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Chapter 1: Introducing the Study of Veterans in American Electoral Politics

Volumnia*: To a cruel war I sent him; from whence he returned, his brows bound with oak…*

Virgilia*: But had he died in the business, madam; how then?*

Volumnia*:…Hear me profess sincerely: had I a dozen sons, each in my love alike and none less dear than thine and my good Marcius, I had rather had eleven die nobly for their country than one voluptuously surfeit out of action.*

—Shakespeare, *Coriolanus* (I.3).

States need armies to survive. Political elites have required armies to both wage and prevent war, to maintain territory, and to exert foreign policy. The raw materials for these military forces have always been soldiers created from citizens. Despite periodic technological advancements in the art of war, manpower is always the vital and core ingredient to the operation and maintenance of armies, navies, and air forces. Service in military institutions requires some degree of self-sacrifice for the welfare of the state however, be it in terms of time, wages, personal liberty, or in risk to life.

While soldiers themselves are invaluable during war efforts, returned veterans hold political value after the battlefields are empty. Historically, inducing men to join the military entails state coercion, but elements of national honor and patriotic pride intersect directly with military service, and governments throughout history laud their war veterans. In many cases, returned veterans enjoyed official state benefits in terms of government positions or other state-sanctioned preferential treatment. Whether this acclaim is intended to reward battle valor, confer legitimacy on the previous war, or feed

the patriotic rationale for the next, the state publicly hails its military veterans with few exceptions, and these veterans serve as potent symbols in regime maintenance.

Scholarly attention to this relationship between the state and its veterans is spare. The study of yesteryear's military has been the bailiwick of historians and contemporary military institutions are the focus of security studies. The military has also enjoyed an intellectual home in political science, but most of its attention focuses on the military's penetration into civilian elite decision-making and its impact on foreign policy and domestic politics. Usually with non-democratic or democratizing states, scholars have investigated several issues related to praetorian interventions in broad theoretic terms (e.g., Nordlinger 1977), and in relation to specific cases of interest (e.g., Barany 1997; Hunter 1997).

However, democratic regimes have needed armies as well. Compared to other contexts, encroachment into politics by the U. S. military institutions and elites has been minimal.[1] This is not to say however, that the military does not play a role in American politics. On the contrary, to remove the trappings of military service from American elections would be to remove one of its most recurring themes. From the beginning, political candidates have relied upon their martial experience to attract voters. Veterans in the electorate have procured special policy benefits and are themselves wrapped into the symbolic fabric of elections.

This dissertation consists of five substantive chapters (summarized below) that share the mission of exploring the intersection of previous military service and American electoral politics. Specifically, the dissertation comprises treatment of the use of military

[1] Of course, "minimal" does not mean inconsequential. Vital debate over the U.S. military's political impact has been active since the mid-twentieth century, including seminal theoretical works (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1960), and recent scholarship on the recent "gap" between the military's political attitudes and their civilian superiors (Feaver and Kohn 2001).

service by presidential and congressional candidates as well as the political attitudes and behavior of veterans in the electorate.

At the Constitutional Convention, there was apprehension over the existence of a standing army—a potential source of tyranny so recently cast off. Many of the framers, well versed in the classical history and lessons of Sparta as well as the warnings from Locke and Montesquieu, were additionally motivated by the despotism associated with the British troops in the colonies—grievances made clear in both the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights (Smith 1951). These fears manifested into a proposal at the Convention to limit the size of the federal government's military. George Washington, from his role as the convention's president and his role as popular military expert, whispered a riposte to the proposed limit, that the convention should also regulate the size of attacking armies (Omond 1933). The fears of a federal army, voiced by James Madison, Elbridge Gerry, and others, did not translate into a lingering national fear of military men.

It was to be the opposite. It would become clear that those with military experience enjoyed a special legitimacy in gaining the electorate's trust. Military service conferred an attractiveness uniquely appealing while somewhat apolitical, that could yet be translated into political support. George Washington himself embodied the American version of the spirit of Cincinnatus, the Roman role model of the citizen-soldier ideal, and many followed Washington's footsteps on the bridge between a military and political careers. Andrew Jackson, William Harrison, Zachary Taylor, Ulysses Grant, and many others translated their popularity gained from battle into electoral victory. Outside of elections, Daniel Shays' rebellion in Massachusetts also illustrated the ability of military service to garner political support—if in unorthodox ways.

Veterans matter politically outside the elite level as well. Veterans are often believed to be a critical voting bloc responsible for the election of soldier-friendly presidents, such as Lincoln in the 1864 election. Their military service ennobles veterans into “supercitizens,” who participate in civic and political life. In addition, especially following the Civil War and World War II, the state has treated veterans well.[2] Their treatment has not been consistent over time or among all veterans, but those that have served the country under arms have been the beneficiaries of special political rewards since before the founding. The first example of government aid to its veterans in America came in 1636 at the Plymouth Colony (Washington 2003). The types of assistance veterans have received in the U.S. are numerous: pensions, direct cash benefits for education, civilian job placement, appointment of county veteran service officers to administer benefits, guaranteed first time home mortgages, heath care for those with service-related injuries, and hiring preferences in state employment. At the federal level, there is a committee in each chamber of Congress and a cabinet-level department dedicated to serving the interests of America’s veterans. It would difficult for veterans today to claim collectively their interests have gone underrepresented in Washington.

There are things known about the politics of previous military service. It is clear that candidates employ their previous veteran status during campaigns, at a minimum repeatedly demonstrating the belief that military service is a positive political asset. Equally clear is the assumption, perpetuated largely by the media, that veterans maintain a special status in the electorate. Whether it is because candidates surround themselves with members of veterans organizations in regalia at campaign stops, due to higher-than-average perceptions of veterans’ civic duty driving political participation, veterans’

[2] Others portray both the lighter (Bennett 1996) and darker (Severo and Milford 1989) days of veterans’ treatment after returning from war in more detail.

solidary bonds to veteran candidates, or simply because the media are preoccupied with military service, veterans are often and increasingly singled out for attention in election years.

Bill Clinton penned a letter in 1969 that would later surface in the 1992 presidential campaign. The message was to Colonel Eugene Holmes, an Arkansas ROTC commander, and within it Clinton explained the reasons behind his manipulation of his draft status in a way that helped him both avoid the draft and remain within the letter of the law. For Clinton, the rationale behind attempting to avoid resistance and illegality was explicit and central to his future political life: "I decided to accept the draft in spite of my beliefs for one reason: to maintain my political viability within the system" (quoted in Ifill 1992). Far beyond the specifics surrounding Clinton's frustration is implicit evidence of a broad, unique, and enduring attractiveness to military service in American electoral politics.

What Clinton recognized in 1969, along with candidates before and since, was that voters often consider military service a legitimate criterion for selecting among candidates. A handful of scholars have recognized the electoral power of previous military service in the context of Dwight Eisenhower's popular appeal, and connected it to the preponderance of generals-turned-presidents in the nineteenth century (Somit 1948; Campbell 1960; Converse and Dupeux 1966).

• • •

How is the study of previous military service in American elections relevant to our scholarly understanding of electoral democracy in the U.S.? Next to "lawyer," "general" is the second most common previous profession for successful presidential candidates. At its heart, the following chapters investigate the relationship between candidates and those from whom they are attempting to solicit support. To understand

more fully the reciprocal connection between candidates and voters is to enhance our understanding of representative democracy. That the theme surrounding this connection ties into topics related to war, security, and national service makes the study all the more pertinent. The ongoing execution of the war on terrorism, the potential renaissance of conscription, and the partisan implications that Democrat candidates enjoy greater electoral boon from previous service all further contribute to the relevance of studying this military theme that has permeated American elections since the founding.

SUBSTANTIVE CHAPTER SUMMARIES

Chapter two introduces and develops a theory of presidential candidates' use of previous military service in elections. The personalized nature of campaigning in the contemporary political climate requires candidates for public office to impart appealing characteristics to a generally inattentive electorate. A recurring bullet-point on candidates' résumés in political electoral races throughout American history is "soldier." Elections analysts, with notable exceptions, have largely ignored this repeating pattern in campaigns. Despite an anti-militarist disposition in American political culture, the nineteenth century was replete with presidential candidates who used their soldierly reputation to access the nomination process. Over half of the presidents preceding Harry Truman experienced military service and Somit classifies over a third as bona fide "military heroes," men whose military victories "were largely responsible for their elevation" to national politics (Somit 1948). The attractiveness of these veterans to the party elites that nominated candidates, as well as to the voters, continued after World War II.

Recent presidential elections demonstrate a partisan asymmetry regarding the campaign use of previous military service. The data suggest a difference between Republicans and Democrats in recent years: case studies indicate that veteran status is one of the rare costless ways for Democratic candidates to gain footing on defense and security issues. In these terms, defense and security in both the pre- and post- 9/11 eras can be thought of as owned by Republicans (Petrocik 1996; Petrocik, Benoit, and Hansen 2001), and previous military service provides an foothold for Democrats to "trespass" into GOP territory (Norpoth and Buchanan 1992). Due to the current arrangement of the parties' issues, Democratic candidates with military experience of their own seem to hold electoral advantages that their non-veteran rivals do not, despite the apparent decline in voters' concern over candidates "personal" issues (Wattenberg 2004).

Moving from presidential to congressional elections, chapter three uses the first post-9/11 congressional elections in 2002 to evaluate the partisan nature of the electoral advantages of previous military service. Taking the contested races for the U.S. House of Representatives and measuring the previous military service of both parties' nominees, I quantitatively estimate the advantage that veteran candidates have over nonveterans on the ballot. The findings line up with the theoretical expectations set forth in chapter two: Democratic candidates benefit more from previous military service than Republican veterans do. The veteran Democrat collects approximately two percent more of the two-party vote than the nonveteran Democrat, other things being equal—including incumbency, partisanship of the district, and candidate gender. Republican candidates already enjoy credibility on issues related to security and national defense in the post-9/11 era, mitigating any gain from their military experiences.

Chapter four is a search for distinctions between veterans and nonveterans in the electorate. The high salience of military service in the 2004 presidential election, due to

Wesley Clark and John Kerry's candidacies, provide an ideal environment to investigate and explain the attitudinal and behavioral differences between veterans and nonveterans. After a section of content analysis that looks at the strategies and impact of George W. Bush, Clark, Howard Dean, and Kerry's use of military service, chapter four uses 2004 polling data to test for veteran distinctiveness in the electorate. Specifically, I focus on the partisanship and vote preferences of veterans, testing the conventional wisdom that veterans lean toward Republican attitudes and vote choices. Lastly, feeling thermometers, open-ended questions, and primary election exit polling are used to measure veterans affect toward veteran candidates in the 2004 election as well as the 1952 and 1960 general presidential election for comparative purposes.

Chapter five also investigates veterans in the electorate. At the intersection of military service and politics is another important theoretic and empirical puzzle: whether military veterans participate in politics at different rates than non-veterans. After analyzing both cross-sectional data on voting behavior from 1972 to 2002 and longitudinal data from 1965 to 1973, results indicate that previous military service has a positive effect on turnout after controlling for other demographic factors, though the effect is context-dependent. Because some veterans volunteered for the armed forces, the government drafted some, and some volunteered for fear of the draft, it is necessary to dissect possible theories behind any elevated participation rate among veterans. There are two principle competing reasons that may explain differences between veterans and non-veterans, self-selection bias and institutional socialization. Those who join the armed services might be a priori more likely to cast ballots than average, perhaps due to higher levels of patriotism or a willingness to bear costs for their country. Socialization effects, on the other hand, describe the political impact on members from the institution itself. Results indicate that veterans have higher propensity to turnout, controlling for correlated

demographic factors such as age, education, and family income. By dividing veterans from each sample into their respective war cohorts, we can parse the differential effects from different eras and conflicts. The data indicate that, instead of draft-era cohorts marking the distinction from volunteer-era cohorts, military service drives up turnout for all cohorts except men who served during the Vietnam War. For World War II, Korean War, and post-Vietnam War era veterans, previous military service positively influences turnout when compared to contemporaries lacking military service. These findings demonstrate that self-selection alone cannot account for the higher turnout because of changes in conscription rules across time.

Chapter six compares the findings in chapter five based on American veterans with Israeli veterans. The contrast is stark: using commensurate control variables, this chapter's analysis measures turnout and other forms of political participation among Israeli citizens, finding no participatory difference among veterans. Israel makes an excellent case to test the effect of previous military service on political participation because it imposes universal conscription. Results from Israel augment the American findings by providing an initial "most-different" comparison using a simplistic version of John Stuart Mill's method of agreement. Analyzing individual level determinants of turnout in Israel is challenging because of uniformly high levels of self-reported electoral turnout. To enhance this measure of political participation, this paper incorporates turnout, party membership, discussing politics with friends and family, and poll-watching as a broader metric of political participation. Turnout is the first empirical analysis conducted herein, in which I use American preconceptions of turnout proclivities to conceptualize Israeli voter turnout at the individual level, but only partisanship consistently predicts self-reported turnout. A more nuanced dependent variable that measures respondents' turnout, political discussions with peers, poll monitoring, and

party membership but offers no different results. This difference between veterans of two democracies demonstrates the uniqueness of the American case with respect to the relationship between military service and elections.

Chapter 2: Tippecanoe and Hanoi Hiltons Too: Presidential Campaign use of Candidate Military Service

I have no private purposes to accomplish, no party projects to build up, no enemies to punish—nothing to serve but my country.

—General Zachary Taylor (April 12, 1848, letter to Capt. J. S. Allison)

I do not believe that killing 2,500 Englishmen at New Orleans qualifies for the various, difficult, and complicated duties of the chief magistrate.

—Henry Clay, 1824

The personalized nature of campaigning in the contemporary political climate requires candidates for public office to convey appealing characteristics to their electorate. To that end, contenders provide critical biographical information to influence potential voters. These biographic facts typically consist of a recent political history of past offices, legislation, or deeds, but candidates may also offer items from their pre-political life. Campaigns do not choose these bio items arbitrarily, but emphasize them strategically to garner the most positive impact. Sufficiently motivated voters can easily learn a candidate's alma mater, hometown, birthplace, and previous private sector employment in addition to political past through campaign advertisements, candidate websites, voter guides, and free media.

American citizens pay attention to politics at variable but generally low levels (Neuman 1990; Jones 1994) and their knowledge of the political system has impelled many scholars to explain the electorate's unexceptional ability to process, hold, and use political knowledge (Luskin 1990; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996). Given these realities

about potential voters, campaigns need to mobilize supporters and persuade undecided citizens with short but efficient messages about the candidate: slogans rather than treatises, images instead of explanations, bullet points over paragraphs. Normative implications of this phenomenon aside, this environment provides incentives for campaigns to utilize candidates' personal characteristics that communicate as much favorable information as possible, but quickly and simply. Article II of the Constitution tasks the president to be commander in chief of the nation's armed forces. As such, candidates present themselves as qualified leaders, capable of taking charge of the most powerful military force on the planet. Personal military experience conveys military competence to an electorate that uses informational shortcuts to learn about candidates.

American candidates quite often disclose and promote their previous service in the armed forces on the hustings, impressing voters with their war and military service since General George Washington. This practice continued through nineteenth century campaigns, such as General William Henry Harrison's famous 1840 "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too" election, and through modern television campaigns like John McCain's 2000 primary campaign or Bob Dole's 1996 and John Kerry's 2004 general election campaigns. In the 2000 and 2004 presidential race, both major candidates served during the Vietnam War and the differences between the nature of their military service prompted significant interest from the mainline media (Henneberger 2000) and, by extension, readers and potential voters. The very fact that candidates promote their veteran status across time indicates that campaigners making strategic resource allocation decisions believe military credentials resonate positively with voters.

This chapter develops a theory of the campaign use of previous military service in American presidential elections. Through the examination of the elections and candidates, I create a taxonomy of the candidates' service to evaluate critically how the

campaigns employ the candidates' records, whether the candidate was a peacetime supply clerk or prevailing general during a time of conflict. This chapter argues that military service goes far beyond a mere the bullet point on candidate CVs; instead, it is imbued with important partisan implications that are dependent on its electoral context. The partisan distribution of veteran and military issues is not symmetrical, nor is it static over time. Parties are not on equal footing on all elections in the perceptions of the electorate. Due to the perceived lock on security and defense issues by the Republican party recently (Norpoth and Buchanan 1992; Petrocik 1996; Benson 2003; Betts 2005), the association between Republicans and the personality trait of leadership (Hayes 2005), along with the ostensible campaign link between contemporary defense issues, leadership, and past military service, there exists a decided partisan tone in the topic of veteran status. To understand better the nature of previous military service and to suggest reasons behind observed phenomena, I construct a taxonomy of military service to systematize veteran status—as well as differentiate the ways veterans use their service in a campaign setting over time. The main focus of the analysis centers on presidential candidates, however specific references to notable primary candidates who did not obtain the nomination as well as vice presidential candidates occur when germane.

While presidents since Truman have been military veterans excepting Bill Clinton, the number of veterans running for other high public office has decreased. World War II demanded a significant proportion of the military-eligible population and the war produced many veterans. This generation of political leaders has in large part passed the torch to the Vietnam-era generation in the 1990s, resulting in a smaller proportion of veterans in the population and also within the pool of potential political elites. This decline is measurable in the electorate. The veteran population peaked in the late 1970s at nearly 30 million, but has waned since then and the current proportion of veterans in the

adult population is around 12% (Richardson and Waldrop 2003). The proportion of veterans among politicians has historically been well above that of the electorate, but the trend has reversed lately and veterans have become underrepresented in elite political positions. The number of veterans in Congress traditionally remained above the proportion in the population, but after 1990, the number of actual veterans in Congress dropped below the expected representation value (Bianco and Markham 2001).

This attenuation of the number of veterans in office might lead one to presume a corresponding decline in the campaign usage of previous military service, but interestingly, recent elections do not support this expectation. Whit Ayres, a Republican campaign manager working in the context of the 2002 election, indicated that veteran status is "one of the most prominent positives for candidates" for voters in the current climate of national security (Marlantes, p. A2). A handful of prominent congressional races in 2002 featured a candidate using his veteran status as a campaign tool prompting this assessment, including Mike Feeley's losing bid for Colorado's new seventh House seat, Max Cleland's losing attempt at keeping his Senate seat for Georgia, Bob Clement's loss for Tennessee's vacant senate seat, and Tim Johnson's successful reelection try for South Dakota's senate seat. Election handicappers, such as Michael Barone's *Almanac of American Politics*, political websites such as CNN's, and voter guides often include candidates' military service in their brief candidate bios.[3]

When you add the preponderance of political candidates with military experience, even casual spectators of American political campaigns can recognize the persistent pattern of promoting military service to attract voters, irrespective of the size of the aggregate veteran population. The same casual spectators would not conclude that the

[3] Others (Hudson 2002; Feaver and Gelpi 2005) discuss the policy preference distinctions between veterans and nonveterans in the legislature. See chapter three for a detailed account of recent congressional candidates' use of their military status.

number of veterans enlisting in politics has decreased based on the continuing salience of military experience.

Academic interest in political elites vis-à-vis military experience rests largely in the vein of studying praetorian interventions in civilian politics and largely addresses non-democratic or democratizing regimes (e.g. Nordlinger 1977; Barany 1997; Hunter 1997). Most of the few political science works addressing political ramifications of previous military service in the American context pertain to questions of civilian supremacy over the military (e.g. Huntington 1957; Kohn 1994; Collins and Holsti 1999). A handful of works have addressed the electoral implications, however, and one in particular has highlighted the recurring importance of former generals in presidential politics. Regarding the interplay between military background and electoral success, Albert Somit (1948) wrote on the eve of General Douglas MacArthur and General Dwight Eisenhower's potential presidential candidacies. Despite an anti-militarist disposition in American political culture, Somit wrote that the nineteenth century was replete with presidential candidates who used their soldierly reputation and wartime standing to access the presidential nomination process. Over half of the chief executives preceding Harry Truman saw military service and Somit classifies over a third as bona fide "military heroes," men whose military victories "were largely responsible for their elevation" to national politics (p. 195). Somit's conclusions overreach beyond their bivariate methodology, but he makes the reasonable claim that former generals make "good" presidential candidates based upon popular vote comparisons, a belief shared by those who choose party nominees as the following observations of American elections will confirm. Ascribing Eisenhower's appeal partially to his role in the World War II victory, James Davies (1954) compared Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson using the National Election Study's open-ended questions and found that the few respondents who

used charisma as an electoral guide invariably chose Ike. More recently, some have identified the high frequency of candidates' use of their service in the 20th century (Holtzman and Teigen 2002; Fulwider 2005).

Another study examined the electoral consequences of previous military service in the House of Representatives during the 1950, 1952, and 1954 Congresses (Somit and Tanenhaus 1957). Finding overrepresentation of veterans in the House compared to the electorate, the authors attribute apparent veteran electoral advantage not to something inherent about the candidates' service but rather to the parties' nomination habits. Parties recognized the electoral appeal of veteran candidacies, they posit, and nominated a large number of them for congressional elections.

This chapter explores the over-time variance in presidential candidates' service and their use of their military service in American elections, 1789-2004. There are matters related to the electoral appeal of previous military service outside the purview of this chapter. Rather than just focus on wartime presidents or an electoral "war surge" (Nardulli 2004), this study focuses more broadly on campaign usage of military history, not contextual campaign factors such as wartime elections. Nor do I normatively argue here that previous military service translates into higher quality commanders in chief.[4] This chapter also does not aim to provide quantitative estimates of the electoral profit of previous military service. Even though veteran status is ranked and placed on an ordinal scale and a dependent variable seems obvious, estimates would raise more methodological questions than they currently would substantively answer. One could regress popular vote share on candidates' veteran status, but two confounding issues cast

[4] On the contrary, some previous scholarship has explored this thesis, illustrating glaring counterexamples such as Jefferson Davis and George Washington. Davis entered office with a stunning military record but failed badly as a civil administrator of war, while Washington inherited the presidency based on his Revolutionary War heroism but suffered early crippling defeats in Indian campaigns (Arnold 1994).

immediate doubts on resulting estimates. The lack of consensus over appropriate control variables involved in modeling presidential vote share stems from a dissonant cottage industry of election forecasting, and it is very unclear which variables to use across the entire span of presidential elections to isolate the impact of the previous military experience of candidates (chapter three includes quantitative analysis that probes the electoral appeal of candidates with military service using more wieldy data than presidential elections: congressional elections).

Military service among candidates varies extensively. Surveying historical cases, this chapter divides presidential candidates into five subcategories according to their veteran status and its potential uses in a campaign. The labels of *former general, hero vet, common vet, apparent vet, and non-vet* cover the range of politicians' varied previous military service. While this taxonomy certainly applies to candidates up and down the ballot, presidential examples provide the highest demonstrative power due to their widely known personal stories, high media coverage, and campaign duration. The five categories exhaustively cover the span of candidates' military background (including the lack of military service) as well as rank and differentiate the types of service without loss of information. The classification of veteran status pertains to presidential candidates' actual service record, not necessarily to how campaigns on either side portray the candidates' experience (how campaigns brandish their service comes later). This perspective means that Michael Dukakis, for example, Democratic candidate in 1988 who is remembered for an unflattering photo-op involving a tank and oversized helmet that his opponent promoted in his advertisements, is classified on the empirical status of his actual service prior to the campaign and his political life.

The most recent exemplars of the *former general* category are Dwight Eisenhower and Wesley Clark. With exceptions I will note hereafter, former generals by

virtue of spending their adult lives in the professional military and, in the way that "actors, athletes, and astronauts" can (Canon 1990), use their military past as a statement of political moderation—a lack of history with either party and a lack of political favors to repay. Former generals in some cases enjoy national name recognition, particularly in times of conflict and beyond. Philip Converse and George Dupeux (1966) compared Generals Charles De Gaulle and Eisenhower and noted the similarity generated by the "acclaim which a populace reserves for its conquering generals" (p. 293). Charles Sellers (1965) connects the study of surge elections (Campbell 1960) to candidates with military pedigrees. For Sellers, men such as Eisenhower, William Henry Harrison, George Washington, and to a lesser extent, Andrew Jackson, Zachary Taylor, and Ulysses Grant won in surge elections.[5] The conception of surge elections consists of attributes such as relatively high turnout, an inability to alter the underlying pattern of party regime, and an extraordinarily high majority for the winning candidate temporarily helped by circumstance, issue, and personality. Sellers notes the major force behind these surges as the magnetism embodied in a "'popular hero' candidate…revered for their military achievements," (p. 22) and having the ability to draw ephemeral, low propensity voters into the process. Converse and Dupeux see a different type of draw. They note that the generals rely not on specific martial traits or military experiences intrinsically for their appeal, but instead that high military rank confers uprightness and honesty to the electorate. Hence, retired generals possess a unique lateral entry potential into presidential politics for the very same reasons that bind the country's tradition of civil

[5] Not all generals have successfully used their rank as an electoral asset. General William Westmoreland, who led U.S. forces in Vietnam, could not obtain the 1974 Republican nomination for a home state gubernatorial bid in South Carolina. He later described himself as an "inept candidate…used to a structured organization" (cited in Pace 2005).

supremacy of the military: an officially nonpartisan officer corps.[6] As I will set forth below, generals have the option to use their military service as a campaign tool. Not all generals have entered the stage of presidential politics as a political moderate, some have assumed the role of sharp partisan.

