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**Fighting Corruption on a Learning Curve:**

**The Evolution of Ukrainian Civil Society since 2004**

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**Fighting Corruption on a Learning Curve:**

**The Evolution of Ukrainian Civil Society since 2004**

**by**

**Valerie Toropin**

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## **Abstract**

### **Fighting Corruption on a Learning Curve: The Evolution of Ukrainian Civil Society since 2004**

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The University of Texas at Austin, 2022

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Ukraine's battle with its deeply rooted corruption has been ongoing since the country achieved independence in 1991. At the forefront of this fight have been Ukraine's civil society organizations, advocating for reform, monitoring politicians, and organizing two anti-corruption protest movements that became the Orange Revolution (2004) and the Euromaidan (2013-2014). The purpose of this report is to examine Ukrainian anti-corruption CSOs and the factors that have influenced their development between 2004 to the present day. Rather than compare Ukraine's post-revolution periods as isolated entities, however, this paper examines the two transitional phases through one connected, chronological "learning curve" framework. By following the simultaneous evolution of CSOs and the external actors that impact them, this report finds that the "lessons" of the past have helped shape the predominantly positive developments for anti-corruption CSOs in the post-Euromaidan period. Despite growing pains stemming from an overreliance on Western funding, CSOs have expanded and become more cooperative, sustainable, influential, and consolidated anti-corruption actors at the national level.

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## Chapter 1: Introduction<sup>1</sup>

From the moment it became an independent state in 1991, Ukraine's underdeveloped system of governance, weak justice system, and excessively powerful oligarchs have created a highly resistant corruption problem that affects every aspect of Ukrainian life. Since then, Ukraine has undergone two periods of transformation and reform related to anti-corruption, democratization, and state-building. The first came following the Orange Revolution, a series of protests that erupted in 2004 after Viktor Yanukovich was accused of massive voter fraud, including "voter intimidation, physical assaults and the torching of ballot boxes."<sup>2</sup> The second wave followed in the years after the 2013-2014 Euromaidan, where civic demonstrations broke out in the streets of Kyiv again after President Yanukovich reneged on a deal with the European Union's Association Agreement in favor of strengthening ties with Russia, thus dashing Ukraine's hopes of joining the EU.<sup>3</sup>

In this period of post-independence state-building, Ukraine's civil society has emerged as a major player, especially in the ongoing fight against deep-seated corruption. Civil society has actively engaged in landmark protest movements, bringing attention to political and economic corruption, mobilizing citizens, and driving many of Ukraine's reform and democratization efforts at local, regional, and national levels.

However, in analyzing both transformative periods, scholarship notes that the Orange Revolution and its cadre of activists ostensibly failed to make any significant dent in the tough armor of Ukrainian corruption or establish a sustainable environment where

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<sup>1</sup> Sections of the following chapter have been imported from an unpublished essay written by the author on recent anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine, which was written for a graduate level course in 2021.

<sup>2</sup> Quinn-Judge, Paul, and Yuri Zarakhovich. "The Orange Revolution." Time Inc., November 28, 2004. <http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,832225,00.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Zelinska, Olga. "*Ukrainian Euromaidan Protest: Dynamics, Causes, and Aftermath.*" Sociology Compass, vol. 11, no. 9, Sept. 2017, p. n/a-N.PAG. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1111/soc4.12502.



anti-corruption initiatives could actively evolve.<sup>4</sup> By comparison, civil society organizations' anti-corruption efforts after 2014 appear to function off a much sturdier framework with far more success stories that are expected to carry on into the long-term. Various factors – ranging from internal staff competency to external domestic Ukrainian laws and international donor funding – have been noted as principal influences on civil society organizations' (CSOs') efficacy and programming direction.

The purpose of this report is to examine Ukrainian anti-corruption CSOs and the factors that have influenced (or harmed) their development between 2004 to the present day, a span of heightened civil society activity due to the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan. Rather than compare Ukraine's post-revolution periods as isolated entities, however, this paper seeks to view the two transitional phases through one connected, chronological "learning curve" framework. This will allow us not only to trace the evolution of CSOs as they progressed from one revolution to the next but follow the parallel progress of external actors and how changes made over time ultimately impacted civil society.

After establishing context for Ukraine's corruption problem and defining Ukraine's anti-corruption civil society organizations and the work they do, this contribution analyzes how "lessons" of the Orange Revolution have encouraged changes in internal, domestic, and international factors using both critical discourse analysis and comparative historical analysis. The crux of this report is an examination and discussion of the multifaceted consequences these changes have had (or may have) on Ukraine's CSO development, the environment they function in, or the anti-corruption initiatives they pursue.

Internal factors are defined as changes made by CSOs within their own organizational structure. Domestically, key actors include the Ukrainian state, other

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<sup>4</sup> Tregub, Olena. "Ukrainian Activism for Transparency and Accountability: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back." United States Institute for Peace, May 28, 2019. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/05/ukrainian-activism-transparency-and-accountability-two-steps-forward-one-step>.

CSOs, and Ukrainian society. Finally, due to the restricted scope of this report, international actors have been limited to only the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its anti-corruption related funding programs in Ukraine.

This contribution argues that despite ongoing growing pains for Ukrainian CSOs and the actors that influence them, the “lessons” of the past have helped shape the predominantly positive developments in the post-Euromaidan period. This includes a more cooperative and influential CSO-state relationship, an improved politico-legal framework within which to work, expanded capacity development, a productive coalition of CSO consolidation, and greater online visibility. However, continued reliance on international funding is costing CSOs their legitimacy and autonomy while exacerbating the divide between national and local-level CSOs. Furthermore, successes in the realm of open data monitoring and co-governance may be taking attention away from anti-corruption areas that still need to be addressed.

## **METHODOLOGY**

The research structure of this report is two-fold. First, this report reviews the wide array of secondary literature that has already provided in-depth analysis on Ukraine’s civil society and its recent developments, legislative anti-corruption reforms, the efficacy of these reforms, and the outcomes of Ukraine’s two revolutions. Scholarship from the National University of Kyiv-Mohyla’s Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre (ACREC), CCC Creative Center (Творчий центр), Orysia Lutsevych, Iryna Solonenko, Olena Tregub, Jessica Allina-Pisano, and Mridula Ghosh among others, were robustly referenced. I pay particularly close attention to Iryna Solonenko’s work from 2014, building off her examination of the interconnection between civil society and the external actors that play a role in its development. The report is further supplemented with primary documents from the Government of Ukraine, USAID, and the Razumkov Centre to bolster analysis of domestic Ukrainian anti-corruption policies, international funding initiatives, and public opinion polling, respectively.

Second, I apply a mixed methods approach to collect empirical data in both English and Ukrainian on anti-corruption CSOs in Ukraine. The focus of the collection is publicly available sources: primary documents, social media sites, and webpages as reflected on the organizations' respective websites, as well as archival data accessed via the Internet Archive's Wayback Machine.

The scope of the data collection is limited to national-level CSOs, rather than regional or local, for ease of comparison. National-level CSOs are generally similar in organizational structures, anti-corruption programming, and funding sources, and thus easier to compare, as opposed to regional/local, which have more varied/bespoke approaches. Selected CSOs are involved in anti-corruption in some way, even if they also pursue other initiatives. The final requirement is an active, accessible online presence with sufficient available data.

A sample group of 20 CSOs were selected for this report. I scraped their current and archival websites for data that could signal direct effects from internal and external changes. The units of analysis are: year of establishment, profile (what anti-corruption activities do they engage in), Reanimation Package of Reforms membership, organizational capacity (staff size and number of offices) and observed growth, level of funding transparency, and evidence of engagement with the government. Other criteria (funding amounts, duration of specific anti-corruption initiatives) were omitted due to a lack of consistent availability. For the full table of selected CSOs and units of analysis, see Appendix A.

This report was subject to several research limitations. The primary limitation to these findings is the information gap surrounding the activities of anti-corruption CSOs in the years following the Orange Revolution. Many CSOs and any information on their efforts have since ceased to exist, while others either did not establish an internet presence until much later or have not provided robust archival information on their current websites. Although every effort was made to find a wide sampling of organizations that operated from 2004 to 2020 and avoid general selection bias, primary

documentation and detailed information on post-Orange Revolution CSOs activities is limited and had to be supplemented with secondary sourcing. Second, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022 put a far-reaching limit on information gathering for this report. I was unable to access USAID reports on Ukraine-related funding programs, which were taken offline to protect the identities of program implementers and grantees. Establishing contact and scheduling interviews with Ukrainian CSOs negatively impacted by war also proved difficult. Finally, the scope of this analysis does not extend beyond February 2022 and the effects of the ongoing war in Ukraine will not be discussed in this report.

## Chapter 2: Ukraine’s Corruption Problem<sup>5</sup>

Transparency International defines corruption as “the abuse of entrusted power for private gain.” Variations of corruption include bribery of government officials, involvement with organized crime, embezzlement, and abuses of high-level power.<sup>6</sup> Corruption can be perpetuated at any level – from citizens to heads of state – and can harm societies by corroding state capacity and rule of law, reducing public trust in state institutions, and undermining economic and democratic development.<sup>7</sup> With its far reach and pervasive consequences, corruption is a systemic issue for Ukraine, and one of the most pressing for its citizens.<sup>8</sup>

One of the more critical areas where corruption has affected Ukraine is its economy. Corruption has been identified as one of the main reasons for Ukraine’s poor post-Soviet economic performance. In 2000, a World Bank report found evidence that Ukrainian firms and oligarchs were influencing laws and regulations in their favor through illicit payments to politicians and officials; a phenomenon known as state capture, or a capture economy.<sup>9</sup> By 2014, a report released jointly by the Ukrainian government and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on high corruption confirmed much of the same, describing the pyramidal power structure of Ukraine’s state capture. With “well-known elites at the top, heads of agencies in the middle and agency staff at

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<sup>5</sup> Sections of the following chapter have been imported from an unpublished essay written by the author on recent anti-corruption efforts in Ukraine, which was written for a graduate level course in 2021

<sup>6</sup> Transparency.org. “What Is Corruption?” Accessed August 7, 2022.  
<https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption>.

<sup>7</sup> The White House, *United States Strategy on Countering Corruption*. Washington DC, 2019, 4-6

<sup>8</sup> In a 2019 Razumkov Center survey, 46.6% of respondents said that the fight against corruption is the most concerning problem facing Ukraine today. Source: Разумков Центр. “Оцінка Ситуації в Україні Та Електоральні Орієнтації Громадян України.” Разумков Центр, July 18, 2019.  
<https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-sytuatsii-v-kraini-ta-elektoralni-orientatsii-gromadian-ukrainy>.

<sup>9</sup> Hellman, Joel S., Geraint Jones, and Daniel Kaufmann. “‘Seize the State, Seize the Day’: State Capture, Corruption, and Influence in Transition.” Washington, DC: World Bank, September 2000, 3.  
<https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-2444>.

the base,” these “predatory” structures had formed corrupt networks that allowed them to maintain control of Ukraine’s economy for the purpose of self-enrichment.<sup>10</sup>

Further proof is in Ukraine’s numbers: its GDP growth has barely grown between 1992 and 2019, and some estimate that the country loses nearly 40 billion USD per year due to corrupt parliament members and oligarchs lining their pockets with money from the state budget.<sup>11</sup> Ukraine is currently ranked 122<sup>nd</sup> out of 180 on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, placing it on the same tier as the Philippines, Eswatini, and Mexico.<sup>12</sup> Ukraine’s corruption problem has also put a halt to the Zelensky administration’s goal of joining NATO, with President Biden noting in June 2021 that Ukraine would need to “clean up corruption” before it met NATO membership criteria.<sup>13</sup> Ultimately, public frustration over the extensive corruption in the country has come to a head twice in contemporary Ukraine, culminating in two separate protest movements over the last twenty years.<sup>14</sup>

Both revolutions have drawn attention to the severity of Ukraine’s unfolding corruption crisis and attracted international and domestic scrutiny. However, the reality is that Ukraine has been hounded by multi-level corruption since the fall of the Soviet Union and the adoption of the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Government of Ukraine. “Diagnostic Study of Governance Issues Pertaining to Corruption, the Business Climate and the Effectiveness of the Judiciary, Government of Ukraine Report,” 2014, 4. <https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14263-a.pdf>, 4.

<sup>11</sup> Buitter, Willem. “Ukraine’s Choice: Corruption or Growth.” Atlantic Council, June 19, 2021. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-choice-corruption-or-growth/>.

