

Copyright

by

Zachary Austin Reeves

2018

**The Report Committee for Zachary Austin Reeves
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following Report:**

Radicalizing the Marginalized: Central Asian Migrants in Russia

**APPROVED BY
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:**

Robert Hutchings, Supervisor

Michael Mosser, Co-Supervisor

Radicalizing the Marginalized: Central Asian Migrants in Russia

by

Zachary Austin Reeves

Report

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degrees of

Master of Global Policy Studies

and

Master of Arts

The University of Texas at Austin

May 2018

Abstract

Radicalizing the Marginalized: Central Asian Migrants in Russia

Zachary Austin Reeves, MGPS and MA

The University of Texas at Austin, 2018

Supervisor: Robert Hutchings

Co-Supervisor: Michael Mosser

This paper will examine the pattern of Central Asian migrant workers in Russia becoming radicalized and leaving to fight for the Islamic State in Syria. This progression is notable, as few Central Asian residents have left from their homelands to Syria directly. Instead, there appears to be a combination of push and pull factors driving migrant workers out of Russia and into the arms of the Islamic State. Through a historical review of radicalization-related literature and an analysis of the social situations unfolding in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Russia, this paper will attempt to shed light on why migrants would risk moving to Syria and Iraq. The results of this research indicate that Tajik and Uzbek migrants in Russia are uniquely vulnerable to radicalization. A combination of authoritarian repression at home, discrimination and marginalization abroad, and a potent group of local recruiters, is pushing Uzbeks and Tajiks out of Russia and into terror groups. These factors are unlikely to change in the near future, necessitating a serious consideration of new policy options to stymie this burgeoning geopolitical security issue.

Table of Contents

Introduction.....	1
Chapter One: Literature Review	2
Section One: Radicalization on a General Level	2
Section Two: Radicalization in Russia	10
Section Three: Radicalization in Uzbekistan.....	15
Chapter Two: Push/Pull Factors in Migrant Radicalization	20
Section One: Central Asian Autocracies as an Insulator from Radicalization	20
Section Two: Russia as an Incubator of Migrant Radicalization	27
Chapter Three: Future Challenges	33
Section One: Implications for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan	33
Section Two: Implications for Russia.....	38
Conclusion	43
Works Cited	44

Introduction

On April 3, 2017, a bomb exploded in the Saint Petersburg metro, killing 14 and injuring more than 50. The perpetrator, Akbarzhon Jalilov, was a Kyrgyz national who had repeatedly traveled to Russia for work purposes. It is suspected that Jalilov was radicalized while living in Russia and traveled to Turkey and possibly Syria before carrying out his attack. Jalilov's path to radicalization is not uncommon: over the last several years, thousands of Central Asian migrant workers in Russia have left to fight for the Islamic State. This paper will bring this phenomenon into focus, analyzing the origins and root causes of migrant radicalization in Russia.

First, this paper will examine common themes in radicalization-related literature over the last thirty years, with specific emphasis on radicalization in Russia and Central Asia. Academic research has long been playing catch-up with active geopolitical threats and radicalization movements; the literature review covered in Chapter One will highlight both the astute observations and critical oversights present in radicalization research over the last decade and a half. The second chapter will analyze the push and pull factors of migrant radicalization, contextualizing the situation in Russia and Central Asia with a combination of historical analysis and societal trends. Through this analysis, the paper will shed light on how the radicalization process for migrant workers in Russia differs from radicalized individuals in the West. Finally, the third chapter will cover the policy implications of these conclusions and will highlight the severity of the problem moving forward.

Chapter One: Literature Review

SECTION ONE: THE RADICALIZATION PROCESS ON A GENERAL LEVEL

Following the 2001 September 11th terror attacks, efforts to study the driving factors behind Islamic radicalization have become a prominent component of academic literature. This first section will examine the predominant literature regarding the radicalization process and the combination of structural, societal, and personal stress factors that push a person to radicalize.

There is considerable debate regarding the nature of the radicalization process. Is radicalization a personal issue that develops internally within someone, or does radicalization develop more broadly at the collective level?¹ Beyond personal psychology, there are varying external factors that have influenced people to join jihadi networks and/or carry out terror attacks. Factors on a micro level, like direct discrimination based on race or religion, differ from larger geopolitical events that galvanize angry feelings and push at-risk individuals towards radicalization. Generally, radicalization-related research falls into a subcategory of psychology, sociology, or political science. Together, all of these factors work in varying degrees to radicalize an individual.

Early efforts to psychologically analyze Islamic radicalization were limited, as most of the research was forced to focus on open-source reporting rather than personal interviews.² Literature also focused on the “deviant” nature of terrorism, characterizing terrorists as delinquents who were psychologically predisposed to distasteful and violent behavior.³ Researchers’ inability to interview and directly interact with would-be terrorists exacerbated confirmation and attribution

¹ Emmanuel Karagiannis, “European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization,” *Politics, Religion, and Ideology* 13, no. 1 (2012): 105.

² Andrew Silke, “Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization,” *European Journal of Criminology* 5, no. 1 (2008): 102.

³ Silke, “Holy Warriors,” 103.

biases. For some authors, the extreme nature of terrorist behavior indicated that only extreme and disturbed individuals were capable of carrying out such acts. Future research was able to elucidate more proximate psychological causes of radicalization, which included feelings of marginalization and discrimination, as well as the possibility of rewards and increased status.⁴

Sociologists have also attempted to explain the cause of radicalization beyond psychological imbalances and personal stress factors. In addition to direct marginalization and discrimination, young second and third-generation Muslim immigrants often struggle with identity, occupying a space between cultures.⁵ Several sociologists have argued that while searching for answers, these alienated individuals often “find” militant Islam as an outlet for feelings of discord.⁶ Would-be radicals are able to empathize with the suffering of other Muslims, pitting the Muslim community against the United States and its allies, who are perceived as perpetrators of violence. Other sociology scholars have argued that individuals are radicalized through social movements, and direct exposure to radical individuals or ideas serves as a key means of altering one’s views to conform with militant Islam.⁷

Prior to 2001, the term “radicalization” was sometimes used to describe a shift in terrorism itself: as the driving ideology of terror groups began to change from primarily political to primarily religious, terror attacks also became more violent and indiscriminate.⁸ In the 1970s, the number of terror incidents spiked, as groups like the Baader-Meinhof Group (also known as the Red Army Faction) and the Japanese Red Army gained notoriety for terror attacks carried out in the name of

⁴ Silke, “Holy Warriors,” 115.

⁵ Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know,” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 33, no. 9 (2010) 800.

⁶ Farhad Khosrokhavar, *Suicide bombers. Allah’s new martyrs*, (London: Pluto Press, 2005): 185.

⁷ Dalgaard-Nielsen, “Violent Radicalization in Europe,” 802.

⁸ Walter Laqueur, “Terror’s New Face: The Radicalization and Escalation of Modern Terrorism,” *Harvard International Review* 20, no. 4 (1998): 48-51.

far-left Marxist ideology.⁹ Both groups were comprised of young, middle class individuals who sought to enact violence against the state and ruling classes to bring about popular revolution.¹⁰ Early scholarly insight into these groups utilized interviews with former members to depict a social movement that had been pushed towards violence by a select group of individuals in leadership positions.¹¹

Through the 1970s and 1980s, global terror activities were not viewed as being driven by Islamic extremism, but rather a tool to further extremist political agendas. The terror groups that were inherently Islamic, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Hezbollah, were more likely to draw upon an existing population already galvanized by political discord. Individuals who carried out violent terror attacks did so with the aim of making some type of political gains. Here, violence against both the state and civilians was a means rather than an end.

In the late 1990s, research into Islamic radicalism and further insights into new forms of terrorism began to garner more interest, but prior to 9/11 these two ideas were largely unconnected. Research regarding the increasingly radical nature of Islam often focused on sectarian issues and how such large divides created localized conflict. Muhammad Qasim Zaman's research into the radicalization of Pakistani religious identity is informative, as he points to a combination of economic and religious factors that caused a spike in Sunni-Shia violence in 1990s Pakistan.¹² Although the violence Zaman's research is not classified as terrorism, the author details a kind of

⁹ John F. Burns, "Fate of 5 Terrorists Hangs Between Japan and Lebanon," *New York Times*, March 17, 2000, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/17/world/fate-of-5-terrorists-hangs-between-japan-and-lebanon.html>.

¹⁰ Andrew McKirdy, "Imprisoned Japanese Red Army founder Shigenobu holds out hope for revolution," *Japan Times*, June 8, 2017, accessed March 11, 2018, <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/08/national/imprisoned-japanese-red-army-founder-shigenobu-holds-hope-revolution/#.WpSPRa2grIU>.

¹¹ Horst Mahler, "Birth and Death of the Red Army Faction," *Australian Left Review* 1, no. 78 (1981): 47-49.

¹² Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities," *Modern Asian Studies* 32, no. 3 (1998): 715.

proto-radicalization that took place in 1980s Pakistan: local madrassas and clerics sought to sow religious discord for political gain, thus inciting their followers to carry out violent attacks in the name of their sect (in this case, Sunni or Shia).

