity and opposition, the expressed meaning is entirely displaced.*

*There is intention and lack of intention (with regard to the expressed meaning) in the two cases of connection and association.*

**Verse 13**

*In cases of appropriation, there is intention (with regard to the expressed meaning), but in the cases of indirect indication, there is lack of intention (with regard to the expressed meaning).<sup>120</sup>*

*In cases where there is connection to an action, there is setting aside (of the expressed meaning), and sometimes the opposite of this.<sup>121</sup>*

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<sup>119</sup>The list of relationships between the utterance meaning and the speaker's intention comes from Ānanda's classification of kinds of *dhvani*. Mukula will try to show that indication can be marshalled as an explanation for all of these purported instances of *dhvani*.

<sup>120</sup>These categories were introduced above. As stated then, these two kinds of *lakṣaṇā* correspond generally to the terms 'ajahallakṣaṇā' and 'jahallakṣaṇā,' respectively.

<sup>121</sup>Mukula presents a three-fold division without any hierarchical structure: the primary meaning is either discarded, unintended, or intended. In contrast, Ānanda has two major divisions, intended or unintended, and within unintended there are two further distinctions: meaning which is shifted ('*artha-antara-saṅkramita*'), meaning which is entirely discarded ('*atyanta-tīras-kṛta*'). Mukula presents Ānanda's meaning which is shifted and its broader category, meaning which is unintended as both being "unintended." He treats meaning



Figure 9.8: Analysis of Expressed Meaning

| Discarded                | Unintended             | Unintended or Intended    | Intended      |
|--------------------------|------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|
| Similarity<br>Opposition | Indirect<br>Indication | Connection<br>Association | Appropriation |

[58.18] *Because of the relationship with that which is to be denoted* means that where what is uttered takes one of the five forms of very close (relationship), then when there is similarity or opposition the expressed meaning is entirely discarded. For instance, in indication that depends upon similarity, the expressed meaning is entirely discarded. This is because the expressed meaning has the character of being a comparans aiming at a comparandum, through a word signifying the comparans.<sup>122</sup>

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which is entirely discarded as its own categorization. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 358ff and McCrea 2008, p. 302-03 for more detail. In what follows, Mukula analyzes the five relationships of proximity to the primary meaning in terms of three possibilities: where the primary meaning is embedded within the new indicated meaning, where it is intended in some manner, and where it is unintended. The latter two options (intended or unintended) are understood to be cases where the primary meaning is not embedded, but it is not necessarily because the speaker always intends to convey the primary meaning. Mukula is again using the broad term, ‘*vācya*’ in the sense of meaning which is expressed rather than utterance meaning in distinction from sentence meaning, the *vākya*. What is expressed can be what is expressed by a word, a sentence, or a speaker. The particular examples below make clear in what sense meaning is expressed.

<sup>122</sup>This will be further explained in the next sentence, but we can illustrate the principle generally using a stock English metaphor: “Juliet is the sun.” The word “sun” literally refers to a gaseous orb. This is the comparans or subject of comparison (Sanskrit: *upamāna*). The comparandum or object of comparison (Sanskrit: *upameya*) is Juliet. In contrast to this sentence, the examples that follow have the comparandum suppressed. The comparandum, by being indicated, replaces the literal meaning of the word. It is as if, after having uttered this sentence, Romeo were to use the word “sun” in another sentence. We would know that he is implicitly comparing Juliet to the literal sun, and the natural meaning of “sun” would be entirely discarded.

[58.20] This is just like the example (16) “Smearred with splendid thick bright color” and (17) “friends of the clouds.” Since here the words “smearred” and “friends” aim at the comparandum through their natural meanings, the two are made to lack any close connection with a natural meaning.<sup>123</sup>

[58.24] As well, in the dependence relationship of opposition, the expressed meaning is completely displaced due to fact that another meaning is applicable, one which is opposed to the expressed meaning. Take, for example, (26) “One with a handsome face.” Now here, having a handsome face is entirely displaced due to the person’s having an unhandsome face. Thus the expressed meanings of similarity and opposition are entirely discarded.