<sup>12</sup> “Corruption Perceptions Index 2021.” Transparency International, January 2022. [https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2021\\_Report\\_EN-web.pdf](https://images.transparencycdn.org/images/CPI2021_Report_EN-web.pdf).

<sup>13</sup> Wingrove, Josh, and Jennifer Jacobs. “Biden Says Ukraine Has Work to Do on Corruption to Get Into NATO.” Bloomberg.Com, June 14, 2021. <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-06-14/biden-says-ukraine-has-work-to-do-on-corruption-to-get-into-nato>.

<sup>14</sup> In a 2020 Razumkov Center poll, less than 30% of respondents recorded that they trusted state officials, the Ukrainian government, Ukrainian courts, political parties, the Prosecutor General, or the Verhovna Rada. Source: Разумков Центр. “Оцінка Громадянами Ситуації в Країні, Рівень Довіри До Виконавчих Та Правоохоронних Органів Влади, Оцінка Діяльності Уряду (Лютий 2020р. Соціологія).” Разумков Центр, November 10, 2020. <https://razumkov.org.ua/napriamky/sotsiologichni-doslidzhennia/otsinka-gromadianamy-sytuatsii-v-kraini-riven-doviry-do-vykonavchyykh-ta-pravookhoronnykh-organiv-vlady-otsinka-diialnosti-uriadu-liutyi-2020r>.

<sup>15</sup> Bazaluk, O. A. *Corruption in Ukraine Rulers’ Mentality and the Destiny of the Nation, Geophilosophy of Ukraine*. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016, 2-3.

Responsibility for Ukraine’s continued struggle to overcome its corruption problems and integrate with its Western neighbors falls in part on its six elected presidents and the political officials they brought into their inner circle. The thread starts with Ukraine’s first president, Leonid Kravchuk, a former leader of Ukraine’s Communist Party who allowed inflation to go unchecked and privatizing companies to land in the hands of future oligarchs.<sup>16</sup> It ends with present-day Volodymyr Zelensky, whose connections with prominent oligarch Igor Kolomoyskyi and naming in 2021’s Pandora Papers has cast doubts on his anti-corruption promises.<sup>17</sup> <sup>18</sup> In the thirty years in-between, Ukraine’s presidents utilized an informal system of rule; they wielded tools like bribery and embezzlement to keep themselves in power while taking advantage of blackmail, *kompromat*, and sympathetic prosecutor generals to punish their political rivals under the guise of fighting corruption while simultaneously protecting themselves.<sup>19</sup> Bribery and cronyism have similarly spread to public officials and civil servants. Members of Ukraine’s parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, have even been reported to keep under-the-table pricelists for votes or parliamentary requests.<sup>20</sup>

Closely connected with Ukraine’s corrupt politicians are the oligarchs, a small group of hyper-wealthy, politically connected businessmen. The oligarchs emerged following Ukraine’s state-planned economy collapse in the 1990s, consolidating power and planting deep roots in Ukraine’s society by buying up privatized state assets and

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<sup>16</sup> Other issues include the inflation rate hitting 10,155% in 1993, and the country’s GDP had shrunk by 40% by 1991. Source: Gorchinskaya, Katya. “A Brief History of Corruption in Ukraine: The Kravchuk Era,” May 14, 2020. <https://eurasianet.org/a-brief-history-of-corruption-in-ukraine-the-kravchuk-era>.

<sup>17</sup> Gorchinskaya, Katya. “A Brief History of Corruption in Ukraine: The Dawn of the Zelensky Era,” June 17, 2020. <https://eurasianet.org/a-brief-history-of-corruption-in-ukraine-the-dawn-of-the-zelensky-era>.

<sup>18</sup> Zelensky was found to have established a network of offshore accounts in 2012. Source: Al Jazeera. “Pandora Papers: Ukraine Leader Seeks to Justify Offshore Accounts,” October 4, 2021. <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/4/pandora-papers-ukraine-leader-seeks-to-justify-offshore-accounts>.

<sup>19</sup> Darden, Keith. “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution.” *Politics & Society* 36, no. 1 (March 2008): 35–59. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329207312183>.

<sup>20</sup> Yemelianova, Anna. “A Diagnosis of Corruption in Ukraine.” *European Research Centre for Anti-Corruption and State-Building*, September 2010, 3.

taking control of key economic industries like iron, steel, and energy.<sup>21</sup> Many now own television stations or media holdings that can sway public opinion, lead their own political parties to influence electoral outcomes, and utilize their powerful influence to obstruct many major anti-corruption reform attempts or push forward Russia-friendly agendas.<sup>22</sup> On top of preserving their wealth and power, oligarchs aim to “keep Ukrainian state institutions weak, [preserve] the corrupt status quo, and [prevent] the country’s integration into the far more transparent and rules-based Euro-Atlantic community.”<sup>23</sup> A 2017 Helsinki Commission Staff Report made note that Ukraine’s oligarchs are the primary reason for why corruption has persisted in Ukraine: “They are not so much businesspeople as courtiers, who transform political and personal connections into monopolies supported by the state.”<sup>24</sup> Furthermore, a 2021 report from the European Court of Auditors underlined the severity of the problem by concluding that grand corruption, along with the oligarchs and the elites that perpetuate it, are “the main obstacle to the rule of law and economic development in Ukraine.”<sup>25</sup>

Of course, corruption is not limited to high-ranking politicians and oligarchs. Lesser corrupt practices, or petty corruption, has penetrated all levels of government as well as higher education, the judiciary, the banking sector, law enforcement, the

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<sup>21</sup> Kaleniuk, Daria, and Olena Halushka. “Why Ukraine’s Fight Against Corruption Scares Russia.” *Foreign Policy*, December 17, 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/12/17/ukraine-russia-corruption-putin-democracy-oligarchs/>.

<sup>22</sup> Ben, Bohdan. “What’s behind the Return of pro-Russian Politicians to Ukraine?” *Euromaidan Press*, July 8, 2019. <https://euromaidanpress.com/2019/07/08/who-is-responsible-for-the-return-of-pro-russian-politicians-in-ukraine/>.

<sup>23</sup> Verlanov, Serhiy. “Taming Ukraine’s Oligarchs.” *Atlantic Council (blog)*, November 19, 2020. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/taming-ukraines-oligarchs/>.

<sup>24</sup> Massaro, Paul. “THE INTERNAL ENEMY: A Helsinki Commission Staff Report on Corruption in Ukraine.” *Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, October 2017.

[https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/The%20Internal%20Enemy\\_Final.pdf](https://www.csce.gov/sites/helsinkicommission.house.gov/files/The%20Internal%20Enemy_Final.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> Grand corruption is defined by ECA as “the abuse of high-level power that benefits the few and causes serious and widespread harm to individuals and society.” Source: European Court of Auditors. *Reducing Grand Corruption in Ukraine: Several EU Initiatives, but Still Insufficient Results. Special Report No 23, 2021*. LU: Publications Office. <https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2865/451972>.



healthcare system, and even the critical infrastructure sector of Ukraine.<sup>26 27</sup>

Approximately 40% of Ukrainians believe that corruption is so ingrained in day-to-day life that it is essentially a normalized part of the social culture, rather than a “shameful phenomenon.”<sup>28</sup> A separate survey reported that half of Ukraine’s adult population has admitted that they would engage in corrupt activities if it served them in some way.<sup>29</sup>

Ultimately, thirty years of politicians, elites, and law enforcement officials manipulating state institutions has created a deeply rooted, well-protected system of corruption that has proven difficult to dig up and destroy. While Ukraine has seen significant efforts, particularly after Euromaidan, from anti-corruption activists and officials to close legal loopholes, promote transparency, and increase governance, the fight is ongoing. Vital areas, including the private sector, the civil sector, as well as the judiciary and law enforcement agencies, are still due for a serious overhaul.<sup>30</sup> Political officials and tycoons continue to collude to enhance their wealth and power, access to public information remains unevenly regulated, and legal frameworks remain insufficient to enforce any existing regulation or provide much-needed accountability.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, fear and distrust of authorities – a holdover from the days of Soviet control and disastrous

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<sup>26</sup> Transparency International defines petty corruption as “everyday abuse of entrusted power by public officials in their interactions with ordinary citizens, who often are trying to access basic goods or services in places like hospitals, schools, police departments and other agencies.” Source: Transparency International. “What Is Corruption?” Accessed August 7, 2022. <https://www.transparency.org/en/what-is-corruption>.

<sup>27</sup> Bullough, Oliver. “Welcome to Ukraine, the Most Corrupt Nation in Europe.” *The Guardian*, February 6, 2015. <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/04/welcome-to-the-most-corrupt-nation-in-europe-ukraine>.

<sup>28</sup> Кучеріва, Ілька. “Якою може бути відповідь на перше питання ‘всенародного опитування’ Зеленського.” *Українська правда*. Accessed August 10, 2022. <https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2020/10/15/7270036/>.

<sup>29</sup> “Comparative Analysis of National Surveys: 2007, 2009, 2011, and 2015.” *Kiev International Institute of Sociology*, February 16, 2016, 9. [https://kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20161602\\_corruption/Corruption%20in%20Ukraine%202015%20ENG.pdf](https://kiis.com.ua/materials/pr/20161602_corruption/Corruption%20in%20Ukraine%202015%20ENG.pdf)

<sup>30</sup> Lough, John, Vladimir Dubrovskiy. “Are Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Reforms Working?” *Chatham House*, November 19, 2018. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-11-19-ukraine-anti-corruption-reforms-lough-dubrovskiy.pdf>.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

events like the Holodomor – as well as lack of political will has kept many citizens quiet and even tolerant of the blatant excesses of power their leaders demonstrate.<sup>32 33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Bazaluk, 10.

<sup>33</sup> Nesterenko, Oksana, and Max Bader. “Impact of Local CSOs on Implementing Anti-Corruption Reforms in the Regions of Ukraine.” Anti-corruption Research and Education Centre, December 2019, 11-12. <https://acrec.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/zvit-BIG-ENG-6.pdf>.

### Chapter 3: Ukraine's Civil Society

The involvement of grassroots-level activists during Ukraine's Orange Revolution first raised awareness of the country's dynamic civil society. With its resilience and adaptability, combined with the ability to spontaneously organize, mobilize citizens, and quickly gather resources for various campaigns, Ukraine's civil society has proven to be a powerful tool with the capacity to confront socio-political challenges like corruption and push for necessary reforms on local, regional, and national levels.<sup>34</sup>

The definition of civil society has evolved over time and varies by country. This report will be referring to the description proposed by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which states that civil society is:

an ecosystem of organized and organic social and cultural relations existing in the space between the state, business, and family, which builds on indigenous and external knowledge, values, traditions, and principles to foster collaboration and the achievement of specific goals by and among citizens and other stakeholders.<sup>35</sup>

More recently, an active and healthy civil society has come to be considered an important component of a functioning democracy. It involves citizens in policy making and allows them to work together to promote joint national interests and defend common values.<sup>36 37</sup> Ukraine's civil society has been rapidly growing in the last two decades, gaining

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<sup>34</sup> Ghosh, Mridula. "In Search of Sustainability: Civil Society in Ukraine." Freidrich Ebert Foundation, June 2014, 2. <https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/id-moe/10862.pdf>.

<sup>35</sup> Kojo VanDyck, Charles. "Concept and Definition of Civil Society Sustainability." Center for Strategic & International Studies, June 30, 2017. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/concept-and-definition-civil-society-sustainability>.

<sup>36</sup> Lutsevych, Orysia. "How to Finish a Revolution: Civil Society and Democracy in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine." Briefing Paper. Chatham House, January 2013. [https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0113bp\\_lutsevych.pdf](https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/Russia%20and%20Eurasia/0113bp_lutsevych.pdf).

<sup>37</sup> For a robust definition of civil society in Ukraine, see: Паливода, Любов, Олександр Вінніков, and Володимир Купрій. "Громадянське суспільство в Україні: звіт за результатами дослідження." Творчий центр, 2016.

experience, becoming more diverse in its initiatives and goals, and self-organizing into civil society organizations (CSOs).

A CSO, as defined by the United Nations, is a “non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group which is organized on a local, national or international level.”<sup>38</sup> In the context of Ukraine, a United Nations-implemented working group noted that although defining a CSO is complex due to the diverse scales of size (local vs. national) and activities, they can be designated legislatively, such as via tax regulations, and functionally.<sup>39</sup> Organizations are also expected to meet certain functional criteria to be recognized as a CSO in Ukraine, including voluntary participation, a mission that serves its members’ or the public’s interests, an internal structure that involves self-governance, and a ban on any profits going to its members. CSOs are also required to be registered as non-government organizations (NGOs) in Ukraine; for that reason, CSOs are often interchangeably referred to as NGOs in academic and practical contexts.<sup>40</sup> Both labels will be used in this report.

