-

DECLASSIFIED 
./

E.O. 12958, Sec. 3.6 
NLl 

,,_,,,;a. 
BY. dcHt' , NARA Date9-&-'i 7 
February 11, 1965 
Memorandum of Conversation Between David Klein and Dr. Jan Snobl, Counselor, Czechoslovakian Embassy, Thursday, February 11, 1965 
I had lunch today with the Czechoslovak Counselor, Dr. Jan Snobl, who made the following comments! (Although he never clearly indi­
cated whether these views were his own, the Embassy's or the Governmen~s, I am inclined to think they are personal rather than official, and based more on readings of the situation on this side of the ocean than from his own capital.) 
1. 
He is distressed by the Vietnamese developments. Unlike other Communist commentators, however, he chose to point the accusing finger at Peking. He said that Hanoi was not charting its own course. It was at Peking's mercy and bidding. The point of the present fracas was Peking's efforts to complicate Moscow's relations with the West. It would be most unfortunate if Peking succeeded. Snobl said he remembered that when Kosygin1s trip to Hanoi was announced, the Americans seemed to welcome the idea --looking to Moscow to play a constructive role in the area. It was therefore an odd twist that Kosygin's visit should have touched off this present and most serious crisis. He hoped, nevertheless, the Soviets could now establish a bridge making constructive negotiations possible, but admitted uncer­tainty as to what specific role Moscow could play. And he added parenthetically that Peking's bellicose statements might be more than propaganda. They might reflect serious political developments in Peking indicating that aggressive Chinese forces have assumed dominant positions in the hierarchy. 

2. 
He asked whether the White House statements of this week meant that all future North Vietnamese and Viet Cong attacks on U.S. and South Vietnamese forces and installations would invite U.S. retalia­tory action. I waffled this one, but made the point that Peking, Hanoi and Moscow had to understand that the North Vietnamese were playing a dangerous game which, unless brought under control, could indeed be very costly to them. 


• 

-2 ­
He made several critical comments about the demonstrations against our Moscow Embassy. He said he hoped there would be no such incidents in Prague. The last such demonstration had unfortu­nate consequences and he was convinced the Czech Government would do all it could to prevent a repetition of it. 
4. 
The conversation then drifted on to the question of Soviet leader­ship --how it was constituted and who would emerge as the leader. During this part of the conversation Dr. Snobl gave me a long disser­tation on how collective leadership was compatible with Communist ideology and told me I over-simplified the situation by appearing to insist that a single leader had to emerge --which, in fact, I did, and which, in fact, I believe. I told him that, given the nature of the Soviet system, collective leadership could never be more than an interregnum during which the contenders for the leadership mantle could maneuver for position. 

5. 
Then, moving the conversation to Czechoslovakia, and specifically the question of Czech leadership, Prague's relations with Moscow, remnants of Stalinism, etc., Snobl took time out to criticize the Dan Schorr Eastern European opus (given on CBS last Monday night) for focussing almost wholly on the negative aspects of Czech develop­ments and ignoring the positive and constructive elements. Admittedly, Czechoslovakia was closer to Moscow than several of the other Euro­pean countries. But, he added, historically this was understandable. The principal ogre for the Czechs are the Germans, and the only effective protection against another German threat is the Soviet Union. Perhaps the only other people in Eastern Europe who could understand this in the same way are the Poles. But in the Polish case there was a long and unfortunate history of Polish-Russian relations. Ergo, the difference in their handling of the situation.