[59.28] But in connection and association, the expressed meaning—whether it is intended or unintended—is not entirely discarded. Now, in these cases, given that appropriative indication has the nature of appropriation, where there is the intention to convey the expressed meaning, the expressed meaning is *intended*. For in just this way, the expressed meaning has been explained in the poetic domain by sensitive readers as aiming at another, intended meaning. But in the case of indicated meaning, because it is transferred to another

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<sup>123</sup>The explanation here expands upon the explanation above. “Smearred” normally means spreading something like saffron. But in the poem, the word is used to describe skies darkening. The natural meaning of spreading is similar to skies darkening in that both will remove brilliance. However, Mukula argues that the natural meaning of spreading is now embedded within the new meaning. Likewise, with “friends” which normally does not signify peacocks. Mukula’s point is that there is not a tight connection between the literal referent, or natural meaning, of “friends” and peacocks, not that there is no resemblance relationship between friends and peacocks.

meaning, the expressed meaning is not intended.<sup>124</sup>

[60.4] Now, therefore, when expressed meaning is transferred to another meaning, as in appropriative indication based on the relationship (with the primary meaning), where the expressed meaning is intended there is this example: (7) “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.”<sup>125</sup> Now here, the intended effect is Devadatta’s characteristic of fatness. It is intended by Devadatta’s being qualified by the absence of eating in the daytime. The effect implies the cause, which is eating at night, through indication based in the relationship (with the primary meaning), by the meaning having a naturally established meaning.

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<sup>124</sup>The Sanskrit in this section varies among printed editions. Venugopalan, says, “The printed text reads ‘*tatra hy upādāna-ātmikāyām lakṣaṇāyām upādāne vācasya vivakṣāyām vācyasya vivakṣitatvam*’ and the phrase ‘*upādāne vācasya*’ is redundant. Hence it is omitted. One of the manuscripts does so as well.” The Dvivedi edition does not omit the ‘*upādāne vācasya*’ and instead of ‘*tatra hy upādāna-ātmikāyām*’ reads ‘*tatra hy utpādāna-ātmikāyām*.’ However, nowhere has Mukula described appropriation as having a productive (*utpāda*) nature. Rather than read it as redundant, I read it as emphasizing the nature of this kind of indication (hence “has the nature of appropriation.”) There is also a phrase missing from Dvivedi and Venugopalan’s: ‘*[lakṣaṇe tu] vācyasya avivakṣitatvaṃ tasya artha-antara-saṃkramitatvāt*.’ McCrea notes that without this phrase, the text “makes Mukulabhaṭṭa give ‘transformation into another meaning’ (*artha-antara-saṃkramitva*) as a reason for regarding expressed meanings as *vivakṣita*...when it would, on the contrary, be a reason for regarding it as *avivakṣita*.” McCrea 2008, p. 303.

Venugopalan also says, “Mukula here definitely accepts the view of Dhvani indirectly” (p. 262). However, as the entirety of his text is aiming to show that *dhvani* can be understood as within the scope of indication, this is unlikely. Rather, his point is that the sensitive readers are right to observe that there is a different and intended meaning in the provenance of poetry. They are incorrect to attribute this to *dhvani*, however. This section describes how it can be understood through *lakṣaṇā*.

<sup>125</sup>While Mukula here begins to discuss appropriation and indirect indication, two categories which earlier were subsumed under the ‘*śuddhā*’ or “pure indication,” here he is addressing the first of Bhartṛmītra’s categories. This is where indication functions based on some relationship with the primary meaning of the word or phrase.

[60.10] In the case of appropriation dependent upon association, the expressed meaning is intended—just as in (25) “The umbrella holders go.” For here, “umbrella holder,” because of its being declined in the plural, also implies the umbrella-less people, since this meaning is established as syntactically connected with its own plural. When this occurs, then, the expressed (singular) meaning “umbrella-holder” is intended in dependence upon association, as there is appropriation of those people who are umbrella-less. In this way, the expressed meaning is said to be intended in the two indications whose natures are appropriative: the dependence relationships of association and relationship (with the primary meaning).

