AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IN THE SOUTHWEST, 1800-1837 Approved: Approved: y Deai. of/tKe AMERICAN IMPERIALISM IN THE SOUTHWEST, 1800-1837 THESIS Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By Richard Rollin Stenberg, 8.A., M*A. (Austin, Texas) Austin, Texas June, 1933 PREFACE The effort made in this study to trace certain indications of imperialism in the early expansion of the United States has been largely confined to diplomatic affairs and particularly to the views, motives and actions of the more prominent actors. Most phases of the general subject have been dealt with in some detail by scholars, in monographic works and articles. The writer has endeavored to bring together chronologically the principal events pertaining to early expansion and the things which, in his opinion, seem to show that the American nation has been from its birth increasingly imperialistic. The writer is aware of the many inadequacies of his treatment and of a tendency towards special pleading inherent in his present too interested stats of mind. The extensive reliance upon circumstantial evidence has necessarily resulted in many conclusions which are mere conjectures and have the generous tolerance but not sanction of Professor Eugene C. Barker, under whose guidance this study has been done. Allen Johnson has recently written (The Historian and Historical Evidence, 4B): w The tendency . . . is to give less and less weight to the probative value of testimony and more and more to realistic or circumstantial proofs.” Especially is this applicable to historical topics already carefully treated: in these the historical student is not likely to acquire a new point of view except by means of circumstantial evidence, which is usually the last and least used method of approach. I am deeply indebted and grateful to Professor Barker for his continual encouragement and his many painstaking suggestions -and criticisms, without all of which this thesis would not have been possible. To my father I owe an accumulated debt cthe kind that can never be repaid; he has given much effort and time in making stylistic changes and corrections and in reading proof, and has given more than abundant encouragement and help in other ways. I am grateful also to Professor J. Lloyd Meacham for his kind encouragement; Chapters II and IX were written in preliminary form in his seminar on American Diplomacy during the session of 1930-31. For their courteous assistance I am obliged to the members of the Library staff of the University of Texas, especially to Mr. Ernest W. Winkler, Librarian, and Mrs. Mattie Austin Hatcher and Miss Winnie Allen, Archivists. I owe a similar debt to Miss Harriet Smither, Archivist of the Texas State Library. Acknowledgment of special favors from Professor Barker, Dr. J. Franklin Jameson and Dr. James A. Robertson are made in the footnotes. CONTENTS CHAPTERS: Pages I. Early American Territorial Ambitions 1 11. The Boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase . . . 37 ITT. Aggressiveness towards the Floridas and Mexico .69 IV, The War of 1812 and Aftermath . 112 7. The Monroe Doctrine., Cuba and Expansion Philosophy .146 VI. Adams, Expansionism and Slavery 170 VII. Houston and Jackson 220 VIII, Jackson’s Ideas concerning Texas ....... 269 IX. Jackson and Anthony Butler 286 X. Texas Revolt, and Zenith of Jackson’s Imperialism ; . .... 358 Appendix: Jackson and the Rhea Letter .... 436 Bibliography 460 CHAPTER I EARLY AMERICAN TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS In 1763, removing the French danger from Canada, England entered upon the course of restriction which provoked a revolution in the thirteen North American colonies, where new ideals of political liberty, unbounded progress, and free land and commerce had developed to resent British restrictions. Apprehension that further expansion of these settlements might endanger her imperial unity and her commercial interests, together with the wish to calm the Indians, went into the making of England’s proclamation of October 7, 1763, which decreed an inviolate "Indian territory" west of the Alleghenies. l Termed an unjust and cruel regulation in the Declaration of Independence, the Proclamation was bv that time "a scrap of paper." Daniel Boone, leading a band into the "dark and bloody ground" in 1770, was by no means the first of such adventurers. 2 The conquest of the continent had just begun. Much has been written about the early pioneers’ motives and the Westward Movement stimulated by the wa,rs with Great Britain, and about the pa.rts played by the land speculator, the ma,n discontented with Eastern conditions, the trader, hunter, gold-seeker, Indian fighter, and adventurer. 3 Moving west be- came a perennial habit with some men. Daniel Boone related (it is said): I first moved to the woods of Kentucky. I fought and repelled the savages, and hoped for repose. Game was abundant, and our path was prosperous. But soon I was molested by interlopers from every quarter. Again I retreated to the region of the Mississippi; but again these speculators and settlers followed me. Once more I withdrew to the licks of Missouri—and here at length I hoped to find rest. But I was still pursued—for I had not been two years at the licks before a d-*-d yankee came, and settled down within a hundred miles of mer' Spain tried vainly in the peace negotiations of 1782-83 to restrict the United States to the east of the Alleghenies. France, in the difficult position of trying to retain both her American and Spanish alliances, proposed an Indian reservation south of the Ohio River, between the Alleghenies and the Mississippi, in which Spain and the United States should have spheres of influence, while the country north of the Ohio was to be "regulated" by England. 5 England allowed us the trans-Allegheny country, and with it a brilliant future, not only to deserve our friendship and to detach us from France but because the westward movement could not long be restrained. She realized that "a stable peace could only be made by ceding sufficient territory in the west for the expansion of the restless frontier 6 population.” The peace was fortunate in another way: in exchange for the Bahamas England gave the Floridas to Spain, making their future acquisition by the United States possible. Moreover, the Americans were allowed by secret agreement with England broader limits towards the Floridas in case the provinces went to Spain than the United States should have otherwise. Jefferson wrote from Paris in 1786: "Our confederacy must be viewed as the nest from which all America, north and south, is to be peopled. We should take care ... not to think it for the interests of that great continent to press too soon on the Spaniards. Those countries cannot be in better hands. My fear is that they are too feeble to hold them till our population can be sufficiently advanced to gain them piece by piece." 7 The next year Hamilton expressed in the Federalist (No. 11) the ideas which went into the Monroe Doctrine: ’’Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and new worlds. The reluctant and weak assistance which the United States received during the Revolution from decadent Spain only evoked the contrary of gratitude. From her birth the American nation viewed Spain as her natural enemy, whose possessions were a fair field for conquest. The lure of easy gain had led the Spanish conquistadors far in exploration, and the same lure of gold and adventure beckoned the Americans towards the Spanish region of mines and romance. Public prints began early to describe and descant on the riches of northern Mexico. ”The Intendant of Louisiana prepared an elaborate report in 1787, in which he represented to the Spanish Court the people of the United Sta,tes as exceedingly ambitious, as animated by the spirit of conquest, and as anxious to extend their empire to the shores of the Pacific.” He suggested that ”The only way to check them is with a proportionate population, and it is not by imposing commercial restrictions that this population is to be acquired, but by granting a prudent extension and freedom of g trade.” The American Revolution was hardly over before the Spanish heard reports that bands of "ambitious” Westerners meant to seize Natchez as their right; and their fears were revived in 1791 by Dr. James O’Fallon’s filibuster scheme. To the Spanish the Americans were people "whose desires knew no bounds, who were not limited by a Sense of justice and who would dare to commit any excesses against the Spaniards on the pretense of their right to secure the free navigation of the Mississippi. wl s The Spanish meditated many schemes to build a human barrier in Louisiana against the Anglo-American tide. But all the colonization plans failed, and the Americans crept in to equal ouickly the French inhabitants in number. 3 ' 1 In 1789, yielding to the inducements of General James Wilkinson, the Spanish legally admitted Americans into Louisiana and the Floridas. Wilkinson urged this as a means of building up the pro-Spanish party in the West and bringing about its eventual separation 12 from the Union and its adherence to Spain. Long afterwards, events having betrayed Spain’s hopes, the Janus-faced Wilkinson felicitated himself in his Memoirs for having thereby aided in the American acquisition of these Secretary of State Jefferson heartily approved of Spain’s policy as one of self-immolation, believing that she could not denationalize the American immigrants in her borderlands and use them to check the expansion of their native land: "I wish a hundred thousand of our inhabitants would accept the invitation. It may be the means of delivering to us peaceably what may otherwise cost a , ft war. ” In 1790 aggressive rivalry began between France, England and the United States over the Spanish possessions. England questioned Spain’s pretensions to territorial monopoly in the Hootka crisis, and France deserted her "family ally" in the hour of great need. Jefferson, unduly called "pacifist," immediately, fearing England’s seizure of Louisiana, deliberated in an aggressive spirit which indicates that the United States even this early held itself to be no third-rate power: Instead of two neighbors balancing each other, we shall have one, with more than the strength of both. Would the prevention of this be worth a War? ... As to Spain? If she be as sensible as we are that she cannot save Louisiana and the Floridas, might she not prefer their independence to their subjugation to Great Britain? Does not the proposition of the Ct. de Estaing furnish us an opening to communicate our ideas on this subject to the Court of France, and through them to that of Madrid? and our readiness to join them in guaranteeing the independence of those countries? This might save us from a war, if Gt. Britain respects our weight in a war. And if she does not, the object would place the war on popular ground with us ... we should view with extreme uneasiness any attempt of either power to seize the possessions of the other on our frontier as we consider our safety interested in a due balance between our neighbors. D In August Jefferson framed a plan of a treaty by which Spain would "Cede to us all the territory on our side of the Mississippi: on condition that we guarantee all her possessions on thewestern waters of that river, she agreeing further, to subsidize us if the guarantee brings us into the war ... In fine, for a narrow slip of barren, detached and expensive country, Spain secures the rest of her territory, and makes an ally where she might have a dangerous enemy.He had just previously written the charge at Paris that the United States desired Hew Orleans eventually, but at the moment he should try to induce France to help us get "a port near the mouth of the river, with a circumjacent territory sufficient for its support, ... leaving 1 7 the idea to future growth.” In 1793 George Rogers Clark and Citizen Genet, the French Minister to the United States, planned filibustering expeditions against Louisiana and the Floridas, to confer ’’independence” on the northern provinces of Spain. Louisiana was to become a French protectorate. Jefferson, privy to these plans, instructed his agent at Madrid not to sign a treaty guaranteeing Spain’s western territory. For not only was England now on fair terms with Spain and thus a less dangerous rival, but ’’France means to send a strong force early this spring to offer independence to the Spanish American colonies, beginning with those on the Mississippi, & ... will not object to the receiving those on the East side into our confederation. Interesting considerations require that we should keep ourselves free to act 18 in this case.” But the Genet-Clark scheme was blasted by Washington. Genet’s rude, insistent efforts to force the American government into open armed alliance with revolutionary France, even after Washington’s neutrality proclamation, led to a request for Genet’s recall. The national government, which had put down forcibly the Whiskey Rebels of western Pennsylvania, feared a widespread insurrection in the West in case it should apply force there to check the filibusters, whose numbers openly included the Governor of Kentucky. It resorted instead to soothing diplomacy with Spain. Spain’s refusal to allow the Americans free navigation of the Mississippi—their right”—and the government’s neglect of their interests had made the Western people angry and rebellious and undecided whether it would be more profitable to continue their allegiance to the United States or to join Spain, which offered commercial inducements. In 1794 the ”Secret Committee of Correspondence of the West,” of which Wilkinson and other prominent Western men were members, informed Governor Carondelet of Louisiana that the next year would see either a pro-Spanish revolution in Kentucky or an invasion of Louisiana, the object being in either case the navigation of the Mississippi. Spain was advised to favor the West if she desired the first alternative fulfilled. The choice of yielding concessions to the American government, which now earnestly pressed the Western interest, or of trying to revolutionize the West was placed before the Spanish government. Carondelet recommended the second plan. Spain yielded the concessions (the free navigation of the Mississippi with a right of deposit, temporarily placed at New Orleans, and the 31st parallel as the northern boundary of West Florida) and rejected "the infallible intrigue." For she eschewed war and was loath to make New Orleans a permanent free port, as the Western intriguers demanded. After this "frontier treaty" of San Lorenzo, in 1795, the intrigues of the Spanish officials in the West declined, though correspondence con-19 tinued. Carondelet, excitable and belligerent, wished to anticipate the American danger by potent steps, of which the Spanish government had long since been incapable. He marked the aggressive restlessness of the men of the West, whose writings, public papers, and speeches, all have as their object the navigation to the Gulf by the Mississippi, Mobile, Pearl, and Appalachicola Rivers ... and the rich fur trade of the Missouri. And in time they will demand the possession of the ridh mines of the interior provinces of the very kingdom of Mexico. Their method of spreading themselves and their policy are so much to be feared by Spain as are their arms. Every new settlement, when it reaches thirty thousand souls, forms a state, which is united to the United States ... but which governs itself and imposes its own laws. The wandering spirit and the ease, with which those people procure their sustenance and shelter, quickly form new settlements. A carbine and a little maize in a sack are enough for an American to wander about in the forests alone for a whole month. ... A general revolution, in my opinion, threatens Spain inpAmerica, unless it apply a powerful and speedy remedy. The Governor’s only recourse was to Indian intrigues against the United States: ”Not only will Spain always make the American settlements tremble by threatening them with the Indians, but she has no other means of molesting them.” Spain was very active among the Indians of the Southwest, but her reliance was ill placed. The unstable natives could neither be controlled nor employed effectively, and Spain merely irritated the American frontiersmen by her half-hearted policy. The Indian menace served as a standing invitation and pretext for American intervention in Spanish territory. In 1795 England planned an attack on Louisiana with the aid of American frontiersmen. But Spain discovered this filibustering project, in which Senator Blount of Tennessee was p 19 involved; and the American government nipped it in the bud. Averse to England’s or Prance’s seizing Louisiana, the United States wanted Spain to keep it until she herself could make it her own. General Wilkinson may have fpoken from personal knowledge when he told the Spanish Governor of West Florida in 1804: It is a positive fact that the United States, being very well satisfied with their right of deposit which Spain had conceded to them in Louisiana, were determined, even from the time of Washington’s administration, never to permit either Prance or England to acquire any settlement in the neighborhood of the Mississippi, and during the French Revolution England made several propositions to the United States which ••• were immediately refused. So great was the interest shown by Great Britain in this particular that it offered all Canada to the United States under the sole condition of being allowed to take possession of the right bank of the Mississippi riouisiana]. 4 France was more anxious about American than English rivalry for Louisiana. 25 Regretting bitterly its loss in 1762, she urged Spain to return it, and, expecting to regain the province, sent Collot in 1796 to reconnoitre it. Louisiana was rapidly becoming predominantly American in population and industry when Collot This agent was oppressed by a sense of the "manifest destiny" of the United States and believed that nothing less than a Franco-American alliance or a separation of the West from the Union could keep Louisiana long in French hands: "I conclude that the Western states of the North American republic must unite themselves with Louisiana and fozm in the future one single compact nation; else that colony to whatever power it shall belong will be conquered or devoured." 2 * 7 In French activities John Quincy Adams saw dist inctly a threat to the integrity of the Union: "They have wowed the destruction of the American government and are desirous to ascertain whether the American people will assist them in the laxdable work." France, re- covering Louisiana, might well have tried to establish a protectorate over the West in mere self-defense; she had her ambitious eye also on Canada. Although Spain had agreed at San Lorenzo to yield the disputed strip between 31° and 32°31’, she delayed its delivery, exciting the wrath of the Western Americans and stimulating their ambitions with regard to the Spanish Southwest. The American government sought in 1797 to take over the Natchez territory without causing a rupture with Spain, which, Andrew ISllicott, the American boundary commissioner, seems to have tried deliberately to provoke in the process of surveying the 29 line. George Willey, a witness of the border events, says: A temporizing and evasive policy was, as usual, pursued by the Spanish authorities, and on the part of many military officers in the United States army there was an evident desire for hostile conflict between the countries, thus opening to their ambition the prospect of conquest of the Spanish provinces of Louisiana, Texas, and Mexico. Fortunately the arrival of Capt. guion, a man as prudent as he was patriotic and honest, and on whom devolved the duty of seeing the treaty carried out in good faith, soon brought about an agreement between the Spanish governor and himself, according to which the Spanish evacuated the fort. In 1799 the Bishop of Louisiana, PeSalvert y Cdrdenas, also noticed the "restless and ambitious tempers" of the "Western countrymen, who are in the habit of saying to such of their boys as are distinguished for a robust frame, whilst patting on the shoulder, T you will be the man to go to Mexico Spain’s procrastination was "based on a hope that war would soon break out between France and the United States and to a less degree on a last hope of succeeding in separating the Western states from the Union; she gave as a pretext for delay the necessity of holding Natchez to defend Spain’s tertitory from a British invasion down the Mississippi from Canada. Information of the correspondence of the Span!sh with Wilkinson, Judge Sebastian, Senator John Brown and other Westerners old in "Spanish conspiracy,” fell into the hands of SLlicott, who sent it to the Secretary of State. Mlicott wrote Pickering on November 14, 1798: This correspondence in cipher has been carried on for several years; it is ingeniously managed, the letters are diciphered by the help of a pocket dictionary. The first object of these plotters is to detach the States of Kentucky and Tenese from the union and place them under the protection of Spain. If that could have been effected this season the treaty would never have been carried into effect. ... The design of detaching the western country from the union is but a small part of the general plan which is very extensive and embraces objects of immense magnitude; nevertheless, to ensure success, this point must be first carried; which being effected and by the system of promotion adopted by the court of Madrid, Govr Gayoso will be at Quito and the Baron de Carondelet at Mexico about the same time: so soon as this arrangement takes place or sooner if the necessary officers can be corrupted a general insurrection will be attempted, and cannot fail of success if the first part succeeds. Genl Wilkinson is to proceed from Kentucky with a body of troops through the country by the way of the Illinois into Hew Mexico which will be a central position—the route has been already explored. Nine tenths of the officers of the Louisiana regiment are at this time corrupted and the officers of the Mexican regiment which is now in this country are but little better. The apparent zeal of the Spanish officers on the Mississippi for the dignity of the Crown, is only intended to cover their designs till the great plan which is the establishment of a new empire is brought to maturity. Their principles are highly revolutionary. This being understood the policy of the present Spanish Governors in this country in enticing our citizens to settle under their jurisdiction may be easily discovered. the manner by which I have obtained the forementioned information (which I am convinced is correct) I am unable to make any other use of it than to communicate it to our first magistrate and the department of state that the plan so far as it affects the U. S. may be count eracted—it must remain secret. All we know of Wilkinson shows him dreaming of a vast Western empire carved from the territories of Spain and the United States, though the nature and extent of these conspirings in the West are all too little known. Governor Gayoso at length ordered the evacuation of Natchez in January of 1793, when longer procrastination was likely to cause a rupture. Francs, provoked by the neutral and pro-British policy of the United States, particularly by the Jay treaty of 1795, severed relations in 179 7, adding insult to commercial in - juries, in the X, Y, z affair. NavaL war existed in fact. The American public was for once solidly behind President John Adams when he expressed resentment at France’s treatment and recommended the arming of the country on land and sea. Many looked forward to a war of expansion, as well as of redress of honor, with France and Spain. Having allied herself with France in 1796 for the mutual guaranty of possessions, Spain would be legitimate prey and make a war worth while. The Anglo-Spanish crisis offered opportunity for an alliance with England. Hamilton and some other leading Federalists favored the plan fostered by Francisco de Miranda in 1793 for a joint Anglo-Arne rtLcan attack on and liberation of the Spanish dominions in America. The West Indies were to be the reward of England and the Floridas that of the United States. England had for several years thought favorably of an attack on Spain’s dominion, and apparently would have joined Adams in a war. France suddenly realized, however, that she had gone too far in her wish to humble the United States. She had no wish for war with the Americans when peace was requisite for the consummation of her Louisiana project: the Directory reversed its tone and through several routes signified its desire to receive an American Minister. Over the question as to what policy should be pursued towards France the Federalist party split. Hamilton’s friends belittled the French overtures and were still for a war which would involve Spain. Adams, however, at last threw off Hamilton’s guiding influence and sent a Minister to France. Adams believed Hamilton’s grandiose plans of conquest chimerical and desired peace, if it could be kept with sufficißhi honor. Moreover, he was jealous of Hamilton, a rival for the Presidency, and disliked Hamilton’s plan of winning great laurels as commander in the proposed war. Doubtless, too, the Federalists were restrained by the clamor of the pro-French party of opposition against war with France and "any connect ion with the corrupt and tottering monarchy of Sngland." Ironically, it was Jefferson, the high priest of Republicanism, who was to consider the abhorred British alliance most seriously. Hamilton believed the acquisition of the Floridas "essential to the permanency of the Union." Clearly the desire for war with France was inspired to some extent by the craving for Spanish territory. 33 It has been asserted, with some evidence, that, while making peace with France, President Adams resolved on striking a blow at Spanish supremacy in America, which if successful would entirely overthrow her government. This was nothing less than the acquisition of New Orleans. He caused twelve regiments to be raised, which were added to the army in 1799, and when this was effected, dispatched three of the old regiments to a position, near tne mouth of the Ohio, where they were to hold thansel ves in readiness and keep their boats in constant repair for service. These were to form a junction with the new levies, and the whole force was to seize on New Orleans, before any Spanish tropps could arrive in the country• a < States had a just cause of war against infringed the terms of the Treaty of rejected our Ministers, and her Navy had committed spoliations on our commerce, and if we had declared war, it was perfectly justifiable. But there was the certainty of a change in the administration of the Government of the United States, be- pla ? s could be matured, and in the summer of 1300, the new levies were Thera wag no cordiality in Jefferson’s relations with Spain. The government paid no attention to the complaints of the Spanish Minister, Yrujo, concerning plots hatching in the United States to revolutionize the Floridas, for it sympathized with their object. The -American press villified Yrujo, whereupon, in the belief that absolute license of the press existed, he retaliated in publications. Possibly, to provoke Spain was the intent of the request for his reca11. 555 In reaction to the American danger, when all hope of detaching the West was gone, Spain in 1798-99 had prohibited the issue to Americans of land grants in Louisiana. 36 But the Spanish Smpire was doomed; it suggested to Henry Adams at the end of the century a huge and helpless whale about which its captors gathered with fascinated and greedy eyes. Prance was stimulated to renewed efforts to get Louisiana, fearing that with the least delay it "will be conquered by America and 3ngland." v Refraining from precipitating a war by open seizure, she teased and coerced Spain in 1800 into the "voluntary" cession of San Ildefonso. Prance’s interest in Louisiana had been mainly commercial, and she now wished to realize a monopoly of the trade of Louisiana. Kapoleon told General Victor that he would endeavor to fortify Louisiana against the bold American frontiersmen "by alliance with the Indian nations scattered to the east of the river," and instructed him to inquire into the nature of the commerce and regulations then existing in Louisiana. The fact that Spain had recognized a British right to navigate the Mississippi was "a consequence so serious for our commerce that the captain-general must ... limit himself to tolerating what he shall find established. Americans feared that Napoleon planned to conquer and add the western portion of the United States to Louisiana* ”He saw in it a new says Livingston. Obviously Jefferson had good reason to resolve, when hearing a rumor of the cession, that on the day France took New Orleans we should abandon our isolation and "marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.” In 1802, at the twelfth hour, Jefferson again offered Spain a guaranty of Louisiana in exchange for the Floridas, declaring that in her next war Spain would lose these, and pointing out that the United States and Spain would never be permanently on amicable terms as long as Spain owned the Floridas and thus refused to "substitute the manifest indications of nature for the artificial and inconvenient state 39 of things now existing.” But it was not in Spain’s power to deny Prance Louisiana, so that she could not win the friendship of the United States in the way suggested. Spanish-American relations merely grew worse. American hatred of Spain was enhanced by the Intendant’s order of October, 1302, closing the port of New Orleans to the West without naming a new place of deposit. This seemed to presage the exclusive policy of Napoleon, for it was gratuitously feared to be the order of this new proprietor of Louisiana. The failure of Spain to ratify the American claims convention of August, 1802, aggravated the desire of the country for a war of reprisal and conquest. But Prance was understood tc have anticipated the United States in the Spanish borderlands; so our government directed its diplomatic energies towards Prance, whose presence in Louisiana and New Orleans not only dropped the curtains upon the Western vista of expansion towards Mexico and the Ploridas and threatened American commerce but endangered the Union. A French conspiracy” might soon have succeeded the outworn Spanish. Once more the West was in a fever, and its inhabitants were encouraged by the Federalists (who were eager to discnedit the administration at all costs) to demand forceful action. An armed descent of ”the hunters of Kentucky” on New Orleans was narrowly averted by the government. Jefferson was driven to negotiations with Prance by the danger of a Western explosion. Pinckney at Madrid was instructed to try to buy the Floridas. Jefferson assumed a half aggressive and half coaxing tone towards France. In 1302 he asked Dupont de Nemours to warn Napoleon confidentially that "this little event, of France f s possessing herself of Louisiana, ... which now appears as an almost invisible point in the horizon, is the embryo of a tornado which will burst on the countries on both sides of the Atlantic, and involve in its effects their highest destinies. That it may be avoided is my sincere prayer; and if you can be the means of infoimirg the wisdom of Bonaparte of all its consequences, you have deserved well of both countries." 4l Livingston was instructed to buy New Orleans and the Floridas so as to ensure the free navigation of the Mississippi; nothing more was really hoped for. Though the French assured Livingston that free navigation would be allowed the United States, Uapoleon refused to put his promise into writing, so that Livingston knew that it meant little. France was secretly delighted with the Spanish order suspending the deposit at Hew Orleans, for she wished to continue that suspension and exclude the Americans from the trade of Louisiana and the French West Indies. Livingston, who was assured that the Floridas were not ceded to France, sought to induce Kapoleon quite to forego his "new project. He wrote and placed before the First Consul and others of influence in the autumn of 1302 a printed sur cette question* Sst il avantageux &la France de prendre possession de la Louis lane? In this he endeavored to show that Louisiana would be of no economic importance to France as long as the navigation of the Mississippi was left free, and pointed out that if the river were closed or its navigation curtailed the United States would be gravely alienated, and in any case England would be likely to seize the province. A possible war with England, which Hapoleon himself desired, was of course one factor in the transfer of Louisiana to the United States. It was not the only factor. The horror of the Santo Domingo tragedy caused a revlusion in napoleon’s mind towards Louisiana. Moreover, the emphatic hostility of the Americans to his plans of occupation--which included the absolute control, if possible, of New Orleans, without which the commerce of the province was not his own had greatly impressed him, so that Livingston believed that the spectre of an Anglo-American alliance was the precise fozm of apprehension which produced the actual sale. As early as August of 1802, perhaps in consequence of the Santo Domingo set-back and the American menace, Napoleon seriously discussed the sale of Louisiana to the United States. Livingston was cautiously sounded on the subject by Joseph Bonaparte late in October. Livingston evincing no desire on the part of the United States for Louisiana, Napoleon was encouraged to continue his plans for occupying the pro vince. Beuronville was sent to Madrid in November to renew the efforts to get the Floridas; but Spain, encouraged by England and the United States, stubbornly refused. In December, stimulated perhaps by Joseph’s suggestion in October, Livingston proposed to Talleyrand that France cede to the united States that part of Louisiana lying north of the Arkansas Biver, as well as New Orleans. And he was constant in his warning: "The right of deposit which the United States claim, and never will relinquish, must be the source of continual disputes between the two nations, and ultimately lead the United States to aid any foreign power in the expulsion of the French from that c010ny." 44 The idea of reconciling the united States by the cession of a part of Louisiana, retaining a substantial portion, seems to have recommended itself to Kapoleon, who early in 1303 determined to send General Bernadotte to the United States "in the character of minister plenipotentiary of France. This was a kind of exile, and, to diminish its bitterness, he was given to understand, that it was in contemplation to cede to those states a part of Louisiana, and that he would be employed in the negotiation.” 4s Hearing of the imminence of war with England, the General refused to go. And the approach of war emphasized Napoleon’s need of money. If Napoleon had. been willing to allow the united States New Orleans, he might have saved Louisiana; but to yield New Orleans would have rendered Louisiana comparatively worthless and subjected it to a continuation of rapid American penetration. His hand was forced on the New Orleans deposit question by several factors, one was the rise of American hostility: in February and March Congress debated resolutions authorizing the President to call for 50,000 volunteers to take possession of such places on the Mississippi as he might think suited for deposit. Napoleon had the choice of freely granting the deposit or of accepting war—a war in which England would take part. Spain’s withdrawal, in February, 1303, of the order suspending the New Orleans deposit a withdrawal contrary to France’s hopes and quasi understanding with Spain—made it more difficult thereafter to deny the 46 United States the deposit thus restored. A third factor was France’s discouraging failure to procure the Floridas, or even West Florida, which was of great importance for the military defence of Louisiana, especially after the Santo Domingo fiasco. Finding it necessary under these circumstances to yield New Orleans, and needing funds for war with England, Napoleon saw it was the best policy to sell the whole of Louisiana to the Americans, since without control of New Orleans it would be of little value and would be hard to defend. against The so much emphasized danger of Eng- land’s seizing Louisiana was probably but a graceful pretext for the cession, covering a diplomatic defeat. As Decr6s said to Napoleon, "If they should seize on Louisiana, as some would have you fear, Hanover would be immediately in your 47 hands as a certain pledge of its restoration." The fate of Louisiana as between France and England would have been settled on the battlefields of Europe. On April IQ Napoleon consulted Decrds and l!arbois--the one opposing, the other advising, a cession—and the next day said to Marbois: "I renounce Louisiana ... I direct you to negotiate this affair with the envoys of the United States ... I want fifty millions, and for less than that sum I will not treat; I would rather make a desperate attempt to keep these fine countries.” Livingston thus reports his activities and Talleyrand’s overture on April 11: He said, that if they gave New Orleans the rest would be of little value; and that he would wish to know T wtet we would give for the whole.’ ... I think, from every appearance, that war is very near at hand; and, under these circumstances, I have endeavored to impress the Government that not a moment should be lost, lest Britain should anticipate us* I have used every exertion with the Spanish ambassador and Lord Whitworth, to prevent the transfer of the Floridas. He threatened that the United States "would avail themselves of the breach of the treaty to possess themselves of New Orleans and the Floridas" and sought to convince France "that, without the Floridas, Louisiana would be indefensible." 43 When the treaty was made, Talleyrand again remarked, says Livingston, "that if they gave what I asked the rest was not worth keeping." saw that the only thing to do was to set up the United States as a possible rival to England: "I shall be useful to the whole universe, if I can prevent their ruling -America as they rule Asia." Had England seized Louisiana from France, the United States might haw joined France in war provided the province was promised us in remuneration. When our Minister at London, Rufus King, was informed that England's first step in a French war would be the occupation of Louisiana, he warned that government that such a measure should be "well weighed," for while "we had no objection to Spain continuing to possess it ... we looked forward with impatience to events which in ordinary course of things must at no distant day annex this country to the United States." The united States held a balance of power between England and France and turned it to good advantage. The westward movement was a powerful argument, as was also the American threat of alliance with England. Monroe, sent to France in the spring in 1803 to assist Livingston and emphasize the seriousness with which the United States viewed the matter• was instructed on April 18 to arrange an English alliance In event of failure at Baris. 60 These instructions arrived, after the Purchase treaty was signed.. Napoleon ceded Louisiana in violation of his Spanish treaty, but Spain in May of 1804 gave express acquiescence to the transfer to the United States after a preliminary protest • England also reluctantly Hot until 1315 was our permanent possession of Louisiana assured. When Laussat transferred the province to the United States Claiborne noted a wide belief that Louisiana would revert to France when peace returned, and was impressed by Laussat’s remark that "the harvests of Louisiana were not yet secured to the United States.” 52 Did Napoleon hope that Louisiana would bring the United States into war with England? Apparently he had some thought of recovering the province himself, as shown by the reconnaisance of 0* C. Robin* In reports to the French government in the spring of 1808 Robin dwelt on the continuance of the French larguage and customs and the discontent of the inhabitants with American rule. 5 ’ 3 He urged France to regain the colony as soon as possible, and to aid Spain meanwhile in preventing the United States from occupying Texas. France as well as Spain has the greatest interest in confining the Americans within these narrow limits; to this is attached the destiny of the ccntinent of America, of Mexico, of Peru and the Isles. Louisiana squeezed into this narrow strip will always be a feeble colony at all times easily partitioned and conquered. All would have been lost if, according to what M. Tskerdo told me, the limits had been extended to the Colorado River ... That region where the beautiful prairies are covered with cattle and horses would have been overrun by Americans in less than six months without the government being able to stop them; Mexico would soon have been subjugated by that invasion. Robin declared that the only way to regain Louisiana was "to employ interior means against the Americans ... to have in Louisiana a confidant who would nourish the pro-French sentiment in favor of reunion ... The same policy should be carried on at the Government of the United States at Washington. It is necessary to foment the party of opposition which detests the acquisition of Louisiana, stimulate the fears that this acquisition will only throw the United States into ruinous wars and expenses. It would even be desirable that they believe themselves obliged to place the country on a defensive military footing, as a farther means of deranging their finances and of preventing their expansive population from leading out decentralizing expeditions from the federal body and thinking about Mexico. Napoleon dreamed of new imperial enterprise in America when France once more should have energies not needed in Surope; that time never came. Sven after Louisiana became a state (1811) the French inhabitants entertained "an ardent wish" to be reunited to France, while the Spanish inhabitants longed for any change. Americans living in Louisiana in 1814 feared that either England or France would eventually take Louisiana; one wrote that "a revolution is too much wished for by the people of E E this State." Napoleon’s fall in 1814 served to strengthen the danger from England, who tried in the last year of the War of 1312 to conquer it. General Pakenham, commander of the Hew Orleans expedition, planned to issue a proclamation calling upon the Louisiana people to cast off the pretended authority of the United States on the ground that the cession of 1803 was invalid, as France had promised Spain never to alienate the province. England did not intend the Ghent peace negotiations to apply to the Louisiana Purchase; and only Jackson’s victory at New Orleans saved that vast territory. s6 The Louisiana Purchase was one of the great steps by which the Federal government expressed and established its sovereignty. It not only stimulated -American imperialism, as the Federalists sorrowfully predicted, but made possible the extension of the united States to the Pacific, through Oregon and the Spanish-Mexican Southwest. When the Missouri struggle brought realization to Southern leaders that Louisiana had paved the way for the packing of Congress with members of new states hostile to Southern institutions, indifferent to the guaranties of the Constitution, and opposed to the right of secession, Randolph, who had been Jefferson’s strongest backer in 1803, said frankly that had he foreseen this peril he would have said to France, "Take back your fatal gift’." The Louisiana Purchase, while it rendered the Civil War inevitable, placed the American nation and Union on the path of permanence and greatness. 1 Channing, History of the United States, 111, 15 and note, 20-22; C. W. Alvord, "Genesis of the Proclamation of 1763,” in Mich. Pioneer and Hist. Colls., XXXVI, 20-52; The History Magazine, ed. H. B. Dawson, 2 Ser., IX, 90; “Early” British Opinions on Westward Expansion,” in Chicago Hist. Soc. Ml• i HI, 32-36; Barrington’s report in Alvord and C. E. Carter, 111. Hist. Colls., XI (The Hew Regime), 234, 235; Alvord, The Mississippi Valley in British Politics, I, passim. If in 1763 the British government intended the Indian line merely to be tempora.ry, within three years was substituted, says Alvord, "a radically different policy which contemplated the maintenance ’for ages’ of an extensive Indian reservation in the heart of North America and the stoppage of all future settlement at the Appalachian range of mountains” (The Mississippi Valley in British Politics, I, 245, 249, 251)7 2 Alvord, "Daniel Boone," in American Mercury, VIII, 266- 270. 3 ' ——■ —- —- A. Henderson, "The Creative Forces in Westward Expansion: Henderson and Boone," in Am. Hist. Rev. XX, 86-107; F. J. Turner, The Frontier in American History. 4 Wiles' Register, XXIV, 166. view—now discredited—was that Vergennes sought "the interests of France under the guise of securing the rights of Spain. He desired to procure Louisiana for France and extend its eastern border to the Alleghenies." Turner in Am. Hist. Assn. Report, 1903, 11, 10 and references; Turner, "The Diplomatic Contest for the Mississippi Valley," in The Atlantic Monthly, XCIII, 676-691, 807-817; Turner, "The Policy oPF rance towards the Mississippi Valley," in Am. Hist. Rev. X, 249-255. See J. A. James, "Spanish Influence in the West during the American Revolution," in Miss.Vailey Hist. Review, IV, 193-208; M. S. Fletcher, "Louisiana as a Factor in French Dinlomacy from 1763 to 1800," in ibid.,XVII, 367, 368; F, P. Renault, Le Pacte Mlle et l’Amerigue, 326 ff. There is no evidence to indicate that France sought a retrocession of Louisiana before 1790. g ——- -—— Alvord, "Virginia and the West; an Internretationin Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., 111, 19-38. 7 — — The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Federal Edition, by P. L. Ford), V, 75. References are to the Federal Edition unless otherwise stated. 8 of Alexander Ha.milton, ed. H. C. Lodge, IX, 67. Q — A. M. Hart, History of the Valley of the Mississippi (1853), 249, 250; 0. E. A. Gayarrd, History of Louisiana, 111, 183. J. A. James, The Life of George Rogers Clark, 403-406, 372, 373. — Hatcher, The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 12-40. ” W. R. Shepherd, “Decision of the Council of State on Wilkinson’s First Memorial," in Am. Hist. Rev., IX, 749-764. 13 Memoirs of His Own Times, 11, 117. 14 Writings of Jefferson, VI, 239. 15 Jefferson’s "Considerations on Louisiana," July 12, 1790, in Robertson, Louisiana, I, 265-267. — — Jefferson to Carmichael, August 22, 1790, in Writings of Jefferson, VI, 123-131. 17 Jefferson to Short, August 10, 1790, in ibid., VI, 115-118. 1 p ■ " * ' — — Writings of Jefferson, VII, 267, 268; J. F. Jameson, "The Correspondence of Clark and Genet,” in Am. Hist. Assn. Report, 1896, I, 993 ff. 19 ' ' —-—— Turner, ’’The Origin of Genet’s Projected Attack on Louisiana and the Floridas,” in Am. Hist. Rev., 111, 650-671; A. Henderson, ’’lsaac Shelby and the Genet Mission,” in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. , VI, 451-469; E. M. Coulter, ’’The Efforts of the Democratic Societies of the West to Open the Navigation of the Mississippi,” in ibid., XI, 376-389; A. P. Whitaker, The Spanish-American Frontier, 189, 196-200; J. A. James, George Rogers Clark, 408-456; Turner in Am. Hist. Rev., X, 249-255; C. M. Thomas, American Neutrality in 1793 (Columbia University Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, No. 350), 186; J. Rydford, ’’The French Revolution and Mexico,” in Hispanic Am. Hist. Rev. , IX, 74-82. Carondelet’s report on Louisiana and West Florida, November 24, 1794, in Robertson, Louisiana, I, 298. 21 Carondelet quoted by Turner in The Atlantic Monthly, XCIII, 678. pp J. M. Berry, "The Indian Policy of Spain in the Southwest, 1783-1795," in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., 111, 463-477; A. P. Whitaker, The Span!sh-American Frontier, 36-46; Whitaker, "Spain and the Cherokee Indians, 1783-98," in North Carolina Historical Review, IV, 252-269; Hatcher, "Background of the Colonization of in The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXIV, 187. ft y ' ' - 1 — ■ ■ - — — - Turner in Am. Hist. Assn. Report, 1903, 11, 11, 12, 939-992. — ' * Wilkinson to Folch, 1304, in Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 329, 330; Am. Histe Rev., XIX, 793 note. —— — . Memoir to Delaorois, September, 1796, cited in James, Clark, 431, 432. See Fletcher, "Louisiana as a Factor in French Diplomacy from 1763 to 1300," in Miss. Valley st .Be v., XVII, 370-376; L. P. Kellogg, "France and the Mississippi Valley: a R6sum6," in ibid., XVIII, 3-22. J. Viles, "Population and Extent of Settlement in Missouri before 1804," in Missouri Historical Beview, V, 197-207; 1. Houck, The Spanish H^gimein Missouri. Ti. 414; L. Pelzer, "Economic Fact ors”lh the Acquisition of Louisiana," in Miss. Valley Hist. Assn, procs.. VI, 109-128. Channine, History of the United StatesTlV, 310, 311, 303, 304. Collot’s Voyage dans l'Amerique Septentrionale, I. quoted in James, Clark, 433; see K. H. Cnizat, "General Collet's Reconnoitering Trip down the Mississippi and His Arrest in Hew Orleans in 179 6," in Louisiana Historical Quarterly, I, 303-323; James, Clark, ~ CT — ! — — — Adams to Pitcairn, March 1797, in W. 0* Ford, The Writings of J, Q. Adams, U, 132. See De Bow’s Review, i; — Adams Knew that France had negotiaTe*3rTo~g?rTouisiana in 1796 (Writings, 11, 31 note) . 2$ ————— ~ -- J. P. H, Claiborne, Mississippi as a Province, Tat. ritory and State, I, 173 ff;~Hart, History ofthe Valiey~of the Mississippi, 231. p O r 'version see V/ — Mat hews, Andrew gllicott. His Life and Letters, 151-15 7. m 11 —*r Claiborne, Masisaippi, I, 529, 530• 3J — — Quoted in W< H. Brown, The Glory seekers: the Romance of Would-Be Pounders of Tn tEe~^arly Bays of the Sreat-ponThwesi, 37; 3ayarre, Hlafory~ofTouf 3 la^, “In, _$ 9 ® $• Wisher, "American Influence upon the Tove- L^ 9xican dependence," in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., “ ... Quoted in Mathews, Andrew micott, 160-163, from the Pickering Papers; B* 0. Steiner, she life and Correspon- McHenry, 269; J. H. rerHns, tonSs of the ' WpT7 426-431, 464. on Wilkinson’s earlier IhtrigulngTrth the Spanish see M. Serrano y Sanz, 31 Brigadier Jaime Wilkinson j Sus Tratos con BspaHa paraTa Tndepenaencia~deT~ Kentucky Tlfios 1737 aT797l ; t.TTgraen, TW Spa nisi h~7Tonspiracy; Wrß.TEephera7“"Wilkinson and tEe~Beglnnlngs~of then Spanish Conspiracy," in 4m. Hist. Bev. IX, 490-506; James, George Bogers Clark, 374TCV; TT"J. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 40-63. In 1793 Carondelet was advanced to the Governorship of Quito, and Gayoso to that of Louisiana. 33 H. B. Fuller, The Purchase of Florida, 36-93; Channing, History of the UnlTed? w. S. Robert- son, "Francisco de Miranda and the Revolutionizing of Spanish America," in Am. Hist. Assn. Report, 190*7, I, 329-336; J. A. James, "French Opinion as a Factor in Preventing War between France and the United States, 1795-1800," in Am. Hist. Rev., XXX, 44-55. — "The inestimable Hamilton told me," says J. H. Daveiss, "it was intended to declare war against Spain, (from whom we had received many abuses in the West Indies) at the same time with France, and to march and seize the Floridas and Mew Orleans ... but war was not declared when it ought to have been" ("Sketch of the Political Profiles of Cur Three Presidents," 1307, in Quart. Pubs, of the Hist, and Philos. Soc. of Ohio , XII, 135) • John Adams says’: Brit iaFTac - TTon was det ermined to have a war with France, and Alexander Hamilton at the head of the army and then President ... Peace with France was therefore treason against their fundamental maxims and reasons of stale 1 ’ (Adams to Cunningham, March 20, 1309, in J. Wood, Administration of John Adams, 364) . — -'■■ — — Fuller, Purchase of Florida, 91-93. — Hatcher, The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 35, 36. “ — James, Clark, 440, 449, 450. 23 — — Deeres to Victor, November 26, 1302, in Robertson. Louisiana, I. 365-369* * 39 — I. J. Cox, The West Florida Pontroversg, 67; Faller, Purchase of Florida, 333, 334. This is an early intimation of "manifest destiny.” 4— — —— Channing, History of the United States, IV, 313; Mrs. D. Rowland, Life, letters and~Tapers of Will lam Dunbar, 153, SpaHsK Hng’s order of July 14, 1302,f0r the closing of New Orleans was not the result of a sinister Napoleonic influence, but simply an attempt to give remedy to local complaints from Louisiana of the illegal conduct of the Americans. See 3. W. Lyon, "The Closing of the port of New Orleans," in Am. Hist. Rev., XXXVII, & J V — tizi Q . Judge Richard Peters wrote Jay in 1310 that in conversation with Dr. Logan of Philadelphia Lord Wellesley said "he had in his office proofs of an offer from Bonaparte, to divide this country [the United States] with Bhgland" (Peters io Jay, November 25, 1310, in H. p. Johnston, The Correspon- AQQQQ and Public Papers of John Jay, IV, 341) . — 51 — — Jefferson to Nemours, April 25, 1302, in The Writings of Jefferson, ed. A. 5. Bergh,X, 317, 313. 42 _ Marbois says: "The Americans had already for more than twenty asserted, as an incontestable right, the free navigation of that river to the sea; and neither Spain, nor subsequently France, had been inclined to this concession, so contrary to the exclusive system" (Louisiana, 211) . Livingston s "Memoirs" are found in Am. Stat~Paps. ."'For. Bels., 11, 520-524, 534-537. — ST — — — w . General Milfort to Talleyrand, August 16, 1802, in N.M. Miller Surrey, Calendar of Manuscripts in Paris Archives relating to the HlsEory of the Mississippi tip XI, 172$T MarsKall, The West erh Boundary of the Louisiana Pure ha se, 3,4, and note. Ti vi ng sto n wro t e Jefferson on October 23, 1302, that Joseph Bonaparte approached him. ”1 told him that the only cause of difference that might arise between us being the debt and Louisiana, I conceived that both might be happily and easily removed by making an exchange with Spain, returning them Louisiana, retaining New Orleans, and giving the latter and the Floridas for our debt. He asEed me whether we should prefer the Floridas to Louisiana? I told him that there was no comparison in their value, but that we had no wish to extent our boundary across the Mississippi" (Am. State Paps., For. Bels. 11, 525, 526) . On the famous bath scene see“X”K. Hosmer ’ Purchase, 74-111; A. 3. de la Faverie, Bapoleon efT’Amerique, 159-133. ’ 44 Livingston to Talleyrand, January 10, 1303, in An. SJate Pa£B. Por. Reis., 11, 531. See ». P. Renault, La" Question de laloaisiane, 94-97. — 45 — Marbois, Louisiana, 204, 205; Talleyrand to Livingston, February 19? 1303, in Am. State Paps., For. Reis., 11, 546 • $5 A. 2. Whitaker, "France and the American Deposit at New Orleans," in Hispanic American Historical Review, XI, 435-502. Varhols, Louisiana, 263-275. 4# Livingston to Madison, April 11, 1303, in Am. State Paps** For* Bels.. 11, 552; cf. ibid., 11, 553. — 49 — — D * April 2, 1303, in Am. Hist. Assn. Report, 1907, I, 352 note. Iff -—- ———— 3 tate Papa.. For. Rei a., 11, 555. FT —— __ Ibid., 11, 569, 570, 533; J. F. Rippy, Rivalry of United States and great Britain over Latin Eerie a, "T 9 — ll 1 g ■■—■ - ■ — -. —I- - - L . L --- - --- - . ... _ ■ _ Claiborne to Madison, February 6, 1804, in B. Rowbanc, Official Letter Books of W. 0. C. Claiborne. 1801- 1316. 1, 364," ~ ~ —— 53“ —————— , + The people of Louisiana were treated as colonial subjects and given tardily the rights due under the Purchase treaty. See H. S. Chambers, Mississippi Valley Beginnings, Ch. XXIII, "America’s First ’Bcrap o/^ap er.' rw 54 — - C. 0. Robin’s report, Februaiy 20, 1808, in the University of Texas transcripts from the Archives Nacionales. Affaires Strangdres, Stats-Unia. ’ “ ~ 55 - —— 3. S. Brown, "Letters from Louisiana, 1813-1814," in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., XI, 571-579. w ——- — —•— C. T. Brady, The True Andrew Jackson, 105-108; Wellington to Liverpool, Bo vender $7 13147 in 0. Lodge, One Hundred Years of Peace, 27-31; British to American Commit si oners, September 19, 1814, in Am. State Paps., For. Pels., 111, 718; A. 0. Buell, History Jackson, 11, W-31; Faverie, Napoleon et l'Ameriqie, 234, 235“ CHAPTER II THE BOUNDARIES OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE Did France and Spain delimit their North American possessions by fixing conventional eastern and western boundaries for Louisiana in 1762, when it was transferred to Spain? Were the Mississippi and the Bio Grande made the limits of Louisiana by preliminary or secret treaty more secret than the deed of transfer, which itself remained till 1764 in concealment? If this were so, American statesmen were the more clearly wrong in their claim to West Florida as part of the Louisiana Purchase, but perhaps right in their claim to Texas, though they were not apprised of this possible basis of Napoleon’s claim. The words defining Louisiana in the treaty of San Ildefonso (1800), repeated in the Purchase treaty of 1803, have since been an enigma: Louisiana was transferred by Spain to France in 1800, and by France to the United States, "with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other states." Not suspecting that the province might have been demarked by a previous convention, historians have. not unnaturally, considered this language "indefinite and contradictory. French Louisiana had extended as far east as the Perdido ... while Spanish Louisiana had included nothing east of the Mississippi." l This "indefinite" language would be quite definite if a prior Franco-Spanish boundary agreement existed: a geographical restatement in 1300 of already agreed limits would be unnecessary and perhaps impolitic. In this view a design to deceive would enter only when the implicit definition of 1800 was placed in the treaty of 1803 without explanation to the United States. In 1763 the French king ceded to England, by the treaty of Paris, "everything which he possesses, or ought to possess, on the left [eastern] side of the river Mississippi, except the town of New Orleans." This territory had been a part of French Louisiana, and yet France by the secret cession at Fontainebleau, November 3, 1762, giving the remainder of Louisiana to Spain, ceded not "Western Louisiana" but the whole province—"tout le pays connu sous le nom de la Louisians, ainsi que la Nouvelle Orleans et 1' Isle " - -pre supp os Ing the delimitation of this new Louisiana not defined hereby. The territories of Spain and France clearly had not been separated by de fo re boundaries before 1762, in which year Grimaldi, the Spanish diplomat, objected to a division of Louisiana along the Mississippi, fearing England’s control of the river. Choiseul replied that France hoped to retain control over the mouth, but if England insisted on free navigation no arrangement would be made without a previous boundary agreement between the Bourbon monarchs. Talleyrand stated that France and Spain did have an "understanding" in 1762, which limited Louisiana to the Mississippi on the east; concerning any 2 western limit he was reticent. It was not to France’s interest to aggrandize the United States without reward. Beverly Tucker, among the few Americans who belatedly learned of what seems to have been the real basis of Napole on’s claim to Texas, writes: About 1762, just before the cession of Louisiana by France to Spain the Rio del Norte was established as the boundary by treaty. 2?he subsequent cession made that treaty of no consequence, and it was forgotten. But meantime a copy had been furnished the vice-regal government of Mexico where Branch Archer told me, in 1833, it had been seen by many persons of his acquaintance during the connexion between Texas and Mexico ... Jos. M. White, about tie same time assured me that a copy of the article had been furnished him by the French Minister of foreign affairs .77 WanceTT properly , called upon, is bound to produce the treaty of boundary. So curious a tale might well seem fanciful to Calhoun, even though Judge Tucker assured him again that as to "the authenticity of the information given to me by Mr. White ... I cannot be mistaken": The language of the treaty of Cession by Prance to the United States strongly intimates the existence of some document defining the limits of Louisiana as ceded by France to Spain, and by Spain back again to France. This, and other circumstances put Mr. w. on the enquiry. His large interest in Spanish Florida grants determined him to prosecute it, at the expense of spending a great part of his time in Europe ... he learned that somewhere about 1760 a treaty of a secret character had been concluded between France and Spain, then governed by the two branches of Bourbon, and that into that treaty an article defining the bounds of Louisiana was introduced. He applied to the French Minister of foreign affairs for a copy which was refused. He then went to Talleyrand, then in London, to invoke his influence with the Minister, and procured from him a letter expressing the opinion that the article in question, in a treaty otherwise secret, might be divulged without impropriety. Thereupon a copy was furnished, from vfoich it appeared that the Rio Bravo and the Mississippi, including the Island of New Orleans, were the agreed boundaries. Such was his account to me. A week afterwards I repeated this conversation to Branch Archer, who said he had often heard that there was such an article among the archives of Mexico, whither it had been immediately sent, for the information of the vice-regal government. The cession taking place immediately after, the document was no longer of any consequence, and was not made notorious by any action upon White himself writes briefly that Texas rt was anciently a part of the province of Louisiana ... It was marked off on the maps of the Marquis Barbe Marbois, the Minister of Napoleon, as part of the Louisiana cession to the United States in 1803, but abandoned in 1819. For some time before 1762 Charles 111 of Spain had desired Louisiana, saying to the French ambassador in 1760: ”1 believe, as you do, that we are natural and necessary allies ... I must arrange with France after the peace for g Louisiana by means of some exchange.” In October of 1761 the ambassador confessed that prance was no longer able to protect Louisiana, and begged Spain for assistance to defend it from >igland. The province had been unprofitable to Prance, who was glad to gratify and compensate her ally and gain her consent to a joint peace with "Sngland by a cession of the western portion. In the spring of 1761 Spain had proposed that the boundaries of Louisiana be definitely fixed, 7 and it seems that this was done in 1762 when France ceded to Spain the western portion under the designation "tout le pays connu sous le nom de la Louisiane." Carondelet, Governor of Louisiana from 1791 to 1793, recalled when asked in 1807 for information with regard to the western boundary, that "There is no doubt but that in the archives of the government of Louisiana will be found a copy of the cession made of the same by France to Spain in the year 1763, with a statement of its boundaries." He did not remember what the 8 document contained. The Spaniard Onis also admitted that "the boundaries of Louisiana were fixed by the treaty of 9 1763-4." Svery reason enjoined the grateful King of Spain to accept the desired, and. magnificent gift with the broad, limits seemingly prescribed by France—the Mississippi and the Rio Bravo in its lower course. Spain’s superior claim to Texas by her continuous occupation had now lost all practical moment, and Charles 111 might well have been willing to concede the shadow of right for the real gain of Louisiana. A friendly concession as to the old boundary dispute in taking an over-broad Louisiana offered by generous France would have been but a gesture of gratitude and magnanimity which, if handsome, was barely comparable to that of his kinsman’s gift. Immaterial might well seem a concession which would not rise to plague Spain as the permanent beneficiary. Napoleon and the imperialism of Revolutionary France could not be foreseen. On the other hand, it may be that the French stipulated the Rio Grande as boundary in 1762 with an eye to a possible reacquisition of the relinquished province. 11 And it was possibly such secret delimitation in 1762 that partly explains Spain’s reluctance to retrocede Louisiana to France during the next forty years. Under Spain the old de western boundary of Louisiana continued to separate that new acquisition from Texas, but the French in repossession might alter this de facto situation. When the Louisiana revolt of 1769 raised the (jiestion of a retrocession to France, the Spanish cabinet decided that Spain should keep possession, not merely to ensure the Mississippi’s being an "indelible line of demarcation between our provinces and those of the Snglish," but to avoid no less great a danger in France, Declared J/Uniain: "Should this colony be ceded to France with MX X^ a lerritorial enlargement, that power might extend itself towards Mexico." The allusion must be to sane con- atractive "territorial enlargement," for Louisiana received. no actual enlargement under Spain (West Florida, acquired by Spain in 1783, was not considered or made a part of the jurisdiction of Louisiana) . Patently no trouble to Spain would have arisen if Napoleon had not gained Spain’s consent in 1800 to return Louisiana "with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France possessed it, and as it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and other states.” Woleon informed his intended agent to Louisiana, through instructions written by the Minister of Marine on November 26, 1802 (the Spanish king having given on October 15 his final signature to the retrocession), that Louisiana extended from the Rio Grande to the Mississippi. Henry Adams and Sdward Channing have perceived in these Instructions an absolute demonstration that Texas was included in the Louisiana which we bought from France, inasmuch as Napoleon would have occupied Texas if his 13 imperial schemes had progressed. Channing says: "Napoleon sold us Louisiana, and we became possessed of Louisiana, simply and solely because he held the Spanish monarchy by the throat. Whatever he meant to take possession of under the name of Louisiana, he intended to hand over to us and handed over to us.” Professor Eugene 0. Barker, authority on the history of the Southwest, speaks for the many who believe Napoleon’s claim to have been arbitrary and unfounded: But most of us are unwilling, fortunately, to dismiss the question so summarily. Ownership and occupation prior to 1763 seem a fairer basis for determining the question than Napoleon’s intention in 1302* If France did not own and occupy Texas before 1763, it did not cede the territory to Spain; if Spain did not receive it from France, it did not recede it; and France, in consequence, did not sell it to the United States. No one who reads Pichardo’s monumental brief can doubt that Spain and not France owned Texas in 1763 and thereafter* 14 Napoleon’s claim to Texas seems to the writer not to be so devoid of foundation as has been supposed. His instructions of November 26, 1802, point distinctly to a boundary treaty as the basis of that claim, and he elsewhere says expressly that an ea rly treaty was its basis: The extent of Louisiana is well determined on ••• the west by the river called Rio Bravo from its moath to about the 30th parallel, [but] the line of demarcation stops after reaching this point, and there seems never to have been any convention in regard to this part of the frontier# The farther we go northward, the more undecided is the boundary* ?his part of America contains little more than uninhabited forests or Indian tribes, and the necessity of fixing a boundary has never yet been felt there* Nor. has any line been drawn between Louisiana and Canada* 10 Further instructions to Victor, of December 9, 1302, read: Le traits de 3aint-Ildefonse a do a la louis lane r^^yny oll ; iS. Brayo depuis son embouchure indetermines vers MJ££g» £®^®£ J^S?_nF^sTes^oTTTu^es~3enu3es — £ etahilasevents ' "' Talleyrand in his "Report to the on Monroe’s ’Memoir on the Floridas " in November of 1304, denying that West Florida was part of Louisiana, said: The limits o f Louisiana were not literally recalled in the treaty of, San Ildefonso of October 1, 18Ob,' hut to only necessary to consult the prTor Trea^ e, who had possessed Louisianauntil 1762" and who had then ceded it to Spain, had included in the cession only the western bank of the Mississippi and the isle of New Orleans ... By the preliminaries of peace signed the same day with England and con firmed some months later ... France ceded to England all that she possessed on the eastern bank of the Mississippi? l7 That France in 1802 rested her Texas claim on a Bourbon boundary agreement of 1762 is expressly stated. John Grahan, Pinckney’s Secretary of Legation at Madrid, wrote Madison on November 29, 1802, that he learned—doubtless from the French ambassador, St. Cyr—that the boundaries of Louisiana were laid down in the treaty of 1762-63. St. Cyr declared that the Rio Grande was the western boundary. l3 Again, Talleyrand similarly informed Turrean, the French ambassador at Washington, in 1805: The western boundary of Louisiana ceded to the United States was deteimined by the convention of 1762, which at that time caused that territory to pass to Spain. It is from that that they derive all their rights as to actual possessors; and these rights do not receive for them any extension from the motives of convenience which make them desire to extend their settlements to the Perdido River. 19 France, holding the Rio Grande to about the thirtieth parallel a western boundary so indisputable that Spain would take no exception, wished merely to negotiate a northward extension of the line to separate the upper part of Louisiana definitely from the Spanish settlements of Rew Mexico, which the French did not claim or desire. A draft of a proposed treaty with Spain, dated October 18, 1802, dealing with the cession of Suropean territory, the transfer of the Floridas to France, and the western boundary of Louisiana, says in Article VIII that commissioners shall make this extension: "To determine precisely the line of demarcation ... the middle of the Rio Grande from the mouth to the 29th degree will be taken as the boundary between Louisiana and the Kingdom of Mexico. Commissioners named by each party will trace from this last point the line of demarcation between Louisiana and New Mexico and California.” It seems from the foregoing that the convention of 1762, ceding Louisiana to Spain, fixed as the western boundary the Rio Grande to about the twenty-ninth or thirtieth parallel, thus presumably designating the mouth of the Be cos River as the stopping point. It is worthy of note that four years before this the Frenchman Du Pratz traced the western boundary along the Rio Grande to thence running it westward about forty miles and taking it northward parallel to the Pecos to about the forty-first parallel. 2l The map in Du Gratz’s His to ire de Louisiane (1753) may have served as a guide to the French claim in 1762, though the latter part of Du Pratz s line, infringing on the New Mexican towns, was not followed. The twenty-ninth parallel is again mentioned in Champ igny’s Stat Present de la Louisian e (1781) : What remained to France of her vast province of Louisiana [in 1763] comprised a vast strip eighty leagues from east to west from the mouth of the Mississippi to Mexico. The Rio Bravo del Norte on the west and the Mississippi on the east bounded these possessions, which extended from twenty-nine degrees north latitude to fifty degrees and even beyond. 22 Though historians have justly deemed Spain’s claims to Texas by actual occupation greatly superior to those of J'raice as put forward by our uninitiated diplomats, the evidence shows quite submissive when the French declared Texas a part of Louisiana regained; and it is improbable that Spain would have failed to protest a claim which she felt unjustified. An over-generous delimitation of Louisiana in 1762 would be none the less binding later: the Boman idea that a party could not be bound by his own generosity had passed in feudal times. Only when the United States became the possessor of the French title did Spain, enlisting France on her side, discover that consciousness of the impeccability of her own claim ishich has been so convincing to historians. Seemingly, French statesmen knew more about the basis of the French claim to Texas than they vouchsafed to the American purchasers ; and Spain guided her course accordingly before and after the transfer to the United States. When the Spanish Minister at Washington, Casa Yrujo, sent to Spain a pamphlet by "Silvestris,” vhich he rightly thought our Secretary of State had written, and which asserted that Louisiana lay between the Mississippi and the Rio Grande, he 23 made no attempt to dispute the claim. Yrujo seems to have feared that the Americans would gain possession of Texas, though he held it to be worth while to endeavor to save that priceless barrier: "Among the things which we still have for destroying any wild attempt of the Americans to penetrate to New Mexico are, the important position of Havana, and the superiority of our naval forces ... In whatever manner, it must be of the greatest importance for us to make a boundary treaty with the United States, and try to obtain, if possible, a considerable wilderness between the divisional line and our possessions of New Mexico. For this purpose, it would be necessary to send commissioners who had a practical knowledge 24. of that country.” So again, Cevallos, the Spanish Foreign Minister, when acknowledging Casa Calvo’s complaint from the Texas border "of the exaggerated ideas which the Americans have formed" concerning the boundaries, strongly denied the claim to the Perdido, but ventured no reproof to the Rio Grande claim. 25 When St. Cyr, the French Minister at Madrid, declared that Spain had ceded to France the Gulf region to 26 the Kio Grande, no protest is heard. Charles IV granted Texas to Godsy as a hereditary fief at this time, and a was issued on May 30, 1804, which may indicate the Spanish understanding of the limits of Louisiana as transferred to France. This order, inspired by Napoleon's tool Godoy, divided the Northern Interior Provinces of Mexico into two groups, eastern and western, and was unique in treating the Rio Grande as the boundary between Texas and Nuevo Santander, whereas the long recognized limit had been the Nueces. 27 Spain was seemingly prepared to relinquish an enlarged Texas if France should encourage the United States in her western boundary claim. Godoy planned to colonize Texas if it was kept, and make it a buffer against the dreaded Americans; his schemes were not executed, because of Napoleon’s intervention in Spain. When the immediate danger from the Franco - American claim was over, Spain removed the Texas boundary to its former position: Texas was again delimited at the Nueces by a royal and map of 1805. 23 Some have suspected Napoleon of a wish to embroil the United States with Spain when he retained the intangible definition of San Ildefonso in the treaty of 1803; but it is more likely, when he told Marbois "that if an obscurity did not already exist, it would be good policy to put one there,” that he merely desired to hold a means of gain in his negotiations with either Spain of the United States. He could lend his influence in the western boundary matter, for a consideration, either to Spain or to the Americans. Talleyrand and Marbois in 1803 gave only the vague encouragement necessary to good salesmanship to the American purchasers’ broad views that the province lay between those widely separated limits which they desired. Talleyrand had no wish to please gratuitously a distant and un-useful Republic. So, telling Livingston that Spain meant to give Prance possession "according to the words of the treaty," he uttered the evasive and laconic challenge: "You have made a noble bargain for yourselves and I suppose you will make the most of it.” 29 But when, immediately after the purchase, imperialistic Americans asked Laussat, whom Napoleon had sent to take over Louisiana, what the boundaries were, he read freely the Consul’s description, most ample as to the western limit. 3o That he had received no admonition to be reticent on this point seems to show Talleyrand’s indifference at the outset to the publicity apt to be given the French boundary claim. Laussat’s disclosure both gratified and offended Jefferson, for the President had already made up his mind that the Rio Grande and the Perdido served as limits, and Laussat discredited the latter claim. Laussat’s expansive description irritated Spain’s officers in the New World, who were exclusively impressed by the effect of Spanish occupation on the disputed title to Texas. Governor Salcedo and the Marquis Casa Calvo, delegated to convey Louisiana formally to France, objected to the "absurd claim" of the Americans and deplored and protested against Laussat’s "support” of their contention concerning the western limit, laussat replied that he had merely quoted his instructions, which he proceeded to quote again, with quite evident satisfaction, as the Spaniards had treated him unpleasantly." The last who would know of a secret boundaiy convention unfavorable to their views, Spain’s local agents displayed none of the reticence which marked the course of the Spanish administration. Their conspicuously superior zeal and assurance have caused one authority to say that Spain’s "frontier officers possessed greater knowledge of her rights to the disputed territory and a greater determination to secure them” than the government in Spain, whereas they perhaps possessed but greater ignorance. 33 When these Hew World fulminations reached Spain, Cevallos remonstrated to Talleyrand against Laussat’s indiscretion, and entreated him to discourage the Americans’ claim to Texas; he did not deny the justice of Laussat’s statement, "tacitly yielding it," avers Henry Adams, whom the insincerity of Spain and France impressed. 34 Talleyrand was accommodating to Spain, who showed no consciousness of having superior claims, and he instructed Turreau at Washington ”to dissuade the United States from the idea of attempting to extend the boundaries of Louisiana towards the west and northwest, in such a way as to cause annoyance to the court of Madrid.” The United States was calmly led to think that Napoleon would only have taken a rather eastern limit on the west, and have negotiated with Spain—a misleading equivocation. The French never expressly denied the Texas claim, as they did that of West Florida, and seemed chiefly concerned with preventing the Americans from claiming the Spanish New Mexican settle-35 ments northwest of Texas. Madison wrote in May of 1305: What part prance may take in relation to the western boundary of Louisiana seems not to have been disclosed. From the silence on that point, in Talleyrand’s note of November 3, in answer to yours, in which the claim of the united States to the Bio Bravo is expressly asserted, and from the confidential acknowledgment of that boundary by M. Laussat, ... it might be expected that ... France would side with us against Spain.* 6 In the meanwhile, Talleyrand may seem to mark oat an agreeable course for Spain to pursue towards the United States—one based on the theory that "We should have sought to distinguish between settlements that belong to the kingdom of Mexico, and settlements ... by the French. This distinction between settlements founded by the J*rench or by the Spaniards would have been made equally in ascending north-37 wards." If this was meant to be favorable to Spain, as historians have generally assumed, it was perhaps only to stress the friendship of Prance that Talleyrand prefaced the suggestion with the seeming reminder that the question was not innocent of early treaty milestones: The western limit of Louisiana not having been fixed in a manner equally precise by the treaties which preceded t hat of March 21, 1801 V "nor by tEat treaty it - self, the uncertainty which prevailed in regard to the direction of its frontiers has necessarily continued since the cession made to the United States. But it way well be that the equivocal Talleyrand simply meant that the test of actual settlement should have been applied only abcre the mouth of the Pecos on the upper Rio Grande, to determine the "direction" of the boundary. Spain seized on the possible and more agreeable interpretation, however, and in negotiating with the United States urged the test of de facto settlement applied to the whole western region in support of her claim to Texas. Talleyrand’s explanation to Turreau the next year that the Prench-Arnerican claim rested on the Louisiana cession treaty of 1762, by which "the western boundary of Louisiana ♦ was determined," might seem a curious avowal if Prance meant to support Spain even farther. But, though Napoleon had temporarily equivocated, he would gladly aid the United States in this boundary affAir when it should be more profitable to do so* Envisioning the seizure of Spain Itself, he had no scruple against selling West Florida to the United States, much less against divulging any western boundary secret; what he desired in return for friendly assistance to the United States in her Spanish relations was, as usual, a douceur. Livingston reported: "While Spain wishes to limit us as much as possible, France wishes to make our controversy favorable to her finances. Yesterday Marbo is again spoke to me on the subject of purchasing the Floridas and giving sixty millions for them."" Monroe was similarly advised when he passed through Paris to Madrids "Spain must cede territory; the 40 United States must pay money." In the spring of 1805 "the order of Deeres and the interpretation of Talleyrand regarding the limits of Louisiana were both used in an attempt to bargain with the United States," the secret of 1762 being apparently disclosed to Turreau at Washington for that purposed Jefferson was willing to pay for the eastward extension of Louisiana, but not anxious to pay for support of the western claim; and, though near its secret, let slip what was possibly the great opportunity of ensuring the United States early possession of Texas. Jefferson’s administrat ion had but a clue; Secretary Madison wrote to the American representatives abroad that he had found in a Life of Chatham printed at London in 1793 "a memorial referred to ... with the other negotiations preceding the peace of 1762-3, expressly on the subjects of the limits of Louisiana. ... You will perhaps be able to procure in London or Paris a sight of this document: it probably contains most of the proofs applicable to the question, and will be the more important as proceeding from prance." Madison added that the reference seemed to indicate that the memoir was favorable to France. Madison apparently did not locate this document. And Jefferson disparaged his one bit of solid information—Lauasat 1 s disclosure— -simply because it was unfavorable to his West Florida claims *We cannot suppose that the French prefect, Laues at, had any instructions from uis Government by what limits he was to receive the province of Louisiana from the officers of Spain.” 43 After 1803 the United States and Spain battled fifteen years over Texas, the odds of diplomacy thrown by Prance to Spain. Jefferson, Adams, Benton, Clay, Jackson and the many others who maintained that the United States ceded Texas to Spain in 1819 were perhaps right. Onis, the Spanish negotiator of the Florida treaty, suggested on beginning his negotiation at Washington in 1816 that Spain "might be willing to cede territory on the eastern side of the Mississippi in satisfaction of claims and in exchange fbr territory on the western side." And in his published account of the nego- tiation he declared that he might truthfully have put into the treaty this clause: "In exchange [for Florida], the United States cede to his Majesty the province of Tchas"; but, he continued, ”as I had, in the correspondence ••• for three years contended that that province [Texas] belonged to the King, it would have been a contradiction” too stultify-45 ing. During the negotiation the Minister of Bourbon France at Washington, Hyde de Neuville, acting as friendly mediator with a bias in favor of Spain, told Adams in November, 1818, that "Onis wanted him to interpose ... in favor of Spain, but intimated that he had declined, and told him that if he did give a declaration it would displease both parties, for it would be against the United States upon the Florida and French consular points, and against Spain upon the Western boundary In the negotiation the American government made no claim to the New Mexican territory lying east of the Rio Srande. "I utterly deny," said Adams, "that I claimed the Rio del Norte as our boundary in its fill extent. I only claimed it a short distance up the river, and then diverged to the 47 northward." The later assumption by "re-annexationists" that President Monroe and Adams claimed the Rio Graide in its whole course is apparently gratuitous. Adams knew that Onis was authorized by his last instructions to give up all of Texas if necessary; but the United States yielded its Texas claim—at least provisionally—in the Florida treaty, not because this was necessary to obtain Florida, but, as we shall see, because of "difficulties of an Internal nature which meance the Union itself." 4B The "re-annexation" movement dated from the Florida treaty, and had a basis in truth, if its argument did often go astray. Benton, it seems, invented the term "re-annexation" in 1820, when denouncing the Spanish treaty in the columns of the St. Louis inquirer, which he edited, as "the most execrable in the annals of diplomacy.” 