Against this backdrop, it is important to consider two major geopolitical events and their ramifications regarding Islam: the Iranian Revolution in 1979, and the Soviet war in (and subsequent withdrawal from) Afghanistan. The former created a sovereign Shia-dominated state in the heart of the Middle East, exacerbating sectarian tension far beyond localized conflict and into outright state-to-state animosity, including an eight-year war with Iraq. The latter, meanwhile, functioned as an incubator for future jihadists and radical ideological leaders. Taken together, the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet-Afghan War heightened tensions between the Muslim world and the West, while also contributing to further ideological divides within the Middle East.¹³

By the end of the 1990s, some scholars had begun to connect recent high-profile terror incidents carried out by Islamists against Western targets. They argued that the nature of terrorism had shifted, both in terms of scope and ideology.¹⁴ Some authors went as far as to warn the West that future terror attacks would grow larger in scale and would focus on civilian targets. Osama bin Laden's became a prominent focus in new terrorism literature. bin Laden and Ramzi Yousef, the perpetrator of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the failed Bojinka plot, both publicly stated their anger with the United States and its foreign policy. Bin Laden criticized US troop presence in the Saudi Arabia during the Gulf War, while Yousef blamed the US government for perpetrating Muslim civilian deaths. Pre-9/11 terrorism literature did not deeply engage in the

¹³ Peter Tomsen, "Untying the Afghan Knot," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 25, no. 1 (2001): 21.

¹⁴ Simon Reeve, *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden, and the Future of Terrorism* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1999).

driving factors behind bin Laden and Yousef's radicalization, but this analysis still serves as a viable early look into the changing nature of terrorism.

The decade following the September 11th attacks saw a sharp increase in terrorism and Islamic radicalization-related research.¹⁵ Research in the early years of the War on Terror tended to focus primarily on radicalization on a macro level. This is understandable, as little research had been done on al Qaeda and other Islamic terror networks. Additionally, there was concern in the West that other Islamic movements would spring up in the aftermath of the United States entering two wars in the Middle East.¹⁶ Given the nature and consequences of terrorist behavior there is considerable difficulty even today in interviewing former jihadis to glean a better understanding of the radicalization process. This problem was more acute in the early years of the War on Terror, given the technological limitations of the time.

As literature began to come out focusing on the micro and personal elements of radicalization, the research primarily posited radicalization as a process vis a vis hatred of the West and its allies.¹⁷ Here, radicalization is discussed as something people are pushed towards as a consequence of geopolitical actions taken by the United States and its allies. Disaffected youth are more easily drawn to extremist groups because of perceived solidarity with the Muslim world: if the West is perpetuating the suffering of fellow Muslims, then angry individuals with little else to lose are drawn to take up violent action in retribution. The arguments for geopolitics being one of the driving factors tended to focus on the radicalization of people in Muslim-majority countries, i.e. the Middle East and neighboring regions. Although this research is enlightening, it is somewhat

¹⁵ A University of Texas Library online search with of the words "Islamic" and "radicalism" together generates 9,041 results from 1992-2001, while the same search generates 22,614 results from 2002-2011.

¹⁶ Hasan Mehdi, "Did the invasion of Iraq heighten the threat from al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism?" *New Statesman*, September 16, 2011, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/mehdi-hasan/2011/09/iraq-qaeda-verdict-terrorism>.

¹⁷ Jared Cohen, "Diverting the Radicalization Track," *Policy Review* no. 154 (April, 2009): 51-63.

limited in scope in that it does not necessarily illuminate the reasons for citizens in the United States and Europe – ones that have not felt the brunt of geopolitical and/or military force – to leave the safety of their home lives for violent jihadi groups. Additionally, too often research does not adequately discuss the war within Islam – especially in a geopolitical context – as a catalyst for sectarian violence and radicalization.

With this framework in mind, research began to focus more specifically on what kinds of factors set up an individual to be inclined to radicalize. More substantive research was published regarding individuals living in Western countries who were radicalized, and radicalization research began to more heavily scrutinize policies designed to counter those individuals.¹⁸ The Arab Spring movement of 2011 represents a critical juncture in radicalization research. Across North Africa and the Middle East, citizens began pressuring authoritarian governments for political reform.¹⁹ In some ways, this behavior represented a radical shift in political behavior not seen before in the Modern Arab world. In the aftermath of the protests, Islamist groups were galvanized by the general public's new interest in political change. In countries like Syria and Libya, civil wars involving jihadi groups involved recruitment and radicalization on a massive, societal-level scale.

The Arab Spring also coincided with an outgrowth of social media usage in the Middle East and North Africa.²⁰ Although much of the attention was given to Twitter, apps like Facebook and WhatsApp remain the social media options of choice for young people in the Middle East. WhatsApp and similar apps have been a particularly crucial part of the evolution of radicalization,

¹⁸ Jonathan Githens-Mazer and Robert Lambert, "Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 86, no. 4 (2010): 889-901.

¹⁹ NPR Staff, "The Arab Spring: A Year Of Revolution," *NPR*, December 17, 2011, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution>.

²⁰ Damian Radcliffe, "Five years after the Arab Spring, how does the Middle East use social media?" *The Conversation*, February 24, 2016, accessed April 2, 2018, <http://theconversation.com/five-years-after-the-arab-spring-how-does-the-middle-east-use-social-media-54940>.

as they allow for encrypted text conversations between users in different countries. The Syrian Civil War served as the first prominent example of Islamist groups recruiting foreign fighters to their cause through these messaging apps.²¹ In the years before during the Arab Spring protests, social media primarily functioned as a tool for a country's citizens to organize resistance groups and spread information. As the Syrian Civil War drug on, however, Islamist groups (who were often comprised of foreigners themselves) began to actively reach out to foreign Muslims to bolster recruitment, mirroring earlier conflicts in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya.

The formation of the Islamic State in 2014 further altered the jihadi landscape by crafting a message designed to appeal to all Sunni Muslims, rather than targeting fighters and jihadi veterans specifically. Whereas Islamist groups in the Syrian Civil War were fighting against the Syrian government in a bid for dominance within the country, the Islamic State claimed large swaths of territory as its own. Thus, the appeal to foreigners was not a call to fight against an oppressive regime, but for Muslims to come live in a like-minded society.²² Would-be jihadis in the previous two decades were limited in their ability to physically interact with or join al Qaeda, which is one of the primary reasons that literature on radicalization often focused on groups and macro-level trends. Unlike al Qaeda, which operated as a geographically nebulous group of cells, the Islamic State utilized its tangible territorial gains to bring in a much broader swath of Muslim men and women from around the world.²³

²¹ Sandra Laville, "Social media used to recruit new wave of British jihadis in Syria," *Guardian*, April 15, 2014, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/social-media-recruit-british-jihadis-syria-twitter-facebook>.

²² David Ignatius, "How ISIS Spread in the Middle East," *Atlantic*, October 29, 2015, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syria-iraq/412042/>.

²³ Graeme Wood, "What ISIS Really Wants," *Atlantic*, March 2015, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/>.

Following the Islamic State's rise, radicalization-related academic literature began to focus increasingly on Europe and European Muslims.²⁴ Discourse began to shift, as the Islamic State's ranks were bolstered by young Muslims who had been living as minorities outside their ethnic region of origin. Research sought to explain why young people who were born in European countries and often did not speak Arabic or know the Quran began to join an international terrorist organization in such large numbers.²⁵ This research is informative, but often times the literature seems to be playing catch-up with ongoing sociological and geopolitical issues. This is not an entirely new trend- much of the new research on radicalization of young European Muslims has data that shows that Muslim minorities in Europe have felt increasingly marginalized in the years following 9/11 and the War on Terror.²⁶ Unfortunately, research into why this marginalization was taking place is lacking. Only after thousands of would-be jihadis left Europe for the Islamic State, however, has there been a broader attempt to explore these problems in great detail.

The Islamic State's aggressive use of new technologies in its propaganda and recruitment efforts have also warranted increased scrutiny. Over the last few years, research on radicalization has attempted to explore the roles that technology has played in convincing young Muslims (especially Europeans) to swear allegiance to the Islamic State and other radical groups.²⁷ Unlike al Qaeda, whose propaganda relied on broad public messaging, Islamic State recruiters are able to reach out (or be reached out to) directly to internet and mobile phone users. Some authors have argued that these technological advances have fundamentally changed the nature of radicalization,

²⁴ Angela Rabasa and Cheryl Bernard, *Eurojihad* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 41.

²⁵ Carolin Goerzig and Khaled Al-Hashimi, *Radicalization in Western Europe* (New York: Routledge, 2015).

²⁶ "Migrants and Their Descendants: Guide to policies for the well-being of all in pluralist societies," *Council of Europe*, December 2010, accessed 5/1/2018, https://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/GUIDEMIGRANTS_EN.pdf.