[63.17] Now there are two kinds of indication in which the expressed meaning is neither unintended nor entirely discarded. This is due to the indicated meaning having a connection with the effect, in some way, by means of what is being indicated. In cases of indication which are dependent upon relationship (with the primary meaning), there is expressed meaning which is unintended, as in the example, (18) “I am Rāma.” For here, the expressed meaning of the word “Rāma” has the form the son of Daśaratha, due to its being transformed into a different property which is “suggested,” it is not employed for its usual purpose.footnoteBy using “suggested” (*vyāṅgya* here, Mukula should not be understood to be implicitly accepting Ānanda’s account of *dhvani*, as Venugopalan claims (footnote 92). He is explicitly arguing that suggestion is identical to indication. Instead, since he is here pointedly responding to the *dhvani-vadins*, he appropriates their own terminology, but gives an ex-

planation in terms of indication or *lakṣaṇā*. This is the way I would apply the principle of charity to what is otherwise an “odd and seemingly rather careless” (McCrea 2008, p. 304) use of the term. The idea is that the word “Rāma” is not being literally applied (*‘svaparatenā’*) to the speaker in the sense that he is the son of Daśaratha, but figuratively in that he is a person who has certain properties. These properties arise in the same way as in other cases of indication, and so there is no need for an additional operation. Therefore it is unintended and it is not entirely discarded. This is because there is somehow a unifying connection in the meaning of the sentence, by the “suggested” properties. In the same way, (5) “The village is on the Ganges” and, etc. is to be explained.

[63.25] Now in the case of indication which is dependent on the relationship of association, (25) “The umbrella-holders go”—this very example is an expressed meaning which is unintended. For instance, “umbrella-holder,” by its being inapplicable otherwise to attain sentential unity in the plural, is appropriated as being about the collection. When this occurs, then, because of the collection being intended, the expressed meaning is unintended. And in this way also, because of being contained within the collection, by means of the collection, the umbrella-holder is also connected to the action and is in this way easily obtained (as part of the meaning).<sup>126</sup> And just for this reason, the expressed

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<sup>126</sup>The referent of “umbrella-holders” must have a plural referent, and so it refers to the entire (umbrella-less) collection around the single umbrella-holder, including him. The individual umbrella-holder is therefore not the intended referent, but he “comes along for the ride,” so to speak, as he is part of the collection.

meaning is not entirely discarded—because of its connection with the action, by being contained within the boundaries of the collection. In this way it is shown that the expressed meaning of two kinds of indication dependent on the relationship of association, whether intended or unintended, is not entirely discarded.

[65.24] In the case of indication which is dependent on a connection with action, the indicated meaning has the word’s capacity as its foundation. This conforms to the capacity of the constituent parts that make up the word. And there the expressed meaning is discarded, just as in

(29) The man is a man.<sup>127</sup>

For here, through one word—“man”—having an accepted meaning which is a generic class, another word—“man”—assumes the meaning as being superior, in contrast. This is by contrast with the word’s own natural meaning, through indication which is dependent on connection with an action.

[65.29] But where the expressed meaning is certainly intended due to there being a collection of factors—and through another word’s capacity a different established meaning is made non-different—in that case, there is the opposite of this (earlier analysis). There is the opposite of the action which is the

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<sup>127</sup>McCrea suggests this may be an excerpt from a larger verse by Hemacandra. If so, the wider context is, “A hero who moves in battle, at the forefront, killing a great many enemies: that person [*‘puruṣa’*] is like a *puruṣa* [“one who goes in front,” “one who protects].” The second use of “*puruṣa*” can be taken in an etymological sense, an agentive form of either of the verbs  $\sqrt{pr}$ , “to protect,” or  $\sqrt{)pur}$ , “to go in front.” McCrea 2008, p. 307-08.

meaning of the expression.<sup>128</sup> Here, it is certainly not the case that there is discarding of the expressed meaning, but it is instead intended—just as in the example, (27) “You are ‘Enemy-Killer’ in the great battle.” For here, the word “Śatru-ghna” (“Enemy-Killer”), through its connection with the action understood through indication, accomplishes as its meaning: the actor whose action is killing an enemy, its natural meaning, as well as the thing being compared, viz, “son of Daśaratha.” Therefore its natural meaning is also intended.