49 Often it is assumed that Monroe’s administration, except for Adams, did not think much of our claim to Texas, and that the loud cry which arose in the country over the "cession” of Texas to Spain was a partisan cry got up by Clay, Benton and other outspoken critics of the administration. Far is this frcm true. The administrat ion believed so well in the French claim to Texas and yielded it so reluctantly that Monroe said in his message of December 7, 1819, to Congress: "For territory ceded by Spain, other territory of great value, to which our claim was believed to be well founded, was ceded by the United States.” 50 Adams gives the usual verdict when he says: "That we had a shadow of right beyond the Sabine I never believed since the conclusion of the Florida treaty." The "re-annexationist" reasoners were unfortunate in their tendency to span the chasm of the Florida treaty by the too convenient "constitutional principle" which—Robert J. Walker says "Mt. Olay maintained, in his speech of the 3rd April, 1820, that territory could not be alienated, merely by treaty; and, consequently, that, notwithstanding the treaty, Texas was still our own." . J * American Foreign Policy. 110.111. Though nJ®? S® v ®thought Napoleon preparing in this "indirection" and indefiniteness" to make territorial claims too extravagant to declare at once, the double definition of Louisiana may well have had no sinister meaning, pointing to the last clause and to Spain s acquisition of British West Florida in 1733, some conjecture that Napoleon meant later to claim this region as part of ancient French Louisiana. But on taking over Louisiana Napoleon expressly stated to his envoy that West Florida had been cut off from Louisiana in 1762-63 art formed no part of the Louisiana recovered from Spain (Deeres to Victor, November Robertson, Louisiana under Spain,France and the United States, I, 361) . Though not claim ihgfesnToridaT Napoleon wanted it, and Talleyrand s plan in 1300 for a Spanish treaty reads! "Spain ... pledges herself to retrocede to the French Republic the colony of Louisiana, with the sane extent it actually has in the hands of Spain and such as it should be according to the treaties subsequently passed between Spain and other states. Spain shall further join in this cession that of the two Sloridas, eastern and western, with their actual limits" (H. Adams, History of the United States, I, 366, 367; Cox, The west Florida conFroverly, 74. 75) • As Talleyrand later assured Monroe, Spanish government has constantly refused to cede any part of the Pl ori da g even from the Mississippi to the Mobile" (Talleyrand to Mon-’ £22» December 21, 1304, in State Papers and Public Documents, XII, 203-205) . - g- W* Re Shepherd, "The Cession of Louisiana to Spain," in Political Science Quarterly, XIX, 441-443. For Talleyrand' see last reference in note 1; Adams, History of the United States, 11, 295-300; Cox, The West Florida Uonlroversy, 1179 , nr; * ’ g Tucker to John C. Calhoun, Secretary of State, November 13, 1844, in J• P. Jameson, Correspondence of Calhoun, 1008 note, in Am. Hiat. Assn. Report, 1399, II so in C. S. Boucher and R. P.Brooks, "Correspondence to Calhoun," in ibid., 1929, pp. 253-262. " 4 ■ — ——— Tucker to Calhoun, December 12, 1344, in Jameson, Cor. of Calhoun, 1003, 1009. White’s European trip in 1333 (wHTch was the same year that he gave his information to Tucker) and his procurement of Talleyrand’s assistance are also detailed in Henry A* Wise, Seven Decades of the Union, 107-109, where Talleyrand says towhite': "Tes between the French and Spanish territories had been fixed by a certain treaty which was secret ... and could be had at his order." Probably White also told his friend Wise what he told Tucker. White died at St. Louis in 1840; for more about him see the writer s "The western Boundary of Louisiana, 1762-1303," in The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXXV, 95-103. ~5 — White, A New Collection of laws. Charters and Local Ordinances of the governments of great Britain, France and Spain, Relaxing to the Concessions of Land in Their Re g“Z pective Colonies; together with the"Taws aHd~Texas on the Same Subject (13591 . T, xIT“xTH 6 — A. S. Aiton, ’’The Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession,” in XXXVI, 701-720, discredits the view that Louisiana was a "white elephant” in the eyes of Spain in 1762—a view held by Louis Jana (1854 ed.) , 11, 94, 227, and more recently by Pr o fess or She phe rd. Alton’s is one of the several articles on Louisiana which have appeared since the opening of the French archives. 7 — —— Surrey, Calendar of Manuscripts in Paris Archives and g- —— Carondelet to Godoy, Quito, July 21, 1807, in Robert - son, Louisiana, 11, 156-161. Governor Kerfrec of Louisiana was instructed in 1763 to hand over Louisiana to its new owners "in accordance with the limits fixed upon in the said preliminaries ” (B. French, Hist. Colls, of Louisiana. 11, 65) . 9 —- — [Onis], Observations on the Existing Differences between the Government of Spa in~anTt Ke Unit ed" states. by _ Veras, pamphlet ( JOii; —The University of Texas transcripts from the archives of Mexico contain a copy of Verus sent by Onis to the Viceroy. — On the two interesting "courtesy" maps of Louisiana made in 1762, one by Lopez, geographer to the King of Spain, and the other by Vaugondy, Geographe Ordinaife to the King of France, see J. R. Ficklen, "Was TeTas Included in the Louisiana Purchase?" in Pubs, of the Southern Hist. Assn., V, 364-366. The former gave TexasTo France, anT”the^atter gave it to Spain. H. a Spain boldly claimed in her negotiation with the United States that France had never claimed Texas before 1763, and historians have often accepted this averment as true. France, however, had on numerous occasions—for instance, 1712, 1721, and 1755-1763—laid a claim to all or part of the territory westward to the Rio Grande; and undoubtedly she would have contested Spain’s occupation had it not been that in this period France and Spain were generally allies in &iropean wars and diplomacy. See Marc da Villiers, la Louisiana: Histo ire de Son Hom et de Ses Fronti^res (1631-1319) , 51, 52; H. 3. Bolton, Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century, 66-77, 359-364; intrusions into Uew Mexico, 1749-1752," in H, m. Stephens and Bolton, The Pacific Ocean in History, 339-407. ■ — — — _ Ipuiaiana, 11, 247-263 (my italics) . Arabia's similar opinion is quoted by The Spanish Sovernor sfn+« U K 3ia ? a a3 f s4 is 1? 39 for a slight extension of the de ac - boundary to the Sabine, but nothing was done. See "ST L• Portillo, Apuntes para la Historia de Coahuila y Texas, 338. 13 — — Adama, History of the United States, 11, 5-7, 299; Channing, History of thT~UnlTed States',' IV. 331-333. These Historians have been criticized because they do not go behind and make an effort to justify Napoleon’s claim. - — Barker’s review of Pichardo’s Treatise on the Limits of Louisiana (ed. 0. W. Hackett) , in”” The Southwestern Sis- “ Torxcal Quarterly, XXXV, 243. PS — — — —— Minister of the Navy, to General Victor, November 26, 1802, in Adams, United. States, 11, 6; and more literally translated in Bobertson, Louisiana, I, 361-363. The instructions but repeat a memorandunT wrlllen to Deeres October 2, 1302, by Talleyrand, whose official knowledge went back far into the monarchy: "I shall indicate to you the boundaries of Louisiana which have been traced with some precision. The treaty of 1763, of which I send you an extract (enclosure no. 2) provides that the eastern boundary of that colony must follow the middle of the Mississippi ... a part of the boundaries of New Mexico and of Louisiana is determined with seme precision. The Rio Bravo, from its mouth up to the 30th decree serves as the line of demarcation. But from that last the line is less exact. It does not appear that any convention of boundaries was ever held for that part of the frontier. The farther north one goes, the more vague is the demarcation ... Neither has any line been drawn between Louisiana and Canada. Since both of those countries belonged to France before the treaty of 1763, there was little to be gained in separating exactly their boundaries, and that has not since been done, for the same reasons that caused the demarcation of part of the wilderness of Louisiana and New Mexico to be neglected" (Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 141; the original French is given in part by J. R. Ficklen, in Pubs, of the Southern Hist. Assn., V, 333, 334). DecrdsTnZ structions were first published in the united States and Texas in 1345. . 7~Z Villiers, La Louisiane, 61. p? — — n Les limites de la Louisiana n pas littAralerappelges dans Ie traite de Saint du 3 vend - miaireTn IX; ma is ii suff fsa iF~pour les suiter Tga~rarEes .77" RenauTt? la QuesTibn~de 1 a louislane, (my 11 al ics) . IB Graham to Madison, November 29, 1302, Spanish Dispatches, MS., VI, Bureau of Indexes and Archives, State Department; cited in Cox, The west Florida Controversy, 70. On St. Cyr see Cox in The Southwestern HisTtbrical Quarterly, XVII, 10. Al cedo ’ s Dice ion ar io Seo gyaf icg His tor ico, 1786, represented Louisiana as extending 650 miles from longitude 36° to 96°, that is, from the Appalachicola to the mouth of the Rio Grande; this was cited by John Quincy Adams in support of the French claim (Niles 1 Register, XIV, 38). Professor Barker has called to my attention the fact that Thomas Salmon s Geographical Grammar, published in Kilmarnock, Scotland, in 1767, contains a map of North America showing the Rio Grande as the western boundary of Louisiana. See The Dallas Morning News, March 27, 1932. 19 — — Talleyrand to General Turreau, April 26, 1805, Henrv Adams transcripts, French State Papers, in Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 142 note. lam indebted to Dr. Robertson for the Original French: "La limite occidentals de la Louisiana ced6e aux Stats Unis a s£terminee par la con vent lon deT7 62. * 2s - — — "Pour determiner avec precision la ligne de demarcation ... on prendra pour limit es ent re la Louisiana "et Ie Royaume de Mexico le yUieu de fl eave del eh l~rF3 montant >puia son embouchure r jus qu T Tes~ommissaires nommes de part ef d autre Trace ron point la ligne de~demarcation entre Ta Louisiana st Ipuye.au Mexique etla California.* The draft“is quoted from the French Arc Elves by K p. Renault, La Question de is iogisiane, 95; cf. W. M. Sloane, 0 plans for a Colonial in Am. Hist* Rev.. IV, 445. Negotiations on these lines bore no fruit. 1 "— — ■ — x,. Cox * " Ths louis iana-!Vexas yrontier," In The Quarterly of the Texas State Hist. Assn.. X, 20; I’arahall."TEelfesterh - Boundaiy of tEe loulslana , 5. 22 ■ 11 1 — — ... - _ French, Hist. Colle, of Louisiana, V, 123. The French De Lisle map of 1707 traced the boundary along the Rio Grande to the mouth of the Pecos, thence north along the Pecos, excluding the New Mexican settlements. The Lopez map likewise showed the Rio Grande only in its lower course. The French, of course, never claimed New Mexican territory. See Marshall, The Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 36 • ■ 23 —— — Yiu jo to Cevallos, November 5, 1303, in Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 117-120; of. I, 25. Livingston also believed that Louisiana was bounded by the Mississippi and the Rio Grande, but this did not prevent him from trying to despoil Spain of West Florida (P. Young, History of Mexico, 70) . For a brief statement of various French aril Spanish claims to Texas see L. Houck, The Boundaries of the Louisiana Purchase and Annals of Congress? 1319, coTs.Trsa9-H&'. —F6r~ the Spanish point of “view see also J. M. puelles. Report to the President of Mexico upon the Boundaries of the“provlnce of Texas with rEat of Louisiana ( Zacat ecas, IH2HT? g Ivan in full in Louisiana Historical Quarterly, I, 21-43; and note 33 below. 24 Yrujo to Cevallos, "Important Reflections on the Cession of Louisiana," August 3, 1803, in Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 70-77. (My italics.) pK ' ■ 1 ' ——— — Cevallos to Casa Cal to, April 2, 1804, in Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 177-179. Cevallos also received and read W S lives tris" without comment (ibid., 11, 130) . Cox, in The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVII, — — G. P» Garrison, Westward Extension, 103, 104; H. H. Bancroft, North Mexican 3TaFes~and Texas. 11, 10, 11; Ashbel Smith, Reminiscences of Hie Texas Republic, 27; M. A. Hatcher of Texas to Foreign 83, 84; Anson Jones, Memoranda and Ulfl ci al Correspondence Relating to the Republic of Texas, a gß — — 3iarterly of the Texas State Hist. Assn., I, 14, 15; cf. Garrison, Westward . —— gg — _ — Livingston to Madison, May 20, 1805, in Am. State ftps *» For• Heis •, 11, 561; Marbois, History of Louis - lana, 236. Wen Monroe and Livingston urged? a statement of boundaries, Talleyrand assured them that it was unnecessary: France "would cede to the United States every foot of territory which Spain had ceded to her” and France would have construed "her claim to boundaries liberally"! (Monro©"TcTUal- June 1, 1816, in S. M. Hamilton, Writings of James Monroe, V, 385). — Madison to Livingston, January 31 and Karch 31, 1804, in Am. State Paps., Por. Reis ~ 11, 574, 575; Claiborne and Wilkinson to Kachis on? 'December 27, 1303, cited by Cox, in f j-he Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVII, 10, 20; Daniel Slark, American consul at New Orleans, to Kadison, December 13, 1803, in Am. Hist. Rev., XXXIII, 356, 357. 31 — Jefferson’s ”lamination” of 1303, in Documents Relating t° the Parphase and Sbcplorat ion of Lo ui s iaha (Hougirt on Kifflin~o., gg— ■ — —— ■ — Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 162-172, 150 ff.; Cox,in The Southwestern Hjstor icaT Qaart XVII, 18-20. Casa Calvonad been sent by the Capta in-general of Cuba, Touts tana and the Floridas at Havana as his delegate. 33 ' ' ' - • 1 • .. - • Cox, in ibid.,, XVII, 17. United States, 11, 293. - ... - r- ' .. - ■ — Talleyrand to Turreau, August 3, 1304, in Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 193, 194; Talleyrand to Turreau, February 3, 13u5, cited by Cox, in The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVII, 174; cf. Marbo is, Louis iana, 235 ; Marshall ,"The Western Boundary o f the Louisiana' Purchase, 34. Adams put’TT: H Sut when sold her' bargain to us ... she changed her tone—first equivocated and evaded, and finally declared herself point-blank against us upon the eastern limit, and more feebly and ambiguously, upon the western" (Memoirs, IV, 220, 221). Madison to Monroe, May 23, 1805, in Am. State Paps., For. Heis.. 11, 633. —... Talleyrand to Gravina, Spanish Minister at Paris, August 30, 1804, in Adams, United States, 11, 299, 300, and Hohertson, Louisiana, 11, 195-193. CMjTital les.) 33 - - - - — Cavallos to the American envoys, April 20, 1305, in Am* State Paps., Por. Reis., 11, 663. In May of 1305, Cevallos ordered the compilation of Spain’s claims by exploration and occupation; and the resulting compendium, made by Talamantes and pichardo, is edited by Q. W* Hackett as Pichardo 1 s Treatise on the Limits of Louisiana and Texas. during his search for germane documents Talamantes wrote Carondelet, and we have quoted the Governor’s reply above (Talamantes to Carondelet, Mexico, April 1, 1307, and Carondelet to Godoy, Quito, July 21, 1307, in Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 156-161) . It was not the intent of Spain that Talamantes should present unfavorable facts, and it may be presumed that Carondelet T s ghostly information never reached Talamantes, for it was addressed by way of Godoy in Spain. The suppression by Spain of information of the convention of 1763 would again seem to show its nature. Pichardo ’s Treatise asserts that the boundaries of Louisiana had never been fixed—an indispensable premise of the plausible claim to Texas by occupation which Spain presented to the United States. T ■ - ' — Livingston to Monroe, September 21, 1804, in Hamilton, Writings of Monroe, IV, 305 note. H. b» Mier, The Purchase of Florida, 153, 159. The quotation is from I. J. Cox, "The Significance of the Louisiana-Texas Frontier," in The proceedings of the Miss. Vai ley Hist. Assn., 111, 207. Cox' gives reference~to^Tohroe papers of March, 1805. 42 — Madison to Monroe and Pinckney, April 15, 1304, in Arn. State Paps., For. Reis., 11, 629. General Wilkinson, who was in the confidence of the Spanish officials in America, knew in 1304 that the Rio Grande had been "determined as the western boundary” (Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 336, 337; cf. Cox in Am. Hist. Rev., XIX, 793 note) . 1nT764, on Els return from Louisiana, Governor wrote a memoir on the state of the province and his administration, at the request of the French government (see surrey, Calendar of Manuscripts in Paris Archives and Libraries, 11. 1462, 1464T.Possibly iT“d e s cribed the de~fa enT of Louisiana as it then was. Onis, who doubtless knew of any definition of boundaries for Louisiana made at the time of its cession to Spain, mentioned this memoir of 1764 as an official "supplement to the act of cession," stating that it agreed with his averment to Secretary that Prance ’’never ventured to go beyond the certain and well-known limits of their settlements, or violate those of the territory and dominions of Spain” (Cnis to Adams, January 5, 1313, in Am. State Paps., for.Reis., IV, 459; cf. Cnis, hemo ria soFre las negoclaciones enTre fsnaha v los Stades Unixes, bhdrld? T3gC, in Femoriaspara la Wisteria de la Guerra de Texas, I, 35, 36' • was FuT" one of many m Tsrep res en tat ions and deceptions, some of which Adams saw through. Cnis, for instance, declared boldly that the cession of Louisiana to Spain occurred in 1764—this to Indicate that West Florida, having been ceded by france to England in 176 could not have been a part of the Louisiana which was ceded to Spain. And possibly, too, his fictitious dating of the cession ”1764” was to link it up with the Kerlerec memoir of that year. But Adams called Cnis's bluff, pointing out that hitherto Spain had declared that the boundaries of Louisiana had never been fixed, while now of a sudden Cnis declares that they had been fixed, though he gives no adequate information on the subject. Cnis, sorry that he had mentioned the matter, went off irrelevantly to a discussion of de facto boundaries and their ’’notoriety,” hushing up hi“aFmission that the boundaries had been fixed. Adans might have pursued his inquisition into the Spaniard 1 s deception, but Jackson s invasion of Florida now absorbed attention. See Adams to Cnis, March 12, 1313, and Cnis to Mams, Karch 23, 1813, in Am. Pans., por. Reis., IV, 475. 434 ; cf. Cnis in ibTS.Tv7~ 453, 454, 457. 43 "—~~— —— Pinckney and Monroe to Oevallos, March 3, 1305, in Am« State Paps., For. 11 » 655. 44 1 Marshall, The Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 50. (My - italics.) 35 — Onia, Memoir upon the Negotiations between Spain and ths United States of America, "translated by 'Tobias Watkins TBaltimore, T8S1) ,T45'," - Adams, Memoirs, IV, 169. (My italics.) — „ ~ in ,-S22£- S- 10^ 8 . 29 ?°ng-. I Sess., App., 907; hay 13, 1846. The truth of Adams s statement is shown by his correspondence with O n is; in which he lays no claim to say part of New Mexico, the actual extent of which was well known. See, for instance, Adams to Onis, March 12,1318. in Jtew., J? o**• 0 **• Jtels *» IV» 471. The actual boundary offers for the ear Tier phase of the negotiation do not appear in the correspondence, and T. M. Marshall is probably in error in assuming the Rio Grande in its fill extent to have been Adams s offer (The Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 55, and map opposite page 66) . 1 ' 23- Adams to Porsyth, August 13, 1819, in Am. State Paps., Por. Reis., IV, 245, 250; Adams in Niles* Register, LOTI, TUH. — 5 43 ~— - - Banton called on the West to elect a President known to favor the "re -purchase" of that ancient boundary of Louisiana," and asked, Would"not the purchase of Texas'give immortality to some future Jefferson?" (inquirer, in Niles’ Register, XX, 239) • In his Anericams and la Salle articles of 1829 Benton again stresses the propriety and heed of using the prefix "re" in speaking of getting Texas Salle," No. 1, in St. Louis Beacon, October 7, 1829). 50 - Calhoun and Wirt, both in Conroe s cabinet, were also pro-Texas* CHAPTER III AGGRESSIVENESS TOWARDS THE FLORIDAS AND MEXICO The claim to West Florida preferred by the Jefferson administration seems an unscrupulous lawyer’s interpretation of the implicit definition of Louisiana in the Purchase treaty. As long as Louisiana was in the hands of France American statesmen were seemingly certain that it did not include West Florida, and they also knew that Spain did not cede any of the Floridas to France in 1802-03. Livingston reported over and over to Secretary Madiscn, as on March 3, 1803, that "The Floridas are still in the hands of Spain.” l But Livingston had been sent to buy Florida’. Could the gentleman return empty-handed? we say "empty-handed” because he did not think much of Louisiana as compared to the Floridas; he penned this remarkable confession to Madison on April 11, 1803; I would rather have confined our views to smaller objects, and I think that if we succeed it would be good poiiey to excharge the west bank [of the Mississippi! with Spain for the Floridas, reserving Mew Orleans." Several weeks after the Purchase treaty it occurred to Livingston that possibly, in view of the puzzling definition in the treaty of San Ildefonso and Talleyrand’s reticence, the United States had procured West Florida without knowing it. 3 Madison adopted this view. The West Florida claim, absurd enough, was still Persisted in (though not openly until 1810) after France had declared that she had not obtained West Florida with Louisiana and had pointed out that inasmuch as the French territory east of the Mississippi had been ceded to England in 1762-63 it could not have been a part of the Louisiana then given Spain General Wilkinson in vain urged Spain to cede the Floridas to the United States in exchange for Louisiana, giving warning that the American frontiersmen like the ancient Goths and Vandals would precipitate themselves upon the weak defenses of Mexico, overturn everything in their path, and propagate in their course the pestilent doctrines that had desolated the most valuable part of 3urope and deprived whole kingdoms of their foundations. In August, 1303, Jefferson wrote that our territorial claims "will be the subject of negotiation with Spain, and if, as soon as she is at war, we push them strongly with one hand, holding out a price in the other, we shall certainly obtain the H o rid as, and all in good time." 5 And, again: "the Floridas will fall to us peaceably the first war Spain is engaged in." But Spain was slow in becoming engaged in war. Her policy was pacific. While Burr and Wilkinson were early meditating their plans of conquest in the Southwest, President Jefferson ushered in a new era of American diplomacy in udiich private pecuniary claims were used as the lever to compel cession of territory from the weak southern neighbor. He cast about for spoils in view of the "impending” war with Spain. He sent Senator John Smith of Ohio to the PLoridas in the summer of 1805 to ascertain whether the Spanish officials and the inhabitants were favorable to annexat ion in case war were resorted to. Smith reported that these were both on the whole favorable to such annexation. Jefferson told the British Minister that in event of hostilities the Floridas and Cuba, "which was necessary to the defense of Louisiana and Florida, would be an easy conquest." 7 To attain his object peaceably if possible, Jefferson did not hesitate to have shady dealings with Napoleon; he evolved two methods of getting the Floridas* One was to frighten Spain by a threat of war, secretly "buying” the longed-for Spanish territory through Napoleoi, whose proposal to induce Spain to sell the Floridas reached Jefferson in November, 1805; and the other was to wage war on Spain, taking Cuba, Texas and the Floridas, if successful. Jefferson’s message of December 3, stressing the pecuniary claims against Spain, looked primarily to the first alternative. His confidential message of December 6 was thus in marked contrast to the martial fervor of that of December 3* Indignantly did Randolph note this retreat; it seemed to him that the President wished to take credit for patriotic boldness, shifting upon Congress the invidious responsibility for backing down. When Jefferson asked him to report from the Committee on ways and Means a secret appropriation of two millions to "buy* the Floridas, Randolph, who was told by Secretary Madison that this payment was to go to France, refused to turn over "the public purse to the first cut-throat who demanded it." Randolph denounced it as "a mean attempt to bribe one nation to Join in robbing another." Greedy for money, France intimated to the American government that all its dealings with Spain must be done through prance, who "would take part with Spain in any contest she might have with the United States." When the appropriation was finally put through over Randolph’s opposition, in February, 1806, the American agents to France, Armstrong and Bowdoin, were instructed to subserve everything to the "essential” object of west Florida and the "important” object of Hast Florida; to further these the Sabine might be allowed as the western boundary, though either the Guadalupe or the Colorado was, of course, preferable, belated overture was unsuccessful: Napoleon no longer needed the money, and—therefore, perhaps—could not induce Spain to cede the Floridas. 3 Jeffers cn had sone misgiving about the sacrifice of Texas, and still entertained an idea of war with Spain. The notion of a war’s being begun without a declaration by the government could have appealed to him. He may have welcomed the opportunity for a "defensive” war presented in 1306 by the encroachment of Spanish troops across the Sabine. Orders were given General Wilkinson in May to repel the invader. 9 Jefferson might count on Wilkinson’s doing more than merely driving the Spanish beyond the Sabine. But for some reason probably his awaiting developments with Burr—the General long delayed, and when he finally reached the Sabine frontier it was not to fight, but to betray his confederate Burr to the Spanish General, Cordero, whom by a fraternal policy he induced to withdraw to the west of the Sabine and to sign an unauthorized "neutral ground" agreement. It was perhaps not altogether incidentally that Wilkinson thought his services to Spain worth $300,000 (only half of which he collected) . Burr’s and Wilkinson’s plot against New Spain and perhaps West Florida was probably premised on the outbreak of war with Spain, which the arch-schemer Wilkinson was in a position to precipitate when it was desired. Many of the chief leaders of the West were involvad in the plot. The people of the west generally were but too glad to leap on Spain to gain plunder and confer "on our oppressed Spanish brethren in Mexico those inestimable blessings of freedom which we ourselves enjoy." John Adair of Kentucky assured Wilkinson in 1804 that "the Kentuckians are full of enterprise and altho not poor as greedy after plunder as ever the old Romans were. Mexico glitters in our syes—the word is all we wait for." Burr sought in vain to obtain money from the British and Spanish Ministers at Washington on the grounds that it would be used to promote the separation of the West; and he did probe the feeling of the Western people only to find them strongly attached to the Union, so strongly, indeed, that the leaking into the public prints of Burr’s indiscreet talk about the possibilities of disunion was a large factor in his ruin. Whatever of treason his unpatriotic mind may have at first conceived, his practical plan from first to last was an attack on the Spanish pro vinces. He claimed (with what warrant is not known) and convinced many that his plans for conquest, or for settling the boundaries for "half the sum" of Jefferson’s "two million" act, were "well known by the administration, and seen by it with complacency. They are such as every man of honor, and every good citizen must approve." ll He, for instance, assured his accomplice and dupe Blennerhassett, in August, 1806, that he was advised as to the views of the Administration; that the expulsion of the Spaniards from the American Territory then violated by them or even an inyas ion of Mexico, would be pleasing to Mr. Jefferson, if either could be effected without a declaration of war, which was now prevented by parsimony on the one hand, and dread of France on the other It was Burr’s misfortune to confide in the Spanish pensioner and congenital turncoat James Wilkinson, who. on the other hand, had some cause to be irritated both by Burr’s indiscretions, which were arousing the country, and by Burr’s monopolizing attitude. Burr thus described to the General a division of their future power: "Burr first, and Wilkinson second." The fact that Wilkinson’s past Spanish relations were somewhat notorious also bore down the "conspiracy”; for such early and ardent antagonists of the plot as Colonel Joseph H, Daveiss, District Attorney and prominent Federalist of Kentucky, tended to infer a treasonable character in the plot merely from Wilkinson’s connection, whether the confederates meant after conquering an empire from Spain to induce the west to secede frctn the Union is an insoluble enigma. Afterwards Burr always insisted that the object had been to liberate the Spanish possessions "and after a while annex them to the United States." It would seem probable that till late in 1306 Wilkinson had no intention of abandoning his plans with Burr and of retracing his steps in order to prove a patriotism that he did not possess. Yet Blennerhassett, musing during the aftermath of the abortive project, in August of 1307, when Burr’s trial for treason had exposed Wilkinson’s past, thought otherwise, and wondered that Burr should have placed confidence in old Spanish pensioners, when there were others less bound to Spain: Col. Burr must have strarg el y overrated his own powers, if he ever thought that these men would have Joined him in any thing but words against Spain, iiiiile he might with the greatest ease, when he was in Kentucky, have enlisted Baveiss and the Marshall party in his interest. ’Baveiss and Br. Marshall,’ he [John Wood, who had been brought io Kentucky by Baveiss and Humphrey Marshall to edit the western World at Frankfort] added, ’would gladly have embarked in all or any of his speculations’; they had no Spanish ties to break, and Baveiss instituted proceedings against him, partly from a sense of neglect on the part of Burr, and through enmity to the President, who he fhlly believed was concerned with Burr, or connived at his operations A* Jefferson undoubtedly had known favorably a great deal more about Burr’s and Wilkinson’s activities than he could admit, flatly refusing during Burr’s trial for treason to allow the court to examine his pzdvate correspondence with Wilkinson, the substance of which has never appeared. During the trial the real Wilkinson was sufficiently brought out. Governor Adair, whom Wilkinson had the misfortune to arrest, declared that as late as September, 1806, the General had written him from the Sabine, urging him to join a military expedition against the Spaniards, saying that 5,000 light troops would overrun Mexico, and concluding: "Dear Adair, you are the only military character in whom I can place con-14 * fidence." The General was heaped with undeserved honors and. "hugged to the administration," to quote Randolph, who was among those who denounced Wilkinson as a Spanish pensioner. Yet it was too plain that Wilkinson was involved with Burr, even though he did turn informer and charge Burr with disunion plans. One of the government prosecutors curiously acknowledged that "Wilkinson ... was as much concerned in Burr’s schemes as Burr himself; but his exculpation was not only due to him, from his seasonable discovery and overthrow of the [alleged disunion] plot, but his country should cannonize him for it, and the Government could never sufficiently requite him." Jefferson’s credulity of the charge of treason against Burr and his vigorous prosecution of the former Vice-President has not unreasonably been ascribed largely to personal animus • J. H. Baveiss wrote Jefferson throughout 1306, informing him of the two confederates 1 movements and reputed projects against the "Mexican provinces, and the American possessions on the Mississippi, and the Moridas." His first letter, of January 10, assured Jefferson that Wilkinson had been in the pay of Spain, a thing that the President already knew; Baveiss believed a disunion plot to be on foot. Jefferson replied on February 15, expressing a wish to hear of further developments and to keep secrecy.Daveiss wrote Jefferson again and again with farther inforiration and warnings Nehruary 10, March 28 and 29, April 5, April 21, July 14—and still no answer or sign came from the President. Naturally this struck Daveiss as evidence of Jefferson’s desire to overlook the matter; and, being a Federalist, Daveiss was not pleased with or lenient towards the President’s conduct. Daveiss maintained that the President had adequate information from him, not to speak of Mlicott’s reports to the government, to institute an investigation to save the country from a grave danger. Daveiss o ver-emphasized the danger to the Union. And it was no doubt because Jefferson knew or believed the Burr-Wilkinson scheme to be directed against Mexico that he apparently connived at it. On July 14 Daviess reported a friendly conversation with Wilkinson, who showed him a map of New Mexico and said significantly "that had "Burr been president, we would have had all this country beo 18 fore now." Daveiss believed that he "offended the President" by showing in the letter of July 14 that the President was understood. The District Attorney determined to waste no more letters on Jefferson* But on August 14 he addressed the Secretary of State: I have addressed seven letters to the president ... The first letter has been answered by the president; all the rest remain unacknowledged ... for which I am unable to account ... It is my duty, as a citizen, to support my government in a matter of this nature, and to communicate all I may hear or know about it: of this I am determined to acquit myself, no matter what regard the government may give it. Madison acknowledged receipt of this letter and sent it to Jefferson, who made reply to Daveiss on September 12, saying that he had received all of Daveiss's letters: The acknowledgment of their receipt is now therefore made to relieve you from any anxiety respecting their safety; and you may rely upon the most inviolable secrecy as to the past [and] future communications you may think proper to make. Your letters are not filed in the offices; but will be kept amorg my private papers Daveiss had wanted anything but secrecy, and was astounded. Was anything so astonishing! So unaccountable! That in reply to a letter so distinct, the government should still keep me profoundly in the dark, never order me to do or forbear anything, or give me one hint of their views! ... I continually heard it whispered, that the thing was going on by the privity of the executive, and I was ... staggered relative to that point by the silence of the administration to me ... I determined to make an effort to arrest Mr. Burr’s preparations ... I made an affidavit, of my information and belief, as to his expedition against Mexico; and stated to the court, that the law only reached that part of the plot — but my information was equally conclusive, that the scheme embraced New Orleans, and all the western states. $ The District Attorney believed that Jefferson welcomed Wilkinson's desertion and calumny of purr as a means of escaping a plot whose notoriety was growing too dangerous to him. As Daveiss points out, the failure of the Mexican project was owing alone to Wilkinson's defection, and not at all to the passive Jefferson, from whose foreknowledge one must infer his sanction. The President could find it good policy to connive at the project as long as it went well against Spain, and disavow it, if necessary, making Burr the 20 scapegoat • Naturally Jefferson did not publicly confess his early knowledge of the Burr-Wil kins on conspiracy, but pre tended that the plot was exposed to him by Wilkinson’s treacherous letter of October 21, received on November 25. Wilkinson’s letter contained some obvious falsehood; and the famous coda letter from Burr to Wilkinson, which the general sent to Jefferson (perhaps falsified) , was plainly addressed to one who knew already as much about the plans against Mexico as did its writer. Jefferson could overlook this and at last issue a proclamation of neutrality (November 27, 1806), and send John Graham to investigate in Orleans Territory. The President sent Congress on January 22, 1807, a communication on the matter in which he assumed an attitude of ignorant innocence: Some time in the latter part of September, I received intimation that designs were in agitation in the western country, unlawful and unfriendly to the peace of the nat ion; and that the prime mover was Aaron Burr ... The grounds of these intimations being inconclusive, the objects uncertain ... the only measure tkken was to urge the informants to use their best endeavors to get further insight into the designs ... and to communicate them to me. It was not till the latter part of October that the objects of the conspiracy began to be perceived. Jefferson knew far more of Burr’s and Wilkinson’s plans from Davelss’s letters than he learned from Wilkinson’s labored repudiation of Burr, and yet he declared: "The General’s letter, which came to hand on the 25th of November .♦. and some other information received a few days earlier, when brought together, developed Burr’s general designs." Of course Wilkinson was held not only innocent but deserving of praise for his "patriotic,” though very blatant, verbal shafts against the great Armada with which, as he feared, Butr was descending upon New Orleans to lay siege to the Union. The great army turned out to be some sixty men floating down the Mississippi on nine or ten boats; for it seems that Burr expected Wilkinson to provide the chief military io rce • Andrew Jackson’s peculiar but characteristic conduct in the Burr affair deserves a brief mention, as the General later becomes prominent in our tale. Jackson had intimate relations with Burr and engaged to aid his enterprise, but was above all anxious "to secure his own safety." 22 Jackson’s long and winding letter to G. W. Campbell of January 12, 1807 (which was shown to Jefferson), and his shorter and cryptic letters to Jefferson and Governor Claiborne of November 12, 1806, designed to set himself right with the administration, can hardly be viewed, in the light of his intimacy with Burr before and after, as anything but masterpieces of obscurity and equivocation, one must suspect that Jackson's professions of ignorance of Burr's projects, save as they were "such as were sanctioned by legal authority," would, like Wilkinson's treacherous letter against Burr, have been considered by the administration rather an indication of his complicity than evidence of his innocence had the administration not known fairly well and favorably what Burr had aimed at. There is something ludicrous about Jackson's bombastic professions and his avowed sudden deep suspicion about November 9 of disunionism in Burr soon easily calmed by Burr himself. Jackson told Canpbell that about November 10, 1806, from a certain Captain's disclosure to him of a disunion intrigue, it rushed into my mind like lightening, that he, (Burr,) was at the head, and from the colourings he had held out to me, Generals Robertson and Overton, and the hospitality I him, I viewed it as base conduct to us all, and heightened the baseness of his intended crimes, if he really was about to become a traitor. Burr shortly after "regained" Jackson’s confidence by letter and verbal communication—so much so that Jackson raised a military force to aid the project. But befbre this occurred, while the General's mind was still "agitated," he wrote Jefferson and Claiborne letters on November 12 in vdiich, curiously enough, he was most careful not to name Burr, though he whispered mysteriously about great dangers to the Union and sent a shaft at Wilkinson, whom he hated. He was clearly more eager to proclaim his own innocence and virtue, and preserve his connection with Burr, than to be of material service towards count eracting any national danger. Consider his letter to Claiborne; Be on the alert—keep a watchftil eye upon our General [Wilkinson], and beware of an attack, as well from our own country as Spain ... There is something rotten in Penmark. I fear there are plans on foot inimical to the union ... but rest assured they are in operation, or I calculate boldly. Beware of the month of December. I love my country and government — I hate the Dons. I would delight to see Mexico reduced —but I will die in the last ditch, before I would yield a foot to the Dons, or see the union disunited. This I write for your own eye, and for your own safety; profit by it, and the ides of March remember! Jackson’s "love" of the government was expressed by violent diatribes against the President. His letters of 1806-07 were published in 1828 through the agency of his Tennessee "whitewashing committee." "Of all the persons connected, with the story of Burr’s expedition, Daveiss and Marshall alone showed the capacity to conceive a plan of action and the courage to execute the plan they conceived," says Henry Adams. Jefferson and the others played parts "neither dignified nor creditable." And Dave is s and Marshall were virtuous perhaps mainly from motives of convenience and politics. Jackson remarked *to Claiborne, "I fear treachery has become the order of the day." We pass on from this unpleasant episode to the continued yearning of Jefferson for Spanish territory. Armstrong, An erican Minister to prance, strongly urged that Texas be occupied, Napoleon having gone back on his offer. The Presidents hesitation to go to war with Spain arose only from the danger of Prance’s defending Spain, and he was sometimes tempted to ignore this danger. His policy of keeping dom the navy by way of retrenchment was incompatible with his wish to despoil Spain. Had he spent the millions he wished to use in buying th 3 Ploridas through Napoleon in building up the navy, he might well have received the support of Pederalists as well as such dissentient Democrats as Randolph, and possibly could have defied Napoleon. Jefferson preserved a nominal neutrality towards the Spanish in America; but, says Cox, "he was willing to ignore, if he did not openly encourage, filibustering projects against their dominions," though "bound to suppress these illegal projects." 24 Miranda thus in 1805 received the "tacit approbation and good wishes" of the government and no hindrance as regards his expedition from the United States to revolutionize Venezuela. 25 In 1807 Jefferson grew more incensed by Spain’s "perfidy and injustice" and wrote his agent in April, 1807: "We expect, therefore, from the friendship of the Emperor, that he will compel Spain to do us justice, or abandon her to us. We ask but one month to be in possession of the City of Mexico." He now admitted to Bow do in that Burr had aimed at Mexico: "Although at first he proposed a separation of the western country, and on that ground received encouragement and aid from Yrujo, ... yet he very early saw that the fidelity of the western country was not to be shaken, and turned himself wholly towards Mexico. And so popular is an enterprise on that country in this, that we had only to lie still, and he would have had followers enough to have been in the City of Mexico in six weeks." 2s Madison wrote Armstrong that on the Mobile was "kindling a flame which was not easily manageable." Secretary Dearborn believed the American people ripe for a "brash" with Spain: "We could in a very short time dispossess His Catholic Majesty of all his possessions north of ... the Isthmus of Darien." Spain, aware of this atti- tude, sent agents to induce American Indians to emigrate from Orleans Territory into Texas, to be organized for hostilities 28 against the United States. To such straits was she reduced. Napoleon also had an eye on the Spanish territories and would not abate his standing threat to aid Spain against our attack—that is t o say, without a "consideration.” In 1808 he informed the United States that he would put no obstacle in the way of her occupying the Floridas provided she joined 29 him in war with England. Disliking the idea of war with England as much as he yearned for the Floridas, Madison most cheerfully overlooked the objectionable feature of Napoleon’s proposition, and expressed his great pleasure at receiving the Etoperor’s approbation of the anticipated occupation of the Floridas. In reply Napoleon posed as vastly astonished and indignant. Champigny told Armstrong that the allusion to the occupation o f the Floridas was incomprehensible; the Americans, being at peace with Spain, could not occupy the Floridas without the permission of the Spanish king. He continued, with effrontery, that it had re ver been a question of allowing an American occupation, and that "the W®ror had neither the right nor the inclination to authorize an infraction of international law, contrary to the interests of an independent power, his ally and his friend"'/' 0 Several years later Joseph Bonaparte offered, the 'Floridas and the western land to the Rio Grande to the United States on condition that certain lands be reserved as a fhnd to maintain him on his precarious throne in Spain. But revolutionary events were fast changing the American situation, and the humiliating necessity of truckling to the Blench might soon pass. It would seem that upland and France, alike utterly disregardful of our neutral commerce in their war of decrees, both encouraged us to despoil the Spanish ISnpire, each anxious to prove our best friend and involve us in war with the other. Turreau, the French Minister, reported from Washington that British activities were no longer necessary in the instigation of revolution in Latin America, as revolution was prevalent. "Thus it is at least that Mr. Rose [the British Minister] has explained himself here, and particularly in confidence to General Wilkinson, to whom he observed that it was a favorable moment for the Americans to act against New Mexico and that it would be especially advantageous to the general, whose interests and glory such a fine enterprise would serve. "“$2 In August, 1808, Jefferson wrote that if England were more conciliatory we might take advantage of Napoleon’s intervention in Spain "to seize our own limits of Louisiana." 33 And rumor ascribed to him the sentiment: "We must have the Floridas and Cuba." His cabinet agreed that it "should be unauthoritatively expressed by our agents to influential persons in Cuba and Mexico, to wit: ’lf you remain under the dominion ... of Spain, we are contented; but we should be extremely unwilling to see you pass under the dominion of France or England. " Jefferson wrote similarly to the Governor of Orleans Territory in November, 1808, concerning Cuba and Mexico, adding that "we consider their interests and ours as the same, and that the object of both must be to exclude all 3hiropean influence from the Hemisphere." 3s In 1809 Jefferson still had a great desire to pounce on Spain. He wanted Cuba and the Floridas, after which "We shall then have only the north to include in our Confederacy, ¥hich would be of course in the first war.”$ 6 In the ex- tensive militazy preparations which were made in the southwest fearful Spain thought she detected Hapoleon's inciting influence, in which, however, she seems to have been mistaken. taken. In American expaxis ion, diplomacy has generally followed the conquering pioneer—notably in Florida, Texas, California and Oregon. It was in Florida that Jefferson's hope of 1790 first came true. The Mexican historian and statesman Lucas Alaman gives a not unfair picture of the "claim-making stage” of American diplomacy: Their [American] machinations In the country they wish to acquire are then brought to light by the appearance of explorers, some of whom settle on the soil, alleging that their presence does not affect the question of the right of sovereignty or possession to the land* These pioneers excite, by degrees, movements which disturb the political state of the country in dispute; then follow discontents and dissatisfaction, calculated to fatigue the patience of the legitimate owner, and to diminish the usefulness of the ”admin is trat ion and of the exercise of authority. When things have come to this pass ... the diplomatic management commences; the inquietude they have excited in the territory in dispute, the interests of the colonists therein established, the insurrection of adventurers and savages instigated by them, and the pertinacity with which opinicn is set up as to; their right of possession, becomes the subject of notes, full of expressions justice and moderation, until, with the aid of other incidents, which are never wanting in the course of diplomatic relations, the desired end is obtained of concluding an arrangement as onerous for one party as it is advantageous to the other. 33 The Baton Rouge region of West Florida had been the scene of filibustering disturbances for sane time before the West Florida Revolution. Friction between the Spanish and American inhabitants had been kept up particularly by the Kemper brothers, the extolment of whom by the early writers of the Southwest shows the spirit of that time. Such disturbances lacked dignity until the general uprising of Latin America after 1808 gave the cue and pretext for a greater and more dignified movement aided by a portion of the natives. The motive of the revolution was annexation to the United States; and the rumor that Napoleon meant to claim West Florida served as a ground for calling a convention. As early as 1807 the American government was apprised that the Americans and natives in West Florida showed a "formidable" discontent and evinced desire to seek protection from ISngland if they could not get it from the United States. And in 1810, when Governor Claiborne came to Washington, "he seems to have gained the assent of President Madison to his plan of intervent ion, suggested three years before. The prospect for success at that time doubtless recommended such a policy to the American executive, who was wearied by years of futile diplomacy." 13 The revolutionary cause was there- fore taken under the wing of the government. John Rhea, land speculator and President of the convention which drew up the Baton Rouge declaration of independence, addressed to the United States a petition for annexat ion, needlessly warning the United States that West Florida if repulsed would appeal to some foreign country, and stipulating, signifi - cantly, for the satisfaction of the revolutionists’ land cravings as a reward for their services, and for the pardon of all deserters from the American army and navy then resident in the "commonwealth." The boldness of this was generously overlooked by the administration; and even the opposition leaders in Congress, headed by Josiah Quincy, were distressed exclusively by the prospect of a new state and lavished their eloquent invective on the subject of constitutional limitations, seeing only a domestic question. "Here was the whole thing in a nutshell," says Babcock,"—a desirable province, a convenient claim under the ambiguous treaty, a weak and troubled opponent, and a shadowy ’third party 1 eager to snatch the prize away ... The solution was Madison’s remarkable proclamation of October 27, 1810," ignoring the republic in West Florida and assuming to enter at last into our rights from the treaty of 1803. Onis, the Spanish Minister, reported to the Viceroy of New Spain that the United States was taking steps to ensure the success of the revolt and was planting seeds of revolution in Sast Florida: "Disciple of Bonaparte, this administration possesses all his affectation and follows the same course of perfidy and treachery." It seems significant that, immediately after the West Florida Proclamation, the President issued a proclamation on November 2, 1810» declaring non-intercourse with In apology Madison insisted without reason that France had withdrawn the Berlin and Milan decrees; but Napoleon had merely promised in August that the decrees would cease to have effect on Novenber 1 in case either Shgland revoked her orders in council or the United States would "cause her 42 rights to be respected by the English.” Neither of these contingencies had happened, so that the Federalists with some reason charged the administration with becoming "willingly the dupes" of Napoleon. 43 Napoleon had held out the Floridas as early as 1803 as the reward for joining him against England, the possessor of Canada, and the United States gradually drifted in this direction to the War of 1812. The British Minister, poster, strongly protested against the seizure of West Florida, but the United States took a haughty tone: Foster was "pained” by secretary Monroe’s reply that "the United States had shown sufficient forbearance in not assisting the insurgents of South Ameri„44 ca." How did Napoleon, self-constituted guardian of Spain’s territory, view the belated incorporation of "American” West Florida? He had initiated a conciliatory or coaxing policy towards the United States in July: Napoleon wished to avoid a war between France and the United States, and provoke, on the contrary, a war between -England and the United States. He was therefore satisfied to learn that President Madison by his proclamation of November 2, 1810, had put into force the act of non-intercourse against England. He felicitated himself on the terms of that proclamation to the point of raising no objection to the pretension formulated in a proclamation nearly simultaneous to seize possession of West Florida. Seeing the United States ready to defend the independence of their flag against the English exactions, he was ready to make every concession. He made it understood that he would not find it disagreeable if the Floridas should become an American possession and that he was more than ever favorable to" all measures facilitating the independence of Spanish America, provided, always, that such independence would not constitute a useful and dangerous factor in England’s hands ... How in fact could the same sovereign, even had he been more powerful than the powerful Napoleon, reconcile the two contradictory operations: urge Mexico and Peru to free themselves from the yoke of the mother country and sacrifice annies, at the same time, to crown his brother king of Spain? This was despoiling deliberately the prey which in vain he strove to conquer. This inconsistency was inherent in the grandeur and vanity of the enterprise: its vast proportions involved impossibilities of execution, and the fate of Louisiana could not but come upon the Floridas ... In 1811, unable to succeed at Madrid, he gave Madison a free course in Spanish America. But ... for compensation ... he turned his eyes northward, towards Moscow and st. Petersburg who replaced Turreau in the spring of 1811, conveyed further to Madison the new views of France. He found in the Secretary of State, Robert Smith, an admirer of Napoleon and a firm believer in the inevitability of a war with ISngland; Smith’s successor, Monroe, was rather indifferent to French 46 blandishments. American attention, encouraged by France, was next turned to Sast Florida, where a pro-American revolution did not come as quickly as Madison could hava wished. The shadow of England’s hand was perceived here too; and Congress in January of 1811 voiced our manifest destiny and the later Monroe Doctrine in a resolution directing the President to take 3ast Florida whenever necessary to prevent its falling to "any foreign government.” England was advised by Secretary Monroe that Sast Florida was insufficient to satisfy our claims against Spain. General Mathews in Georgia was instructed, to allow no foreign power to gain a foothold in 3ast Florida and to treat with the Spanish Governor, Folch, who in discouragement had in December, 1810, intimated a willingness to negotiate concerning a cession to the United 48 States. The General in friendly communication with the incipient revolutionists in East Merida, began military preparations to aid and take charge of the revolution and the anticipated new republic. Mathews used American military forces to engineer the revolt, having given his government every opportunity by frankness and fulness in his reports to rebuke and forbid his use of force. As Pratt says: "The only reasonable conclusion is that the government wished the plan to proceed under the auspices of Mathews, but preferred to avoid committing itself in any way, so that it might disavow the action of its agent should it prove ex-4.9 pedient to do so." The revolution in East Florida failed to reach the fullness of that in West Florida, and the Spanish maintained a precarious authority in the province until the cession of 1819. Though Mathews claimed to have had Madison’s secret instructions for all that he did, the Secretary of State saw fit to repudiate him in dealing with Spain, telling him privately that "at present they could not vindicate him." Angry at being repudiated, Mathews told his friends that he would go to the Capitol and "blow them all up." But, exhausted by his labors, he died in September of 1812, having already abandoned his intention of self-vindication. His secretary, Ralph Isaacs, explained that "the Genls. patriotism cooperated with my exertions" to induce the General not to publish "much of what is call’d ’back stairs’ instruction approba-50 tion." The affair, says Wyllys, was a step in the develop- ment of an American "technique of filibustering.” Disavowing Mathews, Madison had no intention of disavowing his work, and announced on April 4, 1812, that the United States intended only a provisional occupation to prevent a foreign power from taking possession; and he gave other pretexts. It was a pare "camouflage." For Madison was determined to proceed towards annexation—a motive which was one cause of the War of 1812. Bid not the cabinet and people sanction the enterprise? Monroe told the French Minister, "In this matter, it would be more dangerous to retreat than advance." sl But Congress, domi- nated by the Federalists, voted against the occupation, so that the President reluctantly ordered Governor Mitchell of Georgia to withdraw the American troops. As Georgia was hostile to this policy of self-abnegation, and as Mitchell strongly protested, the government did not press the order and remained silent, shifting the responsibility for its execution upon Governor Mitchell, whose instructions authorized the employment of force in Bast Florida only to prevent a British occupation. Finally in 1813, Congress having firmly refused to take Florida as spoils of war, the troops were withdrawn. disputed western frontier was similarly the scene of revolutionary and filibustering disturbances. The American government watched with great interest the beginning of revolution in Mexico and felt a new concern in the question of Texas, not only because of Spain’s convenient distraction, but because the success of revolution in Mexico might bear adversely on our chances of getting the region east of the Rio Grande still in Spain’s hands. Before the government took any steps, a partizan of Hidalgo’s arrived at Washington, in the spring of 1812, seeking aid fbr the cause of Mexican independence. This agent, Bernardo Gutierrez—a man described as possessing "a highly commanding person, most insinuating manners, and extraordinary mental accomplishments"—, planned to revolutionize Texas. He was informed by the Secretary of State that the United States was just about to take Texas herself. She had not done so before "because the Spanish government had placed obstacles in the w sy; but that all was cleared up, because before Spain had taken possession France had occupied the port of San Bernardino [Matagorda Bay]." The Secretary, Monroe, manifested much sympathy with the revolutionary cause, and mentioned the increasing difficulties with Great Britain. "He has told me also," Gutierrez continues in his diary, "that in the event of a declaration of war against Great Britain they will immediately place an aimy of 50,000 men in our country to aid our independence and make common cause with Gutierrez was advised that Mexico should form a government similar to that of the United States so as to facilitate a 53 union. " Gutierrez was not well pleased with his interviews with the aggressive Washington government. In his report to the Mexican Congress in 1815, he adds that after the American authorities had avowed their intention to take Texas, They proposed to me another plan, apparently very advantageous for us, which was this: that they had decided to give me the aid of fifty thousand men who were already enlisted in Kentucky and Tennessee. I thanked them for their very liberal decision, and they went on to say that they considered that the fifty thousand men placed on the border would be too far away to assist me; that it would be better for them to march to the Rio Grande and from there aid us in the interior. I was asked what I thought of this plan. I wished to answer them in only a few words, and to be disposed to agree, whatever the result might be, since in reality I could not prevent it. I replied that I agreed that the fifty thousand men should march to the Rio only on condition that I should be their Commander-in-Chief, and that they should obey my orders without dispute until they should receive those of my nation. Their answer silence, and there was no further discussion of that matter • 4 Onis heard of what passed between Gutierrez and the American government and reported to the Viceroy on April 10: "This government has proposed nothing less than to fix its limits at the mouth of the Rio Norte or Bravo, following its course to the 30th degree and, from there, tracing a direct line to the Pacific, taking ... Texas, Nuevo Santander, Coahuila, New Mexico, and part of the provinces of Nuevo ViscAya and of Sonora." On April 12 he added that in the Madisonian plan of conquest "was included the isle of Cuba, ’as a natural appurtenance of the United States.’” 55 Gutierrez ob- served a ’’strong desire among the American people to go to Mexico," and believed that were immigration permitted ’’over a million would flock there.” s6 The imperialistic attitude of the United States towards the Mexican Revolution drew the following sarcasm from M Correo del Sur in April, 1813: When the generous-hearted Anglo-Americans, lovers and protectors of the independence (of Mexico), do not come to aid our efforts in good faith, but only despise our constitution and entertain designs of subjugating us, we may without doubt celebrate our fate, once we are free from the unheard-of cruelties of Spanish despotism. It seems likely that Gutierrez left Washington with an intimation of the willingness of the government to help his cause underhandedly. His recruitment of volunteers for his Texas campaign at Natchitoches, under the nose of the American officials, was seemingly not done without the government’s sanction and connivance. Gutierrez openly declared to his compatriots that "the United States took our part.” He left Washington with letters to Shaler, American commercial assent on the Gulf of Mexico, who repaired with him from. New Orleans to Natchitoches, there to keep the government informed of Gutierrez’s activities. At once Gutierrez called for volunteers and. fraternized with the American officials. Captain James Caines, who figured in this border history, pretended to know that Gutierrez was given permission to proclaim his views at Natchitoches, Louisiana, and gather recruits. And Salcedo, the Governor of Texas, also claimed to know that "the United States has aided Gutierrez,” just as "they secretly aided in the overthrow of West Blorida." 59 It was quits in keeping with Madison’s and. Monroe’s friendly but ambitious policy to wish an American contingent to accompany Gutierrez to keep an eye on Texas. Complaints of the Spanish ccnsul at New Orleans had moved the American government to order the commander at Natchitoches to drive the American intruders out of the Neutral Ground. Lieutenant Augustus Magee was sent to do this task, which he performed with great rigor and severity, burning the trespassers’ homes. He had just returned to Natchitoches when Gutierrez arrived from Washington. He resigned his American army commission to join Gutierrez. Thus, through the iron of fate, "many of the men whom he had driven off the Neutral ground were now marshalled under his command," and he spent the brief remainder of his life in constant fear of being assassinated by those whom he had dealt with so harshly. The Gutierrez-Magee expedition met with great initial success until Magee’s death. Gutierrez was soon thereafter superseded by Toledo, and the declining movement met complete disaster on the Medina in August of 1813, the remnants, including Toledo and Captain Perry, taking refuge in the United states. 61 It is again indicative of Madison’s connivance at Gutierrez that Governor Claiborne, who conscientiously issued a proclamation against adhesion of Americans to Gutierrez’s expedition, was puzzled at the government’s having given him no instructions or intimation of its attitude towards Gutierrez, who, he knew, had been at Washington: ”1 have never understood how far the Executive Government of the U. States felt an interest in the Revolutionary Movement in Texas.” 62 Claiborne disliked the idea of leaving Texas in the hands of a Mexican, for he feared the establishment of an independent nation: "They may become useful neighbors, —but as we have no certainty of it, I wish sincerely, it comported with the Policy of the American government to take possession of the country as far as the Rio Grande.” Dr. John Robinson was sent by the go varment in 1812 as a secret agent to open commercial relations with New Mexico — though in the belief of Onis, really to instigate revolution. Robins ai, who had accompanied Pike into the Interior Provinces in 1806, was stopped in Texas by Salcedo and precipitately ousted from Spanish territory, after assuring Salcedo that the American government meant to settle the western boundary question by "amicable negotiations hereafter.” 64 Robinson’s mission in cont emplating encroachment on Spain’s monopolistic commercial system amounted, to a recognition of Mexican independence. General Wilkinson, who adds to these circumstances the fact that Shaler visited the headquarters of Toledo at San Antonio and then went to Washington, presumes likewise that Gutierrez and his American coadjutors acted with Madison’s connivance. The General remarks indignantly that, though the government intrigued with the Mexican revolutionary agents and sent Shaler and Robinson on secret missions — his own specialty—, he was not made acquainted with the government’s views, "although in the chief military command, on the Mississippi, and possessing tenfold knowledge of the topography and population of the Mexican provinces, and of the political views of the Mexicans, founded on more than twenty years research." 66 That he should live to see a Western intrigue in which he did not chiefly figure was a bitter humiliation J yet he was served no differently from Claiborne. The whole policy in peace and war of the Madison administration struck the General as feeble: he avers that if Madison had recognized the Spanish Gortes which ruled in Ferdinand’s absence, sending Onis to this country, we should have obtained all that we could desire from Spain. Many expressions of Livingston’s before the Purchase treaty was signed that France had not procured the Floridas are quoted by H. Bit Chambers, West Florida and Its Relation to the Historical Cartography oFThe-Uni tedlTales tJohns Hopkins Studies XVI, No. 5) , 4IT 42; The west Florida Controversy, 64-101; Buris King to Livingslon.-IprinFr-1303, in King, Cor. of Bufua King, IV, 246. Tor another view see 3. C. Barker, "On theTTstoriography of American Territorial Expansion,” in The -Mississippi west. ed. ?• Willard, 223. Barker writes: ""rheid no" brleT for the historical validity of Jefferson’s claim to West Florida ••• as part of the Louisiana Purchase ... but it is necessary to remember that it is easy to believe what one wants to believe and that law and diplomacy have sometimes a very tenuous connection with historical facts. There was quite enough basis for the claim to support a lawyer’s argument. Sven a local Spanish governor of West Florida spoke repeate of Py ovi^e as ’that part of Louisiana which we still retain. ... Is it not a conceivable hypothesis that Jefferson and his colleagues were victims of an equally honest misapprehension?" g —— — — q £ap.s*» Bels., 11, 552. "Think of it," exclaims T» IS* Watson; "He was willing to swap the western from the Mississippi to the Pacific for the island of Hew Orleans and the PLoridas. ... Livingston must be classed not with Jefferson, but with Geozge McDuffie and Daniel Webster, each of whom was a ’very able Senator,’" but no seer or prophet of expansion (The Life and Times of Jefferson, 414) . 3 — — — Livingston to Madison, May 20, 1803, in Chambers, Weg* 44 » 45, hackney thought his offer to buy the Hondas had a large influence in defeating a cession by Spain to Prance (Cox, The Wes t Pl or Ida Controversy, 69) • — - - Wilkinson’s "Reflections” for Governor Folch, 1804. in Robertscn, Louisiana, 11, 325-347; of. Am. Hist. Rev., XDC, 793 note. Yru jo tbought that the United 3faTes“wuld seek to exchange Louisiana for the Floridas, and that such an exchange was not to be considered by Spain (Yrujo to Cevallos, August 3, 1803, in Robertson, Louisiana, 11, 76). Senator John Smith of Ohio, a speculatorTn west Florida lands, wrote Jefferson from Florida on August 30, 1803, assuring him that the region was being rapidly settled by Americans and advising him against trying to secure it at once by exchanging Louisiana for it (3. 3. Brown, The Oonstitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase, 1803-181^," — 12 note) . “ — ~ * g — —-—— Jefferson to John Breckinridge, August 12, 1803, in Writings, ed. Bergh, X, 403; Jefferson to John Dickinson, August 9, 1803, in Writings (federal Sdition) , X, 28, 29. $ — —— — J» Burnet, Notes, on the Sarly Settlement of the Northwestern Territory T 1847) , 2W7 2%. 'See note 4. 7 J. P. Rippy, The Rivalry of the United States and great Britain over laH~n~Americ a, -J 1 " - .- ■ . — Burnet, Hot es on the Harly Settlement of the Northwestern Territory, 29"57 w. 1, 224-230,2^9; Marshall , Ihe Western boundary of TEeLouisiana Purchase, 44. Randolph was partly mb tivat a ’desire to discredit Secretary Madison and keep him from becoming President. Burnet says: "It is a matter of history that, after that notice, the project against Spain ... was abandoned; and about the same time measures were takento stop the movements of Burr." Burnet refers to the French threat to take sides with Spain. -g— — — — — Orders of May 6, 1306, in w. y. McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 121. Jefferson in 1805-06 planned a military colony on not more than two million acres of land between the Achafalaya, the Ned Bi ver, and a meridian passing by Nat chi to ches--in view of a possible war with Spain. See 3. 3. Brown, "Jefferson’s Plan for a Military Settlement in Orleans Territory,” in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., VIII, 373-3*76. - J. W. Pratt, The &cpansionis ts of 1812, p. 62; New Orleans gazette, September 23, 1806, in McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy, 126. See I. J. Cox, "Western ReacTiorTTo the Burr Conspiracy, 0 in Trans, of the Hl. State Hist. Soc., pp. 73-87; g, H. Wand ell and MMlnneg erode, The life and -times of Aaron Burr, 11, passim; H. 3. Foote, Texas and the Texans, I, 156. Tj— — C. Colton, The Works of Henry Clay, V, 24; Cox, "The Burr Conspiracy in Indiana," in Indiana Magazine of History, XXV, 269, 270. Burr showed a letter from the Secretary o f War implying sanction of his scheme. IS —— — W. He Safford, The Blennerhassett Papers, 125. n ——— Safford, Blennerhassett Papers, 372, 373. Blennerhassett also was convinced that Jefferson was "privy” to and connived at Burr’s plot (ibid., 551). por Wilkinson’s treasonable dealings with the Spanish as late as 1804 see Cox, "General Wilkinson and His Later Intrigues with the Spaniards,” HA, 8 1* Hey., XIX, 794-812; Cox, ”The Louisiana-Texas Frontier,” inw Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XVII, 23-32. £3 —■— — — Am. Ant id. Soc. Procs., N. 3., XXXIII, 214, 215. James Parton says that Jefferson could hardly have been unaware of Burr s intentions against Spain: "The moment the tide really turned against this fated man, a surprising ignorance overspread many minds that had before been extremely well-informed respecting his plans" (Life and Times of Aaron Burr, 423/ • Bid Wilkinson send Pike to reconnoitre The northern part of New Spain without the government’s express authority? It seems unlikely, pike’s report was published soon after his return. Governor Aiencaster of New Mexico, where Pike and Robinson were captured by the Spaniards, learned from them that "the Anglo-American government considers as included within the borders of Louisiana all of the rivers that empty into the Mississippi and all the territories that extend to the head-waters of the Rio Colorado which rise a few leagues from the Pueblo of Taos further to the North in this province; that it is their intention this year or next to establish forts or settlements on all these rivers, in order to monopolize all the trade and commerce.” Aiencaster s report in R. 3, Twitchell, Leading Facts of New Mexican History, 11, 196 note. For Wilkinson’s schemes see 1. J. Oox, "Opening of the Santa pe Trail " in Mo. His t. Rev., XXV, 30-66. -yg —- Safford, The Blennerhassett Papers, 496. T 5 1 — I* Jenkinson, Aaron Burr, 379-334. p? - — ’ — —- The correspondence between Daveiss and Jefferson is given in J)aveiss, A View o f the President T s Conduct, concerning the Conspiracy of 1906 (Prankfort , l&ot) F rep Tinted - in — Quart. Pubs* of the Hist* and Philos* Soc. of Ohio, XII, Kos. 2 and 3, pp* -’Sei Keffer son ’ s two 1 e tTers are aTso found in Writings of Jefferson, X, 231 , 286. TH— — There is reason to think that a plot against Spanish Louisiana was begun between Burr and Wilkinson when the former was Vice-President. See Safford, The Blennerhassett Papers, 432. -— Daveiss (1307) in Quart. Pubs . of the Hist, and Philos. Soc. of Ohio, XII, fros.- 2 and 3, —— See Pa miliar Letters on Public Characters, and Public Events, from the Peace 0rT733, to Hie Peace ofTHIB gr— —— Jefferson’s message of January 22, 1807, in Writings of Jefferson, X, 346-356. gg —--1 —— —— — Adams, History of the United States, 111, 287, 238. "Many of the best -informsd persons in Tennessee and Kentucky, including Burr’s avowed partisans,” writes Henry Adams, "held but a low opinion of Jackson’s character or veracity. Blight years afterward Jackson and John Adair once more appeared on the stage of New Orleans history, and quarrelled, with charges and countercharges of falsehood and insinuations of treason. ’Whatever were the intentions of Colonel Burr,’ wrote Adair in a published letter, ’I neither organized troops at that time, nor did I superintend the building of boats for him; nor did I write confidential letters recommending him to my friends; nor did I think it necessary, after his failure was universally known, to save myself by turning informer or State witness.’” Bor a more favorable view see J. B. Hanck, "Andrew Jackson and the Burr Conspiracy,” in Tenn. Hist. Mag., 2 Ser., I, 17-23. . a -r , _ 7 ——— "Andrew Jackson dreads me in my decrepitude," declared Burr in his old age, when his resentments would sometimes rise (Wandell and Minnegerode, Aaron Burr, 318) * Judge I. W* Williams wrote in a private letter in 1827, which was shown about in the Adams convention the next year, that Jackson had said in his presence in 1806: "Take notice, gentlemen, you will find that a division of the United States has taken deep root; you will find a number of the members of the House of Representatives are deeply involved in the scheme" (J* 3* Bassett, Cor* of Andrew Jackson, 111, 391 note, 392, 393) • There was much more thought of disunion in 1806 in the Northeast, which had opposed the acquisition of Louisiana and was jealous of the growing W©st, than in the west; thus Burr brought from the 3ast his thoughts of the feasibility of disunion, only to find them out of date in the West* “24 ————————— Cox, Seat Florida Pont roveray, 660. 25 "General Miranda's Expedition," in The Atlantic Monthly, V, 536-6021 Fuller, Purchase of Florida, "175 {‘W. 3. Robertson in Am. Hist. Assn. Report, IW|TT. 353-314: Writings of J. Adams, 111, “T3B',‘ 139. 26 Jefferson to Bowdoin, April 2, 1807, in Writings, X. 381, 382. In August Jefferson wrote Madison: "I had rather have war against Spain than not, if we go to war against England. Our southern defensive can take the Floridas, volunteers for a Mexican army will flock to our standard, and rich pabulum will be offered to our privateers ... Probably Cuba would add itself to our confederation.” (ibid.. X, 476). w : — Cox, West Florida Controversy, 271, 272. gg "A Report from Natchitoches in 1807 by Dr. John Sibley,” Indian Agent at New Orleans, ed. A* H. Abel, in Museum of the .American Indi an (1922) , 16; cited in C. Fo rem an 7 Tn'dl - ans an d" P lone er s 7 33 7" £s Napoleon to Champigny, February 2, 1808, in Correspondence de Napoleon, XVI, 355; Am. State Paps., PorT £els., ill, 250. Faverie, Napoleon et l'Amerique, 209; Napoleon to Champigny, June 21, 1308, In Cor ,~de Napoleon, XVII, 326. 3I — Hatcher, Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement. 129, 130, note. “ 32 General Jarreau to the French goverment, September 20, 1808, in University of Texas transcripts from the Blench State Archives. Writings of Jefferson, XI, 203. 34 — — H. Adams , Hist or y of the United States, IV, 340. — — B* Abbot, Mexico and the United States, 317. ———.—— Rippy, Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain in lat in America, 72. 73” - -- ■■■ Hatcher, Opening of Texas to Pore ign Settlement, 147, 148; Cox, West PloriHa Coniroversy, 30 6, 307. —— — Alaman’s report on Texas, 1830, in House Sx. Docs.. 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 351, p. 322. — I. J* Cox, "The American Intervention in 3ast Florida," * ev *» XVII, 290-311; west Florida Controversy, chs. xiTTiirrr * 40 K. 0. Babcock, The Rise of American Nationality, 24. Rhea to the Secretary of State, Uctbber 10, 1810, in Am. State Baps., Bor. Reis., 111, 395, 396. — — Onis to the Viceroy, November 2, 1810, in University of Texas transcripts from the Mexican Archives. 42' — Proclamation of November 2, 1810, in An. of Cong., 11 Cong., 3 Sess., 1248; S. S. Morrison, Harrison Cray Otis, 11, 23, 37; Oadore to Armstrong, August 57 1810, in Am. State Paps.. For. Reis ~ 111, 386. 43 1 1 Pickering wrote McHenry of Madison's course, on December 17, 1810; "His taking possession of West Florida may seem to be a bold step. It certainly was a rash one; because unwarrantable on any ground. lam sat is fled that we have no title: and if we had, Spain was in possession; we had acquiesced in her keeping possession, and made it the subject of negotiation, and even to negotiation an end was put, five years ago, by a word from France. This furnishes irrefragible proof that the order to dispossess the Spaniards now, is by the permission, if not by the advice, or even direct ion of France; and hence a strong presumption arises, that the revolutionary proceedings in Florida have been secretly instigated by our own administration” (Steiner, McHenry, 559) . “44 - . _—- — Adams, Histozy of the United States, VI, 25-45. jg —— Faverie, Napoleon et I'Amerique, 221, 222; Napoleon - — — Faverie, Napoleon et l'Amerique, 235, 236. Monroe to Foster, Kovenber 2, 1811, in Am. State Paps., For. Pels., 111, 544. The 3ast Florida res oTut ion provided that n at the same time ... the said territoiy shall, in their [our] hands, remain subject to future negotiation." 48 P. 3. Chadwick, Spain and the United States, Diplomacy;, 112 ff. — — Pratt, iSxpansionists of 1812, pp. 73-115. 5$ — Pratt, Expansionists of 1812, p. 114. see r. K. Wyllys, "The East Hori da RevoTuHon of 1812-1814,” in Hispanic American Historical Review, IX, 415-445; Cox. "AmefTcah’ Intervention - Inca'si Florida," in Am. Hist. Rev., XVII, 290-311. — 51 ?• Renault t w La Pol iHgie des Stats-Unis dans I'Amerique du Nord sous Te N&gle de' , w in Revue des' ScTences PoTiTi gie's ~TK£TX. , 52' 3, H. west, "Diary of Jose Bernardo Gutierrez de Lara," in Am. Hist. Rev.. XXXIV, 72, 73. 53 L. Alaman, Hjstoria de M4jico, Hi, App., 45; 0. Pereyra, Tejas, La Primera Pismembracion de Kejico, 13, 14; !• J. Cox,Wbnroe and the 4arly Mexican 'RewluTionary Agents," in Am. Hist. Assn. Report, 1911, I, 199-215. 53 . — Gutierrez to the Mexican Congress, August 1, 1815, in C. A. Gulick, The Papers of Mirabeau Bonaparte lam ar, I, Pereyra, M Mito de Monroe, 269; also his Breve Histbria de America, 65 V, and hi s’"'Tejas, 14; Hat cher, Opening bf Texas' to' Po rei g n 219. 33 Hatcher, Opening of Texas, 35 6 note. — Pereyra, Breve His to ria de America, 65 9. 5$ — - H. M. Wriston, 3xecutive Agents in American T’oreisn 409, 410. see 1. In TOsVn^TeyTHst. Y/» XvIII, 470, citing Onis on the conne ci ion of shaler with Gutierrez in the revolutionary cause; cf. 477. — J. Gaines in Gulick, Lamar Papers, I, 235; governor Salcedo quoted by McCaleb in Tex. Stale Hist. Assn. Quart., IV, 225. Gulick, Lamar Papers, I, 236. 51 — — W. P. McCaleb, ”The First Period of the Gutierrez- Magee Expedition,” in Tex. Hist. Assn. Quart., IV, 213-229; H. H. Bancroft, Morth Mexican Statesman! Texas, 11, 17-31; G. Foreman, Indians and pioneers, 40 note. TH. Yoakum, History of Texas, Ch. XII. 52 Claiborne to Madison, October 23, 1313, in Pratt, Expansionists of 1812, pp. 251, 252. Claiborne to , June 21, 1813, in Rowland, official Letter Books of Claiborne, VI, 223. Cox in Am. Hist. Ag sn . Report, 1911, I, 199-215; Wrist on, Executive Agents in American Foreign Relations, 537, 538. 53 — ——— Wilkinson, Memoirs o f Hjg pwn Times (1816), I, 412- 414. Madison, who perhaps UgrrusteTT Wf General, refused to follow his suggestions durirg the War of 1812, thus offending him. CHAPTER IV THE WAR OF 1812 AND AFTERMATH For some time before it came the War of 1812 was in the air. An observant member of Congress, Samuel Taggart of Massachusetts, noted the drift of the administration and its supporters. The object of the more radical "was to fight and not treat with Britain. Some of the higher toned of the Democratic papers proceed so far as to say there ought never to be peace with Britain ... until she was humbled under the feet of Bona/parte •’* Taggart noted in April of 1810 that a large number of Democrats wanted ”to take measures which would inevitably plunge the nation in a war. Because France burns our ships, confiscates our property, and imprisons our seamen they want to fight Great Britain; and now notwithstanding all the enormities of France advocate as the only proper course, the removal of all restrictions with regard to France, and the adoption of strong hostile measures against England, which they say will enable us to settle with Bonaparte on favourable terms." Again in December, 1810: "The occupation of West Florida ... will be also another very convenient ground of quarrel with Great Britain.... Spain is the enemy of France and the ally of England. ” In February, 1811, Taggart adds: ’’The more the country is oppressed by the absurd proceedings of our own Government, and the more they are kicked and trod upon by Napoleon, the more do they appear to rise in their affection to both.... Some will stick at nothing to show their devotedness to Napoleon and would even consent to declare war against England tomorrow. These expressions, though partisan, are significant: Napoleon was offering inducements to join him. There were good, patriotic causes for war with England and almost as good causes for war with France, hut the decisive factor seems to have been the desire for expansion. The men of New r England were outraged by the cry for war in defense of "free trade and sailors* rights" which was raised by the West and South, sections having no ships or commerce. The hypocrisy of the cry seemed demonstrated by the refusal of Congress to augment the remnants of John Adams*s navy. In June, 1812, war was declared under the pressure of the jingoistic Western leaders, whose territorial desires could only he satisfied at the expense of England and her ally, Spain. Canada was marked and no limit was set to the spoils from Spain. Talk of manifest destiny was rife. "Where is it written on the book of fate," wrote ’’Americus” in the Nashville Clarion, "that the American Republic shall not stretch her limits from the Capes of the Chesapeake to Nootka sound, o . 