CSOs can contribute to a variety of social issues and have been recognized by a number of international institutions, including the United Nations Convention against Corruption, as vital, necessary actors in anti-corruption initiatives.<sup>41</sup> Anti-corruption activities, both in stopping corruption as it occurs and preventing it from happening in the first place, can fluctuate in scope across the broad range of CSOs operating at local, regional, and national levels. A report from the Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre noted that in general, CSO activities fall under six categories: monitoring and

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<sup>38</sup> United Nations. “About Us.” United Nations. United Nations. Accessed August 7, 2022. <https://www.un.org/en/civil-society/page/about-us>.

<sup>39</sup> Паливода, Вінніков, Купрій, 13.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid, 13-14.

<sup>41</sup> Article 13 states: “Each State Party shall take appropriate measures, within its means and in accordance with fundamental principles of its domestic law, to promote the active participation of individuals and groups outside the public sector, such as civil society, non-governmental organizations and community-based organizations, in the prevention of and the fight against corruption and to raise public awareness regarding the existence, causes and gravity of and the threat posed by corruption.” For full document, see: United Nations Convention against Corruption, General Assembly Resolution 58/4 of 31, October 2003, [https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN\\_Convention\\_Against\\_Corruption.pdf](https://www.unodc.org/documents/brussels/UN_Convention_Against_Corruption.pdf).

reporting, awareness-raising, advocacy, direct action, capacity-building, and co-governance.<sup>42</sup>

Monitoring and reporting involve any combination of tracking 1) decision-making of legislative and political officials and ensuring that any laws being passed or considered do not create opportunities for abuse; 2) public procurement;<sup>43</sup> or 3) electronic asset declarations.<sup>44</sup> Should any wrongdoing be found, CSOs typically file appeals or write letters to relevant authorities. Awareness-raising, the most common activity among anti-corruption CSOs, is the dissemination of relevant information on corruption; for example, should a CSO find evidence of corruption, they may choose to publish their findings online to bring attention to the issue. Advocacy efforts focus on encouraging public authorities to adopt certain policies that increase transparency and accountability in the administration or close gaps in certain regulations that left room for corrupt practices. Direct action can take on the form of lawsuits or non-violent demonstrations, though a small number of CSOs may engage in more coercive, confrontational methods like directly challenging corrupt business owners. With capacity-building, CSOs either found coalitions with other organizations or run training courses and seminars for other activists or civic minded citizens. Finally, co-governance involves CSOs becoming involved in working with state officials.<sup>45</sup>

Ukraine's anti-corruption CSOs' ability to rally citizens emotionally dedicated to their cause, utilize their experience in anti-corruption activism, and progress their work more effectively online and on social media have sometimes given them an edge over the

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<sup>42</sup> Бадер, Макс, Оксана Гус, Андрій Мелешевич, and Оксана Нестеренко. "Громадянське суспільство проти корупції в Україні: способи впливу." Anti-Corruption Research and Education Centre of National University Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, 2019, 5-6. [https://acrec.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/3.2-Working\\_paper-1\\_translation\\_010719-blue.pdf](https://acrec.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/3.2-Working_paper-1_translation_010719-blue.pdf).

<sup>43</sup> Public procurement is defined as "the purchase by governments and state-owned enterprises of goods, services and works." Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. "Public Procurement." Accessed August 10, 2022. <https://www.oecd.org/gov/public-procurement/>.

<sup>44</sup> The latter two are more recent developments. Public procurement monitoring became more feasible following the introduction of ProZorro/Dozorro in 2015, and asset declaration became possible after launched electronic asset declaration system for public officials in 2016.

<sup>45</sup> Паливода et al, "Громадянське суспільство в Україні," 7-9.

more conventional anti-corruption efforts of Ukraine's government and legislature.<sup>46</sup> Many of the thousands of diverse CSOs in Ukraine have already made substantial progress towards increasing transparency in domestic institutions, enforcing social accountability, pressuring corrupt officials to step down, and empowering citizens to engage in policymaking through bottom-up activism.<sup>47</sup>

Their efforts have not been without challenges, however, and nearly twenty years of civil society-oriented initiatives have highlighted several weaknesses and issues in Ukraine's CSO networks. CSOs often encounter low political will: "credible, demonstrated, and sustained commitment to reform."<sup>48</sup> Such passivity from their local/regional authorities has often stalled or even sabotaged anti-corruption efforts.<sup>49</sup> Similarly, outside of periods of heightened protests, CSOs have continuously failed to capture sustained public support, create a reliable resource base, and mobilize citizens at a grassroots level.<sup>50</sup> Additionally, there has been documented pushback from political elites and oligarchs who resist reform, stymie anti-corruption initiatives to protect structures that benefit them, and even intimidate activists from continuing their work.<sup>51</sup> Ukrainian CSOs also often note that their work is being excluded from anti-corruption reform efforts. They may be given a seat at the debate table, but they are left out when it comes to collaborating on the direction of a proposed reform.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Lutsevych, "How to Finish a Revolution," 14-15.

<sup>47</sup> Lough and Dubrovskiy, "Are Ukraine's Anti-Corruption Reforms Working?", 17-46.

<sup>48</sup> Johnston, Michael, and Sahr J. Kpundeh. *Building a Clean Machine: Anti-Corruption Coalitions and Sustainable Reform*. Policy Research Working Papers. The World Bank, 2005, 2. <https://doi.org/10.1596/1813-9450-3466>.

<sup>49</sup> Huss, Oksana, Max Bader, Andriy Meleshevych, and Oksana Nesterenko. "Explaining Variation in the Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Activism in Ukraine's Regions: The Role of Local Context, Political Will, Institutional Factors, and Structural Factors." *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 28, no. 2 (2020): 201-227. [muse.jhu.edu/article/754565](https://muse.jhu.edu/article/754565).

<sup>50</sup> Tregub, 14-15.

<sup>51</sup> Nitsova, Silviya, Grigore Pop-Eleches, and Graeme Robertson. "Revolution and Reform in Ukraine: Evaluating Four Years of Reform." *PONARS Eurasia*, July 2018. <https://www.ponarseurasia.org/revolution-and-reform-in-ukraine-evaluating-four-years-of-reform/>.

<sup>52</sup> Zaloznaya, Marina, William M. Reisinger, and Vicki Hesli Claypool. "When Civil Engagement Is Part of the Problem: Flawed Anti-Corruptionism in Russia and Ukraine." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 51, no. 3 (September 1, 2018): 252. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2018.06.003>.

Another issue has been the growing functional disparity between national and sub-national CSOs. Local organizations have the benefit of intimately understanding the specific corruption issues in their area, thus allowing them to design more targeted anti-corruption projects which are typically bolstered with higher trust and social capital from their communities.<sup>53</sup> However, smaller NGOs are also more likely to be underdeveloped, functioning with low organizational capacity, fewer connections and ties to other activist groups, and lacking knowledge in how to run more specialized anti-corruption campaigns. In contrast, national NGOs can operate on a wider scale, with higher budgets, and greater staff numbers. While local and regional level CSOs may take on one or two of the aforementioned anti-corruption activities, national-level CSOs have a higher potential to engage in all 6 due to their broader capacity and funding. However, this also can limit their ability to tackle smaller, more bespoke projects.

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<sup>53</sup> Nesterenko and Bader, “Impact of Local CSOs,” 5.

## **Chapter 4: Lessons of the Orange Revolution shaping post-Euromaidan**

Through a surface-level analysis, it is easy to note how post-Orange Revolution NGOs failure to finish what they started ultimately lead to yet another corruption-induced protest movement ten years later. The post-Euromaidan years, on the other hand, appear more productive and can point to notable accomplishments like ProZorro – a money-saving online e-procurement platform created by CSOs to inject transparency into purchases made by contracting entities and minimize under-the-table embezzlement schemes<sup>54</sup> – and the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR) group – a coalition of NGOs that, in conjunction with parliamentary counterpart, the Platform of Reforms, provide a collaborative space for anti-corruption initiative development.<sup>55</sup>

Although the events of Euromaidan proved to a watershed moment for CSO development, the progress of post-Euromaidan CSOs did not occur in a vacuum. Many of the changes that occurred after 2014 were shaped by lessons learned during the ten years prior, when Ukraine’s people, its government, its international funders, and its CSOs were still trying to lay the groundwork for what anti-corruption reform and CSO development should be.

The following chapter is organized into internal, domestic, and international factors to detail 1) the lesson learned by each respective actor from the time of the Orange Revolution; 2) the changes made around the time of Euromaidan; and 3) the observed outcomes of these changes on Ukrainian CSOs.

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<sup>54</sup> Launched in 2016, by 2018, it had already saved almost \$2 billion USD of state procurement expenditures. Source: Lough and Dubrovskiy, “Are Ukraine’s Anti-Corruption Reforms Working?”, 17.

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## INTERNAL

### Increased engagement with the state

#### *Lessons learned:*

One of the main missteps during the post-Orange Revolution years was civil society's failure to build on the momentum of what their activism had achieved. With Yuschenko's victory secured in 2004's run-off election, civil society demobilized, trusting that their newly elected president would deliver on electoral promises to eradicate corruption and limit the control of oligarchs. New authorities were instead given free reign, with little pressure from below to keep them in check and push for necessary changes and reform.<sup>56</sup>

Whatever attempts were made to stay involved were also generally fruitless. Despite a massive surge in CSO registrations, only 8-9% of them were assessed to be active in 2014.<sup>57</sup> Civil society-founded political parties were not winning in parliament.<sup>58</sup> Activists that managed to enter the political sphere ultimately did little to connect CSOs and state structures.<sup>59</sup> Over 50 public councils were established between 2004 to 2012 to encourage policy dialogue between government ministries and NGOs. However, they only functioned as they were designed at a national level. In local councils, "civil society organizations were involved as partners only on the whim of local government representatives."<sup>60</sup> Yet even these small attempts at co-governance were assessed by the

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<sup>56</sup> Solonenko, Iryna. "Ukrainian Civil Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract." Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy, OSCE Yearbook, 2014, 230.

<sup>57</sup> The number of legally registered NGOs doubled from 40,000 in 2004 to nearly 80,000 by 2014. Source: OSCE. "Ukrainian Elections Free and Fair, Consolidating Democratic Breakthrough," March 27, 2006. <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/47195>.

<sup>58</sup> Lutsevych, "How to Finish a Revolution," 3.

<sup>59</sup> Besters-Dilger, Juliane. *Ukraine on Its Way to Europe: Interim Results of the Orange Revolution*. Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 2009, 192.

<sup>60</sup> Ghosh, 3.

Ukrainian Center for Political Management to be predominantly dysfunctional.<sup>61</sup> Officially, no policy of civil society-state consultations was ever put into place.<sup>62</sup>

### *Changes Made:*

After witnessing Ukraine's backslide into authoritarianism, CSOs learned that a "business as usual" approach was ineffective. Both Iryna Solonenko and Olena Tregub concur that civil society actors took a different tack following the events of Euromaidan, switching from "protest" mode to "cooperation-and-pressure" mode and expanding efforts in lobbying and co-governance activities.<sup>63</sup> Relying less on authorities or a preferred elected leader, the increasingly vigilant and active CSOs shouldered a greater portion of responsibility to spearhead the push for anti-corruption reform and change in "the constitutional system, election laws, and governing practices."<sup>64 65</sup> Many activists took up positions in Ukraine's interim government immediately following Euromaidan. Building on that momentum, individual CSO members began running for and winning seats in the Verkhovna Rada or getting appointed to positions in President Petro Poroshenko's executive office, building coalitions with like-minded MPs, actively participating in government policy development and oversight, and driving change.<sup>66</sup> As one activist in a 2021 research interview noted, "What the government did after the maidan was very much driven by civil society."<sup>67</sup>

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<sup>61</sup> Stewart, Susan, and Jan Matti Dollbaum. "Civil Society Development in Russia and Ukraine: Diverging Paths." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 50, no. 3 (September 1, 2017): 213. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2017.08.001>.

<sup>62</sup> Solonenko, 224.

<sup>63</sup> Tregub, 7.

<sup>64</sup> Solonenko, 230.

<sup>65</sup> Tregub, 5.

<sup>66</sup> Khmelko, Irina, and Yevgen Pereguda. "An Anatomy of Mass Protests: The Orange Revolution and Euromaydan Compared." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 47, no. 2 (2014): 232. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2014.04.013>.