²⁷ Karen J. Greenberg, "Counter-Radicalization via the Internet," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 668, no. 1 (2016) 165.

as the Islamic State became a vessel for career criminals and disaffected youth.²⁸ French political scientist Olivier Roy has coined “Islamization of radicalism,” suggesting that radical (i.e. criminal) behavior has taken on an increasingly Islamic nature, rather than Islam becoming more “radicalized.”²⁹ Academic literature on digital recruitment and counter radicalization also has an added use of providing strategies and understanding for law enforcement and policymakers engaged in combatting Islamic State recruitment.³⁰ Broad, big-picture analysis regarding radicalization trends is important, but is at times hamstrung by its lack of applicability and policy recommendations.

SECTION TWO: RADICALIZATION IN RUSSIA

Within the Russian Federation, the Islamic radicalization process has been a government concern for nearly its entire existence. As the Soviet Union collapsed, Dzhokhar Dudayev, a former Soviet Air Force General, declared Chechnya’s independence from the fledgling Russian Federation.³¹ Chechnya was a Muslim-majority territory in the North Caucasus, helping form Russia’s border with Georgia. Tensions between the breakaway Chechen Republic and Russia simmered for several years before culminating in the Russian invasion of Chechnya in December 1994. For Russia, Dudayev’s resistance harkened back to decades of Chechen resistance in the middle of the 19th century. In that conflict, known as the Murid War, Chechen and Dagestani resistance fighters gathered around a charismatic Islamic scholar named Imam Shamil. Shamil’s

²⁸ Paul Kombo, “Radicalization as a Functional Aspect of Crime,” *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 8, no. 6 (2017), 163-170.

²⁹ Isaac Chotiner, “The Islamization of Radicalism,” *Slate*, June 22, 2016, accessed March 11, 2018, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2016/06/olivier_roy_on_isis_brexit_orlando_and_the_islamization_of_radicalism.html.

³⁰ Sarah McNicol, “Responding to Concerns About Online Radicalization in U.K. Schools Through a Radicalization Critical Digital Literacy Approach,” *Computers in the Schools* 33, no. 4 (2016), 227-238.

³¹ Lee Hockstader, “Russia Pours Troops Into Breakaway Region,” *Washington Post*, December 12, 1994, accessed March 11, 2018, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/russiagov/stories/chechnya121294.htm>.

influence on the region was profound, as he turned a fight that was initially about resisting imperialist invaders into an Islamic jihad.³²

More than 150 years after the Murid War, Dudayev evoked Shamil's name as a rallying cry against the Russian Federation. Dudayev, who by many accounts had only been nominally religious prior to his ascent to power, declared the Chechen-Russian conflict a holy war.³³ Dudayev's cooption of Islam as a rallying mechanism would have profound effects on the Chechen conflict. Over the course of the first Chechen War, a number of Arab Muslim fighters poured into the region to assist the Chechens in their jihad.³⁴ Many of these fighters had been radicalized in the Afghan-Soviet War and had now returned to once again fight against perceived Russian imperialism.

Initial research into the Chechen wars sought to contextualize Chechen's armed struggle against Russia, characterizing the conflict as the oppressor vs. the oppressed.³⁵ In the Soviet period, Josef Stalin ordered the entire Chechen population deported to Kazakhstan in retaliation to what he perceived as collaboration with the Nazis. In the process of deportation and exile, more than a hundred thousand Chechens perished – well over a quarter of the population.³⁶ Early research highlighted the historical grievances of the Chechen population, with Islamic fundamentalism as a secondary reason for the outbreak of violence.³⁷ Over the course of the First Chechen War (1994-

³² John Frederick Baddely, *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus*, (London: Longman's, Green and Co., 1908): 242.

³³ James Meek and Francisco Herranz, "Dudayev Threatens Holy War," *Guardian*, August 12, 1994, accessed March 11, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/aug/12/chechnya.jamesmeek>.

³⁴ "Obituary: Chechen Rebel Khattab," *BBC News*, April 26, 2002, accessed March 11, 2018, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1952053.stm>.

³⁵ John B. Dunlop, *Russia confronts Chechnya : roots of a separatist conflict*, (Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998).

³⁶ "1944-1957: Deportation and Exile," *Telegraph*, January 1, 2001, accessed March 11, 2018, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399561/1944-1957-Deportation-and-exile.html>.

³⁷ Thomas de Waal, "Greetings from Grozny. Fighting for Chechnya: Is Islam a Factor?" *PBS*, July 25, 2002, accessed March 18, 2018, <http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/uncategorized/greetings-from-grozny-fighting-for-chechnya-is-islam-a-factor/3078/>.

1996), Chechen forces carried out several terror attacks against Russia, but their methods more closely resembled the 1970s hijackings of the PLO – hostage-taking for the purpose of political gain – than the indiscriminate violence of al Qaeda.³⁸

Following Dudayev’s assassination in 1996, Russia and Chechnya signed peace accords that temporarily ended the conflict. In the interwar period, many of the foreign jihadis remained in the region and began to garner considerable influence amongst the local population. Most prominent examples include Ibn al-Khattab and Abu al-Walid, mercenaries and warlords of Saudi origin. Much of the research into violent extremism in Chechnya has highlighted this time period as a key time period for Russia’s national security, as Chechnya began to endure an internal struggle between Sufi Muslims and Salafis.³⁹ Sufism had been the dominant form of Islam in Chechnya for most of its history, but many of the foreign fighters that had come to fight in the First Chechen War claimed adherence to Salafism. The Salafis (or Wahabbis, as they are sometimes referred) adopted a more traditional and hardline stance in terms of religious practices.⁴⁰ By the outbreak of the Second Chechen War in 1999, many of the most powerful Chechen warlords had adopted Salafism as their new religious code, bringing their belief system more into line with Arab terror groups like al Qaeda. Although the change in religious tone has been covered by numerous researchers, research into why individual Chechens would gravitate towards a more hardline religious movement has been limited.

³⁸ Elena Pokolova, *Chechnya’s Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia’s North Caucasus*, (Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2015), 46.

³⁹ James Hughes, *Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad*, (Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 98.

⁴⁰ Tom Parfitt, “The battle for the soul of Chechnya,” *Guardian*, November 22, 2007, accessed March 18, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/22/chechnya.tomparfitt>.

Researchers have noted that this religious change portended a shift in the nature of Chechen jihad, though some have argued that the influence of foreign fighters has been overstated.⁴¹ Although the true extent of foreign influence in Chechnya remains in contention, the renewed conflict in 1999 did mark a clear change in Chechen terror tactics. Chechen fighters began to orchestrate mass casualty terror attacks across the country, including apartment bombings in 1999 and a 2002 theater siege that drew considerable international attention. As the targets for these terror attacks shifted from in and around Chechnya to major Russian cities, so too did international perception of Chechen militants. After Chechen suicide bombers downed two Russian airliners in 2003, Chechen rebels became firmly characterized as radical Islamic terrorists – rather than fighters for independence – by both the international community and researchers alike.⁴² After 2004, the frequency and scale of Chechen-orchestrated terror attacks began to subside. In the years that followed, a considerable amount of research was done regarding the Russian government’s strategy to coopt some Chechen groups as state-sponsored proxies.⁴³ Writers have noted that the Russian government’s official rhetoric sought to differentiate moderate Sufis and Salafis, with the latter being explicitly associated with foreign influence.⁴⁴

The Kremlin’s tactics appear to have worked: following the appointment of former Chechen rebel and Sufi mufti Akhmad Kadyrov as Chechen President in 2004, many Chechens began to side with the government-aligned Chechen faction against more radical rebel groups. By 2006, major fighting had subsided, and the Russian Federation declared the Second Chechen War

⁴¹ Roland Dannreuther, "Islamic Radicalization in Russia: An Assessment," *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 86, no. 1 (2010): 115.

⁴² Cerwyn Moore, "Suicide Bombing: Chechnya, the North Caucasus and Martyrdom," *Europe-Asia Studies* 64, no. 9 (2012): 1800.

⁴³ Tom Parfitt, "The battle for the soul of Chechnya," *Guardian*.

⁴⁴ Oleg Yegorov, "Building bridges: Russia encourages traditional Islam to combat extremism," *Russia Beyond the Headlines*, Jan 24, 2017, accessed March 18, 2018, https://www.rbth.com/politics_and_society/2017/01/24/loyal-muslims-how-russian-authorities-work-with-islam_687648.

officially over in 2009. Although sporadic terror attacks continued in the years that followed, the specter of Chechen radicalization temporarily subsided. As the threat of violence from Chechnya decreased, so too did the academic literature regarding Chechnya and Chechen radicalization.⁴⁵ As the region became less restive, researchers instead began looking into the successful components of the Russian strategy in Chechnya.^{46,47} While the number of Chechen rebels may have diminished, feelings of discontent and a desire to fight lingered in the region, eventually culminating in a declaration of an Islamic State-affiliated caliphate in Chechnya.⁴⁸

The declaration of the Islamic State fundamentally altered terrorism and radicalization concerns in Russia.⁴⁹ Despite lower levels of insurgent violence in the North Caucasus in recent years, Russia nevertheless has been one of the largest suppliers of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria.⁵⁰ Research shows that Caucasians bolstering the ranks of the Islamic State are not just veterans of the two Chechen wars: like in Western Europe, a considerable number of young Russian Muslims have left their homes, citing a combination of lack of opportunities and a stifling local security situation.⁵¹ In response, Kadyrov's security forces have begun cracking down on those perceived as Salafists, though hard data regarding the scope of these crackdowns is incredibly difficult to come by. Given the authoritarian nature of the Chechen (and Russian)

⁴⁵ A University of Texas Library online search with of the words "Chechnya" and "radicalization" together shows a nearly 30% decrease in results (1,492 to 1,054) from 2011-2017 when compared to 2004-2010.