2 irom the isthmus of Panama, to Hudson Bay?” Randolph got tired of hearing *but one word, like the whippoorwill, but one eternal monotonous tone— Canada, Canada, Canada!" The longcraved Spanish territory was the great consideration, as we have seen, with the Virginian dynasty; the accompanying cry for the conquest of Canada was a late development and united the Northwest with the Southwest behind the passage of the declaration of war. The desire for Canada became outspoken in 1811 because of the Tecumseh uprising, attributed partly to British influence in the Northwest. Tecumseh had been demanding since 1809 the recognition of the Indians 1 independence and territorial rights, and England had ever since 1783 wished tnat uhe Indians could be firmly established as an independent buffer state. Napoleon had been trying to jockey the United States into war with England,but his bad faith ox' treachery, undex' the pretense of friendship, had become apparent to everyone; France, as the war-critics pointed out, was just as indifferent to our neutral rights as England was. ”The devil himself,” wrote Mason, ’’could not tell vdxich is more evil, France or England.” There was no effort to determine who was the greater wrong-doer. To ascribe our choice of foe to sentimental bias for France is not only meaningless but obscuring, as it was essentially a war for territorial expansion. There was no territory to be gained from France. What if France, instead of England, had been Spain’s ally and owned Canada? That the commercial depredations were but a secondary cause is shown clearly by the fact that the one section directly injured by them was more friendly to England than to France and content enough with the peaceful, though imperfect, status quo . New England was the vehement opponent of territorial expansion and of war, which would dry up her commerce Napoleon’s offer to give the United States a free hand in the Spanish territories if she should prove sufficiently hos- tile to England was now fully accepted in effect. In the fall of 1811 Napoleon had intimated to the American government that Spain (in reality, the French Emperor) would sell the Floridas to the United States for several millions of piastres, adding he would not take it ill if the United States seized them from 4 Spain. On many occasions Monroe urged Sdrurier to bring a French fleet to our aid and described the "great benefits which a French squadron would obtain in our waters from the Jealousy and alarm which it would inspire in England and the excellent effect which it would produce on public opinion by allaying the impression of recent bad blood and reawakening admirable memories.” Monroe wanted a more open coalition against England. informed his government that Monroe closed his plea by saying that, "having so long been denied Justice on our [France’s] part, it would be against the dignity of the Republic to ask favors of us, but that we should divine these sentiments.”" Serurier strongly recommended to his government that a fleet be sent. The exact nature of Franco-American diplomacy on the eve of the war is shrouded . 6 in mystery. The ambitious plans of the war fell through. Congress, because of sectionalism, refused to authorize the seizure of Florida. Gallatin wrote that an attack on Florida involving 7 war with Spain would "disgust everyman north of Washington.***' This spoiling of a cherished scheme cooled the ardor of the Southern war-hawks for Canada. According to Secretary of War Armstrong, President Madison instructed the generals on the northern frontier "not to do too much and that this was Q secretly the wish of thePresdt.” 1 Every attempt to invade Canada met with disaster, and the American commissioners at Ghent failed in their turn to gain that desired territory. In fact, the British had the upper hand at the time of treating. The English commissioners tried to secure that part of Massachusetts (Maine) which their troops had conquered; but the Americans would not hear of a cession of territory, (unless, to be sure, England would yield Canada!) and insisted on the restoration of all territory taken during the war. Liverpool remarked sarcastically to Wellington: They are disposed to advance the extravagant doctrine of some of the revolutionary governments of France, viz., that they will never cede any part of their dominions, even though they shall have been conquered by their enemies. This principle they bring forward during a war in which one of their chief efforts has been to conquer and annex Canada to the United States. The doctrine of the American government is a very convenient one: that they will always be ready to keep what they acquire, but never to give up what they lose. I cannot, however, believe that such a doctrine would receive any countenance (especially after all that has passed) in Europe. / In ths winter of 181 J-16, upon the restoration of Ferdinand VII, Onis resumed Spanish relations with our government. presenting a rather embarrassing request for the restoration of West Florida and a demand that the government put a check on expeditions recruiting in Georgia, Kentucky and Tennessee for filibustering attacks on East Florida and other Spanish dominions. He demanded the arrest of Toledo and other revolutionary recruiting agents. During the Spanish interregnum our scarcely nominal neutrality had grown more and more lax with impunity. The demands of Ont 6 were such, says Adams, as *would imply a settled determination of the power advancing them to follow up the refusal of them by immediate war. Monroe blandly replied that according to his own agents there were no filibustering activities or preparations, and he asked Onis to state the exact places, numbers and names of persons concerned. This is all that appears in the published correspondence transmitted to Congress. But Onis complained that a very important part of the correspondence was not published: he had sent to Monroe actual, evidence of filibustering plots, the depreciation and suppression of which evinced to him the insincerity of American neutrality towards Spain, To Onin’s demand for the return of West Florida Monroe could only answer, with a lofty tone: It is known to your government, that the United States claim by cession, at a fair equivalent, the province of Louisiana, as it was held by France prior to the treaty of 1763, extending from the river Perdido, on the eastern side of the Mississippi, to the Bravo, or Grande, on the western. To the whole territozy, within those limits, the United States consider their right established by well known facts, and the feir interpretation of treaties. In a like spirit may the United States demand the surrender of all the territory above described, now in the occupancy of Spain, as a condition to the commencement of any negotiation for the adjustment of differences. Thus at the outset the negotiation was turned from the subjects of the American seizure of West Florida and the laxness of American neutrality towards Spain to the more interesting subject of further American expansion. The claims against Spain, pecuniary and territorial, and Jackson’s invasion of Florida occupied the negotiators thenceforward. When no effort was made “by the American government to appease Spain and avert war, Onis at first threatened to leave the country. But as Spain, in distraction, could not protect her rights, Onis bowed to the inevitable. His censure of the American government and appeal to the people through Federalist newspapers failed to precipitate the intended storm of retribution upon the administration. Adams remarked: "The European diplomats in America always take a foolish fhncy to negotiate with the people. Genet, Yrujo, Jackson, all had an uncontrollable itching to play the demagogue in the garb of an ambassador. Onis has not learnt to , 12 be wise from others harm.” The British menace in Kast Florida re-appeared. Colonel Nichols made a treaty of alliance with the Creeks in 1815, and the administration expected a border Indian war in consequence. The treaty was at once disavowed by England and Nichols left. Yet American anxiety continued, for the government had "received from various quarters strong and confidential intimations that there had been a cession of i 3 Florida by Spain to Creat Britain.” ~ Adams asked Castle- reagh at London in February, 1816, if this report were true. Castlereagh assured him it was false: "If it is supposed that we have any little trickish policy of thrusting ourselves in there between you and Spain, we are very much misunderstood indeed. You shall find nothing little or shabby in our policy. We have no desire to add an inch of ground to our territories in any part of the world. ... Do you only observe the same moderation. If we shall find you hereafter pursuing a system of encroaching upon your neighbors, what we might do defensively is another considera-14 tion." Adams did not "look with contempt to a war with Spain,” for he feared, that England would eventually be drawn in on the side of Spain. It wss believed that Bina had first planned at Philadelphia a naval expedition to liberate Florida. The United States, though usually favorable to Latin American revolutions, was hostile to any such plan as that ascribed to Bina, which touched her interests too closely. ls The barrenness of the recent war and the failure to involve Spain bitterly disappointed the Southern expansionists. Aggressive Georgia, in particular, kept alive the demand for Florida, and seemed anxious to pick a quarrel with the Spanish officials or the Indians in Florida, to afford the federal government a pretext for intervention leading to annexation. The invasion of Florida in 1816 is generally described as a punitive act against depredating Indians whom the Spanish would not or could not control. But the invasion seems unprovoked and imperialistic. General Gaines of Georgia began in May, 1815, to call the government’s attention to the "negro fort," Fort Nichols, on the Appalachicola, occupied by Seminoles and negroes. He spoke of them as "runaways," "murderers," "pirates," and ’’outlaws,” but charged them with no hostile act against the United States. The Washington government was excited finally and Secretary Crawford, a Georgian, opened correspondence with General Jackson about the &rt, which was indeed a "most singular instrument for the purpose of ’rapine, 1 or plundering our citizens," as it was at least sixty miles from the American line. At last Crawford on R-arch 15, 1816, ordered Jackson to demand the suppression by the Spanish Governor of the "negro fort." This measure was especially uncalled-for, since Fort Scott was now built on the border, at Jackson’s order, just north of Fort Mchols for the defense of Americans. On April 23, 1816, Jackson demanded that Governor Suhiga destroy the fort, merely charging the Seminoles with trying "to inveigle negroes from the citizens of Georgia ... This is a state of things which cannot fail to produce much injury to the neighboring settlements, and excite irritations which eventually may endanger the peace of the nation.” He wanted the ’’bandits" dispersed and American "property” returned—namely, "those negroes now in the said fort, and which have been stolen and enticed from them." But Jackson did not wait until the messenger sent to Zuniga reported, in June, on ¥ay 16 he wrote General Graines: "I have little doubt of the fact, that this fbrt has been established by some villains for the purpose of rapine and plunder, and that it ought to be blown up, regardless of the ground on which it stands; and if your mind shall have fozmed the same conclusion, destroy it and return the stolen negroes and property to their rightful owners.” How, as Jackson doubtless knew, these negroes were not "stolen," nor did Jackson claim to know of any disturbances against our citizens as yet committed; he evidently wished hostilities precipitated but would take no responsibility himself. Gaines was left to decide for himself, and, encouraged by Jackson, did so. situation suggests that of Jackson and Gaines and the Texas border in 1336. Jackson’s messenger reported on June 4 that Suhiga would be glad to send an expedition against Port Nichols if his official superior should give him permission. "To this is to be added the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants, and even of a number of the officers of the Government, and the desire of a majority to see a change effected," added the messenger. He, too, alleged to depredations by the inhabitants of Port Nichols: "From this spot they can easily annoy our settlements on Flint river, and the whole Georgia frontier." It was probably hoped that an invasion would throw Florida into cur hands. Under the plea that the Fort was hostile, a red-hot shot was fired by an American gunboat into the magazine of the fort, and the explosion killed nearly 300 men, women, and children. The American government had no right to try to dictate to the Spanish as to forts in t heir territory. The negroes in Florida were not stolen, but were either refugees on free soil or the descendants of negroes who had gone to Florida in colonial times. These "exiles," as they were called, were free as long as they remained on free soil, and the American government had no legal means of recovering figitive negroes if the sovereign of the soil on whidi they took refuge refused to extradite them. If Spain’s soil gave freedom as much as England’s, Spain was weak, and Florida was ardently desired. The injustice of invading Spanish soil ostensibly to capture negroes, of whom many had never been slaves, was so plain that the American generals pretended that the blacks were "stolen." Yet, strangely enough, in the official correspondence there was no attempt made to prove that the "exiles" had been stolen, nor, still more strangely, was there one specific complaint of any hostile act by the Seminoles or the negroes upon the Georgians. l6 All seems pros- pective! The massacre of Fort Nichols was an act that was likely, if it was not calculated, to provoke retaliation by the Indians and a declaration of war by Spain. 3ven when hostilities began in 1817 with the Florida Seminoles, the encroaching white frontiersmen were originally and more to 17 blame than the Indians. General Jackson was then instructed to use the militia of adjacent states to protect the frontier and put down the Indians. In 1329 Jackson, as President, similarly believed the possibility of border conflicts over our pursuit of fugitive slaves into Mexico an "almost irresistible” argument why Mexico should cede us Texas. lB Though the United States may have done well to drive a piratical horde from Galveston Island in 1817—from a region she claimed—, the seizure of Amelia Island lyinf off Florida seems not so apparently disinterested. A force of Latin American insurgents occupied Amelia Island in June of 1817, with the avowed purpose of revolutionizing Florida. Some Latin American writers think that Bolivar sent McGregor, his brother-in-law and the leader of the Amelia expedition, to erect a barrier in Florida against American expansion. But Bolivar probably had no such purpose; and the "design" is no doubt an interpretation made in the light of after events. Indeed, foreseeing the annexation of Florida, Bolivar applauded Jackson’s invasion in 1318 as a blow involving further blows at Spain’s power: "The day of America has arrived, and everything appears to announce the end of our glorious and terrible struggle. The war of the United States leaves now no doubt. The American general, Jackson, has taken by assault the fort of Pensacola, and the Floridas, and 19 West, are in the possession of the Americans." Aury soon followed. McGregor to Amelia Island with another force and took charge, proclaiming,euphemist ically, that he would "assist General McGregor in liberating the Floridas ... and attacking the tyrant in his other possessions." The prospect of an independent Florida was intolerable to President Monroe. Acting under the resolution of January 15, 1811, he sent a superior force to disarm the revolutionists at Amelia Island and so save the Florida preserve. Whether McGregor 1 s undertaking was a bona fide offshoot of the South American independence movement, as it claimed to be, or whether it was a private filibuster, seems impossible to say. 2C But in any case—and certainly Aury acted under the authority of revolutionary Mexico—Monroe's violation of Spain's territory was of course aggressive. Monroe declared to Congress that Amelia Island was a nest of pirates and smugglers, adding with a little more relevancy, of the Me Greg or-Aury adventure, assumed to have been a private one, that, "Projected and commenced with an incompetent force, reliance seems to have been placed on what fforce] might be drawn, in defiance of our laws, from within our limits." Monroe's invasion of Spanish territory allegedly to anticipate a violation by foreigners of American neutrality towards Spain displayed an anxiety to befriend Spain quite unprecedented, unwarranted, and wholly undesired by Spain. 2l Naturally, Onis termed the American "occupancy of Amelia Island, and invasion of Sast Florida ... outrages which, it will scarcely be believed by posterity, were committed during a time of peace, and at the very moment when negotiations were pending for an amicable ?2 ad jus tai 8a t of all the diffsrences." The Foreign Enlistments, or Neutrality, act of 1317 was passed apparently as an inducement to much-molested Spain to 23 cede us the Floridas. The implied pledge therein to see that no military aid was given by .Americans to the Latin American revolutionists might induce Spain to sell Hast Florida and acknowledge the loss of West Florida. In vain did Spain try to obtain as a condition of her the Florida treaty a pledge that we would not recognize the revo-24 lutionary governments. Such imperialists as Clay and Ben- ton desired the immediate repeal of the Foreign Enlistments act and the recognition and open aid of the revolutionists. The administration from motives of prudence refrained from re cognit ion until 1822. Had the government followed Clay’s plan a sort of pan-American confederation might have been established and our political influence extended to a great degree over Latin America; as it was, the official attitude of aloofness except where self-interest called for intervention lessened the moral prestige of the United States, who won early a reputation for being selfishly imperialistic, despite her high moral pretensions. Another subject of dispute with Spain was the western boundary, where disturbing events cautioned a hasty settlement. Texas independence threatened on several occasions, and the end surely was not yet. Conroe had fear that nothing short of war would loosen the grasp of Spain on her outlying dominions, and took this extreme resort into his calculations. Adams insisted to Onis that all the territory to the Rio Grande in its lower course was part of our louisiana Purchase. The administration at first had no intention, it seems, of failing to procure Spain’s acknowledgment of our title thereto. Colonel Trimble, commanding at Natchez, was instructed by Secretary of War Calhoun in 1317 to go with two officers to explore Texas as far as the "Rio Grande to learn the character of the country and that of the Spanish inhabitants on the question of annexation to the United States as part of our louisiana purchase. He [Calhoun] said the Colonel had made an elaborate report touching the vast resources of the country and that he thought there would be little trouble in asserting and maintaining our claims to the Rio Grande; that with an additional regiment to the Eighth and a company of artillery he would guarantee to hold possession, and urged this policy strongly. Mr. Calhoun said ... he had fully coincided with Colonel Trimble, but the President declined the responsibility, and the treaty of Mr. Adams was adopted 25 transferring the rich domain to Spain." In 1317-18 occurred the Lallemand flurry* General Charles Lallemand, resourceful leader of the Napoleonic exiles in the United States, entertained all kinds of schemes which worried the government and the French and Spanish ministers at Washington. Eventually the exiles issued a proclamation declaring their intention to settle in the province of Texas, which, while now a desert, only awaits industrious colonists to become one of the moat beautiful and fertile countries oft he earth. The members composing this colony are altogether disposed to recognize the Spanish Government, to be loyal to it, to help bear its burdens and to pay taxes proportionately to its revenues. They ask, however, that they may be governed by their own laws, not obeying the Spanish governor, but creating their own military system. If the Court of Spain acquiesces in their demands, it can count upon their services and their fidelity. But if not, they will make use of the law which nature gives to everyone, that of cultivating the wilderness. They established on the Trinity Hiver the colony of Champ d’Asile, but were soon driven away by a Spanish force. To the United States the project had been disagreeable, and in June of 1818 sent ex-Secretary of War George Graham on what proved an unnecessary mission of warning to the prench exiles. His interesting instructions ran: Should they have removed to Matagorda, or any other place North of the Rio Bravo, and within the territory claimed by the United States, you will repair thither, without however exposing yourself to be captured by any Spanish military force. When arrived/you will, in a suitable manner, make known to the diief or leader of the expedition your authority from the Government of the United States, and express the surprise with which the President has seen possession thus taken, without authority from the United States, of a place within their territorial limits, and upon which no lawful settlement can be made without their sanction. You will call upon him explicitly to avow under what national authority they profess to act, and take care that due warning be given ... that the place is within the United States. 26 The negotiations with Spain in 1817 were carried, on chiefly at Madrid, where our Minister, George W. Srving, offered to couple the fixing of a neutral strip along the Colorado as western boundary with the transfer of the yloridas 27 ' i and a pecuniary claims settlement . negotiations were suspended in Spain upon news of Jackson’s invasion of Florida and continued at Washington until the signing of the treaty of mutual cessions in February, 1319. Save what he assumed gratuitously from his broad orders of December 26, 1317, Jackson had no authority to invade Spanish territory. It is plain what his real motive was in entering Florida. Cn January 8, 1818, just before his invasion, he solicited from President Monroe a secret authorization to seize Florida, and years afterwards claimed—apparently without the shadow of truth—that Monroe had actually sent him a hint of sanction through Congressman John Rhea of Tennessee. The General felt that Monroe 1 s diplo- macy was not doing its office, and wrote him confidentially: The Executive Government have ordered ... Amelia Island to he taken possession of; this order ought to be carried into execution at all hazards, and, simultaneously, the whole of ISast Florida seized and held as an indemnity for the outrages of Spain upon the property of our Citizens; this done, it puts all opposition down, secures to our Citizens a compleat indemnity, and saves us from a war with Great Britain, or some of the Continental Powers combined with Spain; this can be done without implicating the Government; let it be signified to me through any channel (say Mr. J. phea), that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable to the United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished. 29 The General at once proceeded to take Pensacola, and Secretary Adams’s famous defense of his course in what has been called by James Parton "the most flagrant piece of special pleading to be found in the diplomatic annals of the United States" convinced Spain that she must yield Florida or accept war. The United States, yielding Texas and taking the Spanish claim to Oregon, "purchased" the Floridas for five millions and assumed the payment of the American claimants. Jackson’s invasion was secretly viewed as an act of providence by many who hotly berated the General in Congress. Adams’s defense of Jackson’s "injured innocence" was not favored by the other members of the cabinet, who considered the General worthy of censure* Besides being friendly to Jackson, Monroe and Adams naturally wished to gloss over Jackson’s invasion and his affront to ISngland (in the summary execution of British subjects) and turn things to the best account; Adams, furthermore, wished to bid high for presidential honors by sharing the General’s popularity and pandering to the imperialism of the South and West. "You will perceive," wrote Rufus Kirg, "when you read it, that it is certainly as much calculated for domestic as for foreign readers. All those who are delighted with Indian wars, including the frontier inhabts, will receive this diplomatic specimen as worthy of the highest admiration & the effusions of the highest order of patriotism."’ Adams entertained a generous feeling for Jackson, which was to be ill repaid. The invasion of jdorida was the occasion of one of Clay’s greatest speeches, in January, 1319: We are fighting a great moral battle fcr the benefit not only of our country, but of all mankind. The eyes of the whole world, are in fixed, attention upon us ... when the minions of despotism heard, in ISurope of the seizure of Pensacola, how did. they chuckle and chide the admirers o f our institutions, tauntingly pointing to the demonstration of a spirit of injustice and aggrandizement made by our country in the midst of amicable negotiation. ’Behold,’ say they, ’the conduct of those who are constantly reproaching kings’ ... Beware how you forfeit this exalted character! Beware how you give a fatal sanction, in this infant period of our Republic, scarcely two-score years old, to military insubordination’. Remember that Greece had her Alexander, Rome had her Caesar ... 32 Clay was prophetic. Jackson, the personification of imperialism, and the American Napoleon, with the new distinction of playing a decisive part in the acquisition of Florida shot upward to the Presidency, where he continued to be an arbitrary dictator. He was the type the mass of people wanted; they sanctioned his aggressive expansion policy, foreign and Indian* Jackson did not hide his Florida exploit under a bushel. Hiring his Presidency, it is said, he was rallied by Mrs. Peggy ”1 expect, General, you forgot that Florida was foreign when you made the trip!" The coneral was not routed: n Yes, yes, maybe so. Some weak-kneed people in our country seemed to think so.”"' Ungrateful "scamps”! England's restraining influence and its scope should also be mentioned. While she warned the United States in 1816 not to be too hard on Spain, it became fairly evident long before the signing of the Florida treaty that England had no intention of joining Spain to curb the Americans. Jackson’s rash and unseemly execution in Florida of Ambrister and Arbuthnot, British subjects, gave fill opportunity for England to intervene had she desired. England’s acquiescence evinced to Monroe that we had Spain alone to deal with. When Spain asked England in the summer of 1818 for active aid against the United States, mentioning the American pretensions to the Floridas and the territory to the Rio grande, Castlereagh absolutely refused—this even though the British public was ripe for war, the newspapers anbition and rapacity upon the United States.” 34 In reality, by 1817 England had become resigned to oar acquisition of Florida, offering to mediate on that basis, and having no intention of going to war for Spain, "whatever her opinions formerly.” The selfish nature of England’s interest—her desire to take ’’compensatory” Spanish t erritory for every bit we took—was appreciated at Washington: Monroe’s chief fear was that if he were too violent with Spain England might seize on Cuba. The American press was full of dread rumors of Ragland’s compensatory designs upon Cuba. 35 In the fall of 1817 Castlereagh told Adams "that so long as the United States forbore to encroach upon neighboring States Ct. Britain would wholly abstain from seeking any possessions of that description. That if the United States set the Example, I could not answer for What might in such case be the line of Policy to which this Country might be driven" — which, Castlereagh reported to his government, was "a warning to America, if she did not wish to see us on her Southern boundary, not to provoke any change in our existing Policy, which was wholly to abstain from acquisitions in that quarter." From this and from Monroe’s and Adams’s statements it seems clear that the yielding of claim to Texas was not caused by fear of England . Spain, delaying her ratification of the Florida treaty on various grounds until the end of 1820, sent to England an envoy in the summer of 1319 to ask if she "would make common cause with Spain, in the event of a rapture between the latter and the United States.” Refusing emphatically, England urged Spain to accept the treaty at once, lest the Americans take Texas and recognize the new Latin American governments ~ 36 . as well. Monroe s threatening declarations convinced Spain of this danger, and she recognized her best interest in yiel ding. The Florida treaty in failing to procure Texas aroused a stozm in the West, where people, though suspicious of the "Eastern" government, had not expected it so grossly to betray their rights. Not even the Colorado had been obtained from weak Spain. Nay, the fact that part of New Mexico and California had not been secured distressed some. Benton, for example, was loud in execrating the "loss” of San Francisco Bay and the mythical Buenaventura River flowing into it, and the acceptance of the forty-second parallel to the Pacific as the far southwestern boundary, "giving to the Spaniards what lies to the South. In the hands of these statesmen the map of Louisiana is as a bit of cloth between the trenchant edges of a pair of shears. It is time that western men should have seme -voice in the destinies of this Republic. The Mississippi Valley was again the scene of filibustering activity. Certain men under Benjamin O’Fallon were thought to be planning an attack on New Mexico in 1819, and the Yellowstone Expedition, sent out by the government to awe the Indians for the benefit of the American fur trade, was feared by Spain as secretly threatening an encroachment. The Spanish vice-consul at St. Louis wrote in July, 1819, that the purpose of the Yellowstone Expedition, according to "persons of undoubted veracity and addicted to our Government, is, the occupation of the internal provinces ... for they have already spread over New Mexico intriguing persons, who direct and command the recruits in that part, which are to operate at the proper time, in concert with the principal force of Yellow Stone ... I told you that the attack upon New Mexico was talked of with great warmth, and that the Commander of the band was to be Mr. Benjn. OFallen, and now I add, that said Offalen goes up the River in the Govrt. steam boat ... In the province of Texas, forces equally considerable are uniting, and also at the points of Galveston, Trinity, Sabine, Natchez Natchitoches ... lam infomed that they are to act under a concerted plan of operation, which will begin to take effect in September.” 38 This last refers to long’s enterprise. James long of Natchez, who had recently married Jane Wilkinson, the niece of the notorious General, gathered a volunteer army to rectify the error of Monroe in the Texas matter. Long declared that ’’after the death of Mina, he agreed with Robinson to settle in this The Western press encouraged the open enterprise, but not as many indignant citizens joined the movement as long expected. The Western people were ardently desirous of Texas, but, not anxious to exert themselves martially, long seems to have had plans beyond Texas, namely, ’’the emancipation of the Mexican provinces. He endeavored to make an alliance with Lafitte, pirate and. smuggler chief at Galveston, who had ostensibly reformed since his hey-day at Barataria, having received pardon and golden words for assisting Jackson against the British, who had made overtures to him preceding the New Orleans conflict. But Lafitte declined, pointing out that Long might fail, as had every one of his predecessors • 4 * L Long’s Republic at Nacogdoches soon succumbed to the elements and Spanish force, and the Doctor was carried captive to Mexico City, where he died. Entertaining designs on Texas — but, characteristically, safe designs—General Wilkinson likewise wound up his long, colorful career in the City of the Montezumas. He urged Emperor Itdrbide, in November of 1822, to transform Texas "from an asylum of pirates and assassins into beautiful settlements, according to modern taste and policy, inhabited by cultured Catholic people, dedicated to manufacturing and all kinds of industry.” The Catholics were to be brought from Louisiana, and other parts of the united States, and at their head should be placed "an official of honor, fidelity, intelligence, adaptability, and political sagacity"—the General himself. He described his ill-fated nephew-in-law as "the Impostor Long." 42 Brom 1790 to 1820 American imperialism grew steadily; and the revolutionary movement in Latin America after 1808 tended, with the example and secret encouragement of Napoleon, to lessen our never conspicuous respect for Spain’s territorial rights. England set an aggressive example also, as in India; it was an era of gilded imperialism among the powers of the western world. The Amer ican press, especially of the West, teemed with expansion doctrines of divine ordination and "usufruct," or better use. The Spanish dominions were looked on as sadly benighted and in need of our "republican light." The necessity of liberating Mexico was incessantly harped upon. Thus Benton, who advocated the establishment of an "American Route to Asia” across the Sreat Blains via the Missouri and Columbia Rivers, declared: If it be asked, where can be obtained the requisite means of carrying on this intercourse? we answer, that, independent of the supply derived from the furs of this country, the mines of Mexico can be easily diverted to this channel, and that in such quantities as to obviate the inconvenience arising from a scarcity of specie, in consequence of the drainage produced by this trade. But it may be said, that the Spanish system o f restriction, which forces the produce of these mines to their ports, may defeat, or defer, the attainment of this advantage. If the obstinacy of Spain will still protract the reciprocal it would then, it is conceived, be advisable to obtain, by a resort to aims, that adjustment of all differences between her government and ours, redress diplomacy could not effect. An efficient aid would then be givsn to the Mexicans, and their independence would be established. The local situation of Mexico renders it impossible fbr them ever to become a maritime nation, and the American possessions contiguous to it will come in for their share of the carrying trade. By this means the gold and silver will flow into Nev/ Orleans, and thence into ... the western country generally. St. louis will be the medium of exchange between the mouths of the Columbia and the Mississippi. j — Samuel Taggart, of Massachusetts, to John Taylor, May 30, 1809, April 27, 1810, December 17, 1810, February 2J, 1811, in Am. Antiq. Soc. Procs. , N.S., XXXIII, 337, 347, 348, 349, 3%- 2 ———— Nashville Clarion, April 28, 1312 (the writer was probably Thomas H. Benton), in Pratt, Expansionists of. 1812> PP* 14, 124. That the War of 1812 was imperialistic' panionist is now generally agreed. Pratt, Expansionists; Pratt, ’•Western Aims in the War of 1812,” in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev * > XII, 36-50; C. B. Coleman, ’’The Ohio Valley in the Preliminaries of the War of 1812,« in ibid., VII, 39-50; L. M. Hacker, tt Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812: a Conjecture,” in ibid», X, 365-395; L. R* Cady, "Western Opinion and the War of 1812,** in Ohio Arch, and Hist. Quart. , XXXIII, 427- 476; Pratt, '’Bootnote to the War of 1312, " in American Mercury , XII, 230-235; H. E. Barnes, ’’The Second War for Independence,” in ibid., IV, 469-475; L. M. Hacker, «Mr. Madison’s War,” in ibid., XXIV, 335-344. 3 —- - ————— G. R. Taylor stresses the economic aspect of the West’s hostility to England in his ’’Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812,” in Journal of Political Sc is nee, XXXIX, 471-50 J. He shows that the West was provoked because of the ruin of its markets. But that they held England alone responsible for the situation is not proved by the fact that they largely damned England. Other reasons for desiring war with England and Spain existing, the heaping of reproach on England was but natural* 4 ' Napoleon to Maret, Duc de Bassano, August 28, 1811, in * de Napoleon, XXII, ?2J. Napoleon instructed the Minister: ... vous parld ce matin dinstructions reyues par le charge d Affaires d*Amdrique sur 1 1 affaire de s Flor ides. Vous pourr iez insinner 1 * idee suivant, que mo'vennant quelque millions de piastres IfEspagne,1 f Espagne, dans la situation de pdnuri e oil elle est, odd era it le s Flor ides. Insinuez cela en" ajoutant que, tout en ne trouvant pas mauvais que I’Amdrique prenne les El or ides, je ne pur s i ntervenir en r ien, puis que ce s pays ne m*appartiennent pas.* — Serurier to the French Government, November 20, 1813, in the University of Texas transcripts from the French Archives. 6 Some of the Federalists believed that the War of 1812 was prolonged to palliate the French "ally.” Wrote James Ross in 1814: "Should Mr. Madison break off from the Confederacy, he might expect denunciation, & exposure of all that has ever been written or proposed between Bonaparte and Mr. Jefferson on [or?J the present Administration, and I vehemently suspect, that rather than see such an exposure the war would be continued by our present Rulers” (Ross to McHenry, February 12, 1814, in Steiner, McHenry, 609) • “7 H. Adams, Writings of Albert Gallat in, I, —-— Pratt, Expansionists of 1812, p. 269• — — Wellington, Supplementary Dispatches, IX, 38?; quoted in ings of J. Adams fV, 172, 173» note. 10 ~ _ — ——— Writings of J. Adams, V, ??1. -Q — — Fuller, Purchase of Florida, 219-225; Writings of J. Q. . v > »0-553• The published correspondence may be found in Register, IX, 392-397• Monroe replied to Onis on January 19, 1616: H You intimate that troops are levying in Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana and Georgia, for the invasion of the Spanish provinces, of whom one thousand are from Kentucky, and three hundred from Tennessee, to be commanded by American citizens, but you do not state at which points these men are collected, or by whom commanded; and as to the forces said to be raised in Louisiana and Georgia, your communication is still more indefinite* The information recently obtained by this department, from persons of high consideration, is of a very different character. It is stated that no men are collected, nor is there any evidence of an attempt or design to collect any in Kentucky, Tennessee or Georgia, for the purpose stated; and that the force said to be assembled by Mr. Toledo is very inconsiderable.... If any portion of it consists of citizens of the United States their conduct is unauthorized and illegal.... I have to request, that you will have the goodness to state at what points in Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia and Louisiana, any force is collected, the number in each instance, and by whom commanded.” This placed a heavy burden on Onis. There had been filibustering activities going on. In 1814 General Toledo attempted to raise in the Southwest a new Texas eixpedition, and some three hundred volunteers are said to have assembled at Gaines’s Ferry on the Sabine, including some rather prominent men of the region, such as Henry Bullard, Dr. Robinson, and one Bradburn. But disputes among the Americans over the command broke up the project. The question was: *Who shall be Emperor of the new Republic?” See Gulick, Lamar Papers, I, 283, 284; E. S. Brown, “Letters from Louisiana, 181371814,” in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. , XI, J72-J79. Again, in March of a division FF”Jackson ’s troops asked Gutierrez through their officers to march with them against San Antonio. ”1 told them I would do it with pleasure,” Gutierrez relates. But he turned away from them when he found they were interested much more in wealth, fame and conquest than in aiding the Mexican movement for independence. Gulick, Lamar Papers, I, 26-28. Captain Perry, also, led his filibuster band into Texas in 181?, after eluding the American authorities. See Chapter VI, note 26. jg — Adams to Sustis, March 29, 1316, in Writings. V. 546 , 547. 13 Writings of J. Adams, V, 502. — lb id., V, 502 , 490 , 496 ,54 7 and note. Brown, The glory Seekers, 235; A. C. Wilgus, "Spanish American Pa tri oT AcTl vi I y along" the Gulf Coast of the United States, 1811-1322," in La. Hist. Quart., VIII, 193-215; Wilgas, "Some Notes on Spanish American Patriot Activity along the Atlantic Seaboard, 1816-1822," in North Carolina Hist. Bev., IV, 172-131. Correspondence in Am. State Paps., For. Reis., IV, 551-562; Fuller, Purchase of Fiori 28-SOT; J. R. biddings, The iSx il es of plorlda, 35 -45'; Brown, The Glory Seekers, 275 It is significant that Adams imis™‘famous defense of Jackson’s course in 1818 did not accuse the "negro fort” of "rapine.” He described it as a post ’’from whence to commit depredations and as a receptacle for fugitive slaves and malefactors." Adams to Irving, November 28, 1818, in Writ ings, VI, 481; and in Am. State Paps., For. Keis., IV", 539/ yy- — Puller, Purchase of Florida, 236, 237; 0. Colton, Works of Henry play, V, Slay believed the harsh treaty of Fori “Jackson the basic cause of the war. Jackson to Anthony Butler, March 23, 1830, in J. S. Bassett, Correspondence of Andrew Jackson, IV, 129, 130; Benton’s "Americanus," Ho. 2 (1829) ,in Washington Globe, May 4, 1844. ' J. 3. Ro do and R. Blanco-Fombono, Cartas de Bolivar, 236. 2C Bancroft, North Mexican States and Texas, 11, 38 and note; J. b* lockey, pan-American Ism; Its Beginnings , 183- 195; P. J. Urrutia, Pagina's de~~His"torla~Diplomiti ca, 9 7-157. Monroe in J. p. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 11, 13-51; Writings of J. ~ — ' —. ——— On is, Memoir upon the Neg ot iat ions between Spain and the United States, 21. Adams says that the public assented to the action against McGregor’s plan on learning of "the pernicious influence which it had and portended to important interests of our own country." Adams to Gallatin, May 19, 1818, in Writings, VI, 314. — Lockey, Pan-Amer i canis m, 19 6-199, 202; Urrutia, Pdginas de Historia Diplomat lea, 133-140. 24 ~ ~ J. 0* Bancroft Davis, Notes upon the Treaties of the United States, 153. Calhoun told this to a group of friends in 1823, and it is related by Senator John A. Trimble, the brother of the Colonel, in his "Memoirs," in Journal of American History, 111, 617, 618. Eb' — Adams to Graham, June 2, 1313, in Niles* Register, LXVII, 234-239; partially quoted in Buchanan to sTiJe 11, November 10, 1845, in J, B. The works of James Buchanan, VI, 300, 301. Adams is quoted as saying in the House on January 23, 1845, that one of the reasons for Hrvirg’s failure in Spain was the fact that he was not authorized to guarantee to Spain the remainder of her territory. Adams quoted in T» 0. Grattan, Civilized America (2 ed.) , 11, 276. See appendix on "Jackson and the Rhea Letter." Jackson to Monroe, Jamary 8, 1818, in Bassett, Cor. o f Jackson, 11, 346. 30 Adams, Memoirs, IV, 263. King to C« Core, December 31, 1313, in King, Cor. of King, VI, 132. 32 “ C. Colton, Works of Henry Clay, V, 444. For a critique of Jackson’s arbitral acfK in Florida see D. Y. Thomas, "Jackson’s Attitude in the Seminole War,” in Am. Hist. Mag . and Tenn. Hist. Spc . Quart., IX, 145-152. — I — — Buell, Andrew Jackson, 11, 303. Rippy, Rivalry of the United States and. great Britain o ver La tin Amer i ca 63 ; R. Rush, Membra hda“ of a Rest dehce at the Court bfLondon, 58. f ' ' ... Kiles' Register, XVII, 305 , 353; XVIII, 46, 47. 36 — R* Rush, A Residence at the Court of lon den, 2 ser., I, 139; Rippy, Rivalry' of' ihe united States and Ureat Britain, 70. On is assured Rush aF a~^iplo mati"c dinner at iondon“in June, 1819, that "Spain has not ceded Cuba to Ugland, and does not mean to"—a bit of information that Rush hastened to send his government. Rush, 2 Ser., I, 99. —— Selections of 'Editorial Articles from the St. louis Snquirer on the Subject o’f Oregon and I’exas, as Originally miTshed^n^aTTaper,"Tn"!he Years Written Fy th e Hon. TFomaa~H* (IB“87 28 ~ ’ 1 " —— — Report of the Spanish vice-consul, July IC, 1819, in Gulick, Lamar Papers, I, 32, 33. A. B. Thomas gives farther documents illustrative of Spanish apprehension of the Yellowstone Expedition in The West Texas Hist. Ann. Yearbook, IV. 3-15. The latest study of" this exp edltion is U. Lesley f s ”A Still Larger o f the So-called Yellowstone Expedition,” in North Dakota Hist. Qpart., July, 1931. See also L. 3. Pisher in WissV Valley Hist! Rev., XVIII, 476. 39 Deposition of long to the Mexican authorities, in Gulick, Lamar Papers, I, 47 . 40 Gulick, Lamar psp ers, I, 31. Colonel lavari, of New Orleans, says t HaF tHe Governor of Louisiana asked him if he could count on him for seven or eight hundred horsemen for service against the Spanish. Delfasse to the Spanish consul at New Orleans., July 16, 1319, in ibid., I, 33. Lafitte and his band soon left Texas under the threat of the American government, which appears to have acted at the instance of Mexico. Arredondo wrote in January, 1820, "that it was necessary to ask the united States to help destroy them" (quoted by L. E. Wisher in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., XVIII, 47 6) . 42 —— H. 3* Bolton, "General James Wilkinson as Advisor to ISnperor Iturbide," in His pan. Am. Hist. Rev., I, 163-180. Wilkinson got a grant in Texas, but" died“Tßecember, 1825) before doing anything with it. "43 — Benton, Selections of torial Art!cl es, 11-13. CHAPTER V THE MONROE DOCTRINE, CUBA AND EXPANSION PHILOSOPHY 1 Adams, because he did not press our broadest pretensions to territory, was denounced in the West as a "Federalist restrictionist” and an "Eastern man." Westerners were very slow to recognize, if they ever recognized, in the great Secretary of State, who was one of the authors of the Monroe Doctrine and the last of Monroe’s cabinet to consent to yield Texas, one of this nation’s greatest imperialists, his "latitudinarian” views "extended beyond those of any of his contemporaries," but he was nevertheless a practical diplomat, hot considering his treaties as final limitations, he took just pride in the Florida treaty because it gave us a boundary "on the South Sea." Our statesmen, including Jefferson, agreed that the Louisiana Purchase did not extend west of the Kocky Though it was rather natural that Western expansionists should view Adams’s Oregon joint occupation agreement with England in 1818 as another attempt of the "Eastern" government to strangle the growing West by neglect, the Secretary had no intention when making this treaty of weakening our claims. He wrote to our Ministers abroad; "The new English pretention ... either indicates a design on their part to encroach by new establishments of their own upon the forty-ninth parallel of latitude, south of which they can have no valid claim upon this continent, or it manifests a jealousy of the United States, a desire to check the progress of our settle-2 ments." Adams declared later— and probably not altogether disingenuously-— that Monroe had proposed the forty-ninth parallel as northwestern boundary in 1818 only in the conviction that England would not accept it, and agreed to joint occupation, waiving a settlement, because we could with time, through our greater ability to colonize the region, secure all 3 of Oregon. Feeling as early as 1811 that it was our destiny to control at least all of North America, Adams, who was distinctly jingoistic, told the cabinet in November, 1819, when Crawford mentioned that France and England were profoundly impressed with the idea that we wbes an ambitious and encroaching people,” t ha t Nothing that we could say or do would remove this impression until the world shall be familiarized with the idea of considering our proper dominion to be the continent of North America. From the time when we became an independent people it was as much a law of nature that this should become our pretension as that the Mississippi &iould flow to the sea. Spain had possessions upon our southern and Great Britain upon our northern border. It was impossible that centuries should elapse without finding them annexed to the United States... because it is a physical, moral, and political absurdity that such fragments of territory, with sovereigns... beyond the sea, worthless and burdensome to their owners, should exist permanently contiguous to a great, powerful, enterprising, and rapidly-growing nation... any effort on our part to reason the world out of the belief that we are ambitious will have no other effect than to convince that we add to our ambition hypocrisy. 4 Adams pointed out ribhat we had acquired territory from Spain by ”fair purchase”; ”but if the world do not hold us for Romans they will take us for Jews, and of the two vices I had rather be charged with that which has greatness mingled in its composition.” In conversing with Stratford Canning on Oregon in January, 1821, Adams averred that England had no color of claim to the Columbia River and that our right extended exclusively ”to all the shores of* the South Sea,* 1 continuing: "We know of no right that you have there/* and "We certainly did suppose tnat the British Government had come to the conclusion that there would be neither policy nor profit in cavilling with us about territory on this North American continent.* Asked Canning: "And in this you include our northern provinces on this continent?” "No,” said Adams, "there the boundary is marked.... Keep what is yours, but leave the rest of this continent to us . ” Luis de Onis perceived unmistakably this vaulting imperialism, which but awaited a favorable opportunity or provocation for further expression. The Spaniard believed that we would be satisfied with no less than the two Americas, the West Indies and the Philippines. The United States had scarcely seen ... the place settled which they were to hold among independent powers, when they formed the ostentatious project of driving from the continent of America the nations that held possession of it, and of uniting under their dominion the whole of the colonies... They sent emissaries everywhere, and even military expeditions under the orders of well informed and experienced chiefs, to explore the interior provinces of Mexico and the islands of Porto Rico and Cuba. They procured correct maps of those dominions of Spain.... J The visiting Englishman William Cobbett was similarly impressed by our u grand ideas about the extension of the empire of the n United States.”' Aggressive nationalism appeared everywhere* Daniel Webster identified his America proudly with "free representative Governments, entire religious liberty... an unconquerable spirit of free inquiry, a diffusion of knowledge throughout the community such as has been before altogether unknown and unheard-of.” He admonished in the Bunker Hill Oration: "Let our object be our country, and nothing but our country.” Stephen Decatur toasted, similarly, "Our country, right or wrong.” A really unselfish sympathy caused many of our enthusiastic freemen to wish zealously for the success of revolution in Greece and Latin America. Gallatin, Minister at Paris, urged our naval intervention in Greek waters, though we had then in the Mediterranean but "one frigate, one sloop and Q one schooner." Many Americans wished to go and some did go to help release those still enslaved shores* The government’s policy of recognition was more cautious. A gentleman wrote from western bew York in all seriousness that he could furnish, to aid the Greeks, "five hundred men six feet tall with sinewy arms and case hardened constitutions, bold spirits and daring adventurers who would travel upon a bushel of corn and a gallon of whiskey per man from the extreme part of the world to Constantinople ," and should the Holy Alliance actively join Spain in an attempt to crush her revolted colonies "our backwoodsmen would spring with the activity of squirrels to the assistance of the regenerated Spaniards and perhaps there we might fight more effectively the battle for universal freedom than Q either at Thermopylae or Marathon*" The famous Monroe Doctrine of December, 1823, was undoubtedly an official expression of imperialism. Nothing less than surprising, in view of the many contemporary indications of its nature, is the belief so long prevalent that Monroe’s message was defensive, and, as some have insisted, even altruistic, in motive. The speeches, writings and other signs of the times contain not the slightest hint of fear of a national danger. On the contrary, Monroe, Calhoun, Madison, and others (but not Adams) felt that the very issuance of a manifesto so transparently aggressive was dangerous in inviting war. In reality there was little risk run by its utterance, since, with England neutral, our naval strength was superior to that of 10 the Allies. Our Minister at London, Richard Rush, says that Canning, who had previously invited the United States to make a Joint declaration with England, vehemently protested against the Monroe Doctrine, and all ’’Europe was surprised at it. They could not comprehend it, except as a threat, and holding up the law of force as soon as we were able. The doctrine was discreetly couched negatively, for the United States could not hope to defend it on all occasions, when not to do so in case of a positive declaration would lower our prestige. The declaration was in part occasioned by the Russian ukase of 1821, which seemed to threaten Oregon and California. The settlement of Russia traders near Bodega Bay in California had already excited no little worry in the people as ’.veil as in the government. Would Alexander make an empire in north- western America to our cost and exclusion? Adams informed Tuyll, the Russian Minister, "that we should contest the right of Russia to any territorial establishment on this continent, and ... assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial 13 establishments.” The other irritant was the reputed project of the Holy Alliance to conquer the Latin American republics ostensibly for restoration to Spain* Behind our desire that Latin American independence be preserved lay our eagerness not only to check the extension of European commerce and colonization in the Lew World but to close up the continent as far as possible as a preserve which would be virtually defenseless if still independent ox* under Spain. What we really apprehended and detested was not a restoration of Spain’s precarious authority in the New World, but the Allies* seizure of the excolonies for themselves. They were wolves in sheepskins. "Spain had not, and never could again have, the physical force to maintain that dominion,” noted Adams; and the Allies would not "waste their blood and treasure” to subject the revolted colonies save ”to recolonize them, partitioned out among themselves. Russia might take California, Peru,Chile; France, Mexico,-- where we know she has been intriguing to get a monarchy under a Prince of the House of Bourbon, as well as to Buenow Ayres. And Great Britain, as her last resort, if she could not resist this course of things, would take at least the 14 island of Cuba for her share of the scramble.* Adams refused to accede to England's proposal of a joint guaranty of Latin American independence chiefly because it involved a self-denying ordinance. Suffering unduly from a feeling of impending danger, much as his remote successor E. M. Stanton, Secretary Calhoun strongly favored a joint declaration "even if it should pledge us not to take Cuba or the province of Texas; because the power of Great Britain being greater than ours to seize upon them, we should get the advantage of obtaining from her the same declaration.” But Secretary Adams, whose larger and more confident views prevailed, refused to ’’tie us down to any principle” which would thwart or hinder 19 our ambitions towards those quarters. Even if the French Revolutionary Assembly had announced that France had no desire to extend her boundaries (this to calm in 1791 her neighbors 1 fear of her missionary zeal), such self-abnegation was not for us. England’s recognition of the Latin American republics in December of 1824 ’’restrained the pretensions of the Yankees, and preserved Cuba to Spain,” in the plausible opinion of an 16 English writer. Jefferson had in 1808-09 used pan-Ameri- 17 canism to cloak his grasping for Cuba and the Floridas# And the Doctrine of 1823 had much of the same subtle significance# Uttered when the actual danger to oui' pretensions was over- rated (as we now know), the Monroe Doctrine has not belied its “blood and iron” origin in serving many times since then as the velvet glove of imperialism. “Debased” and "perverted” it has not been. The supposed altriusm of the Monroe Doctrine was largely in the minds of those eager Latin Americans remote from our shores. Joyfully did Colombia and Brazil hasten to propose armed alliance-- in vain. The fancied promise was gradually 18 seen to be an illusion. The cool Congressional debate on the Panama Congress in 1826 dissipated most of the lingering 19 n doubt. American altriusm in 1823 was very largely the by- product of manifest destiny— a frothy substance. The young American nation was naturally greedy, aggressive, imperious, for it was, to speak figuratively, in its adolescence, a stage characterized preeminently by that self-centered, inordinate and ruthless grasping which in some degree is the way of all flesh. To Latin Americans who took a closer and realistic view no momentary illusion was possible. Zozaya, the first Mexican Minister to Washington, who came seeking sympathy, was sorely disappointed: American aggressiveness and ambition struck him ominously. ’’The arrogance of these republicans,” he reported, ’’does not permit them to consider us as equals, but as inferiors; in my judgment their vanity extends to the belief that their capital will be that of all the Americas.” 2o Much of our contemptuous and imperialistic attitude towards Spain was transferred to, or inherited by, Spain’s successors in the New World, as was only natural, though unfortunate. Very likely the American dislike of Spain had been as much because of what she possessed in America as because of herself, or her policy. 2 Cuba seemed to be the next logical step in expansion after Florida* ihe Pearl of the Antilles was for several years momentarily expected to fall to one of the greedy rivals for the last diminishing possessions of Spain* Americans had long viewed the i sland as a natural appanage, hopefully averring that its acquisition was destined. In 1823 Adams wrote to our Minister at Madrid that within half a century ’’the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the 21 integrity of the Union itself. ” Jefferson urged in 1820 that ”we ought, at the first possible opportunity to take Cuba, 22 even though at the cost of a war with England.** Except for the danger of foreign interference we might have seized Cuba on the heels of the Florida treaty; Spain’s course provided ample pretext. But England and France, not to mention Mexico and Colombia, zealously disputed the American ambition with much indignation at our proprietary attitude. Destiny was put off, perforce. In 1823 rumor said that Spain had agreed to England’s taking Cuba "for the ostensible purpose of suppressing piracy. It was not, therefore, by chance that Joel R. Poinsett introduced a piracy bill during the Congressional session of 1824- 2? for promoting the independence of Cuba as the most adequate means of exterminating piracy, which seemed to center around Cuba;-- nor astonishing that the Mexican Minister saw a design 24 in this piracy bill to seize the "Pearl." In 1825-26 the United States refused to enter a self-denying agreement with England and France for the guaranty of Cuba to Spain, and deterred Mexico and Colombia from sending an expedition to "liberate" the island. The spirit behind the Monroe Doctrine forbade this. The unconcealed policy of this country was to preserve Cuba to Spain for future reference. Unable with impunity to seize it at once, the American government had given no encouragement to the Cuban revolutionists who in 1822 sought aid and encouragement at Fittingly was Cuba described during the Spanish cataclysm as the "Turkey of trans- Atlantic politics, tottering to her fall, and kept from falling by those who contend for the right of catching her in her descent. 3 •Manifest destiny"-- the craving for expansion openly justified on the grounds of our ’’superior civilization," our missionary duty, and divine law-- was as outspoken at this early optimistic period as after 1844. There is a wide popular belief that the real spirit of "manifest destiny"— a term 26 coined in 1845-- first appeared about 1844, or even later, at the time of the successes of the American army in the heart of Mexico; and some have even viewed it as the shibboleth of the "aggressive slavocracy.” In reality it was the natural condition of the national mind: the later open expression of our imperialism was only the revival or resumption, after a long period of suppression and semi-sublimation, of the early vaulting ambitions which we have surveyed. The independence of Spanish America and the check by Great Britain on the northern border and elsewhere were deterrents to our expansion, but the greatest check was perhaps internal. After 1819 the central theme of American history is the ever-growing aggressive rivalry between North and South-- a strife which retarded expansion and so completely swallowed and eclipsed the older East-West sectionalism that the bitterness and very fact of it was nearly forgotten. Long politi- cally decadent, “Federalist” New England had displayed always a deep but futile hostility to territorial expansion, vzhich bled her of wealth and population and reduced her political importance. Now again, however, through the gradual but sure dissemination oi her anti-slavery ideals, New England recovered vicarious power through her intellectual leadership of the North. By ’’moral persuasion,” or propaganda, the New England restrictionists threw more and more odium on imperialism in the Northern mind: for national expansion, actual and prospective, was moving south, along with the free-trade ideal, and becoming distinctly non grata to Northern men foi' reasons economic and political. At root the irrepressible conflict between the two economic-social systems, free and slave, was economicpolitical. The period of suppression lasted from 1819-20 (when the restrictionists won their first victories) to 1845. Till then the restrictionists successfully staved off the annexation of Texas. The imperialism of President Jackson was checked and discredited so well by the flaming diatribes of Adams-- most influential and eloquent convert from imperialism to antiimperialism— that Van Buren, Jackson’s heir to high office, was well content to let Texas rest. The Panic of 1837, involving the country in hard-fought financial questions, and the Whig victory of 1840 absorbed men’s minds and diverted them from expansion. At length a new Western unrest and land-craving turned attention again westward, to Oregon, Texas and Cali- 27 forma. ‘ Pioneers again trekked; and diplomacy followed. With the Southern and Democratic ascendancy under President Tyler the annexation of Texas was carried through over the loud, threatening Northern and divided Whig opposition. The restrictionists denounced it as a pro-slavery intrigue and a rape of Mexico, all of which, it was not. The South especially wanted Texas, to increase her political power in order to triumph or hold her own in such national questions as tariff, independent treasury and the defense of slavery; the antislavery North opposed the annexation from similar considerations of political power. Some Democrats and Whigs feared annexation would bring on war with Mexico, and therefore opposed it; but they ran against the spirit of the times. The expansionists, clearly, cared little whether Texas would bring a war or not, and some welcomed the prospect for further expansion. This final triumph of expansion rent the web spun by Northern jealousy of the South, and reaction set in; the day of ‘’doughfaces’* began in earnest. The "humanitarian" restrictionists- who had opposed the annexation of Texas as being an "extension of slavery"!-- were exposed and ridiculed; no immediate war attended annexation, as had been gloomily prophesied; only from the North sat in the counsels of President Polk; and Jackson’s imperialistic program for the Southwest was vigorously resumed, ’’Young Hickory” himself provoking the War with Mexico, it seems, after the government of Texas in its last days of independence refused to take the responsibility of precipitating hostilities as his cat’s-paw. "Manifest destiny” was an idealistic or teleological description of American imperialism; it included a nationalistic pride in democracy and a belief that the natural desire to expand with our civilization was good and in the nature of things* Men always dramatize or justify philosophically their tiny movements and desires, and, moving westward “with the sun” into a still unconquered West, the pioneers could easily perceive an indication of destiny or divine purpose in their course. Civilization had always moved westward, and such enthusiastic Westerners as Benton stressed this and predicted that in going west we should bear the torch across the Pacific some day and reanimate Asia. Commodore Perry’s forceful opening of Japan to our trade did indeed awaken and begin the making of modern Japan. Our ’’destiny" grew upon us: in 182 J Benton fixed the "western limit of the republic" at the Rockies, “where the statue of the fabled god Terminus should be raised upon the highest peak never to be thrown down,” and Webster still entertained this restricted notion in when Benton had long + . + 28 outgrown it. The American people were then restless and always on the move in search of something better or some El Dorado. "A native of the United States,” wrote De Tocqueville in the early thirties, "clutches everything; he holds nothing fast, but soon loosens his grasp to pursue fresh gratifications.” And even he, a foreigner, could say of the westward movement: ’’This gradual and continuous progress of the European race towards the Rocky Mountains has the solemnity of a providential event; it is like a deluge of men rising unabatedly, and daily driven onwards by the ha.nd of God.” For many decades the Mexican borderlands of Texas, Nev/ Mexico and California were looked to as the field for expansion: except for Oregon, viewed by many as greatly inferior to California, the American Far West was neglected as uninhabitable and long considered and called the "Great American Desert.” Not until new methods and tools of pioneering were developed by continuous experiment on the Great Plains was that region at last conquered to the uses of man/' Thus it was that up to the Civil War ’’manifest destiny” was to justify the seizure of Naboth’s vineyards. Just as the chronic land-hunger of the Americans was insatiable, so the number of land-seekers grew incessantly. Because of her prosperity and opportunities, internal peace, and liberal ideals, the United States attracted a large annual immigration of landless from the Old World— people on the whole rendered progressive by economic stress, and prizers of land. These largely moved west. The once dominant tier of seaboard states became merely ’’the portico to the great territory of the United Harriet Martineau wrote in the late thirties: The possession of land is the aim of all actions, generally speaking, and the cure for all social evils, among men in the United States. If a man is disappointed in politics or love he goes and buys land. If he disgraces himself he betakes himself to a lot in the West. If the demand for any article of manufacture slackens the operatives drop into the unsettled lands. If a citizen’s neighbours rise above him in the towns he betakes himself where he can be monarch of all he surveys. An artisan works that he may die on land of his own. He is frugal that he may enable his eon to be a landowner.3l While natural causes thus made the United States expand and attain supremacy on the continent, equally natural causes made for the disruption and stagnation of Mexico. Her poor heritage from Spain, her racial composition, her climate, and her lack of political stability and economic progressiveness may be mentioned as among these. Mexico desired but could not attract immigrants: she hardly grew and did not possess the man power to occupy, utilize and defend her northern border provinces, which naturally, therefore, went the way of the Floridas. Americans have not viewed kindly Mexico’s impotent jealousy of the “Colossus of the North,” whose progressive example she could not follow. Mexico tended to ascribe many of her deficiencies to our Machiavellian policy of keeping her weak and troubled. The legislature of Tlalpam declared, when accusing our first Minister, Poinsett, of stimulating factional dissension: In fact, the North Americans owe to their liberal institutions what their clime denies; and it is verynatural to persuade themselves that Mexico, in the enjoyment of the same political system, united with all the advantages of its delightful temperature, the fertility of its soil, and the mild and docile character of its inhabitants, will attract an increase of population and wealth which will give it a name and preponderance among the other republics of the continent. The North American policy, so called, is contradictory to our own; and it is for their interest to preserve things in their present state, that Mexico may offer no guarantee, nor any kind of attractives in its society, nor any advantages in its departments of industry, which can diminish the credit and aggrandizement of that nation. On this principle they have to establish their diplomacy in regard to ourselves, and their agent must fulfill their mission accordingly. Poinsett, who quotes this querulous complaint as typical, remarks: "Whether this reasoning is well founded or not, certainly it is so understood by everyone |in Mexico], and hence the alarm, distrust, and unfriendly feeling in the parties, and among all Mexicans.*’ Poinsett 1 s entanglement in Mexican politics, so far from being inspired by petty or insidious desire to disrupt Mexico, was apparently owing to his republican missionary zeal and to his natural desire to counteract the "British party** in Mexico. On leaving Mexico he addressed the government a defense of his course in which he said frankly: The United States are in a state of progressive aggrandizement, which has no example in the history of the world. Its federal union, instead of dissolving, as had been predicted by European politicians, has strengthened with the progress of time. Its commerce rivals that of the most ancient nations of Europe.... Its manufactures are in the most flourishing condition. Its fortifications, its army and marine, can compare with those of any in the world... and, finally, the mass of its population is better educated, and more elevated in its moral and intellectual character, than that of any other. If such is its political condition, is it possible that its progress can be retarded, or its aggrandizement curtailed, by the rising prosperity of Mexico? Instead of entertaining suspicions or distrust of their neighbors, the Mexican people ought to search out the circumstances to which this state of singular prosperity is to be attributed, and adopt them as the most noble means of rivalry. They will be found to consist in liberal institutions, wisely and faithfully administered; a rigid adherence to the constitution... an universal desire to promote the common Poinsett was, like Adams, a man who had travelled widely over the world and was able to judge well of the international ranking of the United States, His successor to Mexico made the same criticism of the Mexicans. The imperialism of the United States was inevitable, natural and in no way malicious. This is fully realized by Manuel Ugarte, who, far from reproaching the United States for what she has been and is, admonishes his countrymen of Latin America to unite and adopt for their self-preservation the characteristics which have elevated the United States to power and which he admires: I have never blamed Caesar for dividing Gaul against itself in order to subdue it. Caesar's manoeuvre was a sign of his superiority. But it is legitimate to deplore the fact that the Gauls were not astute enough to frustrate it.... My object has been to call the attention of the Aztecs and Gauls of my time and my family of nations of the possibility of avoiding suicidal dissentions, in order to develop a vigorous power, increase the health of their community, and co-ordinate it, in view of what is the supreme aspiration of every living species: development and survival. The United States have done and will continue to do what all the strong peoples in history have done, and nothing can be more futile than the arguments used against this policy in Latin America. To invoke ethics in international affairs is almost always a confession of defeat. Ugarte's description of American imperialism— which, long latent after the Civil War, again revived after 1898-- is indeed most flattering: Never in all history has such an irrestible or marvelously concerted force been developed as that which the United States are bringing to bear upon the peoples which are geographically or politically within its reach in the south of the Continent or on the shores of the sea* Rome applied a uniform procedure. Spain persisted in a policy of ostentation and glittering show. Even in the present day, England and Prance strive to dominate rather than absorb. Only the United States have understood how to modify the" mechanism of expansion in accordance with the tendencies of the age, employing different tactics in each case, and shaking off the trammels of whatever may prove an impediment or a useless burden in the achievement of its aspirations... * At times imperious, at other times suave, in certain cases apparently disinterested, in others implacable in its greed, pondering like a chess-player who foresees every possible move, with a breadth of vision embracing many centuries, better informed and more resolute than any, without fits of* passion, without forgetfulness, without fine sensibilities, without fear, carrying out a world activity in which everything is foreseen-- North American imperialism is the most perfect instrument of domination which has been known throughout the ages.Jd This seems to describe well enough our recent policies in the Northern hemisphere and its southern waters; whether it fits also our early expansion, from 1790 to iB6O, the reader must judge for himself* Perhaps today oui' pupil Japan alone approaches the suavity and unyielding force of our imperialism-- an imperialism which the mass of Americans, with naive selirighteousness and benevolence, are very prone to deny. Imperialism is unconscious of itself to a great extent. Slarbois, Louisiana, 286; Am. State Paps., For. Reis., 11, 559- 2 Adams to Gallatin and Rush, July 28, 1818, in Writings, VI, 401. Adams, Memoirs, XII, 221. Adams was, however, a "Fiftyfour Forty" at that later time. 4 Adams, Memoir s, IV, 438, 439; J* Fitzpatrick, The Autobiography of Martin Van Buren, 494, 495, 303, in Am. Hist* Assn. Report, IT; D. Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, 1823- 1826, p. 10. Adams wrote his father on August 31, 1811: H The whole continent of North America appears to be destined by Divine Providence to be peopled by one nation” (Writings of J. £. Adams, IV, 204-210). 5 — Adams, Memoirs, V, 2?2, 253. -g _ Onis, Memoir , 106. 7 W. Cobbett, A Year’s Residence in the United States (2 ed., 1819), . S» Davis , Eur ope since Waterloo, 41 note. 9 R. Bunner to James Campbell, January 12, 1824, in Marian Gouverneur, As I Remember, 41* W — Davis, Europe since Waterloo, 39* ii : Rush to Seaton, in [Josephine SeatonJ, William Winston Seaton, 216. " 12 ” ~~ R. G. Cleland., History of California; the American Per iod, 29-32; Perkins, The Monroe Doctrine, C . P. Howland, Survey of American Foreign Relations, pp. 38-41. Interesting matter on the origins of the Doctrine is to be found in J. R. Clark, Memorandum of the Monroe Doctrine (Govt. Printing Office, 1930) and in S. E. Morrison, "Les Origines de la Doctrine de Monroe, 1775-1823,” in Revue de Sciences Politique s, XLVII, 52-84. Perkins shows that the Russian expansion danger was slight, while Cleland believes that it was perhaps considerable. Perkins's view that there was no real Russian danger is also held by V. J. Earrar, "The Reopening of the Russian-American Convention of 1824,” in Wash. Hist. Quart., XI, 83-88. Foreign writers have seen more plainly the imperialistic spirit of the Doctrine* D. M. Ketelby, AHi story of Modern Times from 1789 to the Present Day (London, 1929/>~357T Breve Hi st or ia de America, 663. T 3 — —.——— Adams, Memoirs, VI, 163 (July 17, 1823)* "1Z ~ — Adams, Memoir s, VI, 207* Adams, Memoir s, VI, 177, 178. England took steps alone to check French designs: the Polignac Memorandum was of more practical weight in Europe than the Monroe Doctrine. H. W. V. Temperley, The Foreign Policy; of Canning, 1822-1827, PP* 108- 110. “15 Temperley, Life of Canning, 188. XT— I. J. Cox, "The Pan-American Policy of Jefferson and Wilkinson,” in Miss. Valley Hist. Bev., I, 212-239; Cox, West Florida, 284-292. ~ 18 Adams to the Colombian envoy, August 6, 1324, cited by W. S. Robertson, ”South America and the Monroe Doctrine, 1824- 1828,” in Pol. Sc. Quart., XXX, 91 > 92. 1? J, F. Rippy, Latin America in World Politics, 86, 87; G. G. Johnson, “The Monroe Doctrine and the Panama Congress,” in James Sprunt Historical Studies, XIX, No. 2, pp. 53“73* 20 — — Zozaya to the Mexican government, December 26, 1822, in La Diplomacia Mexicana, I, 103* —— — J. H. Latand, The United States and Latin America, 86, 87 ; — — — _ Hippy, Rivalry of the United States and Great Britain. 80-82. — — — “53 — Miles* Register, XXIV, 113. ~ __ — _ _ The bill as finally passed was toothless. W. R. Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations be tween the United State s and Mexico, 104. On the whole subject see Manning’s excellent chapter on "Cuba Saved to Spain," in ibid., 89-165• 25 London Courier in 1825, quoted in J. M. Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, 140. 26 J. W. Pratt, “The Origin of ’Manifest Besting, ’" in Am. Hist. Rev., XXXII, 795-795. — See J. C. Bell’s chapter on ’’Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley, 1840-1845,” in Opening of a Highway to the Pacific (Columbia University Studies, XCVI), 116-131. R. E. Riegel, in America Moves West (1930), thinks it "possible to view the westward movement as a search for mental and spiritual values as much as an endeavor to seek economic opportunity.” But, if carried very far, does this not seem to be putting the cart before the horse-- ideals before their cause? W. P. Webb, History of the Great Plains. _ Poinsett’s description in 1830, in J. Stuart, Three Years in North America (1833)» 11, 31 Quoted by Ketelby, A History of Modern Time s, f>6o, 561. roinsett’s Reply to the remonstrance of the State of Mexico, 1829, in Niles 1 Register, XXXVII, 91-93- 33 Ugarte, The Destiny of a Continent (1923), translated by C. A. Phillips and edited with an introduction by J. P. Rippy in 1925, pp* 12?, 139, 140. CHAPTER VI ADAMS, EXPANSIONISM AND SLAVERY Adams strongly maintained in 1818 the justice "of our unquestionable right to the Rio Grande” as the western boundary, and in June wrote that "several documents confirmative of our claim to the Rio Bravo have been transmitted to the Department, and I have so thoroughly convinced myself that it is just, that by my good will the offer shall never again be made to Spain which she has slighted, of taking the Colorado for the western boundary at the Gulf. I would henceforth never recede an inch from the Bravo. When he was told in the following February that many Senators would oppose the Florida treaty, he said, "Send us back the treaty, and we would try if we could do better." In 1836-- defending himself against the charge that he had ceded Texas gratuitously in 1819— he disparaged our Trench claim to Texas, a land to which he had once declared our right "entire and unbroken.” ”It was no right. It was a claim of all the territory to the Rio del Korte, when, in fact, there never had been a division of that territory, or an adjustment of that claim with another and much better authenticated adverse claim of Spain.” "Still we made the best of the claim that we could, and finally yielded it for the Floridas, and for the line of the 42d degree of latitude.” That was merely patriotism. 3 His metamorphosis of attitude towards the acquisition of Texas was caused by acquired hostility towards the. South, the West, Jackson, and slavery. Did he experience, however, a deep change of conviction with regard to the justice of our Texas claim? A slight scrutiny of his career brings out his shiftiness and seems to show that the mere justice of a claim or statement convenient to make had no great importance in his eye. He could argue cheerfully an insufficient, or erroneous but plausible, case if political ends could be served thereby. A rabid, imperialist when he was Monroe’s Secretary of State, Adams reverted to his former ardent imperialism during the Oregon crisis of 1845-46. After the fight against Texas annexation had been lost, he now reasserted the adequacy of our Texas claim through La Salle 1 s colony, confessing again that a conviction of its superior merits had not been an indispensable preliminary to pressing it strongly against Spain. Few more thorough creeds of imperialism are found than that in Adams’s letter to Brantz Mayer on the Florida 4 treaty. He begins: "Whoever sets out with an inquiry respecting the right of territories in the American hemisphere claimed by Europeans, must begin by settling certain conventional principles of right and wrong before he can enter upon the discussion." Then follow historical illustrations to show that ’’right” to territory comes only from conquest and the power to hold The good old rule, the simple plan That he may take who has the power, And he may keep who can. The will of the strong, called "right," is the "law* of European nations, euphemistically ’’called the lav/ of nations... Have the Carribee Indians, in whose possession that Island was discovered by Columbus, ever assented to that system of right and wrong?" Adams implied that in the possession of colonial territory by European nations nothing sacred existed to forbid seizures by other powers; that no further "right" accrued to the possessing nation from a period of occupation « Stolen property does not change its nature with the passage of time. Adams was no doubt right historically: nothing but a growing antipathy in Europe towards the unsettled conditions of continual warfare induced the nations to agree on a goldenrule "law of priority" pretending a sacred "right" to the first possessor of conquered territory. Adams had always wished to draw an indelible line between the New World and the Old, and had scant respect for the "conventional principles" of Europe; they need have no moral weight with us. Such was the convention among the European powers not to disturb each other’s colonies for the avowed purpose of dispossession. "What then was the right either of Erance or Spain to the possession of the province of Texas?... Spain had prior claims to the country, but the claim of France was founded on the last voyage of La Salle, and by extending a supposed derivative right, from the spot where La Salle landed half way to the nearest Spanish settlement. Mr. Monroe and Mr. Charles Pinckney, in their correspondence with Cevallos, assumed this as a settled principle between European nations, in the dis- cussion of right to American territory. It was not contested, but was not assented to on the part of Spain; and ... I argued upon it, and it was never directly answered by Pon Luis de Onis, who could not controvert it without going to the Pope’s Bull [of donation and demarcation]. As between Prance and Spain therefore, I maintained that the question of right, had always been disputed and never was settled, from which opinion I have not since varied... [After the Plorida treaty] Great Britain had not a shadow of right upon the Oregon territory until we have been pleased to confer it upon her,” in Adams was exasperated in 1818 by Spain’s “pretension of engrossing to herself the whole American hemisphere," and reminded Onis that the source of Spanish possession and right was brutal conquest: "You recall to mind with exultation, as if pointing to the most splendid monuments of Spanish glory, the ferociousness with which they attacked, and made prisoners, and put to death, and overthrew, dissipated and destroyed... settlements” in making the Spanish Empire. ”To all such pretensions on the part of Spain,... the United States can never accede." In the Oregon debate Adalis cited a significant European precedent; "After negotiating for twenty years about this matter we may take possession of the subject matter of negotiation. Indeed, we may negotiate after we take possession, and this is the military way of doing business. When Frederick the Great came to the throne of Prussia he found that his father had equipped for him an army of a hundred thousand men.... (Frederick says in his Memoir sfj 1 1 had some excellent old pretensions to an Austrian province, which some of my ancestors owned one or two centuries before; accordingly I sent an ambassador to the court of Austria stating my claim, and presenting a full exposition of my right to the province. The same day my ambassador was received in Vienna, I entered 7 Silesia with my army.** The futility of legal and moral principles in settling the possession of Hew World territory was again asserted in one of Adams r s lectures in 1844, which pronounced a verdict of sophistry on the self-righteous exterioi’ of his own diplomacy and afforded the foreign critic "a fair instance of the I'll lowness of American diplomacy, in this echo from one of its most 8 noisy mouthpieces." In the dehate on Texas in January, 1845, the venerable statesman exposed the Jeffersonian philosophy of claims, which he himself had carried on as Secretary of State without a qualm: w We have some claim (says Mr. Jefferson) to go to the Rio del Korte, and a better to run as far east as the Perdido. What is the difference in a land claim, asked Mr. Adams, between some claim and a better? (Laughter.) Mr. Jefferson said, also, that if we take advantage of the war in which Spain was engaged, we should get Florida, the good claim, if we did not get the other. As to the argument that by the cession of Louisiana, the people of Texas acquired rights which it was not competent for the United States to deprive them of, it was plain that all this was an afterthought., a mere device conjured up for the occasion.