<sup>67</sup> Blatt, Felix, and Caroline Schlauffer. "The Influence of Civil Society on Ukrainian Anti-Corruption Policy after the Maidan." *Central European Journal of Public Policy* 0, no. 0 (January 29, 2021): 000010247820210001, 21. <https://doi.org/10.2478/cejpp-2021-0001>.

*Observed outcomes:*

Secondary literature, especially from Western writers, generally praise this change and highlight that civil society representatives getting a “seat at the table” to actively participate in anti-corruption reform should be considered a positive development, if not a necessary one for anti-corruption activities to succeed.<sup>68</sup>

CSOs have accrued several tangible achievements due to their lobbying and co-governance efforts. In October 2014, the Ukrainian parliament passed a major anti-corruption package of laws partly due to the demands of Ukrainian people and civil society, or, more specifically, the RPR.<sup>69</sup> CSOs have also been credited in having a direct hand in the creation of major anti-corruption institutions: the National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the National Agency for the Prevention of Corruption (NAPC), and most recently, the High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC).<sup>70</sup>

Most national-level CSOs now note ongoing government-civil projects and typically underline their commitments to these projects in their mission statements, though the goals are often vague and co-governance achievements, if published, are not always prominently displayed. Interestingly, a significant number of national CSOs have chosen to omit their full involvement.<sup>71</sup> The Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAc), for example, makes no mention of executive committee member Hanna Hopko’s 2014

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<sup>68</sup> Yemelianova, 5-6.

<sup>69</sup> Pressure from reform-minded MPs and international institutions also played a part in getting the first “major institutionally important reform dealing with corruption” passed by the Ukrainian government. Source: KyivPost. “Ukraine: Parliament Passes Important Laws to Tackle Corruption,” October 23, 2014. <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/business-wire/ukraine-parliament-passes-important-laws-to-tackle-corruption-369122.html>.

<sup>70</sup> For further details on civil society’s involvement with NABU, SAPO, and NAPC, see: Harasymiw, Bohdan. “Civil Society as an Anti-Corruption Actor in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine.” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 61, no. 3 (July 3, 2019): 292-293. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2019.1636630>. For details on HACC, see: Кузь, Іванна Яна, and Метью К Стівенсон. “Вищий Антикорупційний Суд України.” U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, Chr. Michelsen Institute, 2020. <https://www.u4.no/publications/ukraines-high-anti-corruption-court-ukranian.pdf>.

<sup>71</sup> Of the 20 national-level CSOs referenced in this report, 18 presented varying degrees of evidence of engagement with the Ukrainian government on their website.

election to Ukraine's parliament or Foreign Affairs Committee chair appointment in its archives or current website. The Centre of United Actions' founder, Svitlana Zalishchuk, similarly is absent from the CSO's website from 2014 to present day, despite her active role in Ukrainian government, including holding a seat in parliament from 2014 to 2019.

There are several possible reasons for this discrepancy, the simplest being a lack of transparency or a failure to maintain an up-to-date website. However, an equally viable explanation may be the continued lack of public trust in the Ukrainian government and its institutions. A 2020 poll administered by the Razumkov Center, a non-governmental think tank, found that approximately 78% of Ukrainians do not trust state agencies and officials. The average percentage of respondents who distrust NABU, SAPO, NACP, and HACC was 65%.<sup>72</sup> Furthermore, despite increased collaboration, civil society activists themselves continue to distrust their own government.<sup>73</sup> A 2018 study noted that many anti-corruption CSO respondents strongly questioned their government counterparts' motivations, strength of commitment, and expertise.<sup>74</sup> Thus, for Ukrainian CSOs, direct involvement with widely distrusted government institutions, even if it is occurring, may not qualify as an achievement, or at least not one valued as strongly by Western observers and researchers who encourage it. Considering that Ukrainian NGOs and volunteer initiatives enjoy a far greater level of public trust (51% and 70%, respectively), publicizing cooperative programs may even pose a risk to CSOs' legitimacy or their non-governmental, independent status.

Secondly, there is a possibility that the RPR has taken the brunt of responsibility and credit for the heightened levels of CSO involvement in national-level anti-corruption reforms post-Euromaidan. If the RPR has been painted as having "cornered the market" on government-level engagement, other national CSOs may have been dissuaded from pursuing other initiatives and avenues. Rather than choosing not to report on their

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<sup>72</sup> Разумков Центр. "Оцінка Громадянами Ситуації в Країні"

<sup>73</sup> Cleary, Laura. "Half Measures and Incomplete Reforms: The Breeding Ground for a Hybrid Civil Society in Ukraine." *Journal of southeast European and Black Sea studies* 16, no. 1 (2016): 20.

<sup>74</sup> Zaloznaya, et al, "When Civil Engagement Is Part of the Problem," 251.

cooperative efforts with government officials, it could very well be that the efforts had failed in some way, or that the CSOs simply had nothing to report at all. This explanation also invites an opportunity into pursuing further research to discern if post-Euromaidan CSOs' higher engagement levels may have been overstated by analysts and to consider the possibility that although the RPR has certainly expanded the role of CSOs at a state level, the reality is that non-RPR CSOs on the whole have not.

### **Prioritizing capacity development and sustainability**

#### *Lessons learned:*

Ukrainian civil society, predominantly considered “weak” prior to 2004, surged in an unprecedented wave of activism that sparked the Orange Revolution.<sup>75</sup> Just as quickly, however, the wave subsided, revealing the temporary and unstable nature of the groundwork on which the movement had been built, after which the CSO coalition rapidly unraveled.<sup>76</sup> The majority of the spontaneously self-organized CSOs, buttressed by short-term volunteerism, could not stand on their own; citizens had joined the protests in droves, but also quickly returned to their everyday lives once the objective of the movement had been seemingly accomplished.<sup>77</sup> Key civil society leaders and professionals also disengaged from their organizations and departed for government positions.<sup>78</sup> CCC Creative Center surveyed the development of CSOs from 2002 to 2011 and found that CSO human resource capacity substantially decreased in the years after

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<sup>75</sup> Howard, Marc Morje. “The Weakness of Postcommunist Civil Society.” *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 157–69. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2002.0008>.

<sup>76</sup> Beissinger, Mark R. “The Semblance of Democratic Revolution: Coalitions in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution.” *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 3 (August 2013): 590. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055413000294>.

<sup>77</sup> Notably, a disengagement or “settling down” of the protest movement once the objective is achieved is characteristic of “color revolutions”. Source: Reznik, Oleksandr. “From the Orange Revolution to the Revolution of Dignity: Dynamics of the Protest Actions in Ukraine.” *East European Politics and Societies* 30, no. 4 (November 2016): 750–65. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325416650255>.

<sup>78</sup> CCC Creative Center. “Defining Civil Society for Ukraine: Summary of the Research Report.” United Nations Development Program Ukraine, August 9, 2017, 3, [https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/ua/OGS\\_En.pdf](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/migration/ua/OGS_En.pdf)

the Orange Revolution. The average employees shrunk from six to four, for example, and fewer CSOs reported having full-time staff.<sup>79</sup>

What few permanent staff remained may have been committed to the cause, but generally operated with little experience in managing anti-corruption activities, developing strategic plans, or even running an NGO in a sustainable, capacity-building fashion.<sup>80</sup> Furthermore, CSO staff were in desperate need of training in vital skills like “civic-business relations of CSOs and public authorities, business community and mass media, fundraising beyond basic, financial management, project management and project writing.”<sup>81</sup>

In short, CSOs struggled to establish a permanent platform for themselves and develop sustainability and capacity building strategies to remain functional for the long-term. As Knott points out, the Orange Revolution did not lead to a generation of new civil society organizations and the cadre of Orange Revolution-era CSOs did not become more significant in Euromaidan.<sup>82</sup> In fact, most of the CSOs did not stay active long enough to participate in Euromaidan at all.

### *Changes made:*

Ukraine’s civil society and its activists grew and developed over time, gradually amassing experience, training, and skills necessary for sustainability and capacity

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<sup>79</sup> Palyvoda, Lyuba, and Sophia Golota. “Civil Society Organizations in Ukraine: The State and Dynamics.” Kyiv, Ukraine: CCC Creative Center, 2013, 8.

<sup>80</sup> Both internal analyses from CCC Creative Center and an external 2006 USAID corruption assessment identified lack of skill, lack of experience, and low capacity as potential obstacles for CSOs in multiple anti-corruption program options. For full USAID report: Spector, Bertram I, Svetlana Winbourne, Jerry O’Brien, and Eric Rudenshiold. “Corruption Assessment: Ukraine, Final Report.” USAID, February 10, 2006. [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNADK247.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADK247.pdf). For full CCC Creative Center report (In Ukrainian): Паливода et al, “Громадянське суспільство в Україні.”

<sup>81</sup> Palyvoda and Golota, 98.

<sup>82</sup> Knott, Eleanor. “Perpetually ‘Partly Free’: Lessons from Post-Soviet Hybrid Regimes on Backsliding in Central and Eastern Europe.” *East European Politics* 34, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 355–76. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21599165.2018.1493993>.

development. Some of this growth can be attributed to organic learning – activists will inevitably develop skill sets and experiences that are demanded by their profession.

CSOs also underwent structured training from international partners. USAID ran 3 separate programs to support and strengthen Ukraine’s civil society. The earliest, the Ukraine Citizen Action Network (UCAN), provided blanket support from 2002 to 2008 in the form of “grants, technical assistance, training and networking resources” to “develop advocacy skills and build the financial and organizational capacity of NGOs.”<sup>83</sup> The Promoting Active Citizen Engagement in Combating Corruption in Ukraine Project, or ACTION, ran from 2006 to 2009 and built on UCAN. Aside from financially supporting CSO-run anti-corruption activities, ACTION trained hundreds of CSOs in constructive advocacy techniques, financial sustainability, capacity building, and networking skills.<sup>84</sup> The Strengthening Civil Society in Ukraine (SCSU), which ran from 2008 to 2016, similarly provided hundreds of CSOs with training in “strategic planning, organizational and financial management, and fund-raising skills.”<sup>85</sup>

On average, national-level CSOs also physically expanded, either in number of offices or staff, and in turn, brought on more employees with specific skills in fields like digital procurement, law, or even social work. An analysis of civil society conducted by the Nelson A. Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College found that by 2016, most CSO leaders or directors had extensive “international academic study experience or management experience at an international NGO” and skills that “far surpass the organizational capacity workshops promoted by many international organizations.” The

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<sup>83</sup> “15 Years of Partnership: A Photo Perspective.” USAID, 2007.

[https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PBAAF887.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PBAAF887.pdf).

<sup>84</sup> For full details about the ACTION program, see the final report: Management Systems International. “Promoting Citizen Engagement in Combating Corruption in Ukraine (ACTION), Final Report.” USAID, February 1, 2010. [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PDAGR665.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PDAGR665.pdf).

<sup>85</sup> For full details about SCSU (sometimes known as UNITER), see the final report: Tisch, Sarah, Andrew Green, and Orysia Lutsevych. “Final Performance Evaluation of the Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms (UNITER).” USAID, April 2014. [https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PA00JZTG.pdf](https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PA00JZTG.pdf).

study concluded that high levels of specialization and professionalization increase CSO-government interaction, as well as improve fundraising skills.<sup>86</sup>

*Observed outcomes:*

A greater emphasis on sustainability and capacity development has paid off for modern CSOs. Many have now been operating for almost a decade, if not more, utilizing either their organically developed skills or those taught through USAID programs to stay afloat far more successfully than their post-Orange Revolution counterparts. Expansion has not been ubiquitous, but overall, all national-level organizations have evolved in some way, albeit unevenly.<sup>87</sup> For example, while the Human Rights Organization (*Prava Lyudyny*) more than doubled its regional offices 8 to 18 since it was founded in 2013, leadership only increased from 12 to 14.<sup>88</sup> In the same time frame, the Maidan Monitoring Information Center (*Maidan Monitoryng*) has gone from 30 members to over 50, but their regional offices have remained a constant five.<sup>89</sup>

On a quantifiable scale, Ukraine's CSO Sustainability Index (CSOSI) score also improved, dropping from a 3.7 score in 2006 (which places civil society firmly in the "sustainability evolving" category) to 3.2 in 2020 (nearly moving into "sustainability enhanced."), the best score in the Eurasia group of countries.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> The Class of 1964 Policy Research Shop. "Analysis of Civil Society in Ukraine." Nelson A. Rockefeller Center at Dartmouth College, January 23, 2017.

[https://rockefeller.dartmouth.edu/sites/rockefeller.prod/files/prs\\_ukraine\\_report.pdf](https://rockefeller.dartmouth.edu/sites/rockefeller.prod/files/prs_ukraine_report.pdf).