⁴⁶ Roland Dannreuther and Luke March, "Chechnya: Has Moscow Won?" *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 50, no. 4 (2008): 97-112.

⁴⁷ John Russell, "Kadyrov's Chechnya—Template, Test or Trouble for Russia's Regional Policy?" *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 3 (2011): 509-528.

⁴⁸ "Six North Caucasus Insurgency Commanders Transfer Allegiance To Islamic State," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, January 2, 2015, accessed March 18, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-north-caucasus-insurgency-commanders-allegiance/26773615.html>.

⁴⁹ Leon Aron, "The Coming of the Russian Jihad: Part I," *War on the Rocks*, September 23, 2016, accessed March 19, 2018, <https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-i/>.

⁵⁰ "4,000 Russian nationals fight among militants in Syria – Putin," *TASS*, February 23, 2017, accessed March 19, 2018, <http://tass.com/politics/932573>.

⁵¹ Joshua Yaffa, "Chechnya's Isis Problem," *New Yorker*, February 12, 2016, accessed March 19, 2018, <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/chechnyas-isis-problem>.

government and the restrictions placed on the Russian press, academic research regarding driving factors behind Chechen radicalization remains limited. Adding further complications, Chechen jihadis are often drawn from two distinct groups – hardline rebels and marginalized youths – which means that research on Chechen radicalization is in fact covering two different phenomena.

Although limited in their ability to investigate micro elements of Chechen radicalization, Western news media outlets have repeatedly covered the dangers of the Islamic State’s appeal in Russia.⁵² Much of the discourse regarding the Islamic State’s Russian-speaking population centers around the dangers of jihadis returning to their homeland.⁵³ In addition to Russian citizens fighting in Iraq and Syria, concerns also lie with the sizable number of Central Asians who have declared allegiance to the Islamic State. Russia and the former Soviet states in Central Asia do not have visa restrictions, meaning that returning Central Asian jihadis could also wind up in Russia. In 2017, two separate terror attacks perpetrated by ethnic Central Asians in Saint Petersburg left more than 80 injured. As the Islamic State collapses and more fighters return home, the issue of Islamic State-inspired terrorism inside Russia remains a key concern for the Kremlin.

SECTION THREE: RADICALIZATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

Although Islamic radicalization is an ongoing problem throughout Central Asia, this paper will examine the cases of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, specifically. Unlike Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan, both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan experienced an armed Islamic militancy in the 1990s. Uzbek and Tajik migrants also represent two of the largest populations of

⁵² Kathrin Hille, “Russia and radicalisation: Homegrown problem,” *Financial Times*, December 7, 2015, accessed March 19, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/77156ed2-9ab0-11e5-be4f-0abd1978acaa>.

⁵³ Leon Aron, “The Coming of the Russian Jihad: Part I,” *War on the Rocks*.

seasonal workers in Russia (nearly two million Uzbeks and one million Tajiks).⁵⁴⁵⁵ These factors have contributed to the large number of ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks that have been radicalized in Russia and have left to fight for the Islamic State. While the Islamic State may be on the ropes in Syria, IS offshoots continue to thrive. Perhaps most prominent among these offshoots is the Islamic State-Khorosan Province, which operates in Eastern and Northern Afghanistan.

In comparison to Western Europe and Russia, there has been significantly less research done on Islam and radicalism in Central Asia.⁵⁶ Much of this can be attributed to Central Asia's relative geographic and cultural isolation from the West; the United States would likely have little geopolitical interest in the region had the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan not occurred. Before the September 11th attacks, the scant academic literature on Uzbekistan and Tajikistan focused on Tajikistan's five-year civil war, in which Islamic opposition sought to overthrow the secular government.⁵⁷ Following the initiation of the War on Terror, however, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan sought to position themselves as allies of the United States against radical Islamic terror organizations. In the decade that followed, more Western research began to trickle out regarding the security situation in Central Asia, primarily focused on the potential terror threat emanating from the region.⁵⁸ When discussing Central Asian security, much of the literature centers on the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (or IMU), a terror organization allied with the Taliban and later, the Islamic State. The IMU operates in the border region between Afghanistan and Uzbekistan,

⁵⁴ "Eastern promises: why migrant workers are turning their backs on Russia," *Guardian*, May 19, 2016, accessed March 19, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/19/eastern-promises-migrant-workers-turning-backs-russia>.

⁵⁵ "Tajik Official Says Migration To Russia Down," *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, July 22, 2016, accessed March 19, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-official-says-migration-to-russia-down/27873757.html>.

⁵⁶ A University of Texas Library online search of the words "Uzbekistan," "Tajikistan," and "radicalization" yields 1,242 results, while a similar search of "Russia," and "radicalization" yields 21,741 results.

⁵⁷ Stuart Horsman, "Uzbekistan's involvement in the Tajik Civil War 1992-97: Domestic considerations," *Central Asian Survey* 18, no. 1 (1999), 37-48.

⁵⁸ Svante E. Cornell, "Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan," *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, no. 4 (2005) 6119-639.

and although the organization has an ostensibly anti-Uzbekistan agenda, many scholars have stressed concerns about IMU attacks causing further problems for the US military in Afghanistan.⁵⁹

For many years following 9/11, Tajikistan was generally discussed in academic literature within the context of security threats to Afghanistan. These discussions were often limited, however, by placing Tajikistan within broader research into Central Asian security. Although all five Central Asian countries share common security concerns, and contextualizing them in a regional focus is important, security studies research has often lacked depth regarding Tajikistan, specifically. This lack of focus can be attributed somewhat to Tajikistan's obscurity; Tajikistan is one of the most repressive and poorest countries in the world.⁶⁰ These issues also highlight the Tajik population's risk of radicalization, especially abroad. Tajikistan's dire economic straits have driven much of its working population elsewhere, and the government has difficulty keeping track of who goes where.⁶²

The security risks associated with having a large portion of one's male population unaccounted for have been exacerbated by the creation of the Islamic State, as thousands of Uzbeks and Tajiks already working abroad have now moved to Iraq and Syria.⁶³ In recent years, more significant research has finally begun to come out tackling issues related to radicalization of Central Asians (and more specifically, Uzbeks and Tajiks).⁶⁴ Much of this new literature rightly

⁵⁹ Odil Ruzaliev, "Islam in Uzbekistan: Implications of 9/11 and Policy Recommendations for the United States," *Journal of Minority Muslim Affairs* 25, no. 1 (2005), 17.

⁶⁰ "Tajikistan," *Freedom House*, accessed March 26, 2018, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/tajikistan>.

⁶¹ "Poverty in Tajikistan," *Asian Development Bank*, accessed March 26, 2018, <https://www.adb.org/countries/tajikistan/poverty>.

⁶² Catherine Putz, "Tajikistan: Remittance Values Fall," *The Diplomat*, January 5, 2016, accessed March 26, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/tajikistan-remittance-values-fall/>.

⁶³ Andrew E. Kramer, "New York Attack Turns Focus to Central Asian Militancy," *New York Times*, November 1, 2017, accessed March 26, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/world/asia/uzbekistan-isis-terrorism.html>.

⁶⁴ Sarah Lain, "Strategies for Countering Terrorism and Extremism in Central Asia," 47, no. 3 (2016): 386-405.

criticizes the earlier oversimplification of the security situation in the region, and instead focuses on the combination of push-pull factors exhibited by authoritarian Central Asian governments and the Islamic State.⁶⁵ As the Uzbek and Tajik governments have repeatedly cracked down on organized Islam – especially more conservative versions of Islam – the Islamic State has offered many Central Asians opportunities elsewhere.

Today, academic literature on the region often discusses the issue of counter-radicalization and the problems of fighters returning back to their home countries in Central Asia.⁶⁶ Tajik members of the Islamic State have previously declared their desire to “wage jihad” against their homeland, and the Tajik government has responded to security threats by further restricting Islamic practices in public.⁶⁷ While some authors have pointed to restrictive governments as a trigger for radicalization in the region, other scholars argue that dwindling opportunities for work in Russia, combined with problems of poverty and a lack of education, are driving Uzbeks and Tajiks into the arms of the Islamic State.⁶⁸ In this case, both sides appear correct in their analysis. The economic and political situation in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, combined with the prevalence of migrant labor, leaves Uzbeks and Tajiks uniquely vulnerable to radicalization efforts. Academic literature in the West is only now beginning to focus on this problem, but the continued threat of terror attacks carried out by Central Asians suggests that studies into the nature of radicalization

⁶⁵ David W. Montgomery and John Heathershaw, “Islam, secularism and danger: a reconsideration of the link between religiosity, radicalism and rebellion in Central Asia,” *Religion, State, and Society* 44, no. 3 (2016): 192.