*’ Thus he spoke forgetfully. That we could not ignore the Texans* rights under the treaty of 1803, says Beverly Tucker, a judge in Missouri in 1819, ’’was the universal sentiment of the far West at the time, and on that sentiment most of those who migrated to Texas acted in taking that important step. I remember being present at a meeting of the most intelligent gentlemen of St. Louis one night in the Theatre, where the matter was discussed, and the Treaty condemned by an unanimous 9 vote, on that ground.” Onis, who little expected to be able to keep Texas from the United States, naturally desired the limits of New Mexico defined ”so as to separate the Americans as far as possible from these priceless possessions." But why Monroe should yield Texas needs explanation. Olay heard that Texas was virtually offered Uy Onis to Adams, "but that less was taken, because the Spanish minister declared, if he went up to his instructions, he should be afraid of some personal injury upon his return home. Wat will you in the west think of the wisdom of that policy which consents to surrender an important part of our territory from such a There was, no doubt, nothing to this: Adams was not soft-hearted when our interest was at stake; and he yielded Texas most reluctantly. We are better informed by Calhoun and Judge Henry Baldwin of the Federal Supreme Court that Rufus King, Thomas Pickering, and other restriction! st Congressmen from the Northeast sought Monroe and Adams privately when the Florida treaty was being negotiated and demanded that Texas be yielded, wherefore it 12 was done* King, the most outspoken and determined of these men, believed that ”of lands in the west, we have already more than enough”; "The demands and strength of the West are increasing daily, and the vigorous decision and union of the old States decrease in a fully equal The exclusion or cession of Texas in 1819 was thus a part of that determined movement by the restrictionists against the addition to the Union of new Southwestern territory or states-- a movement in which at the time anti-slavery was very largely merely a convenient argument or pretext, helping to conceal the political motive. During the Missouri struggle King boldly proclaimed its political or sectional nature; in his statements against Texas in 1819 we have seen plainly that his blows were aimed at the growing political power of the Southwest. True, in 1820-- when ’’the turbulent men of the west ... desire and would gladly engage in a Spanish war”-- he naturally would write: w the Spanish province of Texas, will now be demanded of 14 Spain so as there to form a fifth slave state.” Again, King referred to Texas as ”a Region desired foi* new slave States, and more frontier on the Gulph-- neither of these objects are desirable by £to] the Union. Many Southerners, knowing well whence the fatal blast blew, believed that Monroe yielded Texas not merely to allay the dangerous sectional strife but to gain Northern votes for re-election; these calculations similarly influenced him in his acceptance of the Missouri Compromise so unfavorable to the South, particularly as a legal precedent. The North got decidedly the lion’s share of the Texas-Missouri Compromise. President Monroe felt that apologies for the Florida treaty were in order, and sent an identic explanation to a number of friends. Some men, like Jefferson, were unaware that Texas had been ceded to Spain without necessity and rejoiced that Spain’s delay in ratifying the treaty afforded an opportunity to gain by force what diplomacy had not won. Jefferson wrote May 14, 1820: M I confess to you lam not sorry for the non-ratification of the Spanish treaty. Our assent to it has proved our desire to be on friendly terms with Spain; their dissent, the imbecility and malignity of their government towards us... to us the province of Techas will be the richest State of our Union, without any exception... The treaty has had the valuable effect of strengthening our title to the Techas, because the cession of the Floridas imports an acknowledgement of our right to it. This province moreover, the Floridas and possibly Cuba, will join us on the acknowledge-17 ment of their independence.” But the reasons for the cession of Texas still largely existing, Monroe replied: If the occurrence involved in it nothing more than a question between the United States and Spain... I should entirely concur in your view of the subject. I am satisfied ... we might take Florida as an indemnity and Texas for some trifle as an equivalent. Spain must soon be expelled from this Continent, and with any new government which may be formed in Mexico, it would be easy to arrange the boundary... so as to include as much territory on our side as we might desire. No European power could prevent this if so disposed. But the difficulty does not proceed from these sources. It is altogether internal, and of the most distressing nature and dangerous tendency. Monroe reviewed the restrictive activities of the New England Federalists against the growth of the West since 17Q% when they had been willing to risk disunion by bartering away the navigation of the Mississippi to secure commercial privileges and their own dominance: Happily it failed.... The river has been opened and all the territory dependent upon it acquired; eight States have already been admitted to the Union in that quarter; a ninth is on the point of entering and a tenth provided for, exclusive of Florida. This march to greatness has been seen with profound regret by them (Eastern Federalists]... but it lias been impelled by causes over which they have had no control.... They did not hesitate to avow (in the Missouri struggle} that it was a contest for power only, disclaiming the pretext of liberty, humanity, etc. It was also manifested that they were willing to risk the Union on the measure, if indeed, as in that relating to the Mississippi, dismemberment was not the principal object. You know how this affair terminated... that complete success was prevented by the patriotic devotion of several members of the non-slaveholding States... to ... the Union.... From this view, it is evident that the further acquisition of territory to the West and South involves difficulties of an internal nature which menace the Union itself. We ought, therefore, to be captious in making the attempt. Having secured the Mississippi, all its waters, with slight exception 0n1y,... ought we not to be satisfied... to take no step in that direction which is not approved by all the members, or at least a majority, of those who accomplished our revolut Perhaps had the great difficulty that soon arose in the path of ”re-acquisition” been foreseen Monroe would not have yielded Texas. He wrote to Gallatin on May 26, 1820: ’’lndeed, so strong is the inclination in some to seize Texas particularly, that I should not be surprised if we should be compelled to act on that principle, and without a treaty... Internal considerations, of which the discussion of the late Missouri question will have given you a just view, are favorable to moderate pretensions on our part. With me they have much weight, as I am persuaded they have with many others. The reason for the loss of Texas was fairly well known to many politicians* Waddy Thompson said in 1836; “It was said, at the time that treaty was made,... that a leading motive for ceding to Spain this valuable territory was to prevent the addition which it would make to the slaveholding interest.* Thus John Floyd soon wrote his Virginia constituents that Texas had been given away by a Southern administration because ~ . , x , _ . ~ 20 it might become slave territory. The Southwest came near forcing the administration to repudiate the Florida treaty. Many of the high-spirited Southerners preferred disunion to acceptance of the Missouri Compromise, or capitulation, even Clay saying privately that he would lead the South off to an independent destiny should Missouri be refused admittance as a slave sta,te ; to lose Texas because of Northern opposition was too much. It was well indeed for the integrity of the Union that the New England restrictionists did not openly oppose, as they did secretly, the incorporation of Texas. The mind of the Attorney-General, William Wirt, turned to our great Florida filibuster, for he thought Texas should be seized, as well as Florida, and ’•Virgil’s coalt... in a rich meadow, would not enjoy the luxurious frolic more than Jackson would, to be turned loose into the Spanish Provinces, Cuba included.... Suppose you drop this hint to Congress.” As Monroe said, it was not external considerations that largely cautioned moderation: Gallatin from Paris had encouraged the idea of occupying Texas, writing October 26, 1819: "It is altogether impossible... to calculate how far the United States may go without provoking a declaration of war on the part of Spain. She is weak, but proud.... So far as I can judge, I think the occupation of what is called the province of Texas and of any part of Florida... would be acquiesced in.” 412 In November of 1819 Monroe read to his cabinet a preliminary draft of a message containing a recommendation that Congress consider the Florida treaty valid and take possession, and suggesting ’’the propriety of occupying the territory between the Sabine and the Rio Bravo” in case Spain assumed a hostile attitude-- a "hint” which was struck out for a passage "more A declaration of war by Spain would probably have been welcomed; but Spain, of course, found her policy in inactivity and procrastination, leaving to us the invidious task oi aggression. In April of 1820, David Trimble of Ohio urged Adams to Join Clay f s policy-- "set the treaty aside and urge the recognition of the Spanish American revolutionists, and insist upon the Rio del Norte as the we stern boundary.” Adams replied that he would never be popular in the West and that he "was the last vho had consented to take the Sabine for our western boundary. I had no doubt that if the treay should be set aside we should ultimately obtain more territory ... but we should get the same territory with the treaty sooner than we should want it; and even now I thought the greatest danger of this Union was in the overgrown extent of its territory, combining with the slavery question. I added as my belief, that there would be a majority of the House of Representatives now who would, not accept of the province of Texas as a gift unless slavery should be excluded from it. Since the Missouri debate, I considered the continuance of the Union for any length of time as very precarious, and entertained doubts whether Louisiana and slavery would not ultimately break it up.” He told Trimble the Florida treaty could "very easily” be discarded, but that it was really a good treaty. ”We had a mere color of claim to the Rio del Korte, no claim to a line beyond the Rocky Mountains, and none to Florida, which we very much wanted.... Now, negotiation implies some concession upon both sides. If after obtaining every object of your pursuit but one, and that of no present value, what would you have offered to Spain to yield that also?” Trimble had no answer to this reasonable talk; but still he disliked it. And Adams himself was comparatively moderate towards Spain only from compulsion. Trimble agreed that slavery might break up the Union— into three confederacies. Clay had said that witain five years there would be three confederacies, North, South, and West, so Adams heard; ”but why there should be precisely three” Adams could not see.^ 4 Spain’s delay in ratifying the settlement even after the final failure to procure England’s armed assistance against the United States was calculated to deter us from recognizing the revolted Pretexts for delay were found in Long’s filibuster into Texas, which was held to have been connived at by the American government, and in the American interpretation of the treaty clause concerning Florida land grants (the Spanish king having made large grants to his favorites on the eve of the But Spain soon saw that delay would be more dangerous than the risk of American recognition of her former colonies-- a recognition which did indeed immediately follow Spain’s ratification. When the recovery of Texas was undertaken in 1825 hy President Adams and Secretary of State Clay the situation in Texas was considerably altered, ho longer existed the almost unbroken wilderness of 1819* In September, 1820, the Cortes of Spain ended the policy of exclusion and threw open the Spanish dominions as a refuge to all. Cuba had already been 27 opened in 181?. Liberal independent Mexico approving this, Mases Austin of Missouri, an old Spanish citizen, was granted permission to bring in a number of colonists; and his son, Stephen F. Austin, carried on the work, overcoming Mexican 27' reluctance and other great obstacles. The settlement of Texas naturally increased Mexico’s determination to hold the province and keep it from her grasping northern neighbor. Americans had in 1819 considered the renunciation of Texas temporary, viewing the Spanish lands as a preserve for expansion ever at hand; they admitted Mexican rights in Texas most grudgingly. "It was inevitable that the policy of the United States should become anti-Mexican in time, since Mexico pos-28 sessed what next to Florida the Union most craved-- Texas.** And then the Union craved California and other territory. In 1823 the Mexican Minister wrote: ”My opinion is that some agents from New Orleans are intending to plant colonies of Anglo-Americans in Texas with the same object which they have accomplished in Baton Rouge, namely, that of acquiring influence and majority in the population and forcing the inhabitants to declare that they desire to be annexed to the United States.* Judge Tucker and others tell us that many Ameri- cans went to Texas with the idea of future annexation to the United States; and in the same spirit a company of young men who met Governor Pope of Arkansas as they were journeying to aid the Texas Revolution told him that they were "going to Texas to fight for their rights.*^ 0 In the late part of 1822 Mexico sent a secret agent into Texas to ascertain the 31 extent of American influence. The American government gave Mexico good cause for apprehension. Though Mexico immediately asked that the validity of the boundary of 1819, made while Mexico was revolting from Spain, be acknowledged, the administration at Washington evaded. Moreover, the Mexican Minister savz a tendency among the state legislatures to claim Texas; and our southern neighbor would have been much more apprehensive had she known we had refused to join England in a self-denying ordinance in 1823 so as not to hinder our future acquisition of Texas and The Mexican government in 1824 instructed its Minister, Obregon, that the United States had designs on California, Hew Mexico and Texas. And our first Minister to Mexico, Joel R. Poinsett, did avow unofficially that the United States would like to have not only Texas but Upper California and Uew Mexico and parts of Lower California, Sonora, Coahuila, and Uuevo Leon-- whereupon he was told that Mexico would never cede a handbreadth of His "modest" aims seem to have been to obtain rich mineral lands, to get ports on both seas for controlling commerce, to monopolize the fur trade with the Indians, to control the California fisheries, and regulate the coasting trade on every coast. Seeing no hope, Poinsett advised his government to wait until further Americanization of Texas should cause Mexico "not to be so averse to part with that portion of their territory as they are at present." In conjunction with Clay f s diplomacy Senator Benton wrote tt re-annexationist” articles in the prints to encourage pub- _ . . . 34 lie opinion. Secretary Clay again in 182? instructed Poinsett to try to get Texas, when it was thought that the Fredonian Rebellion, which had begun late in 1826, might have loosened the Mexican grasp. Still there was no more hope of a sale. J> In June, 1827> in that part of the region south of the Red River the national ownership of which had not been determined by survey, Charles Burkman, a self-styled Captain in the Mexican service, issued a proclamation in which, claiming authority from the Mexican government to attack the murderous Comanches in West Texas, he invited recruits, promising spoils and large compensation from the Mexican government. Governor Izard of Arkansas promptly notified the American government of this plan so much resembling a filibuster, and Clay replied that any citizen of Arkansas proposing to join the illegal expedition would be prosecuted. This stands in contrast with the next President’s neutrality policy on the Mexican border. Comanche punishment seems not to have been the real object in Burkinan* s view. **When the conviction became fixed in the minds of most of those who had enlisted that the real purpose of the enterprise was to plunder caravans conveying silver from Santa Pe to Mexico City, they disbanded and the expedition collapsed.**^ 0 Probably the movement was inspired by the abortive Predonian Rebellion in Texas. Poinsett would have had no chance of purchasing Texas even if the British Minister to Mexico, H. G. Ward, had not exerted all his preventive influence by stimulating Mexican fears of American designs. Ward observed that Poinsett intrigued with Zavala and ”took measures for the purpose of obtaining such a party in the Mexican congress as would consent to let them have Texas for a certain number of dollars.** This failed.ln Mexico Ward freely, as he informed his government, expressed the ’’conviction, both publicly and privately, that the great end of MT. Poinsett's Mission ... is to embroil Mexico in a Civil War, and to facilitate ... the Acquisition of the Provinces to the North of the Rio Bravo.”-* Did he believe this? Probably not. In 1826 Poinsett obtained a commercial treaty, but it was repeatedly rejected by the Mexican Congress because it contained no clause confirming the boundary of 1819* The upshot was that Poinsett finally agreed to that line in 1828 in order to secure the commercial treaty. The boundary treaty was promptly ratified by our Senate in April, but Mexico delayed and the treaty was still unratified when Jackson took office. The Adams administration never considered repudiating the line of 1819: Poinsett’s first instructions, March 26, 182 J, stated that the Spanish treaty ’’having been concluded when Mexico composed a part of the dominions of Spain is obligatory upon the United States and Mexico.” The United States merely wanted a new and better boundary. Poinsett had. an eye to private interest in Mexico* He had scarcely reached Mexico when he wrote Cambreleng of New York: "Fortunes will he made and lost in mining-- It is gambling-- There are still open some of the most profitable speculations, more of that anon-- Could a company with a capital of 100,000 be formed with a certain prospect of a profitable investment? I have been writing to the honble Henry Clay until my fingers are cramped." 39 Later Poinsett became a Texas land empresario in partnership with Zavala, as did his successox 1 likewise. Speculation of a pecuniary nature, after his political speculations, could not have added to his unpopularity, and he finally left his post in 1829* attended by “execrations loud and deep** from every quarter, which could not have been wholly unjustified. His smooth successor, Anthony Butler, was more fortunate until the last days of his long mission, when he removed his gloves in handling one or two enemies. Adams having failed dismally to purchase Texas during his term, his diary is silent on the subject until February, 1832. Then, on hearing of one of President Jackson*s views concerning Texas and his efforts to buy it, he believed that Jackson “would not get it by treaty with Mexico**: “I believed the increasing settlements in Texas were all from this country, and that the inhabitants would prefer to belong to the United States rather than to Mexico, and it might perhaps be taken, as Florida was taken in 1812* But there would be one diffi- 4C culty in it, as slavery had been established in that country.” Adams presents a true picture in comparing Texas to Florida-- a scene of conquest by penetration followed up by diplomatic manoeuvres. Many doubtless v/ent to Texas expecting it to fall to the United States; the bolder were ready discreetly to aid the process. Adams in 1832 shows no animosity towards a probable revolution in Texas motivated by a desire for annexation and the fact that Texas "might be taken, as Florida was taken in 1812.” He seems still to favor the annexation, but notes that slavery will make Texas less easy to acquire because of the restrictionist opposition, in 1836, when Texas is next mentioned in his diary, the "old man eloquent" is heading the opponents of Texas and imperialism. What worked this great change? It is usually said, off-hand, that Adams took up his active opposition to slavery in disinterested defense of the constitutional right of petition. Too sudden was his practical conversion to anti-slavery to be associated by even his blindest admirers with merely moral motives. His defense of a citizen’s right of petition against the "gag resolution" was not the commencement, however, but the continuation of his new departure in 1836, for he had already attacked Texas on slavery grounds. His course must be ascribed to personal and sectional political motives, and fundamentally to the bitter hatred of the South and West and Jacksonism which he acquired after 182?. This may be briefly viewed, for Adams is representative of many Northern men on the Texas question. Adams*s administration was neither pleasant nor successful, and its woes sprang not so much from its own deficiencies as from the constant obstruction of "Jackson 1 s friends’* of the South and West. That Adams and Clay came in by "corrupt bargain" was the partisan cry of this opposition, which for four years ceased not to embarrass and villify the administration at every step. Discredit was heaped on Adams’s measures of "consolidation," which were or became unacceptable to the South and West. The debacle beginning in 1828 more than realized Adams’s fearful premonitions; Internal improvements, national bank, and the other things Adams stood for went under the iron heel of Jacksonism. Pugnacious and full of Puritan self-righteousness, Adams could not view the "vagaries" of untutored democracy under Jackson with philosophic calm and resignation. The overwhelming defeat by Jackson in 1828 was bitter: Jackson was a "barbarian" who had returned to him evil for good. The period of presidency and defeat was the nadir of tragedy: "it injected into his mind the first doubt as to whether there were a God, and whether this life had a purpose." All of the Adamses of the last century subscribed to the pessimistic view of the historian Henry Adams: "I see the age of Andrew Jackson and the cotton planters much as I see the age of the Valois or Honorious, — that is with profound 40 z horror . * Adams took a seat in the House in December of 1831, "with an assurance to the constituents... that I should hold myself hound in allegiance to no party, whether sectional or political. ••• The Jacksonian project of dismembering Mexico for the acquisition of Texas, already organized and in full operation, was yet profoundly secret. I entered Congress without one sentiment of discrimination between the interests of the Korth 41 and South. * But he became more and more alienated from the Jacksonian regime; and his utterances in 1835-36, in the fullness of misery and revolt, show that his ruling 'passion had become an intense hatred of Southern and Western policies, personified in the Tennessee President-- a jealous hatred demanding the overthrow or discredit of the ruling power. Towards slavery he had been almost indifferent; to agitation he had been opposed. But slavery was now to present a convenient 42 point through which to strike the dominant South-West. Jackson’s high-handed policy of removing the Indians from their lands east of the Mississippi— a policy marked by unscrupu- 43 lousness and attended by hostilities-- was a phase of im- perialism in the Southwest which helped turn Adams away in Anger and aversion* Jackson’s revolutionary '’reform 0 regime partly caused Adams to join the obstructive anti-slavery forces in May of 1836; but besides jealous hatred of Southwestern dominance and ire at ’’the gratuitous and ill requiting enmity of President Jackson,” he' had another strong motive, as we shall see-- desire to ensure re-election to his seat in Congress, which was increasingly threatened by the rising anti-slavery power 44 in Massachusetts. Coming on the heels of the Seminole and Cherokee affairs, the Texas Revolution in the autumn of 1835, aided, as it was, by bands of emigrating Americans, and involving a new questionable phase of Indian policy on the frontier, offered Adams-- hitherto a derelict in Congressional politics-- a good opportunity to begin anew his political life and strike a telling blow at Southwestern power, by checking its long triumphant trend of expansion# The once aggressive imperialist still approved of the Louisiana Purchase-- and well he might after the Missouri Compromise# "But ... it is no pleasing consideration to find that while our boundary has been constantly advancing on the south it has been receding at the north. It was Southwestern expansion, rather than im- perialism in the abstract, that annoyed him so. The imperial- ism characteristic of American expansion was now merely Achilles* heel. Adams had long noted the paucity of anti-slavery men in Congress and the fact that in general the members of Congress from the free states were not "able to cope in powers of the mind" with the array of distinguished Southern leaders. A believer in "the natural liberty of man," he cried in his diary in 1320, though he took no part in the Missouri struggle: Oh, if but one man could arise with a genius capable of comprehending, a heart capable of supporting, and an utterance capable of communicating those eternal truths that belong to this question, to lay bare in all its nakedness that outrage upon the goodness of God, human slavery, now is the time, and this is the occasion, upon which such a man would perform the duties of an angel upon In 1836, as in 1820, Congress was still ruled by Southern men and "doughfaces."47 The f ew anti-slavery men were not only of little fame and consequence as against the great Southern array-- men such as Preston, Wise, McDuffie, Clay, Calhoun, Benton, and Waddy Thompson-- but were viewed as fanatic nuisances quite out of place in Congress. Yet the antislavery spirit was growing rapidly in the .North, and especially the northeast, despite and because of persecution-- taking new strength, for instance, from Calhoun’s effort in 1835 to forbid the sending of antislavery matter in the mails. And it lacked an able political leader to direct its energies and give it impetus, astute leader might advance far his own fame and the cause of freedom. Here was a vast opportunity for an ambitious politician who was practical and already had fame and influence-- in "virgin territory.” Although Adams’s new departure was not altogether distinterested or voluntary, he cannot be denied a moral motive, among others. "This is a cause,” he exclaimed on June 19, 1836, "which I am entering at the last stage of my life.... To open the way for others is all that I can do. The cause is good and The arrival of news in early May of General E. P. Gaines’s war-like attitude on the Texas border and the proposed appropriation for Indian defense-- which seemed to have Texas in view-- gave Adams his opportunity. On May 7 he opposed our assumption of the Texas *proslavery” war against Mexico, for tt lt seems that General Gaines considers this a war in defense 49 of *our Texians. * M ' He denounced it as a movement to re- establish slavery in Texas, but says: Have we not seen American citizens going from all parts of the country to carry on the war of this province against the united Government of Mexico? Who were those who fell at Alamo? Who are now fighting under the command of the hero of Texian fame? And have we not been called upon in this House, to recognize Texian independence? The introduction of anti-slavery petitions had been assailed by Southern men since January, and on May 18 the "gag resolution" was reported in the House* The Southerners were urging the immediate recognition and annexation of Texas, and on May 23 Calhoun-- whose frankness often injured his cause— boldly advocated it on grounds of augmenting Southern power. Benton saw in Calhoun’s speech a "design to make the Texas question 49/ an element in the impending election." Adams was impressed above all by the aim of making the Southern political power permanently dominant by this reinforcement. ’’Mexico had abolished slavery,” he told his c onst ituent s, "but Teixas had restored it and made it irrevocable. Ten States, with each a population exceeding that of Virginia, might be carved out oi this territory, and place on immoveable foundations the «5o supremacy of the slave-holding power. The almost simultaneous appearance of the “gag resolution 1 illustrated the domineering nature of the Southern power. On May 2J Adams delivered a great philippic against Texas and her Revolution-- in reality against the Southwestern expansion which threatened. The Texas Revolution was with its American "background susceptible of being portrayed in the deepest olack, as a Southern movement. Sam Houston, who had moved to Texas in December, 1832, with Jackson’s blessing, was easily pictured as the intriguing President’s agent sent to instigate revolution in Texas. Adams’s web of insinuations was gratefully accepted in certain quarters as the quintessence of truth, and was long repeated in our histories. But recent hisuox ians usually point to Adams’s '’absurd tissue” as indicative of a sad lack of critical judgment in him, a tendency in him to distort and self-delude. It is no longer thought that the Texas colonists carried slaves to Texas to extend slavery or that slavery was more than a minor or remote cause oi tne Revolu- 51 tion. But it seems probable that Adams was not, as naive and ingenious as is often believed. It is unlikely that he sincerely believed his dark insinuations of a pro-slavery intrigue, or thought that Houston caused the Revolution. He probably uttered these insinuations for their extrinsic or strategic value-- because they would serve as a weapon against the political foe and proclaim their author as a regenerated Northern man. He told his friend John M. Botts of Virginia that he was now fighting the foe with his own weapons, the devil with fire. Lord Chesterfield found pupils even among puritans. Perhaps Adams’s severe moral arraignment of the "bold, bad** Jackson gave him an incidental revenge somewhat pre meditated• Botts, a foe of slavery, gives us an intimate view of Adams’s mind when he delivered his extraordinary speech. Botts says: 10?. Adams had made a speech in which he had given utterance to sentiments on the subject of slavery which did not correspond with the views he had been supposed to entertain; for up to that time he had made himself obnoxious to the Abolition party in his district, and they had on several occasions brought forward an Abolition candidate against him. Of the speech of Calhoun on Texas Botts adds: He openly proclaimed that the great oojecu of the annexation was for the expansion of slave teriitory, and consequent increase and continuance of power to the Democracy of the South, and this it as I had it from his own lips, that first drove John Quincy Adams into the ranks of the Abolition party. On the adjournment of the House Botts walked down from the Capitol conversing with Adams, who made now still stronger remarks against slavery. Botts ventured to say that Adams did not really mean all that he implied. "Yes,” replied Adams, I said it deliberately and purposely.” "But, Mr. Adams,'* said Botts, "you are not an Abolitionist.” "Yes, I am,” said Adams* I have never been one until now; but when I see tne Constitution of my country struck down by the South, for such purposes a.s are openly avowed, no alternative is left me; I must oppose them with all the means within my reach; I must fight the devil with his own fire; and/to do this effectually, 1 am obliged with the Abolition party, who have been hateful to me heretofore. If the*South had consulted her true interests, and followed your counsels on. the 21st rule and on this Texas question, their institutions would never have been endangered by the Korth; but if matters are to take the shape foreshadowed by Mr. Calhoun and other s of the Democratic party, then no one can foretell what may be the consequences. It was probably in this conversation that Botts learned that the Abolitionists "had on several occasions brought forward an Abolition candidate" against Adams in his district. It was a threat that might well cause the ex-President anxiety, and seem to demand a potent remedy. ”A large share of Mr. Birney’s attention,” it is written of that prominent Abolitionist, "was devoted to legislative bodies... and he obtained a hearing everywhere. ” Determined to advance political abolitionism, ”he used fully the agencies under his control to influence public opinion in the Congressional districts represented by John Quincy Adams and by William Slade, of Vermont.*’ James G. Birney himself says in speaking of Adams’s sudden profession of sympathy with the Abolitionists: The abolitionists in electing Mr. Adams made him their own witness, hoping, like an eager but inexperienced litigant, that his testimony would be favorable to them, because he was heard to speak freely of the bad character of their adversary. And again: ”Mt. Adams owes much of his present popularity-- may I not say nearly all-- to his connection with the antislavery agitation. Abolitionists have contributed more than any other class of people to swell the tide of his His contemporaries testify abundantly that, .although not a good political manager of large campaigns, Adams was certainly an astute politician quick to note the changing and rising tides of public opinion and just as quick to utilize them. So good an authority as William H. Seward, biographer and avowed •disciple of Adams,” privately believed that his hero adopted anti-slavery as a "practical politician* in order to remain in Congress. Mentioning to Charles F. Adams the “failure" of Benton, Clay and other conservatives, many of whom lost their seats in Congress because of the rising slavery issue, Seward added that "unless a man can come out on some new course in this country, appear in some new character, as did J. Q. Adams, he must fail as those men failed. As compared with J. Q. Adams, Calhoun was a man of talent and originality; but he was visionary; whereas Mr. Adams ... was a practical statesman ... who ... loved combat for combat’s sake." 7 Thus when on May 26, 1836, the "gag resolution” was passed-- the day after his Texas philippic-- Adams cried in the House: * I hold the resolution a direct violation of the Constitution of the United States, of the rules of this House, and of the rights of my constituents.” He had now a new interest in ”my constituents,” partly to mollify whom he stepped into the lists against slavery. Of his new, humanitarian career we shall note merely that he proved much less advanced hereafter in the Abolitionists 1 cause than they were induced to expect by his first expressions against slavery. Birney bitterly complained that he had virtually betrayed them: “But the upshot of the matter is that everything substantial in his testimony is favorable to their adversary. To them he gives words-- words-- words. Was this because all his constituents were not friends of abolition and because he was striving (but with futility against Webster’s influence) to gain a seat in the Senate? Benjamin Lundy, who made several trips to Mexico to arrange for a free-negro colony, chanced conveniently to witness the outbreak of the Revolution in Texas, "or rather the invasion of brigands from the United States.” The natural fact that the ’’brigands" came largely from the South seemed more significant to him. Leaving for the East in November of 1835, he began an awful denunciation of the Revolution, publishing a book called The War in Texas;... showing that this Contest is the re suit of a Long Premediated crusade against the Government set on foot by Slaveholder s. In his diary he wrote: "Just about this time, the opportunity presented itself, of exposing with the co-operation of John Quincy Adams, the vile projects of the Texan invaders.” Lor his "writings attracted the attention of John Quincy Adams, and led to an acquain- mattered little to Adams if this editor of the rabid and intermittent Genius of Universal Emancipation was no discriminating observer or just purveyor of hearsay. Adams, seeking inspiration, had a “will to believe.” In his second and great speech denouncing the Texas "proslavery* war and the Indian wars Adams rebuked the idea that the territory of Texas would be of use to the United States* To annex it would be to assume the conflict with Mexico and probably bring on war with England and perhaps with France. It would be followed by a war for the conquest of Cuba. Imperialism feeds on itself. "What would be the condition of your frontier from the mouth of the Mississippi to that of the Rio del Norte, in the event of a war with Great Britain?” Monroe’s reasons for yielding our claim to Texas in 1819> he said, had been three: the weakness of our claim, the fact that Texas would give us a long indefensible coast and be seized by England in a war, and the fact that Texas would break up the Union. Adams declared that he had been the la,st to yield it. Now, however, it seems, the excellence of these reasons had at last dawned upon him. He declared that it was unconstitu- tional to acquire territory. Jefferson had said so in 18C3> and his evil precedent must have no weight. Of the Florida 97 precedent Adams said nothing. 4 He was arguing just as the tariff Nullifiers-- against established legal precedent. But the pristine constitution must be preserved# He threatened the South with wee should it bring on a foreign war: Fran the instant that your slaveholding states become the theatre of war, civil, servile, or foreign, from that instant the war powers of congress extent to interference with ... slavery in every way by which it can be interfered with, from a claim of indemnity for slaves taken or destroyed, to the cession of the state burdened with slavery to a foreign power. On which side of the slavery question Congress ought to interfere he intimated clearly: "your own southern and south western states must be the Flanders of these complicated wars, the battle field upon which the last great conflict must be fought between slavery and emancipation." Such a war was now in Texas, and the South wished to adopt it. Adams proclaimed the competence of the war power to abolish slavery again in speeches in 1841-42, citing South American precedents. Lincoln based his Emancipation Proclamation upon this theory aired by Adams. Patrick Henry had pointed out long before Adams, back in the Virginia convention which ratified the constitution, that slavery could and would be abolished by the Federal government under the war power: Have they not the power to provide for the general defense and welfare? May they not pronounce all slaves free? and will they not be warranted by that power? The paper £the constitution) speaks to the point; they have the power in clear, unequivocal terms, and will clearly and certainly exercise it.sB The idea was therefore not new in 1836-- except to Adams, who had written during the Missouri struggle with his habitual assurance: The British have broadly asserted the right of emancipating slaves-- private property-- as a legitimate right of war. Ko such right is acknowledged as a law of war by writers who admit any limitation. The right of putting to death all prisoners in cold blood, and without special cause, might as well be pretended to be a lav; of war. 59 Adams defended himself and the treaty of 1819 against the Jacksonian charge, made "by Waddy Thompson, that he had ceded away Texas, "by disparaging our French claim and insinuating that it had been impossible to secure Texas. He was ably criticized for this insincerity. But on a related point, in- volving him in a personal collision with the President, he came away with bright laurels. Carrying the war into the enemy's country, he declared that he had shown General Jackson the "unsigned treaty” in February, 1819, at the request of President Monroe: "General Jackson had the treaty before him with that boundary, and approved of it; and he (Mr. A.) did at last, and reluctantly, assent to it.” With what grace, then, could Jackson now become its critic and blame Adams exclusively for the loss of Texas? Jackson had really sanctioned the Sabine boundary. Adams’s use of the word ’♦treaty*’ was probably an unintentional slip, as its divergence from strict truth was as slight and utterly immaterial as it was unfortunate fox' its user. But it seemed to evince a faulty memory in Adams. Jackson seized on the slender pretext for equivocation to make a bold and unqualified public denial of having ever been consulted about the Sabine. He disclaimed ’’the slightest recollection” and could never have agreed to the Sabine. Blair’s Globe brought forth the dated proto- cols of February, 1819, to prove that the treaty had been as yet unconcluded when Adams had “shown* it to Jackson. In short, Adams seemed to be a liar. Blair plainly said so. Jackson would probably have uttered his denial even if no opportunity for an equivocation had been presented. Unworthy of him, certainly-- but characteristic, seemingly. He fancied himself safe from exposure, since Monroe was dead: the President’s word was surely as weighty as Adams’s. But, alas, Adams’s diary was forgotten or overlooked. The "old man eloquent * announced to the House that he was sending to Braintree, Massachusetts, for incontestable proof of his own veracity thus challenged by Jackson and of the President’s falsehood. He could well endure the premature exultation which, perhaps with some inner trembling, reigned for seven days in the Jacksonian camp. For the diary brought retribution on the eighth day, the entries for February 1-3, 1819, proving that Adams’s claim was substantially correct beyond a reasonable doubt. It proved that Adams had shown Jackson not the “treaty,” indeed, but a map indicating the western boundary as Monroe meant to fix it in the treaty-- that is, the Sabine, Red River, Arkansas, and so on. What humiliation! But general Jackson was never willing to yield an inch of vantage, even ill-gained-- which was one of his virtues on the battlefield. “His diary,“ he cried stubbornly; “Don’t tell me anything more about his diary. Sir, that diary comes up on all occasions... Sir, that diary will be the death of me... Sir, I did not see 61 it; I was not consulted about it." Adams (whose Memoirs are not lacking in allegations of Jackson’s falsehood and corruption) assures us that Jackson could never have forgotten their several conversations in 1819 on the boundary. Wise and others say that Jackson’s moral disaster was apparent. Some friends attributed Jackson’s misstatements to the "notorious frailty of his memory." But the one really surprising peculiarity about Jackson’s "bad memory" was it s immense capacity to recall the cir cumstant ial details of events and things that had never been! Thus, for instance, Jackson had such overweening anxiety to get Adams on his hip somehow that he asserted to Blair in 1838- — and how very long he kept this choice bit to himself!-- that ’•Mr. Monroe told me in the fall 1819 > on his visit to the west, that Mr. Adams had prepared a treaty, surrendering to Spain the navigation of the red river and arkansa, which he rejected and threw under a table, after which (through Adams’s persistent machinations, notwithstanding Monroe’s patriotic opposition to the cession of TexasJ the one ratified was adopted and sent to the senate. Mr. Calhoun, I expect knows all about these things. Blair, however, left the General’s would-be public letter out of his Globe. It was too palpable an "error." When what Adams came to call the ”Tex-ass robbery” issue again became crying in 1844— when Massachusetts deemed annexation, and South Carolina deemed non-annexation, sufficient grounds for divorce-- Adams and Jackson renewed the old battle in press and hall and waged it to the fullest extent* Jackson vzas again the aggressor* Some new angles were added to the old points. Adams once more, single-handed, although still self-righteously insincere as to the "cession” of Texas, won the victory. Jackson would never recognize his defeat. And being, as usual, somewhat helpless in these issues of veracity of his own seeking without the aid of friends, testimonies, and compurgators, he was saved from complete rout by his friends. This war of words, most profitable to our history, recalls a proverb which Jackson is known to have quoted freely; •When rogues fall out truth is revealed.” Even so late Jackson insisted that he had not been consulted about the boundary in 1819; and set about seeking written testimony tending Zn to prove an alibi. But in late 1844 Adams asked S. L. Gouverneur, who possessed Monroe’s papers, to produce the Jackson-Monroe correspondence of 1820, in which Jackson had plainly assented to the treaty itself yielding Texas; for Gouverneur had made a public statement that such papers exist-64 ed.' This correspondence was published in early 184?; and Jackson was not heard from again. " Jackson had written to Monroe: M I am clearly of your opinion that, for the present, we ought to be content with the Floridas.” Jackson’s cause would seem to have met an overwhelming reverse. But Blair’s Globe immediately extolled the General’s wisdom in past times. It was all in the game. On the principal point of strife "between the arch-foes in 1844-- namely, the nature of Minister Erving’s negotiation in Spain in 1818-19 concerning Florida and Texas-- Adams again exposed what seems Jackson’s convenient dishonesty, which is little known today. This matter is discussed later. Not the least of Adams’s queries was why Jackson had kept frcra the general public all these years his alleged knowledge of Adams’s treachery to the country in 1818-19: how could he reconcile so long his silence with that duty of divulging which at last prompted him to speak forth with such patriotic indignation? Adams charged Jackson’s falsehoods on him: "General Jackson has responded to my summons, but he has not put himself upon the country, either with regard to his charge against me, or to my charge against him. He blusters. 66 but he retreats. He pours forth invective, but he flinches.” Death in 1845 at last ended the perennial strife between these two noted representatives of the Northeast and the Southwest. ... _ Adams to Erving, April 20, 1818, in Writings of J. Adama. VI, 307; Adams to J. Hopkinson, June 1, 1318, in ibid., VI, 345, 346. On Adams’s statements of our right to Texas, 1820-21, see C. L. Woodbury, Writings of Levi Woodbury, I, 3&5* 2 Adams, Memo ir s, IV, 273* y— - Adam’s speech of May 25, 1836, in Kiles’ Register, L, 276-28 O; speech of 1838, quoted in Cong * Globe, 2o Cong., 1 Sess., App., 533. 4 " — — ——— — Adams to Brantz Mayer, July 7, 1847, in Mayer, History of the War be tween Mexico and the United State s, 107-109. It is to be regretted that Mayer quotes only a portion of the letter. Adams was far more of the ’’clever” politician and demagogue than is generally believed. Adams said in his speech of 1838: "It had been said that the United States were once the possessors of the vhole or a part of Texas, under the cession of Louisiana. He believed that this was correct, although he was not prepared to define the limit to which the claim extended” (pamphlet speech, 16). 5 Tor Monßoe’s and Pinckney’s laying down territorial principles see Am. State Paps., Por. Reis., 11, 662-66 J. ’■g •“ —■ — — - " “Adams to Onis, March 12, 1818, in Niles' Register, XIV, 86. — ? Speech of January 2, 1846, quoted in Mayer, War between Mexico and the United State s, 115• — ————-—-——— T. C. Grattan, Civilized America, 11, 27J. — ■ Adams cited in Grattan, Civilized America, 11, 277; cf. Gong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 Sess., 13R; Tucker to Calhoun, December 127 1844, in Jameson, Calhoun Correspondence, 1008, 1009. Onis, Memoir, 139; Speeches Congressional ana Political of Aaron V. Brown, 5$ 6• —£ - -—_—— — ——_ Clay r s letter ot April 16, 1820, in United States Telegraph (Washington), August 2, 1828; quoted in A. V. Brown, Speeches, 501 • 12 ’ Statement of Justice Baldwin of Connecticut just before his death in 1844, reported by "Randolph of Roanoke* in the Richmond Enquirer in the spring of 1844, and in the issue of February 18, 1845; Charleston Mercury, April 25, 1844 (cf. April 16); Telegraph and (Houston), March 12, 1845; Ingersoll in Kiles’ Register, LXVII, 285 (January 4, 1845); A. V. Brown, Speeches, • Some think that "Jackson’s invasion was the cause of the relinquishment of Texas” (Marshall, Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 58, 59 and note*). Calhoun says that Monroe was assured by certain Senators that "the Senate would not ratify a treaty with a boundary further west” than the Sabine (Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., 2 Sess., 499; of• J* Schouler, History of the United States, 11, 96, 97). “ “ 53— — King to J. Mason, February 20 ? and February 7, 1819, in King, Cor > of King, VI, 215, 208. Some element of patriotism cannot, perhaps, be denied those Easterners who opposed expansion on the ground that the Union would become unwieldy and fall apart, when such a We stern traveller as Stephen H. Long could view the "Great American Desert’* as a blessing in placing a check to the dangerous expansion of the people, and an Englishman believed ’’The rapid extension of settlements to the West of the mountains is ... by no means favorable to the duration of the present happy Union" (Cobbett, A Year’s Residence in the United States, 575-577)* But it is significant that it was the East, not the nationalistic West, that would have seceded from a too greatly enlarged Union; the East’s motive was jealous rivalry rather than patriotism. See Adams, Memoirs, V, 25, 54, 68. King to 0. Wolcott, March 3, 1820, in King, Cor, of King, VI. 287• The Richmond Enquirer of March 7, 1820, said that Southern and We stern men ’’must keep their eyes firmly fixed on Texas; if we are cooped up on the north we must have elbow-room to the west” (in J. S’iske , Essays , Hi st or ical and Literary, I, 332). Because of the Missouri question, says Monroe, ’’Some parts of our Union became less anxious even for the acquisition of Florida, while others, not content with that, were desirous of taking possession also of Texas. Many disliked any movement for a territory which we might take when we pleased, lest it produce hostilities, and the injury of our commerce & revenue” (Hamilton, The Waitings of James Monroe, VI, 127)• 15 King to J. A. King, I'ebruary 11, 1821, in King, Cor. of King, VI, 385. 16 T. H. Benton, Thirty Years* View, I, 16, 18, 667; H. St. George Tucker to James Barbour, February 11, 1820, and other letters in the Barbour Papers, in the New York Public Library. On constitutional grounds Monroe was far from approving of the Compromise; he had wished the Maine and Missouri admission questions separated so as to procure *the unqualified admission of Missouri” when settled on its own merits (Monroe to Barbour, February 3, 1820, in the Barbour Papers). Benton charges that Calhoun and other Southern cabinet members yielded Texas from presidential ambitions. - Jefferson to Monroe, May 14, 1820, in Writings of Jeff er son, XII, 160, 161. — —— — Monroe to Jefferson, May, 1820, in Wr it Ings of Monroe, VI, 119-123- These Monroe-Jeff er son letters were first published in the Washington Globe, February 17, 184 J, to show the baleful influence of Federalism. Jackson, to whom Monroe wrote similarly, acqiesced in the treaty (ibid., VI, 126-130). 19 Monroe to Gallatin, May 26, 1820, in Writings of Monroe, VI, 131. Calhoun felt in 1820 that it was no longer practicable to seize Texas at once: “By the acquisition of Florida we acquire a country of more value to us, than the one between the Sabine and the Del Norte, not in extent, soil or climate, but what to us is more important in position and naval and commercial advantages. Next to Cuba, the ports of Florida will command the trade of the Gulf of Mexico. Nor will its acquisition be so likely to produce war, as the country west of us.“ He believed that a war of conquest against Spain “would not long continue without involving other parties, and it certainly would in a few years be an English war.” Calhoun to C. Tait, January 29, 1820, in Gulf States Hist, Mag., I, 95, 96. Thompson in Debates in Congress, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., 3522; Floyd in Nile's* Register, XXXVII, 394. - Wirt to John Coalter, October 2j, 1819, in Am* Hist. Rev., XXV, 693. - Gallatin to Adams, October 26, 1819, in Adams, Writings of Gallatin, 11, 126. ■23 — Adams, Memoir s, IV, 437, 24 Adams, Memoir s, V, 67-69* "Three confederacies" was a natural and common conception in early disunion speculation, apparently being inspired by the East-West sectional divergence with that of North-South superimposed: the west, at first distinct in its ideals and conditions, gradually became absorbed by the westward penetration of the two fundamental divisions of free and slave society until in the fifties the idea of three confederacies from disunion is heard of no more* Adams himself in 1837 saw in the proceedings of the Augusta commercial convention, guided by George McDuffie, "the germ of a Southern Convention, with South Carolina at its head, which is to divide this Union into a Northern, a Southern, and a Western confederacy, with Texas and a fourth part of Mexico annexed to the confederacy of the South" (Memoir s, IX, 421). McDuffie’s famous "tliree confederacies" speech in 1844 is perhaps among the last instances of the older disunion idea. ~ This policy had been marked as early as November 2J, 1818, by Rufus King: "Spain appears to act on this policy, that so long as the U. S. are in hopes of gaining Florida & its western boundary, they will forbear to recognize Buenos Ayres" (King, Cor . of King, VI, 175)* 26 Adams was "annoyed with what he thought to be the flabby attitude of the President toward infractions of American neutrality. From the beginning of Monroe’s term of office the port of Baltimore had become the centre of privateering.... Another cause of his displeasure was the failure of Monroe to issue a proclamation warning against participation in the filibustering expedition which Long led into Texas in the fall of 1819. The rigorous mind of the Puritan statesman saw in episodes of this kind a dangerous deviation from the basic principles of the Administration policy. Had the Florida treaty never been ratified, it is clear that Adams... would have reckoned these matters to be the cause of failure" (P. Perkins, ’’Adams in Am. Secs * of State, ed. S. F. Bemis, IV, 49, 50). Hatcher, Opening of Texas, 280 and note, 353* 27 Austin seems to have thought of moving to Texas in 1803* Hatcher, Opening of Texas, 143 note. On the coloniation of Texas see E. C. Barker, The Life of Stephen F. Austin, Founder of Texas, 1793*1836. 28 Emil Kimpen, Die Auster e i tung spoiltik der Vereinigten Staaten von Amer ica (1923) , 104. — La Diplomacia Mexicana, 11, ?0-?3, as quoted in Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico, 2, 3. 33 ~ Niles * Register, LXVII, 359« L. G. Bugbee, “The Texas Frontier, 1820-182?,” in So* Hist. Assn. Procs., IV, 102-121, shows the early Mexican fears. 32 ’ Manning, Early Diplomatic Relations between the United State s and Mexico , 279 ff«; see Chapter V above > 33 Ibid., 289, 290. Niles* Register, LXXXII, 222; Washington Globe, April 29, 1844. See J. S. Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 62. . — On the Fredonian movement see Barker, Life of Austin, 168-202. 35 Foreman, Indians and Pioneers, 251, 252. 37 Ward in the House of Commons, August J, 1836, in Hiles 1 Register, LI, 39* Anglo-American Rivalry in Spanish America i s we 11 "tre at e d in Rippy, Rivalry between the United States and Great Britain and Latin America in World Politics; see also B. J. Pratt, ’’Anglo-American Commercial and Political Rivalry on the Plata,” in Hi span» Am. Hist. Rev. , XI, 3°2-312. - Rippy, Rivalry, On Poinsett’s mission see W. R. Manning, ’’Poinsett *s' Mission to Mexico: a Discussion of His Interference in International Affairs,” in Am. Journal of International Law, V, 781-822; J. Smith, ‘’Poinsett’s Career in Mexico*” in Am. Antiq. Soc. Procs., XXIV, 77-92, is more favorable to Poinsett. Poinsett to Cambreleng, June 4, 1825, in W. H. Callcot t, Ghur ch and State in Mexico, 148 note. Adams, Memoir s, VIII, 464. 46J. 4Q/ . _ . . H. Adams, Degradation of the Democratic Dogma, 10. Adams had been the first to broach the subject of internal improvements in Congress, in 1807 (ibid», 14-17). . — Adams’s Address to His Constituents, at Braintree, yanaa wj» naK ■ ■■■ -'Wim m- —*m» i ■»' ।«i September 17, 1842, p. 27. 42 Adams’s lecture at New York, August, 1835, in 7. Quincy, Memoir of John Quincy Adams, 241, 242; Adams to Robert Walsh, April IST 1836, in Weekly Missouri Republican (St. Louis), November 9, 1852; Adams to * W\~Upham, February 2, 1837, in H. Adams, Degr edation of the Democratic Dogma, 24, 25; Adams, Memoirs, IX, 259 fAugust 22, 1835) • 43 On Jackson’s enforcement of fraudulent treaties against the Cherokees and Seminole s— the treaties of Nev/ Echota and Payne’s Landing-- see K. W. Colgrove, ’’The Attitude of Congress towards the Pioneers of the West, 1820-1850,” in lowa Journal of History and Politics, IX, 19&-302; T. L. McKenney, Memoir s, I, 258-284; J. T. Sprague, The Florida War, 82, 83; T. V. Parker, The Cherokee Indians, 29-59 f TH. A. Hitchcock, Fifty Years in Camp and 76-85; A. H. Abel, ’’History of Events Resulting in Indian Consolidation West of the Mississippi,” in Am. Hist. Assn. Repor t, 1906, I, 391-405”. See also N. N. Scott, Memoir of H. L. White, 324, 325* The view that David Wilmot joined the anti-slavery movement in 1846, obstructing expansion to the Southwest, for a similar political reason is taken in the writer’s "Motivation of the V/ilmot Proviso," in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., XVIII, 535-541* On Adams’s feeling towatd Jackson see Adams to Bancroft, October 25, 1835, in Bull. of the N. Y. Public Library, X, 248. 4J ' '' Adams, Memoir s, IX, 35 2 (April 25, 1837)* - - — — —__ Adams, Memoir s, IV, JO6, J2J (January-February, 1820). He added that "if institutions are to be judged by their results in the composition of the councils of this Union, the slave-holders are much more ably represented than the simple freemen.” . The term "doughface*" was used at least as early as 1832. See A. R. Macy to Henry Clay, May 20, 1832, in Clay Papers, Library of Congress# Adams, Memoir s, IX, 293* Debs. in Cong., 24 Cong., 2 Sess., ———— — — Calhoun in Debs. in Cong*, 24 Cong., 1 Sess., 1?31; Benton, Thirty Years * View, I, 667-669- Calhoun declared that annexation* was necessary for the ’’balance of power’* and because "the Southern States, owning a slave population, were deeply interested in preventing that country [Texas] from having the power to annoy them.* yo Address to Constituents, 1842, p. 27• 51 7 E. 0. Barker, ’’The Influence of Slavery in the Colonization of Texas,” in The Southwestern Historical Quarterly, XXVIII, 1-33, and in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., XI, 3-36; 1. G. Bugbee, "Slavery in Early Texas," in Pol. Sc. Q.uart., XIII, 389-412, 648-668. 52 j. M. Botts, The Great Rebellion: Its Secret History, Rise, Progress, and Disastrous Failure, 95,9°; cf• H. Seward, Life of John Quincy Adams, 270. 53 W. Birney, James G. Birney and His Times, 339, 340, 343, 344. 3? Charles Francis Adams; an Au t o biography, $B, —. See Birney, James G. Birney, 343, 344, for Birney’s critique in 1843 of Adams’ whole inconsistent course on slavery I’o discover Adams’s motives and purposes at this, time would make an interesting study, in his Address to his Constituents in 1842 he declares; H I was, therefore not then wa sectional partizan, and never have been to this day.” On his desire to enter the Senate see Giddings, History of the Rebellion, note. yb The Life, Travel and Opinions of Benjamin Lundy, 188, 295; Goodell, Slavery and Anti-Slavery, 386. Speech of May 25> 1836, in Debs. in Cong * , 24 Cong., 1 Sess., 4036-4049; Niles 1 Register, L, 276-280. On his later arguments against the power of Congress to acquire territory see J. T. Morse, John Quincy Adams, 26?, 268. 58 W. D. Jones, Mirror of Modern Democracy, 229* Adams to Rush, July 7> 1820, in V/. B. Lawrence's edition of Wheaton's Elements of International Law (ed. 1863), 496, and in Law Reporter, June, 1862, 48p. To Debs. in Cong., 24 Cong., 1 Sees., 3521, 3522. W — Ibid., 3579* ' 61 ' " For Jackson’s approval of the boundary and treaty of 1819 see Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, 111, 28, 35; Adams, Memoirs, IV, 238-240; Parton, Jackson, 11, 587; Seward, John Quincy Adams, 277-279; H. A. Wise, Seven Decades of the Union, 148-152. 62 Jackson to Blair, November 12, 1838, in Bassett, Cor * of Jackson, V, 569 • N. X- Public Library Bull., IV, 3s9> 31°• He declares that he had left Washington before the time of the alleged consultation: ’’Soon after the triumphant vote of the House... acquiting me of improper conduct in invading Florida... I left the city of Washington” (Jackson to Blair, October 24, 1844, in Boston Liberator, November 15, 1844). But it was not until February 11 that Jackson left Washington for a visit to Philadelphia and New York. In short, the equivocal General, who pretends to know so little himself of any consultation, still refers to a hypothetical consultation over the "treaty” itself, of February 19, 1819: he will persist in setting up this dilapidated straw man to knock down for appearance’s sake. Yet this letter was in direct reply to Adams’s statement to ’’the young men of Boston” that Jackson had been consulted on February 1-3 about the boundary. The Jacksonian press took the cue from Jackson’s letter and villified Adams for his statement in 1836 that he had shown the ’’unsigned treaty” to Jackson, which was shown to have been impossible since Jackson had left Washington on February 11; demonstrated error was persisted in venomously. See Dollar Globe (Washington), October 17, 23, 1844. It was pretended that Adams’s diary was brought forward in 1844 for the first time to present a "new case”-- as if it had not in 1836 crammed the falsehood down Jackson’s throat. The evidence of the diary is ’’pooh-poohed.” Adams is declared a liar, and his evidence is not presented, being held unworthy of consideration. See A. V. Brown, Speeches, 5^7-5^3• The correspondence appeared in the National Intelligencer on January 23, 184 J; Nile s * Register, LXVII, 290, 342, 343; (A• Brown) Algernon Sidney, ’’The Florida Treaty, from Notes Furnished by Gov. A. V. Brown,” February 2,184 J, in Brown, Speeches, %8, Jl9» and National Intelligencer, February 3> 1W;. r 55 Jackson had had W. B. Lewis demand of Governeur a sight of the unproduced "written approbation” by Jackson; Gouverneur refused, but Lewis reported to Jackson: ”1 am inclined to the belief that Mr. Monroe, in his correspondence with you, undertakes to show that no better terms could be had, and that you expressed yourself satisfied.” Lewis to Jackson, January 4, 1845, in R. M. McElroy, The Winning of the Far We st, 4 and note. Jackson’s statements did his reputation no good in his own day. The Whig Banner inquired in 1845: *Hovz long has it been since the publication of Gen. Jackson’s letters has proved a source of annoyance to his friends?” (in Demo c rati c St at e sma n, of Nashville, July 26, 1845, p. 256). The chief letters and speeches in the controversy are found in Niles’ Register, LXVII, 105, 108, 160, 171, 188, 284; Quincy, Adams, ; Washington Globe, December 14, 1844; National Intelligencer (Washington), February 3, 1845; A. V. Brown, SpeFche s\ 5*03 ”T 18 Parton, Jackson, 111, 658-665- CHAPTER VII HOUSTON AND JACKSON Adams insinuated that President Jackson manipulated a secret filibuster against Texas through Houston, and those fond of melodrama may wonder whether indeed there were not some agreement between the two* The once prevalent Lundy-Adams tale of plot deep-laid to instigate a pro-slavery, annexationist revolution seems now too hopelessly exploded to be rehabilitated for their comfort: Jackson has been thoroughly whitewashed and Houston abandoned to his own weak devices, while the Texas Revolution is left to take a natural course of its own. Yet something may be found to enliven this ’’barren” prospect. The bits of evidence ascertainable on Houston and Jackson are few and not quite satisfactory, but their tendency is rather clear. The alleged pro-slavery motives of these early seekers of the acquisition of Texas have been well dismissed as a false sectional ’’interpretation.” In early 1829 Governor Sam Houston threw off the peculiar citilization of Tennessee and went to live among the Cherokees of Arkansas, where he became known, among other titles, as the "Raven* 1 and ”Big Drunk." On May 29» 1829, President Jackson received from Duff Green a letter written by Congressman Marable which said that Houston had declared "that he would conquer Mexico or Texas, and be worth two millions in two years. "Genl Houston intended to wield our Indian force in the enterprise suggested in Dr. Marables letter," relates Jackson, who in June wrote Houston that he could not believe what he heard of his extravagant plan to conquer Texas, "particularly when it was communicated that the physical force to be employed was the Cherokee Indians. Jackson seldom bothered to note things down fox' his own eye in the future, but on receiving Marable’s important disclosure, he made a memorandum of it, in his very fragmentary "executive" journal, on May 31, which he concludes thus: "Believing this to be the efusions of a distempered brain, but as a precautionary measure, I directed the Secretary of War to write and enclose to Mr. Pope. Govr of Arkansas, the extract, and instruct him if such illegal project should be discovered to exist to adopt prompt measures to put it down and give the government the earliest intelligence.” It is improbable that Jackson really thought Houston distempered: his activity in at least putting himself on record as wishing to counteract the plan seems to show that he considered it real. Truly strange is this private May memorandum, so little compatible with Jack- apparent willingness in his letter to Houston in June to shut his eyes completely to Houston’s movements. He does not ask Houston to discontinue his project, but simply shows by his surprise that as President he does not want to hear of the matter. The May memorandum was probably written by Jackson merely to appear as future "proof" that he had not connived at Houston. It resembles the Rhea letter of this same period. Apparently no letter was written to Governor Pope, for the War Department files for 1829-33 were searched in vain for any letter or 3 record of such a character. If such a letter had been written and &ent to Pope in 1829 it would doubtless have been brought out in 1838 to refute the charge then made by Dr. Mayo and Adams of Jackson’s connivance at Houston, during the heated dispute over Jackson’s letter to Pulton of December 10, 1830. This memorandum of 1829 can be better appreciated after a discussion of the Pulton letter. In late November of 1830 Dr. Robert Mayo informed Jackson circumstantially of filibustering plans which Mayo had learned from the lips of Houston himself and from one of his adherents, a young man named Hunter. Houston had offered Mayo a surgeonship in his army. Jackson did not take as much interest in Mayo’s communication as the Doctor expected, but several days was later Mayo/summoned by the President and asked to set down his information in writing, '’as I understood**, says Mayo, ’’for the use or information of the secretary of state.” Mayo in his written statement to Jackson of December 2, 1830? stated that he had learned that there were agencies established in all the principal towns and various parts of the United States.... That several thousands had already enlisted, along the seaboard from New England to Georgia, inclusive. That each man paid thirty dollars to the common fund, and took an oath of secrecy and good faith to the cause on joining the party. That they were to repair, in their individual capacities, as travellers, to different points on the banks of the Mississippi, where they had already chartered steamboats, on which to embark, and thence ply to their rendezvous, somewhere in the territory of Arkansas, or Texas, convenient for action, and that they meant to establish an independent government, and resist any attempt of the United States to wrest so valuable a prize from them. 4 Houston had assured Mayo that ”in his view it would hardly be necessary to strike a blew to wrest Texas from Mexico.” , Mayo was naively astonished to find no mention of the matter in Jackson’s annual message of December 7, 1830, which declared our relations with Mexico satisfactory. It happened that in late 1836, arranging his papers against his final departure from the White House, President Jackson returned many of Mayo’s letters, among them that of December 2, 1830, in which was enclosed inadvertently a ’’copy* of a letter from Jackson to William Pulton based on Mayo’s disclosures. Mayo thus describes his sensations on receiving these letters: The last package that I received, contained my original letter of December 2, 1830, as Inserted above, in the same envelope in which I had addressed it to him, with his endorsement upon it, accompanied with a copy or the original of his letter to Mr. Pulton, in his own handwriting.... At the sight of that letter, and still more at the perusal of it, I was struck with petrifying amazement. I was for some time confounded at the inconsistencies, the contradictions, and the falsifications.... Yes, my confidence in General Jackson, at the time the foregoing letter was written, and for years after, was too strong for me to begin to doubt his near approximation to infallibility, even from the repeated circumstances that had already transpired, calculated to shake the faith of most men* I found myself, however, at last unable longer to resist the torrest of their accumulated force. He was struck by the discrepancy between this pretense of enforcing neutrality against Houston and ’’the repeated official protestations of executive ignorance on the subject of hostile interference of citizens of the United States, in the affairs of Mexico, after such interference had nevertheless become notorious to the world through various other channels.” It •impressed a total revolution in my mind upon the whole career of General Jackson’s tortuous life, and not only resolved me NEVER TO SEE HIM MORE, but ... £to] lay the entire affair before the public.” Mayo began making an exposure of Jacksonian tt duplicity” in the public prints in the latter part of 1837 and attracted Adams’s attention. Mayo showed the letters to Adams, who was also amazed at Jackson’s ’’double-dealing worthy of Ferdinand the Catholic or of Tiberius What was it that convinced these men of Jackson’s obliquity? YZe qruote Jackson’s “copy” of his Fulton letter, with his endorsements on it and on Mayo’s letter of December 2. ’’Strictly confidential Washington, Dec'br. 10th 1830 Dear Sir It has been stated to me that an extensive expedition against Texas is organizing in the United States, with a view to the establishment of an independent government in that province, and that Gen. Houston is to be at the head of it. From all the circumstances cummunicated to me upon this subject, and which have fallen under my observation, I am induced to believe and hope (notwithstanding the circumstantial menner in which it is related to me) that the informa- tion I have received is erroneous, and it is unnecessary that I should add my sincere wish that it may be so* No movements have been made, nor have any facts been established, which would require or would justify the adoption of official proceedings against individuals implicated; yet so strong is the detestation of the criminal steps alluded to, and such are my apprehensions of the extent to which the peace and honour of the country might be compromitted by it, as to make me anxious to do everything short of it to elicit the truth, and to furnish me with the necessary facts (if they exist) to lay the foundation of further measures. It is said that enlistments have been made for the enterprise in various parts of the Union-- that confederates are to repair as travellers to different parts of the Mississippi, where they have already chartered Steam Boats on which to embark. That the point of rendezvous is to be in the Arkansas Territory, and that the cooperation of the Indians is looked to by those engaged in the contemplated expedition. I know of no one who se situation will better enable him to watch the course of things, and keep me truly and constantly advised of any movements which may serve to justify the suspicions which are entertained than yourself, and I know I can rely with confidence on your fidelity and activity. To secure your exertions in that regard is the object of this letter, and it is because I wish it to be considered a private rather than an official act, that it is addressed to you and not to the governor (who is understood to be now in Kentucky.) The course to be pursued to effect the object in view must of necessity be left to youx’ discretion, enjoining only, that the utmost secrecy be observed, on your part. If in the performance of the duty required of you any expenses are necessarily incurred by you, I will see they are refunded. I am respectfully yours, Andrew Jackson” (Jackson’s endorsement :J ” (Copy) *Confidential Wm. Fulton Sec. of the T. of Florida-- private and confidential” [Jackson's endorsement on Mayo's letter of December 2 Q ”Dr. Mayo-- on the contemplated invasion of Texas private and confidential-- a letter to be written, confidential, to the Secretary of the T. of Arkansa [Fulton] with copy of confidential letter to Wm Fulton Esq. Sec to the T. of Florida” One does indeed note some inconsistencies. Jackson’s disparagement of the reports about Houston do not ring true. And why i s it that he is now so anxious that the investigation should be secret and private, through the Secretary of Arkansas, when in May of 1829, presumably knowing then much less of Houston’s reported plans than he does after receiving Mayo’s communication, he would have it appear that Governor Pope himself was given official instructions to a similar effect? To be sure, it does not seem that Pope was ever sent or ever received any such letter written bjr the Secretary of War. Why was this alleged instruction of 1829 to be addressed to Governor Pope and to be written by the Secretary of War (Eaton of Tennessee), when the letter of 1830 to check Houston’s plans was addressed to the Secretary of Arkansas Territory, William S. Fulton, by Jackson himself? The probable answer may be simple: in case Governor Pope did not receive such a letter and was not willing to ’’remember” that he had, the explanation would be that the Secretary of War must have neglected to write it, and it was perhaps addressed to the Governor because he was the proper person to send it to. The Fulton letter was perhaps not actually sent until 1833-- then as an afterthought. Note the peculiar endorsements made by the President. A letter to William Fulton, whom Jackson appointed Secretary of Arkansas in 1829? obviously concerning the jurisdiction of Arkansas, is addressed to Fulton as "Secretary of the Territory of Florida." In the two endorsements three glaring "errors" are committed, and an express distinction is made between the Secretary of Arkansas and Fulton, Secretary of Florida; the letter Arkansas must somehow’ be addressed to Arkansas, even if it be the devious and obscure route of Florida. Jackson knew well enough that Fulton was Secretary of Arkansas and it is not possible to imagine that Jackson could have committed three "errors" from defect of memory or absent-mindedness. The deliberate intent at deception seems too apparent, . Jackson had earned a reputation for gross defects of memory and judgment which would make it barely possible for him to point later to these endorsements to explain why Fulton did not receive the letter if it was never sent; he could say that he had carelessly and accidentally addressed it to Florida instead of Arkansas and it had gone astray and been lost. The erroneous endorsements have even less appearance of being honest than the Rhea letter, and remind one of that Jacksonian endorsement that was supposed to have been written in 1819 but was probably a much later afterthought: "Mr. J. Rhea’s letter in answer is burnt this 12th of April, 1318 {he meant 1819 J." Now at some time the above letter was actually sent to Fulton, probably in 1833, though still predently dated December 10, 1830 (his friend Fulton could overlook the discrepancy of date). The latter actually sent is, with slight differences in wording and punctuation, the same as the "copy” which fell into Mayo’s hands, with one discrepancy, however, of deep significance: it is addressed "Private and Confidential Wm. Fulton Ssqr. Secretary of the T. of Arkansas.” Now Jackson’s chicanery can hardly admit of doubt. How if this letter were actually written and sent on December 10, 1830 (as it is dated, in keeping with its so-called ’’copy”) could Jackson have made accidentally at the same time the three "errors” of his endorsements of 1330 in direct contradiction to this correct inscription?" There is even further reason to think that the care- fully labeled "copy” was really the original: iL contains not less than two erasures and changes in wording and two insertions of words, which would hardly occur in copying unless the copying was very careless-- though it certainly was ’’copied" by one exceedingly careless if its being addressed to Fulton of "Florida” was unintentional. In the light of the Marable and Mayo disclosures to Jackson it may be wondered whether he could say truthfully that "Ko movements have been made, nor have any facts been established.” What would it take, then, short of Houston’s fait accompli to establish in Jackson’s mind a "fact" that Houston was plotting? Mayo and Adams thought that even if the letter had been sent to Fulton it was inadequate in being addressed to the Secretary and not the Governor of Arkansas and in not designating what measures to counteract Houston should be taken other than the request that reports be made to the President. Perhaps the secrecy enjoined was to explain later why Fulton’s investigation was not heard of, in case the letter was not actually sent to Fulton. Jackson’s sense of the inadequacy of his alleged reason for addressing the letter to the Secretary seems evinced by his adding that the Governor was "understood” to be then in Kentucky-- a ’’belief” which would found to be false by Adams and, in being untrue, seems further to show that the letter was not ’written to be sent. Mayo asks sarcastically "whether the governor of Florida was also in Kentucky as an excuse why the president should write to the secretary of that territory likewise instead of the governor? or was such a letter actually sent to the secretary of Florida? In fine, was that also directed countrary-wise, and with the same confusion as was the endorsement on that purporting to have been intended for Mr. Fulton?” It seems to have been the general contemporary belief that Houston received no hindrance from the President. Parton, who notes both the Fulton letter ”copy” and its strange endorsement, assures us concerning Houston: ’’That he experienced no serious hindrance from the government of the United States, and that General Jackson watched his moevemnts with interest and with sympathy, are facts 7 well known to us.- M The Fulton letter became public in this wise. Adams in the House on January p, 1838, called upon the State Department for a copy of Jackson’s letter to Fulton of December 10, 1830, not mentioning its contents, vzhich he had learned from the w copy w in Mayo’s hands. No such letter was found in the State Department archives. Adams then, on June 22 and 23, read the •copy” in the House, expressing his opinion that no ’’original* had ever been sent. On the second day he said that the Chairman of the Committee- on Foreign Affairs had lately sent a letter to Hulton, who was then Senator from Arkansas, concerning the matter and that Fulton had replied that he had received Jackson’s letter in January of 1831* "What he did , ” said Adams, "to counteract the conspiracy is as secret as the letter itself was intended to be. That he could do nothing effective without the direction of the Governor, to whom the letter was never communicated, is as apparent as that nothing effective was done. It is also a matter of more than ordinary notoriety that ... in the spring and summer of 1832, General Houston was again ... at Washington, in constant intercourse apparently, as friendly, familiar and confidential with the writer of this letter, as he had ever been before.” On July 7 Adams read the Hulton letter again, along with Mayo’s letter to Jackson and the President’s two peculiar endorsements. ’’The Secretary of the Territory of Florida is yet living,” Adams remarked: "If both letters were sent, the fact may be proved.” But in the contest, no attempt was made by 8 Jackson to prove this. Adams said that even if sent, the letter was underhanded and insincere, and was no real effort to deter Houston. Mayo, too, from what we have seen, was right in his "firm belief ... that General Jackson was perfectly apprised of the conspiracy of General Houston, before the date of my communication to him”; and he, too, thought that Jackson’s "private and confidential” letter to Fulton, 1 ' affecting to institute an inquiry which its own injunctions rendered inoperative, denouncing to him withal, that his information was not sufficient to justify official proceedings deserves to be regarded in no other light than as an illustrious example of that DUPLICITY which has so eminently characterized ’Jacksonian Diplomacy 1 throughout his eight years’ administration.” On the exposure in 1838 of the private Fulton letter Jackson fell into a curious declaring that Mayo, who was still a clerk in the War Department, as he had been during Jackson’s Presidency, had **purloined w the letter from his private files; he denounced Adams for making public a private letter obtained by such fraud. But Mayo had assured Adams, as he assures his readers, that the 3 etter came into his hands accidentally when his own of December 2, 1830, was inadvertently returned by Jackson in 1836; there is no reason t 0 doubt this Mayo says that Jackson wanted the matter hushed in 1838, and it certainly seems so. In January, when exposure of the Fulton letter was threatened by Adams’s call, Jackson was evidently greatly disturbed. Yet he was character ist ically confident of his own virtue in his reply of January 23 to President Van Buren’s note informing him of Adams’s preliminary move in the House: The reference you have made to his using kayos correspondence and mine, astonishes me, for it is the first intimation I have ever had that Mayo had written a Book, or I was one of the Doctors Correspondents.... Such ungrateful scamps cannot do me any harm, but remember-- he was pressed upon us by the Virginia representatives. I may say truly, 0 tempora 0. mores-- my creed, that truth is mighty and will prevail, I fear not the slanders of such men as Mayo. I have searched my Executive 800 k.... I have 1Q found the following memorandum-- May 21rst, 1829 Then follows a citation of the memorandum concerning the letter on Houston from Marable, asserting that the Secretary of War was to be asked to write Governor Pope of Arkansas. But, significantly, Jackson did not bring this memorandum before the public when the contest with Adams was joined in June-July. Why was this apparently favorable testimony held back from view? Perhaps the absence in the War Department of any record of the matter might harm his cause if the thing was laid before the public. There was an excellent reason why Pope should not have been called upon by Jackson for a reminiscence of having re- ceived an anti-Houston letter: Jackson complains on January 16, 1838, ’’Has Govr. Pope gone entirely over to the Federalists?” 