<sup>87</sup> Based on author's analysis of sample group of 20 national-level CSOs' websites. Research was further limited by many CSOs censoring information on their websites in recent years to presumably protect the identity of their workers.

<sup>88</sup> Prava Lyudyny 2022, retrieved from <http://prava-lyudyny.org/>

Prava Lyudyny 2013, retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20130729194853/http://prava-lyudyny.org/>

<sup>89</sup> *Maidan Monitoryng* 2022, retrieved from <https://maidan.org.ua/>

*Maidan Monitoryng* 2013, retrieved from <https://web.archive.org/web/20131113220311/http://maidanua.org/>

<sup>90</sup> The Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index (CSOSI) is maintained and annually updated by USAID. It assesses the progress of civil society development based on seven criteria: legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and perception by



Increased capacity and improved collective skill sets also indicated that CSOs, with the right team, can delve into a wider variety of activities, such as social media outreach, grant proposal writing, or multi-lingual communication. While this has been a positive development for national-level CSOs, it has often come at the cost of local or regional CSOs capacity development. Nesterenko and Bader both argue that smaller CSOs, already operating under limited resources, must now also cope with excessive staff turnover and brain drain, “as successful CSO representatives from small towns often relocate to regional capital cities (whether or not to work for similar organizations) and successful CSO representatives from regional capital cities often relocate to Kyiv or move abroad.”<sup>91</sup> Local CSOs cannot compete with their larger CSO counterparts, and as a result, as often left without the skilled workers that are vital for their own development and survival.

### **Increased reliance on international funding**

#### *Lessons learned:*

The main problem NGOs faced after 2004 was a lack of financing.<sup>92</sup> As a result, the majority of Ukrainian CSOs in the years following the Orange Revolution consistently relied on international organizations like USAID as their primary source of funding. This was exacerbated by organizations predominantly lacking skills to create fundraising plans and waning financial support from the government from 2002 to 2013, though the second-largest source of funding – membership dues and charitable contributions – increased.<sup>93</sup> Additionally, seeking other avenues of funding was further complicated by CSO leaders’ aversion to receiving funding from the government and

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the general public. For more on CSOSI and to see all available reports on Ukraine:  
<https://csosi.org/?region=EUROPE>

<sup>91</sup> Nesterenko and Bader, “Impact of Local CSOs,” 14.

<sup>92</sup> Palyvoda and Golota, 90.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid, 8, 97.

business “due to the perception that such a relationship would create a conflict of interest.”<sup>94</sup>

This structure of funding ultimately led to an environment where few CSOs were able to function independently. Furthermore, the overreliance on international donors “led to the creation of patron-client relationships” that supplemented accusations of Ukraine’s civil society becoming “an instrument of Western interests.”<sup>95</sup> A widely cited Chatham House report also argued that Western-funded organizations effectively disconnected from society in what is called an “‘NGO-crazy’: a system where professional NGO leaders use access to domestic policy-makers and Western donors to influence public policies without having a constituency in society.”<sup>96</sup> Within the NGO-crazy, an elitist cadre of CSOs emerged that preferred “networking with Western embassies and various state agencies [over] holding town hall consultations and engaging with citizens.”<sup>97</sup>

#### *Changes made:*

Although domestic financial mobilization remains a possible alternate funding option, rather than making a change, post-Euromaidan CSOs and policy-oriented activists have chosen to continue and even expand their reliance on international organizations. In that same vein, money flowing into Ukraine from international funders has also increased: “[in] 2013, Ukraine received up to \$750 million in grants. For the years 2014

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<sup>94</sup> The Class of 1964 Policy Research Shop, 3.

<sup>95</sup> Allina-Pisano, Jessica. “Legitimizing Facades: Civil Society in Post-Orange Ukraine.” In *Orange Revolution and Aftermath: Mobilization, Apathy, and the State in Ukraine*, 242. Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010. <http://jessicapisano.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Pisano-Legitimizing-Facades-Ed.-DAnieri-2010.pdf>.

<sup>96</sup> Lutsevych, “How to Finish a Revolution,” 4-5.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid

to 2017, the aid surpassed \$1 billion annually.”<sup>98</sup> In 2020, the United States tripled its spending in aid to Ukraine’s civil society compared to the year before.<sup>99</sup>

*Observed outcomes:*

On the positive side, access to funds and grants from external actors has allowed CSOs to pursue various programs and initiatives, hire more employees, allot time to fundraising, and even diversify their methods of activism if they receive multiple sources of funding. Some CSOs have even used their funding to pursue pricey lawsuits to tackle corruption through the court systems.<sup>100</sup>

Other outcomes of this trend of ongoing dependence are mixed. First, it has continued to diminish CSO sustainability and autonomy.<sup>101</sup> CSOs that rely almost exclusively on their foreign donors to stay active may have shifted their priorities and organization direction to better align with donor interests and demands. For one, programs may simply stop: due to a lack of alternative funding or fund-raising skills, CSOs are more likely to abandon an anti-corruption initiative once the grant expires.<sup>102</sup> Second, programs may never begin at all: direct action activities, which are principally not supported by international funding programs, have only very rarely been pursued by national-level CSOs since Euromaidan—possibly due to lack of funding.

Another example is USAID’s introduction of the 2016 Transparency and Accountability in Public Administration and Services (TAPAS) program, which prioritized e-procurement and open data monitoring initiatives. Shortly afterward, multiple CSOs added those types of activities to their repertoire, even if went against

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<sup>98</sup> Tregub, 14-15.

<sup>99</sup> “2020 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index.” USAID, FHI360, ICNL, September 2021, 239. <https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/csosi-europe-eurasia-2020-report.pdf>.

<sup>100</sup> Бадер, et al, “Громадянське суспільство проти корупції в Україні,” 16.

<sup>101</sup> Sustainability is defined as “the ability of CSOs to pursue their missions and strategic plans in the long term more effectively, regardless of international donor funding” by the Class of 1964 Policy Research Shop, 19.

<sup>102</sup> Бадер, et al, “Громадянське суспільство проти корупції в Україні,” 16.

their own needs or the needs of their domestic constituency.<sup>103</sup> Conditional grant programs like TAPAS are not exclusively harmful, though; for CSOs that had the capacity or desire to increase their monitoring efforts, TAPAS created an avenue for increased CSO involvement in the anti-corruption areas it was targeting and improved efficiency for ProZorro and DoZorro.

However, even the appearance of such a discrepancy has put CSOs at risk of damaging their legitimacy or credibility, thus increasing accusations of major CSOs becoming puppets of the West and calls for investigations into CSO accountability and internal oversight.<sup>104</sup> In 2011, the Security Service of Ukraine even admitted to investigating foreign-funded NGOs, suspecting that the grants would be used for “political activity.”<sup>105</sup> Zaloznaya, Reisinger, and Claypool found in their research that this distrust has extended even to more progressive government officials and some NGOs, “not because it makes local actors beholden to the interests of other governments but because outside powers, allegedly, do not understand what is best for Ukrainians.”<sup>106</sup> Public officials interviewed in their 2018 study questioned civil society’s motivations (“...they choose grant-funded initiatives over other ones... because it is prestigious and pays good salaries. They don’t think about the people.”) and noted that this supposed pursuit of funding over societal change was to the detriment of Ukraine (“...what they are doing is just not the best for the country.”)<sup>107</sup>

There is validity to these concerns. The story of Automaidan, a major organization during Euromaidan, is a concrete example of CSOs becoming overly reliant on their international funders. As Tregub writes, Automaidan initially focused on vehicle coordination and supply distribution during the 2014 protest. When it shifted its focus to

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<sup>103</sup> Бадер, et al, “Громадянське суспільство проти корупції в Україні,” 9.

<sup>104</sup> Villanueva, Prince Aian G. “Why Civil Society Cannot Battle It All Alone: The Roles of Civil Society Environment, Transparent Laws and Quality of Public Administration in Political Corruption Mitigation.” *International Journal of Public Administration* 43, no. 6 (April 25, 2020): 553. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2019.1638933>.

<sup>105</sup> Kuzio, Taras. “Ukrainian Politicians Put the Squeeze on Civil Society.” Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, May 20, 2011. <https://khpg.org/en/1305841006>.

<sup>106</sup> Zaloznaya, “When Civil Engagement Is Part of the Problem,” 251.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid*, 252.

watchdog/monitoring activities of judiciary officials, however, “its massive membership and donations vanished.... On the other hand, the organization has begun receiving some project funding related to judicial reform from international donors.”<sup>108</sup> Without these donors, Tregub argues, Automaidan would likely not have survived.

On the topic of accountability, some CSOs have begun disclosing their financial reports and statements, partially due to a new 2017 law that requires anti-corruption CSOs to complete e-declaration forms.<sup>109</sup> Some CSOs now also disclose their financial reports on their websites – possibly in an attempt to improve their credibility, either with domestic actors or Western funders – though findings are too inconsistent to be identified as a trend. Many will identify their Western funders, for example, but not the grant amounts received. Of the CSOs that have chosen to be more transparent with their finances, the standard of information reported is varied, ranging from audit forms to easy-to-understand infographics that break down the sources of their funding.<sup>110</sup>

The final outcome of CSOs’ increased reliance on international funding is an exacerbation of the already widening divide between local and national-level, professionalized CSOs. An ACREC report notes a tendency of more experienced, “grant seeking” CSOs leaving no room for grassroots organizations to receive funding. This, in turn, has fomented a more competitive environment as various CSOs vie for external funding and created a sense of rivalry “among groups who in other circumstances might work together and split these organizations into haves and have-nots of international assistance.”<sup>111</sup> Western funding and higher wages also attract talent, pulling skilled employees away from smaller CSOs to large, national-level organizations.<sup>112</sup> Furthermore, smaller organizations, limited in staff and capacity, often simply lack the skills and time to properly “compete” for these fundings opportunities. CSOs are left to

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<sup>108</sup> Tregub, 14.

<sup>109</sup> Karatnycky, Adrian. “Watching the Watchdogs: Why Ukraine’s NGOs Should Disclose Assets, Too.” Atlantic Council, March 29, 2017. <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/watching-the-watchdogs-why-ukraine-s-ngos-should-disclose-assets-too/>.

<sup>110</sup> Findings drawn from analysis of this report’s 20 national-level CSO sample group. See Appendix A.

<sup>111</sup> Бадер, et al, “Громадянське суспільство проти корупції в Україні,” 18.

<sup>112</sup> Lutsevych, “How to Finish a Revolution,” 5.

choose: stay small and direct their attention on their original program missions or expend energy on grant applications for the chance of expanding, even if means shifting their anti-corruption focus to initiatives that did not necessarily align with their own priorities.

## **DOMESTIC**

### **Becoming a more CSO-friendly, anti-corruption government**

#### *Lessons learned:*

There were hopes following the Orange Revolution that civil society-state relations would improve or develop into a real partnership – a vital development necessary for civil societies to function and thrive.<sup>113</sup> Not only would CSOs be more involved in matters of anti-corruption policy, but the state would be more willing to listen and trust them. More importantly, cooperation would become institutionalized.

However, just as we previously explored post-Orange Revolution CSOs' difficulties in becoming a more engaged coalition, the government similarly did not create an environment that invited co-governance nor did it establish “institutionalized mechanisms that enable systematic (not spontaneous) citizens’ political and social engagement.”<sup>114</sup> Ultimately, the success of CSO anti-corruption efforts is dependent on “the broader politico-legal institutional framework where governance and administration take place in general is.”<sup>115</sup> Instead, CSOs had to operate in what Solonenko describes as one of the worst legal frameworks in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) at the time.<sup>116</sup> Legislative regulation obstacles included burdensome registration processes

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<sup>113</sup> Razumkov Centre. “Non-Governmental Think Tanks in Ukraine: Capabilities, Challenges, Prospects.” National Security & Defence, 2007, 6(90), 3-43.

<sup>114</sup> Stepanenko, Victor. “Civil Society in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Civic Ethos in the Framework of Corrupted Sociality?” East European Politics and Societies 20, no. 4 (November 1, 2006): 572. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325406293292>.

<sup>115</sup> Villanueva, 557-558.