Hero veterans differ from former generals with respect to the duration of their service, and therefore are likely to have developed their political careers in the normal presidential breeding grounds of governorships and the legislature. Distinct from the other types of veterans to follow, hero veterans' service featured combat action during wartime against an enemy. John Kennedy, George H. W. Bush, Bob Dole, John McCain, and George McGovern exemplify this category. Kennedy commanded a small but famous gun boat, *PT-109*, which the Japanese rammed and sunk in 1943. Bush the elder was a young Navy pilot of a torpedo bomber during WWII who won the Distinguished Flying Cross after being shot down (Stinnett 1991). Dole also served in a heroic wartime capacity, serving as an infantry officer in the European theatre during WWII. Enemy fire seriously wounded his right arm during combat while Dole tried to save a comrade (Cramer 1992). George McGovern was an Army Air Force B-24 pilot during WWII who flew harrowing ten-hour combat sorties during the last year of the war in Europe (Ambrose 2001). McCain's air combat and POW experiences also place him in the hero veteran category, though a generation later. These examples make clear the nature of hero veterans: individuals who served in dangerous military situations and survived through heroism and bravery. These veterans, like the former generals, can strategically use their military service as a campaign tool though the possible strategies differ.

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[6] See (Smith 2004) for an interesting view on the psychological distinctions between generals who have been successful in translating their rank into obtaining the White House versus those who have failed.

The third category, *common veteran,* includes those who served in the military, wartime or peacetime, during their young adulthood, but did not involve combat or life-risking heroics. Presidents such as George W. Bush, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter serve as good examples illustrating common veterans, along with a host of unsuccessful aspirants.[7] Clearly, the military could not function without service members serving in support roles behind the lines and this chapter does not seek to discredit this type of service. Rather, the methodological need to draw distinctions impels the division between those whose stories create a heroic narrative with potent political campaign utility and those whose stories do not. Nixon and Ford served in the Navy during WWII. Nixon served as a competent supply officer. On board the *USS Montgomery*, Ford held several duties including athletic director and gunnery division officer. Carter, after graduating from Annapolis in 1946, served in the Navy as an active duty submariner for seven years. Former Vice President Walter Mondale volunteered for an enlistment in the US Army in 1951, but served as an assistant to the company clerk and later described himself as a nothing more than an adequate soldier (Gillon 1992). Common veterans also have historically used their military service to aid their presidential campaigns, though the nature of their service circumscribes how they can use it.

Two twentieth century presidents necessitate the creation of the *apparent veteran* category. Apparent vets acquired military affiliation suggestive of military service, but the appearance belies a nonmilitary reality. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan both strategically promoted the impression that they had served in the military,

[7] While many have criticized George W. Bush's military record because he did not serve in Southeast Asia, some referring to his actions as being "AWOL" during his presidential bids, he received a commission, completed flight school, qualified as an air interceptor pilot in the Texas Air National Guard, and logged many hours as a fighter jet pilot between 1968 and 1972 (Robinson 2000b). The controversy of his service record centers on 1972 when he allegedly transferred to an Alabama unit to work on a Senate campaign. Common veterans include individuals who served in the National Guard, Reserves, or Active Duty forces.

though the details of their service do not correspond to the image. Reagan was a reservist like Johnson but was exempted from combat duty by his successful career in the film industry and poor eyesight. While stationed in California, Reagan starred in morale films (Edwards 1987), so the appearance of his being a veteran is unsurprising.

Their detractors might argue that Dan Quayle and George W. Bush also belong in the apparent veteran category despite the fact that both served in the National Guard of their respective states. Quayle's military service record became a political issue during the 1988 presidential election when George H. W. Bush tapped him as a running mate. Quayle served in the National Guard as a military journalist in the early 1970s. Allegations arose that Quayle's politically powerful family pulled strings to keep him out combat duties in the Vietnam War, ensuring he serve in the Indiana National Guard (Dionne 1988). Perhaps the worst criticism came from within the party when Bob Dole, recently snubbed for the position himself, described Quayle's military service: "in my generation, you knew who was in the Guard and who was in uniform and fighting for their country" (Dowd 1988, p. A1). A fighter pilot flying F-102s from 1968 to 1972, George W. Bush suffered from similar charges during his Texas gubernatorial runs and his two presidential campaigns, that family connections helped ensure he stay out of Vietnam (Slater 2000), though the impact of the allegations was subdued compared to the situation surrounding Quayle.

Only one recent president belongs in the final category of *non-veteran*, but there many more during the early twentieth century. Bill Clinton did not serve in the military as a young man though he is of the generation of leaders who came of age during the Vietnam War. His lack of service became a major event on the campaign trial in 1992 when a letter he had written surfaced revealing that he used questionable means to evade conscription without blatant draft dodging. Further, Clinton's lack of military service, the

letter, the push to end the ban on gays' service in the military, and initial trouble in filling the Secretary of Defense spot combined to hamstring his ability to wield as effective control over the military as other commanders in chief, creating a situation of "impaired legitimacy" (Betts 2005, p. 10).

Candidates for public office use biographical facts strategically to fortify their issues positions or convey a general perception to the electorate about their fitness for office. Germane to this study, political aspirants often tout their military service, and I conceptualize three distinct categories of its use during the campaign: political characterization, political wedge, and political moderation.

Table 2.1: Combinations of previous military service type and campaign uses with a sub-sample of notable presidential candidacies as examples.

	Non Veteran	Apparent Veteran	Common Veteran	Hero Veteran	Former General
Moderation					• Washington • Antebellum • Ike '52
Wedge			• Gore	• Kerry • JFK • Bush (41) • McGovern • McKinley	• Gilded Age • Clark • Goldwater
Characterization		• Reagan • LBJ	• Carter '76	• Dole • TR	

Characterization describes candidates' emphasizing their previous military service to introduce themselves to the electorate as one who has heeded the call to service or performed his duty to country in a voice or tone that is indifferent to competing candidates.[8] When candidates use their service in this fashion, the intent is to express the characteristics of service and selflessness inherent in military life to potential voters, traits that demonstrate qualification for political office. This strategy historically fits best with political newcomers. There are several presidential candidates with military experience that do not employ it in the campaign because they are already known quantities in the electorate. Veterans such as Harry Truman and William Jennings Bryan (in 1908) already enjoyed wide recognition when they ran for president and military

[8] In writing about military veterans and presidents, the use of masculine over epicene pronouns stems from the historical preponderance of male veterans in political office as well as the inelegance and lack of consensus regarding gender-neutral options, and should not be confused with insensitivity or inattention.

service as a characterization device would have contributed little to their campaign efforts. Former generals do not fall in this category of campaign usage because their names and military reputations tend to be sufficiently widespread before the campaign.

The political wedge use of military service differs from characterization in its reference to other contenders. If a candidate airs a campaign advertisement that depicts him with his family and shows black and white pictures of him in uniform without referencing his opponent, the invocation of his military past lies within the bailiwick of characterization. If, however, he airs an advertisement depicting his military background to illustrate his opponent's lack of service, it is a political wedge. This strategy brings competition to bear, expressing the message to voters that military experience is an important frame of comparison between candidates. The wedge works by highlighting the opponent's service as lower on the ordinal scale of service prestige, and as table 2.1 demonstrates, nonveterans and apparent veterans cannot use employ this strategy while common veterans, hero veterans, and generals can—so long as their opponent is at least one rank lower then themselves. Examples included on table 2.1 include John Kennedy in 1960 touting his heroic World War II service over Richard Nixon and John Kerry promoting his Purple Hearts over George W. Bush.[9]

Political moderation refers to a candidate utilizing his nonpolitical military experience to illustrate his centrality on the partisan spectrum and lack of connection to ideological wings from either side. As table one depicts, this strategic use of military service is only open to those within the former general category. It may be done in the context of other candidates with military experience, but logically the moderation strategy is not a reactive one that involves interplay with the opponent's campaign.

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[9] The potential gain from Kerry's political wedge strategy was largely blunted by the Swift Boat advertisements, discussed below.

Instead, formal generals can pitch themselves as outsiders to the usual partisan fray, or "above politics." Some generals, such as Eisenhower, enter the political arena as political moderates and use their experience as military general to fortify this image. Others who have held that rank forgo moderation and embrace partisan identities in seeking office, such as the post-Civil War generals of the Gilded Age, Douglas MacArthur, and Wesley Clark. The moderation strategy is akin to Dick Morris' famous 1990s strategy for Bill Clinton's reelection, triangulation, which positions the candidate not simply between partisan poles in a centrist point, but above the political fray itself (Morris 1997; Morris 2002).

In short, table 2.1 demonstrates the interplay between different types of previous military service and the possibilities of its use for a campaign. Some combinations are logically impossible; a lack of service obviously precludes a candidate from using any of the campaign strategies. Former generals, however, possess the ability to use their military experiences three ways in a presidential bid. The political wedge tactic is appropriate when a veteran candidate's military service outranks his opponents.

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES AND PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS: 1789-2004

Winning and losing presidential and vice-presidential aspirants across the spectrum of American history provide evidence to evaluate the argument. Some candidates' military record are notable, such as Jackson, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, while other records are not. To provide the most expansive coverage possible, all major party nominees' military service is detailed below and the historical record is examined for each election to ascertain the way the candidates' made use of their service. Candidates without a military record are noted when germane to an election. Some candidates' military records are prosaic while others are heroic and well-known, but all

provide examples within the context of past presidential elections and inform our knowledge of the variance of its use. These elections are recounted here to provide an historical overview of presidential elections with an eye toward candidates' use of their military service.

George Washington commanded the Continental Army at the Siege of Boston, famously crossed the Delaware, survived Valley Forge, and finally accepted Cornwallis' sword, entrenching himself not only as the sole possible candidate for the nation's nascent presidency (after the Articles of Confederation period and the Constitutional Convention), but installing a precedent for generals turned presidents. As a beloved military hero who converted adversity and uncertainty into the culmination of the revolution, and the only possible contender for the new constitution's executive, Washington and his entire personal history did not just fill the role but in part created it. While the first two elections were not competitive contests, Washington's stature as the first president is a direct corollary of his military service. After Washington left the political stage, James Madison defeated De Witt Clinton in 1812. Clinton's father had been a well-known general of the New York militia (Bobbé 1962). Clinton and his supporters earned a reputation of being against the coming war with Britain, an unpopular stand. Madison had technically served as a commander of militia, but no record of him donning a uniform for campaign purposes exists.[10]

The 1816 election was the first election after Washington's electoral coronations in which at least one of the candidates had served in the Revolutionary War, excepting the pre 12th amendment artifact of Aaron Burr's candidacy that was certainly aimed at the vice presidency. In 1816 Rufus King acquiesced in being nominated as the Federalist

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[10] Having been the only president to flee an occupied Washington D.C., Madison is not remembered for his prowess as commander in chief.

party's sacrificial lamb to lose in a final attempt to contest the presidency against James Monroe (Ernst 1968, p. 351). Both King and James Monroe had served during the Revolutionary War. In a biographical sketch of King by W. Coleman on the eve of his reluctant nomination to be the Federalist nominee for the gubernatorial contest of 1816, there is no mention of King's military service, rather it focuses on his oratory and rapport with Alexander Hamilton (King and King 1894, v. 5, p. 504). King's military service surfaced in the campaign briefly, but not positively. Since his command placed him in New York City, Republican attacks centered on the fact that he did not see action.

The Republican presidential nominee, James Monroe had been shot as a lieutenant in a bold charge against the Hessians at the Battle of Trenton in late 1776 (Morgan 1921; Ammon 1971, p. 13). When the War of 1812 began, Monroe considered rejoining the military from his post as Madison's Secretary of State, but instead Madison temporarily replaced an ineffectual Secretary of War, William Eustis, with Monroe because the Monroe was "considered the only member of the Cabinet with any knowledge of military affairs" (Ammon 1971, p. 314). The 1816 election was essentially decided in the Republican nominating caucuses; there was little campaigning. The presidency in this contest was more a reward for Monroe's life of service than a reward for electoral might (Ammon 1971, p. 357), and it is unlikely that his military experience contributed much to his campaign.

Andrew Jackson's runs for the White House relied heavily on his reputation as the victor of the Battle of New Orleans. In his contemporary Martin Van Buren's own words, "The large vote he received was mainly produced by a general admiration of his military character" (Van Buren 1918). His identity was intertwined with his military service as he was often referred to as "The General," or "General Jackson," or the "Hero of New Orleans." His service as a professional officer predates his most famous victory over the

British, having commanded troops as the commander of the Tennessee militia against the Creek Indians (Horsman 1969, ch. 9). It was the Siege of New Orleans in 1814-15 that cemented Jackson's fame as a military leader, however. The war with the British had been disastrous at many turns, and in one historian's view, Jackson's lasting fame was due in part to the rejoicing of the belated victory as a needed psychological boost, one following severe times and events: an empty treasury, an almost dissolved Union, and a sacked capital (Coles 1965, p. 237). Another historian cites the fact that Jackson was peerless among America's depleted officer corps as a quality strategist (Beirne 1949, p. 390). For these reasons and the simple fact that he had won the two-week-late battle against British regulars who were veterans of the Napoleonic wars, General Andrew Jackson became a nationally known hero after 1815. Upon his arrival in Washington D.C. after the battle, Jackson was the "recipient of a greater manifestation of honor and esteem than had been shown any person in America since the death of George Washington" (Campbell 1941, p. 318).

Jackson's first attempt to win the presidency was the 1824 election, famously thrown into the House of Representatives after none of the candidates obtained a majority of electoral college votes, spurring charges of a "corrupt bargain" between Henry Clay and John Quincy Adams and denying Jackson the presidency. What also made 1824 notable was the lack of party competition. Rufus King's hopeless campaign in 1816 was the death knell for the Federalists, and so the 1824 contest took place between personalities under the same partisan banner who stood divided by few issues. Since the viable candidates shared policy preferences largely, the election hinged on the "relative personal fitness of the candidates…a campaign of opposing persons rather than principles" (Gammon 1922, p. 13). This environment is fertile territory for a nationally known military hero to run for office, offering to be above the normal partisan battles.

Jackson indeed won a majority of votes in 1824 though the Electoral College deferred his victory until 1828.

Jackson's candidacy embodying the role of former general was not universally popular. Henry Clay, the chief antagonist to Jackson's bid for the presidency in the 1824 election (even though he balloted behind Jackson, John Quincy Adams, William Crawford), derisively referred to Jackson as a "military chieftain," and believed that martial experience did not qualify one for high political office and in fact was a dangerous element in a democratic system (Colyar 1904, p. 558; Bassett 1931, p. 352).[11] Neither of his opponents, John Quincy Adams nor Henry Clay, had held any military posts. Jackson's reelection effort in 1832 relied much less on his military image than his first successful presidential run. His nonpartisan military luster wore off as he took positions on the issues facing him as an incumbent—positions that political contenders could use to run against a mere politician rather than a general. His initial political ambiguity was an early asset (Aldrich 1995, p. 108-109), and in the nineteenth century, only former generals could accrue the necessary fame outside of political life.

The heir to the Jacksonian legacy was Martin Van Buren, his former Secretary of State and Vice President. Van Buren, himself without military experience, defeated William Henry Harrison in 1836. Harrison was the hero of the 1811 Battle of Tippecanoe in the campaign against Tecumseh and hero of the 1813 Battle of the Thames against the British. Like Jackson, Harrison had been elected to Congress before his presidential bid, and served as chair on the Senate Military Affairs committee. And also like Jackson, he was referred to as "General." And like Old Hickory, Harrison enjoyed a well-known appellation. The two were bitter rivals despite the similarities.

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[11] In a response, Jackson writes that Clay had never fought for his country and his derisive term applies equally to George Washington.

The Whig vote in the 1836 election split between Daniel Webster and Harrison, enabling Van Buren to win easily, but the rematch in 1840 saw a campaign that specifically and explicitly tied a candidate's military service to the effort of election: "Tippecanoe and Tyler Too." Coupled with the clever Whig reaction to the Democratic snub suggesting if Harrison where given $2000 per year with a barrel of hard cider, he could retire in his log cabin, giving birth to the other facet of the Harrison campaign: Log Cabin and Hard Cider. The 1840 campaign was the first modern campaign, befitted with organizational capacity and national and local levels, slogans, and literature. The campaign took on the appearance of a revival, with previously unseen involvement of people in Tippecanoe clubs and other forms of association for both men and women (Kernell and Jacobson 1987; Formisano 1993). One notable meeting took advantage of the battle site itself and staged a rally there (Nevins 1927, p. 493). There was a tremendous "literary output" of the Harrison campaign, including "pamphlets, broadsides, song books, almanacs, and 'Lives' of General Harrison" (Green 1941, p. 351-58). At the center of this political tumult was the new icon Harrison: Indian-fighting hero and man of the people. Harrison's military record was not left unassailed by the Democrats. Allegations of cowardice in the 1812 War emerged (Chitwood 1939, p. 179), but these attacks were likely quiet compared to the din of the Whig campaign efforts. The Tippecanoe candidacy did not engage issues—the disparate Whigs did not create a platform at the convention (Chitwood 1939, p. 175), but relied on the candidates' personalities and campaign. Richard Johnson was Van Buren's Vice President and his political life was also attributed to his involvement in the Battle of the Thames, but his Democratic associates attempted to convince him to claim that he was the sole hero of the battle (Green 1941, p. 346).

The 1844 election between Henry Clay and James K. Polk was the only election after 1812 and before 1856 in which neither candidate had served in a military capacity. Polk, without military experience of his own, won the election and launched a successful war against Mexico where the officer corps gained what would become combat experience for both sides' in the Civil War, and the war was also the breeding ground of the next generation of presidential candidates.

In the 1848 election, "Old Rough and Ready," the hero of Buena Vista, General Zach Taylor beat a Democratic ticket with two generals on it: General Lewis Cass for president and General William O. Butler as vice president. Cass served in the Ohio militia during the War of 1812, a veteran of the Battle of the Thames, ally of Jackson, and later, Secretary of War under President Jackson (Smith 1856; McLaughlin 1891). Both Taylor and Cass were known as "General." Taylor breaks from the partisan general tradition evidence among others of his era, insofar as his public eschewing a lack of "particular politics" (Smith 1856, p. 654). Taylor, who boasted of his lack of partisanship and the fact that he had never voted, commanded with General Winfield Scott during the Mexican War. Taylor recognized that his political centrism made him the candidate of the center (Hamilton 1941, p. 44). The Cass campaign, sensitive to the military advantages of the Whig candidate, made explicit use of his service in the war of 1812, hoping to defray the perceived advantage of Taylor's military celebrity (Woodford 1950, p. 264). Whigs afterward attempted to tie Cass to an embarrassing surrender by General William Hull to British forces early in the War of 1812, and a young Whig from Illinois named Abraham Lincoln gave a memorable if sarcastic speech on the House floor, mocking the Democrats' attempt at elevating Cass into a war hero:

> By the way, Mr. Speaker, did you know I am a military hero? Yes sir; in the days of the Black Hawk war, I fought, bled, and came away. Speaking of General Cass' career reminds me of my own. I was not at Stillman's defeat, but I was about as near it, as Cass was to Hull's surrender; and like him, I saw the place very soon afterwards… If General Cass went in advance of me in picking huckleberries, I guess I surpassed him in charges upon the wild onions. If he saw any live fighting Indians, it was more than I did; but I had a good many bloody struggles with the mosquitoes; and although I never fainted from loss of blood, I can truly say I was often very hungry (Sandburg 1926, p. 386-87)

"Rough and Ready" Zachary Taylor prevailed in the election and America had elected a man who both embodied the most military experience with the least amount of political experience. Taylor had served more years in uniform than Old Hickory and Tippecanoe combined, but both Jackson and Harrison had both served in Congress and state political office before entering the White House (Hamilton 1941, p. 52). Correspondingly, Taylor lacked clear partisan identity. As mentioned above, he trumpeted his lack of even previously casting a ballot, and when asked for his political issue positions, offered demure replies. In public letters, he confirmed that he would accept nominations from either party because he was not a "party candidate" (Montgomery 1850, p. 400; McKinley and Bent 1946, ch. 16). Yet, he became a Whig, and that party enjoyed approximately the same support in the southern states as the Democrats, making one strong reason behind Taylor's victory the fact that he was a "Southern military hero" (Lynch 1938, p. 281). Taylor's candidacy epitomizes the electoral strategy of moderation as a former general in a presidential campaign, though he shares this strategy with the other antebellum generals-turned-candidates.

Taylor died in office and was succeeded by his vice president, Millard Fillmore, but as they had in the 1844 election, the Whigs decided against fielding an unelected incumbent and instead nominated "Fuss 'n' Feathers," General Winfield Scott in 1852. A contemporary would not have been surprised by the Whig's nomination choice since their

only successes had come in 1840 and 1848 with military heroes. Scott was a career soldier, known for enjoying the "pomp and glitter" of military life, but was also well known for leading his armies to Mexico City to end the war (Miller 1972, p. 153). The Democrats, expecting to lose, nominated a virtually unknown doughface lawyer from New Hampshire, Franklin Pierce. Like Scott and Taylor, Pierce was a general in the Mexican-American War, and he prevailed in the 1852 contest.

Partisan conflict was nearing the boiling point over the issue of slavery by 1856. The Whig party disintegrated after the 1854 elections and the new Republican Party nominated an abolitionist Californian, General John Frémont, trailblazer of the west, but not before he had been approached to be the Democratic nominee. He served as a military commander after his failed candidacy when Civil War broke out, but obtained few battle victories while causing multiple political headaches for Lincoln (Williams 1938). The Democrats selected a War of 1812 veteran from Pennsylvania, James Buchanan.

Republican Abraham Lincoln won a barren presidential victory in 1860 over a disintegrating union. As his mockery of General Lewis Cass above attests, Lincoln served in the Illinois militia early in his adulthood but did not see action against the Indians and did not use his service to win elections. In 1860, he beat a divided Democratic party with its northern wing nominee being Stephen Douglas and its southern one being John Breckinridge. Breckinridge was an officer in a Kentucky militia during the Mexican-American War but Douglas had not served. The politics of secession and slavery clearly drove voters toward particular nominees, not the candidates' biographies. In electoral periods of divisive partisan conflict and sharp issue divides, the electoral benefit of nominating a candidate campaigning on a biography is low, and candidates from times of electoral upheaval do not tend to campaign on their military experience.

The Confederacy was headed by West Point graduate and career officer Jefferson Davis. After serving during peace time as a young man, mustering out and running for the US House, he faced the prospect of serving again. When the Mexican-American war broke out, he resigned his seat and rejoined the Army in a Mississippi unit that participated in the Battle of Buena Vista. He became Pierce's Secretary of War before returning to Mississippi as South Carolina seceded. Davis became provisional leader of the Confederate States of America in early 1861 before winning election to a six-year term as full president of the Confederacy.

Lincoln's reelection bid in 1864 was against another West Pointer and career officer, General George McClellan. He served during the Mexican-American War under General Scott in the 1840s, but after the outbreak of hostilities between north and south Lincoln appointed McClellan as commander of the Army of the Potomac and then placed him in command of all Union forces. Earning a reputation of caution and prudence rather than the decisiveness usually attributed to Ulysses Grant and William Sherman, Lincoln took responsibilities from McClellan and finally replaced him after Antietam. Andrew Jackson was the last president to obtain a second term, Democrats had gained ground in the midterm elections, and the new Republican Party's coalition was unsteady, so early on, McClellan's chances of unseating Lincoln looked promising. As critical Union victories occurred in 1864, especially the victory at Atlanta, the West Point general's candidacy was doomed. All sources indicate that the soldier vote, even when suppressed by Democratic friendly municipalities, went strongly for Lincoln (e.g. Burnham 1955).

After Andrew Johnson's embattled partial term following Lincoln's assassination begins a string of Republican presidential election victories, and the lynchpin of Republican success seemed to be nominating Civil War veterans as candidates. These candidates during the Gilded Age from Ulysses S. Grant through William McKinley

dominated presidential elections, with Grover Cleveland offering the only Democratic respite. Grant in particular campaigned as a national healer, but both he and the other Gilded Age generals were strident Republicans during Reconstruction and after. None followed their antebellum predecessors, employing the moderation strategy of former generals. Instead, the partisan environment provided a climate befitting partisan generals employing their Civil War service as a wedge issue.