11 He has no longer a convenient rememberer or compurgator, if such were needed. Fulton, Senator and ex-Secretary of Arkansas was still an intimate political friend of Jackson, and the ex-President wrote the Senator in January with characteristic finesse, saying that he had written thus and so to Fulton in December of 1830 and requesting testimony to the effect that Fulton had received Jackson’s letter, had kept a vigilant eye, and had reported to Jackson. Fulton agreeably made several declarations after Adams’s reading of the Fulton letter, of which declarations two were published, in July and August of 1838; he averred that he had received Jackson’s letter in January, 1831, forthwith investigated, and sent several reports to Jackson in 1831 which ’’fully authorized the conclusion that there was not at that time (I 831 any hostile movements whatever on foot in Arkansas against Texas or Mexico.” At first Fulton had not wished to be too certain about the date; writing in an earlier letter to Forsyth he said: I went myself to the Western frontier and ascertained . ... I communicated such information as I obtained from time to time to the President; and finally becoming satisfied myself, that no organized expedition was at that time in contemplation or on foot from any point within the Territory of Arkansas against Mexico, either on the part of Genl. Houston or any other person; I communicated that conclusion to to the President in the fall I think of the Year 1831. J ' J To the general public and to historians this testimony has 14 seemed convincing of Jackson’s desire to preserve neutrality. But Fulton’s apparently full memory in 1838-- Jackson’s chief reliance-- was full only after it was prompted. In January, on Adams’s first move, Fulton had no clear recollection. Writing to Jackson on January 11 that he recalled Jackson’s letter to him concerning Houston as one which Jackson might well be proud of, but that he had neither that letter nor a copy of his reply to the President, he asked Jackson to send him copies of both for use in Jackson’s defence. Jackson replied that he had no copies, and that Fulton should rely on his memory-- as helped by Jackson’s. And Jackson quoted to Fulton the memorandum of May, 1829, as earnest of 15 the soundness of his memory. Helpfully, Fulton did rely on his and Jackson’s memory or memories. Jackson claimed only one report from Fulton, but Fulton was generous and recalled having made several— none of which Jackson was ever able, or willing, to produce. The files of the State and War Departments were searched fruitlessly for a copy of the letter to Fulton or for any reports, but Fulton expressed the hope to Jackson that he might find Jackson’s original letter on his return to Arkansas. But he did not delay his pro-Jackson testimony for the procurement of a verification. He confided in Jackson’s statement to him of the matter, perhaps distrusting his own memory, if he had any distinct one. Jackson’s reputation for probity served him well. It was not until February of 1839-- after the storm had passed-- that the “original” letter to Fulton was found in William S. Fulton’s papers in Arkansas by David F u lton, the Senator’s father. A certified copy was sent to Jackson, who endorsed it, perhaps for the eye of posterity: Copy of a letter from A. Jackson President of the United States dated Decbr. 10th, 1830. The copy of this letter to W. S. Fulton then secretary of the T. of Arkansa, was purloined from the secrete Bureau of the President by . Mayo, and read in congress by J. Q. Adams, to prove that tho this letter had been written it was deceiptfully retained, so that the alleged invasion of Texas might be successful, that I was secretely encouraging that invasion inconsistent with our neutrality, what a scamp. A. J.lc We turn to evidence which seems to the writer to show that Jackson 1 s "copy” letter to Fulton dated December 10, 1830, actually "was deceiptfully retained" by the President for several years before an "original’ 1 was sent, and that the word "dated* was inserted by Jackson in the above endorsement with equivocal humor. It is perhaps of significance that Senator Fulton after going through his papers in Arkansas in search of any copies of replies to Jackson’s letter, wrote Jackson: "I find nothing but memorandums, and notes, and the parts of some of the letters-- nothing that would do to be given to the public if it should become necessary to publish the correspon-17 dence. * Jackson may seem to bear witness against himself. On August 2, 1838, he wrote B. C. Howard, an old friend, and the chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs: I conclude, that the letter which Mr. Adams has is the original draft with which the report of judge Pulton was filed, and that he has in his possession or knowledge Mr. Pulton’s report to me which went to shew the rumors were all groundless, and that Genl Houston had settled in Texas and was practising law there for a livelyhood Houston was not in Texas until 1833* Or, explicitly, it was in December, 1832, that Houston entered Texas. Does Jackson suffer from a trick of memory, or does he remember too well that he received no report from Pulton until 1833? At this very time, in 1838, Pulton declares that he remembers receiving Jackson’s letter in "January, 1831,” and that before the year had ended he had sent Jackson several reports indicating that "there was not at that time (1831) any hostile movement 19 whatever on foot in Arkansas a gainst Texas or Mexico.” ' It might be conjectured that Jackson would consider Pulton’s report *private and confidential”, but Jackson pretends that the report was put in the government archives-- for either his private papers do not contain it or it was not such as could be shown to the public, being perhaps made some time after 1831. As no report, however, could be found in the archives, Jackson insinuates to Howard that it was purloined along with the Pulton letter and was in Adams’s handsJ Could Jackson have believed this, or was he merely striving by all means to extinguish that “scamp” Adams? Jackson had a more discreet memory when he wrote Van Buren in January: ”1 have a distinct recollection of receiving his pulton ’sj reply of the investigation made by him as to the movements of Genl Houston, and nothing discovered of his movements that could implicate the neutrality of the U. States.” There were good reasons why Jackson should cease in 1833 to connive completely at Houston, if he had connived at him. Through Houston’s indiscretion, it seems, the Mexican diplomatic agents in the United States became aware of his plans and learned or inferred that the President was favorable towards them, Houston seems to have had intercourse with the Mexican charge, Agustin de Iturbide (the elder son of the late Emperor), and to have been indiscreet, perhaps hoping to interest the Mexican in his plans. Long afterwards Anthony Butler explained to Houston—that Jackson had repudiated Houston in his correspondence with Butler "about the time young Iturbide was Charge d’affaires of Mexico, your intimacy with whom you may Iturbide proved unreliable, it seems, and betrayed Houston’s confidence to Tornel, the Mexican Minister at Washington, who left his post in wrath. In May of 1833 Tornel published at Mexico City his Manifesta c ion a 1 Publico . He charged Jackson with connivance at a movement in Arkansas to seize Texas, and painted the "Old Hero” as a feeble old man directed by rahid land speculators. He claimed that he had ample proof. As paraphrased by Butler, who considered Tornel’s publication the supreme cause of Mexican hostility thereafter, ”he had more than once traversed our plans for 21 seizing the country." Jackson must have felt no slight indignation at Houston’s indiscreet folly-- as Wilkinson had probably felt at Burr’s* When Butler wrote him of Tomei’s charges Jackson replied, October 30: I regret to hear of the slanders of Yturbide and Tomei which have no foundation either in the acts or views, of myself, or any part of the Government. The statement ma.de of my intimacy with Houston is not true. The very opposite would have been nearer the fact, for we had had, ever since the intimation of his being regarded as unfriendly to the existing government of Mexico (Sana Anna had come in April, 1833] a secrete agent watching his movements and prepared to thwart any attempts to organize within the United States a military force to aid in the revolution of Texas. Genl. Houston lam informed is connected with the Bevz York company who you are apprised have obtained a large nominal grant in Texas.• Jackson seems to say here that he has had no such agent as Fulton watching Houston until 1833, for Santa Anna’s administration did not begin until April of 1833* We next turn to the task of trying to trace the slippery Houston, whom some have charged with being Jackson’s special "agent” to conquer Texas or foment a revolution. The reports of his Texas filibustering scheme and Jackson’s apparent reaction to these reports have been noted. Houston came to Washington in the beginning of 1830 and solicited a contract to supply rations to the Indians about to be removed beyond the Mississippi under the newly-passed Indian act. Houston wanted tc receive 18/ a day per Indian-- which was much too high-- and President Jackson was so anxious to give Houston the contract that he and Secretary of War Eaton planned to award it clandestinely, despite the requirements of law that it be awarded to the lowest bidder at public auction. T. L. McKenney, the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, told Jackson that the rations could be supplied at a profit for less than 7/ a day and that Houston’s bid would give him a profit of thousands of dollars a week; time should be given for bids from the West, where the rations would be purchased. Jackson and Eaton, however, rushed ahead, intent on gratifying Houston. But Puff Green, the administration editor at Washington, who had lived in Missouri, likewise assured Jackson that the rations could be supplied in the West as low as 6/, and warned the President that if the contract was let to Houston at 18/ without bidding there w ould be a storm in the West and elsewhere and public confidence in the administration would be greatly impaired, as would also "the fair fame of the President.** Houston sought in vain, says McKenney, to bribe and threaten McKenney into lending his influence to his cause. The President, seeing that editor Green would not publicly support his plan of giving the contract to Houston, prudently abandoned it. Bidding was allowed and Houston privately offered a bribe to Luther Blake of Alabama, the lowest bidder, to withdraw his bid, but Blake refused indignantly to be a party to the high collusion ”to defraud the government.” It was estimated by the investigating committee in 1832 that Houston would have been enriched by about a million dollars if his bid 23 had been allowed. Houston continued his intriguing in the Hast, visiting Philadelphia, Baltimore and New York in March, according to Mayo, who met him in February. Houston, disappointed in his contract scheme, could afford to tell Mayo (so Mayo wrote Jackson in his letter of December 2, 1830) *that he had volunteered to assure the president, that he had no desire for an appointment of any sort under his administration— that he believed the president would give him almost any thing he would request... Yet I have understood,” continues Mayo, ’’from indisputable authority, that Gen’l Houston did apply for and solicit the appointment to furnish provisions, &c . for the Indians, &c. at the charge of the United States in that quarter, which was denied him-- but whether that wish has not been, as to his views, sufficiently substituted by the successful application of a most intimate friend of his, Gen’l Van Fossen, lately of Hew York, is a problem perhaps not unworthy of inquiry.” Mayo was right in his suspicion; Van Fossen did enter his bid in Houston’s behalf. Mayo considered that Houston’s plotting to seize Texas from Mexico should, if known, have disqualified him from being given such a contract in the West as he solicited; Jackson thought otherwise. Ma y> may have fancied he was giving the President valuable news, but probably Jackson was not altogether pleased that Mayo knew so much. In the spring of 1832 Houston was again at Washington, in April making an attack on Representative Stanbery because that gentleman inquired in the House, "Was not the late Secretary of War removed because of his attempt fraudulently to give Governor Houston the contract for Indian rations?” Houston was hardly avenging a ’’slander,” save in the Jacksonian meaning of that word, but Jackson, feeling Houston’s ”cause ! * his own, applauded the assault as tending to teach Congressmen to 24 keep *a civil tongue” in their heads. Jackson gave Houston a commission to treat with certain Indian tribes in Texas, and, so the story goes, loaned Houston as a send off* Houston needed money for his projects and sought it from the New York Texas land speculators, whose land claims, as well as his own, he wished to represent personally in Texas* Houston’s conferences in the East were not fruitful, and he left for Tennessee not knowing whether the New York people would back him or n0t. 25 Houston wrote James Prentiss of the New York company that Texas if left to diplomacy would become a prize in a struggle between the United States and England, and "whichever power should succeed, would claim it by conquest, and the Grantees, would be compelled to accept terms, and not dictate them! There is, a better planl’.l” This was doubtless revolution. On July 12 he wrote another speculator, Daniel Jacicson, from Washington: n lf the project should fall thro’, of sending me on to Texas, I will have to make some arrangement for going, on my own account, but you may rest upon my honor, that no bad feelings will exist towards the Companies, nor will I take advantage of my friends. n 27 On August 18, Houston assured Prentiss, from Kashville, that friends from Texas tell him that settlers would flock to Texas ”if the Government were settled, but will not venture without it.” It was important, he said, to have a man on hand in Texas who could look at matters with a view to the changes which are necessary and must take place before long in that country, and without which it can never be, what it ought to be for the benefit of those interested* Several persons have said to me that I was looked for, and earnestly wished for by the citizens of Texas.... The people look to the Indians in Arkansas as auxiliaries, in the event of a change-- So I will pass that way, and see my old frlends. I will ride to the Hermitage this evening, and see the Old Chief General Jackson. 28 Revolutionary disturbances had already taken place in Texas, and it is said that a public meeting at Nacogdoches had proposed that either Houston or William Carroll of Tennessee be invited to come and lead any movement for independence. Houston was now going to Tejas, therefore, to lead rather than incite a revolution. Jackson, who had long anticipated a Texas Revolution, believed in February of 1332, as we have seen, that a revolt would occur within six months: he wrote his envoy to Mexico that he could not prevent American citizens from going to Texas with their rifles and that he might have to take a revolutionary Texas in self-defense. A new phase of border Indian policy has thus sprouted3s It might be thought that Jackson, if he had felt the danger of a breach of our neutrality to be great, would have taken more ample precautions to preserve it. A cabinet member remarked to him during the disturbances of 1832 that the United States must enforce neu- trality by increasing the military force on the Southwestern frontier to prevent Americans from joining a Texas Revolution; but Jackson disdained such a strict neutrality in the prospective ’’racial conflict” and replied: “Sir, let it be understood that lam not neutral in this conflict. The force in the locality you refer to is ample. Should its increase become necessary I will attend to the matter personally.” After Tornel’s publication Jackson became more discreet in official privacy. Before Houston left, Jackson assured him that he was claiming the Reches River in Texas as the true Sabine of the Florida treaty and “would defend and fight for that line.'*32 This was remembered by Houston and seems to play some part in the shaping of future events. It is said that the President’s last words to Houston before Houston’s departure were: ”good 33 luck to you in any case; recognition if you succeed.” This may well be apocryphal • With what good repute filibusters were widely held by that imperialistic generation may appear in the following letter to Houston, albeit from his friend Van Fossen: I was informed by Col. Shote, with whom I parted at Baltimore on my way home, that there was reason to fear that your friends in Hew York would fail of their engagement to furnish the means of prosecuting your Texas enterprise* I hope it will not prove true, for I had indulged the expectation of hearing of, if I could not witness and participate in, the most splendid results from this undertaking. Ido not believe that that portion of country will long continue its allegiance to the Mexican Government, and I would much rather see it detached through your agency, as the consequences could not fail to be highly favorable to your interest, than to learn that the object had been effected through any other means, or even to learn that it had become the property of the United States on the most favorable terms of purchase.*.* lam asked daily a hundred questions about that extraordinary man, Gen Houston; and I most ardently hope that I may ere long be able to say that you have triumphed over every obstacle that interposed against the accomplishment of your wishes*.* worthy of a high-minded and honorable American. 34 This letter and Mayo’s of 1830 would show Houston planning an independent Texas. Whether he had ambitions to rule permanently an independent Texas to which parts of Mexico might be added by conquest seems impossible to say* Probably his purpose was expressed in the following reported remark to a friend: ”1 am going and in that new country I will make a man of myself again.... I shall yet be President of a great Republic. I shall bring that nation to the United States. The saga- cious Jackson had no fear but that annexation to the United States would be the wish of the Texans and the outcome of a revolution, whatever Houston might have desired, especially if Jackson intervened on the pretext of the Sabine-Neches ”disputed” territory, his great desire to seize which at the most useful moment-- and by no means for its own sake-- seems shown by evidence cited hereafter* Welcomed at Nacogdoches and elected delegate to the approaching Texas convention, Houston reported to Jackson from Natchitoches on February 13, 1833, that the vast majority of Texans wanted annexation to the United States-- an optimistic view representative of Nacogdoches rather than of Texas generally. He believed that Mexico’s hold was loosening: ’’Her want of money, taken in connection with the course of Texas must, and will adopt, will render the transfer to some power inevitable, and, if the United States does not press for it, England will most assuredly obtain it by some means. 11 Houston’s statement ”It is probable that I may make Texas my abiding place** may show that he left Jackson without any definite purpose to stay in Texas or it may be a blind to protect Jackson* njiiston assured Jackson that unless Mexico speedily made reforms Texas would seceded 0 Houston's ’belief that the convention would declare Texas independent in June ms disappointed: the convention merely sent Austin to Mexico with petitions for reform and a draft of a proposed state constitution} a drafu drawn up by a committee headed by Houston* Houston oegan to realize that nineteen-twentieths of the people of Texas were not for a revolution immediately after all* Houston seems to have been a temporizer, an ingratiating lawyer, a land-speculator, and a man biding his time, rather than an agitator of revolution. He is reported to have said that there was going to be war in Texas before long ana that 37 he meant to figure in it. There is evidence that ne was personally opposed to a revolution and to the Revolution when it came. Little is heard of Houston until 1836. His roommate at Nacogdoches, the surveyor J. W. Burton, did nit know of Houston’s being active in public till his Generalship. Houston v/as known as a speculator with "the reputation of a fine orator"; he had "considerable dignity of appearance and... great suavity of manners with a most conciliating address to men in the ordinary walks of life... a man of uncommon natural abilities... a man of excellent heart but dissipates, eccentric, and vain"-- in short, a soldier of fortune. Houston was provoked by Austin’s radical letter to the ayuntamiento of San Antonio ’’when he broke into prison.” Houston may have become desirous of Texas’s remaining attached to Mexico because of his land schemes. In the spring and summer of 1834 Houston was again in the Hast to see his friends and business associates. He wrote Prentiss from Washington on April 20, 1334, that he dia not expect Texas t 0 be acquired by the United States but did think within one year that it will be a Sovereign State and acting in all things as such. Within three years I think it will be separate from the Mexican confederacy, and remain so forever. Letters from Col Butler state that every thing is unsettled in Mexico and that Revolution is going 0n... I assure you Santa Ana aspires to the Purple, and should he assume it, you know Texas is off from them and so to remain. You may reflect upon these suggestions. They are not pleasant to me, but you may file them and see how I prophesy.3s Houston added to Prentiss on April 24 that Texas will have to shape her own destiny, as a treaty of cession, itself improbable, ’’would not be ratified by the present Senate! I” He believed that the year would produce events important to the destiny of Texas. ’’Many may suppose that such events will be sought by me but in this their notions will be gratuitous... * The course that I may pursue, you must rely upon it, shall be for the true interests of Texa. s, (as I believe) and if it can be done, as it ought to be,— to preserve her integrity to the Confederacy of Mexico.” If these are sincere expressions they show howlittle Houston helped instigate revolution. In December of 1834, an English traveller claims to have found Houston in a tavern at Washington, Hempstead County, Arkansas, living a secluded life amid conspirators against Mexico, leather stonehaugh writes : Genera}. Houston was here, leading a mysterious sort of life, shut up in a small tavern*. . . I had been in communication with too many persons of late, and had seen to much passing before my eyes, to be ignorant that this little place was the rendezvous ■where a much deeper game than faro or rouge-et-noir was playing. There were many persons at this ‘-m/e in the village from the States lying adjacent to the Mississippi, under the pretence of purchasing government lands, but whose real object was to encourage the settlers of Texas to throw off their allegiance to the Mexican government . Many of these individuals were personally acquainted with mew*"' In the latter part of lc>34, Gilliam H. Gwin, Lar snail of Mississippi, and one of the more astute politicians ox une day, is said to have visited hi s friend Jackson and talked much of and Houston, and then to have journeyed to Nacog- doches in early 1835 and spent a month with Houston and wiuH T. J. Rusk, a late arrival from Georgia. M At this day,” later writes J. F. H. Claiborne, statesman and historian of Mississippi, ’’when the grave has closed over all the parties ouu om, it will be no breach of confidence to say, tnat ur • Gwin nic-.de that visit to General Houston at the instance of the President, and that the great programme was then planned, which was subsequently followed as closely as events permitted.” Incidentally, Gwin, a dyed-in-the-wool speculator, bought up a lot of cneap writes Texas lands for himself and two Natchez friends. Claiborne/ apparently from personal knowledge. The fact and purport of an understanding between Jackson and Houston seems to be shown by several other pieces of evidence or testimony. Henry A* Wise and Anson Jones both tell us that it was understood that if Houston should become military leader in a Texas Revolution he could count upon President Jackson’s protecting American ’’right" to the "disputed” region between the Leches and the Sabine, in which Nacogdoches lay, and that the Texans would receive aid by retreating and drawing the Mexicans across the Neches. Possibly, too, Houston was to exert his influence (as he apparently later did) to have Texas pronounce herself a part of the Louisiana Purchase and claim American protection as a right. The West and East Florida games could be played again* The converging testimony of these three prominent contemporaries, who were in a position to be intimately informed, seems to be substantiated by Houston’s course in the San Jacinto campaign in 1836. Even if no specific ’’understanding* took place. Jackson’s intention to make the Neches the boundary, known in Texas as early as October, 1832, might well have influenced Houston’s 42 policy. Houston tried to get the American Cherokees into Texas 43 in 1834, it seems, but was opposed by the white colonists. It may well be that one of Houston’s motives in trying to secure these Indians as allies in an impending revolution was to afford President Jackson a pretext for intervention under the Mexican treaty of 1832* We need not go into the causes othe Texas Revolution, among which Houston seems not to have been numbered. It has been shown that the Revolution was the outcome of racial incompatibility, dislike and distrust between Mexicans and the American colonists, Mexico’s apprehension oi aggressive designs and machinations by the United States, various grievances of the colonists, and finally of Santa Anna’s attempt to carry into Texas his program of centralizing the "Pederal" government. Mexicans tended, like Vicente Pillisola, to look on Texas as a refuge of "criminals from all parts of the United States’*-- many of the colonists being fugitive debtors--, whereas the American settlors had a contempt for all Mexicans, unduly emphasized by contact with the thriftless Mexicans of Texas. General Teran confessed that those or 44 Nacogdoches were the offscourings of Mexico. The expectant desire of many of the colonists for annexation to the United States was a factor underlying and stimulating resistance to Mexico- Revolution was foreseen by the clear-sighted years before it come, and perhaps only the weakness of the unorganized and not numerous colonists made for so long a prudent procrastination of a serious movement . ’’Ever since I83O,” said Austin, ”1 foresaw that an open breach with Mexico was inevitable* It was, however, of the greatest important jsicj to keep it off as long as possible, in order to 49 gain time and strength-* The Texas Revolution was a ’’states right s” movement in its justification, as was admitted by Santa Anna when on returning from exile in 1846 he renounced centralism, ’’the love of provincial liberties being firmly rooted in the minds of all, and the democratic principle predominating everywhere”; To draw every thing to the centre, and thus give unity of action to the republic, as I at one time considered best, is no longer possible; nay more, I say it is dangerous; it is contrary to the object v/hich I pro- posed for myself in the unitary system, because we thereby expose our selves to the separation oi the northern departments, which. are the most z clamorous for freedom of interna.l admini stra uioi • In the autumn of 1835, having been made commander-in-chief at Nacogdoches, Houston purchased a General’s uniform at New Orleans, where he issued a call for volunteers for the Texas war* He was not in favor of the early insufficient military movements in the western and central part oi Texas: arose seemed a useless waste of life-- heroic but not war* Hous con, when made commander-in-chief, showed so little desire to prosecute the war aggressively, as the Texans wished, that a move was made by Austin in the Provisional Government to invite some American, such as General James Hamilton of South Carolina, to come and take the lead. It was rumored that certain Southern Congressmen were favoring this plan for annexationist reasons, but eventually William H. Wharton, the Texas envoy, and Hamilton denied that they had anything to do with any project to supplant By authority of the Provisional Government Houston made a treaty of amity with the Cherokees of East Texas, to prevent them from aiding the Mexicans, in which the Indians were promised a title to the lands they occupied. Taking substantial charge of the war after the disasters at the Alamo and Goliad,. Houston began his retreat eastward, the entire body of colonists fleeing towards the Sabine under great hardship. This came to be called the “runaway scrape.” Houston was most reticent, concerning his policy: he said he would order without others* advice and alone take all responsibility. The colonists preferred to make a stand in central Texas against the invader, but Houston perhaps feared an irretrievable disaster. The Mexican odds seemed overwhelming. Perhaps to him the one salvation of Anglo-American Texas seemed to lie in procuring American aid. After leaving the Convention Houston, on reaching camp, wrote back advising the Convention to adopt a resolution. "declaring Texas a part of Louisiana under the Treaty of 1803. ’ The suggestion was not acted on. Houston’s virtual autobiography says: "Such a measure would have won them the sympathies of Legislatures, as well as peoples. They would not then have been regarded as a separate people. It would have matured the Republic...* neither the question of recognition nor annexation would have been raised-- she would have been adopted at once. Houston looked at the whole matter with the 48 eye of a statesman, and the heart of a soldier.” Houston’s idea that the West Florida affair could be reenacted if the "Louisiana” joker were played was possibly based on an understanding of Jackson’s sentiments as well as of those of the people of the Southwest. Houston had too many enemies in the government and was too dictatorial and secretive to carry out his plans. The evidence is plentiful that Houston meant to retreat even further than he did, to the "disputed” region of East Texas, to draw Santa Anna into conflict with the American forces. Henry S. Foote thought that Houston expected by retreating across the Sabine to raise a force of 5000 volunteers/ 1 ' What Jackson and General Gaines intended on the border was hopefully surmised by the Texans. The Texas government at « Harrisburg sent the Secretary of State, Samuel - • Cai son, confer with Gaines at Natchitoches. On his way in early April he heard a rumor that a part of Gaines*s force had crossed the Sabine and was marching to the Neches; his way of reporting this is significant: News-- good news* I have just heard through a source in which Judge Hardin has confidence that a company or battalion of U. 3. troops crossed the Sabine and" were marching towards the Neches. I believe it to be true. General Gaines is there and doubtless my letter by Parmer had the desired effect. Jackson will protect the neutral ground. I should like his protection that far at present. If we are successful, we can hereafter negotiate and regulate boundaries. This news, just arrived, has infused new life into people here (Nacogdoches). It was no time for the Texans to be finical about the boundary. On April 13 Carson reached Gaines and reported full and satisfactory conversation. His position at present is a delicate one... to protect the frontier and neutral ground, also 90 to keep the Indians in check."' This seems to show that even before receiving his orders of May 4 Gaines felt himself empowered to protect the ’’disputed 1 ’ territory or justified in protecting it. Carson felt certain that Gaines would soon be assured of the fact *that the Mexicans have already with them a number of Caddoes, some Cherokees, and Indians of other tribes which are under the protection and control of the United States. »♦. The proofs will, I have no doubt, be abundant by the time he reaches the Sabine; in which case he will cross and move against the aggressors.” Houston’s unpopular plan of retreat was defeated by his exasperated soldiers, who at length tacitly refused to go further east, and turned off, marching southward to San Jacinto to fight Santa Anna. Unwilling but powerless, Houston went with them. Ke had been silent when asked by Mosely Baker and others to say whether he intended to retreat to the Ueches or Sabine, when a denial would have revived his fallen prestige 51 ana his lost popularity.'' When Houston was at Groce’s Ferry, the Secretary of War, Rusk, brought the request of the government that Houston stand and fight, but Rusk joined Houston’s policy. Another military man, John J. Linn, who conferred with Houston at Groce’s Ferry, says: { ’He presented to me an outline of his ’Fabian policy,’ and stated his belief that the Mexican dictator would meet with a defeat as crushing and disastrous to his unholy cause as that which befell the great Napoleon in Russia, could he once be seduced sufficiently 52 far east.... I dissented very respectfully from his views.” Houston would not confess his desire to procure American aid. It is now evident. Henry A. Wise, who speaks of Jackson’s claim to the Neches, says that "Houston was retreating under this secret 53 understanding with Jackson. 1 ’ Anson Jones, a participant in the San Jacinto fight, says of Houston: On the morning he retreated from the Colorado, he had, by the official report of the day, over 1,000 effective men. It was well known that many more were on their way to join him, and that in ten days his force would certainly amount to 2,000, or perhaps more... Of ammunition we had no lack, nor of provisions. There was, therefore, nothing gained by the retreat; but a universal panic and the celebrated ’’runaway scrape* were caused by it. Had it not have been that the retreat was ’foreordained, ’ there was no reason for not fighting on the Colorado, which did not obtain with equal force for not fighting at Lynchburg (San Jacinto)... But on the contrary, the balance of argument be considered as largely in favor of the Colorado.' 4 Some of Houston’s enemies attributed the retreat to cowardice, but Jones was satisfied that it was under an understanding with Jackson, and he hardly needed to add that after the victory of San Jacinto Houston naturally tried to forget and to have it forgotten that he had meant to retreat further and to rest the Texan cause on other force than his own unaided. The incorporation of Texas into the Union was really set back by the battle of San Jacinto, which precluded the chance of annexation without the obstacle of a Congressional mode. xX Houston, it seems, had wished to throw Texas directly into the arms of the United States. Jones says graphically: The retreat of Gen. Houston to the country between the Sabine and the Heches, the pursuit of Santa Anna and his crossing the latter stream, would have been considered an invasion of the territory of the Unitdd States, by their President, and by the Taylor of that day, Gen. E. P. Gaines-- a conflict would have ensued between some of his troops and some of those of Santa Anna-- blood would have been spilled upon (disputed) American ground-- and ’war commenced by the act of Mexico!’ Then General Jackson would have accomplished What Mr. Polk subsequently did; Gen. Gaines would have been the ’second Cortez* instead of Gen* Scott, and the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo would have been signed in 1838, instead of 1848. Jackson’s desire for California was w r ell known to Jones. But one little circumstance intervened: This plan was defeated by the determination of the Texan troops, by which Gen. Houston was forced on the IJth of April, 1836, to deflect from the road to Hacogdoches, Gaines’ Berry, and Bort Jessup, and to take the one that led to San Jacinto* The affair at this place was one of those singularly fortuitous and accidental circumstances, by which ’the best laid schemes of mice or men’ are sometimes frustrated.- 0 After San Jacinto there was still a possibility that Mexico might subjugate Texas. But General Pilisola, next to the captured Santa Anna in command, lacked backbone for the undertaking and retreated, against Urrea’s advice, on the pretext that he still owed allegiance to Santa Anna, who, in order to save his life, had ordered the evacuation of Texas. The dishonor heaped on Mexico by her military chieftains, selfish and cowardly produced a deep bitterness, which no doubt helps account for Mexico’s reluctance to recognize Texas independence. The Mexicans as a race have been charged with being good beginners and poor finishers, and perhaps Santa Anna especially fits Houston’s witty parody-- ’’first in war, first in peace, and first in the heart of the country.” Had San Jacinto witnessed a Mexican victory the War with Mexico might have begun in 1836* Had Houston not crushed Santa Anna, say Benton and Catron, ’’Tennessee, Mississippi and Louisiana, would, within the next nine months.” The West was eager to avenge the massacres of Goliad and the Alamo and would have moved en masse against the Mexicans-- with the added motive of saving Texas to the American pioneer. Caleb Cushing said on May 23, 1836: I believed ... that there has existed, in parts of the United States, a settled purpose to sever Texas from the Mexican republic. I knew that the commanding general of the United State s on that front ier was collect ing troops, and preparing, by order of the Government , to take po st within the possessory limit s of Texa. s. ... If Santa Anna had beaten or driven before him the Americans in Texas, if a victorious army had approached the banks of the Sabine, or even of the Neche s, whatever might be the policy or wishes of the administration, whatever the • conduct of its officers, it would have been impossible to restrain the overflowing enthusiasm of the people of the Southwest, their military ardor, their sympathy in the cause of their kinsmen and fellow-citizens in Texas.s7 1 Bassett, Life of Jackson, 11, 677; Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 532; John Wharton to Houston, July, 1829, in S. B. Elliott, Sam Houston, 38. In 1830 Houston declared privately that he meant to set up "a two-horse republic" in Texas (A. M. Williams, Sam Houston, 75)* According to Henry A. Wise, one of those who believed that Houston was "sent" by Jackson in 1329 to try to seize Texas, "Houston at first affected a mind deseased, and put on the white-tanned skin of a pied heifer, and actually wore it on the streets of Nashville until he left the State forever" (Seven Decades of the Union, 148). — — — Jackson to Houston, June 21, 1829, in H. Yoakum, History of Texas, I, M. James, The Raven: A Biography of Som Houston, 177; G. Creel, Colossus in BuckgFipT' 60, 61. 3 Secretary Forsyth to Jackson, February 14, 1838, Jackson Papers. The May memorandum is given in Bassett, Jackson, 11, 677 • See the appendix on the Rhea letter. ———. ——_—_ _ ——_ Robert Mayo, Sketches of Eight Years in Washington (Baltimore, 1839), 119-122. — — — Adams, Memoir s, IX, 430, 431. . - Jackson’s "copy” addressed to Fulton, ’’Secretary of Florida,” December lb, 1830, is given in facsimile (in Jackson’s own hand) in Mayo, Fight Year s in Washington, opposite 125, along with facsimiles of Jackson’s two endorsements. The letter actually sent to Arkansas, and addressed to Fulton, "Secretary of Arkansas,” was found among Fulton’s papers in early 1839 and sent to Washington and deposited in the State Department; a copy of it, certified to be true, was sent Jackson in February, 1839, ana less yet in the Jackson Papers, Library of Congress, for a photostatic copy of which the writer is indebted to Dr. J. Franklin Jameson. Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV. 212, 213, gives a conglomerate version-- the body of the letter he prints is that of the facsimile "copy” from Mayo, while the inscription is taken from the certified copy of the supposed "original” found in Arkansas.” 7 Parton, Jackson, 111,656. 5 Adams’s Texas speech of June-July, 1838, namphlet 61, 62, 119. —- 9 Adams, Memoirs, IX, 430 (November, 1837); cf. X, 3 2 * Mayo was a reformer, and had constantly worried Jackson with complaints against unworthy government clerks. He was not an anti-slavery man (Eight Years in Washington, 177, 178). Jackson to Van Buren, January 23, 1838, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 529. 11 - ’ Jackson to Blair, January 16, 1838, in ibid., V, J 27• 12 Bull on to Howard, July 7, 1838, in Nat ional Intelligencer, July 21, 1838; Fulton to Blair, August 27, 1838, in Washington Globe, August 2% 1838. 13 Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, J4l note. 14 The Fulton letter has been treated by E. 0. Barker, ’’President Jackson and the Texas Revolution,” in Am. Hi st. Rev., XII, 797-803. Fulton to Jackson, January 11, 1038, cited by Barker, in * Hist. Bev. , XII, 801 note; Jackson to Fulton, January 23, IB3F, in Bassett, Opr. of Jackson, V, 531 > 532; Fulton to Forsyth, February 13, 1838, in ibid., V, 541 note. 16 Bassett, Cor♦ of Jackson, IV, 214, 21>. - Fulton to Jackson, August 21, 1839* Jackson Papers; copy kindly furnished the writer by Professor Barker. IS Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, %!• 19 Did Adams come to think or know that Jackson sent the letter to Pulton in 1833? He wrote in 1844 that he had watched the Texas "intrigue** "from the strictly confidential letter of Andrew Jackson, of 10 December, 1833> to the secretary, not governor, of Arkansas Territory, to that consummate device of the slave-holding democracy, the two-thirds rule of the late Democratic convention at Baltimore** (Adams to Miss A. Q. Thaxter, July 29, 1844, in A. H. Abel and P. J. Klingsberg, A Side-Light on Anglo-American Relations, 1839- 18^8: the Tappan Papers, 14). 20 ‘ Butlet to Houston, December IJ, 184 J, in Archives of the Texas State Library. A plan was laid before Buchanan, Walker and Benton in 1847 to place Iturbide at the head of Mexico as a means of bringing about a favorable peace, but it was not received with enthusiasm. Secretary Walker would have nothing interfere with his hope of annexing "all of Mexico” (letter of a Mexican gentleman to ---, c. December, 1847, in Trist Papers, Library of Congress). Iturbide was living at Philadelphia at the time. — Butler to McLane, July 26, 1833, in H. Ex. Docs., 2j Cong., 2 Sess., Ko. 351, P* 483; Butler to Forsyth, February 8, 1836, in Butler Papers. Butler v/rote McLane: *we are calumniated and misrepresented to this administration as entertaining view towards Texas of a character hostile to the territorial integrity of Mexico, and of secretly abetting and en- couraging the citizens of that country to throw off their allegiance to Mexico.” ' - ■—— • — Jackson to Butler, October 30> 1833, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 221. Jackson had on October 1 written Butler (ibid., V, 213, 214): ”We cannot restrain our citizens from emigrating to any country they please, we can and will restrain all from arming and raising troops within our Territory. This is all the executive power can do.” ?3 House Reports, 22 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 5^2; United States Telegraph, April-May, 1832; Parton, Jackson, 111, 385-3^7; Jame s? The Raven, 133-135; McKenney, Memoirs, I, 207-223. G. Foreman, Pioneer Days in the Early Southwest, 185-188. — Two years later, when Houston was again at VZashington in the summer of 1834; 'Jackson, in his intermittent role of nullifier, remitted to Houston without explanation a fine of $5OO assessed in the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia in 1832 in the Stanbery case. Mayo is unkind enough to suggest that perhaps Houston had only "constructively” paid the fine in 1832 (Eight Year s in Washington , 128) . 25 When Hall J. Kelley was recruiting his much-advertised Oregon Company in 1832, Houston told Kelley, probably facetiously: W I have almost made up my mind to go with you to Oregon, and engage in the East India trade” (Kelley’s Hi story of the Settlement of Oregon, 112, 113; cited in E. Y. Powell, 4 Hall Jackson Kelley/* in Quart. of the Oregon Hist. Soc., XVIII, 43) ♦ pz ' Houston to Prentiss, June % 1832, in Houston-Prentiss Papers, Archives of the University of Texas. Cf. same to same, April 8, 1832. ——s7— —- Houston to D. Jackson, July 12, 1832, in Houston- Prentiss Papers. 28 Houston to Prentiss, August 18, 1332, in Houston- Prentiss Papers. 29 /G. B. Lester/, The Lif e of Sam Houst on; the Only Authentic Memoir , 64 note. 3O - - Jackson to Butler, February 25, 1832, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 409, 410; Williams, Houston, 76, 77• As early as October 19, 1829, Jackson had written Butler concerning Texas: n lts inhabitants will make an effort to set up a free Government the moment they have the power 1 * (ibid > , IV, 82). 31 ‘ “ Buell, Andrew Jackson, 11, 3?0, 351; n 0 source is given. 32 Anson Jones was told this by J. V/. Houston at Washington in April, 1839; J. W. Houston was present at the interview in 1832 in which Jackson told Houston of his design (Jones, Memoranda and Official Correspondence relating the Republic of Texas, 32/82, 83). “It was anticipated,” Jones thinks, “that Santa Anna would not regard this pseudo claim, and would, in pursuit of the Texans, if the retreating policy were long enough continued, cross the Neches, which would have afforded the Government of the United States a pretext for making common cause with Texas, and produced the same state of things vhich was brought about ten years later by Gen. Taylor's advance to the Rio Grande, that is, ’war by act of Mexico,’ with precisely the same want of truth.” 33 , H. Bruce, Houston, /o• 34 John Van Lessen to Houston, August 3> 1832, in .. C. Crane, Life and Select Literary Remains of Sam Houston, 48, 49* -5— —-—- — A. Hynd, ’’General Sam Houston,” in Century Magazine, XXVIII, 500, 501. Crane, Ho us uon , 46, 47* State Hist, Assn. Quart., I, 228. 3K ———— Burton’s "Experiences in Texas,” in Gulick, Lamar Papers, I, 295* 39 Houston to Prentiss, Washington, April 20, 1034, in Houston-Prentiss Papers. 40 G. V. Feather st one ha ugh, Excur si on through .Slave States, 11, 161. 41 Mississi pp i a s a Px* o'/ in co > Territory a no. State ; 42 "Proceedings of the General Convention,* IJ, in H. P. N. Gammel, The Laws of Texas, 1822-1897, 1, 489. 43 . Poreman, Pioneer Rays in the Southwest, 204-206; Yoakum, History of Texas, 11, 3287 44 On the causes of the Texas Revolution see Barker, Mexico and Texas, 1821-1835* . T — - Austin to M- B. Lamar, December J, 1336, in Barker, The Austin Papers, 111, 469 • To — Santa Anna’s letter of March 8, 1846, in Mayer, War between Mexico ana the Unite a St aye s , 4\ , 5$ ♦ - Gorostiza alleged that Calhoun, Preston and Campoell were among the Southern men who ’’worked with ardor* to have Hamilton put at the head of the Texan forces (Gorostiza to the Mexican Government, July 12, 1836, in Ar phiyjo Diploma tica Hexicana , Ho. 8, p. 12?). See Mi le s ; Register, L, 310, 311; Hamilton to Austin, June 28, 1338, in Barker, The Austin Paper s, 111, 373» 37^• It said by Lamar that Austin, and not Henry Smith, would have been elected Provisional Governor of Texas if he had not provoked Houston’s hostility by writing to the General Council in late 1835 suggesting that it “obtain the services of some Genl, from the U S of reputation who would have the confidence of the people here-- he said he was induced to write such because Houston declared he did not want nor would he have the command; when he wrote the letter Houston took it in high dudgeon; opposed Genl Austin as Govr . in revenge & had him defeated* (H. Smither, Lamar Papers, VI, 173» 174)* - [c. E. Lester], The Life of Sam Houston; the Only Authentic Memoir of Him Ever Published, 92* 49 Texas and the Texans, 11, 292* This is also the opinion of'H. H. Bancroft: ”To lure the enemy to the banks of the . Sabine, far from his base of supplies and source of recruits, and give him battle on a broa-der land, where the Texans could confidently expect military aid from the United States, was matchless strategy 11 (North Mexican States and Texas , 11, z , 381) . L. J. Wortham, History of Texas, 111, 284-286. My italic s• 51 —— Testimony of his soldiers in Barker, ’’The San Jacinto Campaign,” in Texas State Hist. Assn. Quart., IV, 302, 312 313, 331, 332; Wortham, History of lexers, 111, 284, 290; C. R- Wharton, The Republic of Texas,“ 1~4 &; Williams, Houston, 219, 210. It was widely stated in American papers in the summer of 1836 that Houston ’’retreated before the Mexicans, till he was compelled to fight* (Lester’s Life of Houston: the Only Authentic Memoir, 3°7; of. 105-10^" 52 Linn, Reminiscence s of Fifty Year s in Texas, 252* 33 Seven Decades of the Union, 148-152• 33 Jones, Memoranda and. Official Correspondence, 85, 86. ”In reality, San Jacinto retarded the ’reincorporation’ of Texas into the Northern Union, because, without war between her (the United States) and Mexico, the obstacles to annexation were insuperable,” says a Mexican historian (Pereyra, 149. Jones, Memoranda and Official Correspondence, 82-94. David G. Burnet, a personal enemy of Houston’s regarded his course as cowardly and devoid of plan: ”Sam Houston has been generally proclaimed the hero of San Jacinto. Ho fiction of the novelist is farther from the truth. [Houstonj Vas the only man on the battlefield that deserved censure. Was absolutely compelled into the fight.... Houston only lacked the genius to become another Alcibiades. Had all the vices without the virtues of the Athenian. Just before and immediately after the Battle of San Jacinto he was universally detested. The army regarded him as a military fop, and the citizens were disgusted at his miserable inbecility. But when wounded and visited Hew Orleans was treated there as a Hero and accounts of his reception were circulated throughout Texas and complete reaction set in, and Sam Houston never worthy to be called a brave man or a wise man became the hero of San Jacinto and the Second President of the Republic* 1 (Burnet to Mary Austin Holly, April 2?, 1844, in Cal/endar of 3,. R. Vagner Manuscripts at Yale University, 7b, 77, in Archives of the University of Texas). Burnet was the first President of Texas, being succeeded by Houston. - - Debs. in Cong., 24 Cong., 1 Sess., 3839* W italics, denoting the popular, and probably true, interpretation of the orders to General Gaines. CHAPTER VIII JACKSON'S IDEAS CONCERNING TEXAS Jackson, it seems, thought that Texas might still be considered, a rightful possession of the United. States, awaiting but a good, occasion to be taken under American jurisdiction, after the West Florida precedent. As early as 1824 he made it understood that he would try to recover the Texas "ceded” in 1819 if he should be elected President, and at a reception he said within earshot of the Mexican charg£ (who found the American ambition for Texas "without limits") ’’that the united states ought to have spared no means of obtaining it; and ... that the way to get territory was to occupy it and after taking possession enter into treaties"—the way of the Florida procurement A Those who would off-handedly exempt Jackson of connivance at Houston and of unscrupulous views regarding the acquisition of Texas would seem to forget Jackson's course in Florida in 1313. His belated and erroneous claim that lie had had a hint of sanction from President Monroe seems only to emphasize his unscrupulousness. Jackson was always rather circumspect in his public statements and it was late in life that he publicly expressed in proper person the sentiments that he probably had always held concerning Texas, though even during his Presidency his enlarged views of the right fill western boundary of the Louisiana Purchase "were well known to his confidential friends," to whom it was no secret that he had "no very pronounced conviction that the Spaniards or Mexicans had any title east of the Rio Grande.” Thus in speaking to 3. A. Hitchcock about Texas in early 13-36 he ’’insisted on the principle that no treaty could yield any portion of our 2 terri to iy In his Texas letters of 1843-44 Jackson inquired if : - ■ . . . ./• ■ - _ Mexico has any right to the territory of Texas, or any cause for resisting the extension to the citizens of Texas of the guarantees of citizenship as intended in the treaty of 1803. When did Mexico acquire any title to the territory of Texas? The title of France was conveyed to us, and that title was recognized by all the civilized worlcTas the only g ood one. Did we conveyitto and she did not convey it to Mexico. How then does Mexico derive her title? She pretends to none except what results from the confederation which was formed in 18 24, and founded on revolution ... 3 He defended our right to Texas under the treaty of 1303, and declared the treaty of 1319 ’’void and of no force”: ’’The treaty of 1303 ... remains ... in force as the supreme law of the land, ... and no subsequent treaty with any other nation could free us from our obligations.” It was our duty to take and defend every inch of territory ”as far as 4 the ancient limits of Louisiana.” Texas, he said, again, was ’’wantonly and corruptly ceded from us ...we must regain Texas peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must.” Such logic deserved Adams’s sarcasm: Before the rebellion of Mexico against Spain, says the hero -- Spain, by the treachery of our government, stole Texas from us. By stealing Texas from Mexico, now, we do but retake our own. There is, however, this difference between the two cases, to the disadvantage of the hero’s logic ... the hero punishes Mexico for the sins of Spain, or, our for surrendering our property to That these were just about Jackson’s views as early as 1829 seems shown by the fact that they were the views intimated in Senator Benton’s ”re-annexationist” articles in the St. louis Beacon in the autumn of 1829, essays planned with Jackson in 6 the spring and widely republished in Democratic papers. Holding that Mexico had gained independence before the ratification of the Florida treaty, Benton implied that the treatymight be considered non-binding as to the western limit. He declared the treaty as far as the western "boundary was concerned ••• [to be] an act of fraud upon the United States and of insult upon Mexico." Benton’s claim that we had a "natural" right "by the laws of God" to all the waters of the Mississippi Valley was particularly irritating to Mexico. Benton gave half a dozen reasons why Mexico should willingly cede the "white elephant? Texas, and appeared to take Mexico’s acquiescence for granted. Alaman noted indignantly Jackson’s campaign to set up a "claim" to Texas: The public prints in those states, including those which are more immediately under the influence of their government, are engaged in discussing the right they imagine they have to the country as far as the Rio Bravo. Handbills are printed on the same subject, and thrown into general circular tion, whose object is to persuade and convince the people of the utility and expediency of the meditated project. Some of them have said that Providence had marked out the Rio Bravo as the natural boundary of those states, which has induced an English writer to reproach then with an attempt to made Providence the author of their usurpations: but what is most remarkable is, that they have commenced that discussion precisely at the same time they saw us engaged in repelling the Spanish invasion, believing that our attention would, for a long time, be thereby withdrawn from other things • 7 It appears, however, that the "re-annexat ion" and "re-purchase" campaign was planned before the Spanish invasion of Mexico from Cuba and that the invasion had a restraining influence,if any, upon Jackson# Jackson had a belief that the annexation of Texas was necessary to the peace of the United States and Mexico. In his notes on instructions &r Poinsett, August 13, 1829, Jackson wrote: It is easy to perceive that the causes of collision with the Mexican authorities, will be constantly increasing, and. if they are not obviated in a short time by the purchase of the Territory as far as the desert west of the Nuesis, our national safety must pay for it hereafter an immense price, peaceably or forcibly ... this is the most favorable time to obtain it on reasonable terms. 3 On October 7, 1830, he instructed Anthony Butler privately; And you may with all the frankness of a soldier urge the policy of adopting the Grand Prarie, as a permanent boundary ...for I say to you confidentially, whenever the present boundary is run and our western Citizens find the imposition that has been practised upon them, no power can restrain them, and they will be sufficiently numerous to declare themselves independent and maintain it... Our future peace with Mexico depends upon extending our boundary farther west, And if you cannot get it to the grand prararie obtain to the Brasos... But candour dictates the fact should be disclosed that the government possessing the Mississppi must at some day possess all its tributary streams Therefore the gran! prairTe including this would be boundary that would give permanent peace to the two Republics: Our right by the Louisiana Treaty being once complete to all this boundary and more. The citizens of the U. States will never be contented untill this boundary is acquired, when they become informed it was wantonly given away to keep down the properity and growing political influence of the west ... 9 As Benton had already assured the country in his essays that Adams had ceded Texas gratuitously in 1319, "the imposition” which Jackson claims was practised on the people and of which they have not yet learned is doubtless a reference explained by the mysterious disclosure made to Jackson in 1329 and 1332 by George W. Srving, Monroe’s Minister to Spain. Concerning this supposed "imposition” upon the country, committed by Adams at the time of the Florida treaty, Jackson was for many years curiously reticent• In his famous Texas letter to A. V. Brown, February 12, 1343, which was not published until March of 1344, Jackson said, to lend color to the ”re-annexationist” cause: Soon after my election, in 1329, it was made known to me by Mr. Blrwin [and Irving set something down in writing on December 17, 1329, and again on February 5, 1332], formerly our minister at the Court of Madrid, that whilst at that Court he had laid the_foundat ion of a treaty with Suain for the cession of the Floridas and the settlement of the boundary of Louisiana, fixing the western limit of the latter at the Rio Grande, agreeably to the understanding of France; that he had written home to our government for powers to complete and sign this negotiaion; but that, instead of receiving such authority, the negotiation was taken out of his hands and transferred to Washington, and a new treaty was there concluded, by which the Sabine, and not the Rio Grande, was recognized and established as the boundary of Louisiana* Finding that these statements were true, and that our government did really give up that Important territory, vhen it was at its ontion to retain it, _I was filled with astonishment. The right of the territory was obtained from Francg? —oWtn stood ready to acknowledge it to the Rio Grande, and yet the authority asked by our Minister to insert the boundary was not only withheld, but in lieu of it, a limit was adopted which stripped us of the whole of the vast country lying between the two rivers. Writing to Lewis in 1844, he was more bold: "In 1829-30 Mr. Irwin ... placed a copy in my hands of the correspondence between him and the Spanish Minister at Madrid, which shwi. that he had negotiated a treaty by #iich Spain recognized the ancient limits of Louisiana to the Rio Grande and ceded Florida for the sum paid." Adams withheld authority to sign it. "I at once knew that Mr. Adams’ object was to keep down the 11 growing political ascendancy of the South and West." Well might Adams, who had not wished to resign Texas, have been incensed by this mass of questionable assertions, which reopened the breach. Irving had in reality merely perceived some chance in 1818 to get the Colorado as the western boundary, even though Spain had refused this proposal, when the negotiations were suspended at Madrid. 12 And it was Spain -- not Adams, as Jackson would at least insinuate — who suspended the negotiations at Madrid, as the consequence of news of Jackson 1 s filibuster into Sast Florida, which nearly plunged the country into war. He would apparently forget that, and remember things less susceptible of proof. Unfortunately perhaps for Jackson’s reputation, Irving’s account written in December, 1329, did not claim that the Minister could have obtained from Spain more than the Colorado, if that much. A. V. Brown so confessed, belatedly. The fact that Jackson's understanding in 1829 was that Irving had only hoped to get the Colorado seems evident: Benton's re-annexation" essays published for the administration in the autumn of 1829 (which denounce Adams for yielding Texas despite Onis's instructions) even assert on the basis of documents then jmown that ISrving's Colorado proposal was rejected by Spain. 13 But in January-February, 1332, President Jackson began declaring privately that Irving had stated to him that he had negotiated a "treaty” with Spain giving us the Rio grande as boundary and that Adams had cut it off and completely concealed the matter, taking the Sabine most unpatriotically; he declared this with the connivance of 3rving, who at this t ime wrote for Jacks on a new "stat ement” about his Spanish negotiations. It was perhaps no mere coincidence that by February, 1832, Jackson believed that Texas would at last revolt within six months, considered seizing a revolted Texas on the pretext of "self-defense” against the border Indians, and looked behind the Florida treaty to 14 the Purchase treaty of 1303 as a legal justification. This unqualified falsehood came at once (in late January, 1332) to Adams’s ear; and he naturally supposed that the ”Rio (Irande treaty” claim was Srving’s, and denied it in his diary. Adams was thus peculiarly fitted to speak critically, if harshly, of this claim upon its belated public appearance* In 1844, when Jackson at last made the claim publicly Adams still believed the deliberate guilt in 3rving rather than in Jackson, who "cited" Irving. looking into his diplomatic correspondence with Hrving, he thought he saw the key to Irving’s deception in a few lines in Irving’s dispatch of May 3, 1317: "They were a supplication to me from irving to raise him xrom the hell of Madrid to the heaven of Paris." 15 the deliberate deception in the charge was really Jackson’s might never have become known to Adams had Jackson’s letter on Texas not been accompanied to the press with a note by A. V. Brown, to whom Jackson had now shown one or both of the written statements by ISrving. In the note Brown confessed, with a brave effort to shield the "Old Hero”: "That this boundary [the Bio Grande] could have was doubtless the belief of our minister; but the offer of the Spanish government was probably to the Colorado," as shown by Irving’s papers. (It was really Irving’s, not Spain s offer.) Adams was quick to inquire why the word "probably" was used by any one who had read Irving’s manuscripts; why if only "Colorado" was said therein had Jackson said "Bio Grande"; and why were Irving’s manuscripts, still in Jackson’s hands, not published. Were the manuscripts true, equivocal or lying? These, it would seem, were hard and invidious questions: for it took the best talent of Jackson’s letter-writing friends, A. V. Brown and C. J. Ingersoll, simply to ignore or evade them by arguments ad hominem, by return thrusts at Adams, connected with Adams’s ’’base” cession of Texas in 1319 and his insincerity in defending it was exhumed: Adams’s instruct ions to Craham in 1313, Onis’s boast of having despoiled "the Yankees," Clay’s surprise and indignation on discovering the gratuitousness of the cession, and so on. Why Adams in particular was held responsible nojone ventured to explain. Adams was determined to sound the depth of this apparent conspiracy and fraud of Jackson 1 s; he insisted on a committee of investigation and put through a resolution calling on the President for the unpublished Srving correspondence, the appearance of which would quite refute the claim that Irving could have obtained even the Colorado. A diligent search failed to reveal the Irving correspondence in the archives that is, for some time —, so that the pro-Texas investigating committee, headed by Jackson’s friend, the sharp lawyer 0. J. Ingersoll, mustered up the boldness to persevere equivocally in Jackson’s claim/ The Committee through Ingersoll reported to the House that the revelation wnich the committee will make, from unquestionable intelligence, discloses the incredible fact that Texas was yielded by the treaty to Spain, she was perfectly willing that our title to Louisiana should have been confirmed, at least over all the country beyond the Sabine to the Colorado, if not to the Bravo. Mr. George W. Irving’s confidential communication to president Jackson, of the 17th December, 1829, repeated the sth of February, 1832, proves this indubitably. Strangely enough, the second Irving affidavit — confessed to exist —-was not produced by the Ingersoll committee; and in the matter of claim there was some backsliding apparent through the dust. Where was now the "Rio Grande treaty"? "This incredible fact the committee refused to reveal” after all, as Adams said, "not because it was incredible, but because it was not true." And why was living’s written statement of December, 1329, made at Jackson* s request ; and why was it "reproduced" in a new affidavit by Irving on February 5, 1332? It may seem that a new and somewhat different version of "testimony" was now needed by Jackson. Ingersoll had to explain the raison d’etre of the second statement, the very mention of which was inadvertent, and he confessed that Irving had been approached in early 1832 by W. B. Lewis, one of Jackson’s unscrupulous managers, who asked Irving if he had a copy of his statement given to the President in 1329. Srving had none. Lewis said that Jackson had "lost" the manuscript of 1329 and wanted a duplicate or copy of it. He had for some reason forgotten its substance, or he desired a new statement, or else he for some reason wanted the old one in writing. Irving was obliging, and perhaps his "memory" was prompted by Lewis. On February 5, 1832, in a letter to Jackson, Irving says he "furnishes &im, accordingly, what he thinks an exact copy, (a few verbal alterations excepted), of that which he had made and submitted pursuant to his desire, on the 17th of December, 1329. There are some matters in this paper, especially that in page 18, marked with a star, which may possibly arrest Andrew Jackson, president, &c. i>c ( S attention. If any further developments or explanations should be necessary, Mr. Irving will be happy to receive the president’s orders" (Adams’s paraphrase). This letter from Irving to Jackson, of February 5, 1832, was brought forward by the committee; but the new, accompanying statement never appeared. And why was Jackson anxious for it to be a "copy” of that of 1829 — except to use it as if i t were the statement made in 1829? Doubtless it contained what Jackson desired, throught lewis — a false assert ion or color to th e claim he then beg an circulating privately, in 1332, that the Rio Grande had been obtainable by Irving in Spain in 1313. Only thus can be well explained either Jackson’s private and public falsehood of the "Rio Srande treaty" — for Jackson always took care to have extenuating "proofs" to be shown in support of his untruths — or the fact that Irving’s affidavits were never produced by the Jacksonian circle. Srving and Jackson had, in short, says Adams, conspired to bring out a fraud. Where was the first BJrving affidavit in 1832, when the second was sought on the pretext that the first was lost? "Ay, what has become of it? asked Adams. "Why it was suppressed, and a counterfeit substituted [in 1832] in its place," he infers. This seems the only reasonable inferenceunless, indeed, the first had really been lost*. When the Rrving correspondence was at length located in the Department of State archives and transmitted to the House on June 14, 1844, it provided "abundant evidence to falsify the pretension of G-eorge V/. Irving that he could have 18 negotiated a boundary even to the Colorado." The Jacksonites weze so greatly mortified, as utterly to lose their balance, crying that Adams had hitherto somehow concealed the correspondence, so that they would march blithely still with falsehood to their undoing• A. V. Brown finally admitted in his ”Reply to Adams, December 14, 1844, that drying 1 s written account of ”1829” did. state the Colorado as the most that had been obtainable* It seems plain enough that the ”Rio Crande treaty” claim was Jackson’s own — though he may have induced Irving in 1832 to give him some grounds in his new statement for the fraudulent claim. The Irving manuscripts do not now seem to exist. This particular venture was not as happy as some others by Jackson, who at last also beat a reluctant public retreat, insisting more obscurely in his second reply to Adams: I believed, from the disclosures made to me of the transactions of 1819, that Mr. Adams surrendered the interests of the United States when he took the Sabine river as the boundary between us and Spain, when he might have gone to the Colorado, if not to the Rio del N G rte. Such was the natural inference from the facts stated by Mr. Irving; ,and there is nothing in the account now given of the negotiation to alter this impression. 1$ He no longer believes that Irving told him that he had had the Rio Grande in his hand, but retreats to the Colorado; but what a clever ambiguity for the sake of appearances was that "if not." He still denounced Adams. The" Rio Grande treaty of 1813" seems to have been manufactured by Jackson before or in 1332, probably to justify the prospective annexation of Texas, and its public appearance in Jackson f s Texas letters of 1843-44 was well calculated to further the cause of annexation by defaming Adams, who had been its chief opponent since 1836. Adams with some justice complained of this Conspiracy of Andrew Jackson, Aaron Vail FVenable] Brown, Georgs W. 3rving, and Charles J. Ingersoll, with their coadjutors and tools, to ruin my good name and fabricate a fable to justify the robbery of Texas from Mexico, by the pretense that Texas had been by me treacherously surrendered to Spain But in 1844-45 the annexation of Texas was not robbery of Mexico except in the ax-grinding language of its opponents. Jackson perhaps largely refers to his "re-annexation" publicity campaign begun in 1829 when he says on the eve of annexation: The dismemberment of our territory in 1319, by the failure to execute the guaranty in the treaty of 1303, has but recently attracted public attention. But it has been silently operating, and is now exerting a great and momentous influence on our system of government. 21 j - - Benton said in his public statement of February 10, 1825, that he knew that Jackson, if elected, ’’could expel the British from the Upper Missouri and protect our Fur trade; that he could expel them likewise from the Columbia river and protect our lights and interests beyond the Rocky mounta ins;* that he was in favor of giving us a road to Mexico, and preventing the Indians from robbing and murdering our citizens while traveling upon it; that he woul d send a military force to the Grossing of the Arkansas and endeavor to remove the boundary line between the u« and Mexico to its old place on the dividing ridge between the waters of the Mississippi and of the Rio del Norte” (St. louis Mis sour i Republ i can, March 14 , 1825; quoted in Pubs, of the Nebraska State feist. Soo ~ XX, 39) . J. A. Torrens Mexican government, January 26, 1324, in La piploniacia Mexicans, 11, *74. Torrens’s "los Unidos nd debian haber per dona do medio para ob tenerla” fs t ransTate d inaccurately "the governmenT"ought n ever have lost the opportunity to obtain it” in Manning, Diplomatic Relations between the United States and Mexico, . ।...———.——— _ - — ■■ ■ ■ । .«■ —— —.... — -— O Claiborne, Mississippi as a Province, Territorv and State, I, 431; 3. A. Hitchcock, "Fifty Years in Samp and I'o9. 3 Jackson to Moses Dawson, August 23, 1844, in Dollar Clobe (Washington), September 18, 1344, p. 259. 4 R. Mcelroy, The Winning of the Far West, 7,8, 60, 71, 72. 5 Adams’s Weymouth Speech, October 30, 1844, in Miles ’ Register, LXVII, 156. 6 St. Louis Beacon, October 21, 1829; Cong ♦ globe, 28 Cong., 2 Sess., App., 484. Benton seems to have been offered the Ministry to Mexico (Prancis Baylies to , April, 1829, in Mass. Hist. Soc. Procs. , XL VI, 332) . His essays were signed H Arne ri canus ” an d "ta 'Salle .” ? , Alaman’s report of 1330, in H. Docs., 25 2 Sess., Ho. 351, p. 317. 3 ~ Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 6], 61 • $ Jackson to Butler, October 7, 1330, in Bassett, Cor, of Jacks oru 183. w Parton, J a cks on, 111, 653-660; Niles 1 Rgg is ter, LXVI, 70. (My italics! 11 Jackson to lewis, March 22, 1844, in Mcelroy, Winning of the Far West, 2, 3• Marshall, Western Boundary of Louisiana, 57; Channing, History of the United "Slates, v, 339 note. Frving actually withdrew hTs "Colorado proposal. 6n his negotiations. 3ee Am. State Paps ~ For. Reis., IV. 512-524. Benton's "Americanus," Ho. 1 (1829(, reprinted in the Washington globe, May 2, 1844. - Adams, Memoirs, VIII, 464 (January 31, 1332); Jackson to Anthony Butler, February 25, 1832, in Bassett, Cor. of Jacks on, IV, 409, 410. Adams wrote on January 31, 1832: "Mr. Johnson Senator from Louisiana asked, me if I knew anything of a treaty negotiated, by Q. W. Irving, in Spain, by which the Rio del Norte was to be the boundary between the United. States and. Mexico. I said, there certainly never had. been such a treaty. He said, the President had assured them that there was, and that the proof of it was in the Department of Stat e’. ' T said - 1 had no TcuUT this was one of G. W. Irving*s lies, as there was not a greater liar upon earth; that I was persuaded that the only color for it that could be produced would be a letter from him written after the conclusion of the treaty with Onis, in which, detailing some interview that he had with the Spanish Minister, Pizarro, he had said something from which living pretended to infer that they would give up the boundary to the Rio Bravo. Johnston said ... that the President believed in this treaty of Irving’s" (my italics). Thus Jackson began making the false claim be fore he procured the new statement from Urving, on February 5, 1832. Why, if Jackson really had discovered "proof of it ...in the Department of State,” did he seek a new' affidavit from Irving and rely solely upon it, never adducing his pretended ”proof” in the oi at e”Hsep ar tment ? "TF"~ " Adams, Memoirs, XII, 33, 145. 16 ’ ——— In the autumn of 1343 Jackson had put Irving’s statements into the hands of Tazewell, diairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to use in the Senate to aid in gaining the retrocession of Texas; probably Tazewell did not like their nature, for he returned them, saying that "it was now too late to take any step in the business." Yet the Texas question was just rising again. The living statements were shown also to Secretary Upshur. McSlroy, The Winning of the Far West, 7, 61 note. n Adams’ Address at Weymouth Landing, October 13, 1844, in Niles’ Register, LXVII, 158, 159, treats the whole affair of 1344. Adams believed that Irving’s object in helping Jackson was still the legation at Paris: "Another vacancy of the mission to Paris is soon to occur; but the visions of heaven are again doomed to disappointment. An office of charge d T affaires to the Ottoman Porte, if not as tormenting as the birds of Tytius, or the rolling rock of Sisyphus, is, atjleast, as bad as the purgatory of the Romish church. Ur.'lrving abandons the pursuit; creeps back to Paris, and there vegetates in the garret of some hot el garni to this day. In the meantime, the hero of the hermitage takes especial care not to lose the revelations again. He keeps them twelve long years" (Niles 1 Register, LXVII, 159) . ' "TT" ————— Adams, Memoirs, XII, 54. 19 Jackson to Robert Armstrong, October 22, 1844, in Niles * Begis ter, LXVII, 171• TU — Adams, Memoirs, XII, 34 (October, 7, 1344); of. ibid.,73. TC ~ See note 31. CHAPTER IX JACKSON AND ANTHONY BUTLER When trying to purchase Texas in 1828, Poinsett was assured that ”a dismemberment of the Mexican territory, which is prohibited by the constitution,” was impossible. He signed a treaty accepting the line of 1819, which lay in the State Department unratified when Jackson became President. Colonel Anthony Butler, an old friend of Jackson’s, appeared in Washington in August of 1829, to urge the purchase of Texas, where he had interests in land. He gave an elaborate paper on Texas to the Secretary of State, and asked to interview the President, who was quite willing to talk about the acquisition of Texas and wrote Van Buren: The constitutional question can easily be gotten over, two millions added to the one already offered will amend the Mexican Constitution, and to obtain it to the west of the Nueces to the grand prararie or desart, I would go as far as five millions. 1 Butler suggested that the Sabine of the Florida treaty was really the Neches —an idea which Jackson may have believed (by some curious process of reasoning) but which he much more likely merely countenanced conveniently thenceforth 2 Butler suggested also that ’’the belligerent attitude of Spain towards the Mexicans is not calculated to make any proposition by which they can obtain money less acceptable.” Jackson made Butler the bearer of ’’secrete” instructions to Poinsett. Five millions might be offered for all of ’’Texas,” proportionate sums for smaller slices. It is not very likely that Jackson thought that Mexico, so long hostile to the idea of selling Texas, would sell it now'; but no means were to be spared that might attain the prize. Jackson was surely not surprised to hear from Poinsett, shortly after Butler’s departure, that there was no hope whatever of procuring Texas without quarreling with Mexico and driving her into a ’’more strict alliance with some European power.” Commodore Porter arrived from Mexico soon after, bringing verbal dispatches from P o insett, and the seed-corn, 3 as will be seen, of a new phase of our Mexican relations. The request of the Mexican Minister for Poinsett’s recall (October 17) was anticipated. In a ’’private and confidential” letter of October 10 Jackson conveyed to Butler the office of chargd, with power to assume the duties of the American legation on Poinsett’s departure. Jackson commended to Butler the negotiation for Texas, suggesting that he mighfe aggravate Mexico’s apprehension of the danger of Amer ican f ilibust ei^s ’ invading Texas and point out to Mexico her crying need for money in view of the Spanish invasion. 4 In confidence, the President continued that Commodore Porter told him that the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs or the Minister of the Treasury, perhaps both gentlemen, had obtained a large grant of land in Texas.... This circumstance may be made to favour the negotiation for the cession by stipulating for the surrender of this grant to the United States , at a fair price, as a part of the five millions to be given for the whole province. This must be an honest transaction, however, not a violation of your general instructions, to regard no grant as legalized, which at the time of cession, shall have any condition to be complied with.... I scarcely ever knew a Spaniard who was not the slave of averice, and it is not improbable that this weakness may be worth a good Seal to us, in this case. Be cautious, and while you process great confidence in those around you, and with whom you have to act, be the possessor of your own Secretes. Butler at some time, perhaps in 1833, endorsed this letter: n Gen. Jackson. Remarkable communication. n Jackson’s words suggested to Butler the idea of bribery, but they did not propose bribery, for the liberal purchase of the above-mentioned claim was to be made from the five millions and in an open treaty, where the good land claims were to be expressly designated from the bad, so as to obviate the speculations so troublesome in Florida. Jackson, for instance, wrote Butler on March 23, 1830: ”1 have to repeat if you obtain the cession, that all private grants except those in which the conditions are fulfilled must be set aside. I have no knowledge of but one of this character and that is Austin’s". 5 Did Jackson intend that all the holders of unfulfilled grants should be reimbursed? Butler says that he understood Jackson as suggesting bribery here; yet Butler’s moral perceptions were not acute or ruling-- a fact that explains much that follows. Jackson’s letter displays a contemptuous readiness to use the Spanish weakness for money that is hardly above criticism, but it is equally apparent that he would have the influence of money upon individuals exerted in a legal, ’’honest’ 1 transaction a s far as it involved the American government. Whether Butler mentally observed this important distinction or not, he assumed that it would be agreeable to the President to pledge cash gratuities to Mexican officials to buy a treaty of cession. Even this did not greatly involve the American government, for Butler’s project, never concluded, was never acted upon at Washington. Butler grew bolder with time and had to be severely taught by Jackson that he must not involve this government in any private diversion which the Mexican administrators might arrange of part of the five millions. But did Butler have Jackson’s consent to use shady methods on his own responsibility? Butler in his letter of January 5, 1830, perhaps inquired, in regard to Jackson’s suggestion that Mexican avarice might be useful, just to what extent the giving of "gifts" might be allowed; at any rate he proposed some method that did not entirely displease Jackson, who responded: "Should you enter upon a negotiation of boundary it will be proper for you to pursue the course, with regard to yourself, mentioned in your private letter." 6 If Butler received express permission to intrigue on his own responsibility it would well explain the boldness of his subsequent hints to Jackson as to his methods and his always taking Jackson’s sanction for granted. It would explain, too, Butler’s "recollection," as given confidently to Jackson in 1833, "that you had instructed me to use the money at my discretion. " If Jackson’s language conveyed the idea of bribery to Butler, Jackson himself may well have felt impeachable, for he concluded his letter: "When you have read this P. 8. and my private letter you will burn them both... not being accustomed to diplomacy these might be stolen from you and make a handle against this government.” The postscript instructed Butler, furthermore, to show his ’’general instructions,” which omitted mention of Texas, ’’very confidentially” and of his own ’’free will” to the Mexican administrators to win their confidence. ”lt is all important that these instructions are shown to them of your own mere will and begging at the same time that it may not be [made] known to us —but in such a manner as to induce a belief that it must be kept a profound secret from you ~rj government, as on that event it would destroy you.” The interminable “general instructions” to Butler, October 16, 1829, form a very curious document. It seems to show that Jackson either had a gratuitously harsh and quarrelsome attitude towards Mexico which blinded him to fact, or else that he deliberately misrepresented our relations with Mexico. l7 It is in this document that we find the remarkable statement, typical of the whole dispatch: "The idea of military invasion of the Mexican territory, has never entered into the imagination of the United States, nor, it is believed, of any one of their citizens.” When Butler reached Mexico City on December 19, 1829, Jackson 1 s purpose was well known. El Sol surprised the charg4 by naming the very sum to be offered for Texas. Butler’s handicaps were severe at the Mexican court. He wished to be made Minister, as Poinsett had been. "The pay of Charge will scarcely support any man here in the appearance of a gentleman,” and a mere lacked weight with the dignitaries he wished to influence. He confessed also his ham* pering ignorance of Spanish, which forced him to study the language for eight months. Recognizing his handicaps and ignorance of diplomacy, Butler immediately asked to be allowed to return. "This request,” he wrote Jackson in 1851, "it was not seen fit to comply with. It then became me, in duty to my country, as well as to those obligations of friendship which had united us for more than twenty years,... to brace myself for contending against those difficulties which seemed to surround me on every side.”® At first Butler found the prospect of getting Texas ”by no means flattering.” 9 Poinsett’s odium was transferred to him, and he believed that the adoption of Alaman*s report of February, 1830, to the Mexican Congress, based on General Teran*s survey of Texas, would have produced a revolution in Texas and thrown her into our arms ’’without costing. .. a dollar.” He reported that Alaman had suggested a ’’possibility of our claiming territory as far west as the Rio Bravo, and I have so managed as to strengthen that impression on his mind (without committing myself or the Government)... I have ascertained... that the Mexican Government are becoming anxious on the question of limits... and I have... always found means to evade it, leaving them under the influence of whatever their imagination might create to awaken suspicion and alarm their fears.” Butler wanted permission to claim the Rio Grande in furtherance of his object.lo His insinuations to Alaman went to strengthen the Mexican apprehensions of American designs which produced the Colonization law of April 6, 1830; this law included a clause against immigration from the United States into the border provinces. But with Poinsett’s departure, about April of 1830, ’’the aspect is materially changed for the better... and all the public functionaries so far as professions go, indicate the strongest desire” for friendship with the United States. Obstacles lay in the path of gaining Texas; but Alaman had promised to treat of boundary and commerce as soon as the continuance of the administration was assured. It was hoped, said Butler, that the United States might intervene to prevent Mexico from being ’’once more subjected to the dominion of Spain.” To Alaman’s inquiry as to whether ”aid could be counted on from the U. States to relieve Mexico” from invasion Butler gave 11 noncommittal encouragement. Alaman has had the reputation of being ready to excite anti-American prejudice in Mexico to divert the people from domestic woes. Yet to have Alaman as negotiator Butler soon deemed essential. 