⁶⁶ Edward Lemon and Helen Thibault, “Counter-extremism, power and authoritarian governance in Tajikistan,” *Central Asian Survey* 37, no. 1 (2018): 137-159.

⁶⁷ “IS Militants Asked Baghdadi For Permission To Fight 'Infidels' In Tajikistan,” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, January 5, 2015, accessed March 26, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/isis-tajikistan-syria-jihad-fighters-repatriated/26777220.html>.

⁶⁸ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “The complex reality of radicalisation in Central Asia,” *New Eastern Europe*, October 31, 2017, accessed March 26, 2018, <http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/10/31/complex-reality-radicalisation-central-asia/>.

in the region will continue. The next chapter will discuss the specific circumstances and push factors driving Uzbeks and Tajiks in Russia to radicalize.

Chapter Two: Push/Pull Factors in Migrant Radicalization

SECTION ONE: CENTRAL ASIAN AUTOCRACIES AS AN INSULATOR FROM RADICALIZATION

In contrast to Chechnya, Central Asians did not have a problematic relationship with Russia. Although the Uzbek SSR endured a series of Stalinist purges in the 1930s, the region remained relatively calm through Soviet period. Although Soviet Uzbeks and Tajiks were overwhelmingly concentrated in their titular and neighboring SSRs, they were nonetheless full Soviet citizens and enjoyed the welfare state that the Soviet Union provided.⁶⁹ This all changed in 1992, however, as Post-Soviet Uzbeks and Tajiks suddenly transitioned from living in a moderately wealthy country to two of the world's poorest by GDP per capita.⁷⁰⁷¹

Newly independent and incredibly impoverished, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan very quickly slid back into authoritarian government systems reminiscent of Soviet totalitarian control.⁷² As the new dictators began to consolidate their power in the decade following independence, localized Islamic militantcies pushed these countries further into instability and provided an impetus for increased government control. Although it appears that the economic situation has rebounded somewhat in Uzbekistan, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev was quoted in December of 2017 saying that official statistics regarding employment and economic growth had been “fiction” for

⁶⁹ “USSR: Demographic Trends and Ethnic Balance in the Non-Russian Ethnic Republics,” *Central Intelligence Agency*, April 1990, accessed March 26, 2018, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000292353.pdf.

⁷⁰ *The World Factbook*, (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1990), 8.

⁷¹ “GDP Per Capita,” *The World Bank*, 2018, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?end=2015&locations=UZ-TJ&start=1990>.

⁷² Sarah Kendzior, “The Curse of Stability in Central Asia,” *Foreign Policy*, February 19, 2013, accessed April 28, 2018, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/19/the-curse-of-stability-in-central-asia/>.

years.⁷³ Both countries remain outside the top 120 in the world by GDP per capita, leaving their population to search elsewhere for profitable work.^{74,75}

Like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Russia also experienced an economic downturn and significant security issues through the 1990s. As highlighted earlier in this paper, Russia's security situation began to improve significantly by the mid-2000s, which also coincided with a sharp increase in economic growth.⁷⁶ As the price of oil steadily rose, the Russian economy surged along with it, leading to a growth of new jobs and an influx of migrant workers. Facing an uncertain economic future at home, more and more Tajiks and Uzbeks began to travel to Russia in search of seasonal work.⁷⁷

In addition to its growing economy, Russia was an ideal destination for many Central Asians due to the visa-free regime established between the Russian Federation and all five Central Asian countries. Although the population of Central Asian migrants in Russia today is down slightly from its peak in 2013, more than two million Uzbeks and Tajiks continue to travel to Russia for economic opportunities. Geographically and politically isolated, migrants from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have few other options.

⁷³ "Uzbek president says economic data was 'fiction' for years," *Reuters*, December 22, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-economy/uzbek-president-says-economic-data-was-fiction-for-years-idUSKBN1EG24T>.

⁷⁴ "World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017," *International Monetary Fund*, October 2017, accessed April 3, 2018, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2017&ey=2017&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=0&pr1.x=37&pr1.y=9&c=923%2C927&s=PPPPC&grp=0&a=>.

⁷⁵ "MPC Migration Profile: RUSSIA," *Migration Policy Centre*, June 2013, accessed April 2, 2018, http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Russia.pdf.

⁷⁶ "GDP Per Capita," *The World Bank*, 2018, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=RU>.

⁷⁷ Ziyodullo Parpiev, "Who is behind remittances? A Profile of Uzbek Migrants," *UNDP*, March 5, 2015, accessed April 1, 2018, <http://www.uz.undp.org/content/uzbekistan/en/home/ourperspective/ourperspectivearticles/2015/03/05/who-is-behind-remittances--a-profile-of-uzbek-migrants.html>.

In contrast, far fewer Turkmen and Kazakh nationals work as migrant laborers in Russia. Kazakhstan is a relatively rich country in the region, whose growing economy still requires many unskilled labor jobs. Turkmen citizens, meanwhile, are not afforded visa-free travel to Russia, and thus often seek employment abroad in other countries like Turkey instead.⁷⁸ Kyrgyzstan, like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, has a significant number of migrant laborers in Russia. However, Kyrgyzstan has a more open society than its two southern neighbors – though its democratic norms have begun backsliding in recent years – and has exported less jihadis to the Islamic State than Tajikistan or Uzbekistan.^{79,80} In the face of ongoing economic stagnation, the Tajik and Uzbek governments have begun to exert increasingly tighter control on their respective populations in an effort to prevent discontent from bubbling over. Both regimes have attempted to coopt Islam as a mechanism of control: by regulating which elements of Islam are officially sanctioned, the government can keep a close eye on potential Islamic radicalization.

Uzbekistan, which has the largest Muslim population in Central Asia, has favored a targeted and less broad approach to combatting radicalization.⁸¹ The former president, Islam Karimov, sought to establish an official, government-endorsed form of Islam that drew upon shared Uzbek history and culture. Meanwhile, all Islamic political groups not under his control were banned and imams that did not adopt the official party line were labeled “Wahhabis” and arrested.⁸² In coordination with the newly-created Muslim Spiritual Board, which operated at the national level

⁷⁸ “Turkey a Magnet for Migrant Workers,” *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, December 18, 2006, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/turkey-magnet-migrant-workers>.

⁷⁹ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “Islamic State in Kyrgyzstan: a real or imagined threat?,” *openDemocracy*, October 1, 2015, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/agnieszka-pikulicka-wilczewska/islamic-state-in-kyrgyzstan-real-or-imagined-threat>.

⁸⁰ Charlie Winter, “War by Suicide,” *International Centre for Counterterrorism – the Hague*, February 2017, 21.

⁸¹ Alexey Malashenko, “Russia and Islam in Central Asia: Problems of Migration,” In *The Fight for Influence: Russia in Central Asia*, 77, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2013.

⁸² “Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan,” *Human Rights Watch*, March 2004, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/uzbekistan0304/3.htm>.

and served to tout Karimov's agenda, the Uzbek government created neighborhood-level Islamic groups to monitor locals for possible dissent. Over time, all public Islamic dissent was eliminated, thus paving the way for state-controlled Islam to serve as a propaganda tool for the Uzbek government.

Tajikistan, meanwhile, has taken an even more heavy-handed approach to combatting Islamic radicalization. Faced with an armed Islamic insurgency in the eastern part of the country and a weak military, Tajik president Emomali Rahmon has enacted increasingly draconian laws aimed at suppressing all forms of "untraditional" Islam.⁸³ Meanwhile, Rahmon has also taken steps to legitimize his status as a Muslim, including dropping the Russian-style "ov" from his last name and officially banning Slavic suffixes for newborns.⁸⁴ Despite these overtures to the Muslim community, Rahmon's crackdown on Islam in the country is seen as an effort to secularize society in order to counter extremism.⁸⁵

Like Uzbekistan, the Tajik government treats Islam as a useful tool as long as the state maintains absolute control.⁸⁶ Given the authoritarian nature of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, both governments fear Islamic radicalization as a means of destabilizing their respective countries. The level of control both governments are able to exert on their populace has marginalized organized Islamist groups and pushed these groups into neighboring Afghanistan, thereby minimizing the

⁸³ "Tajikistan's crackdown on observant Muslims intensifies," *Economist*, September 21, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21729451-beards-veils-madrassas-and-arabic-sounding-names-are-all-banned-tajikistans-crackdown-observant>.

⁸⁴ "Tajikistan Bans Giving Babies Russian-Style Last Names," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, April 30, 2016, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-bans-giving-babies-russian-style-last-names/27708093.html>.