[66.6] And suppose sensitive readers accept the category of entirely discarded expressed meaning as within the purview of this unintended sort of meaning due to the compared thing’s appropriation. By its being about the subject of comparison, when there is an object of indication dependent upon an action the expressed meaning is not discarded, because of the category which is the object of comparison of the expressed meaning.<sup>129</sup>

[66.10] Therefore in this way, on the topic of the dependence relationship in connection with action, it is demonstrated that, on account of the meanings coming together, sometimes the express meaning is discarded but sometimes it is intended.

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<sup>128</sup>In the earlier example (29), the second instance of “man” does not denote a class of human beings, but indicates someone performing the action expressed by its verbal etymological constituents. In the example Mukula will next develop, the etymological reading and literal readings are both present in the same word, simultaneously.

<sup>129</sup>Here, Mukula alludes to the fact that Ānanda subsumes *atyanta-tiraskṛta* within the purview (*viśaye vidhe*) of when the express meaning is unintended (*avivakṣita*), in contrast to his view in which they are distinct. He claims that even if they accept this hierarchy, they must admit that in some figurative cases dependent upon verbal etymological constituents, the expressed meaning is not entirely discarded—which effectively is a counterexample to their structure.

Figure 9.9: Discarded, Intended, and Unintended Meanings

| Kind of Indication Relation | Entirely Discarded            | Unintended                                   | Intended                  |
|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|--|---------------------------|
| Similarity                  | (16) smeared,<br>(17) friends | –  | –                         |
| Opposition                  | (26) One with a handsome face | –  | –                         |
| Based on denotation         | –                             | (18) I am Rāma,<br>(5) Village on the Ganges | (7) Fat Devadatta         |
| Appropriation               | –                             | –  | (25) Umbrella holders go  |
| Association                 | –                             | (25) Umbrella holders go                     | –                         |
| Relationship with action    | (29) The man is a man         |  | (27) You are Enemy-Killer |

[66.12] And, because there is much to be said, not everything is investigated in this text. What is described here is what is included in comprehending the ways of indication but is considered by the sensitive readers to be a novel classification, that is, *dhvani*. Therefore we give the general idea in order to open your eyes. And this is to be investigated by wise persons with intellects sharp as the point of kuśa grass. But now, enough prolixity to avoid entanglement in verbosity. Thus, in this way, there has been outlined a classification of the objects of utterance meaning which are discarded and intended.

[69.8] Now, when the language principle—which has the character of a unity among all words—is manifest as having a threefold form of the relationship between word and meaning, like mistaking a rope for a snake, then this com-



municative function is suitable to rise to the level of ordinary use—which has ten kinds.<sup>130</sup> But it is not suitable when the language principle is aimed at the nature of speech as a collected whole.<sup>131</sup> Therefore, the author, to show this, says:

**Verse 14**

*The nature of speech, unfolding in use, is analyzed as divided into ten kinds.*

*But when the divided succession of words is collected together, how can it be understood in this manner?*

[69.14] The language principle whose nature is unity among all the words has a relationship with the ten-fold communicative principle that has just been delineated. It does so though its four-fold nature of knower, knowledge-source, object of knowledge, and cognition of knowledge, each of which participates in the multiplicity of the expressed meaning, the word, and their relationship. In this way it unfolds in use like a rope mistaken for a snake.<sup>132</sup> But concerning these ten-fold communicative functions, how are they understood when the

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<sup>130</sup>The analogy of a snake and a rope is common in Indian philosophy as an example of two things which are mistaken for one another. What is being mistaken here is multiplicity for unity, at least as Bhartṛhari understands things. The language principle is undifferentiated, but in everyday use (*vyavahāra*) we distinguish between such things as parts of speech and phonemes. However, as things truly are, there is no division. Mukula is trying to present a theory which can be accepted by all major viewpoints in philosophy of language, including the Grammarians who hold the *sphoṭa* theory.

<sup>131</sup>The ‘*śabda-tattva*,’ or “language principle” is an allusion to the ‘*sphoṭa*’ theory of Bhartṛhari, who thinks that we understand language in a flash of insight (*pratibhā*) as a unified whole, without parts.

<sup>132</sup>The relationships which Mukula has painstakingly outlined are, to the Grammarians in the tradition of Bhartṛhari, ultimately illusory. To take them as real would be to mistake a rope for a snake.

nature of speech unfolding—being non-manifest—has no hypothetical descriptions? After all, taken altogether, there is an divided progression. Certainly, therefore, there is no expression (of the language principle).