12 Their conversations were "full and free, and Alaman displayed an "apparent frankness" which Butler "considered it important to have the means of testing." In June he was on the "best terms with Mr. Alaman, and he cannot betray me, unless by the forfeiture of all those pledges... which more than once he has made to me."l3 He was growing confident that he could safely confide in Alaman. Jackson was ever urgent for Texas, whose colonists would ’’declare themselves independent of Mexico the moment they acquire sufficient numbers.” Border conflicts over Indians and fugitive slaves seemed to him "almost irresistible" arguments for a cession. l4 He more than once assured Butler, as on October 6, 1830, that his earlier views touching a boundary ’’remain unaltered,’* confirming Butler’s belief or hope that the argument ad hominem was permissible. From February to May of 1831, Butler spoke of the outbursts of "prejudices" against this country and of his labors to revive confidence. He would let Texas "rest so completely that it would be lost sight of by the people here, and be taken up on some proper occasion." Jackson heartily approved. II The "flame of opposition to President Guerrero, fanned by accusations that he had planned to sell Texas, for which ’’crime alone he deserved expulsion,” well "served to admonish" Butler, who in April at Mexico’s urging unwillingly renewed the treaty confirming the boundary of 184-9. It is perhaps generally assumed that no Mexicans admitted any justice in the old French-American claim to Texas as part of Louisiana. If we can believe Butler,Alaman was tolerant on this point: I know positively that after the Treaty of limits had been concluded and signed, he f AlamanJ remarked to a friend of his: r My anxiety is now over, a recognition of our pretensions to Texas is now made.... I have always doubted whether the U. S. might not have fairly claimed the Territory to the Bio Bravo unless the King of Spain had Interposed the right of the Spanish Crown under the Treaty of 1819. ’ 1Y Meanwhile Jackson wrote again of the utility of the supposed Texas land grant held by the Mexican Foreign Minister; Butler assured him in May of 1831 that he knew certainly that Alaman was not. interested in Texas lands, as Zavala was. Yet Jackson still insisted that Alaman was "confidently” said to be involved in such lands. 18 He looked optimistically tb Butler’s cession ’’with great anxiety.” A Texas revolution aided by American filibusters or ’’emigrants” whom he could not restrain was the prospect to emphasize, as its success ”may close the door forever” to ’’advantageous settlement” for Mexico. This suggestion seems to verge upon menace for the purpose of intimidation. He gave a pungent warning seeming to prophesy our union with a revolutionary Texas with grave consequences to Mexico; a revolt in Texas may... break up the friendly understanding which is now established between this Government and hers, and lead to a train of events that may obscure for a long period the sun of liberty in that quarter. No period can be more favorable than the present for its impartial and wise consideration. l9 In June of 1831, Butler wrote with confidence: ”As the influence of money is as well understood and as readily conceded by these people as any under Heaven, I have no doubt of its doing its office.” 20 He added that nothing but the full knowledge I possess of the Mexican character, their ignorance, gullibility and cupidity would justify even a hope of success —but as one of my views of the question will furnish a plausible argument for a transfer now that might properly have been deemed treasonable in 1828,*9, the great object of keeping down popular clamor will be attained—the other view based on money is as well understood.••• I present the great outline of my plan, which I hope to make the secretary comprehend just as I wish that it should be understood, and if X do the matter is settled. Just what Butler’s plausible argument was does not appear. In October he ’’cautiously approached 11 Alaman on the transfer of Texas, "without intimating that the United States feel any desire to bee one the ow er, 1 * and was told that such a transfer was beyond We power of the central government. But he added that when he should enter more "seriously into the matter" with Alaman, he felt "some confidence that if by any means his scruples in relation to want oi power over the subject... can be vanquished, we may in that event obtain Texas ." Jackson approved his cautiousness, refrained from comment upon his hint as to vanquishing scruples, and as ever made light of Mexican constitutional scruples, which could 21 be overcome. Butler’s interpretation of President Jackson’s wishes had been intimated more or less clearly and not reproved by the General, and Butler constantly harked back to his first private Instructions expressing the General’s anxiety ’’two years since." He rejoiced that Poinsett’s shabby boundary treaty had failed, and urged that its new counterpart "should not be ratified. By any subsequent contract on that subject we cannot do worse. My opinion is most decidedly, that we 22 can do betterV " Jackson replied on February 25 that he could not suppress the odious treaty, but, showing Butler’s letter to Senator Tazewell of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, had asked if the consideration of the treaty "could not be postponed" to the next Session. He enjoined Butler: "Push with all your zeal the negotiation of a new boundary. I have but little doubt but there will be an insurrection in Texas in less than six months.... I was shown a letter, enonemous yesterday that leave no doubt upon my mind but a revolution is intended, and people are emigrating to that country with a view to this thing and it will be attempted shortly." And when Texas revolted the United States might have to annex it in"self-defense" against border Indians, and Mexico might be wroth; if wise, she would at once yield Texas. This was the mighty expansionist’s wisdom. The boundary treaty of 1832 was ratified and ratifications were duly exchanged with Mexico. The survey was delayed. Meanwhile Butler commenced to unfold a new plan and recite conditions which filled his bosom with. hope. The Mexican government was bankrupt and its loan of $600,000 would soon be used up; he had a remedy for the crisis! ”1 intimated a few days since to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, that *if he became much pressed for money I thought ways and means could be devised for obtaining through the U. States a few Millions, and about which we could converse whenever he felt a desire to do so.’” Jackson thought the intimation ”happy and opportune.” 24 In June, 1832, on returning from a visit to Texas, Butler felt that if he dealt under the new regime with Alaman ”al one” they would ’’not disagree eventually... for I think I hold the key to unlock his heart, and the means of enlightening his understanding... we are perfectly cordial... and I feel great Confidence in being able to bring home the Treaty in less than three months from the first protocol.” 23 Jackson merely replied that he hoped Alaman would negotiate, ”as you think him more disposed than any other to do us justice.” When he used the term ”justice” he was perhaps thinking of Texas as part of old Louisiana. 26 Finally, on July 2, 1832, Butler proposed to Alaman the sale of Texas, stressing Mexico’s need of money and the certainty of revolution in Texas, the beginnings of which Butler had just witnessed. Alaman told him to bring maps on July 10, and they would trace the present line ’’and see to what limit it might prudently be extended west.” At the next consultation Alaman considered Butler’s proposed boundary ’’too far west, and besides includes a portion of the population of Texas purely Mexican.” But he was conciliatory, and ready personally to yield the Colorado and, says Butler,” might eventually have conceded a more favorable line.” Perhaps convinced that Texas was lost, Alaman told the American to write down his suggestions to be put before the administration. 27 For the President’s ’’private eye” Butler wrote in bolder detail, the shady significance of which is quite apparent: The amount to which I am limited for the purchase ...will very probably be in part applied to facilitate the Negotiation, in which case we shall provide for that portFon of the payment by a secret article.... At the conclusion of the treaty it may become indispensable for me to be myself the bearer to the U. States, and for this purpose I beg of you to order immediately one of the Sloops of War... to come to Vera Cruz, report to me and wait my instructions... because as I ha ve already remarked it may become indispensably necessary for the purpose of making explanations in regard to the contemplated secret Article. 28 But Alaman was now removed from, power by revolution, though he still directed the department of Foreign Affairs ’’sub rosa. ” The opportune moment was past, if it ever existed except in Butler’s fancy. Some historians believe Butler a liar and think that his alleged hopes of getting Texas were mere.pretence, calculated to prolong his stay in Mexico. And certainly his own interests may have led him to wish to stay. It has also been suggested that Butler’s holding of Texas land scrip may have induced him to delay in the Texas negotiation, as his personal interest might have been adversely affected by a transfer. In October Jackson replied to Butler’s letter of July 18. In this enthusiastic response the President refers to Butler’s ”optimistic” notes of July 18 and 27 and of August 12 and 30: I was pleased to find from your letters... prospects you had of settling permanently our boundary with Mexico. The lasting peace and friendship of ihe two Republics depend upon it. He regarded the golden fruit all but in hand, and made no objection to Butler’s avowed use of money to ’’facilitate the negotiation.” He promised that the desired sloop should lie off Vera Cruz and land the successful at New Orleans, from whence a Steam Boat would ”soon waft” him up the river towards Washington.3o The letter contained nothing but great hope and joy. Not until Butler had schemed another year did he receive, in late 1835, an intimation that Jackson was averse to the use of bribery; and he deemed this a change indeed in his instructions. Butler considered the turbulence of Mexican politics no insuperable barrier: ”1 am fortunate in being on the best terms with every Gentleman in Mexico of that class out of which the Secretary of State must be taken. If however he is selected from without the Capitol, I shall have to study his character before my approaches are made, and that will necessarily require a little time. If Mr. Alaman could have continued in Office three months longer we would have settled everything.” Butler promised the utmost exertion: ’’Depend on me My dear Sir that you, even you, have not this thing so much at heart as I have... my best hopes are staked on the result. It is my wish to reside in that Country, and to do so, it must be ours. ”31 in October Butler was hopeful of the new Secretary, Fagoaga; but Alaman was no longer at hand, having fled before Santa Anna, leaving his family in Butler’s care. Jackson continued to the charge "to keep a steady eye to the boundary quest i0n.”32 But success, so near with Alaman, according to Butler, disappeared from view during the civil strife. Santa Anna had pronounced, ostensibly for Federalism, compelling the acting President, Bustamante, to take the field in August. Pedraza, restored in December by the victorious Federalists to serve the end of his legal term, opposed American expanby sion. Yet/”one road 1 ’ Butler hoped M to reach him and vanquish his scruples.” Failing, he would await the advent of Santa Anna’s administration in April, 1833; but ”l will succeed in uniting T to our country before I am done... or I will forfeit my head. ”3° Jackson sensed that the passing of Alaman from the stage lessened his chances, and grevz chary of Butler’s boldness: only to Alaman’s heart, by confession, did Butler possess the key infallible. New men, and especially such a turn-coat and jingo as Santa Anna, might not be offered private inducements safely. The President assumed a safe, aloof ground: "The five millions of dollars being the consideration, it can be disposed of in the negotiation as the minister of Mexico appointed to confer with you, may deem Butler meanwhile urged a ’’loan” of five millions to Mexico with Texas as the security'—a plan ’’hinted to me” by the Mexicans. The object was certain of attainment, as Mexico could never repay, and it avoided the greatest obstacle to a Mexican diplomat — “the use which might be made 1 ' of an open cession "against the party in power by their adversaries." Butler added, sounding further to Jackson the dearth of hope of a peaceful cession: Yet I confess that my hopes of success are more faint from knowing that some grants have been recently made to persons, some of them friends of General Sant a Anna, evidently with a view to the New York market; and those grantees, by uniting their influence, might have great weight in arresting the negotiation, should they discover that it was pending, because its consummation would convert all their golden prospects into moonshine. 35 When this new plan reached Jackson his attitude had undergone a still further change. Sam Houston’s optimistic letter from Natchitoches, February 13, 1833, had apprised him that the Texans would soon take steps to separate from Coahuila, and would secede if the Republic were not “soon restored to order, and the c onstitut ion revived and re-enacted.” Jackson, long anxious for a Texas revolution, was deeply impressed and received Butler’s costly proposition with coolness. Doubtless the prospect of getting Texas by her own action moved Ja c kson to reject Butler’s plan and send it to Secretary Livingston with the following endorsement on March 15: prepare a reply,...adding anything your own judgt. may Suggest on this subject. Instruct Gol. Butler to bring the negotiations to a close. The Convention in Texas meets the Ist of next April to form a constitution for themselves. When this is done, Mexico can never annex it to her jurisdiction again, or control its legislation. It will be useless after this act to enter into a treaty of boundary with Mexico. 36 This was put into Livingston’s next dispatch to Butler; the added remark, that the constitution did not authorize such a loan, was During most of Santa Anna’s term the honest Vice-President, Gomez Farias, exercised the invidious prerogatives of the Presidency, while the "Napoleon of the West" "recuperated" at Mango de Clavo. Butler could not approach Farias. To aggravate Butler’s annoyance Tornel’s pamphlet appeared charging Jackson ’with connivance at a project in Arkansas to seize Texas. Butler considered this publication the supreme cause of Mexican hostility. 3 ® On September 14 Butler felt little hopeful ’’with the present Men in power.” Yet he informed Jackson that he had offered the Liberal Zavala, a fellow land speculator, who was anxious to leave Mexico to live in the United States, $200,000 for his assistance in effecting the desired treaty. As I said to you once before, it is probable that I shall employ 4, 5 or $600,000 of the sum to which you have limited me in purchasing Men, and the remainder in purchasing the Country, as you permitted me to use the amount according to my discretion.... I have since thought that probably one million may be employed, and the other four for the Territory.... I am not sure whether some threatening may not only be useful but may become necessary padding but striking out], they are a set of cowardly dogs, that may be driven from one end of the Republic to the other with 8 or 10 good Regiments, and with that force I would pledge my head to incomplete .... Butler added that he wrote several notes to the new Secretary of Foreign Affairs concerning the Texas negotiation carried on with Alaman, but received ho reply. Then he addressed a ”private note" to Santa Anna, a copy of which he enclosed to Jackson. But Santa Anna was just on the point of leaving for the army and made no answer. Butler understood that Santa Anna was in need of private funds. 39 Jackson had hinted that the bribery should be put formally on the shoulders of the Mexican negotiators, but Butler lacked Jackson’s keen appreciation of the use of saving distinctions. On October 30 Jackson replied to Butler’s September letter without disapproval or reproach of Butler’s avowed reliance on bribery. ”1 received in due time your favor of the 14th. of September last, and have given to its contents the careful consideration which they merited. In relation to the boundary I can only repeat what I have so often repeated before that it is vitally important.” Butler could haVe inferred from this nothing but Jackson’s witting sanction of bribery. But Jackson did wish to avoid blame and would give Butler another chance to awaken to some sense of prudent finesse and throw the formal responsibility for any bribery upon the Mexican side: ’’Provided that you keep within your instructions and obtain the cession it is not for your consideration whether the Government of Mexico applies the money to the purchase of men or to pay their public debt... all we want is a good an unencumbered Cession of Territory. In late October, 1833, Butler reported a ’’singular conversation” with ’’one of the most shrewd and intelligent men of the country,” who had asked him if he had "command of money." "Yes,” answered Butler, recalling, he wrote to Jackson, "that you had instructed me to use the money at my discretion.” The shrewd man assured him that the desired boundary could be had by paying |300,000 to an important man and from three to four hundred thousand to other gentlemen. Butler believed that the treaty was reduced almost "to so much certainty as I had it with Mr. Alaman.” "Once I put them in the right humor we shall proceed and adjust the articles in six hours.” 41 But the President read this message with care and astonishment... astonishment that you would entrust such a letter, without being in cypher, to the mail, and that you should state... ’that you had money’ and gave for reason, ’recollecting that I had authorized you to apply the amount designated for this object in any 'way which according to ... your discretion... was best calculated to effect the purpose of your mission’--from this it might be construed that my private letters authorized you to apply corruption, when nothing could be further from my intention. He had wished merely, he declared, to rid Texas of fraudulent or unfulfilled land grants to Mexicans, at our expense, as "justice” surely dictated this. The five millions were to enable the Mexican government to "buy in all claims for grants of land in Texas that had been given and whose conditions had not been complied with—and transfer to us an unencumbered title.” Jackson had indeed always ordered Butler to have quashed the unfulfilled grants. 42 The non-moral tone of Jackson’s letter shows him as having no objection to bribery if it could be done safely. His pointing to the instructions concerning land grants shows that he was clearly aware of the source of Butler’s ’’misapprehension” and had long known of it and not ’’corrected ” it. Jackson seems to be shifty on the subject of the Texas land grants. In his letter of October 50 he had tried to put Butler ’’right”: By your instructions you are at liberty to apply as much of the five millions as will liquidate all claims within the Territory where the requirement has been complied with in all its conditions--su ch for instance as Austins and other similiarly situated. The frauds we have experienced under the Florida cession afford us a lesson on this subject by which we must profit. Be careful therefore on this point to throw upon the government of Mexico the extinguishment of all titles the conditions of which have not been compleated diminishing as far as you mayrthink it safe and proper for this object, all that remain of the five millions to be applied generally as the consideration of the cession. Provided that you keep within your instructions and obtain the cession it is not for your consideration whether the government of Mexico applies the money to the purchase of men or to pay their public debu« Writing on November 27, Jackson feared a trap, and so This was what your discretion by my private letters was drawn tobut my dear Sir, be careful lest these ’shrewd fellows’ may draw you into imputations of attempting to bribe these officers.” We must ’’have a boundary without imputation of corruption, and I will hail you welcome with it here--none else. ” Jackson is the soul of virtue. It seems that Butler has transcended his ’’discretion.” As Butler’s note of September 14, as well as that of 1832, had not ruffled Jackson, the President’s "care and astonishment” on receiving that of October 28 must have been largely due to Butler’s increasing boldness, to his involving the President himself in a letter which some hostile eye might read, and to the slimness of the possibility of a cession. Much water had passed under the bridge since the summer of 1832, and Zavala and the "shrewd man were two different characters. Butler replied on February 6, 1834, with an injured air, pointing out that he had avowed to Jackson his reliance on the use of money ”in conciliating, or corrupting if you please, influential individuals to aid me in the object... without which I saw that a successful negotiation for T was out of the question.” Yet Jackson had never dissented from his agent’s view that four or five hundred thousand dollars would be spent to purchase men, but had replied that ”it was a matter of no cons equence to the Government how the money was disbur s e d. Now I beg you Sir to weigh these expressions of yours, and then say whether they admitted of a different construction than that which I gave to them.” What you advise of being cautious of ’these shrewd fellows ’ who may draw me into imputations of att“enipt ing to HrTFe them proves how little you know of Mexican character. I can assure you Sir that bribery is nob'll y common and. familiar in all larks and classes, but familiarly and freely spoken 0f.... Nay Sir, so unblushingly is this thing done, that in many instances you hear the very sum stated.,.. You may ask, does this work no disgrace nor loss of character to the man corrupted? not a whit. To i 1 lustrabe...eh me repeaVto you a conversation I once had with a Senator in Congress on the subject of Texas.... Then Sir, said he let me tell you, that if you mean to succeed, you must begin with an Offer of about two hundred thousand dollars to the President himself... the same THea has The eh more than once advanced to me by others. 43 Butler’s letters of September 26 and October 2 had declared the chance fcf procuring a cession slender and had advised the seizure of the ’’disputed” Sabine-Neches territory to force a cession and incite the Texans to act for themselves. On September 26 Butler wrote concerning the territory between the two rivers: The Mexicans have held possession hitherto, and we have tacitly assented as I presume; first because it was not so well understood then as now that a conflicting claim existed, and. secondly, on finding the adversary in possess© ion at the period of discovering the true condition of the question, they were permitted to remain, in the expectation that an amicable arrangement would be entered into. As for the present that expectation may be considered as overthrown.... And as the Mexican military forces have withdrawn I cannot imagine a sound reason against our doing ourselves right.... You may suppose it a strange idea of mine, but I can assure you that in the Arrogance and folly of this people, they believe that we fear them, and that they may take any liberties with... It is significant that Jackson and Butler never presented the claim to the Neches before the Mexican government, Butler wrote on October 2, 1833: “The Territory once occupied by any portion of our troops, and the people of T —- would themselves do the work.” Austin, then at Mexico City, told Butler that he was decidedly for attaching that country to the U. S. and that nothing short of the Desert will doas a boundary. That the application for a State Govt, is all humbug, ard only meant to prepare themselves the better for their final movement: That no one thinks of remaining connected with Mexico longer than the arrival of a convenient period for separation etc. etc. All this I listen to, and except concurring with him in opinion that it would be better for all parties that T. was united with us I express nothing that would commit myself or the Govern*t to that of Mexico, were all I have said known. 45 On December 20 Butler wrote further: Genl. Santa Anna has studiously avoided any conversation with me on the subject, and although he has intimated to some of my friends who I have procured to speak with him on the subject, that he is himself personally well disposed to adjust the boundary in a satisfactory manner with us, that still he dreads public opinion should he yield any part of what is considered Mexican Territory, and notwithstanding that I have explained fully and clearly the mode by which the act may be done without attaching to him the slightest blame, still he plays off in such a way as to induce me to believe that all his professions are alike insincere. A difficulty presented by the difference of opinion between the boundary Commissioners or some tumultuary movement in the Colony itself, is the only thing in my opinion to bring them right on the subject. 46 Butler’s plan now seems to have been to have Texas made a ’’territory” to separate it from the nation and facilitate its cession. It is said that he got a territorial bill before Congress, where Austin’s influence defeated it. 47 While pru- dence and the prospect of Texas leaping into the arms of the United States made Jackson in 1833 at last forbid bribery altogether on the blundering Colonel’s part, he was not unwilling to follow the Colonel’s suggestion that it was a convenient time to make an ex parte settlement of the ’’disputed’ 1 boundary. He must soon be told by Butler if the desired boundary was not obtainable, so that ”we may proceed to make one ourselves... and take possession of Nachedages.”4B Jackson was perhaps desirous like Butler of giving the ‘lexans an impulse to revolt by this arbitrary step. Butler was warlike in tone, though nothing in the situation e xcept Mexico’s failure to yield Texas would seem tow arrant the ire which was rising in him. On October 2 he recalled to Jackson the ’’hint” that Jackson had asked of Monroe in 1818 to take Florida: he wanted a similar hint in re Texas. I will Negotiate or fight just as you think best. I am frank and speak to you in all the Confidence of an old and tried friend when I say that my preference is for the latter. We have abundant cause for quarrel and it would cost less by one half, aye two thirds to take, than to purchase the Territory. In truth to take it would cost nothing... Santa Anna is a vile hypocrite.... This was the highwayman’s plea. Mexico’s neglect to appoint commissioners to survey the boundary under the treaty of 1832 seemed to Jackson and Butler a great grievance, one justifying arbitrary action. For while Mexico considered the actual survey a formality, Butler urged and Jackson determined that the American commissioner should not yield the Neches, so that the survey was to them far from a formality. Jackson wrote Butler on April 19, 1832 that the American commissioner and surveyor would be instructed to pursue the express words of the Treaty, which declares, it shall commence 6n the gulf of Mexico, on the west bank of the Sabine... therefore it must, when the Sabine forks, take the west bank of the west fork. This by us will not be abandoned and it is intimated that Mexico will contend for the East fork. This we will not consent to. 49 In the spring of 1834 Butler again stressed the need of occupying the Neches-Sabine territory, pledging himself if placed ”at the head of the country to be occupied,” to ”have all we desire in less than six months without a blow and foe the price we are willing to pay for But the President advised the Secretary of State to tell Butler to return if he could not succeed in procuring an extension of the survey article. He endorsed Butler’s letter characteristically but appropriately: ”What a scamp.” Butler must have been grieved at Jackson’s refusal to make him viceroy in East Texas, for he had already prepared the ground. Diplomatic fame seemed hardly fated for him, and he may have lobked to martial glory and leadership in Texas. His ambition was well known to Austin and Houston.'' Perhaps Butler wished to revolutionize Texas merely to further his chancels of procuring in Mexico a treaty of cession. The Colonel had written to Texas acquaintances some inflammatory letters signed ”0. P. Q.” early in 1834, promising to reveal himself at the right moment and asking that any replies be addressed to him through the ’’American Minister to Mexico.” He dwelt on the arrest of Austin as a crying grievance and advised the seizure of Almonte as a hostage when he reached Texas. The Texans should burnish their weapons and take a firm stand, for the Mexican President had told a confidant, u As soon as the War in the South is finished, I shall order from 4 to 6000 men to Texas to punish (castigate) those turbulent and insolent North Americans, and in case they make the least-resistance all their property will be confiscated and Texas will be converted into a desert.” The government hated all Americans, 52 Butler 1 s letters were disseminated far and wide and created some rather lasting anxiety in Texas. Austin said they were ’’very well calculated to rouse the people of Texas into rebellion, and also to throw suspicion on me andperpetuate my imprisonment... as a lever to create and keep up excitement in Texas, at the head of which he expected to be placed—He thinks, as it appears, that the people of Texas can be made tools of to promote the personal aggrandisement of A. B. —he is greatly deceived, or I do not know the people.”s3 Butler had wished Austin to use his influence to get Texas created a ’’territory” and not a state (for which the Texans petitioned), but Austin would not do so. Pressure in favor of a territory was exerted by such speculators as General J. T. Mason and one Miller, and also by Zavala, as Butler found from a conversation with Santa Anna in November of 1833.54 Butler soon said that his ”0. P. Q. ” letters had been partly intended to secure Austin’s release; but Austin was dubious of Butler’s good intentions. 55 The author of ”0. P. Q.” was indeed angry at Austin’s opposition to his plans. He assured the State Department that Austin was one of the bitterest foes to our government and people that is to be found in Mexico... . I am very sure that he was the principal cause of my being defeated in the last effort made to obtain a cession of Texas.... I had the fairest prospects of success in the proposed negotiation with which I had been charged for procuring a cession of Texas. Govr. Zavala had promised me his aid, he was at the time the Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies and exercised great influence and had a large personal interest in its success. Butler says that Austin tried to pump him about the state of negotiations, expressing himself as being favorable to a cession to the United states, but he was unable to learn anything from Butler. Austin was more successful in obtaining information from Zavala ’’and set about counteracting his views--He represented to the Govt, here that Texas was the most valuable section of the Confederation... By these and other means he defeated the plan then on foot for obtaining the object so much desired. ”56 One Gutierrez wrote from Nev/ York concerning the state of diplomacy: It is unquestionable that since the retirement of Santa Anna to his country seat the government has been in the hands of four or five unprincipled blockheads.... Four months ago the pecuniary embarassments of the latter were so great ’que les ministres ne savaient ou donner de la tete. ’ Tn one of their councils they~roposed to alTenate the whole or a portion of Texas to the Government of the United States or to that of England, for a sum of 12 or 15 million of Dollars which, they said, would enable them to carry on the government for some time. The disposition of the government of this country in this respect was tried indirectly, and the public presses in Mexico began to prepare public opinion for the transaction. What the result of their Inquiries at Washington was I cannot say, but I heard not long a Mexican agent say that the English would have nothing to do with Texas. The presses of the opposition in Mexico attacked violently the government, and the antifederals began to take advantage of this accident to discredit the latter. The scheme fell to the ground.... The Mexicans are now convinced that Texas will revolt if not sold. Therefore when Mr. Zavala arrived at New York from Mexico he brought instructions to the charge d*affaires at Washington, Castillo, to press the negotiations pending with the government of the United States respecting the boundaries of the nations. I know that the said charge d’ affaires has had a warm correspondence with Mr. M f Lane..."TTi3~“not feel satisfied with the result, having complained to his Government by the last packet of the difficulties or delays opposed by the cabinet of Washington to bring the negotiations to a conclusion. As to the rest the Colony is fast filling up, because no exertions have been spared at N. York by the jobbers to give it a start. Three schooners have left within 4 weeks full of emigrants and two others are preparing. 57 On receiving Jackson’s rejection of the proposal to occupy Nacogdoches, Butler wrote to Van Buren, asking him to induce Jackson to let him return to the United States. The President was willing for Butler to suit himself, as ’’there remains no hope of concluding the arrangement.”sB Yet new hope was born, and Butler wrote that with an hour’s conversation with Jackson he could return to Mexico ’’with the prospect of being much more useful,” and could ’’close the whole affair to your entire satisfaction in 90 days.” Alaman was again at hand and all was ’’understood” between them since 1832. Butler lingered in Mexico, hoping to bring to Washington a definite Mexican proposition for Jackson’s especial delectation to ccnvince him of the feasibility of bribery. In November of 1834 he reported that President Santa Anna had asked him to suggest a means of getting money, and that he had obliged him, whereat Santa Anna said he would send Alaman to talk it over. “Alaman was sent to me,” said Butler, and would soon probably be Foreign Minister; from him "we may expect to obtain all we have a right to ask, the subject of greatest interest to us is already understood between that gentleman and myself. The outlook in December was not bad, according to Butler; Alaman sat in Congress and J. M. Gutierrez de Estrada was Foreign Minister. In the spring of 1835 Butler completed arrangements, writing Jackson that ’’every thing is ripe for concluding the whole s übject. I can prove almost to demonstration that in three months we may consummate every thing; that there is but one stumbling block in the way, which you must remove.” He would soon be with Jackson to explain this. ”l pledge myself to you--mark me--I give you my pledge, that your administration shall not close without seeing the object in your On April 29, 1835, he left for Washington to lay his plan before Jackson. Perhaps Estrada, the Foreign Minister was not fully in Santa Anna’s confidence, but he was perhaps not entirely ignorant of the secret Texas negotiation. When later charged by enemies, early in 1836, with having made verbal proposals to Butler to sell Texas, he wrote affectionately to his ’’dear friend” Sutler for a statement of disproof. Butler replied that he had never told anyone, in Mexico or abroad, that had made such proposals--as literally, perhaps, was true. Estrada pleaded for a more distinct denial frcm Butler of the alleged proposals. But his ’’dear friend” Butler replied with a certain for apparently he had reason to resent Estrada’s profession of complete innocence. Butler said he had written his first letter in vindication of Estrada without much thought, thinking 'the matter a passing one: I said for your satisfaction, as due to the relations of amity which had long existed between us, that I never had said or even insinuated.., that you had ever made proposals of any sort to me for the sale of Texas. I can have no objection to the Mexican Government publishing what they please on this matter; they will doubtless have respectable authority... and so far as I may be implicated in any statement which may be published, the materials are abundant ard at hand, to justify and support all I have ever said either on this or any other subject in Mexico or elsewhere. 62 In June at Washington Butler showed Jackson how Texas could be obtained "simply by modifying a disbursement of the money to be paid.” In his written statement Butler explained that Santa had invited him "in the most frank and cordial manner to an intimate intercourse... as friends, and not as public functionaries—l did not reject the overture.” His "private note" to Santa Anna on Texas in 1833 wqs not answered or noticed in their later interviews, "although great cordiality continued to prevail.... The motive for this silence is no longer an enigma, it has been satisfactorily explained by the Author of the enclosed letter, and will be explained." s3 The enclosure was a letter from Santa Anna ! s confidential agent, Father Hernandez, dated March 21, 1835, which stated: The negotiation which you have so long desired to effect is, as I have often told you, perfectly within your power; nothing is required but to employ your means properly. Five hundred thousand dollars Judiciously applied will conclude the affair, and when you think proper to authorize me to enter into the arrangement depend upon my closing it to your satisfaction. 64 Precisely what took place in June, 1835, between Jackson and Butler is not known. According to Butler, the President gave him. permission to use bribery, provided it was done without his direct cognizance, and promised him the Governorship of Texas if successful; Jackson, he says, authorized him to use $500,000 of the purchase sum for men, 65 $200,000 to go: to Banta Anna. In 1843, when thus charged by Butler himself, Jackson was silent, merely averring in an endorsement on Sutler’s letter —perhaps for the benefit of credulous historians--that Butler was a "liar.” The evidence is rather in Butler’s favor. Butler says that he told Jackson that the Mexican government had stated: ’We will enter into the Treaty, make the transfer and place the oountry in the possession of your Government bub“as oongress may refuse 'to ratify the Treaty we wish' to know whether Gen. Jackson will consider the possession we give him as a performance of the Contract on our part and will pay the Money. 1 I stated this to you [Jackson] and your reply was--’Yes Sir, if they will sign the Treaty and give us possession I will undertake to keep it.’ It is improbable that Jackson would have sent Butler to Mexico unless he approved his plan in some manner. Jackson knew that there was no hope of getting Texas by cession without allowing the bribes called for, and his great expectation that Butler would bring back a Texas treaty in the short time stipulated in the Hernandez plan adds to the probability that Butler states the matter truly. It would be but in keeping with Jackson’s private tolerance of the Butler diplomacy from 1829 to 1833 that he should again tolerate it if Butler would be careful not to involve the President and would try to put the formal responsibility on Mexican shoulders. Against bribery itself, if safe and useful, Jackson seems to have had no aversion. ”He induced me to return to Mexico,” says Butler euphemistically, ’’and lend my services to the subject (unfortunately for me) I consented to do so —but upon the express condition that I daould be at liberty to return home at any time after the Ist of the ensuing January at my own discretion,” 66 It was to put himself on record as above all reproach—this notwithstanding his own real responsibility for Butler’s mission and methods —that President Jackson endorsed Butler’s written proposition of 1835 equivocally: ’’Nothing will be countenanced by the executive to bring this government under the remotest imputation of being engaged in corruption or bribery... we have no concern in the application of the consideration to be given. This ’’virtuous” equivocation seized on by Secretary Forsyth to repudiate Butler, has convinced historians that Jackson was quite innocent: like W. S. Fulton’s testimony in the Pulton letter affair of 1838, this endorsement was hard to get around. Adams, however, was told by Forsyth frankly in 1837 that Butler came back here once all of a sudden, and made the General believe that if he would give him sufficient authority he would, not only make the proposition, but would accomplish the object. He was furnished with the authority, sent back, and never made The proposition. His reliance had been upon what he believed was the disposition of Santa Anna. ®8 Before pursuing Butler to Mexico we must accompany him on a trip to New York to see the land speculators--a visit which the President was not then aware of. Butler looked here for personal profit and ampler ways and means of ’’facilitation” than the $500,000 that he says Jackson allowed. He told James Prentiss that the time was ripe for a cession of Texas by Mexico and offered his services to gain that great end by a treaty, in which he would incidentally ’’protect and secure if possible the petitioners in their rights”—for a consideration. An agreement was made, a statement of which was given him as "agent of the negotiation.” Prentiss’ instructions to Butler recite that the time is auspicious for the Sale and transfer of the Territory of Texas; with these impressions and a desire to become interested in the purchase, we request the favor of you to undertake the agency of the negotiation for us. For a cession of the whole Territory to the United states making the Rio Grande or the deserts near its bank the Western boundary line, we are willing to pay ten millions of dollars, if it cannot be obtained for less, making... no appropriation of land after 1 January 1835..•. We request you will impart to us the earliest intelligence you may obtain on the Subject of the foregoing that we may be prepared to consummate any arrangement you may make with the promptitude justly due to the importance of the negotiation. The profit of the New York speculators would come from the perfection of "title to about one hundred millions of acres of land exclusive of all previous Grants or Settlements.” This wish perhaps little agreed with Jackson’s desire for an "unencumbered” Texas, but the Colonel would probably have "reconciled” them with his magic. For he was to receive 10% of the claims he would get validated, and $5 in cash for each sitio or leagie of land he should secure for the petitioners. If the treaty should merely transfer the political jurisdiction of Texas and confirm no grants, Butler would still receive 500,000 acres and $5,000. He was given $5,000 immediately to prosecute the land claims. Apparently either Butler or Jackson told some one of their conferences, for a "friend of Mexico' 1 in the counsels of the speculators wrote that Jackson thought that Mexico would sell Texas for some millions and "Butler was commissioned to sound the Mexican ministers and see if an offering to them and to Santa Anna of half a million dollars could bring this transaction to a conclusion^ 70 On August 12 Butler wrote Prentiss from Alabama that he might”go via Texas” and be longer in reaching Mexico than "contemplated.”7l Certainly Jackson too had supposed that Butler would fly to Mexico with the speed of flames and was very naturally chagrined. Butler had perhaps not planned this diversion earlier, but Texas, in the beginnings of revolution, beckoned to him and he there delayed so long that it was in late November when he finally reached Mexico City. This delay ruined any chance for success under the Hernandez plan. Santa Anna’s aspiration to the purple had long been marked. Butler learned early of his intention of placing the Texans under a military regime with the conservative David G. Burnet as probable Governor. l72 It was Santa Anna’s cent rails tic changes in the ’’Federal 1 ’ govern ment and his intention of military occupation which precipitated the Texas Revolution. Butler’s activities in Texas in September-October were I very likely in furtherance of the separatist tendency, like his earlier ”0. P. Q. ” letters. According to reports sent to Tornel from Texas Butler seems to have been in every place where disturbances occurred and to have been there just preceding them. An informant wrote Tornel on October 12 that Butler in the Colonies (of Texas) had lauded the horrible outrages of the rebels committed on the persons of the few Mexicans who were there. From Austin he passed to Gonzales, when they were making the assemblages [reuniones J which threw the country into hos- and finally, two days before the occurrence at Goliad, presented himself in that town, and with him the enemy; having been present at the whole occurrence, he took up his route for this city.... 73 The impression of the Mexicans was that Butler had been expressly instructed by the Washington government to go through Texas and incite revolution--only a natural inference. On October 26 he reached Matamoras, openly talked there with his countrymen in favor of the Revolution, exaggerated (according to the Mexican report) the strength of the rebels, and handed about their manifestoes. On October 29 he left for Monterey and Mexico City, still hoping to buy Texas. 74 Houston came to think Uiat Butler took special pains as he passed from the Sabine to the Rio Bravo to villify him, and implies that Butler had some determined enemies, reminding him that he was eventually ’’taken to La Bahia, and well nigh suffered, as a traitor to Texas, by those who had known you at San Felipe de Austin.” The enigmatical Houston does not explain whether Butler’s enemies were Americans or Mexicans.* 75 There was no delay in Butler’s journey after he crossed the Rio Grande, for he explained to Forsyth that he had been forced to stop by a fever ’’from the effects of which I, at one time despaired of ever reaching Mexico. ”76 & man O f co ior was Butler, if not a humorist. There is some further evidence of Jackson’s excessive desire to get Texas in 1835. After Butler’s departure Jackson is said to have told ex-Governor Hutchins G. Burton of North Carolina in August that "we must have it either by ne g°tlatl°n or force; that if 10,000 men would not do it, 100,000 should, and that it was his intention to make said Burton first governor of the Territory." D. L. Child says that the President made to others within a few weeks the same statement. The Texan diplomat Memucan Hunt says similarly in his dispatch to Secretary Forsyth in 1837: The venerable ex-president General Jackson was so strongly impressed with a belief, at one time during his administration, that the negotiation then pending for the acquisition of Texas would be brought to a speedy and favorable issue, that he tendered the office of Governor of the Territory of Texas to the late Governor H. G. Burton of North Carolina, to be entered upon so soon as the treaty of cession should be completed. Bee a publication on the subject of Governor Burton’s appointment .78 Reaching Mexico City on November 28, 1835, Butler inquired the next day of Monasterio, Minister of Foreign Affairs, ’’what hour would be most agreeable to His Excellency the President... to receive a visit from the undersigned, to offer his personal respects/ 1 Monasterio replied couteously that Santa Anna would receive the chared the next day at twelve.* 79 But Santa Anna was now resolved to gain a brilliant and complete victory over the Texans before he thought further of a sale of Texas; he might then change his mind. Butler’s reports--which make small attempt, if any, to conceal the fact that he has returned to the ’’distribution’ 1 diplomacy —show clearly Jackson’s high expectation that Butler would obtain Texas within a short time; the Colonel carefully explained in a private letter to Japkson in October ’’the reasons for my believing it impracticable to bring to a close the negotiation intrusted to me within so short a period as was anticipated when I left Washington city, in consequence of the very great change which had taken place in the political circumstances of the country.” Bo In November he was hopeful of success, though the ’’new state of things... may require a little more time, and certain changes in the mode of conducting it and the agents to be employed. Jackson on August 6 had Forsyth instruct the charges to purchase as the boundary the hio Grande to 37° of lattitude and a line running thence westward to the Pacific for an additional $500,000. The idea had partly emanated from Butler , who had told Jackson in June that after Texas we could easily buy California for an extra half million--”an empire in itself, a paradise in climate... rich in minerals and affording a water route to the Pacific.” 82 In December Butler confessed some hope of getting California —but not at once. President Jackson was bitterly disappointed by Butler’s fatal delay in Texas. In conversing in the spring of 1836 with an envoy of the Republic of Texas Jackson "commenced on Butler and said that but for his delay and misconduct Texas would have belonged to this Government before this war broke out and sir says he be not surprised if I yet soon announce a cession by Mexico of Texas to the United otates."S3 Butler’s mission now fast ran its course. On October 31 the Mexican government sent a request for the recall of Butler, "to whom are imputed intrigues unbecoming a diplomatic agent,... the revolt there having commenced whilst that gentlemen was in those parts,” namely, Texas. 8 " The Mexican at Washington,who transmitted this request reported to his government on December 5 a conversation with Secretary Forsyth ( who had quarreled with Butler, perhaps over the Colonel’s methods in the summer of the year and bore him ill will). Forsyth assured Castillo that the President hasalways had the intention of naming a new minister and that this should have been done last July: that the recent return to that country Mexico of Mr. Butler was not greatly to the pleasure of his government, who permitted it because of the securities which he gave showing that it would be easy to bring to a head all the necessary means and enter with excellent hopes of a good conclusion into the negotiation concerning" the sale of Texas on the part of the Mexican Government, securities which appeared to Forsyth to deserve little confidence: that his government believed that Butler on his return would not touch Texas and that in mixing directly or indirectly in the affairs of Texas he had been arbitrary and not following the instructions of his government. 85 Perhaps in this, Forsyth, who did not know of Jackson’ s shady windings, spoke his own sentiments and such as Jackson might wish to assume, rather than the sentiments which had really been held by the President. Butler was nonplussed by his instructions of July 2, 1835, from Forsyth, which, he says, were contrary to his verbal understanding with Jackson in June. These instructions told him specifically to be back by the meeting of Congress in December, and said unequivocally that no measure 11 of even an unequivocal character” should be employed to get Texas to which stigma might be attached. Butler wrote towards the early part of December that Santa Anna had retired to his hacienda to watch events and Butler had not been able to see him. Tomorrow or the next day I shall send a Confidential Agent to Gen. Santa Anna with proposals, which will be backed by the influence of such as we can rely on, and I am not without hopes.... I beg you will Bepatient, allow me three or four months in which to work steadily, cautiously and securely, and my life on it that I bring you the Treaty before the adjournment of Congress... I beg you to reply to me immediately, and say distinctly and positively how long I may employ myself on this Subject for the Government. I ask... because the letter of Mr. Forsyth to me is somewhat obscure, and seems to limit me to December next remarking, that if the work is not accomplished by that time I must return home. Butler added that if his mission ended in December he would remain and continue my efforts for a private association of Individuals. I have labored at this Negotiation too long, and have its success too deeply at heart, to omit struggling so long as there is a fair prospect of success, and... I am thoroughly persuaded, that I shall attain the object by being allowed a reasonable time. He now told Jackson about his commission by the New York land company to buy Texas--these private speculators ’’not knowing that the Government is in pursuit of the same object. ”86 Butler apparently offered Saiita Anna thirteen millions for Texas--the highest sum, says Santa Anna, which 87 ’’the United States” ever offered Mexico for Texas. Butler was very much disgruntled by the administration’ s ’’early recall” of him an(o»ro tested against formal instructions which were contrary to his private understanding with Jackson in June. Jackson, he recalled, had merely said to him: ’’Proceed to Mexico, and urge with all your force a speedy conclusion t o the negotiation, so as to let us have the result, if possible, by the meeting of Congress.” Butler believed that Forsyth was actuated by personal spite in limiting him to December. Butler declared to Forsyth that if he had known at Washington of the nature of the instructions he would never again have gone to Mexico. He denounced Secretary Forsyth: How far the failure in effecting the object, may be attributed to the indiscretion of certain persons who affect to be in the President’s confidence to retail his opinions and declare his purposes, will be for after times to disclose. I am in possession of all the facts —and a precious collection they are. This and the movement in Texas suspended for the momeny all my operations. Those upon whose co-operation I relied for success advised such a course; and just at the period when a favorable moment presented itself to renew the work, I am discharged from office. Since lately receiving his absolute recall he had "declined even listening to proposals to The note of recall , which was the result, in reality, of the Mexican demand of October 31, Butler believed, apparently, to be solely the work of the administration. Butler found some consolation in spiting Forsyth: “The dismissal now made of me, anticipates my own determination on the same subject but a few months, as I had myself ’determined 1 to leave Mexico in the ensuing April as I informed the President in June last... and nothing but the deep interest I felt in seeing the affair of Texas brought to a successful conclusion would have induced me to remain here so long.” Probably Jackson would have gladly seen Butler remain longer but for the Mexican demand for his recall, after which it was impossible,though Jackson was angry at Butler’s "delay and misconduct" which had lost Texas, as he believed. Jackson endorsed Butler’s to Forsyth: The last interview with Colonel Butler he did understand that he was to return and he in Washington by the meeting of Congress and the President was brought to believe by Colonel Butler would succeed in his' mission For the PresTdent t old "him " expressly that if he was not certain of succeeding he had better not return to Mexico--He expected to reach Mexico in July 1835 —A. J.°s Butler lingered at the scene of interminable hope, acquiring further detestation of Mexicans. It was only now, after the failure to get Texas, tnat he suggested that private American claims against Mexico warranted "some decisive measure for convincing the Mexican Government... that they shall respect our rights.ln his Texas plan in June of 1835 he had not stressed the matter, though he thought his "treaty” would incidentally care for the claims, which were of "minor consideration —Our own citizens will be indemnified for claims against Mexico and without which who can say, when the day of payment will arrive:—not me." Early in 1836 an article was published in El Nacional on Butler’s intrigues in Texas in 1835, and Butler believed Tornel to be the author and invited him to a duel. Tornel procured the government’s intervention and Butler was given only eight days to leave the land. Leaving after a lengthy correspondence, he sneered at a "civilized” government which stooped to a private quarrel because its citizen "had not the spirit to defend At this period of chagrin Butler may have penned his pessimistic ’’Notes for Benton,” in which he branded Mexicans as destitute of intelligence and energy and neglectful ”of all those pursuits by which the National character would be advanced and the resources of the country developed, whilst an unseemly jealousy of every people, and a vain glorious boasting of their pretensions invites the contempt as well as scorn of every one.” Failure through vanity to realize their deplorable condition prevented other powers from reasoning with them about their own goodj^ 2 Henceforth Butler lived in Texas mainly. He tried to leave xMexico, without passports, by way of Texas at the end of his mission; but the arm of the Mexican government overtook and compelled him to leave Matamoras by boat for the United States. He reached Matamoras in early December of 1836, and remained there seven weeks, becoming intimate with General Amador, whom he frequently visited. During his stay it chanced that a body of about a hundred Indians met in council with the Mexican General, and then left town. Chero kees, Kickapoos, and other tribes were represented. Butler learned from one of the Mexican officers that a treaty had been concluded —a treaty of alliance in which the Indians agreed to assemble on the North and North East of the settled parts of Texas,... be amply supplied with arms and ammunition, and... so soon as they were ready the Commanding General at Matamoras would be apprised of the fact, and a simultaneous movement upon Texas commence by the Mexicans from the west, the Indians from the North and North East, from the heads of the Brazos to the Babine, and the allies to unite at some point near the Centre of the inhabited part of Texas after having driven off or destroyed the whole white population—to reconvert (using the General*s expression) Texas once more into a wilderness. As a condition of this cooperation and a reward for their services, the Indians were to possess thereafter the whole of Texas in absolute right and full sovereignty, and were to form a cordon between the U. States and Mexico. Butler, having dispatched his affairs in the United States, immediately proceeded to Texas and called on Gen. Houston at the City of Houston in the latter part of April 1837.... He had narrated to him all the facts, detailed in the foregoing with such remarks of my own, as seemed proper to me pregnant of the consequences deeply interesting to Texas, and which required prompt and decisive action —for whether the Condition of Mexico enabled her to carry into effect the treaty made with the Indians or not their hopes had been stimulated of some day possessing the Country, and the germ of continual jealousy and inextinguishable hostility planted in their breasts to bud and bear fruit. Houston wished to know, with some anxiety, if his old friend Chief Bowles of the Texas Cherokees had been among the Indians at Matamoras. Butler could not say. Houston, the friend and champion of the Cherokees, was loath to believe in this evidence of treachery, and he and Butler in their conversations on Mexican and Indian affairs differed ”in opinion as widely as possible, and some times the difference leading to warmth’.’ Butler’s opinions had no influence on Houston, who continued his friendly policy towards the Indians--a policy unpopular with the Texans as a whole, who desired the lands occupied by “Houston’s Indians. As a candidate for the Texas Congress in 1839 Butler wrote Jackson, asking him to disprove the charge of Butler’s enemies that the ’’Old Hero” had dismissed and degraded him from the Mexican Ministry. If such refutation, he explained, was ’’done by myself it would become necessary to publish extracts from certain private letters that would discredit” Jackson. Jackson vouchsafed no reply. And Butler was elected. In 1841 Butler supported Houston for the Presidency, but later broke with him, perhaps largely because President Houston refused him the Attorney Generalship. In 1843 Butler ran again for office and again applied to Jackson for a vindication. He was especially urgent, as an anonymous pamphlet by D. D. Child, The Texas devolution, and the Late Outrage in California, signed ”Pro bus,” came out this year in Massachusetts in resistance to Texas annexation, abusing Jackson, Cass, Stevenson, and others, including Butler, who relates that “the abuse of me was afforded by garbled extracts from private letters to Gen. Jackson which by some very strange and unexplained circumstances had been placed in the Department of State, then under the charge of Mr. Webster.” 94 The pamphlet was being used against him by Houston, against measures he was running. The Colonel wanted Jackson to deny having dismissed him in disgrace, asking permission, as an alternative, “to use such extracts from his private letters to me as was necessary for explanation and refutation of the false and malicious remarks of Probus.” But Jackson did not lift a hand. Butler says; these extracts might have afforded materials for opening a new Battery agst. Gen. Jackson, and the pamphlet was evidently designed to provoke me to publish—as it frequently contained such remarks as the following — ’We suffer much for want of the letter to which this was the answer* — ’lf we had access to the whole correspondence of which this is a part, we should be able to exhibit the true character of this man Jackson so little understood, his corruption....’ Jackson refused permission to publish his private letters, and, says Butler, ”1 was compelled to suffer... I felt indignant at the General 1 s conduct, and then addressed him.” On July 28, 1843, he told Jackson that he might feel compelled to publish without permission, especially since the sanctity, if there ever were any, of their private correspondence was destroyed by the fact that Jackson had put many of Butler* s private letters to Jackson into the public archives. He said he would have to quote, in self-vindication, from one or two of Jackson’s letters, H one of which I said to him... would greatly lessen his reputation in the estimation of the whole moral world if published.” Thus wrote Butler in his public letter of self-vindication to Poinsett, Scott, and others, on July 8, 1846 —the nearest he ever came, it seems, to an expose of the Mexican diplomacy. He observed, very optimistically, that when he should write up the Mexican negotiations some day ”my reputation will be advanced, —and I add it will be well that as much may be truly said for the reputation of Gen. Jackson In conclusion, it may be that Butler came nearer to attaining Jackson’s great object than is usually believed. Writers have often referred to Butler’s diplomacy as crude and/offensive to Mexico; but it appears that the Mexican public never knew of the nature of his efforts and that he really managed with finesse and offered no "presents” where they were not called for or acceptable. Writers have also been accustomed to berate Butler as a scoundrel, making him the scapegoat of this unsavory diplomatic episode; but it does not seem that we can hold Butler’s alleged "desperate” character alone responsible for his shady procedure. The affair was a phase of Jacksonian diplomacy. Butler was, of course, no saint. Houston wrote him, during their exchange of unpleasant reminiscences in 1845, "I said, and am still prepared to say, in behalf of you, that you are one of the most intelligent, amusing, and agreeable scoundrels that I have anywhere known.” Butler was probably no worse morally than many of the ambitious men of the early: Southwest, but it need hardly be said that he stood far below such men as Jackson, Houston, and Wilkinson in qualities of leadership and mind. Jackson no doubt considered himself justified in treating with the Mexicans on a lower plane than that on which he would treat such nations as England. And that he should not refrain from using the weaknesses of the Mexicans to ’’regain our own” was simply natural and to be expected. 1 Jackson to Van Buren, Secretary of State, August 12, 1829, in Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, IV, 57 (’’Prairie” was commonly pronounced an extra syllable says Dickens in his American Notes). Butler, born in South Carolina, lived for some years in Kentucky, where he sat in the legislature, ran for Governor, and married the sister of John J. Crittenden. In the War of 1812, after serving at Detroit, he fought with Jackson at New Orleans. Moving to Mississippi, he was a member of the state legislature in 1826. He was a speculator in Texas lands--his lands probably being situated at Nacogdoches. See G. L. Rives, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, I, 235. ’’Notes on Texas” in Van Buren Papers, in the Library of Congress. It is not easy to think that Jackson had any real conviction that the Neches was the rightful boundary, or the river meant to be designated as the limit by the treaty of 1819. That the Neches was not a branch of the Sabine was sufficiently plain on Mellish’s map, upon which the boundary was designated in the treaty. In 1834 Judge Cross of Arkansas told Leatherstonehaugh that ”to the astonishment of the Mexicans, a pretens ion was set up by the American speculators[whose number included ButlerJ that the river—which from time immemorial had been known as the Sabine, there never having been any other stream which bore that name —was not the Sabine, but that in fact another stream lying farther to the west, and which was known by the name of Neches, was the true Sabine. Unfortunately for this pretension, the 32nd degree of the treaty boundary did not intersect this Neches” (Featherstonehaugh, Slave States, 11, 155). Butler’s arguments for the Neches were ludicrous and specious (Barker, Mexico and Texas, 1821-1835, pp. 47, 48). It is significant-,- perhaps, that Jackson always cautiously referred to the Neches as ’’represented” to him as the true boundary; he seems always to a void the appearance of having examined the question and having made the claim himself. Thus, in Van Buren’s instructions of August 25, 1829, to Poinsett we read: ”It is represented to us that, of the two streams which empty into the Sabine bay through the same channel, the one farthest west is the most considerable, and may with reason be claimed to be tie one referred to in the treaty.” Van Buren said the disputed boundary was not worth pressing, as it would take protracted negotiation, but it was among those questions which a cession of all of Texas would obviate. Cong. Debs., XIV, Pt. 11, App., 128. Ex. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Bess., No. 351, p. 286; Rives, The UhiTed StaTes and Mexico, I, 242 and note; D. D. Porter, Hemo'ir of^C ommodore David Port er, 347-391, 394. to Butler, confidential, October 10, 1829, in Butler Papers, in the University of Texas Archives; Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, IV, 80, 81. Jackson’s private letters to Butler and Butler’s replies are not to be confused with the official correspondence of the State Department. Sjackson to Butler, March 23, 1830, in Bassett, Cor. o£ Jackson, IV, 130; same to same, October 6, 1830, in ib ia., IV 183. On Butler’s understanding of Jackson’s wishes from Jackson’s first private letter of instructions see Butler’s account of his relations appended to this chapter: Butler to Jackson, July 28, 1843, Jackson Papers. to Butler, March 23, 1830 (in reply to Butler’s letter of January 5, which seems now non-existent), in Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, IV, 130. Buren to Butler, October 16, 1829, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 551, pp. 40-43. These TnsTrucfions were doubtless written by Jackson himself. ®Butler to State Department, January 5, 1830, in Butler Papers; Butler to Jackson, May 25, 1831, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 351, p. 381. In 1832 Bugler repeated his request to be made a Minister, saying that his private fortune had become wasted. He had entered a contract with Lorenzo Zavala in 1829-30 to colonize a Texas land grant, by which he said long after, ”l should have realized at least $lOO,OOO perhaps much more--All this was lost--sacrificed.... 7 years of my life sacrificed in a period when time was everything, and tnen exposed to reproach and all sorts of misrepresentation...and malignant falsehood 1 ' (Butler to Poinsett", Scott &c, July 8, 1846, in Butler Papers). Jackson believed that the Whig Senate would not confirm Butler as Minister. Butler to Jackson, January 2, 1832, and Jackson to Butler, March 6, 1832, February 14, 1833, in Bassett, Gor. of Jackson. IV. 390-394, 414, 415; V, 17. — —* to Van Buren, February 19, 1830, in Butler Papers. This letter is partly in the code which Butler and Jackson used extensively in their correspondence. It was ”Mr. Monroe’s cypher” of 1805 (E. C. Burnett in Am. Hist. Rev., XXII, 333, 334). 10 Butler to Van Buren, March 9, 1830, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess,, No. 351, pp. 311-322. A had given Poinsett a copy of Ataman* s secret report (Alaman, Historia de j lco, V, 874). to Van Buren, April 15, 1830, in Butler Papers; Butler to Jackson, April 15, 1830, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 351, pp. 323, 324. 1^ Butler to Van Buren, May 19, 1830, confidential, in Butler Papers. See Poinsett to Secretary of State, March 10 and July 22, 1829, in Cong. Debs. , XIV, App., 135, 136. to Van Buren, June 29, 1830, in Butler Papers. to Butler, March 23, 1830, in Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, IV, 129, 130; same to same, October 19, 1829, son Papers, in Rives, United States and Mexico, I, 243, 244. Cor, of Jackson, IV, 182, 183. Jackson added that if a cession was unobtainable Butler should try to procure the Neches as the boundary to prevent strife over land claims. ISButler to Van Buren, February 19, 1831, in Butler Papers; Butler to Jackson, May 25, 1831, in H. Ex. Docs 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 351, p. 381; Jackson to“BulTer, February 15, 1831, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 243-245. Adams, who saw the entire dispatch of Butler ’s of May 25, 1831 (which is printed only in ”extract" in the House Document, and which is one of the numerous "private" letters from Butler to Jackson v/hich the latter put into the public archives, while retaining his own private letters to Butler) tells us that Butler therein advised Jackson to let the new Mexucan envoy, Montoya, who was superseding Tornel, understand that Mexico was of very little I ‘account" with us (Adams, Memoirs, XI, 363). 1 *7 Butler to Jackson, February 6, 1834, in Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, V, 247. Onis’s boast (Memoir, 146) that the Flor’idsT treaty was "in reality one of exchange or permutation of one small province for another of double the extent, richer and more fertile" was of course known in Mexico. Moreover, Martinez, one of the Mexican diplomats, who had been Secretary of Legation with Onis when the Florida treaty was made, openly rejoiced that Onis had claimed the Sabine "without any expectation of its being agreed to .... Don Martinez spoke exultingly, as having obtained an advantage in the treaty beyond anything which his government expected" (Statement of James W. Breedlove, in A. V. Brown, Speeches, 506). Breedlove was Mexican vice-consul at New Orleans, 1829-31, and was succeeded by Martinez, who was Mexican Minister at Washington in 1837. to Jackson, May 25, 1831, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Gong., 2 Sess. , No. 351, p. 381; Jackson To hitler, August 24, 1831, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 335, 336. Jackson added that the New land scrip company might be planning to separate the "colony” from Mexico. 19 Jackson to Butler, February 15, 1831, in Bassett, Gor. of Jackson, IV, 243-245; cf. same to same, August 24, 163 T, Tn ToTT77~IV, 335, 336. 20 E. G. Barker, ’’President Jackson and the Texas Revolution,” in Am. Hist. , Rev., XII, 791; Butler to Jackson, June 23, 1831, Tn Archives of the Texas state Library. to Jackson, October 6, 1831, and Jackson to Butler, December 9, 1831, In Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 354, 380, 381. 22gutler to Jackson, January 2, 1832, in ibid., IV, 390- 394, is a long argument and plea for repudiation of the line of 1819. to Butler, February 25, March 6, 1832, in Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, IV, 409, 415; cf. Jackson to Butler, October 7, in Ibid., IV, 184. 24Butler to Jackson, February 27, 1832, and Jackson to Butler, April 19, 1832, in ibid., IV, 413, 435, 436. to Jackson, June 21, 1832, in ibid., IV, 450. Austin, who met Butler on his trip to Texas, writes: ”Col. Butler... proceeds to San Felipe to settle his private business with Whitesides and others” (S. F. Austin to S. M. Williams, April 12, 1832, in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev. XI, 99), whereas the suspicious ”Political ~C Ei ef ’ of Bexar later declared that Butler’s presence must have determined the then outbreaking revolutionary movements” (Kimpen, Ausbreitungspolitik der Vereinigten Ltaaten, 117; Rives, TEe VnTIEa States and Mexico, I, 222, 223). On the events in Texas in 16’32 see E. 67 Barker, Mexico and Texas, 1821-1835, pp. 112 ff. See note 48 below. 26jackson to Butler, September 4, 1832, in Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, IV, 472. to Secretary Livingston, July 16, 1832, in H. Ex. Docs. , 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 351, pp. 442-445. Enclosed were" the minutes of two conversations with Alaman (Adams, Memoirs, XI, 343). Butler to Forsyth, June 17, 1835, in State Department; I am indebted to Professor Barker for the use of his transcripts from the State Department of this and other letters. to Jackson, July 18, 1832, in Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, IV, 463, 464. 2 sRives, The United States and Mex ico, I, 247; Barker on the Butler Thehaiion, XCII, 600, 601. ’’There has been whispers here," J acks on wrote Butler on February 14, 1833, ’’which have come to my ears, and friendship induces me to name it for your safety, without believing a word of it myself —it is, ’that if you could, you would not make the arrangement with Mexico until the New York Company whose agent Col. Mas on? is, has completed his negotiation with that government 1 ” (Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, V, 17). 30 Jackson to Butler, October 29 ?, 1832, in Butler Papers. The letter of July 17 is unimown. Jackson’s letter is somewhat mutilated. 31 Butler to Jackson, August 12, 1832, in Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, IV, 465, 466. 32gutler to Jackson, October 9, 1832, and Jackson to Butler, December 4, 1832, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 479, 495, 496. to Jackson, January 2, 1833, in ibid., V, 2. Butler expected another revolution not later - than April 1, to determine the succession and make ”a modification of the form of Government” (Butler to 3. M. Williams, December 30, 1832, in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., XI, 104, 105). Butler was now trylng from his strategic position, according to Houston, to ’’obtain a monopoly of the fur trade of the Rio Grande. I saw your letter, in January, 1833, to Gol. James Bowie, on this subject... which fact I communicated to Gen. Jackson” (Houston to Butler, December 25, 1845, in Archives of the Texas State Library). 34j ackson to Butler, February 14, 1833, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 17. On Santa Anna’s ’’proverbial” character see note 43 below. 3sButler to Jackson, February 10, 1833, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 351, pp. 466, 467. 36j. s. Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 72; cf. Adams, Memoirs, Xlf 368. - to Butler, March 20, 1833, cited by Barker in Am. His t. Rev., XII, 792, 793. This precise knowledge," remarks Adams, "of the intended design of the colonists to declare their independence as early as April, 1833, was suppressed in the document communicated to the Mouse." (Memoirs, XI, 368). 3 &Butler to Forsyth, Februaty 8, 1836, Butler Papers; Butler to McLane, July 26, 1833, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 351, p. 483. A copy of the Manifestacion del Ciudadano Jose Maria Tornel (Mexico City, May, 1833) was sent to the State "Department 'by Butler in February, 1834. to Jackson, September 14, 1833, in Archives of the Texas State Library. 4O Jackson to Butler, private, October 50, 1833, in Butler Papers; Bassett, Cor, of J ackson, B, 221, 222. 41 Butler to Jackson, October 28, 1833, in Bassett, Cor, of Jacks on, V, 219-220. to Jackson, November 27, 1833, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 228-230. Butler to Jackson, February 6, 1834, in Archives of the Texas State Library; and in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 244- 247. ‘ to Jackson, September 26, 1833, and October 2, 1833, in b ass ett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 210, 215. 45 Butler to J ackson, October 2, 1§33, in ibid., V, 215. Butler had written on September 14: St. Annans ignorant, bigotted, and insincere--He is proverbally the most hypocritical and insincere of the whole Mexican Nation, and Heaven knows worse cannot be said.” 4 sButler to Jackson, December 20, 1833, in Archives of the Texas State Library. 47g. M. Bryan in D. G. Wooten, Comprehensive History of Texas, I, 449, 450. ’ ' 48jackson to Butler, November 27, 1833, in Bassett, Cor, of Jacks on, V, 228-230. 4=9Jackson to Butler, April 19, 1832, in Bassett, Cor, of Ja©kson, IV, 436; same to same, September 4, 1832, in ibidT, IV, 472. It was just at this time that Houston conferred with Jackson. SsButler to Jackson, March 7, 1834, in Hassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 249-253. Jackson encouraged Butler to procure a cession of Texas thus: ”lf you succeed it will be a lasting feather in your cap, and prevent a bloody civil war” in which Texas —with the help of Amerleans--would finish the ruin of Mexico (Jackson to Butler, October 1, 1833, in Butler Papers). SlHouston wrote in 1832 that Butler in Texas was ’’cutting some capers, or working some magic with wisdom. Such men as he is, would destroy a country and take my word for it, he will never gain one! In the first place he is vain, and in the next,he is avaricious: and in a word, men cannot adhere to him and imbibe consistency, and confidence from him.” (Houston to James Prentiss, June 27, 1832, in Houston-Prentiss Papers, in Archives of the University of Texas). See note 24 above. 52”0. P. Q.” Butler to Senor Don B. T. A. Branch T. Archer , Mexico City, January 28, 1834, and ”0. P. Q. ” to , February 8, 1834, in J. M. Winterbotham, ’’Stephen F. Austin and Anthony Butler; Some Texas Correspondence,” in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., XI, 109-118. These letters were sent to Almonte "by a correspondent at Velasco, Texas. 5S Aust in to S. M. Williams, May 6, 1835, in Barker, The Au st in Papers, 111, 73; cf. Brigham to J. A. July 197 1335, in ibid., 111, 93. butler seems to have tried to produce irritation between Austin, S. M. Williams, General Mason and other Texas leaders (Austin to Williams, April 29, 1835, in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., XI, 125, 126). 545, l. Hammeken, ’’Recollections of Stephen F. Austin,” in The Soutnwe stern Historical Quarterly, XX, 370-375; Barker, Life of Stephen F. Austin, Founder of Texas, 455. Austin and Butler had quarreled over a debt of"T815 owed the latter, who came to Texas to collect it in 1828 and nearly staged a duel (Barker, ibid., 286, 287; H. Smither, Lamar Papers, VI, 180). Professor Barker says that they were always erficially ami cable. ” to J. F, Perry, March 4, 1835 (soon after his release), in Barker, The Austin Papers, 111, 45, 46. s°Butler to McLane, July 13, 1834, cited from Professor Barker’s transcripts; partly quoted in Barker, Life of Stephen F. Austin, 454, 455 note. J. £m. ?J Gutierrez to Van Buren, New York, May 29, 1834, in Van Buren Papers, Library of Congress; quoted from Professor Barker’s transcripts. Perhaps this was the Gutierrez who soon became Mexico’s Foreign Minister. to Butler, June 21, 1834, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 269, 270; butler to Poinsett, Scott &c, July 8, 1846, in Butler Papers. to Jackson, June 6, 1834, cited by Barker in Am. Hist. Rev., XII, 796; Butler to Jackson, October 20, 1834, in HZ Sx. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 oess., No. 351, p. 542. ssButler to Jackson, November 21, 1834, in Bassett, Gor. of Jackson, V, 311, 312. Austin wrote that Mexican statesmen were despairing of holding Texas and that he believed ’’Texas will be transfer red to the U. 8. by treaty in less than two years.... Men who pretend to be acquainted with the secrets of Govt, here are tryin g to buy up Texas lands... the best way money can be employed” (Austin to J. F. Perry, Mexico City, October 6, 1834, in Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., XI, 123-125). to Jackson, February 26, 1825, ”extracts” in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 351, p. 555. s 2 Estrada to Butler, February 9 and 16, 1836, and Butler to hstrada, February 10 and 18, 1836, in University of Texas transcripts from the Mexican Archive de la Secretaria de Fomento, Colonizacion £ Terrenes' BaldTos, Legatos X and XVlllT 1826-1836. Reports were spread~in the American press--perhaps merely as a result of the charges against Estrada--that ’’propositions had been made on the part of the Mexican government to the United States, treating of the sale of Texas to our government... that the secretary of relations in Mexico had conferred with him on the subject of such sale” (Hiles 1 Register, L, 186—May 14, 1836). s 3 Butler to Secretary Forsyth, June 17, 1835, in Justin Smith transcripts from the State Department, in the University of Texas Archives. This paper was one of those ’’confidential” ones which butler little suspected that Jackson would place in the public archives. Van Buren’s Secreta ry of Btate in his note sending the requested Mexican documents to the House on July 4, 1838 (H. Ex. Docs. , 25 Cong. , 2 Sess., No. 351) says that no documents ’’have been withheld except a communication from Mr. Butler, the late charge d* affaires, ... made to this department during his visit to this city in the summer of 1835--and all those parts of his dispatches, and of those of Mr. Poinsett and Mr. Ellis, which contain narratives of political events in Mexico, spec ulations upon them, and speculations and opinions concerning public characters in that country, none of which can now be made compatibly with the public interest.” 64 1 t was perhaps in accordance with this apparently projected sale of Texas that Santa Anna held out hope in 1835 of making Texas a ’’territory" so as ”to separate her from Coahuila, in order that the people might be considered as foreigners” (Wooten, Cpmprehensive History of Texas, 1,163). 6§Butler to Jackson, July 28, 1843, with Jackson’s endorsement, in Jackson Papers, Library of Congress; this letter, hitherto unpublished, is appended to this chapter. James Schouler, seeing this and other private letters between Butler and Jackson in the Jackson Papers, was convinced that Jackson connived at Butler’s bribery diplomacy (Atlantic Monthly, XCV, 220--February, 1905). 66 Butler to Poinsett, Scott, &c, July 8, 1846, in Butler Papers. 67Quoted by Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, 74, and by Barker in Am. risT7 Rev. / XU, 79’7 (my italics). This endorsement did not prevent" ndams from viewing the Butler report of June 17, 1835, as the H passe-partout H of the whole Jackson system. While Adams was probably deceived in believing that Jackson feared a trap by Santa Anna, Adams did know that Butler "made the old General believe that if he would give him sufficient authority he would not only make the proposition, but would accomplish the object" (Adams, Memoirs, XI, 351, 358, 370; E. I. McCormac in Am. Secs, of State, ed. S. F. Bemis, IV, 318). — ~ 68 Adams, Memoirs, IX, 377, 378 (my italics). 6 ®James Prentiss to Butler, New York, July 27, 1835 (three letters, on various phases of the subject), and Prentiss to Butler, September 20, 1841, in Butler Papers. 70 h a friend of Mexico” to the Mexican Foreign Minister, New York, November 5, 1855, in University of 'Texas transcripts from the Mexican Archives* 71prentiss to Butler, September 15, 1835 (in reply), in Butler Papers. Prentiss was disappointed. 72 A. Brigham to J. A. Wharton, July 19, 1835, in Barker, The Austin Papers, 111, 93. On Burnet see Barker, Mexico and p. 145. del Castillo Negrete, Mexico en el Siglo XIX, XXII, 128-131. 74 Ibid., XXII, 128-131, 140-142. 75 Houston to Butler, December 25, 1845, in Archives of the Texas State Library. to Forsyth, November 28, 1835, in H. Ex. Docs. , 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 351. 77cavid Lee Child to Almonte, September 15, 1835, in H. E. Bolton, Guide to the Archives of Mexico, 360; £d. L. ChildJ , The Texas TievoTutlon, and the Late OuTrage in California, by Probus (1843), 71 Thi^information was given, says’ ChTTd Twho was an by Governor on a visit to his acknowledged son, an educated colored man and abolitionist of Philadelphia. Jackson told Burton that Texas would soon be annexed with such emphasis that B ur ton at once bought 40,000 acres of Texas land and advised his colored son to move to that country. Adams also on several public occasions says that Jackson promised to make Burton Governor of Texas. Possibly Child was the ”friend of Mexico” cited in note 67. 