In 1868, Republicans went with a temporarily reluctant General Ulysses S. Grant while Democrats nominated an unwilling New York governor Horatio Seymour (along with General Francis Blair as the vice presidential candidate). In his overwhelming reelection effort four years later, Grant faced a hopelessly divided Democratic party. Grant's first candidacy and campaign were saturated with Grant's success at turning the war around and defeating the Confederacy. Riding the legacy of the five generals-turned-president preceding him, Grant served two full terms. The Civil War left a legacy of partisan politics guaranteeing that Republicans could keep returning to associating the Democrats with secession. Grant and his successors took advantage of this, waving the "bloody shirt," the specter portraying Democrats as traitors and Union generals as saviors by triggering Civil War partisan loyalties.

The 1876 election between nonveteran Democrat Samuel Tilden and Republican Rutherford B. Hayes required a compromise that ended Reconstruction to solve the stalemate in the Electoral College, giving the White House to Hayes, who had lost the popular vote. A lawyer before the war, Hayes rose through the ranks of an Ohio regiment during the Civil War while fighting in several battles and getting wounded four times (Perry 2003). He had been elected to Congress while still commanding in the field, his name on the ballot back home. After winning a gubernatorial election, he was a compromise Republican candidate for the nomination in 1876. In the general election

campaign, Hayes' disparate campaign organization had tried both political reform and sectarian schools as campaign themes, but eventually reclaimed the bloody shirt as the essential campaign tactic. In Hayes' words to his campaigners, "our strong ground is the dread of a solid South, rebel rule, etc., etc. I hope you will make these topics prominent in your speeches. It leads people away from 'hard Times,' which is our deadiest foe" (cited in Hoogenboom 1995, p. 269).

Ohioan James Garfield outballoted Grant for the Republican nomination in 1880 while Democrats selected General Winfield Scott Hancock.[12] Hancock's military record was long and dignified, stretching from Mexican-American War battles through the Civil War, when he served under McClellan early in the war and then distinguished himself at Antietam and finally, at Gettysburg as a hero repelling Pickett's Charge. Garfield was also a general during the Civil War, commanding troops at both Shiloh and Chickamauga. Since the Democrats fielded their own famous Civil War General who had fought valiantly for the Union, Hancock "knocked the 'bloody shirt' from the hands of the Republicans," at least temporarily but still lost the election (Dawson 1990, p. 910).

Taking the assassinated Garfield's place, Chester Arthur declined to run for his own term in 1884, leaving Republicans to nominate James Blaine. Neither the victorious Democrat, Grover Cleveland, nor Blaine served during the Civil War, each paying the $150 for a proxy to take his place, though Blaine's vice presidential candidate was Civil War General John Logan who maintained close relations with the Grand Army of the Republic and veterans. In the closely contested 1888 election, Republican and Union Civil War Colonel Benjamin Harrison beat Cleveland in the Electoral College. Harrison served under General Sherman in the March to the Sea. The fact that Cleveland had

[12] Hancock's namesake was indeed "Old Fuss and Feathers," the 1852 Whig nominee.

vetoed veteran pension bills arose during the campaign, paired with his own lack of service (Perry 2003, p. 300). Cleveland was to win the rematch in 1892.

In both 1896 and 1900, William McKinley decisively defeated William Jennings Bryan. [13] McKinley enlisted into an Ohio unit during the Civil War as a private but left as a captain. His "thoroughly modern campaign manager," Mark Hanna characterized McKinley the candidate was an officer who had seen action against the Confederacy at Antietam (Perry 2003, p. 305). He also initiated the Spanish-American War, which produced heroes Theodore Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood.

Theodore Roosevelt, assuming the presidency after McKinley's assassination, undoubtedly capitalized on his fame borne from his military adventures and adventurism to win in 1904. Roosevelt himself recognized the difference between the Civil War era veterans and those sharing Roosevelt's experiences in the more imperial campaigns for Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines (Morris 2001, p. 23). Roosevelt understood that he and the next generation of elites would not enjoy the same respect from the Civil War veterans, citing the fact that they had saved the Union while his generation projected American power overseas. His Democratic opponent, Alton B. Parker had not served. Roosevelt ran again as a third party candidate in 1912, splitting the Republican vote share and allowing Democrat Woodrow Wilson to win with only 42% of the popular vote.

The period after Theodore Roosevelt and before Dwight Eisenhower's candidacies features few veteran candidates. This "veteran hiatus" is partially explained by the fact that the Civil War generation of political leaders had left the stage and the World War I veterans were still young men. Despite this fact, there were three famous

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[13] William Jennings Bryan actually enlisted in the Army between presidential runs. At the outbreak of war with Spain after the explosion in Havana, Bryan volunteered for a Nebraska regiment and was elected a colonel by his unit in 1898 (Koenig 1971). This makes Bryan the sole candidate whose veteran status changes between multiple presidential attempts (see table 2.2).

generals who attempted to obtain the Republican nomination between World War I and 1960. In 1920, former Army Chief of Staff, General Leonard Wood, won the opening rounds of balloting at the Republican convention before Senator Warren Harding secured the spot. Wood campaigned on the issues rather than relying on his résumé: he had seen action in the Spanish-American War with Theodore Roosevelt, was a Medal of Honor winner from a campaign against Geronimo, served as Army Chief of Staff under Taft, and was a medical doctor. His campaign, hamstrung for its naivety and being at odds with the mainline Republicans supporting Harding (Hagedorn 1931, p. 345-6), started as the frontrunner for the nomination but foundered at the convention after losing a campaign manager and the evaporation of his main issue, the Red Scare (Lane 1978). Since he was running as a clear partisan, seeking the nomination by working from within the party from an ideological position, Wood would have employed the wedge strategy rather than the moderation strategy had he obtained the Republican nomination.

General Douglas MacArthur, the most decorated soldier in US military history, whose name is synonymous with victory in the Pacific during World War II, steward of postwar Japan, and insubordination under Truman, wanted to be president in 1952. His name was on the ballot during some 1948 Republican primaries and he picked up eight delegates in Wisconsin before the war in Korea had even started. It was after his 1951 address to Congress the same month that Truman had fired him that rekindled his presidential aspirations. Republican supporters in Congress invited him to speak, and his popularity gelled as Truman's plunged. Subsequent Senate hearings into the matters surrounding his recall dented his popularity, but MacArthur went on a speaking tour around the country attacking the administration, culminating in his horribly delivered keynote address at the convention that ended his chances of preventing the more moderate Eisenhower from claiming the nomination (Manchester 1978). Without much

doubt, MacArthur as the Republican nominee in 1952 would not have been a former general using the strategy of moderation. Attacking the administration and allying with Republicans in Congress, MacArthur appeared diametrically opposite to the man that actually obtained the nomination.

The American electorate very well knew Dwight Eisenhower's accolades and positions of leadership in 1952.[14] His command of Allied forces that defeated its foes on two fronts (Ambrose 1970) made him an attractive presidential candidate. His nonpolitical past, the successful execution of WWII, provided palpable evidence for prospective voters to judge him. Just like General Taylor before him, both major parties courted Eisenhower for their nomination. Former generals, outside the usual paths of political maturation and promotion, lack the taint of deep partisan affiliation. Eisenhower could have allied himself with either party due to his broad appeal and large number of supporters in both parties (Dishman 1953; Hyman and Sheatsley 1953; Divine 1972). Eisenhower's first candidacy harkens to the antebellum elections of former generals who campaigned on the personality and military record, not on political stances—he stands as a strong example of a former general campaigning using the moderation strategy.

John Kennedy's WWII experiences in the Pacific were virtually universally known. His rescue of his men after their torpedo boat was rammed and sunk became a campaign narrative. His conduct while leading and saving his crewman left "no question of his courage" in the eyes of the American people for years afterward (Martin 1983). At the time, the *PT-109* story was featured in the *New Yorker* and *Reader's Digest* (Hersey 1944). Documents from the JFK Presidential Library provide firm evidence that the *Reader's Digest* story (a reprint of the original from the New Yorker) became campaign

[14] Adlai Stevenson could not have helped his standings with the veteran population who had served under Ike when he told the American Legion in 1952 that the Legion in particular, as well as other interest groups, would receive no special consideration regarding public policy (Helms 1953).

literature for Kennedy's Senate run in 1952. In a private letter dated September, 1952, Robert Kennedy reports delivering 10,000 reprints of the story to be distributed in "barbershops, beauty parlors, etc., in Boston" (Kennedy 1952).

Kennedy used his military service to associate himself with yesteryear's military heroes to assuage fears over his principle electoral weakness. Many inside and outside the campaign considered Kennedy's religion to be an impediment to electoral success. No Roman Catholic had won the presidency before, and Kennedy's campaign needed to persuade the electorate that ecclesiastic pressures from the Vatican would not influence a Catholic president. One tactic to counter such fears was a planned address in Houston before the skeptical Greater Houston Ministerial Association. In a taped speech that later developed into a campaign ad, Kennedy explicitly tied his famous *PT-109* story and his brother's war death with those who had died defending the Alamo as willingness to defend and sacrifice for the country, making specific reference to those Alamo heroes with likely Catholic surnames (Jamieson 1984). Kennedy used his heroic World War II service to demonstrate his dedication and devotion to country to counter the impression that his religion mattered more than his citizenship.

Some historians have attempted to pierce the myth of the *PT-109* story, pointing out that the episode was the sole instance during the entire war when such a small torpedo boat was rammed by a destroyer—implying Kennedy may have helped save his crew, but it was his recklessness that put them in such danger. On top of that, World War II-era news censorship and Joseph Kennedy's personal rapport with editors at *Reader's Digest* succeeding in manipulating the story to the degree that some have referred to Kennedy as a "manufactured war hero" (Blair and Blair 1976; Miroff 2000, p. 275). Irrespective of the veracity of Kennedy's Navy experiences in the Pacific, he made his service central to his campaigns as a political wedge, for both his presidential and senatorial election.

Richard Nixon, the Republican candidate in 1960, 1968, and 1972, served in the Navy during WWII as a supply officer in the Pacific, near but not involved in combat. Although there was evidence of the campaign's minor embellishment of his actual wartime service in the 1960 campaign, Nixon was, in Stephen Ambrose's words, an "officer at an out-of-the-way supply depot…[and] was not going to have an opportunity for any heroics…so he just decided to do the best job he could" (1987, p. 109). Nixon's military service bore little impact on his presidential campaigns because he had cemented a reputation early. Even if Nixon had been one of the flag raisers on Iwo Jima, by 1968 he was a known political quantity to the American electorate with staunch anti-communist credentials.

Barry Goldwater was the Republican nominee running against incumbent Lyndon Johnson in 1964. Goldwater was already in his mid-thirties when he served as a valuable supply pilot stationed in India, tasked with flying the "hump" of the Himalayas to supply Nationalist allies in China (Goldberg 1995). Riding the long coattails of the slain Kennedy and enjoying widespread popularity, the Johnson campaign used Goldwater's strong containment views on communism and his apparent militarism against him, especially in the famous "Daisy" ad. Johnson was already 33 years old and a member of the House of Representatives by the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He had received a Naval Reserve commission and was in repeated contact with President Roosevelt during the time of his service, making him more political field observer than military man, a fact which places him in the apparent veteran category instead of common. He maintained his seat in the House and returned to Washington after a trip to the South Pacific (Dugger 1982), but continued to wear an unmerited combat medal on his lapel for the rest of his political life (McIntyre and Barnett 2001).

Another WWII hero, George McGovern, used his military stature as a bomber pilot who won the Distinguished Flying Cross (Ambrose 2001) to legitimate his anti-war stance, calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Vietnam (McGovern 1974) after his late clinching of the 1972 Democratic nomination. He explicitly employed his military experience during his campaign to provide patriotic cover for his dovish stand on Vietnam and liberal amnesty position on absconded draft evaders. While the effort was hopeless, McGovern marshaled his hero veteran status as a political wedge against common veteran Nixon.

Jimmy Carter used his Navy experience as a submariner in both his 1976 and 1980 White House runs. The first attempt against Gerald Ford saw Carter using his common veteran status for characterization purposes, perhaps because of his relative obscurity as a presidential contender and the need to establish himself. A challenger who does not enjoy high levels of name recognition can benefit most from the use of their previous military experience when employed as a characterization strategy. In his longest 1976 ad ("Bio"), the first minute with a short montage of photos from Carter's time at the Naval Academy and during his time in the Navy. In the wake of Watergate, questions of integrity and character loomed large in 1976, and Carter's military service helped fortify his strengths as an honest outsiders.

According to the American Museum of the Moving Image (AMMI) website that maintains a video repository of past advertisements, Carter fielded two major paid media spots in the 1980 campaign, marking a change from characterization strategy to political wedge strategy to highlight Reagan's apparent veteran status.[15] Walter Mondale ran against Reagan four years later, but the Reagan campaign attempted to nullify Mondale's

[15] Others provide a detailed description of the AMMI database and the potential scholarly yield of its holdings (Richardson 2004).

minor veteran advantage during a debate (Mondale being a common vet over Reagan as an apparent vet) by attacking a Mondale campaign ad depicting him on the deck of the aircraft carrier *USS Nimitz* since Mondale had opposed its deployment earlier.

Reagan's vice president, George H. W. Bush, served as a young pilot in the Pacific, where he won the Distinguished Flying Cross after being shot down during an attack he led (Stinnett 1991). Michael Dukakis did not enjoy a more prestigious military pedigree than his rival, having served in Korea during peacetime in the Army. Running against hero veteran George H. W. Bush, Dukakis suffered from the famous image of the candidate riding in a battle tank. The visual silliness of the image is what is generally remembered, but the Bush campaign used the footage in an advertisement portraying Dukakis in the tank, citing his opposition to defense systems (Black and Oliphant 1989). Because of previous issue stands and his inability to counter Bush concerning veteran status, Dukakis' options in responding to the attack were limited.

Bill Clinton faced an uphill battle in terms of military service in his bid to become commander in chief. As the first candidate since FDR without military service, Clinton's lack of service became salient because of a letter he wrote to his Reserve Officer Training Corps officer attempting to avoid both draft dodging and military service. Not only did he disclose his "loathing" of the military, the letter's revealing wording reinforced Clinton's "Slick Willie" image of attempting to have something both ways while implicitly substantiating the notion that veteran status aids the electoral potential of political candidates:

> I decided to accept the draft in spite of my beliefs for one reason: to maintain my political viability within the system… R.O.T.C. was the one way left in which I could possibly, but not positively, avoid both Vietnam and resistance… (Clinton, cited in Ifill 1992, p. A1)

Later, after Clinton had clinched the Democratic nomination and George H. W. Bush was dropping in the polls, the Bush campaign implied that Clinton had protested the war while overseas (Jehl 1992). This allegation lacked corroboration and did not resonate in the media as the draft dodger accusation had, but the public perception of these incidents in Clinton's past reinforced the image of a non-veteran, perhaps even an anti-veteran—a sharp break from his predecessors. After beating George H. W. Bush in 1992, Clinton would face another World War II hero veteran in 1996.

Bob Dole had served as an infantry officer in Italy, retaking Europe in World War II. He was severely wounded, rendering his right arm incapacitated (Dole 2005). Some of his supporters saw electoral advantage in the form of his service. A survey of the 1996 Republican delegates at the San Diego presidential nominating convention revealed that eight percent of respondents believed Bob Dole's greatest political strength was his war record (Lacayo 1996).

The 2000 presidential race included three men with different levels of veteran status reflected in their campaign rhetoric and advertisements. Al Gore enlisted in the Army before his prominent father's senatorial re-election bid failed in 1970 (Henneberger 2000). He differentiated himself from others when he joined the one percent of Harvard's class of 1969 to enter the Army. His interest in journalism drew him into combat journalism. Despite not being an infantryman, it is clear that Gore avoided the alternatives to military service that were open to other young men of his generation and social group. In Vietnam, Gore chased stories out of his base at Bien Hoa and did interviews, carrying "a pencil and a loaded M16 A-1," as he wrote for an Army paper called *The Castle Courier* (ibid. 2000, p. A1).

Gore's television spots in 2000 clearly attempted to capitalize on his service in Vietnam. Only his biography-style advertisements spent more than a blurb referring to

his military service, but the repetition made up for its brevity. Nearly every Gore spot that ran in battleground states during October started with the phrase, "Vietnam veteran, father of four, married for thirty years," along with matching images. The soft biography advertisements airing earlier in the campaign spent more time informing viewers about his military service. These longer ads characterized Gore's choice to volunteer for service vis-à-vis his father's anti-war stance, portraying Gore's ability to make tough decisions. In both types of ads, the images matched the voice-over: black and white pictures of Gore in uniform accompanied the statements made to characterize his service positively. Gore's use of his military service also helped distance himself from Clinton. Had McCain attained the Republican nomination instead of George W. Bush, Gore's ability to use his service as a political wedge would have disappeared.

In 2000, the nomination fight for the Republicans was between George W. Bush the insider and John McCain the outsider. Following deep footsteps of family tradition, John McCain graduated from Annapolis in 1958 and became a Navy pilot during the Vietnam War. After flying many dangerous missions bombing enemy targets, he was shot down over Hanoi, barely surviving the ejection, and remained a prisoner of war under grave conditions until 1973 (McCain and Salter 1999). He stayed in the Navy after the war, and served as a naval liaison to the US Senate. He remained there until he ran and won a House seat that opened up in his home state of Arizona, marking the beginning of his political career (Chandrasekaran 2000). McCain's political advertisements ran while he was still a viable contender for the Republican nomination, from October 1999 through February 2000, though his initial success was due to more than his Vietnam experiences (Paolino and Shaw 2001). Most of his ads stressed themes such as character, Reagan-style conservatism, and opposition to special interest groups. The voice-over line that stands out the most in terms of McCain's military service is "There's only one man

who's running for president who knows the military and knows the world." This partially reminded voters of George W. Bush's gaffe in failing to recall world leaders' names, but also elevated hero veteran McCain above his common veteran opponent. This usage serves as an example of the wedge usage of military service during a primary contest.

Bush ran advertisements promoting his campaign, but in contrast to both his chief rival in the primary and his rival in the general election, did not mention his service in the Texas Air National Guard. Asserting his Guard service would have only accentuated the disparity between his service and theirs. In the context of 2000, the candidates showcased their military service to a degree directly related to how heroic the service might appear to an everyday voter. It may have been the case that these advertisements were strategic in nature, hoping to steer viewers to the fact that George W. Bush did not serve in Vietnam. Gore and McCain both used their veteran status, through the form of candidate-image-cultivation advertisements (Bryant 1995), both as a wedge distinction from George W. Bush and as positive characterization for themselves because they both enjoyed an advantage over him in terms of veteran status.

The 2004 election campaigns as related to the previous military service receive specific attention in chapter four. In short, Kerry employed his hero veteran status as a wedge issue in past campaigns and attempted to do the same in his 2004 contest with George W. Bush. In 1996, when seeking re-election as the senator of Massachusetts, Kerry often made comments about his opponent's lack of service, such as this reaction to an opponent's comments: "If Bill Weld had any military experience whatsoever, he'd understand how ridiculous that is" (Keller 2002, p. 15). Speculation about John Kerry's potential as a presidential candidate augured that he was less vulnerable from Republican charges that Democrats are soft on defense and security (Barabak 2003). Kerry's hero veteran status provided him with a level of credibility on national defense issues that is

not enjoyed by his fellow Democrats. As a decorated veteran of the Vietnam War, Kerry was ostensibly shielded from the political pitfalls facing those without his military credentials. Yet, the Swift Boat negative advertisements, with their implications of duplicity and sham heroism—along with the lack of timely response, nullified Kerry's wedge potential made possible by his military experience.

Retired General Wesley Clark did not use his rank to demonstrate political moderation; after commanding Operation Allied Force in Kosovo his political proclivities became apparent and leaned toward the Democrats. This behavior makes him more like incumbent Andrew Jackson circa 1932 than newcomer Jackson of 1824 or Eisenhower. Clark perhaps belongs on the margin, straddling hero veteran and former general. Clark's political views may be atypical for the current crop of generals. While some have demonstrated evidence that generals are out of step with mainstream politics due to the conservative nature of the institution, one study found generals to be quite mainstream in the political views (Dowd 2001). Clark's candidacy started late and he did not contest the other Democratic candidates in the Iowa caucuses, and he only won one primary. He conceded by February, 2004 and began campaigning for John Kerry.

George W. Bush attempted to bolster his common veteran image with his photo-op carrier landing on the *USS Abraham Lincoln* where he declared major hostilities over after toppling the Hussein regime in Iraq in May of 2003, but this image provided fodder for Democrats to attack the administration's war planning as insurgent attacks continued and the war's popularity dropped. Kerry's response to the carrier landing explicitly frames Kerry's ability to counter Bush with his military service using it as a political wedge.

While this chapter centers on presidential candidates, the wedge strategy has manifested in gubernatorial races as well. Republican State Attorney General Dan

Lungren and Lieutenant Governor Gray Davis both sought the California governorship in 1998. Davis, the Democrat, was a Signal Corps officer in the US Army during the Vietnam War and earned the Bronze Star for meritorious service. Lungren, the conservative Republican, earned the draft designation of "1-Y," making him eligible for the military only in unlikely event of "war or national emergency," and the Vietnam War was technically neither. Further, Lungren denied recurring allegations that family connections affected his draft status (Howe 1998). In the campaign, Lundgren had a conservative voting record in Congress and took orthodox pro-defense stances but Davis constantly reminded voters, using all available channels, that he was an actual war veteran. This strategy, according to Gary Jacobson, permitted him to appeal to elements of Lungren's constituency without having to make policy statements or concessions to his own constituency (Ainsworth 1998). Davis' constantly reminded voters of his military service by using television advertisements, referring often to his Vietnam service in speeches, and surrounding himself with uniform-wearing members of veteran organizations. Davis' political tactics "inoculate[d] [him] against charges from…Lungren that he is soft on crime" or to use Jacobson's words, Davis' tactics fought "against Lungren's efforts to portray him as a crazy liberal" (ibid). Davis used his military service as a political tool to prevent being branded too liberal by his Republican opponent. Davis' circumstances and his party provided him a shield from campaign rhetoric, especially in terms of defense and security.

CHARACTERIZING ERAS

To make sense of this sweep of American presidential election history, it is useful to delineate the elections into periods sharing common characteristics, especially as they pertain to evident patterns in the electoral use of previous military service. Four distinct

eras are recognizable in presidential election history as they pertain to candidates' use of previous military service. The antebellum period, roughly between General Jackson's first candidacy in 1824 through General Frémont's nomination in 1856, is characterized by generals from either the War of 1812 or the Mexican American War running as political moderates. The Gilded Age, immediately following the Civil War and ending with Theodore Roosevelt's presidency, is dominated by Union generals making the leap from wartime success in saving the Union to political success. Next is the veteran hiatus period between Taft and Eisenhower, marked by a lack of candidates using previous military service. The "Greatest Generation" period's presidents (to borrow Tom Brokaw's oft-cited moniker for the World War II cohort) held the White House from the 1950s up until Bill Clinton, making the last attempt by a World War II veteran Bob Dole's failed attempt in 1996. Except for Clinton, all the presidents of this era were involved in the military during the war—meaning that the only nonveterans to be nominated were Clinton, Hubert Humphrey, and Adlai Stevenson.

After Washington's departure, presidential elections were either uncontested or lacked veteran candidates, save Monroe, so we begin with Andrew Jackson's 1824 candidacy through the antebellum period. Tables 2.2 depicts all of the elections and 2.3 aggregates them by era.

Table 2.2: Major party presidential candidates and their military service, 1789-2004.