[72.1] Now the author summarizes the purpose of the work:

**Verse 15**

*Therefore, the communicative function has here been investigated  
as a ten-fold division.*

[72.3] Four divisions into kinds of the primary meaning's communicative function and six with regard to indication—in this way the ten kinds of the communicative function have here been distinguished.

[72.12] Now the result of this investigation is shown:

**Verse 16**

*That communicative function is reflected in words, sentences, and  
knowledge sources;  
The intelligence of the one who employs it in composition becomes  
bright.*

[72.15] *Words* means grammar because it is the means for understanding words. *Sentences* means hermeneutics (Mīmāṃsā) because it is the means for determining the sentential unity of sentences. *Knowledge sources* means reasoning (*tarka*) because it is employed as a procedure for determining valid knowledge sources. There is a reflection in these subjects—Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Reasoning—which are a means for understanding all of the four kinds of undertakings and all of the sciences, being divided into three kinds. This reflec-

tion's form represents the uninterrupted succession of phonemes. One in due time becomes a lord of luminous speech by completely understanding the entire ten-fold communicative function of speech from its being employed in the four sciences of Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Reasoning, and Composition. From an undertaking of these four sciences, this reflection entirely pervades the whole of world's use.<sup>133</sup>

[73.15] This is because the ten-fold communicative function entirely pervades the ongoing movement of speech, because it is usefully engaged in the four sciences—these being Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Reasoning, and Composition—and because it stretches out among all these sciences which are the root of ordinary practice in its entirety. The ten-fold communicative function which pervades the entirety of ordinary practice has been explained.

### Verse 17

*The fundamentals of the communicative function have been analyzed by Mukula, the son of Bhaṭṭa Kallata, for the purpose of Sūri's knowledge.*

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<sup>133</sup>The numbering of the sciences—three and then four—looks to be in tension at first. The reason is that Mukula is glossing the first part of the verse (which has three sciences) and then goes on to discuss the full scope of the communicative function's applicability (including the second half). The verse that Mukula glosses describes the communicative function as being "reflected" in three areas: words, sentences, knowledge sources. He analyzes each of these as representing an area of investigation or *śāstra*: Grammar (words), Mīmāṃsā (sentences), and what he calls *tarka*, probably a reference to Nyāya or the Logic school, which focused on the *pramāṇa* (knowledge sources). He then says that each of these are important for the four kinds of undertakings, which include religious duty (*dharma*), worldly aims (*artha*), sensual desires (*kāma*), and the highest aim of liberation (*mokṣa*). He concludes observing that the communicative function is useful in Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Reasoning, and also Composition as a way to make one's intellect bright (echoing the imagery of the mirror here).

[73.7] Thus concludes the Fundamentals of the Communicative Function, written by Mukula Bhaṭṭa, son of Śrī Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, an inhabitant of the place sanctified by the grains of dust from the feet of Śārada.

## Appendix

# Appendix 1

## Sanskrit Grammar

To help the reader unfamiliar with Classical Sanskrit grammar, below is a brief overview of some important features.<sup>1</sup>

### 1.1 Nouns, Pronouns

Sanskrit is a case-declined language which admits of three genders (masculine, feminine, neuter), three numbers (singular, dual, and plural), and eight cases. The cases and some of their ordinary uses are:<sup>2</sup>

1. Nominative - sentence subject
2. Accusative - direct object of transitive verb; English: “to,” “at”
3. Instrumental - means, instrument; English: “with,” “by”
4. Dative - indirect object of verb; English: “to,” “for,” “in order to”
5. Ablative - separation, removal, expressing reasons; English: “from,” “be-

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<sup>1</sup>I touch only on major features of the grammar. Further, I omit Sanskrit grammatical terms for simplicity's sake. Readers interested in a fuller picture should see Whitney 2005 and MacDonnell 1986 for more detail.