<sup>116</sup> Solonenko, 223.

with unreasonably long waiting periods and expensive fees, but also limited CSOs to functioning only in their registered domestic regions, blocked CSOs from direct commercial activities, prohibited them from entering joint associations and corporations, and required the already financially stressed organizations to pay exorbitant tax fees.<sup>117</sup> In addition, an unfriendly government also meant little state funding. In some extreme cases, CSOs faced harassment from state officials and attacks from the SBU.<sup>118</sup>

In terms of anti-corruption initiatives and laws, however, Ukraine was fairly consistent, even prior to the Orange Revolution. By 2000, over 50 laws and regulations related to corruption had been put into place.<sup>119</sup> After 2004, Ukraine joined the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption in 2006 and ratified the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) in 2009.<sup>120</sup> But despite the positive progress on paper, the problem, as Harasymiw writes, was "in their chronic lack of implementation, aggravated by legislators' immunity from prosecution, the courts being less than fully independent, and poor co-ordination."<sup>121</sup>

#### *Changes made:*

The realm of anti-corruption initiatives and civil society activism began to improve after 2010, even as Yanukovich's presidency began to limit fundamental freedoms, expand corruption, and strengthen the authoritarian regime.<sup>122</sup> In 2011, Ukraine passed a law ensuring access to public information, a massive boon for

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<sup>117</sup> Bilan, Yuriy, and Svitlana Bilan. "The Formation of Civil Society in Ukraine After the Orange Revolution." *Economics & Sociology* 4, no. 1 (May 20, 2011): 78–86. <https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-789X.2011/4-1/8>.

<sup>118</sup> Allina-Pisano, 245; Solonenko, 224.

<sup>119</sup> Harasymiw, 292.

<sup>120</sup> For information on Ukraine's GRECO membership, see: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/greco/evaluations/ukraine>

<sup>121</sup> Harasymiw, 292.

<sup>122</sup> Matviychuk, Oleksandra. "Civil Society in Ukraine." Razom, 2017. <https://www.razomforukraine.org/projects/policyreport/civil-society-in-ukraine/>.

monitoring/reporting activities.<sup>123</sup> It also joined the Open Government Partnership (OGP) that same year, releasing an action plan in 2012 that included goals to build on its public information law and create anti-corruption initiatives in conjunction with CSOs.<sup>124</sup> In 2013, the government adopted another action plan to promote CSO development. Finally, a new law on public associations cleared away some impediments that CSOs had faced before, including simplifying the registration system, easing regional boundaries, and allowing organizations to finally start earning a profit to sustain themselves.<sup>125</sup>

Still, it wasn't until after Euromaidan that the government turned a more committed corner on pursuing an anti-corruption agenda and modernizing institutional, political, and legislative frameworks for CSOs to productively function and engagement with state actors.

Legislatively, a 2014 corruption prevention law set up definitions and guidelines for an anti-corruption system and its enforcement mechanisms.<sup>126</sup> Poroshenko's government also redistributed the formal legal authority on policy decision-making, some of which went to the RPR, thus clearing a path for civil society-led changes in anti-corruption policy.<sup>127</sup> To strengthen the corruption-weakened economy, Ukraine signed on to the Anti-Corruption Initiative with the support of the European Bank for

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<sup>123</sup> The "On Access to Public Information" law "determines the procedure of exercising and ensuring the common right to access information possessed by power entities, other administrators of public information defined by the Law, and information that constitutes public interest." For full document: Law of Ukraine, "On Access to Public Information," May 9, 2011, [https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/89901/103387/F-1689645560/UKR89901\\_english.pdf](https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/89901/103387/F-1689645560/UKR89901_english.pdf)

<sup>124</sup> The OGP is a multi-stakeholder initiative focused on improving government transparency, accountability and responsiveness to citizens. For more information on Ukraine's action plans:

"Вдохновляющий путь Украины в партнерстве

«Открытое правительство»" Open Government Partnership, April 28, 2022.

<https://www.opengovpartnership.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Ukraines-Inspiring-Journey-in-the-Open-Government-Partnership-Russian.pdf>.

<sup>125</sup> Notably, however, raising money remained an issue because the taxation code had not been amended yet. NGOs risked losing their non-profit status if they conducted "entrepreneurial" activities. Source: Solonenko, 225.

<sup>126</sup> Ст.2056 Закон України от 3 серпня 2022, "Про запобігання корупції" No. 49, ст. 2056.

<sup>127</sup> Blatt and Schlauffer, 20-21.



Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).<sup>128</sup> In 2015, Ukraine continued to build on efforts to improve transparency and citizen involvement by signing the International Open Data Charter.<sup>129</sup> More recently, President Zelensky’s anti-corruption reform efforts took a more direct approach, targeting Ukraine’s oligarchs through de-oligarchization laws to limit “the destructive influence of privileged interests in the economic life of Ukraine.”<sup>130</sup>

Anti-Corruption Reform	Status	Reform Type	Civil Society Involvement	International Partner Involvement
<b>National Agency for Prevention of Corruption (NAPC)</b>	Established in 2015, ongoing delays in execution of mandate	Reduce opportunities for corruption	Serve on council to assess qualifications of candidates for leadership positions	Financially supported the creation of the e-declaration system, the main tool of the NAPC
<b>National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine (NABU)</b>	Established in 2015 actively conducting investigations	Punish and deter corrupt acts	Serve on council to assess qualifications of candidates for leadership positions	Donor financial support provided contingent on establishment of NABU and SAPO
<b>Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO)</b>	Established in 2015; ongoing delays in execution because of corruption allegations	Punish and deter corrupt acts	Serve on council to assess qualifications of candidates for leadership positions	Made financial support contingent on establishment of NABU and SAPO
<b>High Anti-Corruption Court (HACC)</b>	Established in 2018; operations expected to commence in the summer of 2019	Punish and deter corrupt acts	Strong advocacy and communications campaigns for establishment of the HACC	Financial and donor funding withheld to pressure government to advance establishment
<b>ProZorro and DoZorro</b>	Established in 2016; serve as transparent hubs for bidding and monitoring of public procurement	Reduce opportunities for corruption	Build and maintain online platforms	Funds provided for technical work to build these and other portals

Table 1: Post-Euromaidan anti-corruption institutions. Original table by Olena Tregub.

Institutionally, Ukraine made visible progress with its new anti-corruption agencies and judicial bodies (as seen above), although the credit arguably lies more in the pressures that civil society, together with international partners, applied, rather than

<sup>128</sup> More specifically, the Initiative aimed to “improve the investment climate and to strengthen the economic outlook by ensuring greater accountability and transparency and more effective rule of law within the Ukrainian economy.” Source: Usov, Anton. “Ukraine and EBRD Launch Initiative to Combat Corruption,” May 12, 2014. <https://www.ebrd.com/news/2014/ukraine-and-ebrd-launch-initiative-to-combat-corruption.html>.

<sup>129</sup> The International Open Data Charter is a set of principles intended to promote policies and practices that enable governments to tackle corruption via the collection and sharing of data. Retrieved from: <https://opendatacharter.net/>

<sup>130</sup> Vlasiuk, Liya. “Zelensky Signs Law on Deoligarchizati.” KyivPost, November 5, 2021. <https://www.kyivpost.com/ukraine-politics/zelensky-signs-law-on-deoligarchization.html>.

President Poroshenko’s government’s own initiative. Various delays, ranging from obstruction by political elites to internal corruption allegations, have slowed down progress for these structures, but their development is ongoing and may still yield concrete results in the future.<sup>131</sup>

CSO-state cooperative efforts also progressed with two consecutive national strategies action plans aimed at promoting civil society development. Just renewed for 2021 to 2025, the second Strategy initiative, like the first that began in 2016, was developed to encourage CSO development and bring CSOs into the national decision-making process.<sup>132</sup> The first Strategy met few of its objectives, and CSOs struggled to become involved in the drafting process.<sup>133</sup> The development of the second Strategy, on the other hand, was highly inclusive, involving several hundred CSOs in the process. The expected implementation of the new Strategy is already considered an improvement for CSO-state cooperative efforts.<sup>134</sup>

#### *Observed outcomes:*

Ukraine’s government and the great strides it has taken after the Euromaidan towards anti-corruption reform has created a far more CSO-friendly environment than the years immediately following the Orange Revolution. New legislation and a streamlined, online registration process has made it easier for CSOs to operate. Co-governance programming has increased and CSOs play more prominent, influential roles in national

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<sup>131</sup> Tregub, 9-12.

<sup>132</sup> Департамент комунікацій Секретаріату Кабінету Міністрів України. “Розроблено Національну Стратегію Сприяння Розвитку Громадянського Суспільства в Україні На 2021—2026 Роки.” Кабінет Міністрів України, June 18, 2022. <https://www.kmu.gov.ua/news/rozrobleno-nacionalnu-strategiyu-spriyannya-rozvitku-gromadyanskogo-suspilstva-v-ukrayini-na-20212026-roki>.

<sup>133</sup> CSO Meter. “Ukraine: National Strategy for Civil Society Development Objectives Not Achieved, Finds Study,” December 20, 2019. <https://csometer.info/updates/ukraine-national-strategy-civil-society-development-objectives-not-achieved-finds-study>.

<sup>134</sup> Скворцова, Валерія, and Оксана Мізік. “Орієнтирдосприятливого Середовищата Розширенняможливостей ОГС: Україна 2021 Звіт Про Країни.” «Барометр ОГС». Київ: Європейський центр некомерційного права, 56. [https://csometer.info/sites/default/files/2022-06/2021%20Ukraine%20CSO%20Meter%20Country%20Report%20UA\\_0.pdf](https://csometer.info/sites/default/files/2022-06/2021%20Ukraine%20CSO%20Meter%20Country%20Report%20UA_0.pdf).

anti-corruption efforts. Some NGOs, like Together Against Corruption (*Razom Proty Korupcii*), were even formed around government-public initiatives.

However, it should be noted that although Ukraine's government has delivered on certain CSO demands, pushback, sometimes subtle, still exists. For instance, although registration procedures have improved, registration denials are a significant, ongoing concern.<sup>135</sup> Members of parliament have also attempted to pass draft laws that would discriminate against activists, restrict access to foreign funding, and place limits on freedom of association and peaceful assembly, though notably none were passed. In addition, the tax environment for NGOs remains unfavorable and attacks on civil society activists increased in 2020.<sup>136</sup>

The most potent effect on CSOs has been the public information reforms, which in turn have funneled many NGO operations into open data monitoring. For CSOs already involved in monitoring and reporting activities like the Maidan Monitoring Information Center, the "On Access to Public Information" law and the Open Data Charter encouraged further development of more robust initiatives. Others, like the aforementioned Automaidan and OPORA, added monitoring to their repertoire in the post-Euromaidan years.<sup>137</sup> Yet, just as international funding may be steering the direction of CSO strategy, the governmental focus on public information may have equally discouraged or distracted CSOs from pursuing other anti-corruption initiatives that have higher barriers to overcome. One pressing issue is the question of improved accountability measures. While the field of monitoring has become inundated with CSO activists, efforts to persuade the government to actually punish corrupt individuals via prosecutorial and judicial processes have been lacking.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>135</sup> A Ukrainian Center for Independent Political Research (UCIPR) study from 2018-2019 found that approximately 17% of CSOs were denied registration. Source: Лапін, Олег. "Практика і Законодавчі Проблеми у Сфері Реєстрації ГО у 2018-2019 Рр." Український незалежний центр політичних досліджень, December 2020. [http://www.ucipr.org.ua/images/files/1629/1629\\_file.pdf](http://www.ucipr.org.ua/images/files/1629/1629_file.pdf).

<sup>136</sup> "2020 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index," 237-238.

<sup>137</sup> Please refer to Appendix A for further information on CSO profiles.

<sup>138</sup> Tregub, 11.

## CSO consolidation

### *Lessons learned:*

Just as the Orange Revolution was a collaborative effort, so too did CSOs continue to work together in the years that followed, sharing information and combining their efforts to participate in joint meetings and anti-corruption initiatives.<sup>139</sup> All the same, cooperation began to notably decrease between 2003 to 2011.<sup>140</sup> Civil society failed to consolidate their goals and struggled to create sustainable cross-regional networks and coalitions.<sup>141</sup> On the whole, CSOs remained too “fractured and weak to engage in [the] equal partnership cooperation with the government” that they needed to create change and push reforms.<sup>142</sup>

### *Changes made:*

Solonenko finds that CSO consolidation began under Yanukovich’s presidency, when 50 CSOs came together to create the “New Citizen” platform and monitor the upcoming 2010 presidential elections. In 2011, the CHESNO Movement launched, which united 150 organizations in an awareness-raising campaign to inform citizens about potentially corrupt MPs.<sup>143</sup>

The biggest collaborative achievement was the Reanimation Package of Reforms (RPR), which was founded in 2014, describing itself as “a coalition of public activists, experts, journalists, and researchers who pooled their efforts... to transform the energy of protest into the energy of reforms to make changes in Ukraine truly irreversible.”<sup>144</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Palyvoda and Golota, 95.