Era	Year	Republican	Service	Democrat	Service
	2004	**G W Bush (R)**	Common Vet	J Kerry (D)	*Hero Vet*
	2000	**G W Bush (R)**	Common Vet	A Gore (D)	*Common Vet*
The "Greatest Generation"	1996	R Dole (R)	Hero Vet	**B Clinton (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1992	G H W Bush (R)	Hero Vet	**B Clinton (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1988	**G H W Bush (R)**	Hero Vet	M Dukakis (D)	*Common Vet*
	1984	**R Reagan (R)**	Apparent Vet	W Mondale (D)	*Common Vet*
	1980	**R Reagan (R)**	Apparent Vet	J Carter (D)	*Common Vet*
	1976	G Ford (R)	Common Vet	**J Carter (D)**	*Common Vet*
	1972	**R Nixon (R)**	Common Vet	G McGovern (D)	*Hero Vet*
	1968	**R Nixon (R)**	Common Vet	H Humphrey (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1964	B Goldwater (R)	Former General	**L Johnson (D)**	*Apparent Vet*
	1960	R Nixon (R)	Common Vet	**J Kennedy (D)**	*Hero Vet*
	1956	**D Eisenhower (R)**	Former General	A Stevenson (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1952	**D Eisenhower (R)**	Former General	A Stevenson (D)	*Nonveteran*
Veteran Hiatus	1948	T Dewey (R)	Nonveteran	**H Truman (D)**	*Common Vet*
	1944	T Dewey (R)	Nonveteran	**F Roosevelt (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1940	W Willkie (R)	Nonveteran	**F Roosevelt (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1936	A Landon (R)	Nonveteran	**F Roosevelt (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1932	H Hoover (R)	Nonveteran	**F Roosevelt (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1928	**H Hoover (R)**	Nonveteran	A Smith (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1924	**C Coolidge (R)**	Nonveteran	J Davis (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1920	**W Harding (R)**	Nonveteran	J Cox (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1916	C Hughes (R)	Nonveteran	**W Wilson (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1912	W Taft[16] (R)	Nonveteran	**W Wilson (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1908	**W Taft (R)**	Nonveteran	W Bryan (D)	*Common Vet*

[16] T Roosevelt runs against Taft under the progressive Bull Moose party, splitting Republican support.

(table 2.2 continued)

Gilded Age	1904	**T Roosevelt (R)**	Hero Vet	A Parker (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1900	**W McKinley (R)**	Hero Vet	W Bryan (D)	*Common Vet*
	1896	**W McKinley (R)**	Hero Vet	W Bryan (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1892	B Harrison (R)	Former General	**G Cleveland (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1888	**B Harrison (R)**	Former General	G Cleveland (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1884	J Blaine (R)	Nonveteran	**G Cleveland (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1880	**J Garfield (R)**	Former General	W Hancock (D)	*Former General*
	1876	**R Hayes (R)**	Former General	S Tilden (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1872	**U Grant (R)**	Former General	H Greeley (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1868	**U Grant (R)**	Former General	H Seymour (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1864	**A Lincoln (R)**	Common Vet	G McClellan (D)	*Former general*
	1860	**A Lincoln (R)**	Common Vet	S Douglas (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1860			J Breckinridge (D)	*Common Vet*
Antebellum	1856	J Frémont (R)	Former General	**J Buchanan (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1852	W Scott (W)	Former General	**F Pierce (D)**	*Former General*
	1848	**Z Taylor (W)**	Former General	L Cass (D)	*Former General*
	1844	H Clay (W)	Nonveteran	**J Polk (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1840	**W Harrison (W)**	Former General	M Van Buren (D)	*Nonveteran*
	1836	W Harrison (W)	Former General	**M Van Buren (D)**	*Nonveteran*
	1832	H Clay (NR)	Nonveteran	**A Jackson (DR)**	*Former General*
	1828	J Q Adams (DR)	Nonveteran	**A Jackson (DR)**	*Former General*
	1824	**J Q Adams (DR)**	Nonveteran	A Jackson (DR)	*Former General*
	1820			**J Monroe (DR)**	*Hero Veteran*
	1816	R King (F)	Common Vet	**J Monroe (DR)**	*Hero Veteran*
	1812	D Clinton (F)	Nonveteran	**J Madison (DR)**	*Nonveteran*
	1808	C Pinckney (F)	Common Vet	**J Madison (DR)**	*Nonveteran*
	1804	C Pinckney (F)	Common Vet	**T Jefferson**	*Nonveteran*
	1800	J Adams (F)	Nonveteran	**T Jefferson**[17]	*Nonveteran*
	1796	**J Adams (F)**	Nonveteran	T Jefferson	*Nonveteran*
	1792	**G Washington**	Former General		
	1789	**G Washington**	Former General		

[17] Aaron Burr, Jefferson's vice president but technically an electoral challenger, had extensive Revolutionary War experiences.

Table 2.3: Number of Candidates in each Eras by Veteran Type, 1828-2004.

	Nonveteran	Apparent Veteran	Common Veteran	Hero Veteran	Former General
Antebellum (1828-1856) (16 total)	7 (44%)				9 (56%)
Gilded Age (1868-1904) (20 total)	9 (45%)		1 (5%)	3 (15%)	7 (35%)
Veteran Hiatus (1908-1948) (22 total)	20 (91%)		2 (9%)		
Greatest Generation (1952-1996) (24 total)	5 (21%)	3 (13%)	8 (33%)	5 (21%)	3 (13%)
National Security (2004- on) (2 total)			1 (50%)	1 (50%)	

Percentages refer to row-wise totals of the number of major party candidacies per era.

Jackson's triumph at New Orleans may or may not have qualified him for the "various, difficult, and complicated duties of the chief magistrate," to use Clay's words, but the victory was very helpful in securing the name recognition and fame necessary to win an intra-party contest where issues were not largely contested. During his administration, Jackson took political stances on controversial topics such as the National Bank and the Nullification Crisis, but his unsuccessful bid in 1824 and successful run in 1828 employed his nonpartisan martial fame toward office-holding. This model repeated itself in Harrison's "Tippecanoe" candidacy in 1840 and Taylor's "Rough and Ready" candidacy in 1848. Harrison earned his reputation in the War of 1812 and Taylor his in the Mexican-American War, and both men took advantage of their battle-gained names to capture office in campaigns that did not promote the candidates partisan preferences. It is unclear whether Taylor even maintained positions prior to assuming office.

After 1876 begins the Gilded Age, when candidates converted their Civil War service records into presidential victories with the exception of two Cleveland administrations. The Gilded Age represented an era of Republican dominance of the presidency, and every Republican electoral victory of the period was accomplished with a Civil War hero. Many sources report that among supportive Republican voting blocs, the Union Civil War veterans were the most stalwart (e.g. Dearing 1952; Perry 2003, p. 280). These wins were often done by "waving the bloody shirt," or invoking the war generally or Lincoln's assassination specifically. Directly connecting Democrats as the party of secession was commonplace, and nothing cemented the claim better than to present the presidential candidate as a decorated and well-known Civil War candidate. Naturally, Confederate veterans were precluded from using the same strategy. Theodore Roosevelt's first presidential campaign enjoyed the advantage of incumbency, but his place on the

vice presidential ballot was secured by his feats on San Juan Hill, Cuba during the war with the Spanish.

In the antebellum period, as well as during the Gilded Age, there was fluidity between military life and political life. Political leaders could join the military as the rank of colonel. It was not uncommon for a regionally based regiment to take its mayor or other local political civilian leader as its officer—a hallmark of the citizen militia model that endured for the first century of American history. Additionally, despite the fact that the candidacies ran rather nonpolitical campaigns, it was clear with which party they were aligned. When Polk was president during the war against Mexico, he often complained of the "Whig Generals," Taylor and Scott who commanded the operation (McCormac 1922, p. 463-67). Polk's suspicions were justified; both generals subsequently ran for president under the Whig banner. Additionally, the military as an institution was not as divorced from the methods of politics then as today. The skills needed to win elections were not foreign to officers of these first two eras—regimental colonels often obtained their position not by the modern means (e.g. ROTC, the academies) but rather by a regimental election in which leaders were chosen by ballot.

After the Gilded Age, the third era defined here was one largely devoid of veteran candidacies, a recognizable veteran hiatus. When Roosevelt left the White House in 1909, ceding the office to fellow Republican Taft, the position would not be filled by many veterans until Eisenhower, nor would many veterans seek the office. The sole general attempting to gain the nomination was General Wood, and the only veteran to win the White House was Harry Truman. Truman was an officer serving in an artillery unit in World War I and his journals and accounts of his experience describe several battles and artillery exchanges (McCullough 1992). Yet, no evidence is apparent of Truman utilizing his service in the campaign, despite the fact that he ran against a

nonveteran, Thomas Dewey. Truman was well known by the time of the 1948 election, having taken office upon Franklin Roosevelt's death, and did not need to lean upon his WWI service as a campaign tool. Another factor contributing to the hiatus might be the stature of the American war veteran being at its nadir. The Bonus March's unsettling outcome in 1932 along with the final decay of the seemingly indomitable Grand Army of the Republic demonstrate a weakened veteran political punch.

The fourth era is easily bookended by the Eisenhower and George H. W. Bush presidencies. Eisenhower is the first WWII hero to obtain the presidency though he was born in the nineteenth century. Between Ike and Bush, every president either served in, during, or in the immediate aftermath of World War II: these men were among and embodied what Tom Brokaw famously called "the greatest generation" (1998). The image of the veteran was renewed and its role in American politics became vital again, not only for White House aspirants but also in Congress, where the proportion of veteran legislators shot up from 95 in 1941 to 323 in 1957 (Carr, Bernstein, and Morrison 1959, p. 308). Between Kennedy and George H. W. Bush, presidents were largely born in a very small time span in the early 1920s—their generation was one forged by World War II. Between World War II and the Korean War less than ten years later, more than 16 million men had been inducted into the military. The sheer scope of the conflict, similar to the Civil War, made the veteran population large and visible. Everyone understood military service as an implicit prerequisite to political office for decades after the armistice.

CONCLUSION: A NEW ERA OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. has existed in an era of national security, separated from the previous era by generational replacement in politics and Bill

Clinton's 1990s. The 2000 election played out before the 9/11 attacks, but the partisan pattern of a Democrat veteran having a higher prestige than his Republican opponent repeated itself in 2004. What does Gore and Kerry's use of their military experiences portend for future presidential candidates?

Using the cases above, it is evident that not all campaign uses of military service are open to all candidates. Non-veterans are obviously precluded from using military service. For apparent vets, only the characterization option is possible, and only when their opponent is not a veteran. Common vets possess the ability to characterize themselves in a positive way, but also can use their service as a wedge against non-vets. In the same fashion, hero vets can and often do use their service to positively cast themselves to voters using characterization, but they can also demonstrate an advantage over veterans "beneath" them in veteran prestige. Former generals, almost a separate case unto themselves, are alone in their ability to use their military service to portray themselves as above the political fray, moderate, or unsullied by partisan extremes—like others who arrive on the political scene with name recognition but without party label.

The degree of veteran status can be envisioned as a relative scale when given the instance of two veterans running against one another. As illustrated by the 2000 general presidential election, one man's service can trump another's, precluding the latter from making use of his service in the campaign. Though neither Gore nor Bush saw combat in the 1960s, Gore volunteered and actually went to Vietnam, while Bush's service lacks that sheen and marketability. Therefore, while both men were veterans, Gore was a common vet while Bush was closer to apparent vet than his opponent was, giving Gore the ability to run advertisements featuring his service while Bush could not.

Yet, beyond the two dimensional nature of the interplay evident in the case studies between the type of veteran and campaign use thereof, an even more interesting

inference from the data becomes clear. There is a palpable partisan asymmetry as to which party's candidates wield their military service more frequently in a campaign setting. More Democratic candidates make headlines and utilize their military service with paid media and campaign efforts than do their Republican counterparts since Eisenhower's presidency. Strategic promotion by a Democrat is also evident in McGovern's campaign of 1972, Carter's campaign in 1980, and Mondale's in 1984. The asymmetry can exist within the same party during a primary election, particularly when one candidate is a centrist, as John McCain was when running against George W. Bush in 2000.

What best explains this partisan asymmetry in how candidates use military experience is theorized in both Norpoth and Buchanan's notion of "issue trespassing" (1992) and Petrocik's overlapping notion of "issue ownership" (1996). Issue ownership, "finds a campaign effect when a candidate successfully frames the vote choice as a decision to be made in terms of problems facing the country that he is better able to 'handle' than his opponent" (Petrocik 1996, p. 826). Regarding the competence of presidential candidates, the electorate perceives stark differences between the two major parties' respective ability to "handle" issues of national defense and security.

While national defense issues are "owned" by the Republican Party, the credibility gap perceived by the electorate between the parties' candidates on these issues is not insurmountable for Democrats. Certain Democratic candidates have had the opportunity to make headway against the GOP dominance of defense issues by overtly highlighting their veteran status. What enables Democrats to encroach in Republican issue space is their ability to "pull rank" with their veteran status. Henry Clay's 1824 concerns quoted at the top of the chapter, that Jackson's military prowess fails to fulfill sufficient presidential criteria, miss the point of why military service is an important and

enduring facet of American electoral politics in both his time and in the 21st century. McGovern, Carter, Mondale, Gore, and Kerry used their service in their campaign and these efforts serve as prelude to the national security era that provides further incentives for veteran candidacies, especially for Democrats. These veterans that Democrats have nominated have generally lost in the general election to be sure, but this record does not mean the strategy is flawed; the candidates' military record was hardly the reason behind McGovern, Mondale, Gore, and Kerry's losses.

Some have speculated that neither parties' primary voters will nominate military veterans to run for president based on the fact that the pool of potential veterans is "steadily shrinking during the post-conscription era" (Holsti 2001, p. 82). This conjecture appears sound given no perceived electoral appeal to veteran candidacies and that candidates with service records appear on ballots irrespective of political exigencies. Conversely, I argue that the unique appeal rendered by previous military service provides special incentives for Democrats to nominate veterans because it allows relatively costless intrusion into a Republican issue sphere. This argument does not erase Holsti's point that the forest of candidates from which Democrats can harvest presidential timber is smaller for the Vietnam generation than it was for the World War II generation. Yet, the Swift Boat attacks on John Kerry in 2004 illustrate, among other things, that strategists on the right believed Kerry's strongest political asset to swing voters was his Vietnam service—particularly vis-à-vis Bush's own dubious service record with allegations of favoritism and desertion dogging him (see chapter four for an extended discussion on Bush's service). As others have noted, recent Democrats with a military record running for president have not succeeded in their efforts. Bill Clinton the anti-vet beat two World War II heroes in the 1990s between the close of the Cold War and the start of the "war on terror," but in a post-9/11 political atmosphere where terrorism,

national security, and defense related issues either predominate or closely follow whatever overshadows them in a presidential election, a Democratic candidate with military service has allure, *ceteris paribus*.

For the average voter, wading through the issues and campaign rhetoric is a costly process. In a way described by Popkin (1991), candidates' past experiences provide a heuristic voters use for low-information evaluation. The Popkin-style cues imbued in military service, heroism, voluntarism, dedication to country, and sacrifice, retain their value to those seeking office, "Past votes by a political candidate frequently are not easily assimilated into a picture, but there is a whole host of tags that do become integrated, such as…military veteran" (p. 77). By this token, in the national security era, previous military service provides an easy heuristic conveying defense and security competence to an electorate seeking these attributes regardless of the actual link between service and competence.

If Democrats with military service have an edge over nonveteran Democrats in their ability to nullify Republican's issue ownership over defense and security issues, an important corollary extends to the partisan dynamics surrounding candidates' personal traits. Candidates embody personal qualities that correspond to partisan labels, with Democrats linked to empathy and compassion while Republicans typify leadership and morality (Hayes 2005). This "trait ownership" that parties enjoy leads to "trait trespassing," a practice parallel to issue trespassing. Veteran Democrats, therefore, should enjoy an edge on leadership that their nonveteran peers do not, since many associate military service as an officer as the embodiment of leadership.

There is little doubt that one of the reasons for the continued attraction to military candidates even as the number of veterans in the electorate declines, is the fact that the the younger generations in American have unparalleled trust in the military as an

institution (King and Karabell 2003). The expansion of the Vietnam War in the 1960s, the public's growing dissatisfaction with the execution and justification for the war, and the Watergate scandal drove the public's trust of the federal government downward. King and Karabell's book details the growth of trust in the military since those days, attributing the rise to increases in the quality and professionalism of the institution, successful operations in Grenada, Haiti, and Desert Shield and Storm, as well as positive media and Hollywood portrayals of the military. This positive light that the military has been cast in, despite occasional lapses (e.g. Tailhook, Mogadishu), and the fact that no other federal institution is held in such high regard, certainly contributes to the electoral appeal of candidates that wrap themselves in the mantle of the military.

In one way, this chapter qualifies Somit's conclusion that being a veteran, *ceteris paribus*, helps campaign success (1948). It is important to note, of course, that veteran status alone does not predict election outcomes—the *ceteris* are certainly not *paribus* in real elections. Indeed, more than not, there are a healthy number of also-rans in American history with impressive military credentials. Several examples in this chapter illustrate a candidate enjoying an advantage in terms of veteran status but lose their elections: critical events, underlying party regime strength, economic conditions, and campaign spending obviously drive election outcomes far more than veteran status. Instead of postdicting (or even predicting) election outcomes, this chapter updates Somit's 50-year-old conclusion for the national security era by differentiating types of veterans to correspond to how recent presidential candidates have used their service. Somit's 1950s pre-Eisenhower vantage point precluded him from contradistinguishing the moderating effect of Eisenhower's military service from the more distinctly Union and Republican Gilded Age candidates. This chapter also delineates three strategic campaign uses of military service. Isolating the factors that determine electoral outcomes to measure systematically

the impact of a candidate's military background is methodologically unrealistic, but by classification and recognition of the asymmetry exhibited in recent elections, I have offered an explanation toward both why candidates promote their veteran status and highlighted its partisan implications for contemporary and future presidential politics.

Chapter 3: Congressional Elections

For the nonincumbent, qualification is the *threshold impression, without which he will not be taken seriously as a candidate.*

—Richard Fenno, 1978, emphasis in the original.

One mission of the campaign efforts of congressional candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives is to present the candidate's biography to demonstrate fitness for the job. Just as presidential candidates selectively employ personal experiences on top of issue positions and partisanship in their attempts to attract voters, so too do congressional candidates present their political biographies strategically to project qualification. Chapter two posited a theory of partisan asymmetry regarding presidential candidates' use of previous military service in campaigns, asserting that Democratic candidates can use their service as a cue to voters highlighting their security and national defense credentials in the post-9/11 era of national security. Republicans traditionally enjoy ownership over issues related to national defense and war (Norpoth and Buchanan 1992; Petrocik 1996), as well as the character traits of leadership (Hayes 2005). Similarly, Sellers (1998) provides an intuitive logic that candidates perform best in elections when they emphasize issues that resonate strongly with previously established record of competence. I extend this argument by asserting that military service provides the impression of a record on security and national defense as well as the symbols of leadership—Popkinian heuristics (1991) for voters to easily comprehend security and defense credentials. This instant appearance of credibility, in the context of the American electoral environment, imbued with military themes and history, allows Democratic

candidates to relatively costlessly "trespass" into Republican turf, to use Norpoth and Buchanan's term.

The methodological limits of studying presidents and presidential elections are evident in chapter two, especially when the elections of interest are few in number. With only one presidential election and one Democratic nominee since September 11, 2001, quantitative estimates of the electoral advantages of previous military service are elusive. This chapter extends the approach into congressional elections, specifically taking advantage of elections for the House of Representatives. The contested races in 2002, the first national elections after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 for the House serve as this chapter's data to test the partisan asymmetry hypothesis.

This chapter provides empirical evidence supporting the theory in Democratic candidates with military service benefit in terms of vote share more than Republicans do. Democratic veterans enjoy almost a two-percentage point advantage in contested races over nonveteran candidates while Republican veterans' estimates are not statistically different from Republican nonveteran candidates. This advantage is evident despite the fact that Republican veteran candidates outnumber Democratic veterans and that the Republican veterans were more likely to win their races in the aggregate. This chapter also tests the alternative notion that congressional candidates who use their military experience in the campaign seek to garner rapport with veterans in the electorate, as a sort of "home style" connection to constituents (Fenno 1978). No evidence in the 2002 congressional data supports this idea. Candidates parade their service irrespective of the size of the veteran population in their district; they are seeking votes from veterans and nonveterans alike.

Past research has examined some of the questions surrounding military vets in Congress. Both chambers flushed with veterans very quickly after the Second World

War, representing a larger share of the legislature than the population (Carr, Bernstein, and Murphy 1963). Congress comprised only 95 veteran members in 1941 but there were 323 in 1959. The influx was a response to the huge numbers of veterans returned from Europe, the Pacific, and elsewhere during the war. One way to ask whether veterans enjoy electoral appeal is to ask if veterans are overrepresented in Congress. Two separate studies share this approach to the question. By comparing percentages of victory, Somit and Tanenhaus (1957) investigated the post-war boom in veterans in Congress and found that while voters were ambivalent about veteran candidacies, both parties' leaders were quite keen to nominate veteran candidates. They perceived general voter ambivalence over candidates' military service based on comparing the number of races in which veterans won, concluding that parties believed voters prefer veterans. More recent is the study by Bianco and Markham (2001), which employed a careful calculation of what Congress' veteran composition would be if it were perfectly reflective of the veteran population in the electorate, finding that after the early 1990s, for the first time since the early 1900s, veterans are underrepresented in Congress. They conclude that simple generational replacement does not entirely explain the decrease; rather the end of conscription in the early 1970s has had critical implications for the behavior of young people destined for life in elite political circles. My analysis seeks to build on the work of Somit and Tanenhaus as well as Bianco and Markham, and couple the spirit of their inquiry with the theory built in chapter two to ascertain empirically the effects of previous military service in elections, especially relating to partisan advantage in the post-9/11 security environment.

DATA AND METHODS: 2002 HOUSE ELECTIONS

The 2002 House elections provide ideal data for testing the hypothesis of partisan differences of veteran candidates in Congress. There were 353 contested races in 2002 forming a pool of 706 candidates in two-candidate races. Republicans bucked history by increasing their share of the chamber during a midterm election for a new president for the first time since 1934. Rather than the usual loss of seats, George W. Bush's party increased their hold on the House from 219 to 229 Republican seats. Many identified Bush's post-9/11 long coattails as a factor behind the midterm Republican strength.

The best barometer of electoral appeal is the percentage of the two-party vote that candidates accrue. Setting aside third party ballots for candidates, the two-party vote share is the central dependent variable in this chapter.[18] This analysis does not look to electoral victory as its dependent variable because it would be overly restrictive, with incumbency and spending clouding the effects of military service. House elections are not generally competitive. Congressional elections are not a domain of high turnout—there are few incentives for challengers to face near-certain defeat. Advantageously drawn district boundaries and incumbency advantages together create a system where few electoral outcomes are uncertain before Election Day, and 2002 was not different from the norm. In only 36 of the 427 races outside of Louisiana and Vermont was either candidates' two-party vote between 45% and 55%. Of the same 427 races, 74 went uncontested (40 Republican and 34 Democratic). Yet, there is variance in challengers' vote share when taking on entrenched incumbents. Both parties field "sacrificial lamb" candidates in low- or near zero-probability seats, and this analysis takes the variance in the percentage of the two-party vote share rather than whether veteran candidates win or

[18] Two-party Democratic vote share is simply: $100 \times \left(\frac{DemBallots}{DemBallots + GOPBallots}\right)$.

lose elections. Rather than take random sub-samples of House races as Somit and Tanenhaus did, this analysis coded data for all the candidates from the 2002 House elections for more reliable estimates. The resulting estimates inform our understanding of the electoral appeal of veterans, knowledge to export to open seat races, statewide elections, and presidential candidates after 9/11. Learning about the variance caused by candidate factors in the many lopsided races provides information about the rarer competitive races.

Studies using congressional elections as data commonly confront methodological issues surrounding the treatment of uncontested races. Not counting Louisiana and Vermont, 79 of 427 races featured but one candidate. Simply discarding or ignoring uncontested races in analyses of congressional elections masks the power of incumbency by selecting cases based on values of the dependent variable. On the other hand, including uncontested races with vote share values that are either zero or 100% by definition overstates incumbents' electoral strength (Zaller 1998). Zaller's middling solution in his congressional analysis recodes uncontested races at 10% and 90% rather than 0% and 100%. Subsequent analysis herein presents results both ways.

Both Somit and Tanenhaus (Somit and Tanenhaus 1957) and Bianco and Markam (2001) examine the proportion of members of Congress with military experience, which provides a rough measure of the electoral appeal of candidates' military service. However, their analysis is limited by inherent inattention to losing challengers. By collecting biographical information on incumbents seeking reelection, open-seat challengers, as well as challengers seeking to unseat incumbents, this study offers a more accurate assessment of how much veteran status helps political aspirants at the polls.

Accumulating background information on electoral winners is usually straightforward, but the backgrounds of political losers from past elections are difficult to

discover. The biographical information of those that won congressional elections is typically simple to find from both online sources and printed sources, such as Michael Barone's biennial *Almanac of American Politics*. Congressional Quarterly as well as the incumbents' own official congressional websites provide ample information about those that win congressional elections.

Using Barone's *Almanac* as a starting point, I coded incumbents based on their "Military Service" entry (2003). If the *Almanac*'s entry includes military service in either the biography or the description, that served as sufficient evidence of service. If no service was listed, the incumbent's congressional website (www.house.gov/member) was checked, regardless of gender. Members' websites differ substantially from campaign sites. Candidates' campaign websites are also an important source of information on candidate biography. While the use of campaign websites changes over time, the formula for campaign websites within a given year varies little. In 2002, most candidates used their site to provide information on issue positions, demonstrate endorsements, announce rally locations, provide press releases, display photos, sometimes share a weblog, recruit volunteers, and solicit campaign donations. Additionally, all campaign websites provide a biographical section portraying the candidates' background and this section is where I checked for candidates' military service.