<sup>2</sup>The descriptions of the cases exclude a number of uses to which they may be put, in the interest of being succinct. See the grammar texts cited above for more detail. Sanskrit also employs postpositions such as '*prati*' (“towards”).

cause”

6. Genitive - possession, superlative relation, often substituted for other cases; English: “of”
7. Locative - location, situation, also reference to something; English: “in,” “at,” “among,” “on the topic of”
8. Vocative - signifies direct address; English: “O Rāma!”

Nouns are declined by adding case endings to the stem, corresponding to the appropriate gender, number, and case. Depending on the stem, there are different morphological patterns for these case endings—patterns which need not concern us here, but for which see e.g. MacDonnell 1986, pp. 34ff.

Sanskrit has a variety of pronouns: personal, demonstrative, interrogative, relative, and reflexive/correlative. These pronouns decline in gender, number, and case. Demonstrative pronouns can be used to distinguish between degrees of proximity. Thus, ‘*asāu*’ (“yonder”) is used for things in the distance (temporal or spatial) whereas ‘*eṣas*’ (“this”) is used for things which are nearby. The pronoun ‘*tat*’ (“that”) can be used as a demonstrative pronoun but is also employed as a definite article: ‘*tat pustakaṃ mama,*’ (“The book is mine.”)

However, strictly speaking, classical Sanskrit does not have a definite or indefinite article, and Sanskrit authors do not use demonstrative pronouns. Therefore, a noun is frequently used in a sentence without a qualifier, and it is from context that readers determine whether the noun is being used definitely or

indefinitely and generically or non-generically. Below are examples of all four cases:

1. Definite generic: *gauḥ sāsna-ādimān*. (The cow has a dewlap, etc.)
2. Indefinite generic: *gaur gāṃ janayati*. (The cow produces a cow.)
3. Definite non-generic: *kaunḍinyasya gauḥ*. (The cow belongs to Kaunḍinya.)
4. Indefinite non-generic: *gāṃ ānaya*. (Bring a cow.)<sup>3</sup>

## 1.2 Verbs

Verbs in Sanskrit are inflected from a root, represented frequently with the square-root symbol:  $\sqrt{bhū}$ . Morphological changes to the root as well as the addition of prefixes and suffixes indicate voice, tense, mode, number, and person. The verbs in Sanskrit can be analyzed in several ways:

1. Voice: active, middle, passive
2. Tense: present, imperfect, perfect, pluperfect, aorist, future, conditional, periphrastic future
3. Mode: optative, imperative (modes of the present); optative (mode of the aorist, also known as precative or benedictive); participles (modes of the present, perfect, future)
4. Number: singular, dual, plural

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<sup>3</sup>These examples are taken from Ganeri 2006, p. 10-11, which has an excellent discussion of this phenomenon and its relationship to Indian theories of reference.



## 5. Person: first, second, third

Each Sanskrit verb is identified by its verb class, of which there are ten. The classes are distinguished by their conjugational morphology. There are two categories of conjugations, each with several classes which vary slightly in how they change. The first conjugation admits of no change to the verb root (which ends in ‘-a’) while in the second conjugation, the verb root (which ends in letters other than ‘a’) changes based on its vowel strength.

The distinction between active and middle voice does not map onto a systematic semantic difference. That is, while one might think that the transitive verbs conjugate in the active voice and intransitive or reflexive verbs in the middle, this is not so. Some verbs roots can be conjugated as both active and middle. As Whitney notes, it is likely that a semantic distinction between active and passive was the reason for the different forms, but we do not have any written records which reflect it.<sup>4</sup> The passive voice is marked by the addition of a ‘-ya’ to the verb stem and the use (generally) of the middle verb ending. It is considered a secondary or derivative conjugation.

While the tenses share names with Greek tenses, they do not correspond in semantic value. Thus there is no true “imperfect” in Sanskrit, but the imperfect is a simple past or preterite. Likewise, there is no true “pluperfect” in Classical Sanskrit (although there is in Vedic Sanskrit).

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<sup>4</sup>Whitney 2005, p. 200.