<sup>140</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>141</sup> Smagliy, Kateryna. “Kennan Cable No.25: A Wake-up Call for Ukraine’s Civil Society.” Wilson Center, August 2017. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no25-wake-call-for-ukraines-civil-society>.

<sup>142</sup> Yemelianova, 5.

<sup>143</sup> Notably, “New Citizen” is now defunct, but the CHESNO movement has since become an established CSO itself. Source: Solonenko, 226.

<sup>144</sup> Reanimation Package of Reforms. “About Us.” Accessed August 8, 2022. <https://rpr.org.ua/en/about-us/>.

Bringing together 82 NGOs and 22 expert groups and their resources, the RPR's functions include advocating and writing action plans for anti-corruption, decentralization, and public administration reform, then overseeing their plans' progress to ensure implementation.

*Observed outcomes:*

The RPR gave civil society a direct line to the government, policy makers, and policymaking institutions. International organizations, recognizing the coalition as a viable representative of Ukraine's civil society, invited the RPR to high-level round tables and discussion meetings, which in turn allowed RPR members to become directly involved in anti-corruption legislation drafting.<sup>145</sup> This new leverage also created opportunities to pressure the Ukrainian government via the "sandwich" model, a strategy "where civil society activists apply pressure on the government from below while international financial or other bodies exert influence from outside, can result in notable progress on reforms."<sup>146</sup> Scholarship agrees that it's primarily due to the sandwich model that the NABU, SAPO, HAPC, and HACC institutions were established.<sup>147</sup>

Additionally, the RPR has overseen or contributed to over 100 adopted laws since its establishment.<sup>148</sup> Its ongoing successes has underlined that civil society can, in fact, influence policy change, as well as encouraged other CSOs to consolidate and start their own cooperative coalitions.<sup>149</sup>

The RPR may have also potentially highlighted the value of international connections. Although domestic coalitions like the Coalition for the Protection of Civil Society certainly also formed after Euromaidan, many national CSOs also began opting

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<sup>145</sup> Blatt and Schlauffer, 21-22.

<sup>146</sup> Harasymiw, 303.

<sup>147</sup> Blatt and Schlauffer, 24.

<sup>148</sup> Tregub, 2.

<sup>149</sup> Khomei, Oksana. "Increasing the Power of Civil Society in Ukraine." *New Eastern Europe*, December 22, 2019. <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2019/12/22/increasing-the-power-of-civil-society-in-ukraine/>.

for international networks like the Eurasian Academic Anti-Corruption Network, while others created their own like Zero Corruption, an international forum that recently hosted its first conference, Democracy in Action. Agendas ranged from Ukraine's roadmap NATO membership to the efficacy of sanctions. Speakers included President Zelensky, USAID Administrator Samantha Power, and President of Moldova, Maia Sandu.<sup>150</sup>

The downside of the RPR has been the inherent elitist culture that has formed around it, with members of the coalition showing signs of an NGO-crazy forming within its ranks where networking with donors took precedent over reform and civil society development. Millions of dollars were funneled into RPR from 2015-2017 while active members were still required to pay annual membership fees.<sup>151</sup> A former RPR member noted in an interview that

RPR grew into a club of beneficiaries. Many RPR activists only use the RPR 'brand' to boost their personal capital – to meet foreign diplomats, get media opportunities, get invited to international conferences, or win prestigious fellowships in the United States. For some, RPR is a ticket to power corridors, where they can make friends with government officials or politicians and maybe get elected to the Verkhovna Rada during the next election.<sup>152</sup>

Not unlike professionalized NGOs beginning to crowd out smaller, more local organizations for funding, so too it seems that the RPR may have begun skirting the line of detaching from the very society it was meant to be representing.

Interestingly, prior to 2020, the RPR listed very few requirements necessary for interested NGOs to join the coalition. However, the current website now lists transparent funding sources and a published annual report with financial indicators from one of the

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<sup>150</sup> For more information on the 2021 Democracy in Action: Zero Corruption conference, see: <https://uadia.org/>

<sup>151</sup> Though the fee is not particularly exorbitant, currently set at 5,000 UAH, or about \$140 USD. Source: Smaglyi, 4.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid

last two years as necessary criteria for membership, signaling that the RPR may be trying to move away from accusations of growing elitism in its ranks.

### Increased online presence

#### *Lessons learned:*

Internet use was expanding in the early 2000s and Ukrainian CSOs were no different. CCC Creative Center’s Palyvoda and Golota found that from 2002 to 2011, CSOs that had their own website rose from 13% to 41%.

**Internet Usage by Ukrainian CSOs, 2002-2011, (N=637)**

	2002		2003		2004		2005		2006		2007		2009		2010		2011
CSO has an e-mail	58%	↑	70%	-	70%	↑	73%	↑	76%	↑	79%	↑	86%	↓	85%	↑	90%
CSO has own website	13%	↑	23%	-	20%	-	22%	-	25%	↑	32%	↑	33%	-	33%	↑	41%
CSO uses the internet as a source of information about changes/updates to existing laws and regulations	47%	↑	56%	-	61%	↑	67%	↑	70%	↑	73%	↑	81%	↑	84%	↑	
iCSO has an e-mail																	87%

Table 2: Upward trends in internet usage by Ukrainian CSOs. Original table by Palyvoda and Golota, 72.

While a website could mean anything from a web page to a blog post, it was still clear that CSOs were taking a greater interest in making themselves available online. Websites are useful for outreach, publicizing anti-corruption activities, promoting transparency, and sharing information. Despite the upward trends, however, the majority of the post-Orange Revolution years still saw only about a third of CSOs making information about themselves and the work they do publicly available on the internet, to the CSOs’ own detriment. As Lutsevych writes, “poor media outreach weakens NGOs... More than half of Ukrainians who are familiar with NGOs do not know what function

they perform.”<sup>153</sup> Similarly, without a website to spread awareness of the CSO’s existence and generate interest, the CSO is less likely to find opportunities for cooperation with the state, international funders, or other CSOs. Palyvoda and Golota found that “the low interest of the government authorities in the activities of CSOs can be explained by the lack of information about their work.”<sup>154</sup>

*Changes made:*

Ukrainian CSOs, like the rest of the world, have continued on their upward trend of being present online, though precise data is not available after 2011. CSOs operate on their own websites, Facebook, and, more recently, VKontakte and Telegram. Most CSO websites have become more user-friendly and informative. In general, they now list their mission or strategy, their members, their achievements, links to ongoing projects, some variation on the “latest news,” contact information, and links to their other social media if available. CSOs with foreign funders and RPR members also typically include a logo of their partner organization on their website, possibly out of a grant/funding obligation. Detailed funding information, annual reports, and media libraries are less common. The majority of the websites are also available to read in Ukrainian or English, though not Russian.<sup>155</sup>

In addition, while national-level CSOs’ websites have become generally well-established, regional CSOs lag behind and local CSOs even more so, making them incredibly difficult to find without being previously aware of them. Some have established themselves on Facebook, but few attempt to maintain and update a full website, possibly due to lack of manpower or funding.

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<sup>153</sup> Lutsevych, 7.

<sup>154</sup> Palyvoda and Golota, 91.

<sup>155</sup> Observations completed by author. For list of CSOs observed, see Appendix A.



*Observed outcomes:*

In the hyper-connected age that we currently live in, an internet presence is arguably a social necessity and at the very least, a professional expectation. Simply put, a CSO without a website does not exist to the average Ukrainian internet user. Worse, it does not exist to international partners and funders.<sup>156</sup>

Understandably, this has created pressure for organizations to make themselves as accessible as possible, though the standard of what kind of information is expected seems to be varied. RPR is the exception, with most members, either current or former, consistently having more information, such as activity reports and financial statements, available to the public.

On a positive note, increased internet presence will also increase CSO transparency, which in turn may help boost public trust in the organizations. The unfortunate trade-off is that the widening disparity between local and national CSOs. National CSOs can make themselves and their work known to anyone with access to an internet browser, while local CSOs that cannot maintain an active level of internet outreach are denied a valuable outlet through which to attempt to crowdsource funding, communicate with their community, recruit potential volunteers, and, on a broader scale, gain the attention of prospective international funders. As a result, they're left weak with even less prospects to develop as an organization or build on their anti-corruption efforts.

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<sup>156</sup> For the scope of this research, it also certainly made it inevitable to exclude any organizations that did not have a robust online presence, even if, conceivably, they were operating and active outside of the internet.

## INTERNATIONAL

### USAID made changes in funding program format<sup>157</sup>

#### *Lessons learned:*

USAID ran three CSO-related programs over the course of the Orange Revolution period. Two, UCAN (Ukraine Citizen Action Network) and the Strengthening Civil Society in Ukraine (SCSU), were effectively different iterations of the same program aimed at strengthening and supporting civil societies.

ACTION (Promoting Citizen Engagement in Combating Corruption in Ukraine) was the primary funding program that specifically involved anti-corruption CSO efforts. Running for 3 years with a 10 million USD budget, the final report of ACTION included a “lessons learned” section that noted that the three-year length of the program was too short and CSOs remain weak at monitoring and advocating for national-level corruption vulnerabilities. However, “creating and uniting NGO coalitions and networks around particular priority issues of special concern to their constituents” was one of the most effective strategies pursued by the ACTION project. To build on ACTION’s progress, the report recommended continued support of monitoring/watch dog activities, continued pressure from CSOs on the government for reforms, and improved CSO-state co-governance initiatives. Overall, the ACTION program was judged to be a success that made “significant impacts on the incidence of corruption in Ukraine” and “effectively mobilized society.”<sup>158</sup>

The programs USAID ran were straightforward, one-size-fits-all approaches that built a base for what international funding can do for civil society in Ukraine. Leslie McCuaig, the head of the UCAN project, discussed in an interview that the project was,

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<sup>157</sup> For full list of USAID funding programs to Ukraine related to civil society development or anti-corruption, see Appendix B.

<sup>158</sup> More specific results include that 586 CSOs were trained in advocacy skills, 65.8% of advocacy campaigns against corruption produced concrete reform, and a noted, moderate success in increasing public awareness of corruption. For the full report, see: Management Systems International. “Promoting Citizen Engagement in Combating Corruption in Ukraine (ACTION), Final Report.”

quite simply, designed “to include as many people as possible in experiencing the rewards of civic participation firsthand.”<sup>159</sup> However, to tackle Ukraine’s brand of corruption, it would need a more bespoke approach for long-term sustainability.

*Changes made:*

The post-Euromaidan years of USAID funding built on what it had started in the previous post-revolution period. From 2013 to 2022, the agency ran double the programs with well over double the funding amounts.<sup>160</sup> Programs also became more targeted, pinpointing specific needs Ukraine’s CSOs had that would benefit from Western support. SACCI (Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions) was designed to assist the newly formed anti-corruption government institutions and encourage more public support for anti-corruption efforts. “Citizens in Action” was meant to promote CSO involvement in the legislative process of policy making. TAPAS had been proposed explicitly to support and enhance the already established ProZorro/DoZorro and build on Ukraine’s progress with open data initiatives.<sup>161</sup>

*Observed outcomes:*

More variety in programing and more funding has had a predictable impact on CSO capacity, allowing national-level CSOs to expand their strategies, supplement weaker initiatives within their organization, and pursue multiple anti-corruption or capacity development grants that lower levels of funding would not have permitted.

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<sup>159</sup> Andresen, Katya. *Robin Hood Marketing: Stealing Corporate Savvy to Sell Just Causes*. 1st ed. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2006, 34.

<sup>160</sup> Funding is estimated, due to unknown funding amounts for two of the programs. See Appendix B for more details.

<sup>161</sup> Ingram, George. “Fighting Corruption in Ukraine: USAID’s Strategy.” Brookings, October 31, 2019. <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2019/10/31/fighting-corruption-in-ukraine-usaids-strategy/>.

Furthermore, the willingness of USAID to cater to the specific needs of CSOs signaled that “international actors are increasingly perceiving civil society as a partner, not merely a recipient of funding.”<sup>162</sup> At least on a global scale, USAID’s behavior legitimizes the work of anti-corruption CSOs, making them more attractive as a potential partner for other international funding organizations. In turn, allowing CSOs to shape what their funding is for may in turn incentivize organizations to take a greater role in working with Western institutions to begin setting USAID’s priorities, rather than the other way around.