For the losing candidates, defunct campaign websites provide the best opportunity to discover whether a campaign promote Congressional candidates since the turn of the century have maintained and used campaign websites as part of the wider effort to obtain office. The study of the use of websites as a campaign tool has been a growing vein of scholarship, both for the Senate (Puopolo 2001) and in general (Dulio, Goff, and Thurber 1999). Initial websites starting in the late 1990s were little more than a static, online version of the classic candidate brochure, while by the beginning of the 2004 presidential

election, websites had become an important fund-raising tool and a way to forge and maintain links with supporters (Herrnson 2003; Johnson 2003).

For the failed challengers, biographies were harder to come by. Few failed challengers contest incumbents more than once, and switching districts is very uncommon, so the biographies of unsuccessful challengers disappear quickly after election night. Suffering from low victory likelihood, fewer financial and political resources, and with little help from the state or national party organizations, these ephemeral candidates typically garner little media attention, which makes acquiring data on this chapter's critical independent variable, previous military service, very difficult.

The Library of Congress maintains an archive online, "Mapping the Internet Electronic Resources Virtual Archive," or Minerva.[19] Minerva allows researchers to view past websites long after their sponsors have pulled the funding leaving the URL vacant, and it was the main source of biographical information on losing candidates. Minerva's coverage is unfortunately not complete; there were several entries missing from the archive without a way to determine whether this gap was due to a candidate's lack of a website or a technical error of the archive. While additional sources of biographies occasionally appear in other online clearinghouses of candidate information, such as the League of Women Voters website, coverage is less complete than Minerva since the League relies upon voluntary candidate submission. Facing missing data in Minerva's archive, I would extend the search to more traditional and less comprehensive sources by searching voters' guides in local newspapers using Lexis-Nexis, which often yielded local papers' pre-election side-by-side biographies of the aspirants.

Proving a negative is difficult—few candidates promote a lack of service. In the face of no evidence from the campaign website archive and no mention of service in

[19] The Minerva URL for the 2002 website repository is www.loc.gov/minerva/collect/elect2002.

several permutations of candidate biography research in newspapers using Lexis-Nexis and the *Almanac*, this analysis assumes a candidate lacks service. In short, if candidates' websites and news accounts do not provide evidence of military service, potential voters would be unlikely to discover such facts. Undisclosed military service is therefore no military service for the purposes of this study.

Table 3.1: House election candidates with military experience by party, 2002.

	Veteran/Total	Percent Veteran
Republican	103 of 353	29.2%
Democrat	62 of 353	17.6%
Both Parties	165 of 706	23.4%

The coding in this chapter's analysis is different than the coding in chapter two on presidential candidates. The biographies for presidential candidates, in general, provided a much clearer picture of the candidates' actual military service and how it was employed in their efforts to gain the White House than the bios related to congressional candidates. The criteria for measuring military service among candidates in this chapter are necessarily coarser, with aspirants coded dichotomously as either veterans or nonveterans. Table 3.1 lists the party breakdown of veteran candidacies for 2002.

Some congressional races featured candidate military service quite prominently. For example, in the Kansas 3rd district, Republicans nominated a Navy pilot who had enforced the No-Fly zone over Iraq and a civilian airline pilot flying on September 11, 2001 (Freed 2002). Tim Escobar, the Republican nominee in California's new 39th district, prominently made his US Army service flying combat helicopters the dominant

theme in his campaign literature and on his website. Darryl Roberts, a Vietnam veteran promoted through the ranks to colonel, made his service, and the "duty and honor" it bestowed, central to his campaign for Oklahoma's 4th (Barone et al. 2003, p. 1318). These examples are not rare. Some individuals, such as Kentucky's Congressman Ron Lewis (KY 2-R), began military service but did not complete the training period.[20] For the purposes of this study, a candidate needs to have served in a post-training position in any of the four branches or the US Coast Guard. I follow the convention of the Current Population Survey (see chapter 5) that asks respondents in the electorate if they have served for at least six months in military. Guards and Reserves count as military service because members undergo the same basic training and technical specialization training along with active duty service members during the active duty phase of their enlistment, and because Guard and Reserve units have been increasingly important in the protracted war on terrorism. Service in nonmilitary institutions, which may even share a similar electoral appeal as military service, are not coded as service in the armed forces. For example, in the New York second district, both the Republican and Green Party nominees had been firemen on 9/11.

Before proceeding to the multivariate analysis, one broad impression bears reporting. My comprehensive survey of the websites of incumbents and challengers of the 2002 congressional elections provides overwhelming *prima facie* evidence that candidates and campaigns believe that past military service is important and has electoral appeal. Even though the proportion of representatives in the legislature is clearly lower than it has been in the past as the World War II generation leaves politics, there is no shortage of candidates who reference military service. Military service is an almost *de*

[20] In Lewis' case, it was a kidney ailment that forced him out of Navy Officer Candidate School.

rigueur theme on candidate websites, even among those without it. Put simply, candidates trumpet their service when they have it and borrow it if they can from proxies.

Another common occurrence in campaign biographies is for the candidate to mention the service of a father or other family member. If there are no family members, then candidates' often reference the veterans in their district, citing their connections to the community. The use of military service, broadly defined, in campaign literature is ubiquitous across different categories of candidates. Men and women, incumbents and challengers, Republicans and Democrats, commonly highlight their service, or someone else's, in their biographical efforts on the web.

Referring now only to candidates who themselves served in the armed forces, there are patterns evident in the summary statistics. After dropping Vermont's independent incumbent Bernie Sanders, Louisana's seven seats due to the state's unique simultaneous primary and general election, and the uncontested races, 353 contests remain among the 2002 House elections.

Table 3.2: Mean Democratic two-party vote share by military experience of candidate and winning party, 2002.

	No vet candidates	Only Dem Vet	Only GOP Vet	Both vets	Total
Dem win	68.5% (96)	66.7% (23)	66.1% (38)	69.2% (11)	67.8% (168)
GOP win	35.2% (111)	32.5% (20)	31.6% (46)	32.6% (8)	33.9% (185)

353 total races contested races. Number of seats in parentheses. LA and VT not included.

Table 3.2 depicts the relative shares and mean two-party vote share of veteran candidacies by party among the contested races to offer a portrayal of the aggregate

partisan patterns of previous military service usage in a campaign. Republicans won more of the contested races than Democrats, reflecting the outcome of the 2002 elections that gave Republicans 229 seats nationally. Republicans actually perform slightly worse when there is a Republican veteran on the ballot compared to when there is a Democrat veteran, while Democrats do slightly better when they are fielding the only veteran candidate. In both cases, though, the difference is less than one percent among the 127 races where either the Democrat or the Republican is a veteran.

Comparing percentages omits important factors. Control variables are necessary to disentangle confounding effects from known correlates of candidates' electoral performance in the general election. To estimate the effect of previous military service on candidates' electoral performance, I regress two-party vote share on the veteran status along with a host of important controls on Table 3.3.

Because incumbency effects are enduring and robust in congressional elections, the model incorporates a control for incumbency in two ways. The incumbent or district's previous two-party Democratic vote share is included,[21] as well as a variable coded -1 for Republican incumbent, zero for open seat, and 1 for Democratic incumbent (Cox and Katz 1996). The district's partisanship is also an important control. Bush's vote share from the 2000 presidential election is used as a proxy for district partisanship.[22] Because African American voting tendencies lean strongly toward the Democrats and few minority-majority districts feature veteran candidacies, the race of the district (measure by percent Anglo) is also included in the model. The amount spent by each side's campaigns, measured in hundreds of thousands of dollars, is included because of its

[21] In the case of incumbents in contested 2002 races who won unopposed in 2000, I assign the maximum or minimum 2000 Democratic vote share for the lagged vote share value.

[22] Unlike the dependent variable, which is the two-party vote share won by the Democratic candidate, Bush's 2000 vote share is the percentage of all ballots cast.

strong predictive power regarding electoral success in congressional (Jacobson 1990) and presidential (Shaw 1999) elections. The independent variables of interest are the veteran status of both the Democratic and Republican candidates.

Candidate gender is an important control variable because women are included in the analysis. There are two important reasons behind their inclusion. First, to discard cases because women were candidates abandons too many cases arbitrarily—more than 100 candidates are female. It is certainly possible for a male candidate to reference his military status irrespective of his opponent's gender. The second reason is New Mexico's first district's incumbent, Heather Wilson (R). Elected in 1998, the Air Force veteran was the first female military veteran elected to Congress. Since the proportion of females in the officer corps and enlisted ranks has increased in the past generation, the numbers of female veterans have increased and it seems unlikely that Wilson will be the only or last female veteran in Congress. Both genders are included in the analysis, but because military service is far more common among male political aspirants, a dummy variable for Republican male and Democrat male controls for the male dominance of the chamber, despite recent gains by women running for Congress (Matland and King 2002).

Again, the critical dependent variable is two-party vote share, arbitrary coded as the Democratic two-party vote share, among the contested races. Although it is tempting to conceive of the candidate as the unit of analysis, the two-party contest provides more methodological leverage in understanding the two-candidate dynamics involved in a contested congressional election. It is possible to segregate and pool the candidates by party and compare estimates of electoral performance, but this method ignores the interplay between candidates. In other words, this analysis seeks to ascertain the degree to which Democratic veterans outperform Democratic nonveteran, the veteran status of the Republican candidate notwithstanding (and vice versa). Table 3.3 lists the results of

regressing the two-party Democratic vote share on the previous election's Democratic vote share, incumbency, Bush's percentage of the vote in 2000, the percent of the district that is Anglo, spending by both candidates, the veteran status of both candidates, and the gender of both candidates.

Table 3.3: Democratic two-party vote share in U.S. House races, 2002 (OLS).

	Contested	*Contested and Uncontested*
Previous Dem Share	0.252	0.307
	(0.025)**	(0.032)**
Incumbency	8.994	10.623
	(0.545)**	(0.740)**
Bush Vote Share 2000	-0.336	-0.320
	(0.036)**	(0.046)**
District Percent Anglo	-0.046	-0.056
	(0.017)**	(0.021)**
Democratic Spending	0.145	0.138
	(0.044)**	(0.060)*
GOP Spending	-0.071	-0.057
	(0.056)	(0.075)
Dem Veteran Candidate	1.845	4.746
	(0.824)*	(1.063)**
GOP Veteran Candidate	-0.577	-3.214
	(0.673)	(0.878)**
Dem Male Candidate	0.694	0.072
	(0.765)	(1.040)
GOP Male Candidate	1.406	3.769
	(0.956)	(1.316)**
Constant	53.686	50.112
	(2.641)**	(3.479)**
n	348	427
Adjusted R^2	0.91	0.88

Standard errors in parentheses (* $p \leq 5\%$; ** $p \leq 1\%$). Ordinary least square estimation. Incumbency coded -1 for Republican incumbent, 0 for open race, 1 for Democrat incumbent. Spending measured in $100,000s of dollars by the candidate’s campaign. Louisiana and Vermont not included.

The results in the "contested" column are the primary focus. Empirical evidence here demonstrates that Democratic candidates with military service receive 1.8% points in contested 2002 races than Democratic nonveterans. Republican veterans do not enjoy a commensurate advantage over Republicans without service in the same election with two major party candidates. The control variables all perform in their expected directions. Previous vote share, incumbency, Bush vote share, Anglo population, and spending clearly drive most of the variance in Democratic vote share.

Considering both the contested and uncontested races requires some suspension of disbelief, in the form of making assumptions about congressional elections. Essentially, including uncontested races means creating hypothetical sacrificial lambs to run against strong incumbents. First, similar but not identical to Zaller (1998), this analysis considers the Democratic vote share of uncontested races not as zero or 100%, but rather as the maximum and minimum vote share attained by Democrats in contested races in 2002.[23] This manipulation of the dependent variable ameliorates the usual problem of overstating incumbency by granting incumbents the entire vote share in uncontested races (since anyone opposing an incumbent on the ballot will receive *some* votes). Second, there is a problem with assigning a gender to these counterfactual candidates. Zaller's analysis seeks to understand patterns of incumbency, and is not concerned with the biographies of individual incumbents or challengers. My analysis focuses on these biographies, which makes gender impossible to ignore because sex and military service are so steeply

[23] In 2002, Clifford Greene, who took on Don Young (R-AK), received the lowest proportion of Democratic vote share at 18.83%. The same year, Jose Serrano (D-NY) beat his opponent, Frank Dellavalle, with 92.52% of the two-party vote. Ergo, the Democrats who ran in unopposed races are coded as receiving 92.52% and Republicans 18.83%. Zaller (1998) uses 90% and 10%.

correlated. I assign these counterfactual candidates a male gender because it is the modal value among challengers and incumbents.

Bearing in mind these stipulations, the right hand column of table 3.3 presents the results of the model when all 427 congressional races outside Vermont and Louisiana are considered. The electoral power of previous military service is much larger when considering both contested and uncontested races. For Democrats, the advantage is nearly 5%, and for Republicans, it is just above 3%. The differences between the two sets of estimates, the contested data versus the contested and uncontested data, are evidence of a veteran effect among unopposed incumbents. In other words, if incumbents lacking challengers are considered to have successfully scared off challengers, veteran incumbents are especially frightening. Estimates of veterans' electoral attractiveness that include uncontested races have provisos, particularly, that the actual Democratic vote share and the predicted values $(\hat{y})$ are clumped around the extreme ends of the variables range and that gender is assigned rather than measured. Without the caveats and without the inclusion of uncontested seats though, the empirical findings stand out for Democrats with veteran candidates picking up 1.8% more vote share on average than nonveterans.

What is the substantive significance of this small advantage enjoyed by Democratic veterans? Clearly, in most the races from which this estimate is derived, increasing the Democratic candidate's vote share by 2% would not alter the outcome of the race. Also, these estimates are derived from one election. However, just as the national party organizations pour resources into the handful of close open-seat races every year (typically created by retirements or redistricting), knowing that gaining even one percent vote share can cost hundreds of thousands of dollars, having a veteran on the ballot can be an easy advantage for Democrats after 9/11.

VETERAN STYLE WITH VETERAN CONSTITUENTS?

If Democratic congressional candidates attract a higher vote share than their nonveteran Democratic peers, an explanation rests with Fenno's conception of candidates portraying qualifications to their constituents. Military service symbolizes competence and qualification for security and defense related policy making. Another theory from Fenno explaining why candidates express their military biography through campaign literature, websites, and advertising is that the campaign seeks to win the votes of veterans in the district. Richard Fenno's famous description of incumbents' development of a "home style," to match up with their district may have implications for our understanding of veteran candidacies in congressional elections. Incumbents and challengers need to forge a bond with constituents (or potential constituents), and beyond the qualification presentation, there is also the ability to *identify* with constituents. To export Fenno's identification link to our understanding of veteran candidacies, we might expect veteran candidates to use the military experience to bond with the district's veteran population. If this alternative understanding of candidate use of military service is correct, veteran candidates should be more attractive in districts in which they share the experience with a larger veteran population. In short, we should see more veteran candidates do well in districts with a higher veteran population. To test the identification hypothesis, a model that incorporates both the veteran status of the candidates and the districts' veteran population is necessary.

The results of two tests of the "home style" identification argument are within table 3.4. The first tests whether the veteran percentage of the district drives the likelihood of a veteran winning the general election and the second tests whether district veteran population affects whether a veteran candidate emerges from either or both major

party's nomination process. Neither model demonstrates a substantively or statistically signification relationship.

It bears reminding that congressional district lines are not arbitrarily drawn. They are products of incumbency protection, racial and ethnic considerations from the Voting Rights Act and the Department of Justice, as well as population density. There is no evidence that lines are drawn to manufacture given levels of veteran population. The mean percentage of veterans in congressional districts (12.6%) reflects the national average closely, and the variation is not high among predominantly Anglo districts.

These null results are obviously not intended to be a repudiation of Fenno's work on candidates' bonds with their districts. Instead, it serves to illustrate that those bonds are not dependent on the relative share of the group with whom the candidates ostensibly identify. Identifying with veterans is electorally appealing behavior regardless of the veteran population's size in a given district.

Table 3.4: Factors predicting a veteran victory and the emergence of a veteran from either primary, 2002 (logit).

	Veteran Wins Election	*Veteran Emergence*
Veteran Population	-0.012	0.081
	(0.058)	(0.050)
Anglo Population	0.008	-0.003
	(0.009)	(0.007)
Bush Vote Share (2000)	0.017	0.021
	(0.018)	(0.016)
Dem Vote Share (2002)	-0.016	0.005
	(0.016)	(0.014)
Dem Vote Share (2000)	0.011	0.005
	(0.012)	(0.010)
Southern State	0.473	0.134
	(0.327)	(0.292)
Constant	-2.266	-2.727
	(1.314)	(1.149)*
Observations	352	352
Log Likelihood	-190.94	-234.29
Pseudo R^2	0.04	0.02

Standard errors in parentheses (* $p \leq 5\%$; ** $p \leq 1\%$). Maximum likelihood estimation (logistic regression). Uncontested races, Louisiana, and Vermont not included. South dummy variable coded using eleven former Confederate states.

CONCLUSION: HOUSE ELECTIONS AND VETERANS

This chapter sought to use empirical data to evaluate that which chapter two could not with its one presidential election. Do Democrats benefit more at the polls from military service than Republicans after 9/11? The 2002 congressional elections offer the opportunity to appraise the theory's quality in the first national elections after the terrorist attacks in September 2001. Based on results in contested elections and controlling for important correlates of electoral performance, Democratic candidates who touted their veteran status benefited in terms of vote share while Republicans in the same position did not. The proportional weight of veterans in the congressional districts does not affect the electoral attractiveness of veteran candidates.

However, Democrats with military service do not always win elections—if veteran status could overcome the power of incumbency, there would be 535 veterans on Capitol Hill. Even in congressional elections in which military service is salient and becomes the main theme of the election, Democrat veterans can lose. Sometimes, incumbent Democrats with military experience get unseated. Max Cleland, a wounded Vietnam veteran and Democrat, ran for the Senate for the first time in 1996 to fill Sam Nunn's vacated seat. Max Cleland beat Guy Millner narrowly despite being outspent three to one. Cleland's campaign promised he would "Be like Sam," particularly in matter of national defense. Nunn's reputation as a defense guru provided a frame within which the vying candidates operated. Cleland lost both his legs and an arm in Vietnam (though not in combat) and his advertising spots made his disabilities part of the imagery to accompany the message of sacrifice (Kotok 1996; Sherman 1996). Millner, a Republican, who served in the Navy Reserves, was limited in his ability to counter these soft ads or even portray his own military service. Cleland, a former Carter-appointed

head of the Veterans Administration, used his war wounds and palpable veteran status as a characterization tool to provide voters with a view compatible with Nunn's military stature.

In his unsuccessful 2002 reelection bid, Cleland received harsh criticism from his Republican challenger Saxby Chambliss that he was soft on terrorism. Chambliss, a non-veteran, fielded confrontational advertisements attacking Cleland's eleven votes against President Bush's national security proposals, attempting to chip into the advantage Cleland maintained on security issues borne from his "compelling biography" (Barone et al. 2003, p. 461). Cleland responded to the ads by claiming that Chambliss was questioning his patriotism. For Merle Black, Chambliss' campaign efforts went "at the heart of Cleland's strength," and could potentially change "Georgia voters' opinions of Cleland on national defense issues…[taking] away his strongest appeal" (Halbfinger 2002). Cleland lost the 2002 election after receiving only 47% of the two-party vote, so his veteran credentials did not obtain a plurality for him. However, this chapter's findings beg the question: how would a nonveteran in Cleland's place have done against Chambliss with the same eleven votes against national security proposals?

There are important policy implications related to electoral advantages that veterans enjoy. If a legislative body with members who experienced military service produced the same public policies as a legislative body without veterans, then this chapter's relevance would be related only questions of candidate quality and campaign effects for congressional elections.[24] However, recent evidence suggests that political elites' policy preferences can be affected by previous military service. Recent important research has demonstrated that veterans and nonveterans in policy making positions

[24] Congressional scholars have often wrestled with the almost inherently endogenous concept of candidate quality. If military experience has an independent and positive effect on electoral appeal, maintaining measures of armed forces services could augment our understanding of *a priori* candidate quality.

differ about the use of force in a militarized conflict (Gelpi and Feaver 2002), while others discovered evidence that there are domestic policy differences related to specific policy areas regarding gays in the military and selective service (Bianco and Markham 2001).

Additionally, since military service has become an optional experience for the nation's young men after 1973, the sort of people with the requisite educational opportunities and pedigree for entry into elite political life rarely join the military. Relative to previous eras, military service in elite political circles is exceptional and perhaps voters of the future will view the experience more as an electoral commodity in the way that this chapter has estimated.

Chapter 4: Candidates and Military Service in the 2004 Presidential Election

The 2004 presidential election centered on the military service of the candidates and the political proclivities of military veterans in the electorate. Scholarly and popular sources have depicted military members, particularly influential leaders in the officer corps, as increasingly conservative and Republican since the 1980s. Scholarly interest in this growing divide in the US between the military population and civilians has engendered the “gap” literature that has focused on the attitudinal distinctions between servicemen and women versus civilians—civilians in political elite circles as well as ordinary members of the electorate (Feaver and Kohn 2001). Today, just more than half of American veterans joined the service after the end of the draft in 1973, and some argue that increased self-selection effects have created a more right-leaning veteran population. Yet, other scholars (Jennings and Markus 1977; Segal et al. 2001) have stressed that entry-level enlisted members do not exhibit the same right-leaning tendencies as officers and have described the veteran population as quite politically similar to their nonveteran peers. These competing approaches and findings, while valuable contributions to our understanding of veteran politics, have all lacked one important trait: the context of an actual election, in particular an election that made a central theme of the politics of military service.

This chapter focuses on both elite behavior and citizen behavior and attitudes during the 2004 election to provide explanations for important questions: what is the partisanship and candidate preference for America’s veterans? Do veterans prefer candidates with military experience of their own? Evidence from the 2004 election

indicates that, while the current military population may maintain Republican proclivities, partisan differences between veterans and nonveterans is very context dependent—with veterans demonstrating strong affinity for Bush following the Swift Boat advertisements in September, but before and after (and in time for the election), veterans' partisanship does not differ from nonveterans. Additionally, veterans hold political elites with military service in higher regard than their nonveterans peers, but apparently the affinity for veteran candidates is eclipsed by partisan loyalty once these elites run for office.

This chapter segments into three principle parts. First, content analysis of pertinent media coverage is used to characterize the strategies and impact of efforts by George W. Bush, Wesley Clark, Howard Dean, and John Kerry in dealing with questions about military service in the campaign setting using media accounts of campaign strategy, events, and advertisements. This section relies heavily upon journalistic accounts to chronicle the relevant actions and intentions of the campaigns. Second, previous literature and germane findings about the attitudes of military veterans are detailed in order to frame the hypotheses, data, and methods regarding analyzing the partisanship and vote choice of military veterans. Lastly, feeling thermometers, open-ended questions, and primary election exit polling are used to measure veterans affect toward veteran candidates in the 2004 election as well as the 1952 and 1960 general presidential election for comparative purposes.

The 2004 election provides researchers with an excellent case to investigate the relationship between electoral politics and previous military service. Kerry was the first Vietnam veteran nominated by either major party to run for president. Vietnam veterans Bob Kerrey in 1992 and John McCain in 2000 had both attempted to obtain the Democratic and Republican presidential nomination respectively, but Kerry became the

first by successfully defeating Howard Dean, John Edwards, Wesley Clark, and others for the Democratic nomination in 2004. The previous epoch of presidents and presidential candidates, from Dwight Eisenhower to George Herbert Walker Bush, belonged to the generation that waged World War II.[25] Kerry opened his acceptance speech at the Boston 2004 Democratic National Convention with a military salute to the crowd and the line "I'm John Kerry and I'm reporting for duty." The convention had already been imbued with palpable veteran involvement (Schatz 2004; Stout 2004). The presidential campaign spent as much time in advertisements, rhetoric, airtime, and newspaper column inches dealing with a thirty-year old conflict in Southeast Asia as it did with the conflict waging during the campaign against insurgents in Iraq.