The imperative mode, which is important for the Mīmāṃsā analysis of Vedic commands (though as we will see, it is not the only mode used for commands), conveys that something is an injunction. Whitney notes that it is the “most unchanged in use in the whole history of the language,” although it has some nuanced semantic shades:

...the command shades off into a demand, an exhortation, an entreaty, an expression of earnest desire. The imperative also sometimes signifies an assumption of concession; and occasionally, by pregnant construction, it becomes the expression of something conditional or contingent...<sup>5</sup>

The table below illustrates the imperative conjugation for the verb  $\sqrt{gam}$ , meaning “go.” Note that it is syntactically possible to use the imperative to issue an order to oneself—the imperative is not restricted only to the third and second persons.

|            | <b>Sg</b>       | <b>Du</b>        | <b>Pl</b>        |
|------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| <b>3rd</b> | <i>gacchatu</i> | <i>gacchatām</i> | <i>gacchantu</i> |
| <b>2nd</b> | <i>gaccha</i>   | <i>gacchatam</i> | <i>gaccha</i>    |
| <b>1st</b> | <i>gacchani</i> | <i>gacchāva</i>  | <i>gacchāmaa</i> |

Likewise, while the optative conveys a wish, “the optative becomes a softened imperative...comes to signify what is generally desirable or proper, what should or ought to be, and so becomes the mode of prescription...”<sup>6</sup> As well, the

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<sup>5</sup>Whitney 2005, p. 215

<sup>6</sup>Whitney 2005, p. 215.

future indicative can be used to convey commands. Below is the optative for  $\sqrt{\text{gam}}$ .

|            | <b>Sg</b>      | <b>Du</b>      | <b>Pl</b>      |
|------------|----------------|----------------|----------------|
| <b>3rd</b> | <i>gamyet</i>  | <i>gametām</i> | <i>gameyuh</i> |
| <b>2nd</b> | <i>gameḥ</i>   | <i>gametam</i> | <i>gameta</i>  |
| <b>1st</b> | <i>gameyam</i> | <i>gameva</i>  | <i>gamema</i>  |

In addition, Sanskrit has infinitives which takes a single frozen (accusative case) form, and is considered distinct from the tense-systems noted above. As well, there are secondary conjugations: passive (described above), intensive, desiderative, and causative.

### 1.3 Word Order and Sentence Construction

As a case-declined language, word order is less important in Classical Sanskrit than English, but there are still typical patterns helpful for interpretation. The usual pattern is subject – object – verb, as in:

- (1) *Rāmo*                      *vanam*                      *gacchati*  
*Rāma*<sub>MascNomSg</sub> *forest*<sub>MascAccSg</sub> *goes*<sub>PresIndc3PSg</sub>  
 Rāma goes to the forest.

When dealing with non-verbal predicates, word order can be important in distinguishing between what is the qualifier and what is qualified. The predicate frequently (though not always, especially in verse) is found in a sentence-final position:

- (2) *ghaṭo*                      *nīlah...*  
 pot<sub>MascNomSg</sub> blue<sub>MascNomSg</sub>  
 The pot is blue.
- (3) *nīlo*                      *ghaṭaḥ*  
 blue<sub>MascNomSg</sub> pot<sub>MascNomSg</sub>  
 The blue pot...<sup>7</sup>

The preceding sentences also illustrate an important aspect of Sanskrit: *sandhi*. “*Sandhi*” simply means “conjunction” or “combination” and refers to the changes which occur when phonemes come into contact with each other. Take a simple English example: one does not say “a apple” but rather “an apple.” This is because of a rule which requires that when the indefinite pronoun comes into contact with a vowel, one must insert an “n.” In Sanskrit, there are many such changes which occur when phonemes come into contact—either at the boundaries of words or within words, as in verb conjugation with the addition of suffixes.

Here is a simple example. The masculine nominative singular of ‘*Rāma*’ is ‘*Rāmaḥ*.’ There is a *sandhi* rule that says when a word-final ‘*ḥ*’ preceded by an ‘*a*’ comes into contact with a voiced consonant, the ‘*a*’ drops and the ‘*ḥ*’ transforms to ‘*o*.’ So we will never see:

- (4) \**Rāmaḥ*                      *gacchati*  
 rāmaḥ<sub>MascNomSg</sub> gacchati<sub>PresIndc3s</sub>

Instead, we see:

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<sup>7</sup>Examples again originally in Ganeri 2006, p. 10-11.

- (5) *Rāmo*                      *gacchati*  
       *rāmo*<sub>MascNomSg</sub> *gacchati*<sub>PresIndc3s</sub>  
       Rāma goes.