7®Memucan Hunt to Forsyth, September 12, 1837, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Congi, 1 Sess. ,' No. 40, pp. 14, 15. Hunt refers to " the time that General Jackson believed that the chargd d’affaires (Mr. Butler) of this government had succeeded Tn negdtTa ting the acquisition of Texas.” Mexi co en el Si gio XIX, XXII, 144, 145, s°This Butler tells Forsyth in his dispatch of December 27, 1835, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Gong., 2 Bess., No. 351, p. 567; cf. Adams, Memoirs, XI, 344. Slßutler to Forsyth, November 28, 1835, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Bess., No. 351, p. 564. SSButler to Forsyth, June 17, 1835, cited in Reeves, American Diplomacy under Tyler and £olk, 73, 74; Forsyth toßutler, August 6, 1805, in Cong.~DeKs., XIV, Pt. 2, App., 131; Adams, Memoirs, XI, 347, 348; Butler to Forsyth, December 27, 1835, in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Bess., No. 351, p. 567. to Austin, Washington, D. C., June 2, 1836, in Barker, The Aus tin Papers, 111, 363, 364. Minister of Foreign affairs to Castillo, October 31, 1835, in H. Ex, Docs., 25 Gang., 2 Bess., no. 351, p. 719. SSCastillo to his government, December 5, 1835, in Negrete, Mexico en el Siglo XIX, XXII, 125-127, 139, 140. SGButler to Jackson, December ? 1835, in Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, V, 375-377. See Forsyth to Butler, July 2, 1835, in dong. Debs., XIV, Pt. 2, App., 131; These instructions were a broadening of Jackson’s endorsement referred to in not 64: Forsyth omitted Jackson’s restrictive equivocation ’’this government. ” Wharton to Rusk, January 24? , 1837, in G. P. Garrison, Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, I, 188, in Am.' Hist. Assn. Report, 1907, Tl, Butler - offer thirtee“millions as all to come from the American government? Bs ßutler to Forsyth, January 15, 1836, in Butler Papers; also in H. Ex. Docs. , 25 Cong.., 2 Sess., No. 351, pp. 573-575. Butler’s recall reached him on January 14, dated December 16. Jackson’s endorsement on Butler to Forsyth, January 15, 1836, in State Department, kindly furnished the writer by Professor Barker. Italics mine. ssButler to Forsyth, February 8, 1836, in Butler Papers; "extracts" in H. Ex. Docs., 25 Gong., 2 , No. 351, p. 581. Mexico en el Siglo XIX, XXII, 145; Butler to Forsyth, August I'6, 1836, in Butler Papers. 9200py in Butler Papers. Years after, he wrote on the margin of one of his early optimistic letters in the Legation archives: "l drew inferences from facts founded on the well known, ordinary operation of the human mind. I knew nothing at that time of the peculiarities of Mexican character, and hence was betrayed into errors which never occurred after being here about twelve months’’ (quoted in Barker, Mexico and Texas, 1821-IBSS, pp. 46, 47). ssButler to R. Potter, manuscript narrative, in Butler Papers, 94 Butler to Poinsett, Scott, &c, July 8, 1846, in Butler Papers. The next quotation is also from this letter. Child was aided in writing ’’Probus” by Adams, who in early 1843 made an intensive study of Butler’s Diplomacy in the State Department Archives (Adams, Memoirs, XI, 348, 350, 355, passim). 95 An American sympathizer of Mexico wrote Almonte on December 21, 1846, about "Butler’s dirty intrigues... under the private instructions of the President of the United States, amd his final attempt to bribe to the amount of half a million... Butler’s ’precious collection’ may be bought cheap, if you want it (cited in R. S. Ripley, The War With Mexico, I, 523; it was one of the numerous letters of" tHe^lcind'found in the Mexican mails by the American invaders). No doubt Butler showed his collection privately, but it does not appear that he ever published. His papers, or such as survived, were sold long after by his wife as a historical curiosity, and are now lodged in the libraries at Austin. APPENDIX ANTHONY BUTLER TO JACKSON Independence, 28 July, 1843. Dear Sir, There have been placed in my hands very recently by a friend a pamphlet purporting to be published in Northampton, Massachusetts, filled with abuse of a great many persons, and, amongst others, a very liberal share of it for myself. In the correspondence referred to my letters to yourself are mentioned and some of the most important omitted altogether-- the object of the proceeding is apparent —in my reply however I may be embarassed for want of copies as reference, as I possess no copies of my official correspondence with the Department of State, and but few of my private correspondence with yourself. I confess that it created some surprise to find that my private letters to you were lodged in the Department of State, and especially as yours of similar character to me are withheld—l however am in possession of all your private letters, the absence of which the pamphleteer seems so mucti to regret. Amongst the falsehoods uttered against myself is Ist. The charge that I was an absconding debtor, and lurking concealed some where in Arkansas at the time of receiving the appointment—l never was in Arkansas in my life—and that my character for low intrigue and cunning recommended me to your notice for the appointment. You well know that the cause, as I presume, of appointing me was the information I possessed in regard to Texas communicated personally and in writing to yourself and Mr. Van Buren at Washington City in 1829--and which impressed Mr. V. 8., if it did not yourself, with the opinion that I could do much towards obtaining a transfer of Texas to the U. States: That I was successful you well know, for in 1835 at Washington I submitted to Mr. Forsyth communications to me in the original Castilian to establish the fact of my having succeeded and it only required your consent to the secret article of the Treaty appropriating $500,000 of the $5,000,000 towards purchasing the individuals whose agency was indispensable as you had been previously informed by me. In reply to my Letter stating the fact that money must be so applied, and requesting your ideas on the matter —-You say n go on and conclude the Treaty, you know the sum to which you are limited and provided you do not exceed that, it is nothing to us how the money is disbursed.” Let any man acquainted with the English language read this sentence and then decide whether it did not authorize me to purchase assistance in securing the object—bribing if you please--besides I have a letter of youirs addressed to me in May, 1830, long before I had sounded the Depths on the subject, in which you yourself make a suggestion that cannot be construed to mean any thing else than authorizing a bribe or bribes if necessary to attain what we aimed at. The Letter says all Spaniards love money, and with the sum you have at command you may do much in securing the assitance of such as are necessary by appealing to their interest. I do not give your precise words, because I have not turned to the file of your letters to search for the one referred to —but I know well that my language is perhaps less strong and direct than that which you employ in your Letter to me. Well Sir I went on, concluded the treaty and after apprising you of the fact, and referring to the secret article which would be necessary, you then to my astonishment in late 1833 start at the idea of corruption as you term it, and refuse to receive the Country on sucH conditions: —I then apply for leave to return and confer with you—My return is sanctione —and in our private interviews you assent to my doing the very thing by which you had been so much startled-- but refer me to Mr. Forsyth with these remarkable words — ’’Settle it with Mr. Forsyth and manage the affair as you please but do not let me know it.” You will not fail to recollect moreover that I stated to you this fact, which I was instructed to do by the Mexicans, ”We will enter into the Treaty make the transfer and place the Country in the possession of your Government but as Congress ma~r eFuse to ratify””tHe Treaty we wish to know whether Gen. Jackson will consider the possession we give him as a performance of the Contract on our part and will pay the Money.” I stated this to you, and your reply was--" Yes Sir, if they will sign the Treaty and give us possession T will'’undertake to keep it.” If all this will not prove my activity fidelity and success in the Negotiation, then words and acts have lost their usual meaning. The second important item of abuse on me in the pamphlet is — that I was dismissed in disgrace-- that as you know is not the fact. In the last conversation between us at Washing-ton, I mentioned to you the fact of Mr. Forsyth’s saying to me, that 1 must conclude the affair so as to return by the meeting of Congress--! told you that it might be impracticable to do so--and asked of you whether if the affair was in progress and unavoidable delay should require longer than the time indicated by Mr. Forsyth, whether I might not be at liberty to do so—and added-- without this permission I shall decline returning altogether, as it may be a journey made in vain--You in the most clear and distinct manner gave me permission to remain as long as was necessary--urging me however to proceed and conclude the Negotiation and complete the work as early as possible, which you must have been very sure that I would do, as I was as desirous of return as you could be, and this was proved by my letters from 1834. You moreover voluntarily promised me the Government of Texas--I did not ask it—but the pamphleteer states that you had offered it to a Mr, Burton of No. Carolina, who had accepted--and thus Sir if the abusive writer states what is a fact then you deceived me, and disgraced yourself—but this is so little like what I had a right to expect from you, and did expect from you, and the writer states so many palpable unblushing falsehoods, that I am constrained to add this to the number, and to acquit you of the double dealing it would so positively establish. --After the interviev/ with you in which a discretion as to time was allowed me, I prepared to leave Washington, and about 10 o’clock at night whilst engaged in packing my trunk (as I left by light in the morning) a servant brought me a communication from the department of State; supposing it was merely a formal official communication on some matter we had. previously discussed and settled, and all which was well understood, I threw the packet into my trunk, designing at my leisure to look over it —it was forgotten, and only whilst I stayed a day at Matamoras and overhauled my trunk there. You were not aware of the collision which had taken place between Mr. Forsyth and myself whilst at Washington and the ill blood which it seems the affair had created--but this I disregarded as I was just as indifferent about Mr. Forsyth and his opinions as he could be about me and minebut the proof of the ill blood was found in the Despatch delivered on the night before my departure, and opened at Matamoras;--he there intimates a distrust of my success (designed to insult me after all that had passed) and positively limits my return to the period of assembling the Congress —I was very sure that this was done without your knowledge or assent, and so wrote him, with the view of eliciting from you a confirmation of your instruction to me verbally given at our last interview—and addressed at the same time another Letter informing him, that I would not return at the time indicated as I had private matters' to engage me Tor some time, and of course resigned. 1 however continued in the discharge of the duties of the Legation untill Mr. Ellis arrived —whose arrival I urged as soon as I learned through Mr. Forsyth that you had determined to appoint a successor —and doubtless Mr. Forsyth stimulated you on the subject —it was a fortunate opportunity for a mean and paltry spirit to gratify its malignity and revenge. When I first reached Mexico in 1835 the Nation and Presidt. were flushed with hopes of a speedy conquest of Texas and untill that was done nothing would be listened to of the transfer — when punishment had been inflicted they promised to return the subject--and it is a positive fact that after the battle of San Jacinto the transfer was again proposed to meand we should have saved the designed for St. Anna — but as Mr. Ellis had arrived and had charge of the Legation, I could take no step myself, and I left him to manage for himself. —He sought no aid from me--I was not disposed to volunteer in his service, and cover him with the credit of a negotiation that I had labored, for years to effect.--And the York Company could then have made the purchase, as it was in the market for any one —But as Texas had declared itself Independent a private Company could not compel the Texians to recognize their claim to the domain of the Nation, and they declined making the purchase altho* urged to do so. The same objection could not apply to the U. States, for in addition to the desire of the Texians for Union with the U. States--the U. States had the means of coercion if they resisted the claim founded on a transfer from Mexico. Whether the offer was ever made to Mr. Ellis I am not able to decide-- but as he was a stranger to the Agents employed and mcr eover neither spoke nor understood a word of the language it is probable he heard nothing of the matter, as on such subjects it is not customary to speak through interpreters—it is a matter of too much delicacy and danger. Now the object of this letter is to ask whether you mean to notice the pamphlet, and vindicate me from the foul and calumnious charges urged against me by the writer? If this is done, it will obviate the necessity of doing so mysel —if you do not mean to take up the subject and reply to the calumnies I shall do so, and in my defense, it will become indispensably necessary to refer to several of your private Letters, all of which amounting to 31 are in my possession: — this may afford a morsel to the pamphleteer which he appears desirous to gain and which I have no wish to gratify him inand would not under any circumstances expose to the public eye short of self-defense, against unmerited abuse, and to which they are indispensable.—l hope the necessity may be avoided, and shall wait your answer till Ist October--time enough, after which I mean to proceed. You shall see all that I write. Most respectfully yours, A. butler To Genl. Jackson Note of explanation for the 2d page # for this extract I do not pretend your very words as I have not time to refer to your Letters —but I have read so often the Letter containing your assent, that I have the idea correctly, and very nearly the language as will be seen when a quotation comes to be made as I shall be compelled to do, if I am put on my defense —And as my private Letters have been made the property of the public the obligation of confidence seems to be annulled if it ever existed. A. B.—- Jackson* s endorsement! I have read over this tissue of falsehood and false coulourings —• I once thought A. Butler a man of honour...but in this I have been mistaken. there never were as many barefaced falsehoods as is stated in the foregoing--That he was positively directed that he must return before the meeting of congress—that if he was not certain of concluding the treaty he ought not to return to mexico—That the 5,000,000 was all that could be applied, and offered the Government of Mexico and the money how they applied was nothing to us... £in Jackson Papers, Library of Congress} CHAPTER X TEXAS REVOLT AND ZENITH OF JACKSON'S IMPERIALISM Ken have not been of one opinion as to the nature of Jackson’s relations with Mexico in 1836-37. The facts are obscure and incomplete, and one is necessarily influenced in taking a favorable or unfavorable view by his own opinion of Jackson’s character and motives. The belief was once rather general that a Kachinavellian imperialism lay beneath the smooth surface of Jackson’s conduct, outwardly so ingenuous • Recent authorities have held Jackson’s diplomacy justifiable if not above criticism. But there are certain things which seem to show that the recent tendency to justify this phase of American conduct has gone too far and which to seem lend color to the old?r view. A John Quincy Adams has stated this older view in his Texas speech of 1338: from the day of the battle of San Jacinto.every movement of the administration of this Union appears to have been made for the express purpose of breaking off negotiations, and precipitating a war, or of frightening Mexico into the cession of not only Texas,but the whole course of the Bio del Norte, and five degrees of latitude across their continent to the South Sea. The instructions of the 80th July, to Fr. 3111 s almost immediately after the battle, were evidently premediated to produce rupture, and were but too faithfully carried into execution. His ( Ulis’s) letter of the 20th October, 1936, to Mr. Monasterio was the premonitory symptom, and no truehearted citizen of this union can read it, and the answer to it on Ihe next day by Mr. Monasterio, without blushing for his country... The perpetual teasing of the Government of Mexico for cessions of territory, increasing in proportion as the proposals were repelled with disgust; the constant employment of agents civil and military, for all official intercourse, with Mexico and Texas, citizens of states most intensely bent upon the acquisition of Texas, such as Anthony Butler, Powhatan Silis, and General Gaines; the uninterrupted intimacy with General Houston, from ths egg to the apple of the Texian revolt; the promise to Hutchins G» Burton, of the Government of Texas; the wanton, unprovoked, and unconstitut icnal discretionary power given to General Gaines to invade the Mexican Territory; the apparent concert between that officer, in the execution of this authority, with the Texian Commanding General Houston; the cold indifference to every complaint on the part of Mexico, against all the violations of our obligations of amity and neutrality towards her; the disingenuous evasion of a direct answer by the wooden-nutmeg distinction that a direction not to g o beyond Nacogdoches was not equivalent to an authority to go" as far as Nacogdoches; the contemptuous treatment of all the protests of the Mexican minister, Gorostiza, and the preposterous importance attempted to be given to his printing a pamphlet in the Spanish language, exposing the bad faith of this Government in their treatment of his mission, and circulating a few copies of it before his departure from this country, — in all these things there is a mutual coincidence and coherence which makes them perpetual commentaries upon each other. G. 1. Rives gives a more recent view — that of a scholar versed in our early relations with Mexico: The conclusions to be reached as to Jackson’s conduct in this businass will principally depend upon the opinion... as to his personal character... Adams looked upon Jackson as a man capable of carrying out a long-meditated system of deep duplicity ! which involved such subtle intrigue as the careful fabrication of a letter years in advance of its production [theßilton letter]; but the patient plotting... of such a system is foreign to the judgment that has generally prevailed in regard to Jackson 1 s character. It seems far more in accordance with his impulsive and wilful nature to sup ose that the violent course he pursued in reference to the presentation of the claims on Mexico was the result of genuine indignation at her procrastination, and at Corostiza’s insulting language, rather than to believe that it was the result of a complicated plot. 1 Adams and many other contemporaries viewed Jackson’s occupation of Nacogdoches and handling of the private claims against Mexico as phases of his expansion policy, whereas recent historical writers tend to draw a sharp line between Jackson’s border-defence, Texas, and claims policies, treating them as detached entities. 2 It is a mere coincidence to to these writers that Jackson should finally make a summary demand upon Mexico in the claims matter just after Texas had revolted and when she was as yet unrecognized. His claims policy is explained favorably on the basis of his passionate and arbitrary character, and is compared to his management of the claims against France (which to the writer do comparable to the claims "against Mexico") . Undoubtedly this treatment of expansion, claims and "defence" of border as detached entities has helped these writers reach their favorable view of Jackson’s conduct in each. The evidence still allows, if it does not invite, one to consider the various phases of Jackson’s Mexican diplomacy as inseparably int -rrelated, and the claims and frontier policies as the handmaidens of Jackson’s desire for expansion. Jackson’s conscicusness that a sinister construction would be placed on his conduct in reference to ’’neutrality,” border "defence” and claims if his desire for Texas were too much in evidence seems to be indicated by his careful shrouding of the abortive Bu ler negotiations fbr the acquisition of Texas and northern California and New Mexico. In 1336 the President wished to appear innocent of having had such a stubborn desire for Mexican soil. Thus Adams complained, when the movements of General Gaines were under surveillance and suspicion, that a system of mystery and of secrecy had been constantly adhered to by him [ Jackson] on the subject, to such an e? tent that a resolution, offered on the 17th of May. 1836, and repeated on the 24th of the same month, in the ... calling for information concerning any overture by him to the Mexican Government for the acquisition of any portion of their territory, was twice evaded influence and of his most devoted partisans. If ws view Jackson’s Mexican diplomacy as an interrelated unit, with expansion its central idea and motive, the question of the private claims ’’against Mexico” is not so much a question of their intrinsic, legal justice as of how and why they were pressed so forcefully in 1836-37* Was it because of their ov/n merits or because they would be a convenient entering wedge of imperialism, an instrument of coercion? The significance of the Gaines and claims enisodes seems to the writer to lie in the notive behind them as well as their manner of operation* The sane question arises in the Mexican War guilt controversy — that is, how far were the claims used merely as a pretext to force tie cession of territory? Recant authorities on the Sou thwest , like Justin H. Smith, have tended to have large faith in Jackson’s and Belk’s apparently indignant diatribes about wrongs long suffered by our citizens, xedress long forborne, and ’’patience” at last brought to an end by Mexican "delayV They thin- it sufficient evidence of Jacksonh and Polk’s ingenuousness that these statesmen themselves proxessed a virtuous simplicity of motive* But frankness seems to the writer an atrophies essence in politicians, whose .actions orally speak louder than their words. Proceeding to note certain things which seem to raise some question as to Jackson’s simplicity, we may omit many details of a tale circumstantially related by scholars in this field of history. We have seen that Jackson was somewhat hostile towards Mexico, held that the treaty of 1319 was void as far aslt related to the western boundary, did not hesitate to indulge in perhaps well-meant menaces against Mexico, probably connived at Houston’s scheme, and tolerated Butler’s efforts to gain a cession of Texas by the employment of bribery. He seemed long eagerly expectant of a revolution in Texas and ready immediately to annex a revolted Texas. He waited in vain for Butler to succeed or Texas to revolt from Mexico. He dropped a hint to Butler that he might seize a revolutionary Texas in "self-defence” against the Indians in the border region, who would probably cause disturbance. He was determined to take the disputed” territory between the Neches and Sabine Rivers, "peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must.” In the writer’s opinion such an occupation was desired by Jackson for diplomatic reasons. Whether the President really wanted the boundary of 1319 surveyed, under the treaty of 1332, or wanted it left open so as to use the "disputed” territory as a lever in Texas is a matter which defies certainty. But the evidence points to a policy of delay. On He cent) er 2, 1333, Castillo, the Mexican charge at Washington, informed the American government that Mexico had appointed a commissioner and surveyor; but the time allowed by the treaty of 1332 for can eluding tine matter had elapsed, Mexico’s delay probably being due to revolutionary conditions. The American government insisted that a new survey could proceed; and on January 13, 1334, Butler was instructed to negotiate a time extension, and have it ratified and sent to Washington. 4 The Mexican chargd "complained to his Government ... of the difficulties or delays opposed by the cabinet of Washington to bring[ing] the negotiation to a conclusion.” Butler at his very great leisure nego- tiated a new survey article in the spring of 1335, having called the matter to the attention of the Mexican government in an insinuating note on 21, 1834, which may have seemed to refer to the Arkansas boundary: he would only observe, that Mexico was actually occupying a large territory which the government of the undersigned considered as justly belonging to the citizens of the United States ... and as it was well known, that not onl y the go vernme nt of Mexico, but that of the u nited States, had al ready graited a large part of this territory to various natives and for eigne is, the prompt conclusion of this affair became every day more urgent. Butler suggested to his government on March 31, 1835, that ’’the mere renewal of the treaty is in itself a matter of importance to us, because I am convinced that we shall gain by it jurisdiction over a very valuable tract of country, now either in an unsettled state or under the dominion of the Mexican government.” Butler brought the new article to Washington in June, 1835, but Jackson withheld it pending Butler r s final negotiation for Texas. Only on May 6, 1336, when Congress was considering Caines T s apparent desire to assist "our Texians," did the call upon Congress for legislation to carry it out—after extending the time, which he had let lapse, by 3 ample agreement, this time, with Corestiza on April 20* This belated action, as Marshall says, was a bit of hypoc- and also something more, perhaps; it S g rve aa an excuse for military intervention in the "disputed" region. This briefly is the background of the Caines affair on the Sou t hwe s t ern front ie r • The Texas Revolution had hardly begun when Secretary Forsyth warned Mexico that neither she nor the insurgents could be pemitted to encroach upon the territorial limits of the United States, ”or make our soil a battle ground fbr settling their political dissensions.” But the territorial rights of Mexico were not to be so care&lly respected. For syth also intimated to Castillo in November, 1335, that the United states claimed the Neches as the boundary and would consider the Neches-Sabine district as "neutral,” pending settlement. Mexico, hearing of this claim, sent to Washington as Minister Extraordinary Gorostiza, the "Magno Apollo of Mexican diplomary." Gorostiza was disturbed on arriving by reports that in a certain white house, it had been asserted that the Sabine was noF the KaElne, and that the real Sabine was the Naches. And he read in the government's confidential newspaper that between two distinct branches of the Sabine lay a narrow tract of territory, to which the United States and Mexico both lay claim, and which the United States already considered as their own property, and, in consequence, believed themselves bound to assist and protect its inhabitants. On May 10, 1336, Secretary Forsyth sought to explain to Gorostiza why Jackson’s Naches claim had not been made the subject of diplomacy: If the true demarcation according to that treaty has not been filly made known to Mexico, it is because there has been on the part oT that government a delay to proceed to the execution of that instrument. Questions belonging to the duties of the commissioners and surveyors, could not be properly presented or cmside red until they met to enter upon those duties. A correspondence between the united States and Mexico, for the treaty of limits ... was no place to look for traces of the pietensions of the two governments, founded on a construction of that instrument ... To discuss them in advance, would have been useless, if not suspicious ... Whatever may have been done or omitted prior to that time, it is certain that want of infbrmation on this point since November last, cannot be complained of by the Mexican government. The , undersigned load the honour to give the Mexican charge d’affaires, Mr. Castillo, in a conference in that month, the most distinct intimation of the claims and expectations of the government of the United States under the treaty of limits and the additional article, a conference vhich the undersigned has supposed was the chief cause of the subsequent extraordinary mission of Mr. Gorostiza to the united states. d In vain did Gorostiza, as on May 9, point out the fact--which doubtless explains Jackson 1 s failure ever to submit the question to diplomacy--that upon Mellish’s map, published in Philadelphia, and improved in 1313, the only authority on the matter which the Mexican government will recognize agreeable to the treaty, ... Nacogdoches is situated several miles beyond the Sabine river, and consequently far within the indisputable territory of Mexico. The undersigned is, moreover, not aware that any claim of this nature has ever been advanced on the part of the American govemment ... unless it be the solitary and vague indication contained in Fr. Butler’s note of the 21st December, 13M« The undersigned ... [protests against the authorization given to General Caines, to go with his troops to Nacogdoches, because he considers it essentially, and with regard to its possible effects, as a positive violation of the territory which is known to be As said above, there is reason to believe, from its inherent absurdity and Jackson’s secretiveness and shifting argument for it, that Jackson had nothing more than a convenient ’’belief” in the Neches claim. What was perhaps the first step in a deliberate plan to invade Texas to assist the colonists was thus taken in November of 133 5 by the President, Jackson well knew that Mexico would not observe his pretense of a ’’neutral ground” on Mexican territory. Jackson’s shifting reliance on the Neches claim and on an Indian ’’danger” and on a pretended right to cross into Mexico to protect Mexico from our Indians, his shouldering of the responsibility on Baines while he encouraged him to advance, and the obvious duplicity in his statements seem to show Jackson’s conduct a piece of quite Machiavellian imperialism. general Caines was ordered in January, 1336, to take a milirary force to the southwestern frontier to watch events in Texas and protect our territory from the contending forces and restrain American Indians in compliance with the treaty of April, 1831. Neutrality was enjoined, but fixture events, as Marshall says, throw these orders ’’under suspicion Jackson, as in 1332, anticipated Indian disturbances: The thirty-third article of the treaty with Mexico, requires both the contracting parties to prevent ’by force, all hostilities and incursions on the cart of the Indian nations living within their respective boundaries, so that the United States of America will not suffer their Indians to attack the citizens of the Mexican Stat as,• The provisions of this article you will cause to be faithfully enforced ... and you will not hesitate to use the force at your disposal, for the purpose of preventing any such designs ... Caines was farther advised: ”It is possible that the course of operations may induce one or the other contending parties to approach the boundary line* with a view to cross it in arms. Should you find that the case, you will give notice to the persons having the direction, that they will not be permitted to cross into the territory of the United States: and if they attempt to do so by force, you will resist them with the means at your disposal." the boundary was Caines was not yet told. Caines knew that Jackson had laid claim to the Neches and knew that he desired Texas. And Jackson’s memorable seizure of Florida had been pretexted on Indian disturbances. Caines, too, was ambitious for himself and for his country, and he knew that Jackson wanted Texas. Caines in his aggressive report to Secretary Cass on Faroh 29 shewed that he thought open intervent ion to he desirable, in view of the sanguinary manner in which the Mexican forces seem disposed to carry on this war against our Texian [neighbors] ... I take leave to suggest whether it may or may not become necessary, in our own defence, to speak to the contending belligerents in a language not to be misunderstood—a language requiring force and military supplies ... to check the savage operations of each of the contending parties who may forget to respect the laws of war and our neutral rights, until Mexico and the United states shall by an adjustment of existing difficulties, put an end to seems of barbarism which cannot but endanger the; neace and. other vital interests oTaIT Hie p artle s conceghe'd ... 3houTd"T find any disposition on The parT of Mexicans or their red allies to minace our frontier, I cannot but deem it to be my duty ... to anticipate their lawless movements, by crossing over our supposed or imaginary national boundary, and meeting the savage marauders wherever to be found'.in their approach to our frontier. Should I err in this view of the subject, ... I shall be grateful to receive the views of the President to which I shall scrupulously adhere. But ... if my own views are approved, I shall, in that event, have occasion for some mounted volunteers, with other forces, sufficient to make my numerical strength equal of the estimated strength of the contending parties, ... eight to ten thousand men A* This plan, conceived before Gaines had left New Orleans, shows what he thought might be consonant with the President’s sentiments. He had already come to the conclusion that the Mexicans had Indian allies and that the united States might be justified in protecting the Texans from this combination. Yet any "right” to do so seems entirely derivative from the desire. Gaines reached Natchitoches, louis tana, on April 4, and ■found the eastward retreat of the Texans threatening the end of Anglo -American Toxas. Cass’s reply to Gaines on April 25 did not rebuke the general’s unneutral suggestions. but placed the responsibility for any action on Gaines, enclosing to him suggestively Jackson’s claim to the Neches, stated in a memorandum of an official conference, between the Secretary o f State and the Mexican Minister, respecting the present state of affairs upon the south-western border of the united States, ... as a part of your instructions.” Oass added equivocally: It is not the wish of the President to take advantage of present circumstances, and thereby obtain possession of any portion of the Mexican territory. Still, however, the neutral duties, as well as the neutral rights, of the United states, will justify the government in taking all necessary measures to prevent a violation of their territory ... In that portion of the country there are many Indian tribes whose habitual predisposition to engage in war is well known, as is, also, their reckless disregard of any of the claims of humanity. And from information which has reached this government , there is too much reason to believe that efforts have been made to induce these Indians to join the Mexican troops. It may, therefore, well be, as you anticipate, that these various contending parties may approach our frontiers, and that the lives and property o f our citizens may be placed in jeopardy. Should this be the case, the President approves the suggestion you make and you are authorized to take such a position on either side of the imaginary boundary line, as may be best ibr your defensive operations. You will, however, under no circumstances, advance farther than old Port Nacogdoches, which is within the limits of the United states, as claimed by this government. put you will please to observe, that this permission wiTT" nof Ie exercised, you’ slwdir?ind’ advanced positron necessary', fo afford' due" s ecu fito Th e~ WohVlTr, in' consequence of the unsetfTeT s tate’ of th ingsTTeyond you . , You will please to explain, fully, your views and instructions to any armed parties who may be marching towards you, and should they continue to threaten your position, or to manifest a design of crossing into the United States, you are authorized to attack and repel t hem • I have this day, by direction of the president, requested the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi, to call into service any militia force you may find necessary for the protection o f the frontiers. This force must be called out for a term of not less than six months. These seemingly double-faced instructions close with the inconsistent adminition that "as little cause of offense as possible will be given to any foreign authority." Caines is instructed to protect and repel any invader from "American territory" and encouraged to think that he should consider the Sabine-Ueches strip as American; he is given encouragement as to his suggestion that he cross the boundary to "anticipate" the lawless depredations of the Mexicans and their allies upon our frontier, with the barely consistent admonition that he may do so only if the "lives and property of our citizens may be placed in Jeopardy." Marshall’s strictures on Jackson’s equivocal instructions of May 4 apply equally to these of April 25: acting under them on his own discretion "an impetuous officer could easily have produced a war with Mexico,"while, when analyzed, they "were of such a natux*e that they could be used as a defence of the government, if occasion required." Jackson’s wish and expectation that Gaines would take a hint and occupy the "disputed” territory does not rest entirely on inference. The President confessed, this desire in a private letter to Kendall, his Postmaster General: I have very little doubt but Genl Gaines wishes were to give the possession to Texas that their claim might bestrengthened ... because he was ordered at first to take a position as far advanced as Nacogdoches, but he did not, and by a late order [of July 11] was ordered to occupy it. But in neither order did the President really order Gaines to occupy the disputed territory as American territory: on different occasions bespeaks a various language. Gaines was merely encouraged to take the arbitrary step on his own res pen sib il it y* Jackson was not the man to take invidious responsibilities if there was anyway to shift them in appearance. Secretary Forsyth’s first irritating assertion to Gorostiza that regardless of Mexico’s wishes the United States would do Mexico a favor to go to the heart of Mexico in pursuit of Indians from the United States was an argument most absurd and illustrative of American aggressiveness. The Mexican treaty did not contemplate such a violation of the territory of one party by the other. "Will the United States admit,” asked Tornel, "that we have the right to cross over into Arkansas whenever the Apaches decide to inconmode the inhabitants of that district? Such an interpretation of Article 33 would result in an immediate 15 declaration of war against Mexico.” Jackson himself quickly shifted the argument to one purely of self-defence; yet it is no less difficult to imagine that the United States had any right to invade a neighbor’s territory to anticipate wrongs to our citizens. It looks as though Jackson considered the Texans for the occasion "American citizens.” Jackson’s indefinite and discretionary instructions to General Gaines bear a striking resemblance to Polk’s instructions in 1345 to General Tayler, which strongly encourage Taylor to occupy the "disputed” (Mexican) territory between the Nueces River and the Rio Grande, but, when analyzed, much responsibility upon the General by their discretionary nature. Like Taylor, Gaines probably understood the v 131138 0:f imperialistic President, but hesitated to move and assume sc great a responsiblity. Meanwhile rumors of Indian disturbances in Texas were brought to Gaines by Texans, especially by speculators .and refugees at Nacogdoches. Historians in gen have concluded, Gaines must have felt, that the rumors of Indian danger were largely fabricated to give him a pretext fbr intervention. Certainly, as Hives says, "the fears of an Indian invasion of 16 the acknowledged territory of the United States were chimerical.” Governor White of Louisiana and General Macomb, the Commander-i- chief of the army, as well as Hitchcock, who was with Baines, declared trie rumors to be Texas fabrications which deserved no credit. Hitchcock in denouncing the "unfounded alarm" of "Indian Massacre" raised by "scoundrels" says: "I regarded the whole of our proceedings in the Southwest as being wicked, so far as the United States was concerned. Our own people provoked the Texaswar with Mexico and prosecuted it, not for but for land." Gaines had much more definite information about the "runaway scrape," the eastward retreat of the Texas forces, the bloody affairs at the Alamo and Goliad, and Santa Anna’s alleged threat to desolate Texas than he dM about Indian Hostilities of any kind when on April 8, without awaiting authority, he called on the governors of four Southwestern states fo r troops for border defence, notifying the government of his action. It is hardly likely that he thought these troops necessary merely to protect the border. His dispatch of March 29 showed that he desired a fores greater than the Mexican and that he might, if not restrained from Washington, cross the "supposed" boundary and join battle with the Mexicans and their "red allies." This was perhaps his intention: certainly it so appeared tc these who could best appreciate his conduct, senator Benton deci ared in early May, "when the reported advance of the Mexicans upon Nacogdoches, and the actual movement of General Gaines and cur own troops in that direction, gave reason to apprehend the encounter of flags," that while neutrality was the obvious line of our duty and of our interests, yet there might be emergencies in which the obligation of duty could have no force ...when, in fact, a man should have no head to think’. nothing but a heart to feel, and an arm to strike’... It was after the affair at Goliad, and the imputed order to unpeople the country... I declared it to be my sentiment, that treaties were nothing, books were nothing, laws were nothing! that the paramount law of God and nature was everything! and that the American soldier, hearing the cries of helplessness ... should fly to- the residue, and strike to nrevent the perpetration of crimes which shock humanity and dishonor the age« I uttered this sentiment ... with a view to the public justification of General Gaines and his men, if, under circumstances appalling to humanity, they should nobly resolve to obey the impulsions of the heart instead of coldly consulting the must: leaves of books -and treaties. Benton adds in his Thirty Years 1 View: The public feeling in behalf of the people of that small revolted province, strong from the beginning of the contest,was now inflamed into rape from the massacre of th eAI amo and of Goliad, Towards the middle of May news of the victory of San Jacinto arrived at Washington. Public feeling no longer knew any bounds. The people were exalted — Congress not less so — and a feeling for the acknowledgement of Texian independence, if not universal, almost general. I? It was only on April 28, when news of San Jacinto reached him, that General Gaines seemed suddenly to doubt the Indian darker and wrote the Governors to suspend enlistments. Professor Marshall thinks that Gaines was eager for a war with Mexico for p arsenal aggrandizement: "The war with Mexico, in wai ch he hoped to gain a great name, had suddenly become a remote possibility." This may be so, but the present writer has seen nothing to show that the General was not actuated by honorable, if unneutral, motives. His hesitation to march to Nacogdoches later without having seme evidence of Indian disturbances seems to show that he really wished to adhere Strictly to his orders. The fault, if any, lay in the unwarranted breadth of Jackson’s instructions. Gaines’s notification to the government of his requisition upon the fair governors was acknowledged and approved I / of in Casses reply of May 4: the General was left to act as he otiose, and was even encouraged, while, as Marshall says, the perhaps deliberately equivocal wording was such as to leave the government room to repudiate him, if expediency demanded it. The preparations called for and authorized were plainly for a large war, no mere defence of the border from the ossible incursion of a few Indians. William Jay saysjwith his customary sarcasm: The General had, on his own responsibility, called for four battalions from fcur States. The President, still more provident, gives him newer to call fbr an unlimited number of Militia from no lessthan five States. And why were these vast powers confided to Gains s? — and what and where were the enemy against whom this unnumbered Militia was to be poured forth by all these States? Gaines on May IC sent Hitchcock to Washington with the great news of victory contained in a note from General Houston; this Gaines did. believing it to be of great importance to our country, as well as to Texas and Mexico ... that our Government should, be prepared to act promptly won the anticipated application of the people of Texas for admission, and ’ esiring, as fervently as any of the early friends of the President can possibly desire, that this magnificent acquisition to our Union should be made within the period of his presidential tezm. Hitchcock reached Washington in three weeks and was enthusiastic call y received "by Jackson. "The President expressed himself openly in favor of .Texas," relates Hit ch cock, "and insisted in fact that the river Nueces (rNeches] was our boundary, scouting the idea of any reference to Relish’s map (as if those who made the treaty knew nothing about it) and insisted on the principle that no treaty could yeld any portion of our territory* This last may be correct, but the former is no reason at all." 21 Jackson apparently wished Gaines to occupy the "disputed" territory and had encouraged him to do so in the orders of April 25.—Such an act would, of course, have brought our troops into ccnflict with the Mexicans if Can Jacinto had not intervened, and it can hardly be doubted that this was Jackson’s intention. The Mexican decree repudiating Santa Anna’s treaties with the Texans and continuing the war reached Washington on July 9 and doubtless accounts somewhat for the new orders to Gaines of July 11, as well as the instructions of July 20 to Ulis to press the private American claims peremptorily in Mexico. In these new orders Gaines was again encouraged to invade Texas. This independence, not to say annexation, of Texas was again, and Jackson probably wished to have it appear to Mexico that we were distinctly for Texas. If Mexico could be induced to declare war against the United States, so much the better. In toat case Texas would bring in New Mexico and California. In early May the authorization given Gaines to invade Texas was "inadvertently” made public, and Jackson was soon compelled by the outcry of his opponents to begin a retreat and cover his tracks. Gaines was eventually made the scape-goat of an aggressive movement as unnecessary, as it piPved, to save the Teynna as it was to protect our citizens from the Indians. When it became clear to the country that the rumors of Indian ’♦massacre" had been unfounded Jackson publicly chided Gaines for unneutral conduct. His calm and ungenerous assurance that Gaines had never been so much as honestly deluded by the reports may seem a commentary on Jackson’s own conduct in the matter. The President’s professions of neutrality now come thick. But Jackson’s duplicity, as well as his unfairness to Gaines, appears in the following private letter of August 12 to the Bos tmas ter -Gen ral , who has just informed him that Gaines has at last occupied Nacogdoches (a movement which Jackson may have had some intimation of about July 25): You will discover that the basis on which Genl Gains made the requisition was the movement of the Mexican troops into Texas, which basis was a violation of that neutrality which we had assumed, and was in fact, and which Jfee ico might have viewed it as an act of war upon her if it ted been carried into effect, and I nave no doubt was intended by Gains to get troops there who would have at once went over to the Texan army; but I have stopped it in the but. And you will find that there has been no possible movement bv the Indians, and the whole has been projected in New Orleans ... Genl. Gains would do any act to injure and implicate the administration. Your fears about taking possession of Nacogdoches will vanish when the true cause of this movement is made Renown. This movement was ordered by the Government, and made -nown by the Secretary of State to the fuican Minister, Nr. Gorostiza, and accuiesed in by him. We contend, from the words and spirit of the treaty, that all the navigable waters of the Sabine belong to the United States by the contracting parties, and as I am advis ad will be able to show from the ancient map of Spain "EKat the western branch ... was known by the name of the Sabine at the time Louisiana was ceded ... be have been anxious to run this line fbr a long time, [but] Mexico has not been ready to join us; ... and we have now to contendwith Texas as well as Mexico with regard to our limits. Texas would claim the boundary as claired by Mexico ... We take possession and hold it with a perfect under st and line is run and established if our possession is west of the established boundary, we withdraw our troops ... Thus you see we act with the knowledge and acquiescence of the Minister of Mexico, and with a view of keeping out of collision with Texas. I have very little doubt but Genl Gaines wishes were to give the possession to Texas that their claim might be strengthened ... because he was ordered at first to take a position as far advanced as Nacogdoches, but he did not, and by a late order was directed to occupy it, neither Texas nor Mexico being in possession, and there keep our Indians at peace and sustain our neutrality. You will now see that we cannot be charged with violation of our neutral ity, by Mexico, and our own safety required the possession . as it regards Texas. The falsehood and seeming hypocrisy of this letter, in contrast to the facts and to Jackson’s statements to the public and to Gorostiza, add to the probability that Jackson had been determined to intervene in Texas on any pretext. He grasped at every possible straw to justify the movement. Yet publicly he did not dare to assert that he had a right to occupy the ’’disputed* l Sabine-Neches district prior to a diplomatic settlement . He seems tc have great difficulty in finding any substantial ground of justification. That Gorostiza had "acquiesced** in such an occupat ion was not true. from Butler’s letters and from other sources Jackson knew well that Mexico would not observe his "wooden nutmeg" claim to the Reches, and it was well known that there was some desire in Mexico for war against the united states, Butler’s private letter to Jackson of December 19, 1335, shows clearly that Jackson’s authorisation to Uaines on April 24 to invade Texas was a witting invitation of war to the Mexican force marching eastward after the Texans, toward the Sabine. Butler related a conversation of Santa Anna’s with the British an d ch M inis te rs: 3ant a Anna as usual very seen began to speak of the affair of Texas, and. as a consequence introduced the United States. He spoke of our desire to possess that Country, declared his full knowledge that we had instigated and were supportrngTtHe and that he would in die season Chastise us for it. Yea Sir, he said chastise us* he cont inued, I understand that Gen. Jackson sets up a claim to pass the Sabine, and that in running the division line, hopes to acquire the Country as far'as the Maches. said he, (turning to Gentlemen present) I mean to run that line at the Youth of my Cannon, and after the line is Established, if the JTation will onlygive me the Yeans, only afford me the necessary Supply of Money, I will march to the capital, I will lay Washington City in Ashes, as it has already been once done, 1 (turning and bowing to the British Minister) . Don't suppose that I am hoaxing, to be sure the conduct is sc extraordinary fora man in the Station of Gen. St. Anna ... Yet it is true, I had it in the first instance from persons entitled to the fills st credit, and it was confirmed to me subsequently by the British Minister himself, in every thing except the bow addressed to him, he disclaims that; but my other informant insists on his version of the Story as true. There is little doubt YuT Wa¥ genl. Santa Anna will be taught a lesson by the people of Texas themselves, how difficult it would be to reach even the Sabine River much less visit our Capital ... Kay that he may ’become so placable as to permit a boundary yet westward of the Caches. Butler wrote similarly to Robert J. Walker, who delivered Santa Anna’s threats to the Senate on May 9 as an argument for Texas recognition just when the news of the Alamo and Goliad massacres had excited this country to a warlike or fever. Gaines’s conduct was justified by many on the grounds of humanity and race affinity—and there seems to be no other justification. Jackson privately gave vent to his indignation at trie Mexican conduct of the war. The editor of the Neapolit ian, a clerk in the war Department, learned somehow of Jackson’s sentiments and published them in his paper* Jackson wrote Blair of this: The reply you have made to the Neapolitan was just. Tcould any Christian countenance the horrid treachery and mass acre of Panning, and his men, after seducing them to surrender under written Terms subscribed by the proper authority. For this act Santa Anna forfeited his life on the just principles of retaliation, and policy could only Justify sparing him, and that was to get Texas cleared of the Mexican without the great sacrafice of men that might have been made in obtaining possession of Goliad, and the alamo — but if the Mexicans disavow his scts, and attempft] to renew her acts butchery, then, I would retaliate to the knifehandle and not only put to death the officers with Santa anna at the head, but the soldiery, one for one, if Mexico made it a war of extermination, I would meet her eye, for eye, tooth for a tooth, until she would learn to act like Christians. How has this Clerk Editor become acquainted with my opinion. I have had no conversation with him on the subject as far as I can recollect ... Why the Editor of the Neapolitan would drag my name into view as it regards St anna I know not, and if he has become the Editor of a Foreign government he is unfit fbr a clerk in the war depar tm ent. It was natural that Jackson should wish to aid the Texans and at the same time save the appearance of neutrality. His endorsement on Stephen F. Austin’s appeal of April 15 for American aid for the Texans in the "war of barbarian against civilization, of despotism against liberty, of Mexicans a~ gainst Americans," may be viewed as a characteristic piece of hypocrisy for the eye of posterity: The writer [Austin] does not reflect that we have a treaty with mexico, and our national faith is pledged to support it. The Texians before they took the steps to deciare themselves Independent, which has arounsedand united all mexico against than ought to have pondered well, it was a rash and premature act, our neutrality must be faithfully maintained. From this one might think that Jackson took the Fexican view 93 of the revolution in Texas, but as he had probably been declared: "No one considers it other than a wicked and unheard-of rebellion; and there will not be found a single individual who, with reason, can compare it to the just and sacred cause of Mexican independence, or to the separation of ( the United States of the North from their mother country’* (to Butler, April 3, 1836, in H. lx. Docs., 25 8 Sess., No. 351, p. 539). eagerly desirous, as well as expectant, of a Texas revolt fbr six years past, his opinionthat it was now tf a rash and premature act 1 ’ seems only a little sincere in the sense that the He volution was inopportune to the final hopeful phase of Anthony Butler’s diplomacy, spoiling the Hernandez plan of a peaceable cession. Jackson could see, as did Polk in 1345, that a war with Mexico once begun (by however devious means) would be a popular one to the American people, especially to the men of the South and of the Mississippi Valley, whose hunger &r land and desire for adventure, fighting and expansion needed only an opportunity for expression* The 1336 marked the high point in the period of boom, expansion and land speculation ended by the Panic of 1837 — a period similar to that after 1342, which provided the moving background of the Mexican War. Articles descanting on the rich lands and mines of Mexico were common in American papers. Generous land bounties attracted many an American volunteer to Texas. Jackson made no real attempt to enforce neutrality. True, hqtid instruct the district Attorneys to prevent open enlistments for the war in Texas, but it was notorious that these authorities, particularly in the Southwest, did not comply with their duty. Jackson’s innocent professions were sufficiently bewildering. Por instance, he was travelling by boat on the Ohio River, after Gaines’s occupation of Nacogdoches of June-July had stimulated .American recruiting . ’Lemoyne, the great Abolitionist, was on that boat and demanded of the President why it was that armed bodies of men were allowed to recruit in the United States to make war on yer Aco . To which General Jackson replied, ’That Americans had a lawful right to emigrate and to bear Jackson’s stock plea ever since 1829. But what does it amount to? How had neutrality been preserved in the past when preservation was really desired? In short, why did the President not issue a proclamation of neutrality? %y, if the civil agencies refused to up hold the law, did he not, instead of beim so ready to allow Gaines to enter Texas in quest of an Indian danger and to usurp a naw boundary, order an edequat 3 militar; force on the border to prevent the bands of filibusters from going into Texas while the war was in progress? But, of ccu.X’se, such preservation of neutrality cannot be expected of the agressive leader of an imperialistic people, "It vas generally believed," said a contemnerof Jackson’s, "that he had not exerted his to prevent ci tis 3ns of the United States from joining the ’rebels* in Texas, then helm organised and led by his old friend hhen dorostisa complained that "seme agents of the Federal Government” wsre not obeying the President*® Inst ruetiono, the acting of 3t-tr replied that the subject wuld be invest! ■ and ViMifUlW pmishfie Milt the Finieter infons the government of specific derelict lone of Federal officials? Secretary Fonroe had thus put off Gul® in 1315-16< It appears that no American. official was ever punished aven for the most flagrant breach of the maintenance of neutrality* 2he hypocrisy of the American adm Iniat ration in reference to the instructions to the .District Attorneys io pin in enough. In September complained that General Dunlap was raising 3,000 troops in Tennessee for Texas (solicited by Houston) . Secretary Forsyth replied that the attention of the District Attorney of Tennessee had been called to the matter. How farcical this was, when this very attorney. Captain Grundy, had been raising a Texas force earlier in the year, as was undoubtedly known to the government at Washington. The Texas 3. P. Carson had written from Nashville on June 1: Seventy men are now ready to leave under Captain Crundy who is the prosecuting Atty, for the United Stat es for this District', aha had formal orders to arrest and prosecute every man who may take up arms in the cause of Texas ... He says he will prosecute any man under his command who will take up arms here and he will accompany them to the "boundary line of the United States to see that they shall not violate her Neutrality and when there, if the boys think proper to step over the line as peaceable Migrants his authority ... will cease and he THnks ’IT Klghl y p rob ab 1 e that he will take a peep at Texas himself. Thus you will see how the neutrality of this Covt is preserved by her civil officers. $$ Jackson 1 3 "neutrality” was farther exemplified in ths case of ile Bratus,a Texas vessel which was given refuge at the port of Sew York by the pro-Texas Collector, Swartwout, whose action amount ?d to a recognition of Texas independence before such recognition had been given by the government. Against Mexico’s protest, Jackson upheld Swartw out’s act on the ground of certain precedents of the period of Latin- American devolutions — for, as we have seen, there were sane precedents, often more chan memorable, of the harboring in American ports of ships of various unrecognized 34 revolutionists and buccaneers. On the the.Swartwout defalcation in 1338 it was asserted in the Hew York Commercial Advertiser and Whig papers generally that part of the money either stolen or "borrowed" by Swartwout from the customs was sent as a loan* with president Jackson’s privity, to the Texas revolutionists; * the invest igation did show that such advances had been made to Texasjby Swartwout, who, moreover, had large Texas 1 andint erasts, f * * ■ acquired mainly in 1835-36. Jackson wrote to the editor of the Nashville Union: "Hermitage, Dec# 8, 1333 * "Sir — I thank you ibr calling my attention to the subjoined extract from the Hew York Commercial Advertiser, a paper to which I am not a subscriber, and whose statements, therefore, might not otherwise have met my observation# Supposing it possible that the extract in question may obtain some credence with these who may not have the means of knowing the injustice it has done me, I think it my duty to give this public contradiction to the insinuation it contains of my being privy to any advances, if there were any, made by Fr. Iwartwout, the late collector of the port of New York, to aid the Texians in their contest with ln all my correspondence on tie subject of Texian affairs, private or public, and in all my intercourse with our citizens# no human being can find any authority for the allegation t hat I ever countenanced any step or proc ceding inconsistent with our treaty relations to Ye: ico, or with the peaceful character of air Republic# Ycur obedient servant, Andrew Jackson" Jackson’s subtlety seems displayed in this letter, which, corning at the end of the Pulton letter controversy, seems, as Faye says, to be an "additional effort at exculpation in the Houston conspiracy, for it squinto more in that direction, 36 than it speaks to the Swartwout defalcation." Being generally empathetic to the Texans and of expansionist, spirit, Mariams wore as a whole not overcr it leal of Jackson’s pro-Texas attitude# Md early Corostiza found that at the seat of Government, of which, with the exception of some Senators and Representatives, there is scarcely an inhabitant who does net depend directly or indirectly upon the Government, there were likewise very few persons who were not interested actually and materially in favor of the Texans; one, because ha owed lands, bought ata very low price, or presented to him; another, from being engaged in speculations in slaves or provisicns, and munitions of war; others, because they had relations or friends in th® ranks or in the administration of the Texans, because they thought that they thus make their court better, or because they did not wish to place in jeopardy the situation which they held already, and, lastly, others, because they were nullifiers. Bo one of these made any sec at of his sympathies; and if any honest man, in Congress or through the press, ventured to raise his voice in defence of the most obvious principles of equity and right* they all charged upon him at once; the least opprobrious epithets and phrases applied to him were those of a bad citizen, sold to Mexico; or he was declared to be speaking thus, merely because he was in the opposition. ulgEt the'" FeFicanenvoy infer from all this? What had he not to fear? Nevertheless he suspended his judgment, and could not for a t ime convince himself, in spit e of what he heard, saw, and read, that the United States, which were at that very moment negotiating with him respecting the exchange of the rat ifications of the 2d additional article of the treaty of limits, and from which he had not received a single hint or word indicating discontent with its stipulations, could, notwithstanding, have already harbored in their bosoms the sinister design of violating them all* Gorostiaa was for some time deceived, or rather bewildered, by the artful ways of the American administration. ' On April 20, just after Gorostiza had signed with Sbrsyth an explanatory declaration extending the time for survey for a year, the Secretary told Gorostiza "in the name of the President (though in a tone of the utmost indifference, as if the subject was of no importance,)" that General Gaines might be advanced to some position to protect American territory from Indians and that the troops of the United States would be ordered to protect the commissioners and surveyors of the two governments whenever they should meet to execute the instructions to be ar epared under the treaty of limits... Should the troops, in the performance of their duty, be advanced beyond the point Mexico might suppose was within the territory of the United States, the occupation of the position was not to be taken as an indication of any hostile feeling, or of a desize to establish a possession or claim not just i tied by the treaty of 1 imit s* The occupation would be precautionary and provisional, and would be abandoned whenever (the line being run and the true limits marked) the disturbances in that region should cease the y being the only mot ive for it. 39 Gorostiza did not agree with Forsyth’s insinuation about a possible Advance beyond the Sabine, but thought the suggestion insignifi- and made no reply. But when to his surprise and consterna?tion a memorandum of the interview was sent to him the next day by Forsyth, implying plainly and being intended to imply Gorostiza’s acquiescence, the Mexican Minister began to divine the sinister significance and craft of Forsyth’s conversation. He wrote his government on April 25 that if an invasion of Mexican territory occurred he would demand his passports and leave. And he wrote a formal protest to the American government against the substance and implications of Forsyth’s memorandum: She presence of a body of neutral troops in the very theatre of the war, cannot fail to embarrass the operations of the Mexican army, to favour the Texians indirectly, and create a constant risk of collision. The further General Gaines advances, the more restricted will be the circle within which the belligerents can move... Who can then prevent ths Texians, if'they find themselves pursued at any time by Mexican detachments, from taking refuge behind the troops of the United States, by passing a line which is unguarded? How can the Mexicans know where to stop? ... And what will the troors of the United States do with the Texians, who thus, in a manner, place themselves under their protection, or wi th the Mexicans, who, impelled by the ardour of the fight, should pursue in order to take them? The undersigned shudders at the idea of the evils which the slightest incident may occasion in either of these cases, to two countries which have so many motives for esteeming each other, and whose relations are now so frank and amicable. He trusted that Gaines would not be suffered to take a position which "would be equal to a real military occupation of a part of the territory of Mexico, and to an indirect intervention in its domestic affairs." Gorostiza lost more faith in the sincerity of the American government when he learned, on May 9 that upon April 25 Gaines had been actually authorized to cross the Sabine, whereas Forsyth had assured him (though equivovally) as late as April 26 Ui at he knew of no intention to order Gaines to make the hypothetical movement suggested on April 20, reproaching Gorostiza for seeming M to take it far granted that General Gaines will be ordered tc take a position in Texas, on territory mown to be beyond the limits of the United States." What subtle md inccnsistentjevasionl Forsyth refused to discuss the American boundary pretensions with an evasion as impudent as sophistical: "Whether the territory beyond the United States belongs to the Mexican Government or the newly declared Texas State, is a question which the United States does net propose to enter." leanwhile, Forsyth insinuates, the United States will not be hampered by Mexican boundary claims in that quarter. As appears from Jackson’s above-quoted remarkable letter to Kendall, Gorostiza was right in his suspicion that Forsyth’s written memorandum of his artful oral remarks of April 20 was intended to be used as an app arance of the Mexican Minister’s consent to an occupation of territory beyond the Sabine. Cn naming of the authorisation given to Gaines, Gorostiza protested. He could not appreciate Forsyth’s distinction, in reply, that an order not to go beyond Kacogdoches was not an order to go as far as Nacogdoches, and The undersign on the contrary, conceives that it would not have been judged necessary to warn that Gen ral trml he la not to pass beyond a certain determined point, unless he had been already supposed to have the newer of advancing to that point. But the American government, hard pressed by Melisb’s map, would not suffer its clandestine reliance upon the Neches claim to be fastened on it by ths perspicacious Mexican Minister, and Forsyth aggressively took the absurd ground that under the treaty of 18gl the United States could send troops to the heart of Mexico to restrain American Indians invading Mexico with hostile intent, and assured Rorostiza that the United States had no desire to prejudice the Mexican claim to the "disrated territory" — a term which he persisted in using while flatly refusing to discuss its justice with the Mexican Minister. Jackson, as above seen, did wish, however, to prejudice the question of claim — nay, practically ordered Raines to usurp possession. Aside from Jackson’s obvious deceptions, his unjust positions and actions may have been mere defects of judgment, but the stronger supposition will be that this was all deliberate chicanery as pretext for an invasion of Mexico hostile to her territorial intergrity. Jackson quickly shifted to the slightly more tenable ground that we had a "natural" right to cross the national border to anticipate hostile Indian .attacks. After May 9 Uorostiza constantly inquired if Raines had crossed the Sabine. On June 28, hearing of ths determination of the Mexican government in May to continue the Texan war, and again hearing of Indian depredations and Indian relati ns with Mexican agents, Gaines made a new requisition on the American governors for troops; he had sent a detachment of troops to Nacogdoches. Just how early he sent a force across the Sabine is not clear, but on June 22 he sent News indirectly to "the officer commanding 40 a detachment of United States troops at or near Nacogdoches." Sending to Washington on the same day a copy of the communication to the American officer in Texas, Gaines reported that he heard of depredations in Texas, "but it is not so clear that the Caddoes ,or any part of the tribes usually resident on our side of the national boundary were among the offen ers." Yet,seemingly, the General, under his instructions, had already sent a force into Texas* As early as July 8 at Mexico City Monas teric sent the American Minister an article clipped from the Natchez Courier asserting that Gaines had ord?rs to advance immedately upon Nacogdoches "and that in consequence thereof, he had taken steps to procure the necessary carriages for transporting his provisions." 41 Perhaps Gaines had been inclined to act on Jackson’s encouraging orders. Alexander Jones wrote Lamar from New Orleans on July 19 that Gaines had marched "over the rubicon" to Nacogdoches "in obedience to the orders of Pres id Jackson, under a plea of restraining Indians, and settling boundary lines according to ...treaty." ™ On July 10 Gaines instructed the American "officer commanding the United States troops at or near Nacogdoches near Texas" to restrain the Indians from hostile acts "against the United States troops or against any of the inhabitants of this frontier, or the disputed territory tc the South or Sa st or Nor th of Nacogdoches." A copy of these orders reached the War Department on August 5 and the similar letters from Gaines of June 22 had perhaps arrived about twenty days earlier. o n j u iy 31 some troops arrived at Nacogdoches, and the force remained there until December. President Jackson had apparently hoped that Gaines would immediately occupy the "disputed” territory on receiving his discretionary instructions of April 25, but the General had not at once assumed the responsibility. Accord Ingly, learning that Mexico had repudiated -Santa Ama’s peace with Texas, and not having heard as yet that Gaines had already moved finally to Nacogdoches, Jackson on July 11 sent the General new orders enpeuraging him to occupy the n dis'outed n territory: I am apprehensive, from the tenor of this report Fof Captain Dean’s, so nt to Washington by Gaines], as well as from your observations Fen June 7], that the frontier has much to fear from the hostilities of the Indian tribes living in Texas. Cn this subject, it is proper to call your attention to the instructions previously issued to you and to say to you, that if the conduct. of the Indians in Texas threatens the frontier whose defence is entrusted to you, and you consider it necessary, with a view to its protection, to ■ far as Nacogdoches, you will do so without hesitation. If the authorities of that country cannot prevent bodies of savages from approaching our frontier in am, tM iecttoanr mi ?s must be taken by you. This is the view of the President* But did the Brasi dent really believe in an I n dian darner? Brobably not* He believed that the ir” be great enough Gaines to occupy Ha coed ooh 33 1 hut not great enough for Gaines to call for m troops! why was this? It seems that the Indian Bernice was arfßoMl in the e f the public and it would no longer do to have Gainss raise numerous troops in the Southwest: it vould W* Happy that Gaines had finally gate over th? •••.bine on a nretext, Jackson was not so happy that the General should carry his duty of defence so far as to start recruitments again. This woild be more than the public could shallow, Gaines seems to have had even better knowledge of some kind of Feri can and Indian activities on this occasion than in April, but Jackson confidantly vrote Kendall and others that there was nothing to it and that Balnaa it. Ban Jacinto had new been won, and Jackson was being denounced for unneutral conduct. Jackson found it convenient to reuudiat) and blame Gaines publicly — but he had no intention of rescinding his act of invasion or of r/ ' l&g € ant to Mexico. On August 6, for th a sake of appearance, ha suspended Gaines’s requisition for troops on the several governors, lest, as he said in letter to Governor Cannon of Tennessee t a sanction of such requisition lend color to the charge that the government «as not neutral in the Texas devolution* This circumsp ectf n had net occurred to Tres id ent than he approved Gaines’s requisition before San Jacinto# Jackson was ccnvoni mtly in Tennessee vhen Governor Cannon’s enthusiastic request of August 4 to be allowed to send even core troops than Gaines called for offerat the ’♦Cid H«ra w an opportunity to protest again his neutrality to a large Inc üblls and a dubious In his letter of August 6 to Cannon, which he immediately had published in the Nashville papers and sent to the acting Secretary of , . 45 State, Asbury Dickens, for Gorostiza a benefit, he stressed his religious observances of the obligations of neutrality. A scrupulous sense of these obligations lias prevented me thus, far from doing any thing which can authorize the suspicion that our government is unmindful of them, and I hope to be equally cautious and circumspect in my Mture conduct ... [Gaines T s] requisition ... unless there is a stronger necessity for it, should not be sanctioned ... when it is well known that the disposition to befriend the Texians is a common feeling with the citizens of the United States, it is obvious that that requisition may furnish a reason to Uexico for supposing that the government of the United States may be induced by inadequate causes to overstep the lines of the neutrality which it professes to maintain. Wfo re“ Fle ft~Wa shing ton Gen era 1 Gain es int ima ted to the Department of War that seme indications of hostilities from the Indians on our western frbnHer’had been made, and that if it should become necessary he should make a call for the militia. Gaines, he says, already has an adequate force, and there is no real danger. Dis cretion can no longer be filly trusted to Gaines! Jir it at last seems that Jackson feels Gaines to be unneutral in his motives. The government of the united States having adopted, in regard to Mexico and Texas, the same rule of neutrality which had been observed in all similar cases before, it was not to have been expected that General Gaines should have based his requisition for additional military force on reasons plainly inconsistent with the obligations of that rule, should Mexico insult our national flag, invade our territory, or interrupt our citizens in the lawful pursuits which are guaranteed to them by the treaty, tnen the gove mment'will promptly repel the insult, and take speedy reparation for the injury. But it does not seem that offences of this character have been committed by Mexico, or were believed to have been by General Gaines. The most striking passage in this letter gently reproving Gaines is the statement that the United States suffered no injuries at the hands of Mexico which would justify any hostile action. This stands in bold contrast with the government’s secret hot clamor through Gills at this very time; in Mexico City and with its message of February 6, 1357. But perhaps Jackson’s belligerent threat that on finding Mexico guilty of insult and injury "the government will promptly repel ths insult, and take speedy reparation for the injury,” 46 is anticipatory. There were of course many who viewed the President’s strictures on Gaines’s ’’unaccountable requisition’* as hypocritical, inasmuch as he had given the General on Hie frontier just such discretion, which hypo - he knew he Trainee] would exercise ... on the approach of danger—he was willing that he should do so —he wishes it, and had no objection, if the Mexicans attacked the Texians in great force, for Saines, under any pretext, coming to their aid; he was avowedly in favor of Texas, and against Mexico. What produced the change, if any, in his mind-- what made him so suddenly feel such deep yearning for the neutral it yof the United States? ... We know his motives, an d understand his movements; he who thinks that Jackson is not a cunning and adroit intriguer,knows nothing of the man ... He is mistaken, however, if he thinks he can make Gen. Gaines his scapegoat ... The secret, however, of countermanding the marching of troops may as well be knom. The President is aware dhat Texas is free ... There fbre a little preaching about ' neutrality’ might be acceptable to Mexico, and at all events look like good faith. Jackson made it possible for Gaines still to get troops from Arkansas and Missouri. 