Incumbent president George W. Bush served in the Texas Air National Guard from 1968, flying F-102 interceptors after a period of flight training. He sought a transfer to an Air Reserve Unit in Alabama in 1972, to participate in Winton "Red" Blount's Senate campaign. There, records indicate he allowed his flight status to lapse by failing to acquire medical qualification. Doubts about Bush's arose from Democratic sources, the Kerry campaign, and the media. One thrust concentrated on the fact that Bush had served in the National Guard rather than in a unit bound for Vietnam. This criticism suggested that Bush's father, then-congressman George H. W. Bush (R-TX 7), used his political connections to ensure his son a spot in the National Guard rather than one that rotated men and resources to combat in Southeast Asia, echoing the criticism from the 1988 presidential election that involved Vice Presidential candidate Dan Quayle's service in the Indiana National Guard, allegedly with help from his politically influential father to avoid Vietnam service (Dionne 1988; Dowd 1988). The lieutenant governor of Texas at

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[25] Eisenhower belonged to the cohort before the WWII generation of course; he had fought in both world wars.

the time of Bush's assignment to the Texas unit, Ben Barnes (D), disclosed during the 2004 campaign that he had improperly used his office to appoint Bush and other sons of prominent Texans to the safe assignment, a point both Bush and his father strenuously deny (Dobbs 2004). Another line of doubt about Bush's service questioned whether or not he had actually fulfilled his duty during the period of service in Alabama. Some Democrats went so far as the call Bush AWOL (Romano 2004). The author of Doonesbury, a political cartoon, offered a $10,000 reward to any witnesses that could affirm Bush's presence at the Alabama installation, a reward that went unclaimed. These criticisms reflected similar questions during Bush's first presidential campaign in 2000 (e.g. Robinson 2000a).

George W. Bush's dramatic but ultimately ill-advised announcement of the end of major military operations in the Iraq war in May of 2003 featured him piloting a Navy jet before trading control to the pilot for a carrier landing on the USS Abraham Lincoln, decorated with a "Mission Accomplished" banner. The event attracted criticism from Democrats both at the time and during the presidential campaign after the insurgency proved more enduring and extensive than the administration anticipated. The decision to land the president on a carrier after helping fly the warplane could have been made to highlight the president's role as commander in chief as well as to counter claims that he had dodged military service.

Following in the footsteps of Dwight Eisenhower and a host of 19th century presidential candidates, Wesley Clark attempted to make the leap from high-ranking general to US president. His campaign did not last much beyond January after it became clear that John Kerry was dominating the primaries, but from his candidacy until November, Clark's involvement in the race was a clear attempt to wrest national security and defense issues away from the Republicans during wartime election.

His campaign began tardy and somewhat reluctantly. Rather than the usual appearance of exploratory statements and tentative temperature taking, the Clark campaign initially took the shape of a grass-roots effort to convince the candidate to become the tenth candidate in the race to unseat George W. Bush (Finer 2003). Supporters sporting “Draft Clark!” signs and bumper stickers impelled the retired general, who had apparently been undecided on the decision, to run. Media accounts describe the people involved in the campaign in New Hampshire as composed of both nonveterans and veterans but definitely borrowing military themes in its organization (Leibovich 2004).[26] Clark enjoyed the endorsement of World War II veteran and 1972 presidential candidate Senator George McGovern (D-SD) and Korean War veteran Representative Charles Rangel (D-NY).

Between announcing his candidacy and the New Hampshire contest, Clark had the unique opportunity to highlight the fact that he was the supreme commander of NATO and “faced down a dictator,” in Slobodan Milosevic (Sciolino 2003; Smith 2003). In mid-December, only a month before the New Hampshire contest, Clark traveled to The Hague to testify at Milosevic’s ongoing war crimes trial, giving him some valuable free media coverage further spotlighting his military career. Clark explicitly connected his experiences as Army general as desirable attributes, vital for serving as president (Kurtz 2003). The advertising his campaign fielded in New Hampshire avoided domestic issue specifics and instead featured Clark as a leader with images highlighting his military career (Rutenberg 2003). He also attempted drawing connections to fellow Arkansan and former president Bill Clinton, by using footage of Clinton’s awarding Clark the Presidential Medal of Freedom award for his service in Kosovo.

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[26] Clark’s relatively late entry into the race necessitating him concentrating resources in New Hampshire and largely forgoing the Iowa Caucuses.

Clark and Kerry sparred in the media about who held more credible foreign policy credentials based on military service. With less than a week before New Hampshire, Clark delineated himself as a commander and reminded audiences that he outranked Kerry: "…with all due respect, he's a lieutenant and I'm a general," an event that spurred some back-and-forth between the two contenders and a subsequent apology from Clark (Halbfinger and Wyatt 2004). After a disappointing finish in New Hampshire, his campaign foundered. Oklahoma was the only first place finish the Clark campaign managed, and he ultimately conceded defeat and climbed aboard the Kerry campaign by mid-February (Stolberg 2004).

Howard Dean suffered some negative media coverage before the Iowa Caucuses related to his own lack of military service. Dean's age made him eligible for the Vietnam draft, but he sought medical deferment due to a back condition (that did not preclude his year as a ski bum in Aspen)—a story that found resonance due to its contrast with the biographies touted by both Kerry and Clark (Lyman and Drew 2003). Later, Dean misstated that his brother, Charles Dean, had been a POW/MIA in Laos to a newspaper questionnaire when his brother had never been in the military (Wilgoren 2003). Taken together and contrasted with the military records of Kerry and Clark during a wartime election, Dean's lack of service did not contribute toward helping his campaign.

While Bush, Clark, and Dean provide examples of the confluence of military service and electoral politics, in 2004, the real focus is on the junior senator from Massachusetts, John F. Kerry. Coverage of the candidate, from a year before Election Day all the way to November 2004, used the senator's military service in Vietnam and anti-war protest activity after the war as a frame to portray Kerry. In the pre-primary period, the Kerry campaign parried Dean's attacks on his vote authorizing the war in Iraq with his military service, and continued to use his veteran status as a campaign vehicle at

the convention and during the general election campaign against Bush. One example of typical media accounts characterizing Kerry's use of his vita as a campaign tool is "it [is] clear that being a lieutenant in Vietnam is not just a biographical chapter that the senator is marketing in his campaign—it is part of the essence of who he is" (Kurtz 2004).

Kerry's use of his veteran status was more complex than previous generations of candidates serving in earlier wars. The Vietnam War was a politically polarizing event that divided the Democratic party and the nation, and its conclusion was more ambiguous and opprobrious than the ticker-tape parades marking the end of WWII in 1945. Kerry himself exemplified this divide by serving in the Navy and receiving commendations for bravery while also coming home to help found the Vietnam Veterans Against the War organization (Jackson 2003; Halbfinger 2004). Coverage of Kerry captured this dual image—he could be seen on the husting surrounded by other veterans wearing VFW hats in 2004 while images of Kerry from the sixties with anti-war activist Jane Fonda at a rally circulated on the internet.

While enjoying front-runner status in the early speculative period of the invisible primary, Kerry's polling numbers in late 2003 sank as the Dean and Clark candidacies gained momentum. Kerry's first place finish in the Iowa caucuses surprised the conventional wisdom and renewed his campaign, an effort that Kerry and his advisors credit in part to veteran organizers on the ground (Connolly 2004). Kerry's reliance upon a group of fellow veterans working in the campaign, whom he repeatedly referred to as his "band of brothers," dates to his past senate campaigns but became an important and central fixture of Kerry's 2004 presidential run (Jackson and Mittlestadt 2004; Lawrence 2004; Zengerle 2004).

The 2004 Democratic Convention in Boston, Massachusetts ended the summer with a political spectacle more imbued with military themes than recent conventions from

either party (Casteel 2004; Schatz 2004). Kerry arrived at the convention by crossing Boston Harbor aboard a ship with a dozen Vietnam veterans who had served with him (VandeHei 2004). A host of former generals and military leaders lent their credibility to the Kerry candidacy by appearing together on stage before Kerry's acceptance speech. Introducing Kerry for his acceptance speech was fellow Vietnam veteran and former Senator, Max Cleland. The most memorable symbol of Kerry communicating his military service was of course the opening line of his speech, as he "reported for duty."

The positive light surrounding his military service in summer darkened in autumn as competing voices entered the fray. Following the Democratic convention, an August advertisement ran in Wisconsin, Ohio, and West Virginia entitled "Any Questions?," produced by a group that was to become the face of "527" groups (eponymously named for the tax code befitting their tax-exempt status), Swift Boat Veterans for Truth. The ad generated far more impact than any other ads during the primary or general election, due to the free media coverage of the ad itself. Sharply critical of Kerry, the spot featured Vietnam veterans reporting that Kerry was unfit to lead and had exaggerated the events that underpinned his medals for bravery. The organization aired another ad in September focusing on Kerry's anti-war activities after his return stateside, despite criticism of outside groups from Republicans including Bush and John McCain (Memmott 2004). One of the leaders within the Swift Boat organization authored a book detailing evidence of how Kerry's medals were unwarranted (O'Neill and Corsi 2004). As evidence of the ad's centrality to the election campaign, many post-mortem criticisms of Kerry's failed presidential bid blame the campaign's decision to wait and not immediately respond to the Swift Boat attacks.

Among the most important of Kerry's veteran campaigners was the former senator from Georgia, Max Cleland, a Democrat unseated in 2002 by Saxby Chambliss

after one term. Cleland, a triple amputee badly wounded by a grenade in Vietnam and former head of the Veterans Administration during the Carter administration, became an important figure and symbol in the 2004 Kerry campaign. A month after the Democratic convention, one of Kerry's late but potent responses to the Swift Boat attack ad sent Cleland to Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas with a letter in hand asking the president to condemn the 527 group's anti-Kerry advertisements. The spectacle of political theatre generated wide media coverage after the president's secret service agents refused to accept the letter at the ranch's gate. A state Republican official and Vietnam Veteran, Jerry Patterson, had a letter for Cleland to give to Kerry stating that Kerry should not try to silence critics after he made military service a central theme of his campaign (Roth 2004).

Taken together it is abundantly clear that candidates running for president believed what previous generations of candidates have, that military service is a useful political attribute for attracting electoral support. As other chapters have demonstrated with repeated evidence up and down the ballot and across time, candidates parade it when they have it, borrow it from proxies when they can, and even exaggerate when it is lackluster. Yet, these campaign events in 2004 and other races do not necessarily translate into generating votes, veteran or otherwise, despite overwhelming *prima facie* evidence that the campaigns and candidates expressly court veterans as a group.

If this fact presumes that veterans are distinct from the population in some political way, we need to understand the nature of the distinction. Military training differs from academic training in that it provides for both the instruction of military skills and knowledge as well as an assimilating function into a "total institution" during a formative period of young adulthood—in many ways the institution is a "turning point in life"

(Elder, Gimbel, and Ivie 1991, p. 215).[27] The political implications of former members' attitudes inculcated during military service upon return to civilian life became a scholarly interest after World War II. While its main thrust centered on the quality of civil-military control, Samuel Huntington's seminal *Soldier and the State* describes a rather apolitical and professional military in the United States (1957). Subsequent critics of his work characterized the American military as a dispositionally conservative institution (Abrahamsson 1972) with values that implied partisan allies. Since the late 1980s, an important scholarly discussion has focused on the partisan identity of members of the US military.

During the 2004 presidential election, due to the military background of the candidates and the fact that the contest was a wartime election, pundits and other political prognosticators estimated the political leanings of America's veteran population to be Republican. Headlines such as "Veterans Mostly Support Bush, National Poll Finds" (Weiss 2004) stemmed partly from bivariate analysis released by the National Annenberg Election Survey that demonstrated veterans' support for Bush over Kerry (Clymer 2004). The support for this analysis lay in many assumptions about the veteran population, including the conservative nature of the military institution, the presumed support for military actions generally, the role that absentee ballots played in the 2000 presidential contest in Florida (Barstow and Van Natta 2001), the fact that the veteran population is overwhelmingly male, as well as the sense that Republicans "own" issues related to security and national defense (Norpoth and Buchanan 1992; Petrocik 1996) assuming that veterans embody and exemplify the military.

[27] Some time has passed since the publication of thorough and critical literature review articles on the state of the study of military institutional socialization. Two in particular deserve credit for exhaustive coverage (Moskos 1976; Lovell and Stiehm 1989).

Partisan attitudes specifically have not been the focus of studies of military veterans, but scholars from both political science and sociology have studied related political attitudes starting after World War II. These topics include authoritarian attitudes, political efficacy, and trust in government. Military service necessarily attenuates personal liberties and freedom, instead favoring unity, conformity, discipline, and role hierarchy, but these values do not accord with the democratic norms found in the civilian word to which veterans return. Service in a military environment might engender acceptance of authoritarian attitudes and early scholarly examinations of veteran attitudes following World War II found modest evidence of increased levels of authoritarian attitudes among men who had served in the military (Christie 1952). Others found evidence of nonexistent, contingent, or even lower levels of authoritarian and conformist attitudes among servicemen (French and Ernest 1955; Campbell and McCormack 1957; Firestone 1959). Other scholarship using mid-1970s data found mixed results and no discernable pattern to veteran distinctiveness on authoritarian attitudes in the U.S. (Schreiber 1979). The question of authoritarian attitudes holds relevance for other countries as well, especially those with universal male compulsory service. Mid-1970s West German soldiers were the focus of studies of the Bundeswehr's political effect on young men (Roghmann and Sodeur 1972; Lippert, Schneider, and Zoll 1978; Wakenhut 1979). Taken together, the preponderance of evidence gives no indication that the military institutions of liberal democracies inculcate members with authoritarian attitudes or dispositions, and the linkage between authoritarian attitudes and partisanship is uncertain.

Using unique panel data featuring youths who graduated from high school in 1965 and re-interviewed after the conflict in Vietnam, Jennings and Markus investigated the effect that military service had upon its members (1977). They explored a wide variety of

attitudes, including political cynicism, foreign policy, and racial tolerance, and results from their longitudinal study provide modest evidence of a distinction between those that served and those that did not. Other scholars have arrived to similar conclusions, finding little evidence for striking attitudinal differences between veterans and nonveterans, citing reasons such as short duration of service for the large majority of members (Lovell and Stiehm 1989) and the permeability of external forces keeping the military from being a completely insulated institution (Lippert et al. 1978).

While these attitudes are important, the heart of this analysis lies in understanding the partisan allegiances of military veterans. Historical evidence of veterans being an important voting bloc exist for particular races, though the analyses rely on media accounts. Joseph McCarthy's 1946 narrow victory over Bob LaFollette Jr. for the Senate credited ex-Marine McCarthy's support from veterans (Stavisky 1948). Veterans are also seen as the nineteenth century progenitor of organized interests able to back a political party electorally in exchange for large-scale federal expenditures to benefit the group (Skocpol 1993; Holcombe 1999).

Recent scholarship has focuses on and debated the growth of a gap between the political disposition of the military, especially the officer corps and military elites, and the public at large—depicting a Republican and conservative institution that clashes with Democratic presidents and inculcates conservative values (e.g. Betros 2001; Feaver and Kohn 2001; Cummings, Dempsey, and Shapiro 2005). However, the officer corps comprises less than 20% of the armed forces as a whole. The enlisted ranks, men and women who likely joined without degrees beyond high school, do not exhibit the same distinctions from mainstream America as their commissioned leaders do (Segal, Freedman-Doan, Bachman, and O'Malley 2001). While most survey instruments preclude measuring the officer-enlisted differences directly because they do not ask about

respondents' former rank, we know that the preponderance of veterans are not officers therefore the "gap" literature's ability to help us explain distinct partisanship for the veteran population is incomplete.

Many empirical signs indicate that the Kerry campaign's attempts to attract veteran voters may have been an uphill struggle due to Republican sympathies. While veterans are a symbolically potent electoral target during a wartime election and a higher-than-average turnout group, the Kerry campaign's quest for the veteran vote ran counter to data indicating preference for Republican candidates, results that were published in the mainstream press (Weiss 2004). One source of polling during the Democratic convention and after release of the Swift Boat ad by the National Annenberg Election Survey (NAES04) provided strong bivariate evidence that veterans use their partisanship as their main heuristic for candidate choice and do not follow the candidate with more prestigious military pedigree. According to NAES04, Bush maintained demonstrably higher favorability ratings than Kerry (+17%) and the survey analysts attribute their findings to the fact that underlying partisanship of veterans is Republican-skewed.[28]

Veterans in their September sample saw Bush as being more knowledgeable than Kerry, the opposite of the nonveterans in the sample. Of interest to campaign watchers, the NAES04 rolling polls across the period demonstrate that Kerry's support increased during and immediately after the campaign but receded once the news about the Swift Boat ad became widespread. Also, while 57% of veterans viewed Bush as a "strong leader" before the conventions, that number dipped to 43% during the conventions, but then rebounded back to pre-convention levels, movement Clymer attributes to the effectiveness of the ad and its coverage (Clymer 2004). Other polling agencies conducted

[28] As of June 2005, NAES has not made their individual-level data available to either scholars or the public, so I am deferring to their conclusions.

candidate support polls and differentiated veterans from nonveterans, finding veterans to lean significantly toward Bush (Rasmussen 2004) a month later.

The presumption, given these facts, is that 2004 veterans should favor George W. Bush and should self-report identification with the Republican Party. Several hypotheses stem from these questions related to the political phenomena surrounding veterans and the 2004 presidential election. The first pertains squarely to ex-servicemen's party identity. Using individual level data and controlling for relevant demographic factors, are veterans different from those without military service experience in terms of partisan identification?

Our understanding of partisan loyalty stems from the beginnings of the political behavioral research based on the 1950s presidential elections, establishing that party identification is a stable enduring psychological bond with a party formed early in life (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). Earlier conceptions of vote choice saw the decision as a product largely of sociological determinism (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). Military service immerses young adults into an institution that controls its members' environment with near totality during the period in their life when attachments to party form. In an institution that values conformity and conservatism, and whose core value is national defense, attachment to the contemporary Republican Party seems a reasonable assumption. Additionally, if the post-Clinton political years are as hyperpolarized along party lines as some have characterized (Barone 2002), perhaps the military and its corollary, veterans, stand clearly on one side of the divide.

The 2004 American National Election Study (ANES) asks respondents for their partisan loyalties as well as their veteran status and a host of other political attitudes,

allowing a direct empirical test of veterans' political affinities.[29] Counter to what media expectations, campaign assumptions, and the "gap" literature may suggest about vivid partisan differences between those in this country who have served and those that have not, the National Election Study data exhibit scant partisan differences dividing veterans and nonveterans in 2004. Party identification among the 160-odd veterans (out of approximately 1,200 total) statistically mirrors the party identification of the population and the rest of the nonveteran sample, and the same is true for a three-point ideology scale.[30]

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[29] National Election Survey data provided by the organization's website (http://www.umich.edu/~nes) (The National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan. The NES Guide to Public Opinion and Electoral Behavior. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan, Center for Political Studies [Producer and Distributor]. 2004)

[30] Using an ordered probit model to identify factors driving party identification, the usual suspects of ideology, income, gender, et cetera live up to their expectations while the veteran variable held no effect.

Table 4.1: Party Identity Percentages by Veteran Status, 2004.

Party Identity	*Nonvets %*	*Vets %*	*Total %*
Strong Dem	17.1	16.4	17.0
Weak Dem	15.2	13.9	15.0
Independent lean Dem	17.8	16.4	17.6
Independent	9.8	10.3	9.9
Independent lean Rep	11.6	11.5	11.6
Weak Republican	12.7	13.9	12.9
Strong Republican	15.9	17.6	16.2

Pearson chi^2 (6 *df*) = 0.7824, Pr = 0.993, *n* = 1,195. Based on NES data.

Figure 4.1: Party Identity Percentages by Veteran Status, 2004.



Figure 4.1 depicts the proportions of veterans and nonveterans in each category of the seven-point scale of partisan identification. A slight Republican tilt is evident among the veterans compared to the whole sample. For both strong and weak identifiers, veterans proportionally outnumber nonveterans on the Republican side and nonveterans proportionally outnumber veterans on the Democratic side. However, the difference is not substantively or statistically meaningful. A simple bivariate test of association, in this case a chi-square test, cannot falsify the no relationship null hypothesis between party ID and veteran status (χ^2=0.7824). To consider the same question a different way, a t-test comparing the veteran sample's party identity mean (3.99 on the seven-point scale where

1=Strong Dem and 7=Strong Rep) to the nonveteran mean (3.85) assuming unequal variance does not demonstrate statistical or substantive differences ($p = 0.452$). Different age groups of veterans hold no partisan pattern either. Those that served in the military after the advent of the all-volunteer force (AVF) statistically mirror their same-aged peers vis-à-vis party identity, as do those that served before the AVF.

If partisanship is an important measure of veterans distinctiveness, candidate preference is the electoral manifestation of these psychological attributes in a campaign setting, and certainly the most relevant political behavior. Looking at veterans and vote choice only, bivariate comparisons indicate that veterans prefer Bush in each sample more than nonveterans prefer Bush. The veteran margin (difference between nonveteran Bush voters and veteran Bush voters) ranges between 3-12 percentage points across the samples. It is this finding that pollsters and journalists seized upon as evidence for the above-mentioned reporting of Bush's advantage among veterans in the electorate. Yet, we know that the veteran population is substantially older, slightly more Anglo, and overwhelmingly male when compared to the whole population, so multivariate analysis is required to understand the impact of previous military service alone. Table 4.2 portrays results from six different data sources, five ABC/*Washington Post* surveys conducted between March and September of 2004 (2005) and the November ANES data. Both data sources asked respondents for germane political questions as well as veteran status. As party identification is asked differently by the two types of surveys, the values are standardized to prevent the instrument differences from having an effect on the results.

Table 4.2: Two-Candidate Bush Vote Choice, 2004 (Logistic Regression).

	March	*April*	*May*	*July*	*Sept*	*Nov*
Veteran	0.23	0.03	0.58	-0.16	1.18	-0.20
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.49)*	(0.39)
PID	1.61	1.56	1.69	1.88	1.77	2.18
	(0.13)**	(0.12)**	(0.14)**	(0.13)**	(0.15)**	(0.19)**
Ideology	0.83	0.91	0.42	0.92	1.08	0.48
	(0.18)**	(0.16)**	(0.16)*	(0.18)**	(0.19)**	(0.15)**
Age	-0.00	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	0.22	0.20	-0.34	0.11	-0.36	0.16
	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.29)
White	0.71	0.33	0.65	1.17	0.77	0.74
	(0.24)**	(0.31)	(0.33)*	(0.31)**	(0.35)*	(0.33)*
Constant	-2.40	-1.95	-0.89	-2.25	-1.63	-2.21
	(0.45)**	(0.55)**	(0.64)	(0.53)**	(0.69)*	(0.50)**
Observations	1063	1018	859	888	828	780
LL	-421.83	-409.81	-350.77	-288.07	-274.82	-235.63
Pseudo R^2	0.42	0.42	0.41	0.53	0.52	0.56

Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Trial heats, March-September and post-election self-reported vote choice in November. Unpooled analyses. March-September data are from ABC/*Washington Post* polls while November respondents are from the American National Election Study pre- and post-election data (and include only voters).

We are interested in the effect of previous military service on vote choice *ceteris paribus*, so we need to control for party identification and ideology (three-point scale, coded liberal-moderate-conservative). Additionally, the veteran population is distinctive in terms of its age, gender, and race and ethnicity, making controls for each necessary in the vote choice model. While the ANES data measures actual self-reported candidate choice immediately after the election, the five media polls conducted well before Election Day ask the counterfactual trial ballot question, “If the election were held today, for whom would you vote?” The results indicate that for the March, April, May, July, and

November samples, veterans' vote choice was statistically indistinguishable from nonveterans preferences after controlling for the other factors, but for the September data, veterans did express a strong preference for Bush over Kerry. Figure 4.2 provides a closer examination of veterans' candidate preferences and partisan identity in September.

Figure 4.2 demonstrates the proportion of veterans and nonveterans who chose Bush for each discrete unstandardized value of party identity in the September sample. Stark contrast is especially evident among Democratic identifiers and independents, for example the veterans who are independents that lean toward Democrats are more likely to vote for Bush than Kerry (0.58)—almost .3 higher than the 0.31 probability to vote Bush for nonveteran independents who lean Democratic. As a comparison, the samples other than the September data, the greatest difference between veterans and nonveterans across all party identification values is 0.04, making the September differences remarkable.

Figure 4.2: Probability of Voting Bush in Trial Heat, September 23-26, 2004 (ABC/Washington Post Poll).



Bars indicate the probability of voting for Bush during a pre-election counterfactual trial heat question. Quantities estimated with Clarify (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000). Assumes mean values of age and education and white males. Corresponds to "*Sept*" column on Table 4.2 with 828 respondents.

What caused the September results to vary from the rest of the available time points? Why would Democratic veterans crossover to Bush in September and not November or July? The survey was conducted between September 23-26, after the conventions and after the airing of the first Swift Boat Veterans for Truth advertisement. The 527 groups produced and aired subsequent ads in battleground states, spending over $22 million during August, September, and October. The effect of the ad extended

beyond the targeted states, enjoying wide free media coverage because it attempted to repudiate directly Kerry's reliance on his military service to bolster his commander-in-chief credentials. The resonance of the attack continued to damage Kerry's support after the initial impact because an effective response to the negative advertisements was slow in coming (Cook 2005).