The same process occurs with *ghaṭaḥ* in sentence (2) and *nīlaḥ* in sentence (3). As Sanskrit *sandhi*-rules are complex, I do not include them here. However, the phenomenon itself is important to take note of, as it allows for multiple meanings to be encoded into a single sentence, since there are often multiple ways to disambiguate sandhi. This is especially the case since Sanskrit admits of lengthy compounds (see below) and words are frequently written without spaces marking word-boundaries. It is then up to the reader to determine where the word boundaries lie, and often there may be several ways to do so. For instance, coming across a (pseudo) phonetically-written sentence like this:

- (6) The stuff no one can lead to problems.

an English reader could disambiguate it in two different ways:

- (7) The stuffy nose can lead to problems.  
 (8) The stuff he knows can lead to problems.<sup>8</sup>

Further, Sanskrit words often have a broad semantic range (made even broader by poetic dictionaries which stipulate new word meanings). So, for example, ‘*hastin*’ means “having hands” but can also mean “elephant” (as an elephant

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<sup>8</sup>Example taken, with some adaptations, from Bronner 2010.

is an animal with a “hands”—a trunk). These two features together open up a broad range of ways to read multiple meanings out of a single text.

Finally, an important feature of the Sanskrit language which must be remarked upon is its extensive use of compounds. The use of compounds increases in complexity as the language develops. Take, for instance, the following sentence, in which the compound (the string of hyphenated words ending with ‘*kāñcaih*’) is the instrumental term in a relatively simple sentence construction where ‘*prabhāte*’ is a verb meaning “shines”:

- (9) *manda-smīta-sundara-iśvara-mahā-cāpa-mukta-bāṇa-dagdha-asura-pura-kalpita-hiraṇya-maya-kiñkaṇī-śiñcita-kāñcaih tanulayāyā gaṇḍa-bāṣpa-ambu rātri-jalam iva pūjā-kadamba ullasati prabhāte.*

A compound is constructed by combining elements in their stem or root forms (sometimes words have a particular form they take for compounds) and applying rules of *sandhi* internally. The compound above has its *sandhi* disambiguated to be a useful example, but, for instance, ‘*sundara-iśvara*’ would be written as ‘*sundareśvara.*’ Each element of the compound has a relationship with the other terms in the compound. For instance, there may be a case relationship implied, such as the instrumental:

- (10) *daiva-hataḥ*  
 fate<sub>stem</sub>      struck<sub>PastPassvPtc,MascNomSg</sub>  
 One who is struck by fate.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>9</sup>The word ‘*daiva*’ is derived from ‘*deva,*’ meaning “god,” and is an example of San-

Other times, the elements will be in the same case and have a qualifying relationship:

- (11) *nīla-utpalam...*  
 blue<sub>stem</sub> lotus<sub>MascNomSg</sub>  
 Blue lotus...

These are just two of the many kinds of compounds—others include compounds that end with a verbal derivative (*‘veda-vit’*, “knower of the Vedas”), that contain lists of terms (*‘sukha-duḥkham’*, “pleasure and pain”), that contain numerals (*‘tri-bhuvanam,’* “the triple worlds”), and so on. The last element of a compound is declined and can adjectivally qualify other sentential elements, act as the subject, instrument, and so on. Returning to (12), the sentence including the full expanded compound (in bold) reads:

- (12) *manda-smīta-sundara-iśvara-mahā-cāpa-mukta-bāṇa-dagdha-asura-pura-kalpita-hiraṇya-maya-kiṅkaṇī-śiñcita-kāñcaih tan-  
 ulayāyā gaṇḍa-bāṣpa-ambu rātri-jalam iva pūjākadamba ullasati prab-  
 hāte.*

On the cheek of a girl slender as a vine, **whose jingling girdle is formed with gold fashioned from the city of the evil demons which was burned by arrows freed from the great bow of**

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skrit’s ability to form abstract terms through small morphological changes. Here, through strengthening the vowel, the meaning changes from “god” to “related to the gods,” in this context, “fate.”

**the beautiful lord with a gentle smile**, tears shine like dew on a  
*kadamba* flower presented at the dawn ceremony.



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