43 Jackson’s letter to Gannon, confess- ing the Indian danger to be chimerical, was agreeable to Gorostiza, who naturally supposed that Jackson if sincere would revoke the authority given Gaines to cross the Sabine. Vain hope: he was yet to be fix 11 y disillusioned. Indeed, he had just begun to hear reports that Gaines had actually occupied Nacogdoches, and he sought to learn certainly from the State Department whether the General had crossed the Sabine, and whether the government did not intend to revoke the discretionary orders to Gaines, since the pretended reason for them was now admitted to be non-existent. The American government found these questions so very embarrassing that it put the Mexican Minister off by deception. On August 4 and 23, Forsyth assured him that the government had no information to show that Gaines had crossed the Sabine. Yet on August 5 the government had received Gaine s*s letter of July 10 citing his orders to his officer commanding "at or near Nacogdoches near Texas,” and even earlier it had received Gaines’s letter of June 22 similarly implying an occupation of the "disputed" territory. And on August 3 the Postmaster-General at Washington, who surely was not alone in knowing, knew of Gaines* s advance as a "confinmed" fact, writing Jackson on that day: The rumor of Sen. Gaines having crossed the line is confirmed. Nothing has occurred to change the [view] I have already expressed in reference to this move. Without extreme necessity for his maintaining his ground I think he ought to be directed to recede. Jackson, as we haw seen, privately explained to Kendall that the movement was really based on a different ground than had been supposed—namely, on the territorial claim. In his retreating letter to Gaines of September 4, writ - no doubt fertile public (it was officially gratuitous), Jackson did not have the temerity to justify the advance of Gaines on any ground except that of Indian danger—-which he believed in sufficiently for the purpose. His shifting credence of the Indian danger seems to have no basis save convenience. How can he reconcile his denunciation of Gaines 1 s unfounded pretext and Gaines’s unneutral proclivities with his om substantial upholding of Gaines’s invasion of Texas? This Gordian knot General Jackson severed by a clever ruse: he pretended in his public letter to Gaines, as late as September, that he was wholly unaware of Gaines’s advance to Nacogdoches, though in fact he fully knew of it by August 12 and probably had an intimation as early as July 251 On d Q ptember 4 Jackson cont inues the discretionary power to Gaines, for border "defence,’ 1 to take an advanced position the most favorable to the security of our frontier ... Unless tie necessity exists, unless there are actual disturbances of the peace of the frontier, or a moral certainty that the Indians are in hostile array for the purpose and are drawing their means of operation from the territory of Mexico, of an advanced post beyond our limits must be ~ The whole letter carefully implies ignorance of the fact that Gaines had already occupied ”an advanced post beyond our limits’ I —or does the equivocal President consider Nacogdoches within ”our limits”? Why in all the official correspondence with General Gaines was the government always so careful to tell Baines to repel invaders from "American territory,” not to go beyond ”our limits,” to cross the "imaginary boundary,” and so on? Why this careful obscruity? Why did not the government plainly and decently tell Gaines what were the limits of the United States and whether he was to march to the "Naches" or not go beyond the "Sabine”? It strikes one that Gaines was to be encouraged to take the responsibility for an unjust or questionable act which the government feared to order unequivocally. was this no tt he course Jackson pursued with Anthony Butler in the Texas negotiation? The government seems to want its agents to do unscrupulous tasks, while, to avoid blame, if possible, it refrains from being materially useful or responsible in the determination of policy. was not pleased, with Jackson's letter of September to Gaines, for it was the very opposite of what he had a right to expect after the Cannon letter of August 6 and from the circumstance Sa He complained that these instructions were even more deleterious to Mexico than those of April 25 and July 11, whidi at least limited an aimed advance to Hacogdoches, whereas these allowed Gaines to go, if he thought "necessary, n to Mexico City itself. Thus for some time the administration attempted to delude Gorostiza, concealing its knowledge of Gaines’s invasion, which it was neither prepared to explain satisfactorily nor willing to back down from. But news of Gaines’s movements more and more filled the press , and the government on September 23 finally felt compelled to advise Gorostiza of die occupation, justifying it on the grounds of self-defence IJackson’s declaration to Cannon that "There is no information to justify the apprehension of hostilities to any serious extent from the western Indians” and his more unqualified, statement to Kendall show how impudent was the plea that the occupation of Nacogdoches wss in "self-defence." Jackson confessed in his annual message of 1936 that "the sufficiency of the causes assigned for the advance of oar troops hy the commanding general had been seriously doubted by me." This would serve to stress his own innocence. But why had he left Gaines a discretionary power to advance — even encouraging an advance —when there was no just cause and when he well knew Gaines’s notorious pro-Teyas feelings? How sincere was porsyth’s promise to Gorostiza to with- draw the troops as soon as it should be found that the unas-52 certained Indian danger was a ’’malicious invention"? This implied a right to invade a neighboring country even before a national danger was ascertained, as Gorostiza said, the Mexican republic was ruined from mere motive® of precautionif not worse motives. In vain did Gorostiza protest and demand the revocation of Gaines’s orders. He pointed out that Graines and his force were fraternizing with the Texans. On October 16, diplomacy having provided no remedy, Gorostiza asked for his passports and reviewed at length the question of ’’disputed” boundary and the ebb and flow of Indian danger, which went and returned, ”as if by magic,” with the Mexican threat to subjugate Texas; he dwelt with gentle sarcasm on all "these strange coincidences.” The undersigned mist likewise notice the earnest desire which he has observed in the United states to occupy Nacogdoches at all events; and were it not for assurances which have been repeatedly given him from this Department of Htate, that the said measure Md no connection whatever, with the future deteminatio n of the limits, he confesses that he would not know certainly in what light to view this earnest desire. The undersigned bears in mind, that this same Nacogdoches has already been declared to belong to the United States by the Secretary of War, in his letter to General Gaines, authorizing him to proceed thither. He also bears in mind that Mr. Forsyth, on receiving the protest of the undersigned, on account of this strange pretension, refused, agreeably to the President’s orders, to enter into any explanation whatever on the subject. The undersigned has likewise observed, that in the notes from this department, as well as in the correspondence between the Secretary of war* General and the governors of some of the States, the utmost care appears to have been constantly taken not to apply to the Mexican territory beyond the Sabine any other appelation than the contested t erritory, ... as if the existing treaty had not^puTah ~~ end. "to “line disputes ... with regard to limits, while the old line of Louisiana ran between the rivers Mermento and that is to say, thirty or forty miles to this side of the Sabine. Notwithstanding these circumstances, the undersigned repeats that these assurances respecting the nature of General Baines’a movement render it unnecessary for him longer to dwell on these strange coincidences. He regretted that the president, relying solely on the principle of self-defence, has not t nought proper to attend to the just complaints of the undersigned, respecting the violation of the Fexican territory by the troops of General Gaines, and that, on the contrary he persists in his intention ... to continue such violations hereafter, whensoever he may consider them proper, for the better defence of the frontier of the United States. Tlie undersigned evidently cannot for a moment admit the existence of such a right, because it would be equivalent to acknowledging that every nation might occupy the territory of another ... and because such a right would be a continued threat held out against the sovereignty and independence of every other nation. Otherwise, what nation would not desire to strengthen its frontier at the expanse of its neighbor’s, if its own conviction were admitted as sufficient to justify the act? To the President's offer to punish Gaines (whose place was now taken by Colonel Arbuckle, who was given discretionary power to remain at Nacogdoches as long as he deemed it "necessary" on account of Indians) , should the General "have varied ever so slightly from his instructions," Gorostiza bitterly replied that punishment was of no use to Mexico and that the partiality of General Gaines in favor of the Texans is a matter of notoriety, and that his credulity ... has been so great, that his statements should have had no weight with one so enlightened as the President ... especially since his character, and the influences by wnich he was at that time guided, have been so clearly exposed by the Governor of'Louisiana and General Macomb. On leaving, Gowstiza sent to the members of the diplomatic corps at Washington, in Mexico’s behalf, a pamphlet printed in Spanish entitled Correspondence Which Passed between the Legation extraordinary of Mexico and the Departmmt of State o f the Unit ed Sta tea, relative to the Passage of the Sabine bj the Troops under .the Command of Cen er al 54 1 QaLnss* Hecent writers have tended to accept Jackson s claim tiiat this publication was an insult to the United States. It seems to the writer only a true and mild statement of Jackson’s conduct, its unpleasantness inherent in its subject. Jackson would naturally try to cry down with show of indignation such public charge of bad faith. But must Gorostiza be expected to suffer Mexico’s wrongs in weak silence? for a publication addressed to the diplomatic world he had an ample precedent in the conduct of the American peace commissioners at Ghent. His pamphlet was an "insult" only in reason if its charges were unjust. The lexican government justly refused to disavow Gorostiza’s presentation of Mexico’s case, which Jackson, probably more cal culatingly Wan indignantly, described as an act "unexampled in the history of diplomacy"-- so glaringly violating all the decorum of diplomatic usage; so disrespectful to the government and people of the united States; ... and so wall calculated to interrupt the harmony and good Mil which ought to subsist between the United States 55 and Mexico." Ulis was directed to demand his pass ports and leave Mexico if her government sanctioned Gorostiza’s act. Here was an excellent pretext for egging on war. But ULlis had already broken off relations on the claims pretext. Soon after news of San Jacinto Jackson assured the Texan envoy: "Be not surprised if I yet soon announce a cession by Mexico of Texas to the United States. But how was this to be done, after Mexico repudiated Santa Anna’s acts in Texas? Mexico was hostile to the United States and excited about Texas, and was not likely to sell her claim willingly. Besides, California was in Jackson’s eye. it seems significant, therefore, that the Minister to Mexico, Powhatan Ulis, was now instructed, on July 20, forcefolly to press the private daks of American citizens, which had occupied the background as long as there had been any hope of getting Texas by purchase. They appear now to be brought to the foreground as a part of the same program of expansion. Ulis’s early instructions, of January 29, 1836, are in contrast to Butler’s: Texas and commerce are conspicuously absent, and claims are stressed, though not yet in the violent manner of the instruc-57 tions o f July 20. It seems that Jackson had intended early in 1836 immediately to recognize and annex Texas,his friend R. J.Walker heading the movement in Congress; but his plans load been spoiled by the sectional outburst added to the Whig opposition. The extreme sectional positions assumed in debate by Calhoun and Adams and the latter’s arraignment of Jackson’s imperialism had made recognition impolitic and immediate annexation, in view of Mexico’s relation with Texas, quite hopeless. It was clear that Congress would do nothing, for political and sectional reasons and for fear of bringing on war with Mexico* Belaying recognition of Texas, Jackson could hope to coerce Mexico into a "cession.” Texas if acquired by such "cession” could be more easily brought into the Union. Jackson was the man to take and keep a Texas once ceded to him, despite an unwilling Congress, if it were in any way possible . Ritchie of the Richmond Inquirer, who was ’’likely to be well informed on the subject,” said in May, 1836, that ”if the President felt himself at liberty to indulge his private feelings, he would not hesitate one moment to speak liberty to Toxas, and an af-58 filiation with the United States.” But because this was impossible of immediate fulfillment it was but wisdom for Jackson to prolong and emphasize his "scrupulous neutral ity" towards Mexico and to continue "our wonted caution." Prudence and respect for appearances, when an aggressive course was worse than useless, called for patience. Jackson could not conceal his chagrin at this enforced virtue, and complained privately to Lewis; The mission of Col* Butler having failed, I then determined to use my influence, after the battle of San Jacinto, to have the independence of Texas recognized, an dto receive her into the Union. But that arch enemy, J* Q. Adams, rallied all his forces to prevent its annexation tot the U. States—We must rega In Texas; peaceabl y if we can; forcibly if we must 1 This was the situation when on July 20, 185 6, dll is was sent a list of fifteen private claims arising since the treaty of 1832 for which the government demanded redress. The American government confessed that it "is not in possession of proof of all the circumstances of the wrongs done in the above cases, as represented by the aggrieved parties,” but Silis was to make "a demand on the Mexican Government that they shall be promptly and properly examined, and that suitable redress shall be afforded.” If contrary to the President’s hopes, no satisfactory answer shall be given to this just and reasonable demand within three weeks, you will infbrm the Mexican Government that, unless redress is afforded without unnecessary delay, your farther residence in Mexico will be useless. If this state o f things continue longer, you will give formal notice to the Mexican Government, that unless a satisfactory answer shall be given within a fortnight, you are instructed to ask for your passports; and, at the end of that time, if you do not receive such answer, it is the President’s direction that you demand your passports and return to the United States, bringing with you the archives of the legation. 0 Could this peremptory demand for satisfaction within so short a time have been anything but an invitation to a breach? If Jackson had really wanted the claims settled, would he have made a demand so unreasonable ? Adams’s opinion ihat these instructions ’’were evidently premeditated to produce rupture” seems to the writer the most reasonable view. Silis had written the government on May 23: The pretensions and statements, hitherto made by the legation in regard to their claims, have been postponed from time to time, and ultimately evaded by some pretext, not founded in the justices of the.cases... I am unable to find a single case where indemnification has been awarded to, and payment received by, the claimant. Under this state of things, I would respectfully suggest the propriety of pursuing a different policy in our intercourse with the Mexican States. 1 311 is, who also wrote that Mexico was in a warlike humor, was thus a suitable agent—assuming that Jackson had designs. Silis, a Mississippian, was not only desirous of Texas, but, like Butler, described California in glowing terms. Butler had carried away all his personal diplomatic papers, so that ’Silis was forced to reaiest new instructions on these ”inter£ p esting’ 1 subjects. That a craving for Texas inspired Jackson’s peremptory demand as to the claims seems to have been known to his friend Swartwout, whose intimate connection with the affairs of Texas has been noted. The New York Customs Collector wrote Houston insinuatingly as early as August 7: The old chief encourages us to believe that you are not abandoned ... Genl Stewart left here the day before yesterday for Pensacola. His real object we sunpose to be the command of the West India fleet preparatory to the reception of the answer from Mexico, to some queries or questions that the old man has sent to her. 6 *" On September 26, presenting the fifteen claims, Til is declared blatantly: The flag of the United States has been repeatedly insulted and fired upon by the armed vessels of this Government; her consuls, in almost every port of the republic have been maltreated and insulted by the public authorities; her citizens ... have been murdered on the. high seas by a licentious and unrestrained soldiery ... 4 What a contrast to Jackson 1 s letter to Governor Cannon! To Silis’s bold, general charges against the Mexican government Monasterio replied with dignity: "But as these charges are made in terms so general, the Sun re me Government ... desires that they may be specified, before taking them into consideration." Bill is made no reply. On October 3 the Mexican government assured 311 is that it would examine and report on the American claims "with all dispatch." On October 20 311 is notified Monasterio that if redress were not given without unnecessary delay his longer stay in Mexico City would be useless. On November 4he demanded an answer within two weeks on pain of his departure. Monasterio replied the next day that documents concerning the claims had been sent for to various parts of the republic and that they would be promptly examined on their arrival. furthermore, he reminded the •American envoy that by right such as were wholly private claims belonged to the Mexican judiciary, and pointed out not only that the failure to make immediate answer to a diplomatic note was no cause for breaking relations but that 311 is had not replied to some of his (Monaster io* s) notes of August and September upon subjects of great interest to Mexico. Fonasteric resented. Allis’s use of such words as "illegal,” "violent," and "arbitrary" to characterize the acts of the Mexican government, when the acts were not committed by the Mexican go ver me nt at all* Ulis wrote Secretary Forsyth a , ... on November 30 that Fonasterio’s reasonable reply was ’’wholly unsatisfactory *" On December 7he demanded his remarking that the treaty of commerce providing for the settlement of private claims by the courts of the two countries was not meant to preclude other modes of red r $ 3s: It will be recollected that many of the claims now urged for adjustment arise out of the illegal seizure and condemnation of vessels and cargoes, by the same tribunals to which, your excellency is pleased to say, we can alone resort for indemnification. It has been the general verdict that Ellis "perfozmed his duties in a rude or peremptory manner”—"more forcible than diplomatic." 66 But he was merely carrying out instructions, which seem unreasonable, inviting rejection. Of the fifteen claims presented through 311 is (two of which were adjusted before Bhlis’s arrival), four were of four years 1 standing, tv© of three, three of 1835, and the remaining five of 1836. How, then, could it be expected that Mexico could so quickly examine and give proper redress to claims the majority of which were of recent date and now for the first time presented? Mexico had held, too, that the central government could not be held responsible ibr the acts of state officers in her federal system; and the same argument has on notable occasions been used by the American government in its foreign 67 relations. In one of the cases presented by Silis, the ship-owner had been paid for his impressed boat and had made no complaint . But Secretary Porsyth told gllis that as the owner "was content" he could only demand satisfaction for the "insult" to the United States. The animus behind the claims is thus clearly betrayed. Meanwhile, wishing to allay public doubt as to his neutrality and soothe to sleep the anti-Texas spirit, Jackson sent a generous message to Congress on December 22 to explain his withholding of recognition from Texas; how much, credit must be given this "frank" expression the reader must judge for himself. •- Pm dance seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof, and Maintain our present attitude, if not till Mexico or onh of the great foreign powers shall recognize the independence of the new Sovemment, at least until the llpse of time, or the course of events, shall have beyond all cavil or dispute, the ability of that country to maintain their separate sove rei gnty. The pre carl ou sness of Texas indep encence hade us refrain from any partiality, "as it might subject us, however unjustly, to the imputation of seeking to establish the claim of our neighbors to a territory, with a view to its subsequent acquisition by ourselves," How long before this had he ardently wished to do more than recognize the Texans, and how soon after this did he recognize than I Jackson kept up this hypocritical farce when explaining to Kendall that he is referring the question of recognition to congress, because "the acknowledgment of the Independence of Texas might lead to war with Mexico" and "the Constitutional power of declaring war" was "vested in 69 , Congress." What scrupulosity now. Only a short time has elapsed since the President has invaded Msxico without the sanction of Congress, whereas the mere recognition of a secession state could be no cause of war. This is surely another defect of judgment# Jackson now implies--though it need not be believed—that immediate recognition would be an injustice to Mexico* In short, this message was most un-Jacksonian in tone and sentiment—”a total reverse of the spirit which almost universally prevailed at the close of the last session of Congress, and in the President notoriously shared.”* 70 It was only the deceptive lull before the whirlwind then gathering in the American legation in Mexico and in the State Department. There were many conjectures as to the reasons for Jackson 1 s non-re cognition message, which invited Congress to reach some conclusion for the President to follow. The Texan envoy reported that some said that Van Buren, the Presidentelect, wanted Congress to take the responsibility! and added: Others say that from the dissatisfaction and departure of Gorostiza, on account of the movements of General Gaines that the United States apprehend difficulties with Mexico, and do not wish to give this new cause of offense, Viz. recognition believing that it will be difficult enough to explain to the world the causes of dissatisfaction already existing, others say that the administration expect to acquire Texas by treaty with Mexico soon and thus remove all cause of complaint, others say that Santa Anna is still viewed as President of Mexico. That he is shortly expected here and that i f he treats with me and recognizes Texas, the -Administration here will recognize and guaranty the treaty. 1 Undoubtedly Jackson wished by his message to emphasize the virtuous benevolence of the American government in contrast to the injustice of the Mexican government which was to be brought increasingly to view, Incidentally, it may be noted that Jackson’s message on recognition distinctly intimated that in annexing Texas he would take her with her newly claimed and "ancient" western boundary, the Rio Grande. It was but natural that Anglo-American Texas upon revolting should set up a claim to the territory etween the Woes River and the Rio grande in its whole course, thus including the eastern and more populous portion of lew Mexico; but, while making a few slender raids into these borderlands, Texas never took and occupied them or made good by conquest a claim unfounded in right. Under Spain and Mexico Texas had not extended west of the Hueces River.? 2 Jackson in his annual message of December 6, 1336, made a chary and delusive mention of the claims "against Mexico," giving the impression that he had been and would be most lenient towards that distracted country. He feared (anticipating the failure of Elis’s mission?) that "the irritating effect o f her struggle with Texas" might lead Mexico to "delay" in acknowledging and satisfying these "ancient complaints of justice." Aside from the insinuations in such words as "ancient" and "justice," the amicable and forbearing tone of this message contrasts with the violent Ulis mission (concerning which a profound secrecy was maintained) and with the approaching remarkable reprisals message of February 6, 1837. In early January of 18-3 7 Santa Anna arrived in Washington, by arrangement of the Texan and American governments. He had hopes of being restored to power in Mexico and was willing to negotiate a "sale" of Texas to the United States. Jackson did not wish to commit himself formally to any preliminary agreement with the Mexican dictator: it might appear grasping and if divulged make ”a handle against this government.* He took a lofty tone towards Santa Anna, upon he had no need to rely for the attainment of his desires. Yet Santa Anna might be usefill, if he should be reinstated. And Jackson advised the Texan envoy to sign a treaty with Santa Anna recognizing Texas. The Texan gays of the President’s confidential advice: During the conversat ion he observed that Santa Anna was still President of Mexico and that if I could make a treaty with him especially through the Charge de Affaires now at Philadelphia, that it would be valid. I answered that our claims for recognition were predicated on higher grounds. $ Jackson, by hi a own report, told Santa Anna that as matters now stood, the U. 3. could not act in the matter until we were placed In a situation to know the disposition of the Texians, when we would with pleasure when asked by the two pavers interoose with our good offices +o restore harmony between them* Until Texas is acknowledged Independent we cannot receive her minister or hold any co rrespondence with her as a nation. And as the Genl thro his Minister here cannot act We can only instruct our Minister at Mexico to receive any proposition her Government may make on the subject—Until we hear her views we cannot speak to Texa.s. But Jackson expressed his desires: If Mexico will extend, the line of the U. States to the Rio grand—up that stream to latitude 38 north and then to the pacific including north calafornia we might instruct our minister to give them three millions and a half of dollars and deal with them as it respected Texas as a magnanimous nation ought —to wit—in the treaty with Mexico secure the Texians in all their just and legal rights and stipulate to them into the United States as one of the Union. How generous the prospective treatment of Mexico’s "loyal citizens* of Texas’. Mexico must understand that such an arrangement would be made as much to accommodate Mexico as to acquire territory: But it must be understood that this nroposition is made to meet the views of the Genl, and not by the U. States to acquire Territory or take advantage of the disturbed state of Mexico but to meet the wishes of the Government and secure peace and tranquility on our respective borders and lay the foundation of a permanent tranquility between the U. S* and Mexico that has so happily existed, and which has like to have been interrupted by the civil war in Texas * Santa Anna says that Jackson repeated that he would give him "six millions” of pesos for a Rio Grande boundary. now arriving from Mexico, assured Jackson that Santa Anna’s reinstatement was not improbable* The Texan diplomat Wharton did not like Jackson’s plan of paying Texico "hush money,” 75 but his government expediently gave consent • Jackson’s desire for California must have been stimulated by the bloodless California Revolution of the latter part of 1336, in which the decisive American element, led by Isaac Graham, sought to commit California to independence and union with the United States. The native California leaders, while willing to use the energetic Americans to cast off the Mexican regime, were not eager to declare independence, once they had control of the offices of government. They preferred to remain nominally under Mexi co . It is said, and Mexico charged, that the American navy in the Pacific encouraged the revolt by promising American protection. The American Captain Hinkley promised such protection.^ 6 Perhaps Jackson had instructed the pacific naval authority to keep an eye on California. The American element held in conference that ”at that moment, war must have been declared between Mexico and the united States, and in case it was not so, that Mexico through the war with Texas, would ba so busy and powerless, that it would be impossible to undertake any thing against California." The whole tier of northern Mexican states, dissatisfied with Santa Anna's policy, seemed about to follow the course of 77 Texas. Tornel wrote in 1337, reviewing the relations between Mexico and the United States: In Upper California their navy supported an insurrection of Americans against our government. Such an insurrection would not have been attempted had not the leaders felt certain of the approval and support of the United States. The bloody revolution of New Mexico is, no doubt, due to the activities of secret agents of the Unites States, further proof of which is seen in the fact that the leaders of t his sanguinary revolt tock refuge in American territory ... This bare outline ... of the unscrupulous policy of t lie United States should serve as a warning to Mexicans, making them realize the dangers that threaten them... The imagination of the Americans is stimulated by their own vanity, and in their dreams of grandeur, they look upon us as pigmies, objects deserving their pity. They consider our possessions but a fair prize of their There is nothing to show that the United States had a hand in the New Mexican revolt, which was the result of causes 79 similar to those of the Texas Revolution. V/harton reported to the Texas government on February 2, 1337, that one cause of delay in recognition was the fear of Van Buren’s friends that the subject of annexation will be pressed immediately after recognition; that annexation or no annexation will be made the test of the elections for Congress during the ensuing awer;—that the North will be opposed and the South in favour of annexation, and that Nr. Van Buren will of course have the support of either the South or North in mass accordingly as he favours or opposes annexation. The fear then of throwing Nr. Van Buren into a minority in the next Congress induces his friends to de. sire a postponement ... giving Mr. Van Buren more time to ... consolidate his strength. This may well explain the passivity of Congress, but probably Jackson was moved by another motive in his delay—namely, his claims diplomacy. Wharton added on February 2 that Jackson told him to rest easy as regards the subject of recognition and assured him that all would go right, adding that he was preparing a message to Congress, in which he intended to zecommend the granting of letters of marque against Mexico and that his government would no longer submit to her injustices and outrages. It is the opinion of Hillis and of the President that Santa Anna will be reinstated in power. In which event the President said that there would be no more difficulty either between this country and Mexico or Mexico and Texas . He said that he had conversed freely with Santa Anna in regard to extending the at present open southwestern line so as to include Texas and that their views and wishes were in entire accordance. $ Wharton shows us again the intimate connection between Jackson’s claims policy and Texas, when he writes thus on February 5 of Jackson’s reprisals or "war" message, sent to Congress the next day: My own opinion is that the evils, resulting from a temporary suspension of commerce with Mexico, would be more than counterbalanced by its superior security in the fxture. Again, the conclusion of the war would afford a favourable opportunity of extending by treaty the at present open South Western boundary of this Government to the Bio del Norte, with the assent of Mexico and of Texas Jackson’s message of February 6 asked congress to authorize a last summary demand, unon Mexico for satisfaction from a warship, to be followed if necessary by military reprisals on that country. Corostiza’s con duct, he declared, and "The length of time since some of the injuries have been committed, the repeated and unavailing applications for redress ... would justify in the eyes of all nations immediate war.” Yet Jackson did not ask frankly for war—but this probably not so much from "forbearance" as from prudence. The nature of the Ulis mission is by no means divulged to Congress. Jackson tells Congress that "not withs tan ding the irritating effect upon her [Mexico’s] councils of the movements in Texas, I hoped, by great forbearance, to avoid the necessity of again bringing the subject of them to your notice.” Yet the 311 is mission seems to show Jackson deliberately trying by a great lack of forbearance to bring the claims again before Congress in just such away as they are f inally brought. Jackson privately designated Penton as commander in a war with Mexico. Those who reason that, "Had Jackson made up his mind to get Texas, it certainly would have been easier for him to recognize the independence of that republic and induce Congress to annex it than it would have been to go to war over the claims in order to secure it as an indemnity,"' 32 ignore Jackson’s desire fbr California and the important fact that the annexation of Texas by act of Congress was highly improbable, if not impossible, because of the opposition of certain groups. To the message Jackson appended not only the fifteen claims presented through Uli is but thirty-three new ones to seem to strengthen his case against Mexico; of these, twentynine bore a date prior to the treaty of 1831, and some went back to a time when Mexico was under Spanish rule and could hardly be admitted by Mexico. A footnote to the list said with typical Jacksonian impressiveness• M lt is proper to mention that the above is not considered a fbll exhibit of the just claims of citizens of the United States on the Mexlean Government.'' Tornel says that the measures adopted by the United States with regard to Texas were analogous to those used for the acquisition of the Floridas. In the present case, as in the former, claim upon claim of exaggerated or imaginary injuries have been piled up and the opportune moment awaited to present them together ... The coincidence of their demands with the developments in Texas, the irritating tone of the message of General Jackson ... leave no room for a favorable interpretation of their motives. ... A cursory reading of the message of February 6th of the present year will persuade the most credulous that the cabinet of the United States has anticipated us in making public their injuries in order to win the ear of the civilized world and make the denunciation of the series of injusitces, insults, and usurp at ions committed against us, fall upon deaf About January 24, in conversing with Wharton, "Genl. Jackson hinted rather than asserted, that a recognition of the independence of Texas by this Govt would prevent any treaty with Mexico by this Govt in regard to Texas, for it would be an open declaration that Mexico had no longer any jurisdiction over Texas or right to sell or bind her." 3s After the failure of Jackson’s plans of coercing Mexico there was much lass reason for withholding recognition. In feet, recognition was a necessary preliminary to an annexation contract with Texas. Jackson’s consciousness of the construction that would the more forcefully be placed on his claims message if his expansion desires and diplomacy were fully known is shown by his unaccommodating reply to the Senate resolution of January 14, which called on the President for ’’any communications received, or correspondence had, between the executive of the United Stated and den. Santa w, or by any other person claiming to act on behalf of Mexico* with regard to Texas. Jackson transmitted a letter from Santa Anna of July 4, 1836, saying: *Ko other communication upon the subject of the resolution referred to has been made to the executive” by ’’any person claiming to act on behalf of Mexico.” To be sure, the intercourse and understanding between Santa Anna and Jackson had been merely verbal, and Santa Anna was out of power. Morfit, whom Jackson had sent in 1336 to investigate conditions in Texas, reported that the Texan government had at first intended to ’’extend” the national boundary of Texas to the Pacific so as to take in much of California, but had finally decided "modestly" that the Rio Grande along its entire course to the forty-second parallel gave Texas territory "sufficient for a young republic." Jackson was more ’’generous” and broadminded, if not quite so scrupulous. Wharton reported to Texas about February 18, Congress having by then shown its aversion to war with Mexico: General Jackson says that Texas must claim the Californias on the Pacific to paralyze the opposition of the North and Rast to Annexation, that the fishing interest of the North and Rast wish a harbour on the Pacific; that this claim of the Californias will give it to them and will diminish their opposition to annexation. He is very earnest and anxious on this point of claiming the Californias and asys we must not consent to less . is in strict con fidence. Jackson 1 s idea apparently was that the country would acquiesce in a despoilment of Mexico if it were only extensive and non-sectional enough. Adams tock credit in 135® for checking Jackson’s imperial ism; I have arraigned them before the tribunals of the civilized world, and of posterity. They are upon their defence ... They must retrace their steps; they have broken off all diplomatic negotiation with Mexico, and they have negotiated still. They have recalled w ithout sufficient cause all their functionaries at Mexico, and they have spurned from them the Mexican Ambassadors of Peace at Washington ... The People of this Union will not go to war with Mexico on the false pie tense of petty spoliations, and the real impulse of craving for Texas, and the Paradise restored of SIAV3RY War then is out of the question; negotiation must be renewed ... If the executive Administration wish at once for peace with Mexico, and for satisfaction to the just claims of their injured fellow’-citizens, they must cast their lust for Texas to the winds, and demand and give satisfaction and redress in the spirit of peace. J Van Buren continued Jackson 1 3 claims policy, but hardly from desire for war . It was not to be thought, however, that President Van Buren would give any kind of satisfaction to Mexico to salve her injuries. As Poinsett, the Secretary of War, told McKenney, when the latter suggested that a belated justice be done the Cherokees: "Colonel McKenney, Mr. Van Buren will never consent to undo anything that general Jackson has done . The recognition of Texas occurred in the last days of Jackson’s Presidency. A resolution providing money for an envoy to Tayas was rat through the House by a clever rise by Southern men, and Jackson appointed a Minister and called in Wharton for a glass of wine. The motion was offered and put through by baddy Thompson of South Carolina, who says enigmatically that it was "by an intrigue 0 f mine with Tom Ritchie (who was at Washington) that Jackson at once nominated the minister." Th© Texas statesman Anson Jones believed, not unreasonably, that California was even bigger in Jackson's eye than Texas after her successful raw It • he had come to th ink that the settlement and occupation of this country [Texas], almost exclusively by Americans, made its ultimate reversion sure, or in the language of Ooi. Benton ... that ’any time in twenty years would be soon Cen . Jackson was, doubtless the architect of the scheme for acquiring California, c. r which Polk carried out]. Disappointed, however, in effecting his object, and in a pretext for a war with Mexico, he' thought little of Texas ... until she had got her hobbles 0ff. 91 until she had got her hobbles Tornel believed that the whole United States was imperialistic: As in the United States nothing is done without a preconceived plan, and since everybody works by common accord as if by an admirable instinct for the realisation of the ends pursued, it is incredible that the slow working out of the means by which some day certain difficulties whose transcendental importance has been filly realized will be solved should have been ignored in the reckoning. Thus we see the concurrence of an infinite nunfoer of interests o f the United States, converging for the stimulation of their policy of expansion. 92 The United States and Mexico , 1821-1348, I, 432* —— T —- Rives, fhe Uni.ed States and Mexico, I, 417-444; J. Smith, War with Mexico, X," 74-77, 425; 'UT o.Xohl, Claims as a Cause of the Mexican war, 21 -29 . 3 ! — — „ . s 3Qcn 1338, p. 6. Jackson’s pretence tIW Senate called upon him for documents concern- xexas evinced an hypocrisy that was nearly insufferable to' the Mexican Minister: "Y Ba unica moralidad del , Jme,. icano se ci fra/br ecisamente an sal var s iemnrTTas apar i (dispat ch i o we Teri can" July 6 “ In" Archive Historica Di lomatica Meyicana, VII, 143) . ’ ’ —— —— _ McLane to Butler, January 13, 1334, in Com. Debs., XIV, Pt. 2, App •, 130, 131. T* M. Marshall de TcrTh American nolicy as one of procrastination (The Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 106 ff.TT” ~~~ 5 ' • — --—" ——— — Gutierrez to van Buren, Kay 29, 1834; see Oh. IX, note 54. 5 - , _ Marshall says of the President’s message of May 6, 1336: ‘’Coming at such a time and it having been made apparent that tlie adminis trat ion fbr four years had grasped every opportunity to delay the fulfillment of the treaty, this message can be looked upon only as a piece of hypocrisy on the part of Jackson’’ (The Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 163), - ~ ~~~ *— —— H. W* P° ca * * 25 Ceng., 2 Sess., No. 190, pp. 70, 71, Porsyth to Corostiza, Fay 10, 1336, in H. Do cs., 25 Cong., 2 Seas., No. 190, pp. 35-37. “—— -—-—————— — Gorostiza to Porsyth, May 9, 1336, in H. 3x. Doos. , 25 Cong., 2 3ess., Ko, 190, pp, 32, 33. 15 Marshall, The Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 144; Secretary Cases’to Caines, January 2“\ 1836, 'in B° c3 *» 24 Cong., 1 No. 256, pp. 40, 41. ™n ——— Gaines to Cass, Karch 29, 1336, in H. Docs* > 25 dong., 2 less., Ho. 351, pp. 763, 769. 12 Cass to Gaines, April 25, 13,36, in H. 3x, Docs., 24 Cong., 1 Sess., No. 256, pp. 43, 44. My italics. 13 , ~ Marshall, The Western Boundary of louislana. 165. Marshall points outthat Jackson illegal call for six-months militia showed that he was confident that Congress would alter the law, bills being in traduced for that purpose (ibid., 159-161). —.— — - Jackson to Kendall, August 12, 1836, in Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, V, 420. See Cass to Gaines, July 11, 1336, in H. .Bo cs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 19C,p. 97. 15 Tornel, Relations between the United States and the Mexican Rep üblio (18gTIT translated' in C. 'Oas't eneda Mexican Side of~the Texas Revoluti on by the Chief Mexi can Participant s / 363, 364. J. H.Smith’s argument' (The War with Mexico/I, 65) that the Texans as Mexico’s de facto ’’successor” could demand protection against the Indians and that the United States would owe compliance seems quite fallacious. Aside from the fact that under the Mexican treaty our duty of restraining American Indians from hostilities against Mexico ended at our boundary, Smith seems to beg the question. Would not a compliance with the Texans’ request be a recognition of their independence and an unneutral interference in Mexico-s domestic concerns? Such int erference was precisely what Jackson wished to avoid the appearance of indulging in. 13 —— Rives, the United States and Mexico, I, 310. Gee also Barker, "The Unite d G‘ t ates and Mexico, 1836-37," in Miss . Valley Hist. Rev*, I t 13, 19, 24-26; Hitchcock, Fifty Years Tn Tfamp lO2, 111; Ml as 1 Register, thinks the Indian danger was zeal and considerable (The western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 143-157) . “ ~~ —— Thirty Years * View, 1,665. Professor Barker says that what little evidence there is tends to show that Santa Anna was undecided as to what to do with the Texans after he should have conquered them (Mss. Valley Hist. Rev., I, 18 and note) . T££ Western Boundary of the Louisiana Purchase, 169. G n e who knew Gaines says, in reference to his beln^sent bv President Adams to Georgia during the Indian-stat a rights dispute: ,f Gen al Gaines was, of all men, the most unfit for a position like that in which he was placed. He was a good fighter, a chivalrous, brave man; but he was weak and vain, and without tact or discretion. His intentions were, at all times, nure, but want of judgment frequently placed him in unpleasant positions” (W. H. Sparks, The Memories of -^ifty Years ... Spent Chiefly in the —x T 9 Jay, Ke view of the Me: ican m, 24 , 25. 20 — H* Docs.. 25 Cong., 2 3538., Ko. 351, pp. 736-737. Hitchcock, J ifty Ye ar sln Camp and Ilel c, 103,109. — — — — Gaines’s requisition on the governors and the governm ent 1 s approval were laid before the House on May 9: « He reports that the Mexican forces are rapidly approaching the border and he anticipates that as scon as they have reached the vicinity of the Indians, that these will join in the contest, and that ths Indian force will respect no boundary line” ( H. Hh. Docs., 24 Cong., 1 less. , No. 249). Cass's cautious instructions to Caines of May 12 show a retreat (H. Docs.., 24 Gong., 1 less., No. 256, p. 54). 23 ’ Jackson to Kendall, August 12, 1336, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 420, 421; see Bassett, Life of Jacksoh, 11, ~ CHO . Fy Tt al ics . 24 Butler to Jackson, December 19, 1335, in Bassett, Cor.of Jackson, V, 331, 332. See Niles’ Register, I, 191. WI.HI H.J'I ■Manju. .1- on. r.lg.i’tli 1W W 1»»» —— ——__ Cong * globe, 24 Cong., 1 Bess., 436, 437. — — Jackson to Blair, August 12, 1836, in Bassett, jOor. o f Jack son, V, 41 9. "W— ————- - Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, V, Fonasterio, Mexican Finis ter of foreign Affairs, 333 le3 Register, I, 123(Aprill6, 1336) ;J. 3. Winston, "The Attitude of the’ di eVs pap ers of the United States towards Texan Independence," in lAss. Valley Hist. Assn. Proceedings. VIII, 160-175. 1 — ——x - — - — , „ G. W. I organ, "Reminiscenc es, ” in The Sou thwestern Historical kuart yly, m, 134; J. a. SatEer ,~TecolnHion of the Republic of Texas by the United St at as (Bulletin of the”"" University afTexas, Ho. TCS), IV2, 211. sr ——— Claiborne, yiasisainM, I, 32 Basil, Jackson, 11, 350 t 3-51 note, cltja soma az*Lpl,aa> 33 H. -Docs., 24 Cong., 1 Sess. , No. 2, pp. 63, 64; Carson to Barnet, dune 1, 1836, in Carr is cn, Diploma tic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, I, 93. 34 Marshall, The V estern Boundary of the Louis Lana Purchase, 204 • Blair to Jackson, December 23, 1838, in Bassett, Cor* of Jackson, V, 575; Swartwout to Frost Thorn of WcogZoches , Texas, February 11, 1836, in W. 1. Mackenzie, I ife and Times of Van "Buren, 261. Jackson’s letter is given and commented on in Kayo, light Years in lushing ton ,136. 13?; also in Nil es* Ist er, IV, TWAT* ” (lores tisa f s pamphlet of October, 1836, in H. be* Decs., 25 Cengs, 2 less., lo* 190, P* ?!• Faye had this impression of the situation: n The entire circumvention of the highly talented but ’unpractised’ Mexican Minister, by the combined arts and cunning of general Jackson and his ministers of State and War, reminds me of nothing half so forcibly, as of the case of the young collegiate, who,., ;ust commencing the world with a large patrimony, falls into the hands of an association of gentlemen-sharp era and black who fleece him out of his possessions with such elegant and practised adroitness as to impress him with the deepest of their gentlemanly conduct in the whole affair; for which, he ...tenders them the most gracious acknowledgments, with a perfect resignation to tie lo s of his money, while he felt that his honour was safe; and was doubly cheated into the same belief of his OIRCUMVCTORS’." ( Sight Years in Washington, 155) . 39 Memorandum of the intervie ,in H. Jy. Docs. ,24 Cong. 1 Sees., No. 256., p. 45. Gorostixa’s reply is given in ibid., 13-21; Gorostiza to his government, April 25, 1356, in ITT Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 190, p. 74. My italics. 40V Gaines to Major 3. 0. Robertson, June 22, 1336, H. lx, Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 351, p. 794, enclosed with GaTHes to Cass, June 22, 1336, in ibid. ,790 -792; See Marshall, The Western Boundary of Louisana, 175 note. “41 ' Monasterio to July 8, 1336, in lb id., 59?, 594. 42 ’ Alexander Jones to M. B. Damar, July 19, 1836, in Gulick, lam ar Papers, I, 422. ——* — Barker In Flss. Valley Hist. Rev. , I, 20. 44 Cass to Caines, «July 11, 1836, in H. Docs•, 25 Cong., 2 Sass., 10. 190, p. 9*?. ™ —— — Jackson to Dickens, August 17, 1336, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 421; Jackson to Cannon, August 6, 1336, in _ 6 13 . - - the order countermanding the General b s requisition was not given through the Secretary of War does not appear. Possibly it was deemed most prudent not to put the important admission we have quoted, on record in the War Office.” Thus writes -Jay (Review of Mexican War, 32) . It appears that Jackson at first planneT"toTave his countermanding order go to Cannon by report of a third party. In the Jackson Paners (Bassett, Cor, of Jackson, V, 415, £l6) there is a draft in Jackson 1 s Hand dated ”111)erty, Tenn., Aug 3, 1336,” similar in substance to Jackson’s letter to Cannon of August 6, and purporting to be Jackson’s answer through a friend to Cannon’s letter of July 30: "Sir, your letter of 30th of July last was handed the President this morning on his way hither and he had directed me to say in reply that he [is] much astonished to leam that Genl Gains has made a requisition on Tennessee for volunteers ... Before the Executive left Washington there had been a letter reed, from Genl Gains intimating some appearance of hostile feeling by the Indians upon that frontier but no acts of hostility had been committed by them, and later intelligence says every thing on that frontier wears at present a peaceful appearance." — ____ . Hew York Evening Star, in Gulick, Lan ar Papers, I, 144, 445. Marshall, The western Boundary of the Louisiana Purahase, 183. 4^ — • — — — —— Kendall to Jackson, August 3, 1836, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 415. _ ___ Jackson to Gaines, September 4, 1336, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 423 -424. My italics. —— The acting Secretary of State asserted: "It is founded on the great principle of self-preservation ... The present inability of Mexico to restrain the Indims within her terrii tory from hostile incursions upon the citizens of the United States, if they should once be engaged in hostility near the frontier ... renders it imperative fto occupy the territory] beyond the frontier" (Dickens to Gorostiza, October 13, 1336, in H. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sees., No. 2, p. 39) . 52 Sen. Docs., 24 Gorg., 2 less., Ko. 1, 43. " — — Gorostiza to Dickens, October 15, 1336, in H. 3x. Docs., 24 Cong., 2 Sees., No. 2, pp. 97-10 C. ■ - - Given both in Spanish and in translation in H, 25 Cong., 2 Sees., No. 190. — ——— ——— —— — —— Persy th to Silis, December 10, 1336, in H, Does., 24 Oong., 2 Sass., 10. 105, pp. 47-50. Wharton to Austin, June 2, 1836, in Barker, The Austin Papers, 111, 363, 364. 57 Forsyth to Silis, January 29, 1836, in H. lx. Docs., 25 Cong., 2 Sess., Ko. 351, pp. 160-162. Riles 1 Register, 1, 135 (Fay 14, 1336) . eg— — — ——— • Jackscn to lewis, September 18, 184-?, in W. 8. Sumner, Jackson, 413. _ .. w . — - H. J^cs., 25 Oorg., 2 Sess., No. 105, pp • 24-27. The fifteen dLaUs are cited by 0. 0. Kohl, Claims as a Cause of the Mexican War, 90-82, from H. Boes., SdJong., 2 Sess., No. ~ — ol H. JZ* C3 * »25 Oong., 2 Sess., No. 351, pp. 16C-162. — — — _____ Silis to forsyth, July 16 and September 24, 1336, in Smith transcripts from the State Department, in the University of Texas Archives. —— " Swartvout to Houston, August 7, 1936, in James, The Raven, 263. — ——„—. — H. sscs •» 24 Cong., 2 Sess., Ko. 105, pn. 29-33. — 1 - ' - - H* ®? Boo S-m 24 Conge, 2 Seas., No* 139, pp* 50-59. —- ———- Sumner, Andrew Jackson, 421; Garrison, westward tension, 190. ———— —— For Mexico T s position see Butler to Selane, Farch 2, 1834, in H. Sx. pocs. , 25 Cong., 2 Sass. , No. 351, pp. 51 518; Jay, Review _of the Mexican 34. —_ _—.—— . — — Forsyth to Kilis, December 9, 13,36, in H. Kx. ♦ 24 Cong., 2 Sess., 80. 105, pp. 53 , 59. ~ Jackson to Kendall, December 4, 1836, in Basset J, Cor. of Jackson, V, 441. ——— —— — Adams, irs, IX, (December 22, 1336) . —— Wharton to Austin, December 23, 1836, in garrison, Dip. Cor. of the Republic of Texas, I, 153. 159. iwmim.i. ijiuF - QI" n-WCTWKI.IH *■ IIMW nr ' " 1, Li- WT 72 The most noted of the Texan raids was the ill-fated Santa Fe expedition. D. 1. Child wrote in his The Texas Revolution, and the Late Outrage in Califomia/Dby TroEus , 77: "T have also “Jackson was at fKFTot - tom of the Santa F 4 expedition. He deserves to be at the end of it." Jackson was an expansionist and encourager of expansion, but no evidence has been found to link him directly with the expedition. He did, however, intercede with Santa Anna for the release of the prisoners taken by Mexico (Tonne ss e e Historical Magazine, 11, 34; 111, 149, 150). —— — — — Wharton to Austin, January 6, 1837, in Garrison, Dip. Cor* of the Republic o f Texas , I, 171, 172. The Texan government HadTn Tui y~asledT Genera 1 Gaines to guarantee the treaties of Velasco made by Houston with the captured Santa Anna; but Gaines properly refused, replying that ae had no authority to pledge the United States to enforce these repudiated treaties against Mexico (Barker, The Austin Papers, 111, 334, 403, 410) . — “"74 ' ~ Jackson’s memorandum, cited by Barker in Am. Hist. Rev., XII, 808; and by Cleland, His tory of California: Xmer ican Period, 143. See C. R.' Warton, 3TPresident e:““ Cen era! Santa Inna, 72 . _ _ _ - — Wharton to Austin, December 2, 1336, and Austin to Wharton, December 10, 1336, in Garrison, Dip. Cor. of the Repub lie of Texas, 1, 149, 151 • “——76 —~— — —— — - Henryk. Virmond to william D. Jones (American consul in Mexico), San Diego, December 25, 1336, and M. Burroughs to Silis, January 10, 1337, in Smith transcripts from the consular papers in the State Department. — — — _ — Nil eg 1 Register, LI, 34 (September 17, 1336) • —_ —_ — — Castaneda, The Mexican Side of the Texas Revolution, 368. yg -.—— — Twitchell, i’he Leading pacts of New Mexican History, MBIMI ' M11.1.l Mu'lW Hl , WnrW II 1 iIMIiMIHB |.n IWHH 11l ' ■**»!■ B—W* 11, 54. H. H, Bancroft believed that Americans and Texans did play a part in the revolt in Nev/ Mexico (History of Arizona and New’ Mexico , 317) . — —— — Wharton to Houston, February 2, 18 37, in Carri son, Dip. Cor» o f the Bepubl ic of Texas ,I, 179, 180. “31_ Wharton to Houston, February 5, 1837, in ib id., I, 183. grg— — ~ Kohl, Claims as a Cause of the Mexican War, 26; ByawMjnM.aLM ..■»»»*_-■ H'will I y««' i’.rwW»* WTrm MMMi n«»'«W’Wr* Smith, war wit n Mexico , I, 423. H. c 3 * * 24 2 Sess., N 0.139. Mexican Jide o f the Texas Revolution, 367. Of. William K^nne^/Uex^ - , H? 23U7 ■ - - ■ ~ ■—“ - — ————— Wharton to Rusk, undated, in garrison, Pip. Cor. of the Republic of Te^as, I, 191. 36 Sen. Docs., 24 Gong., 2 Sess No. 20, pp. 12, 15. ——— ———_ —- — Garrison, Dip. Cor. of the Republic of Texas, I, 195, 194; cf. 169. ■ ——33 —’— “ — — ~~ — ~ “ Alans's Texas Speech of 1333, p. 131. —-——— ——— ——«—. T. I. McKenney, Memoirs, I, 26.3-274. • > ”1 was the first man,” adds Thompson, ”to raise my voice in favor of Texas', not from, any sympathy with the renegades, but from a conviction of the importance of their success to the South. It is a fine corps de reserve to fell back upon" (Thompson to N. B* Tncher, rarch”l3,~T342, in Will iam and Eary Poll ege Quarterly, Xll t 153) . See Schouler, History > IV, 256, 257; Adams's — — ——— Jones, Fem or anda, 33, 34. 92 Castaheda, The Mexican Side of the Texas Re -go Inti on, 330. APPENDIX JACKSON AND THE RHEA LETTER The famous letter of 1319 in which Congressman Rhea of Tennessee was supposed to have sent Gensral Jackson never dent Nonroe’s authorization to invade Spanish Florida seems/ to have existed but to have been conjured up by Jackson in 1330-31 from motives of policy. This tale, though it may be painful to those who believe in Jackson’s integrity, vindicates the characters of those slurred by Jackson. Writers often accept the Jacksonian fable as the truth, or at least they generally exonerate Jackson of dishonesty. Cf the latter group J. S. Bassett is the scholarly guide Bassett argues, ingeniously but not convincingly, that Jackson may have come to think later that he had received an affirmative reply about Florida in some letter from Rhea in 1313 which had really dealt with another matter. Bassett still reasons thus Wien later editing the Jackson Papers, refusing to impugn ’’the conceded honesty” either of Jackson or of Monroe, who denies having given the General a clandestine authorization 2 James Schouler has suggested strongly, with a mass of evidence, that the Rhea story was a forgery, but, having at t lie time no access to the Jackson Papers, he admitted as an alternative (one more favorable to Jackson but much less likely) that Rhea, desiring Florida, may have lent Jackson a pretended authority from the President. assumes that Rhea was informed immediately by Jackson of his confidential letter to Monroe requesting authority, or connivance; but it would seem that Rhea did not know of Jackson’s letter till years later, did not know the nature of Jackson’s connection with the Rhea publication of 1831, and no writer seems to have gone further along his path. ' How has Jackson’s Rhea fable—credited by few contemporaries, it seems—attained its present wide acceptance and semi-acceptance? The first public intimation that Rhea had sent an authorization from Fonroe to Jackson in 1813 was given to the public by Rhea in a bold, querulous letter addressed to Fonroe on June 3, 1331, barely a month before the ex-President died. 4 It harked back to Jackson’s confidential letter to Conroe of January 6, 1313, in which occurred that remarkable expression which places Jackson in no enviable light! "Let it be signified to me through any channel (say Fr. J. , that the possession of the Rloridas would be desirable to the United States, and in sixty days it will be accomplished,” and "without implicating the Government." Rhea claims that Fonroe told him to give Jackson the hint, and that it was given. 3chouler shows the impossibility of this claim, and establishes these facts: (1) Jackson’s invasion was a shocking surprise to the administration and was declared unauthorized and worthy of censure; (2) Monroe, ill at the time, did not read Jackson’s letter till long after the invasion; (3) Rhea was never mentioned in the cabinet, and it is improbable that Monroe would have given Jackson so important a secret order without consul ting the cabinet; and (4) Jackscn went into Florida before any reply from Monroe was at all likely to have reached him. Parton, while defending the Rhea story, marvelled that in the correspondence and in the investigation of Jackson’s conduct held at Washington in the winter of 1313-19 not once was 4hea or a letter from Rhea to Jackson mentioned* Aa&s Parton: "But what became of Mr. Rhea’s letter? Why was that never prodiced, since its production would have silenced the thousand tongues that so loudly condemned general Jackson for the conduct which it authorized? The general answers this question"-in 18-31. He had burned it. But Jackson claims that he burned it when he returned to the Hermitage after the trial, in April of 1319; for in Tennessee lay meanwhile, as he claims, that important letter from Rhea, which he might be expected to have brought to Washington had i£ existed. It was when he was at Washington, he claims, that Rhea told him that the President desired the letter 5 burned. In 1313 and until Jackson vouchsafed no plea save that his specific orders had given him virtually dictatorial powers; and during the investigation the most he expected was after-approval for what he had done on his own authority. Shea’s account in 1331 is refuted by facts and reason. In 1327, having heard from Dalhoun that some fraud to exalt Jackson might be founded on Jackson’s letter of 1313, Monroe sought Rhea, recording the interview: I asked Mr. Rhea in a conversation whether he had ever intimated to General Jackson his opinion that the administration had no objection to his making an attack on Pensacola, and he declared that he never had. I did not know, if the General had written him to the same effect as he had to me , as I had not read my letter, but that he might have led me innocently into a conversation in which, wishing to obtain Florida, I might have expressed a sentiment from which he have drawn that inference. But he assured me that no such conversation had ever passed between us. I did not apprise him of the letter which I had received from the General on the subject, being able to ascertain my object without doing so As early as December of 1813 W. B. Lewis asserted anonymously in the Philadelphia Aurora that ’’the Government knew Jackson’s views on the capture of the Spanish forts before he marched his army into Plorida.” 7 was a part of Lewis 1 political campaigning for Jackson, and seems to show that Jackson may have written his letter of solicitation to the President for future justification rather than in expectation of an answer, which he did not wait for befbre seizing plorida. It remains to tell how Jackson, when President, impressed "Johnny Ray” into the Rhea letter affair in 1330-31 . In early April, 1330, Jackson was told by scheming friends of Van Airen that Calhoun, as Monroe’s Secretary of War, had censured the General’s invasion of Florida in 1313. To Jackson, always conscious of rectitude or else anxious to discover it, it may have seemed that no true friend could have questioned his conduct, and much less have "concealed" such "personal hostility" these many years. He wanted to make an issue with whom he had come to dislike and to whom he owed very largely his elevation to the Presidency. In this angry frame of mind he delivered his doubtless uncalledfor Union toast on April 13, assuming treason in Calhoun. In a note of May 13 he asked the Vice-President if the Plcri da disclosure were true, enclosing a. biased testimonial procured from Crawford, the Carolinian’s bitterest enemy. Calhoun could not deny that he had criticized the General’s unwarranted conduct. Jackson was not content with the simple query: he accused Calhoun of falseness and animus in his censure, for the Secretary knew that "Iwas but executing the wishes of the Government, and clothed with authority ’to conduct the war in the manner I might judge best.’" This untruth reflected seriously on Calhoun, as well as Fonroe, for if it had been truth Calhoun had moved to investigate Jackson’s conduct without grounds. As Van Buren says, "Calhoun was invited if not necessarily called" upon to consider, in mere self -def anse, the claim that Fonroe had given the 3 T Senaral authority. In a conciliatory reply on May 29, cal - houn denied Jacks on’s claim and showed plainly that the unjust aspersions against himself proceeded from the hatred of Crawford and the intriguing of Van Buren’s friends. Put Jackson responded unreasonably, on Fay 30, "in the language of Caesar, ’ n tu Brute,’" He persevered in his "error" and declared that it might “become necessary hereafter, when I shall have more leisure, and the documents rl] at hand, to place the subject in its proper light, which will give a very different view of this subject ... I had authority for 9 all that I did.” With this the matter rested in private until early 1331. The breach was widened by the 3aton affair, and Jackson seamed to conceive that Calhoun was again the treacherous, ambitious "secret agent," aiming at saton and Van Buren, Jackson’s chosen. To undermine his supposed foe and the rival of Van Buren, the President was not content to fasten the issue of nullification upon Calhoun, heedless of the real issue of tariff grievance end careless of trie constitutional question; he must also resort, it seems, to a forgery, since he could discover no real treachery in Calhoun’s even course. The maligned Calhoun did his best to heal the breach which his political foes had effected to prevent his succession to the Presidency in 1332—a succession commonly agreed 10 upon in the Jacksonian ranks when they came into power. Calhoun wrote on January 13, 1331: "As ... I have acted on the defensive this far and intend to do so throughout, I will not publish unless it should become absolutely necessary. But Jackson slandered Calhoun privately and forced the issue upon him. Thus the general’s friend and intended biographer Pajor Henry Lee was circulating Jackson’s claim of having had authorization from Uonroe. Calhoun explained in the preface of his pamphlet published in February, presenting his correspondence with the President on the Seminole War along with testimony, that the publication was made necessary by the fact that in public rumor and discussion the correspondence had been distorted in a manner "highly injurious to my character." The Carolinian aimed to show that Jan Buren had intrigued to bring about the breach between the President and the Vice-President. But not wishing to irritate Jackson, he took care to print nothing that would reflect unjustly on him, and issued his "book" only after he confidently believed that its contents were acceptable to Jackson. "Conversant as I was," writes Van Buren, "with the then condition of things as affecting that point I can very well conceive that, but for that mistake, and the publication which was its first consequence, Mr. Calhoun might well have 1 3 been raised to the Presidency." Calhoun 1 s clear-sighted friends warned him against publication, saying "Jackson will . „14 cmsh you." So far from discrediting Wn Buren—who had no good national reput at ion--and ensuring Calhoun’s succession, the pamphlet further aroused Jackson: Van Buren was apparently not personally involved in the intrigue against Calhoun, though he was doubtless aware of it, and Jackson was quick to fly to his defense. But, what was worse, the printing of the correspondence, including a paraphrase of Jackson’s hitherto unpublished ’’confidential” letter to lon roe of January 6, 1313 (which showed on its face that Jackson had been actuated by the motives of a filibuster) , along with various proofs that Jackson* s invasion had not been authorised, placed before the public what Calhoun lightly termed his "difference of opinion" from Jackson. Calhoun had no idea that Jackson would cling to his "error" and be offended by the exposition of plain truth; but he knew not as yet the General’s smallness and resourceful malignity. Jackson with ire saw his word publicly brought forth and impugned, and his "pride" in his reputation could brook no such invasion. Jackson had become closely allied with his claim of authorization made in Ms letters to Calhoun in May, 18.30, and hatred and pride would not let him confess an error, even though Monroe’s adverse testimony was brought forward in Calhoun’s publication. He was vehement in reproaching Calhoun for publishing his "confidential n private letter to Monroe of 1818. Such baseness’. Jackson had already* in December of 18.30* begun steps to back his claim by written "documents ," as he had threatened. For in December he wrote with finesse to the aged Rhea in Tennessee concerning the letter which Rhea, according to Jackson, had written him in 1813, conveying Monroe’s sanction for the subsequent invasion of Florida. He explained to Rhea that it was in answer to his, Jackson 1 s, letter to Monroe of January 6, 1818, in which he had mentioned Rhea as a convenient intermediary. And he wanted Rhea, as a friend in need, to testify to his having sent Jackson Monroe’s permission. Rhea’s reply, January 4, 1331, showed—as had his interview with Monroe in 1827—that he knew nothing of the matter; but he was now willing to have a helpful recollection if told further what it should be about. He wrote Jackson: I request you to send me at Blountville a copy of the letter (in which you mention my name) to Mr. Monroe. I am desirous to have it and trust all will come to light. As you are on the defensive I will help you all I can. I desire nothing to be know of me in this business, until I speak out as fully as I can and therefore this letter so far 00WIDWIAI COOOTm . 15 Rhea told Jackson that he had no recollection of what he had done during the Congressional session of 1318-19 and had no way of refreshing his memory. Jackson’s asseveration for posterity that the details of Rhea’s letter to honroe in f June, 18.31, were based on Rhea’s diary of 1818-19 is one of the most patent of Jackson’s lies. Rhea did not think of ■ alleging this in his letter. But Rhea died in early 1832, and Jackson was able to add this detail fbr verisimilitude without danger of exposure. Jackson was eager to present Tt proof n by Rhea even before Calhoun’s publication; apparently he did not think that Calhoun would make the first move. But Judge Overton of Tennessee, on whom Jackson counted for farther testimony, and who had gained, as had Judge Andrew Jackson, a reputation for probity. was reluctant to set such a trap, which might well bring ♦ sorrow to its authors. He wrote the president on February 3 that no further good in tills affair could come from Jackson’s pen. The general claim made in 1330 was sufficient to its purpose. It chould be attributed to Jackson’s "bad memory” by those woo knew its erroneousness; it had no tangible details to be refuted with ruinous effect. Wrote Cver ton: If Monroe has not entirely lost ordinary prudence, he will not come out in Calhoun’s favor, and ... if he says anything, it will be that in his present state of health, etc. he has forgotten, or cannot relate any part of the affair with confidence ... it will be with pain that I shall witness the necessity for making a single move farther than you have done. Crawford ... has already retired, and but let them alone, Calhoun will soon have to take the same step; accompanied by perfect silence on your part. Both your letters to [Fay, 1330] ... leaves you in an elevated position; which should not be lightly jeopardised. It seems to me, that should Monroe, not recollect, I should not interfere with these combatants. Thus my friend I have given my opinion frankly. Calhoun did not shrink faint-heartedly from the issue of truth and allow Jackson’s bullying to blight his political career. His pamphlet in February quoted testimonials from Monroe and his cabinet members shovdrg that Jackson had not been authorized to invade Florida. Calhoun had long been prepared for this vindication, the letters from Monroe and Wirt being dated May, 1830; that from Adams was dated Janu t 17 ary, 1831. Believing himself now in a cul de sac with his reputation for integrity at stake, Jackson hastened to mature his plans for bolstering his falsehood or error at the cost of Monroe’s reputation. The reputations and rights of others were cheap to Jackson. On March 30, 1331, Rhea wrote Jack* son, still calling for information and coaching to dispel his ignorance in the matter. I will be with you as soon as I can ... I am gratified in being informed by you that Judge overton and his nephew Samuel Overton saw the letter from me to you and know its contents, and I now request you to write to Judge Overton and his nephew Samuel, and desire them to infom you of all they know and remember of the contents of that letter, and as soon as you receive letters thereof from them, please to send on copies to me here at Blountville, if I be not previously at Washington, ... and I request that the Judge and his nephew may tell the date of that letter or as near as they can. I desire every information you can give me on the subject.^- 3 All the minute circumstances of the doubtless imaginary episode sprang from the fertile mind of Jackson, who taught them to his witnesses as facts to be repeated by them as things of their own remembraice. Shea and Overton came to Washington to spring the trap; Balch, Done Ison and other members of Jack son 1 s famous "white-washing committee” of 1828 came to put their signatures as witnesses to the important copy of Rhea’s letter to Monroe which was kept for 19 Jackson’s use. On June 2 Jackson wrote a letter of virtual instruction to Rhea, who was now at Washington, setting forth the whole fabrication, which Rhea merely repeated in his letter to Monroe the next day: On the 6 of Jany 1318 I wrote a confidential letter to Mr. Monroe a copy of which mar ed A I here dan close vou, in which you will find the following expressions. it be signified to me thro any channel, (say, J. Rhea) that the possession of the Floridas would be desirable to the U. States and in 60 days it will be accomplished.’ About the 20 or 23d of February on my way to Fort Hcott I recvd your letter informing me, that Mr. Monroe had shown you my confidential letter to him of the 6 of Jany 1818 and approved thereof; and further, that ample instructions had been, or would be given on that head. In substance going to show, that course pointed out in my confidential letter to him was approved. I quote from memory—your letter was burped. Towards the rise of Congress, after the debate on the Seminole question in 1819 had closed, you came to me at Strathers Hotel, and enquired if I had reed such a letter from you, I replied I had. You then requested me as an old friend, for gods sake to burn it as soon as I got home. I promised that I would, and did so. This was done on the 12 of April 1319, and is so endorsed on the main of my letter Book, opposite where the confidential letter is recorded. The object of this communication is to request you to say, whether the feet as stated, to wit, your request to me to burn the letter is not correct, and whether that request proceeded from any intimation or suggestion, of Kr. Monroe and Mr. Calhoun, or either of them. 2o The last query proved to be no excessive drain on Rhea’s tutored memory, and he showed some p-udence in his letter to Monroe the next day in recalling that it was only Monroe who had desired the burning. Overton’s affidavit, June 2, was cautious as to the alleged Rhea letter of 1313, which he pretended to have seen. Bassett says: "Overton does not say that it clearly and pointedly said that Monroe authorized what Jackson suggested; but says that it l in substance conveyed the idea. 7 Why should Overton, a skillful lawyer and a devoted friend of Jackson, use this indefinite language if 21 he had a clear recollection of the matter?” Bassett was hard pressed by the incriminating nature of the evidence. As we have seen, Jackson claims that he endorsed on his letter to Monroe of 1313 a statement on April 12, 181$, saying » that he burned hhea T s letter in virtual reply on that day. probably this endorsement was made in 1830 or 1331 . The copy of Jackson’s letter to Monroe, January 6, 1813, in the Jackson Papers bears this peculiar endorsement in Jackson’s hand: ”Mr. J. Shea’s letter in answer is burnt this 12th of April, 1818.” This slip of ”1318” would indicate that the endorsement was made later, and not in 1819, when su ch an error, so late in the year, was not likely to have been mads/ 8 Thus the Rhea fabrication was launched by the concealed President. To tlb public it was Shea’s tale, not Jackson 1 s — though there were not wanting those who well knew who was the real ’’secrete agent,” to use Jackson’s expression. while not openly endorsing the tale, the President privately commended Rhea’s letter to his friends, in the same ex cathedra manner in which he pointed to the Irving affidavits: ’’Providence has permitted Mr. Rhea to live and see this book [Calhoun’s pamphlet], and, on reading it, he addressed a letter to Monroe verifying [l] all the facts stated in his letter on the subject and has placed in my hands a certified copy of the same." What does Jackson mean by "verifying"? In the same letter he shows us clearly the despicable purpose of the seeming forgery: It is clear then that Mr* Calhoun did know that I had not transcended my orders; but, on the contrary, had fulfilled them to a tittle, and accomplished the secret wishes o f Mr. Monroe expressed to me thro* Mr. J. Rhea ... What then can you think of Mr. Calhoun, who was capable» after being filly possessed of all this knowledge, and whilst ... he professed the strongest friendship for me, and approbated my conduct in the Floridas, of moving, in the secret cabinet counsil, my arrest or punishment, and thus causing proceedings in Congress against me in 1818 and *l9? One would, think from this that Jackson’s memory were refreshed by Rhea, instead, of vice versa, and that Jackson had had. no wish himself to betray his confidential promise to Monroe to seize Florida, if given a hint, "without implicating the Government*" A little tiling like his professed friendship for Monroe seems not to have restrained him now from slander: self-interest and enmity more than once led Jackson into falsehood and intrigue* Calhoun, though aware of the real author of the Rhea charge, felt little astonishment, as he had. too well learned. the character of Jackscn and those nearest to him. He replied to a letter from Leon roe’s son-in-law, Gouverneur, concerning Rhea’s letter: If anything could amaze me, as to the conduct of those in power, what you communicate would have that effect; I take it for granted the Movement is from the president himself. How, after the correspondence between him and Mr. Monroe, and Ms attempt to justify his conduct on the ground, that his [regular] orders authorized it, he can at this late date attempt to give the affair a turn, which it would be impossible for him to make the publick to believe to be true; and, if he could, would prove fatal to his own character for honor, sincerity and truth, is really extraordinary. Calhoun was glad that Gouverneur had foil evidence for the vindication of iron roe ’’and the prostration of those, who to save themselves from disgrace, would ruin his reputation Adams saw in Jackson’s move another motive: Writhing under the consciousness of the [evil] return which he has made to me for saving him from public indignation and defending himself triumphantly against the vengeance of Britain and Spain, and the impeachment of Congress* the disavowal of Mr. lon roe, and the Courtmartial of salhoun and Crawford, he struggles to bring his cause before the world and before posterity upon another basis. This basis is itself as rotten as his own heart ... To establish this, he resorts to his own unprincipled letter, which I never saw; to the recreant desperation of Crawford, and to the ravenous imbecility of John ... both haw made themselves, by impudent, unblushing falsehoods, panders to his unnatural passions ... His moral perceptions are so confused and discomposed by his convuJsive passions , that, in his eagerness ... he blinds himself entirely to the inevitable recoil upon himself. 20 Adans remarked to Wise on the badness of Jackson: "He chose rather to rely on a forged order to do wrong than on the laws of nations to do right. He said, "B—n Grotiusl d—n Ruffendorfd—n Vattel!—this is a mere matter between Jim ~ 26 Monroe and myself. " Monroe made a denial on his death-bed, and Gouverneur challenged proof of shea’s charge. Prudence was perhaps now the better part of Jackson's valor, for he did not come forward to assume responsibility, though he approved the Rhea fable privately. But the president was not by nature cautious and. soon wrote his friend John Coffee; "Yvhen necessary I will make a fill expose, but not until then, on the subject of his [Rhea's] answer to my confidential letter to Fr. Monroe on 27 the 6th of Jany 1313.” In the spring of 1832 Jackson wrote. and signed himself, a long exposition against Calhoun in which he set forth the whole of Rhea’s story with some new details evincing a truly mysterious omniscience in his ’’bad memory.” He consulted with friends about publishing it, and J. A. Hamilton and Louis McLane very wisely and "urgently advised him not to publish,” so that the manuscript lay unknown for many years in the private papeis of The self-righteous virulence of this shame fill "Reply to Calhou 5 ' maybe illustrated by the passage which follows the narrative of Calhoun's alleged machinations against him: Lest accident should bring the truth to light, and expose his duplicity [i.e. Calhoun’s in censuring Jackson in 1318], he procures through the president and Fr. Rhea the destruction of the approving answer to the confidential letter. Fr. Rhea was an old man and General Jackson’s health feeble. In a few years all who were supposed to have any knowledge of the reply would be in their graves. livery trace of the approval given beforehand by the government to ... General Jackson would soon be obliterated ... Happily however for the truth of history and the cause of public justice, the writer of the reply Rhea is still alive; and from a journal kept at the time, is able to give an accurate account of this transaction. He testifies directly to the writing of the letter . .. sy Jackson was determined to read the fable into history, if 4t all possible. He probably knew that General Fathaws’s filibustering in >last Morida in 1811-12 had been with the government's connivance (Monroe then being Secretary of State) , and it may have seemed to him that he was deserving of the same consideration for his patriotic efforts in aid of our manifest destiny* In 1837 he asked Lewis to have Major Henrylee, half -brother of Robert h lee, to testify to his having seen Jackson’s entry in his copy-book, on the margin of the famous letter to Monroe, saying that he had burned Rhea’s letter giving Monroe’s favorable response. Lee was 30 writing a biography of ths general. This gesture was actuated by the fact that in January, 1837, Gouverneur sent the President a copy of the letter sent Monroe by Rhea in June, 1331, remarking : It bears on its face so much of singularity both of matter and manner, that,it may perhaps with best effect speak for itself, independently of a mass of evidence" in my possession Mr. Monroe has fortunately had the opportunity, immediately before his death, and in the most solemn manner of recording his views of this matter. It is fbr the purpose of affording you a, similar Occasion, should you think proper to a Throve it; to vindicate the claims of justice and truth in behalf of the living and the dead, that the copy herewith, is now placed in your hands.' 1 Considering that Jackson’s contemporary biographers, his most knowing parti zans and friends, make no reference to Rhea’s saving testimony, and seek to justify the invasion of Morida on the grounds of the General’s military orders, which he himself felt to be so inadequate, it may be concluded that the nass of thinking men were not gulled by the Jackson-Rhea fabrication. 32 Then how has it acquired so respectable a place in history? Benton found Jackson T s unpublished "Reply to Calhoun" when he consulted the Jackson Papers for his Thirty Years 1 it seemed to authenticate the Rhea story. Bent on generously supposed that Jackson had re fra in e d fro m pub 1 ish ing it mere 1y b e cans e 1t was und ig ni - fied for the president to stoop to a newspaper quarrel, especially with the "disunionist" Oalhoun! So Benton innocently published the manuscript in 1854, thus fully joining the question of veracity between Jackson in uerson and Konrce. Parton, writing his Life of Jack son soon after this, was confronted by the joined issue and made a labored but hesitating defense of the Rhea version of the Florida invasion. These influential histories, taken with Jackson’s early acquired reputation for honesty, have brought about the wide acceptance of an imaginary episode, or at least of Jackson’s "ho nest m i sapp re he ns i on." — — - —-— The following writers believe Jackson rather than lonroe’s denial: K. 0. B a i C ock, The Rise of American Nationality, 275, 276; a. W. Johnson, .AndTew TacksDN TpDn, 195-199; H. B. Faller, The BurchaFeTf Florida? Kimpen, Die Ausbre itungspol it ik deF Verein igt en sTaa ten, 75; Buel 1, -dis to ry o f Andrew Jackson/ 11//14, 115; J~. , Assays, Historical and literary, I, 255. Among those writers who suspend judgment maybe named F. History of the American J^Miex> 132; D* Perkins in American Jecretaries AXMa, ed. s. p. Bemis, IV, 17; j. r. American Bpr- Aslationa, 169. See Bassett, Ufa Xkf Jac kBo n, T, 246-250. 2 Baasett, Cqr. of Jackson, 11, xii,335, 341, 348. pas - sett admits that JacksorChau'no misconception at the time concerning Rhea’s letters of 1318 on other subjects than Florida. As late as 1323, writing Calhoun, Jackson admits that he had entered Florida under a construction of his orders of December, 1817 (ibid., 111, 404-406) . 3 □ chouler, "Monroe and the Rhea Letter, in Fag. of Air. Hist., XII, 303-322; reprinted in Historical Briefs, 97-12 C. See also his History of the United States, TFTeH. 1394), 37, 33 note. It iscurTouFThat passeTF makes no reference to Bchouler’s article. Rhea to Fonroe, June 3, 1331. in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 233, 239 note. Fonroe’s denial of Rhea 1 s charge, writ Ten down by his son-in-law, 8. L. Gouverneur, on June 19, is given in Hamilton, ings of lonw e, VII, 234 -236. lonroe died on July 4,1331 k -3 — — . —__ Parton, Jackson, 11, 436, 523, 543. 6 Monroe to January 28, 1323, in Wri ti ngs of I'onroe, VII, 139-141; Jameson, . of £alhoun, 2427 2H4, 26 2, 263. See note 2 above; ariTTonroe’ s' endorsement in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, 11, 346. 7 —— —- Lewis in Parton, Jackson, 111, 313; Adams, femoirs, IV, 194 (December 17, 1318) . ~ — _____ Fitzpatrick, Autobiography of van Buren, 375. Crawford said President Conroe liaTnotreaT” Jack son's letter of January, 1813, till late in the year; but remarked gratuitously that Jackson might have inferred permission from the President’s silence. W, 3. Dodd says * "Jackson must have known since the summer of 1823 that Calhoun had not been the President's defender in 1318” (Expansion and Conflict, 64). ——- -— -— ————. —_— _—_—— - The correspondence is found in Calhoun's pamphlet of 1331, later referred to. Calhoun told C* J. Ingersoll in 1344 that "he had differed with Jackson because he required flattery as Tyler does, and that he, Calhoun, never flattered anyone" (w. M. Meigs, life of C» J* Ingersoll, 266, 267) . Calhoun was perhaps somewhaf coniescTnllhg“Toward Jackson. Fitzpatrick, Autobiography of Van puren, 504. Van Buren understood that a reconciliation was arranged by mutual friends in the winter of 1330 (ib id., 377); but Jackson T s Jaokacm T o correspondence would snow but an increase of angry intolerance on his part towards Cahluun. Jameson, Galhoun Correspondense. 279. — Adams, Femoirs, VIII, 249, 250. — - — Fitzpatrick, Autobiogra phv of Van Buren, 373, 379; 3. C. Andre^JacksoiTpnd larly Tennessee History, 111, 626. Van Buren convicts on" ofna v ing "deliberately allowed Calhoun to entertain the erroneous impression that the unpublished ’’book" had been shown by him to Jackson and found acceptable. 6th er astonishing instances of the assumption of members of the "kitchen cabinet" to act unscrupulously, against his known professions and commitments, for Jackson could be given. As Van Buren says, Jackson was surrounded by bad advisers—a sign of Jackson’s character, perhaps. 4 Reverend Aaron poster’s letter of reminiscences of Calhoun, in Harper ’s Monthly, XXIX, 466. 15 Rhea to Jackson, January 4, 1331, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 220, 221 . ——Yg- — — —-—- —— John Overton to Jackson, February 3, 13.31, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 237. ~~—n ~~ “— Correspondence between Cen. Andrew Jackson and John C. Cal ho uh, Pre side nf amT”Vice -Bresident Blates? on TheTubjecToT'TOe Course* oFTEeTalter, In tEe tlons or the Cabinet of Mr. Monroe, on the Occurren cesin trie semTnoTe War TwasETnglon, DuTf Creen, IB3TT, —.— — —— —.—„———.— ——— Rhea to Jackson, Ivarch 30, 1331, in Bassett, Cor .o f Jackson, IV, 254, 255. ———— —__ Schouler, History of the United States, 111 (ed. 1913) , 5Q5 note. ” 20 Jackson to Rhea, June 2, 1931, in Bassett, Cor.of Jackson, IV, 233 , 23 9; Rhea to Monroe, June 3, 18317~in TEIdTriV, 233 not e. 21 Overton’s affidavit, in Bassett, Qor. of Jackson, IV, 237, 233, and note, For Jackson 1 s aid of memory, as of Rhea’s, see Overton to Jackson, February 3, 1831, in Bassett, MiajMayn., IV, 237, 238. 22 . -• — > - • Bassett, Cor * of Jackson, 11, xii|, 346 note. 23 Jackson to D. Burford, July 23, 1831, in Bassett, Cor .of Jackson, IV, 319. Cf. Jackson to J. C. McLemore, June 27, 18317 in ibid*, IV, 304; Jackson to R. G* Dunlap, July 18, 1831, in Am. Hist. Mag,* and I’enn. Hist. Soc. Quart., IX, 89, 90. — “ - -— Calhoun to Gouverneur, July 14, 1831, in Jameson, Ca Ihoun Co rre sp on den ce, 295. Cadkoun refers to the correspondence ’in late 1318 in wnich Monroe rebuked Jackson for transcending orders” and Jackson defended his course on the basis of his orders of December 26, 1317 (published in Calhoun’s pamphlet) . _— —— —— Adams, Memoirs, VIII, 404, 405. U. .UA.-*-.. — UU.. W - I V « «■"' ■- — — ™'” Wise, ven ojf the Union, 151, 152. — ———— Jackson to Coffee, September 6, 1831, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 349. On Gouverneur's challenge see 'Cdlt on, Olay, I, 252-253. —~~ — " Reminiscences of J. A. Hamilton, 24/ , 24 5. In early 1832, JacksonwrdTeT^bner lacock/"wHFTad made the report in the House on Jackson’s conduct in 1319, asking what Calhoun had ever said to pacock concerning Jackson’s confidential letter to Fonroe. Lacock could give Jackson nothing reflecting on Calhoun; n his testimony is against Jackson: ”1 recurd [in talking to to your confident ial Johnny Rhea letter ...as proof irrefragible of your having committed an unlawfiil act with a perfect consciousness of its being so ... escaping with impunity, by shifting the responsibility ard throwing it upon the President.” [Hassett, Cor. of Jackson, IV, 444, 452-457) . Benton, Thirty Years 1 View, I, 179. Jackson’s "Heply” was first publisKeTKn Benton’s View (1354) . Another draft of Jackson’s "Case against Calhounis given in Bas- Coy * of Jackson, IV, 228-236, seen by internal evidence. 30 • i ’ n Jackson s memorandum for w. -o. lewis, January, 1837, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 445. lee’s work was unfinished at Kis death." gl Gouverneur to Jackson, January 6, 1837, in Bassett, Cor. of Jackson, V, 443 and note. Jackson endorsed the letter: Gouverneur of H York inclosing the copy of a letter from Mr. John Rhea of Tennessee to Mr. mu n roe , on the subject of my confidential letter to him on the subject of Mo ri da. I thank Mr. Gouverneur for this copy. A. J.” — ——— —- See, for the biographies of Jackson by p. A. Goodwin (1332), J. °. Jenkins (1850), and J. Prost (18 59). fhe most significant omission of the Rhea letter affair is in Van Buren’s Autobio gr aphy (see p. 333), where the conflict and correspondenceoaWeo'n Jackson and Calhoun is dealt with in great detail. Van Buren did not for a moment suppose that there was a thing to the Rhea fable. BIBLIOGRAPHY MANUSCRIPT SOURCE MATERIAL E C. Barker 1 s notes from the State Department and the Jackson and Van Buren Papers in the Library of Congress. Anthony Butler Papers, in the Archives of the University of Texas and of the Texas State Library. Houston-Prentiss Papers, in the Archives of the University of Texas. 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