The point of the organization and the ads was to hinder the Kerry campaign's efforts to win the election, and many believe they were effective. The nature of the ads' appeal and its theme and imagery could likely have had an especially potent impact on potential voters who themselves had served in the military. Claims that Kerry exaggerated his war wounds and broke faith with American prisoners of war may been the key contributing factor toward Democratic veterans temporarily abandoning their party's candidate in September. The shared experience may be veterans a group with mobilization potential beyond average.

VETERAN AFFECT FOR CANDIDATES WITH MILITARY SERVICE

The key logical inference from John Kerry sailing with his former comrades-in-arms at the convention and Wesley Clark's "Veterans for Clark" banners is that campaigners believe that veterans in the electorate hold appeal for veteran candidates. Another way to measure veterans' attitudes toward political elites who share their history of military service is the measure their views of political elites involved in the campaign and those that are not and include candidates with military service and those that lack it. The environment of a political campaign is replete with political messages that tap into potential voters' partisan identity, and that party identification becomes intensely activated—more than other candidate choice heuristics such as a candidate's military service.

Table 4.3: Mean “Feeling Thermometer” Ratings, 2004.

Subject	*Whole Sample*	*Veterans*	*Nonveterans*	*n*
Ralph Nader	42.4	37.8*	43.4	940
John F. Kerry	53.0	52.0	53.2	1191
Bill Clinton	59.2	57.9	59.4	1202
G. W. Bush	54.9	57.9	54.5	1207
John McCain	61.1	68.4*	59.8	952
Colin Powell	69.3	75.9*	68.2	1146
“The Military”	79.5	83.5*	78.8	1054

* denotes difference of means test between veterans and nonveterans (assuming unequal variance) $p \leq .01$. “Feeling thermometer” questions pose the following question to respondents, asking them to rate individuals, groups, and institutions from 0 - 100: “I’ll read the name of a person and I’d like you to rate that person using something we call the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person.” Individuals unable to identify the subject considered missing values. Based on NES data.

Figure 4.3: Mean “Feeling Thermometer” Ratings, 2004.



Table 4.3 and figure 4.3 lists evidence that veterans in the electorate do hold some affect toward political elites with military service—so long as those elites are not running for office. The mean feeling thermometer ratings in the 2004 ANES data for the two parties' nominees are statistically and substantively equivalent between veterans and nonveterans—veterans and nonveterans feel the same way about Bush and the corresponding veterans/nonveteran comparison is also true for Kerry even when asked with a party-neutral “feeling thermometer” instrument. The findings are different for other political elites though. John McCain, a presidential contender in 2000, and former

general and secretary of state Colin Powell enjoy higher levels of support (statistically distinct from the nonveterans) among citizens that also served.

Feeling thermometer ratings might be a proxy for ballot preference. Multivariate analysis reveals a more complete answer. Regressing the thermometer ratings onto a commonly used vote choice model allows us to say veterans hold McCain and Powell in higher regard than nonveterans, and this finding does not disappear after controlling for other relevant factors. An OLS model regressing the thermometer rating on veteran status, age, party identification, ideology, education, race, geography, and marital status demonstrates that veterans, other things being equal, feel about 4% warmer about these two war veterans not involved in a 2004 campaign. Yet, neither Bush nor Kerry exhibit any favorability distinctions between veterans and nonveterans in the bivariate or multivariate comparison and this is likely due to the importance of other voting heuristics during an election. Election time evaluation of these candidates, with all the power of party identification, supersedes the veteran affect that ex-servicemen and ex-servicewomen may feel for political elites with the shared military experience.

Table 4.4: Factors Driving Feeling Thermometer Ratings (OLS).

	Powell	*McCain*	*Kerry*	*Bush*	*Nader*
Veteran	4.644	4.173	0.499	0.339	0.212
	(1.907)*	(2.049)*	(1.986)	(2.436)	(2.391)
Age	0.147	0.202	0.060	0.105	-0.278
	(0.047)**	(0.051)**	(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.046)**
Party ID	3.123	0.852	-7.595	9.587	0.364
	(0.388)**	(0.370)*	(0.403)**	(0.410)**	(0.465)
Ideology	1.556	0.508	-1.176	6.019	0.480
	(0.913)	(0.796)	(0.843)	(1.059)**	(1.019)
Education	0.517	1.016	-0.245	-0.912	0.003
	(0.352)	(0.315)**	(0.288)	(0.357)*	(0.326)
Anglo	-0.610	1.579	-3.623	-2.516	-1.616
	(1.815)	(1.699)	(1.570)*	(2.020)	(1.848)
South	2.751	-0.891	-1.476	5.175	-2.503
	(1.510)	(1.585)	(1.501)	(1.731)**	(1.746)
Married	2.029	0.263	-4.373	4.910	-0.149
	(1.504)	(1.396)	(1.379)**	(1.659)**	(1.590)
Male	1.831	2.810	-1.605	-1.410	-4.317
	(1.475)	(1.461)	(1.421)	(1.667)	(1.540)**
Constant	39.806	30.307	84.281	19.866	57.356
	(5.646)**	(5.050)**	(4.717)**	(6.157)**	(5.241)**
n	1092	914	1126	1139	898
R-squared	0.16	0.09	0.45	0.51	0.06

Robust standard errors in parentheses (* $p \leq .05$, ** $p \leq .01$). Data are from the 2004 National Election Study.

Veterans held affection for the military as an institution during the 2004 election, a finding in line with previous research finding that veterans maintain feelings valuing national defense and the armed forces (Schreiber 1979), which is not surprising for a wartime election where the military itself became a campaign theme. It is interesting to note that veterans held the institution in higher regard than any of the elites from either party. Bill Clinton, whose poor rapport with the military establishment appeared quite sour with his 1992 conflict with then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Colin Powell as a president-elect over gays in the military following revelations during his campaign that

he dodged the draft, might be expected to be less popular among veterans than nonveterans. In 2004, Clinton was slightly less popular among veterans, but not significantly so.

Findings from the 1952 and 1960 presidential elections augment this conclusion that veteran candidates on the ballot are not necessarily the beneficiaries of veterans' votes. The 1952 election between General Dwight Eisenhower and Adlai Stevenson and the 1960 election between PT-109 veteran John Kennedy and Richard Nixon are a pair of interesting comparisons to test whether veterans prefer the more "war hero" candidate beyond their partisan loyalties. While the ANES began employing the feeling thermometer questions well after both contests, it allowed respondents to answer open-ended questions about reasons to both like and dislike each candidate. Despite concerted efforts by both the Eisenhower and especially the Kennedy campaigns to wield their war experiences as way to attract supporters (see chapter 2, and Jamieson 1984), especially those that shared their military experiences, a very small number of respondents reported that military experience was a reason to like Eisenhower in 1952 and Kennedy in 1960.

Another means of perceiving Kerry and Clark's affect among veterans without partisanship clouding the results is orthogonally possible by examining his electoral support among veterans during the primaries. The primary races are between candidates of the same party, which provides leverage to discern whether veterans who participate in Democratic primaries support veteran candidates more than average—thus untangling the effect of party loyalty. The central contenders seeking the Democratic nomination were John Kerry, Wesley Clark, and Howard Dean as detailed above, as well as John Edwards, a senator from North Carolina.

Bivariate evidence from exit polling in New Hampshire primary provides no substantiation of veterans supporting any of the Democratic candidates *en masse*. Even

without the individual-level data, there are few distinctions between the percentages of veterans who support each candidate and the percentages of nonveterans who support the same candidate. Clark's differential between veterans and nonveterans was higher than the other candidates, but the magnitude of the difference was not notable in the Edison/Mitofsky primary election exit polling.[31] By the time of the South Carolina contest, Kerry's support among veterans was 33% and among nonveterans, 28%, while the gap between veteran Clark supporters and nonveteran Clark supports had disappeared. In Oklahoma, the only primary contest in which Clark came in first, the former general fared no better among veterans than nonveterans while Kerry was slightly more popular among veterans than nonveterans were. This inability to energize veteran voters in these states came despite an explicit campaign strategy targeting them (Slater and La Ganga 2004). The exception was Arizona, where Clark came in second to Kerry. Arizonan veterans substantially (7%) preferred Clark more than nonveterans, while Kerry enjoyed only modestly higher support among veterans than nonveterans.

CONCLUSION: THE 2004 ELECTION AND VETERANS

Veterans became a symbolic center to the 2004 presidential election due to the candidates' military service, the continuing conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, and activities of electioneering interest groups during the campaign. Using evidence from an election year with salient military themes, this chapter has cast doubt over the view that the veteran community is a deeply conservative one. Examination of polling data spanning the election year demonstrates that the veterans of 2004 were not a particularly Republican population, especially when controlling for other factors. There are likely

[31] Mitofsky's polling is the source of all the mainstream media's polling information, referred to as the National Election Pool (née Voter News Service). Evidence discussed here stems from the bivariate results as the individual level data have not yet been released.

many reasons behind veterans corresponding politically to nonveterans. It could be that countervailing forces affecting individuals in the military cancel each other out, leaving veterans to find other sources for developing partisan and ideological identities. Both the individuals that compose the military and the institution itself value conservative traits; the military is perhaps the institution most invulnerable to change. Yet, some have written about the armed services placing a strong emphasis on communitarian values, likening the military to a "Great Society in camouflage" (Ricks 1996), embodying group-minded and inclusive values that do not necessarily comport with core Republican values. Alternatively, it is easy to recognize that today's veteran population is a mélange of individuals from different cohorts, regions, and backgrounds despite their shared experience in the institution. Initial analyses of the American combat deaths in the war in Iraq (as of summer 2005) indicate what many have realized about the current armed forces, that they are drawn disproportionately from rural communities (Cushing and Bishop 2005), but this fact guides our understanding of tomorrow's veterans more than it does today's veterans. Yet, it is important to bear in mind that veteran distinctiveness can be activated, as the Swift Boat advertisements appeared to do to the September sample discussed above. If this is the case, then veterans may possess shared but latent political dispositions vote-seeking elites may tap into to garner support.

Exporting these findings to subsequent generations of veterans is difficult because of inevitable changes to the veteran population over time. The implications of these findings for the future depend on the knowledge that today's military population is tomorrow's veteran population. Today's military appears to exhibit more conservatism and bonds more with Republicans than Democrats, so these findings are bound to the 2000s era. Yet, the military is increasing heterogeneous regarding gender, race, and ethnicity, a fact which may ameliorate Republican tendencies.

The salience of military veterans in the 2004 presidential election, generated by the candidates' use of their status and the behavior of veterans in the electorate is fertile territory for subsequent research. This chapter has covered both the primary contests and the general election broadly, but campaigns need to execute different strategies in each (Bartels 1988). As such, the logic of the candidate attractiveness differs and so too may the power of previous military service. Electability is of course the characteristic candidates want to demonstrate to primary voters to obtain their party's nomination. Without data or empirical analysis of primary election voters from 2004, this chapter necessarily does not take into account the primary-general differences, but subsequent research needs to address how the different contests might alter how candidates portray their veteran status in terms of the different election strategies.

Chapter 5: Sometime Supercitizens: Veterans' Political Participation

Of relevance to us is the claim…that serving in uniform not only is a citizen duty but also helps produce better citizens, men who will care about and participate in the public life of their democracy.

—Jennings and Markus, 1976, p. 176.

Voting stands as the essential expression of political participation in electoral democracies. It is the modal and primary political behavior among citizens. Previous research on the patterns of political participation indicates that the propensity to turnout is not distributed equally across the population. We know that some groups are overrepresented at the polls while other groups' ballots understate their share of the eligible population. At the individual level, certain demographic characteristics of citizens affect the propensity of electoral participation, such as age, the level of family income, gender, or race. Membership in civic groups and elite mobilization efforts also spur turnout among the electorate. Additionally, there are clear effects of early-life experiences on later-life participation habits, the most notable being citizens' experiences within educational institutions. Increased levels of experience with formal institutions of education early in life has an enduring and robust effect on the likelihood of turnout later (Verba and Nie 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Leighley and Nagler 1992; Verba, Schlozman, and Bradey 1995). Virtually everyone in the contemporary US has familiarity with high school and many have seen college, but a sizable portion of the electorate has experience in an another government institution, one that is more controlling and immersive than anything else a young adult can experience as an institution of the government: the armed forces. Moreover, as illustrated in chapters 2 and

3, those veterans play an important role in elections throughout the course of American history.

Since voting is the vital link between citizens and their elected leaders in a representative democracy, expanding our understanding of the factors that stimulate turnout enhances our understanding of voting as the citizen "input." While previous research has examined the effects of demographics, group membership, and elite mobilization on vote likelihood, we lack a systematic assessment of the role previous military experience plays in citizens' later-life political behavior. This shortcoming is unfortunate, since 26 million veterans constitute more than 11% of the eligible electorate. The increased salience of military service and war in recent elections along with veterans' sheer numbers together warrant an empirical examination of their political participation levels.

Despite previous research findings to the contrary (Jennings and Markus 1976), the conventional wisdom holds that veterans vote more often than nonveterans. Many factors point to a reasonable assumption that military veterans vote at higher rates than nonveterans do. The visible role that military service has occupied in electoral politics throughout US history has inspired research of elite political behavior in different contexts and roles. Early researchers observed the unique appeal of military service provides candidates (Somit 1948; Converse and Dupeux 1966) while others identified veteran organizations' origins and impressive political clout (Skocpol 1993; Holcombe 1999). The logic behind veteran organizations' political power is the presupposition that veterans vote, even if the groups' actual ability to influence electoral outcomes is modest (Key 1943). Group membership, a hallmark of veteran life after the Civil War, WWI, and WWII, is also positively associated with higher rates of political participation (Verba and Nie 1972). Veterans, like farmers (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980), are often the

recipients of comparatively generous federal aid (e.g. heath care, education), a fact that may lead them to the polling places at higher levels than others. In addition, the nature of the military institution provides an intense context where one might expect increases in levels of patriotism, civic duty, and an enhanced ability to navigate bureaucratic hurdles. These changes may serve to depress the abstention rate by reducing the costs of voting or bolstering its psychological benefits, to borrow the language of the rational turnout literature (Downs 1957). The salience of military voters in recent elections has engendered recent research on their turnout levels that, generally speaking, finds veteran status drives turnout upward depending on the context of service (Teigen 2002; Dubyak 2005).

Table 5.1: Aggregate levels of veteran turnout in 2000 presidential primaries

Date of primary (2000)	*State*	*2000 Voting age population*	*2000 Veteran population*	*Percent of veterans in VAP*	*Sample size*	*Percent of veterans in exit poll (difference)*
2/1	NH	926,066	139,038	15	2,065	25 (+10)
2/8	DE	585,855	84,289	14	1,351	30 (+16)
2/19	SC	2,967,197	420,971	14	1,967	27 (+13)
2/22	AZ	3,747,180	562,916	15	2,306	27 (+12)
2/22	MI	7,341,880	913,573	12	2,164	21 (+09)
2/29	VA	5,211,916	786,359	15	1,681	27 (+13)
3/7	CA	24,501,941	2,569,340	10	2,004	21 (+11)

Cable News Network provides a poll vault listing breakdowns of the primary and general election exit polls (http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/primaries/). Aggregate data on each state's voting age population and veteran population are from the Veteran Administration's various reports on veteran statistics (http://www.va.gov/vetdata/Census2000/index.htm).

Exit polling from the 2000 and 2004 presidential primaries provides initial but solid evidence of high levels of veteran political participation in the aggregate. Potentially due to candidacies of notable military veterans such as John McCain, John Kerry, and Wesley Clark, exit pollsters included a veteran question on their instrument measuring several presidential primaries. The percentage of veterans in the exit polls grossly outnumbered their relative proportion in the voting age population in every state exit poll that included a veteran question often by a factor of two, which demonstrates exaggerated veteran turnout in primary elections. Granted, this evidence is bivariate and both 2000 and 2004 featured salient veteran themes, but the palpable overrepresentation of veterans warrants further and more detailed examination of their turnout rates. Table 5.1 focuses on the 2000 presidential primaries to depict the difference between the population's veteran proportion and the proportion of voters that are veterans. Clearly, veterans are overrepresented amongst primary voters, even in states without a reputation as a military state (New Hampshire's veterans voted proportionally more than South Carolina's). General elections feature higher turnout rates for veterans as well—table 5.2 depicts aggregate turnout rates for veterans over time and they are invariably higher than the whole sample turnout rate.

While we know much about the demographic correlates of voting turnout, few survey instruments have included measures of previous military service within the electorate. Beyond the education system, the military is the most common governmental institution with which American men have direct and immersive experience. In addition to the scholarly attention paid to candidates with military service and research on veteran interest groups, media coverage of recent elections often assumes the existence of veterans as a salient voting bloc. In this chapter, I seek to measure turnout rates among

military veterans with appropriate data and methods and provide explanations for their distinctiveness. Through an evaluation of veteran behavior, we gain greater understanding of the political implications of military service and the factors driving political participation more generally.

POTENTIAL SOURCES OF VETERAN UNIQUENESS

Since some veterans volunteered for the armed forces, some volunteered for fear of the draft, and the government conscripted others, it is necessary to dissect possible theories behind any elevated turnout rate among veterans. There are three main competing reasons that may explain differences between veterans and nonveterans. First, one could argue that any differences between veterans and nonveterans may be a product of self-selection bias among those who join the military (Bachman, Freedman-Doan, Segal, and O'Malley 2000). Those who join the armed services might be a priori more likely to cast ballots than average, perhaps due to higher levels of patriotism learned in high school or a willingness to bear costs for their country. The characteristics that spur voluntary enlistment into the armed forces might be shared with or at least related to psychological forces that stimulate later life political participation. If this theory is true, higher voting tendencies reflect attitudes held before enlistment and indicate a smaller causal role for the effect of actual military service on voting behavior and political participation. Self-selection effects therefore apply more to eras with an all-volunteer force (AVF) than to times of conscription.

Self-selection bias is not the sole possible explanation of distinctiveness among veterans. The military may alter attitudes related to political participation. While Jennings and Markus rightly observe that "the military does not work with empty slates when it receives its young recruits" (1977: 147), inductees are neither tabulae rasae nor tabulae

plenae. The institution itself may inculcate norms or values that translate into later life political participation. Recruits are often teenagers fresh out of high school, whether draftees or volunteers, and the years spent in the military happen during the period in life when political attitudes tend to solidify. The notion that military service induces psychological changes upon its members describes a socialization effect infused by the institution.

While not addressing the phenomenon of political participation directly, scholars from multiple disciplines have addressed the socialization effects of the military institution, focusing on various distinctions between veterans and nonveterans. Early research after World War II empirically refuted the concern that military service caused higher levels of authoritarian attitudes in both the short term (French and Ernest 1955) and the long term (Campbell and McCormack 1957). Sociologists and political scientists working after the Vietnam War published several articles comparing attitudes and values held by veterans versus nonveterans (e.g. Jennings and Markus 1977; Schreiber 1979), but none reported more than modest evidence of attitudinal differences. The only consistent distinctions on which the various researchers might agree relate to veterans' higher affect for the military and opinions regarding increased military preparedness. The debate over whether socialization or self-selection effects drive military members' political attitudes has proponents on both sides, but there is rough consensus that socialization effects are mitigated by the type and nature of military service. (Lovell and Stiehm 1989; Bachman et al. 2000).

Beyond these two conceptions of veteran distinctiveness, the third competing explanation describes increased political participation by veterans as a byproduct of strategic mobilization efforts by interest groups or vote-seeking candidates (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Elites may engender higher turnout among veterans by presenting

themselves as empathetic supporters of veteran benefits, or as sympathetic military heroes who share the experience. Examples of notable veteran candidates include John Kerry and his Swiftboat experiences, John McCain's "Straight Talk Express" candidacy, as well as John Kennedy's 1960 highlighting of his PT-109 experience (see chapter 4 for a detailed account of the 2004 presidential election and military service). Mobilization efforts come from sources other than candidates; they may also stem from the mobilizing effect of historically strong veterans' organizations. Veterans' groups since the late 19th century have demonstrated organizational and financial resources by enrolling members influencing the policy process, characteristics beneficial to organizing members into a higher-than-average turnout group. The US has had three major veterans' organizations, the Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW), and the American Legion, along with scores of smaller groups. The GAR aligned with Republicans after the Civil War and was an effective pressure group and mobilizing agent for Union veterans to vote. The American Legion and VFW, formed by returning soldiers of World War I and the Spanish-American War respectively, worked more as a non-partisan pressure group than the GAR and continue to exist. If civic organizations enhance turnout probability, veterans' organizations could bestow the same effect upon its members. This mobilization strategy theory, while a potential source of enhanced veteran turnout levels, is unfortunately not directly testable with the data this chapter employs. For this reason, the competing explanations of socialization and self-selection are the two theories tested hereafter.

TESTING FOR EFFECTS OF PREVIOUS MILITARY SERVICE

The United States has been involved in martial conflict periodically throughout its history and these conflicts have each generated their generation of veterans. An ideal time

span for evaluating the political effects of military service should include ample survey data and a sufficient span of repeated cross sections to include multiple generations and electoral contexts. The period between 1972 and 2002 is an ideal time to measure veteran political behavior and draw inferences from observations. This wide range allows examination of World War I, World War II, Korean War, Vietnam War, and post-Vietnam war veterans. The relative proportion of the different cohorts obviously changes through the years due to population changes and generational replacement, but the 1972-2002 period offers the ability to track over-time change as well as examine each cohort. Despite its lack of political questions beyond registration and turnout, the Voter Supplement file of the Census Bureau's Current Population Study (CPS) (2004) is the best available data source for tracking veteran turnout during this time period when considering its large sample sizes, pertinent survey questions, time span, frequency, and consistent question wording.[32]

Along with most studies of turnout, error stemming from self-reporting inflation stands as a minor methodological concern of this chapter. The lack of any validated vote data is a weakness inherent in the veteran turnout question, though given the reality of few validated surveys, unvalidated data must suffice. Inferences about veteran voting behavior using unvalidated data are more vulnerable to the nonrandom bias and error described in the over-reporting literature (Silver, Anderson, and Abramson 1986; Leighley and Nagler 1992). Veterans Administration reports and the survey data employed in this report corroborate the slight advantage that veterans enjoy, on average, in terms of education and income. Ergo, veterans are precisely the people prone to exaggerate their behavior to survey researchers, given their above-average income and

[32] Specifics on the methodology, wording, and other characteristics of the CPS are detailed in Appendices A and B of Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980).

education and moreover, their conceivably elevated levels of patriotism, civic duty (whether through nature or a drill sergeant's nurturing), and support of the legitimacy of voting. Yet, I should not overstate a minor methodological matter; overreporting cannot account for the entire turnout rate boost explained by veteran status nor its variance across time and cohort.

According to these data from the CPS and other official sources, veterans differ from the population at large regarding variables already identified by the literature as affecting turnout, though the degree of the difference varies over time. In 2000 for example, veterans were approximately 17 years older than nonveterans on average, while only two years older in 1972. To describe the entire time series and generalize about the differences, veterans are slightly older, slightly more educated, report higher family incomes, are more likely to have spouses present, and reside at addresses longer. Omitted from the sample are women since the overwhelming majority of veterans during this period are men.[33] The fact that these demographic variables correlate with veteran status and the dependent variable, turnout, they need to be incorporated in the multivariate model as independent variables.

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[33] The number and salience of women serving the military has been rising since the 1980s, however, and future analyses of twenty-first century military service should certainly include them in studies, if not focus specifically on women veterans.

Table 5.2: Effects of Demographic Factors on Male Voting Turnout, 1972-2002.