On the other hand, USAID’s increased funding has done nothing to dispute Ukraine’s NGO-crazy or assist CSOs in regaining their legitimacy as independent organizations as discussed previously in the report. In 2020, a CSOSI survey found that 40% of respondents believed that foreign-funded CSOs were effectively being manipulated by foreigners to “establish control over attractive areas of Ukraine’s economy.” Nearly half believe that CSOs are colluding with their funders to share grant funds between themselves.<sup>163</sup> CSOs in Ukraine continue to struggle with their credibility, which impedes domestic collaboration between national and sub-national level activist groups.<sup>164</sup> Although USAID has been helping CSOs expand, there is a risk that these funding programs are driving them into a corner, leaving them with no one to collaborate with except other Western-funded CSOs.

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<sup>162</sup> Solonenko, 234.

<sup>163</sup> “2020 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index,” 244.

<sup>164</sup> O’Regan, Davin, and Miranda Rivers. “Five Things You Need to Know About Foreign Funding for Social Movements.” United States Institute of Peace, June 24, 2019. <https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/06/five-things-you-need-know-about-foreign-funding-social-movements>.

## Chapter 5: Conclusion

Ukraine’s civil society, its development, and its fight against corruption is an excellent case study that offers “a set of important lessons to transitional democracies seeking to overcome similar challenges.”<sup>165</sup> Ukraine CSOs, along with the actors that shape them, made substantial progress in the last 18 years by way of improved institutional frameworks, expanded capacity development and sustainability, and strengthened CSO-state relationships. These changes have allowed civil society to become a full-fledged actor of fighting corruption in Ukraine.<sup>166</sup> Of course, the learning curve is ongoing. CSOs in Ukraine still have work to do in building legitimacy, overcoming extremely low civic participation, and managing their crippling dependency on international funding.<sup>167</sup> Corruption had not been beaten before February 2022, and it will also inevitably return in some iteration once Russia’s war of aggression comes to an end. For Ukraine’s government, CSOs, institutions, and Western partners, the only way is forward, continuing along the curve and learning the necessary lessons along the way.

### *Future Research*

Due to the limited scope of this report, future research would greatly benefit from information interviews with CSO members and USAID representatives to gain deeper qualitative data not available to the public on internal structure and developments since 2004. A more robust examination of the impact of political will and citizen participation on CSO development would also be beneficial. Looking into the impact of other international funders, such as the EU, or into CSOs at local or regional levels could also be of interest.

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<sup>165</sup> Kaleniuk and Halushka. “Why Ukraine’s Fight ...”

<sup>166</sup> Бондаренко, О.С., П.М. Маланчук, and М.А. Думчиков. “Роль общественности в противодействии коррупции на Украине.” *Всероссийский криминологический журнал* 14, no. 4 (September 11, 2020): 631–42. [https://doi.org/10.17150/2500-4255.2020.14\(4\).631-642](https://doi.org/10.17150/2500-4255.2020.14(4).631-642).

<sup>167</sup> “Громадський Активізм Та Ставлення До Реформ: Суспільна Думка в Україні.” Accessed August 8, 2022. <https://dif.org.ua/article/gromadskiy-aktivizm-ta-stavlennya-do-reform-suspilna-dumka-v-ukraini>.

## Appendices

### APPENDIX A

CSO	Year Established	Profile	RPR (*former)	Staffing	Funding transparency §	Government Engagement	Website (date of establishment)
Centre of United Actions	2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Awareness raising</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Capacity-building</li> </ul>		Regional offices (from 5 to 15 by 2019), consistent supervisory board	High	✓	<a href="https://centreua.org/">https://centreua.org/</a> (2014)
OPORA	2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Awareness raising</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Capacity-building</li> </ul>	✓*	Regional offices (from 7 to 25 by 2022), addition of supervisory board	High	✓	<a href="https://www.oporaua.org">https://www.oporaua.org</a> (2012)
Committee of Voters of Ukraine	1994	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Awareness raising</li> <li>• Capacity-building</li> </ul>	✓	Regional offices (from 27 to 125 by 2022), though under 20 full time/volunteer staff per office	High	✓	<a href="http://www.cvu.org.ua/">http://www.cvu.org.ua/</a> (2001)
Anti-Corruption Center (AntAC)	2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Awareness-raising</li> <li>• Direct Action</li> <li>• Capacity-building</li> <li>• Co-governance</li> </ul>		Supervisory board, executive board, but fairly consistent in terms of staffing	Mid	✓	<a href="https://antac.org.ua/">https://antac.org.ua/</a> (2012)
The Eidos Center	2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Awareness-raising</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Capacity-building</li> <li>• Co-governance</li> </ul>	✓	Regional offices (consistently 13 from 2016 to today), center team (16 to 19)	High	✓	<a href="http://eidos.org.ua/">http://eidos.org.ua/</a> (2016)
Stop Corruption	2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Awareness-raising</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Direct Action</li> <li>• Capacity-building</li> <li>• Co-governance</li> </ul>		Regional offices (1 to 80 by 2020)	Mid	✓	<a href="http://stopcor.ngo/">http://stopcor.ngo/</a> (2019)
Agency for Effective Solutions	2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Awareness-raising</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Capacity-building</li> </ul>		3 board members, 5 team members as of 2021 (no information prior to 2020)	Low		<a href="https://aer.org.ua/">https://aer.org.ua/</a> (2020)
Women's Anti-Corruption Movement	2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Awareness-raising</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Co-governance</li> </ul>		Unknown	Mid	✓	<a href="https://zhar.org.ua/">https://zhar.org.ua/</a> (2016)
Automaidan	2013	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Awareness-raising</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Co-governance</li> </ul>		Unknown	High	✓	<a href="http://www.automaidan.org.ua/index.html">http://www.automaidan.org.ua/index.html</a> (2013)
Maidan Monitoring Information Center	2000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Awareness-raising</li> <li>• Capacity-building</li> <li>• Co-governance</li> </ul>		Regional offices (constant 5), team members (approximately 11 to 50 from 2000 to today)	High	✓	<a href="https://maidan.org.ua">https://maidan.org.ua</a> (2001)
NAKO (Independent Anti-Corruption Commission)	2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>• Advocacy</li> <li>• Awareness-raising</li> <li>• Co-governance</li> </ul>		Team members (6 to 15), addition of supervising board	High	✓	<a href="https://nako.org.ua">https://nako.org.ua</a> (2017)

Appendix A: A list of national-level CSOs analyzed by author.

CSO	Year Established	Profile	RPR (*former)	Staffing	Funding transparency §	Government Engagement	Website (date of establishment)
All Ukrainian Anti-Corruption Center and Law Enforcement Support	2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>Awareness-raising</li> <li>Advocacy</li> <li>Capacity-building</li> <li>Co-governance</li> </ul>		Regional offices (15-16 from 2016 to present), supervisory board (constant, 1 member), general board (6 in 2016 to 4 today)	Low	✓	<a href="http://anticorruption.com.ua/">http://anticorruption.com.ua/</a> (2014)
Human Rights Organization	2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>Awareness-raising</li> <li>Advocacy</li> <li>Co-governance</li> </ul>		Regional offices (8 to 18 today), leadership (12 to 14)	High	✓	<a href="http://prava-lyudyny.org/">http://prava-lyudyny.org/</a> (2012)
Center for Public Monitoring and Research	2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>Awareness-raising</li> <li>Capacity-building</li> <li>Co-governance</li> </ul>	✓*	Team members (4 to 6), regional offices (3 opened in 2018)	High	✓	<a href="https://gmd.center/">https://gmd.center/</a> (2017)
The Anti-Corruption Headquarters	2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>Awareness-raising</li> <li>Capacity-building</li> <li>Co-governance</li> </ul>	✓*	Team members (4 in 2020 to 6), regional offices actually fell from 29 in 2020 to 14 in 2022)	Mid	✓	<a href="https://shtab.net/">https://shtab.net/</a> (2016)
Together Against Corruption	2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>Awareness-raising</li> <li>Advocacy</li> <li>Capacity-building</li> <li>Co-governance</li> </ul>	✓	Steady, 11 team members from 2016 to today.	High	✓	<a href="https://www.rpk.org.ua/">https://www.rpk.org.ua/</a> (2020)
Institute of Civil Society	1997	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>Awareness-raising</li> <li>Advocacy</li> <li>Capacity-building</li> <li>Co-governance</li> </ul>	✓	Functioned primarily with a 5 member board, expanded to 7 team members by 2016.	High	✓	<a href="https://www.csi.org.ua/">https://www.csi.org.ua/</a> (2001)
DEJURE	2016	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>Awareness-raising</li> <li>Advocacy</li> <li>Capacity-building</li> <li>Direct Action</li> <li>Co-governance</li> </ul>	✓*	Began with 3 members, added a supervisory board in 2020. Staff went from 14 (in 2020) to 19.	High	✓	<a href="http://en.dejure.foundation/">http://en.dejure.foundation/</a> (2020)
Journalists Against Corruption	2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>Awareness-raising</li> <li>Advocacy</li> <li>Direct Action</li> </ul>		Has had regional offices in every region of Ukraine since 2015. No info no specific team members or board members.	Low		<a href="https://pero.org.ua/">https://pero.org.ua/</a> (2015)
The CHESNO Movement	2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Monitoring/reporting</li> <li>Awareness-raising</li> <li>Advocacy</li> <li>Capacity-building</li> <li>Co-governance</li> </ul>		Little information prior to recent reports -- org now has 11 members and at least 7	High	✓	<a href="https://www.chesno.org/">https://www.chesno.org/</a> (2012)

Appendix A, cont.: A list of national-level CSOs analyzed by author.

§ High transparency included detailed financial reports with funders/donors and amounts. Mid transparency involved mention of donor names but no mention of actual funding amounts. Low transparency was no mention of donors or funding amount.

## APPENDIX B

USAID Programs	Program Focus	Length of Program	Amount of funding (USD)
<b>UCAN</b> (Ukraine Citizen Action Network)	NGO support. Supporting and strengthening NGOs to increase citizen participation, increase networking and outreach. "Attention will be given to developing initiatives to strengthen the information technology capacity of CSOs."	2002-2008	~8 million
<b>ACTION</b> (Promoting Citizen Engagement in Combating Corruption in Ukraine)	<b>NGO support.</b> Supporting public awareness campaigns, targeted advocacy efforts, watchdog and monitoring activities, direct dialogues and negotiations with public authorities	2006-2009	~10 million
<b>UNITER</b> (Ukraine National Initiatives to Enhance Reforms) or Strengthening Civil Society in Ukraine (SCSU)	<b>NGO support.</b> Objectives: 1) support national and local advocacy, 2) enabling legislative environment, 3) building organizational capacity, 4) strengthening NGOs financial viability ( <i>Successor to UCAN</i> )	2008-2016	~ 13 million
<b>RADA</b> (Responsible, Accountable and Democratic Assembly)	Objectives: 1) Improved public representation in the legislative progress, 2) <b>Expanded role of citizens in monitoring the work of Parliament</b> , 3) Role of legislature in providing independent oversight of the executive branch strengthened	2013-2018/2021	4.5 million
Ukraine Civil Society Capacity Building Project	1) Improving the organizational capacity development skills of CSOs through the NGO marketplace, 2) Strengthening the NGO Capacity Building marketplace	2014-2019	(not known)
Ukraine Civil Society Enabling Environment "Citizens in Action"	1) to improve the quality of relevant civil society enabling legislation and policy; 2) to increase capacity of public officials and CSOs to ensure effective implementation of legislation and policy; 3) to increase technical and organizational capacity of UCIPR as a leader and driver of civil society legislative efforts.	2014-2019	1.5 million
<b>TAPAS</b> (Transparency and Accountability in Public Administration and Services)	(1) training for (GOU) officials to use software-based procurement processes to reduce corruption (e.g. eliminating malfeasance, providing transparency in acquisition, and imposing accountability); (2) an Open Data initiative that disseminates standardized, accessible, consistent GOU data for public, intra-governmental, and international oversight, and; (3) an eServices platform to provide government services over a secure and user-friendly medium.	2016-2022	30.5 million
<b>ENGAGE</b> (Enhance Non-governmental Actors and Grassroots Engagements)	(1) enhancing civic education; (2) supporting civic coalitions and initiatives at the national, regional, and local levels; (3) strengthening organizational capacity of partner CSOs; and (4) developing the long-term sustainability of civic engagement in democratic reforms.	2016-2021	22 million
<b>SACCI</b> (Support to Anti-Corruption Champion Institutions)	1) empower key government institutions to fight corruption, 2) increase public support for, and engagement in, anti-corruption efforts, and 3) reduce the public's tolerance of corrupt practices.	2017-2022	(not known)



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