⁸⁵ Lemon and Thibault, "Counter-extremism, power and authoritarian governance in Tajikistan," 143.

⁸⁶ Massoumeh Torfeh, "Why is Tajikistan imposing a dress code on its people?" *Al Jazeera*, July 31, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/07/tajikistan-imposing-dress-code-people-170728092646033.html>.

opportunities for localized radicalization at home.⁸⁷ In contrast, the Russian state has to contend with migration inflows, and while the vast majority of migrants to Russia do not arrive already radicalized, the enhanced risk of radicalization effectively acts as mechanism to export potential terrorists from Central Asia to Russia. Unlike the Uzbek and Tajik governments, Vladimir Putin must also balance security concerns with domestic public opinion.

The Russian public's perceptions of various Muslim groups residing in the Russian Federation are varied and complex. Given Russia's recent history of Islamic terror attacks at the hands of Chechen insurgents, it is unsurprising that the majority of Russian citizens hold negative views of people from the North Caucasus. In contrast, the Russian republics of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have large Muslim populations, but ethnic Tatars and Bashkirs appear to have assimilated into Russian society more so than their Caucasian counterparts, and inter-ethnic marriages are not uncommon.⁸⁸ Additionally, Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have two of the higher GDPs per capita among Russian federal subjects, minimizing internal migration to larger Russian cities in search of economic opportunities.⁹⁰ A 2013 survey stated that nearly 2/3 of Muscovites polled would characterize Russia as "a mix of Asian and European civilizations," indicating that many Russians perceive Muslim and Asiatic Russian nationals as fellow countrymen and peers.⁹¹

⁸⁷ Jacob Zenn, "The IMU is extinct: what next for Central Asia's jihadis?" *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*, May 3, 2016, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13357-the-imu-is-extinct-what-new-for-central-asias-jihadis?.html>.

⁸⁸ Lilliya Karimova, "Russia's Muslims Are as Diverse as Their Experiences," *Wilson Center*, May 25, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-muslims-are-diverse-their-experiences>.

⁸⁹ A.B. Blokhin and I.M. Gorodetskaya, "Взаимоотношения супругов в моно- и полиэтнических браках русских и татар," *Problems of Social Psychology of Personality*, (2008), accessed April 16, 2018, http://psyjournals.ru/sgu_socialpsy/issue/30318_full.shtml.

⁹⁰ Alexander Auzan and Sergei Bobylev, "National Human Development Report for the Russian Federation," *United Nations Development Programme*, 2011, 138, <http://www.undp.ru/documents/nhdr2011eng.pdf>.

⁹¹ Richard Arnold, "Surveys show Russian nationalism is on the rise. This explains a lot about the country's foreign and domestic politics," *Washington Post*, May 30, 2016, accessed April 1, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/30/surveys-show-russian-nationalism-is-on-the-rise-this-explains-a-lot-about-the-countrys-foreign-and-domestic-politics/?utm_term=.37de31e47475.

Russian perceptions of foreign Muslim groups are far more negative. Data from the Russia-based *Levada Center* reveals that public feelings towards migrant workers vary by country of origin: Ukrainians and ethnic Russians from the Baltic states are viewed somewhat positively, while migrants from Central Asia are viewed almost as negatively as Chechens and Dagestanis.⁹² In Russia, migrants from Central Asia are often blamed for crime spikes and other societal maladies. These biases are not limited to the general population; in 2015, Moscow's Chief Prosecutor stated, "If you create a ranking of criminality, you will find citizens of Uzbekistan at the top... next is Tajikistan..."⁹³ With few economic opportunities at home, however, many Central Asian workers continue to travel to Russia for work despite Russian anti-migrant biases. Once in Russia, migrants are inclined to keep their heads down and limit contact with Russian nationals, often coalescing in migrant-oriented housing towards the outskirts of large towns.⁹⁴ Nonetheless, migrants are often the target of violence from hate groups in Russia, and data shows that racially motivated killings in Russia have disproportionately targeted Central Asians.⁹⁵

As public anti-migrant sentiment has crystallized over the last decade and a half, so too has official Russian policy towards visiting Central Asians. The Russian government has steadily implemented new laws and controls aimed at stemming the flow of migrants northward into Russia, making it more difficult to obtain official work permits. Russia now has an electronic system set up to deny entry to foreigners who have committed two or more administrative offenses

⁹² "Отношение к трудовым мигрантам," *Levada Center*, April 28, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, <http://www.levada.ru/2017/04/28/otnoshenie-k-trudovym-migrantam/>.

⁹³ "Eastern promises: why migrant workers are turning their backs on Russia," *Guardian*.

⁹⁴ Franco Galdini, "A Glimpse Into Moscow's Little Kyrgyzstan," *The Diplomat*, May 24, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/a-glimpse-into-moscows-little-kyrgyzstan/>.

⁹⁵ "Тезисы выступления представителя центра "СОВА" на консультации ЕС-Россия по правам человека в Брюсселе," *SOVA Center*, May 29, 2009, accessed April 1, 2018, <http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2009/05/d16123/>.

over a short period.⁹⁶ This system adds further pressure to migrants once inside Russia, with foreign workers under increased pressure to pay bribes to avoid arrest. reports suggest that local police often target migrant communities with arbitrary searches and drummed up charges.⁹⁷

Russian concerns regarding Central Asian immigration have reached the highest levels of government as well, as Vladimir Putin has publicly stated that curbing “illegal immigration” is a priority for the Russian government.⁹⁸ Visa-free travel to Russia is enticing for many Central Asian workers, but increased difficulties in obtaining official work permits have led many to take their chances with security services. In 2010, Russia’s Federal Migration Services estimated that there were three million people working illegally in Russia; by 2014, that number had increased to more than four million.⁹⁹¹⁰⁰ Ostracized from society and persecuted by Russian authorities, Central Asian migrants working in Russia struggle to assimilate and often live in fear of deportation. As research described in the previous chapter indicates, marginalized Muslim populations face a higher risk of radicalization and are often targeted by terror groups. The confluence of economic hardship and xenophobic discrimination has left Uzbeks and Tajiks working in Russia particularly vulnerable to Islamic radicalization.

⁹⁶ Bradley Jardine, “For Russia's Labor Migrants, a Life on the Edge,” *Moscow Times*, November 4, 2016, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/for-labor-migrants-a-life-on-the-edge-56018>.

⁹⁷ Arman Kaliyev, “Future in Russia 'dim', say Central Asian migrants,” *Caravanserai*, December 13, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2017/12/13/feature-02.

⁹⁸ Vladimir Putin, “News conference of Vladimir Putin,” *President of Russia*, December 20, 2012, accessed April 1, 2018, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173>.

⁹⁹ “ФМС: в РФ нелегально работают 3 млн трудовых мигрантов, остальные 4 млн “халтурят” с налогами,” *NEWSru*, November 23, 2010, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.newsru.com/russia/23nov2010/migranty.html>.

¹⁰⁰ “Over 4 Million Immigrants Live in Russia Illegally, Official Says,” *The Moscow Times*, September 23, 2014, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/over-4-million-immigrants-live-in-russia-illegally-official-says-39675>.

SECTION TWO: RUSSIA AS AN INCUBATOR OF MIGRANT RADICALIZATION

As Uzbek and Tajik migrants continue to suffer from harsh treatment and racism, they have increasingly turned to Islam and the mosque for literal and figurative refuge. In doing so, migrants have unwittingly placed themselves at a higher risk of radicalization by virtue of increased proximity to Islamic State recruiters. The issue of jihadi recruiters finding and radicalizing downtrodden and marginalized migrants at mosque is especially problematic for Russia's Federal Security Service, given the practical limitations of monitoring the millions of Central Asian migrant workers operating in Russia. This problem is exacerbated by the significant portion of Uzbeks and Tajiks residing in Russia illegally, as well as widespread corruption and bribery issues among the local police.¹⁰¹

Russian security experts have suggested that of the several thousand Uzbeks and Tajiks fighting in Syria, as much as 80 to 90 percent of them came from Russia, rather than their home countries.¹⁰² With this dynamic in mind, it is important to explore the question of why Central Asians are not mobilizing in significant numbers at home. As described earlier in this paper, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan operate a robust security apparatus that is able to surveil citizens at will, especially those that regularly attend mosque. Authoritarian controls are only a partial explanation of a lack of radicalization in the region, however. Tajik and Uzbek society also places a premium on behavior that does not draw government attention to oneself or one's family, including even peaceful protesting.¹⁰³ Against this backdrop, familial and societal factors often curb tendencies

¹⁰¹ Nataliya Vasilyeva, "In Russia, Bribes Drive Up the Cost of Living," *Associated Press*, April 1, 2016, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://apnews.com/a3fef3fd83294d52bc92cb1bda34b568>.

¹⁰² Zinaida Burskaya, "Дорога в ИГИЛ пролегла через Москву," *Novaya Gazeta*, January 17, 2016, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/01/18/67080-doroga-v-igil-prolegla-cherez-moskvu>.