	1972	*1974*	*1976*	*1978*	*1980*
Vet	**0.100** **(0.025)**	**0.101** **(0.026)**	**0.148** **(0.033)**	-0.024 (0.029)	-0.014 (0.029)
Educ	**0.202** **(0.004)**	**0.179** **(0.004)**	**0.193** **(0.005)**	**0.169** **(0.004)**	**0.216** **(0.004)**
Income	**0.083** **(0.005)**	**0.045** **(0.005)**	**0.091** **(0.005)**	**0.078** **(0.005)**	**0.083** **(0.004)**
Age	**0.058** **(0.004)**	**0.064** **(0.004)**	**0.052** **(0.005)**	**0.083** **(0.004)**	**0.061** **(0.004)**
Non-South	**0.305** **(0.026)**	**0.359** **(0.028)**	0.000 (0.001)	**0.307** **(0.028)**	**0.090** **(0.027)**
Spouse Present	**0.214** **(0.028)**	**0.359** **(0.031)**	**0.255** **(0.032)**	**0.222** **(0.029)**	**0.347** **(0.026)**
Anglo	0.003 (0.038)	**0.230** **(0.037)**	**0.327** **(0.035)**	-0.014 (0.035)	**0.160** **(0.030)**
Res. Stability		**0.281** **(0.007)**			
Constant	**-4.869** **(0.101)**	**-7.24** **(0.116)**	**-5.13** **(0.119)**	**-5.98** **(0.109)**	**-5.63** **(0.102)**
n	42,016	35,793	31,196	35,983	43,971
PseudoR^2	0.117	0.160	0.136	0.135	0.143
LL	-23602.27	-20840.45	-17588.89	-21516.88	-24190.20
Sample Turnout	66.7%	49.6%	64.2%	52.8%	65.9%
Vet Turnout	72.7%	57.1%	75.7%	64.9%	76.3%
Vets in Sample	44.1%	43.3%	34.1%	33.2%	31.7%

Standard errors in parentheses. Bolded cells denote one-tailed hypothesis tests are statistically significant ($p \leq .01$). Residential stability variable unavailable in some years. Age-squared term included in models but results omitted.

Table 5.2, continued

	1982	*1984*	*1986*	*1988*	*1990*
Vet	0.025 (0.028)	0.037 (0.031)	-0.009 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.028)	0.058 (0.026)
Educ	**0.173** **(0.004)**	**0.214** **(0.005)**	**0.173** **(0.004)**	**0.232** **(0.005)**	**0.207** **(0.004)**
Income	**0.060** **(0.003)**	**0.079** **(0.004)**	**0.045** **(0.003)**	**0.079** **(0.004)**	**0.017** **(0.003)**
Age	**0.080** **(0.004)**	**0.056** **(0.004)**	**0.073** **(0.004)**	**0.046** **(0.004)**	**0.060** **(0.004)**
Non-South	**0.358** **(0.027)**	**0.143** **(0.029)**	**0.138** **(0.025)**	**0.153** **(0.026)**	**0.120** **(0.026)**
Spouse Present	**0.303** **(0.026)**	**0.303** **(0.027)**	**0.322** **(0.025)**	**0.346** **(0.026)**	**0.322** **(0.026)**
Anglo	-0.045 (0.031)	-0.070 (0.032)	**-0.134** **(0.030)**	0.033 (0.032)	0.056 (0.032)
Res. Stability					**0.298** **(0.009)**
Constant	**-5.59** **(0.101)**	**-5.13** **(0.106)**	**-5.44** **(0.101)**	**-5.55** **(0.108)**	**-6.63** **(0.111)**
n	40,582	39,196	44,095	40,839	41,954
PseudoR^2	0.142	0.143	0.131	0.154	0.153
LL	-23904.62	-21550.68	-26501.09	-22555.16	-24534.44
Sample Turnout	55.7%	65.9%	52.6%	64.1%	53.72%
Vet Turnout	69.1%	76.9%	63.1%	73.4%	65.0%
Vets in Sample	30.0%	28.8%	35.3%	33.5%	33.0%

Table 5.2, continued.

	1992	*1994*	*1996*	*1998*	*2000*	*2002*
Vet	0.026 (0.031)	**0.072** **(0.028)**	0.050 (0.032)	**0.085** **(0.031)**	**0.097** **(0.036)**	**0.077** **(0.031)**
Educ	**0.258** **(0.006)**	**0.217** **(0.005)**	**0.244** **(0.006)**	**0.205** **(0.006)**	**0.26** **(0.006)**	**0.229** **(0.005)**
Income	**0.075** **(0.004)**	**0.055** **(0.004)**	**0.062** **(0.004)**	**0.048** **(0.004)**	**0.066** **(0.004)**	**0.051** **(0.004)**
Age	**0.019** **(0.004)**	**0.04** **(0.004)**	**0.023** **(0.005)**	**0.048** **(0.005)**	**0.007** **(0.005)**	**0.029** **(0.004)**
Non-South	**0.191** **(0.029)**	**0.252** **(0.027)**	**0.090** **(0.030)**	**0.306** **(0.030)**	0.037 (0.033)	0.039 (0.030)
Spouse Present	**0.317** **(0.028)**	**0.325** **(0.027)**	**0.316** **(0.029)**	**0.323** **(0.029)**	**0.389** **(0.031)**	**0.369** **(0.028)**
Anglo	**0.121** **(0.034)**	0.054 (0.032)	0.003 (0.035)	-0.043 (0.034)	0.052 (0.035)	**0.079** **(0.032)**
Res. Stability	**0.180** **(0.009)**	**0.278** **(0.009)**	**0.210** **(0.009)**	**0.271** **(0.010)**	**0.193** **(0.010)**	**0.250** **(0.010)**
Constant	**-4.59** **(0.110)**	**-6.10** **(0.109)**	**-5.01** **(0.113)**	**-6.23** **(0.119)**	**-4.75** **(0.119)**	**-5.85** **(0.116)**
n	38,660	38,357	32,933	32,502	29,721	35,806
PseudoR^2	0.153	0.172	0.162	0.169	0.164	0.171
LL	-19779.32	-21951.22	-18243.49	-18727.75	-15932.36	-20511.06
Sample Turnout	70.8%	53.1%	62.6%	50.6%	66.0%	53.5%
Vet Turnout	78.5%	64.9%	73.2%	63.6%	76.6%	66.8%
Vets in Sample	32.4%	31.1%	29.5%	28.6%	26.8%	25.8%

Table 5.2 presents results of the full turnout model for presidential and off-year elections from 1972 through 2002, as well as important descriptive statistics. Table 5.2's regressions are not pooled, but each column represents a separate dataset for that election year. The bottommost three rows of table 5.2 indicate aggregate turnout percentages from each year's sample (the entire sample turnout rate, the veteran turnout rate, and the percentage of veterans in the all-male sample). This bivariate contrast reveals that veterans turned out between 6.0% and 13.4% above the aggregate male turnout rate, an advantage parallel to the aggregate differences seen in the 2000 primary election data in table 5.1. The rest of table 5.2 depicts the multivariate model. The dependent variable, self-reported turnout, is dichotomous and stipulates a maximum likelihood model. Using logistic regression (logit), the model controls for factors that the turnout literature has identified as relevant and within the CPS' instrument: education level, family income, age, age-squared, a non-South dummy variable, whether or not a spouse is present, and residential stability (Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Leighley and Nagler 1992).[34] A dummy variable designating Anglos is doubly important as a control variable since previous research has identified elections where Latino (Leal 1999) and African American (Ellison 1992) veterans exhibit higher-than-average participatory tendencies, though the race and ethnicity differences manifested in other forms of political participation beyond turnout in those studies.

The model incorporates a dummy variable for veteran status to test specifically for military service's effects upon later-life turnout. Previous military experience impels a positive and statistically significant impact on turnout in both presidential election years and off-year elections. In 1972 through 1976, 1994, and 1998 through 2002, veterans

[34] The residential stability measure is not available for all the years.

turned out to vote at a higher rate than the population in these years, controlling for potentially confounding factors. At no point in the time series does veteran status depress turnout at statistical significance, but the years of the 1980s are devoid of positive veteran effects.

Parameter estimates from maximum likelihood models require conversion to reveal directly comprehensible information about the substantive magnitude of the relationship between previous military service and voting behavior. To gauge the substantive significance, table 5.3 provides the changes in turnout probability, given that the value of the chosen independent variable moves between substantively meaningful values while other factors remain constant.

In the upper half of the table, each row represents differences in probability when changing the dummy independent variables from zero to one (e.g. the difference in turnout probability, other things being equal, for a veteran versus a nonveteran, or a non-Southerner versus a Southerner).[35] For each of the scale-level regressors (age, education, and income), instead of presenting the minimum-to-maximum value change as done for the dummy regressors, the table lists the change in predicted probability as each moves from a half standard deviation below to a half standard deviation above its mean.

[35] Since holding a dummy variable at its mean makes no substantive sense (who has "average" gender?), I also calculated the probabilities holding dummy variables at their modes, but there were no notable changes in the results.

Table 5.3: Substantive Effects of Demographic Factors on Male Voting Turnout, 1972-2002.

		1972	*1974*	*1976*	*1978*	*1980*	*1982*	*1984*	*1986*	*1988*
Dichotomous	Vet	**.021**	**.025**	**.033**	-.006	-.003	.006	.008	-.002	-.002
	Non-south	**.067**	**.089**	.006	**.077**	**.019**	**.088**	**.031**	**.035**	**.034**
	Anglo	.001	**.057**	**.075**	-.004	**.035**	-.011	-.015	-**.033**	.008
	Spouse	**.047**	**.089**	**.058**	**.055**	**.076**	**.075**	**.066**	**.080**	**.077**
Scale	Education	**.152**	**.154**	**.149**	**.141**	**.152**	**.138**	**.142**	**.131**	**.155**
	Income	**.046**	**.031**	**.058**	**.055**	**.052**	**.054**	**.063**	**.042**	**.062**
	Age	**.210**	**.272**	**.202**	**.354**	**.230**	**.342**	**.213**	**.304**	**.174**
	Res. Stability		**.135**							

Values denote the change in the probability of turnout, Pr(y = 1), when moving between two substantively meaningful values of an independent variable while holding the other independent variables constant. For the dichotomous variables, the two values are 0 and 1, while for the scale variables, the difference is computed moving between a half standard deviation below to a half standard deviation above the mean. Probability changes (or "first differences") calculated with SPost (Long and Freese 2001). Bolded cells represent probability changes stemming from statistically significant effects ($p \leq .01$, one-tailed) from the logit model in table 1.

Table 5.3, continued.

		1990	*1992*	*1994*	*1996*	*1998*	*2000*	*2002*
Dichotomous	Vet	.014	.005	**.018**	.011	**.021**	**.020**	**.019**
	Non-south	**.030**	**.037**	**.063**	**.021**	**.076**	.008	.010
	Anglo	.014	**.023**	.013	.001	-.011	.011	**.020**
	Spouse	**.080**	**.061**	**.081**	**.072**	**.081**	**.084**	**.092**
Scale	Education	**.149**	**.135**	**.151**	**.151**	**.139**	**.149**	**.149**
	Income	**.018**	**.048**	**.050**	**.052**	**.043**	**.049**	**.044**
	Age	**.250**	**.059**	**.178**	**.087**	**.198**	.024	**.119**
	Res. Stability	**.104**	**.047**	**.099**	**.068**	**.096**	**.056**	**.086**

While comparing the probability changes between ordinal dichotomous variables and scale-level variables is difficult to interpret, ranking the dichotomous factors provides a way to assess the impact of veteran status relative to other factors. In the 1972 election, for example, consider the change in probability explained by previous military service, or the “veteran boost”: 0.021. This may appear a small figure, analogous to a 2.1% change caused by previous military service. To be sure, socioeconomic status exceeds all factors including previous military service. Yet, when compared to the other variables that the turnout literature has discovered to stimulate (or dampen) turnout, veteran status often outperforms them. Veteran status surpasses race and region as an explanatory factor in 2000, and it surpasses the effect of race on turnout in every year that veteran status is significant except 1974. The actual results are not included, but when running the model with females included and adding gender as an additional control variable, veteran status outperforms gender in several elections as well, especially later in the time series. This observation is certainly not to suggest that veteran status plays a more critical role than

race, region, or gender in all elections, but it does offer evidence of the substantive impact of veteran status relative to variables already considered relevant by the turnout literature.

COHORT ANALYSIS: CONFLICTS AND GENERATIONS

To say that veteran status drives turnout based on a simple dichotomous variable measuring military experience leaves important questions unanswered. The effect of veteran status on turnout is palpable but lacks stability election to election. Why, for instance, should veteran status induce robust changes in turnout likelihood during the mid-seventies and late-nineties even after controlling for known factors, but then have little or no effect in the eighties? What could explain why veteran status outperforms region and race as an explanatory factor, boosting turnout at some points but not at others? Although each of the above regressions controlled for age to avoid conflating maturation effects with the veteran question, comparing different cohorts of veterans against nonveterans within respective generations is necessary to make the analysis sensitive to different contexts. Contextual sensitivity is critical regarding the key independent variable because military experience is very different across the span of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.

Dividing each year's sample into discrete birth year cohorts allows us to compare veterans of a particular era against people of the same generation who did not wear a uniform. Importantly, cohort analysis also allows evaluation of how much conscription affects turnout, since there are times US elites employed the draft and times they did not. Vietnam, WWII/Korea, and WWI vets, other things being equal, should exhibit similar voting behavior if the draft removes the effects of self-selection bias—since all three

conflicts featured conscription.[36] I chose ages seventeen through twenty-seven as potential service age, and calculated an inclusive birth-year range for each war presupposing that the youngest birth year for the beginning of American combat involvement is the lower limit and the oldest birth year for the end of significant American combat involvement is the upper limit.[37] This calculation is done for each election year's sample. Substantial US military involvement took place between 1917-1918 for World War I, 1941-45 for World War II, 1950-52 for the Korean War, and 1965-73 for the Vietnam War. Those in service after 1974 are represented as Post-Vietnam era veterans or All-Volunteer Force era (AVF) veterans. Respondents were coded as members of particular eras by their birth year: World War I 1889-1901, World War II/Korea 1912-1935, Vietnam 1938-1958, and Post-Vietnam 1959 and on.[38] WWII/Korean-era veterans form the plurality of all veterans in the sample in 1972, Vietnam-era veterans form the plurality from 1974-1996, and post-Vietnam era veterans dominate thereafter.

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[36] 59.24% of WWI, 52.63% of WWII/Korean vets, and 21.22% of Vietnam veterans were draftees (according to the Selective Service website, www.sss.gov). Unfortunately, these figures are not sensitive to pre-emptive voluntarism, volunteering for one branch to avoid likely conscription into a less desirable branch or job. By all accounts, these numbers likely understate draft rates substantially. (include cite?)

[37] Seventeen through twenty-seven (twenty-nine for WWII/Korea) was chosen to encompasses the preponderance of military members. Different age ranges yielded only trivial differences to the results.

[38] At the risk of homogenizing the effects of two different conflicts, I necessarily collapse World War II and Korean War-era veterans into one category due to the short amount of time between the wars.

Table 5.4: Effect of Previous Military Service on Male Voting Turnout in the US, Together and by Cohort, 1972-2002.

		1972	*1974*	*1976*	*1978*	*1980*	*1982*	*1984*	*1986*
All Vets (from tables 1&2)	β (se)	**.100 (.025)**	**.101 (.026)**	**.148 (.033)**	-.024 (.029)	-.014 (.029)	.025 (.028)	.037 (.031)	-.009 (.025)
	±Prob	**.021**	**.025**	**.033**	-.006	-.003	.006	.008	-.002
WWI (1889-1901)	β (se)	.223 (.107)	.076 (.114)	**.335 (.143)**	-.124 (.135)	-.085 (.156)	-.178 (.189)		
	±Prob	.040	.018	**.068**	-.030	-.019	-.042		
	% of vets	6.6	5.3	4.5	3.7	2.6	1.9		
WWII & Korea (1912-1935)	β (se)	**.341 (.040)**	**.217 (.043)**	**.287 (.047)**	.086 (.042)	.085 (.045)	.089 (.043)	.083 (.051)	**.127 (.045)**
	±Prob	**.065**	**.052**	**.054**	.019	.014	.018	.012	**.026**
	% of vets	40.5	38.7	39.4	37.8	35.4	34.0	31.7	28.0
Vietnam (1938-1958)	β (se)	**.104 (.041)**	**.119 (.043)**	.088 (.075)	.027 (.065)	-.068 (.056)	-.051 (.058)	-.011 (.059)	-.070 (.035)
	±Prob	**.025**	**.026**	.022	.007	-.016	-.013	-.002	-.017
	% of vets	37.6	42.2	42.4	40.5	40.0	38.3	38.0	43.1
Post-Vietnam (1959-now)	β (se)				.288 (.589)	-.018 (.210)	-.189 (.164)	.208 (.105)	-.154 (.102)
	±Prob				.050	-.004	-.036	.052	-.029
	% of vets				5.9	11.1	15.8	20.4	21.1

Standard errors in parentheses. **Bolded** cells denote one-tailed hypothesis tests are statistically significant ($p \leq .01$). β denotes unstandardized logit coefficient and ±Prob denotes substantive impact measured by probability change between vets and nonvets.

Table 5.4 cont.

		1988	*1990*	*1992*	*1994*	*1996*	*1998*	*2000*	*2002*
All Vets (from tables 1&2)	β (se)	-.007 (.028)	.058 (.026)	.026 (.031)	**.072** **(.028)**	.050 (.032)	**.085** **(.031)**	**.097** **(.031)**	**.077** **(.033)**
	±Prob	-.002	.014	.005	**.018**	.011	**.021**	**.020**	**.019**
WWI (1889-1901)	β (se)								
	±Prob								
	% of vets								
WWII & Korea (1912-1935)	β (se)	.116 (.054)	.085 (.050)	.111 (.064)	**.135** **(.059)**	**.186** **(.073)**	**.158** **(.071)**	.093 (.090)	**.320** **(.077)**
	±Prob	.018	.017	.014	**.025**	**.028**	**.030**	.013	**.058**
	% of vets	26.3	25.3	23.3	20.9	18.1	16.8	14.9	12.9
Vietnam (1938-1958)	β (se)	**-.107** **(.040)**	.026 (.037)	-.006 (.045)	.033 (.040)	-.030 (.047)	.002 (.044)	.032 (.053)	.044 (.043)
	±Prob	**-.023**	.006	-.001	.008	-.006	.000	.006	.010
	% of vets	42.3	41.8	40.8	40.5	39.4	38.8	38.0	37.8
Post-Vietnam (1959-now)	β (se)	.156 (.084)	**.200** **(.079)**	.012 (.070)	**.151** **(.066)**	.117 (.066)	**.156** **(.065)**	**.237** **(.067)**	.052 (.059)
	±Prob	.039	**.043**	.003	**.034**	.029	**.034**	**.058**	.012
	% of vets	24.9	27.7	31.5	34.9	38.8	41.5	44.8	47.0

Table 5.4 provides the cohort breakdown results. Each row contains the unstandardized logit coefficients and the substantively intuitive probability changes between discrete values of having served or not (0 or 1). Immediately evident are the inter-cohort differences. In many elections, WWI, WWII/Korea, and post-Vietnam era veterans report turnout significantly higher than similarly aged nonveterans holding the same factors constant reported in table 5.2. Of particular interest is the finding that

Vietnam veterans exhibit zero to negative propensity to turnout after 1974. The Vietnam cohort is the only cohort that ever exhibits a statistically significant negative coefficient, in 1988. Yet, for WWII and Korean War vets, military service induces a consistently positive significant and enduring turnout boost.

Noting the differences in results between the Vietnam era and World War II/Korea era, self-selection effects cannot alone explain differences between veterans and nonveterans since both cohorts feature conscription. Under the self-selection assumption, WWII/Korean veterans and Vietnam veterans should share turnout tendencies and be distinct from the all-volunteer-force that filled the ranks after 1974, other things being constant. In other words, cohort analysis reveals that the World War II/Korean war generation has been the main reason behind elevated participation for the aggregate veteran population. Also striking is the result that a largely conscripted veteran cohort such as the WWII/Korean veterans share turnout tendencies with the fully volunteer post-Vietnam veterans. The veteran cohort that is unique among the other cohorts is the Vietnam group with the anemic participatory effect of military service besetting their ranks. The blanks on table 5.4 signify an insufficient number of respondents for statistical analyses among the World War I and AVF cohorts.

There are clear limits to analyzing different cohorts by dividing the entire time series by both year and cohort. Substantively trying to make sense of 52 regressions is unwieldy, so to provide an additional test for the inter-cohort analyses, a fixed-effects model pools respondents by cohort and provides controls for the election years. This approach allows the analysis to specify the effect of veteran status upon turnout irrespective of the election year. By parceling out the effect of all the given election years, we can see the cohort-by-cohort differences of veteran status without dwelling on the noise generated by presidential and off-year differences, high-turnout elections,

veteran candidates, and other known and unknown factors. The logit results above in tables 5.2 and 5.3 ran a separate regression for each election year to portray year-to-year differences in the effect of veteran status, even within cohorts, but we are interested in more than the year-to-year variance. To disentangle the time-bound effects, a fixed effects logit regression with dummies for each year allows inference of veteran status irrespective of election year. To sidestep perfect multicollinearity problems, all but the final year, 2002, have a dichotomous control variable to capture the variance caused by election-specific effects.

The cohort definitions are slightly different here than the above cohort analysis in tables 5.2 and 5.3. For the purposes of simplicity, men who were born outside the birth year ranges for the three principle cohorts of interest (WWII/Korea, Vietnam, and AVF) were omitted from the subsequent analysis, meaning that men with birth years before 1912 or between 1936-37 were omitted.

Table 5.5: Effects of Demographic Factors on Male Voting Turnout in the US, 1972-2002 (Pooled Fixed Effects Logistic Regression)

	WWII/Korea	*Vietnam*	*AVF*
Veteran	**0.149**	**-0.040**	**0.057**
	(0.012)	**(0.010)**	**(0.022)**
Education (std)	**0.509**	**0.733**	**0.774**
	(0.006)	**(0.006)**	**(0.010)**
Family Income (std)	**0.254**	**0.240**	**0.236**
	(0.007)	**(0.005)**	**(0.007)**
Age	**0.080**	**0.040**	-0.019
	(0.006)	**(0.004)**	(0.009)
Age squared	**-0.000**	0.000	**0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	**(0.000)**
Spouse present	**0.622**	**0.291**	**0.114**
	(0.015)	**(0.010)**	**(0.014)**
Anglo	-0.025	**0.119**	**0.055**
	(0.017)	**(0.012)**	**(0.016)**
Nonsouth	0.001	0.002	**0.140**
	(0.001)	(0.001)	**(0.015)**
Constant	**-3.332**	**-2.163**	**-1.420**
	(0.187)	**(0.071)**	**(0.130)**
Observations	172,126	264,347	134,954
LL	-90000.205	-157132.863	-80798.259
PseudoR2	0.108	0.127	0.113

Standard errors in parentheses. **Bolded** cells denote one-tailed hypothesis tests are statistically significant ($p \leq .01$). Election dummies (save 2002) included in model but not presented on table for presentation simplicity.

Table 5.5 lists the estimates of the pooled data for each cohort. Two control variables required standardization because of the over-time change to the variables' coding, education and family income. Each year's sample measures of formal education and income were standardized so the mean equaled zero and the variance follows standard units before pooling to eliminate the measurement error across years. Controlling for the same demographic factors as the logit models above as well as year-to-year variation, the effect of military service varies by cohort and comports with the previous findings: WWII/Korea era vets and AVF veterans exhibit elevated levels of

turnout while men who served during the Vietnam era are less likely to turnout than their nonveteran peers. This fixed-effects model allows estimation of the effect of previous military service across the time series generally. Substantively, the effect of having served in the armed forces on later life turnout is +0.028 for WWII/Korea era vets and +0.014 for AVF veterans, analogous to a 2.8% and 1.4% boost respectively. Vietnam era veterans' turnout is 0.010 less than those that did not serve across the time series.[39] These findings do not preclude the temporal variation found in the repeated cross-sectional analysis, but they do clarify the effects of veteran status by isolating the effects of particular elections.[40]

The effect of early-life military service influences men differently, to be sure. The substantive probability estimates are approximately +2.8% for WWII/Korea, +1.4% for AVF era vets, and -1% for Vietnam, but these values stem from calculations holding the other factors in the model at their mean values. A demonstration of the institutional

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[39] These substantive impact effects were calculated from the logit parameter estimates with both SPost (Long and Freese 2001) and Clarify (King et al. 2000). Clarify provides standard errors for its estimates to quantify the uncertainty using Monte Carlo simulation. The standard errors for 2,000 simulated parameters are 0.0023 for WWII/Korea, 0.0024 for Vietnam, and 0.0053 for AVF.

[40] It is important to note that World War II demanded a large proportion of America's young men in the 1940s. Across the entire time series, the WWII/Korean cohort subsample is approximately 65% veteran. This large percentage should remind us that as the eligible soldier pool dwindling, those that remained home (to become the "nonveterans" in my analysis) had a higher chance of being physically or mentally unsuitable for the military, or held defense sector jobs, compared to the other cohorts. It is unclear what bearing this fact has upon the measurement of later-life turnout, and it is impossible to do more than acknowledge the problem because the data collection for the analysis took place forty years after the conflict, and the survey only measures employment at the time of the survey.

effect's heterogeneity plots the substantive significance of military service across values of another important predictor of turnout in figure 5.1. We understand that higher education drives higher turnout likelihood, so to specify the effect of military service across the range of formal education provides a more nuanced understanding of the political implications of being a veteran.