¹⁰³ "Central Asian Involvement in the Conflict in Syria and Iraq: Drivers and Responses," *USAID*, May 14, 2015, accessed April 1, 2018, https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CVE_CentralAsiansSyriaIraq.pdf.

towards radical behavior. The system of state-approved Islam in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan has also ensured that moderate Muslim voices are prominent, and well-known clerics have publicly denounced the Islamic State and the idea of fighting in Syria.¹⁰⁴

Free from the watchful eye of their native governments, Uzbek and Tajik migrants in Russia enjoy significantly more technological freedom and are unencumbered to explore their religiosity through social media and the internet. Migrant communities are generally not divided by nationality, and instead Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Kyrgyz coalesce together based on a shared identity- one that is based not just on geography and religion, but also on the collective hardship and discrimination that they face in Russia.¹⁰⁵ Unlike many Western European cities, Moscow and Saint Petersburg – which host the majority of Central Asian migrants in Russia – do not have large suburbs of immigrant communities. Instead, Uzbeks and Tajiks often live together in cramped, dorm-style housing or tiny apartments on the outskirts of town. With no place to congregate at their place of residence and fearful of gathering in public areas, many migrants turn to the mosque to serve as a central meeting point and an opportunity to interact with like-minded individuals. The mosque provides Central Asians with a sense of community, comfort, and cover from persecution.

The allure of the mosque also provides additional opportunities for radicalization. Once in Russia, a migrant worker's ethnic identity often takes a back seat to religious identity, increasing the chances they will interact with religious hardliners and members of extremist groups. Free from the media controls in their home country, many Central Asian Muslims also turn to the internet for further religious guidance, where they are vulnerable to Islamic State recruitment

¹⁰⁴ Mumin Ahmadi, "Ҳоҷи Мирзо: Русия лонаи чалби тоҷикон ба ҷанги Сурия шудааст," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, May 14, 2014, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.ozodi.org/a/excl-iv-with-dfamous-cleric-hoji-mirzo-ibronov/25384535.html>.

¹⁰⁵ Siyovush Qosimzoda, et al, "Central Asian Migrants in Russia Find Religion," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, June 13, 2014, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/central-asian-migrants-russia-find-religion>.

efforts.¹⁰⁶ Some researchers have also argued the Uzbek and Tajik governments' tight controls on Islam have left their nationals unprepared to resist jihadis propaganda, further exacerbating the chances that an Uzbek and Tajik migrant could be persuaded to join the Islamic State.

In addition to its sizable digital footprint, the Islamic State maintains a robust stable of recruiters and propagandists inside Russia. In 2017, Aleksei Grishin, a security analyst and former Kremlin advisor, estimated that there are 300-500 active Islamic State recruiters operating in Moscow alone.¹⁰⁷ According to a Tajik citizen whose brother is now a prominent member of the Islamic State, the majority of these recruiters are ethnic Chechens working to send Central Asians to Syria.¹⁰⁸ The use of Chechens to propagate and recruit makes strategic sense for the Islamic State, as Chechens hold Russian citizenship and as such have an easier time navigating around Russia than their Central Asian counterparts. In a 2012 press conference, Vladimir Putin highlighted this issue in describing how young people from the North Caucasus often enroll in Moscow-based universities to justify their legal residence in the city.¹⁰⁹ Once in Moscow, it can be very difficult for security services to keep track of ethnic Chechens, and their permanent legal status is unlikely to draw much scrutiny from authorities. Once in Moscow, Islamic State-aligned North Caucasians are able to meet marginalized Central Asian migrants organically through mosques, allowing recruiters to target specific individuals perceived as susceptible to radicalization.

¹⁰⁶ "Central Asian Involvement in the Conflict in Syria and Iraq," *USAID*, 12.

¹⁰⁷ "Гришин: вербовкой в ИГ на русском занимается 5-10 тысяч пропагандистов," *RIA Novosti*, June 19, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://ria.ru/world/20150619/1079078702.html>.

¹⁰⁸ Daniil Turovsky, "How Isis is recruiting migrant workers in Moscow to join the fighting in Syria," *Guardian*, May 5, 2015, accessed April 1, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/isis-russia-syria-islamic-extremism>.

¹⁰⁹ Putin, "News conference of Vladimir Putin," *President of Russia*.

The tactic of selling an idealized future to potential recruits is not unique to Islamic State recruiters in Russia, but often the focus of the pitch is based on the economic incentive of moving to Syria – an element of recruitment seen less often in Western Europe.¹¹⁰ As more and more Uzbeks and Tajiks have moved to Syria, the recruitment pitch becomes somewhat easier: potential recruits are told that in addition to a well-paid life free from marginalization, the presence of thousands of their ethnic brethren ensures that they will be welcomed with open arms. Recruiters build trust by spending time with potential jihadis on a personal, one-on-one basis, inviting poor migrants to tea or a café.¹¹¹ With the majority of their pay being sent home as remittances, Uzbek and Tajik migrants have very little disposable income. Even relatively minor indulgences like tea or an afternoon of conversation in a nice apartment can be enough for Islamic State recruiters to earn the trust of migrant workers. Once this trust is established, recruiters are able to tailor messaging to each individual, depending on a potential recruit’s level of poverty, Islamic fervor, and feelings of ostracization.¹¹²

The Islamic State’s personalized recruitment strategies in Russia illuminates a sobering aspect of Islamic radicalization: international terror groups have become advanced enough in their recruiting to tailor the nature and the content of recruitment pitches based on the constraints of individual states or societies. Rather than rely on internet propaganda to draw in disaffected youth, as is often the case in Western Europe, or radical imams that proselytize hardline ideology to large groups, as seen in Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Islamic State in Russia has instead focused on direct interaction to win over potential recruits. Although the Islamic State has suffered serious setbacks in recent months and no longer holds significant territory, the malleable nature of modern

¹¹⁰ Turovsky, “How Isis is recruiting migrant workers,” *Guardian*.

¹¹¹ Agnieszka Pikulicka-Wilczewska, “The complex reality of radicalisation in Central Asia,” *New Eastern Europe*.

¹¹² “Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia,” *International Crisis Group*, January, 2015, accessed April 2, 2018, <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/syria-calling-radicalisation-central-asia>.

terror recruitment is unlikely to change in the future. If terror groups can take advantage of marginalized groups on an ad-hoc basis, countries with populations at risk of marginalization must adjust their policies accordingly. To date, the Kremlin has been slow to respond to the outflow of migrants from Russia to Syria, instead focusing on restricting migrant population inflows and increasing deportation rates.¹¹³

Over the last twenty years, Islamic radicalization in Russia has seen a seismic shift in recruitment strategies in response to the rise of global jihad and the Islamic State. What was once a localized and political conflict against the Russian state later morphed into an ideological war based on establishing a caliphate in the North Caucasus. As noted previously in this paper, these efforts largely failed. In recent years, Chechen recruiters aligned with the Islamic State have changed their tactics and their target audience. Violent resistance to the Russian state is not a key part of Central Asian identity, so efforts to radicalize migrants have utilized feelings of resentment in a different way: rather than suggesting that Uzbek and Tajik migrants take up arms against their oppressor, recruiters instead focus on the idea of a better and more purposeful life under the Islamic State.¹¹⁴

Although there are common themes among individuals and groups that are susceptible to radicalization, Central Asian migrants in Russia encounter a “perfect storm” of push and pull factors. Economic stagnation coupled with harsh governmental control pushes Tajiks and Uzbeks out of the country in search of work, while geography, economic opportunity, and political history naturally drives migrants into Russia. Once there, Central Asians occupy a position on the lowest rung of Russian society, ostracized by the Russian people and systemically oppressed by the

¹¹³ “The number of cases of deportation of Tajik citizens from Russia increasing,” *Asia-Plus*, October 5, 2016, accessed April 2, 2018, <http://news.tj/en/news/tajikistan/society/20161005/231636>.

¹¹⁴ Noah Tucker, “Islamic State messaging to Central Asians Migrant Workers in Russia,” *CERIA Brief*, no. 6 (2015): 7.

Russian government. Russia's history of Caucasian Islamic resistance then provides a wealth of opportunities for disgruntled Russian nationals to coerce marginalized, nominally Muslim Uzbeks and Tajiks to join the Islamic State and free themselves from oppression. As more Central Asians leave Russia for the Islamic State and other terror organizations, the pitch becomes even more appealing: to come live in a world surrounded by your peers, free from marginalization.

The next chapter will look ahead and attempt to explore how, despite the Islamic State's contraction, this issue could and should remain at the forefront of Russian and Central Asian security concerns.

Chapter Three: Future Challenges

SECTION ONE: IMPLICATIONS FOR TAJIKISTAN AND UZBEKISTAN

Although the Islamic State no longer holds significant territory in Iraq and Syria, it continues to pose a serious security threat to the West, Russia, and the rest of the Middle East.¹¹⁵ Following its territorial contraction, many security experts believe that the Islamic State will shift its tactics to incorporate more terror attacks abroad.¹¹⁶ As former residents of the Islamic State begin to return home in greater numbers, the governments of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia all face a myriad of security and policy challenges.

Ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks fighting in the Islamic State have long made it clear that they desire an expansion of the caliphate into Central Asia. In 2016, prominent Tajik Islamic State commander Nusrat Nazarov publicly stated that he had asked Islamic State leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi for permission to bring his followers home to wage jihad in Tajikistan.¹¹⁷ His request was apparently denied, but Nazarov's request indicates that Uzbekistan and Tajikistan's tight societal controls may not be enough to prevent the organization of new terror cells comprised of returning Islamic State fighters. Although the domestic situation in Uzbekistan remains stable, Tajikistan's internal security troubles have left the country teetering on the brink of widespread instability.¹¹⁸ Security experts have suggested that even a small number of returning Islamic State

¹¹⁵ Maher Chmaytelli and Ahmed Aboulenein, "Iraq Declares Final Victory Over Islamic State," *Reuters*, December 9, 2017, accessed April 16, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/iraq-declares-final-victory-over-islamic-state-idUSKBN1E30B9>.

¹¹⁶ Hassan Hassan, "Its dreams of a caliphate are gone. Now Isis has a deadly new strategy," *Guardian*, December 30, 2017, accessed April 16, 2018, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/31/isis-dreams-of-caliphate-gone-now-deadly-new-strategy>.

¹¹⁷ Turovsky, "How Isis is recruiting migrant workers," *Guardian*.

¹¹⁸ Rami Ayyub, "U.S., Russia Both Worry About Growing Turmoil In Tajikistan," *NPR*, May 8, 2016, accessed April 16, 2018, <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/05/08/477057772/u-s-russia-both-worry-about-growing-turmoil-in-tajikistan>.

fighters could utilize their training and experience as force multipliers.¹¹⁹ It is not difficult to imagine a scenario in which Tajik fighters return home through Tajikistan's porous border, galvanize public discord, and set off further a localized conflict.

A January 2018 report suggested that only a fraction of the Russian-speaking fighters in the Islamic State had returned to their homelands, but ethnic Uzbeks and Tajiks have other options beyond returning to Central Asia.¹²⁰ Violence and instability in neighboring Afghanistan, which has large Uzbek and Tajik populations of its own, has long been a cause for concern among the Uzbek and Tajik governments. The United States' invasion of Afghanistan and subsequent strategic partnerships with Central Asian nations temporarily allayed these security concerns, but the formation of an Islamic State branch in Afghanistan has created new fears of Afghan instability spilling northward over the border.¹²¹ Despite the U.S. military's efforts, the Islamic State-Khorasan Province has continued to carry out widespread terror attacks in Afghanistan, as the group vies against the Taliban for influence among hardline Islamists.¹²² If IS-K can maintain its capabilities in northern Afghanistan, the organization could serve as a destination for Uzbek and Tajik fighters returning from Syria.

As the Islamic State in Syria collapses, many of its former residents have begun to flee. When captured, these jihadis often claim that they only did menial labor for the Islamic State, rather than fighting, in an attempt to avoid punishment and perhaps eventually return to their

¹¹⁹ Thomas M. Sanderson, "From the Ferghana Valley to Syria and Beyond: A Brief History of Central Asian Foreign Fighters," *Center for International and Strategic Studies*, January 5, 2018, accessed April 16, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/ferghana-valley-syria-and-beyond-brief-history-central-asian-foreign-fighters>.

¹²⁰ Sanderson, "From the Ferghana Valley to Syria and Beyond," *Center for International and Strategic Studies*.

¹²¹ "Afghan Instability Threatens Tajikistan," *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*, July 28, 2017, accessed April 16, 2018, <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/afghan-instability-threatens-tajikistan>.

¹²² Ben Brimelow, "ISIS claimed responsibility for deadly attack on a children's charity and it shows their resilience in Afghanistan," *Business Insider*, January 24, 2018, accessed April 16, 2018, <http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-afghanistan-resilience-save-the-children-charity-2018-1>.

homelands.¹²³ Like the United States and Western Europe, the Uzbek and Tajik governments are currently grappling with how to handle returning citizens who once resided in the Islamic State. Somewhat surprisingly, Tajikistan has taken a soft approach to returning Tajiks who have not engaged in “violence” while in Syria and have expressed a desire to repent. These nonviolent offenders are rehabilitated and reintroduced into society without incarceration. In August 2017 the Tajik government announced that approximately 100 Islamic State members had returned, and that the government had pardoned more than half of the returnees. Pardoned returnees have also been utilized as tools in government-funded anti-Islamic State propaganda. As the Islamic State has lost territory, however, Tajik officials have warned that the government intends to draw a distinction between fighters escaping the collapse of the caliphate and those who have voluntarily returned home to repent.¹²⁴

In contrast, the Uzbek government has adopted a harsh stance against returnees. In May 2017, Uzbek Interior Minister Abdusalam Azizov expressed disdain for Sweden’s policies regarding Islamic State fighters, arguing that they were “treated as refugees” rather than terrorists.¹²⁵ Azizov’s statement is indicative of the approach Uzbekistan has taken towards Islamic State members: harsh punishments for returnees not only serve as a warning to Uzbek citizens thinking of straying from the government-approved strain of Islam, but also as a deterrent towards Uzbek fighters who are considering returning home.¹²⁶ The government appears to believe that the

¹²³ Rod Norland, “Captured ISIS Fighters’ Refrain: ‘I Was Only a Cook,’” *New York Times*, October 1, 2017, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/world/middleeast/iraq-islamic-state-kurdistan.html>.

¹²⁴ Farangis Najibullah, “Life After Islamic State: Pardoned Tajik Militants Navigate Road To Reintegration,” *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, August 6, 2017, accessed April 19, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-islamic-state-pardoned-militants-reintegration/28661770.html>.

¹²⁵ “Uzbekistan says uncovering militants daily among returning migrants,” *Reuters*, November 1, 2017, accessed April 19, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-islamists/uzbekistan-says-uncovering-militants-daily-among-returning-migrants-idUSKBN17Y1ND>.

¹²⁶ Rick Noack, “How harsh counterterrorism measures can play into the hands of the Islamic State,” *Washington Post*, November 1, 2017, accessed April 19, 2018,

security situation will remain stable if Uzbek jihadis move on elsewhere, rather than returning home. Although this approach may seem cynical, Uzbekistan reticence to dealing with returning jihadis likely echoes the sentiments of European nations as well; without a clear history of a returnee's behavior, European courts are unable to prosecute fighter's specific crimes committed abroad.¹²⁷ Faced with a similar conundrum, Uzbekistan has simply defaulted to long jail sentences, rather than trying to parse an individual's behavior.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan face further issues in reintegrating the women and children of the Islamic State. Over the course of 2016 and 2017, the number of women and children residing in the Islamic State increased at a higher rate than that of incoming fighters.¹²⁸ The Islamic State's territorial contraction has thus left many of these women and children in limbo. Hundreds of Uzbek and Tajik families currently reside in Iraqi and Kurdish-administered camps as they await possible repatriation.¹²⁹ Although the Tajik government has made some diplomatic efforts to bring back orphaned Tajik children, this represents only a fraction of the families left behind in Iraq. As of late 2016, neither Tajikistan nor Uzbekistan had an official plan to repatriate and integrate the children of Islamic State fighters.¹³⁰

While suggesting that the Tajik and Uzbek governments adopt European-style repatriation programs may seem farfetched, the governments of Central Asia need only look northward to Russia for an example of how to handle the return of women and children from the Islamic State.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/01/harsh-measures-keep-is-fighters-from-returning-but-they-may-have-radicalized-them-in-the-first-place/?utm_term=.180c749783e1.

¹²⁷ Alyssa J. Rubin, "She Left France to Fight in Syria. Now She Wants to Return. But Can She?" *New York Times*, January 11, 2018, accessed April 22, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/world/europe/emilie-konig-france-islamic-state.html>.

¹²⁸ Richard Barrett, "BEYOND THE CALIPHATE: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees," *Souphan Center*, October 31, 2017, 5.

¹²⁹ "Tajik Diplomats Plan Return of Children of ISIS Fighters from Iraq," *Fergana News*, January 13, 2018, accessed April 22, 2018, <http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=3710&mode=snews>.

¹³⁰ Uran Botobekov, "Central Asian Children Cast as ISIS Executioners," *The Diplomat*, September 20, 2016, accessed April 22, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/central-asian-children-cast-as-isis-executioners/>.

Russia has opted to place orphaned children back home with their grandparents in an effort to stabilize their lives and reintegrate them back into society.¹³¹ The senator in charge of the repatriation program, Ziyad Sabsabi, has argued that by bringing back orphaned children and placing them in a familiar environment, the children are more likely to avoid radicalization in the future. In this vein, the Uzbek and Tajik governments would be wise to account for orphaned Uzbek and Tajik children now, rather than leaving them adrift and at a heightened risk of radicalization.

Following the election of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as Uzbek president in December of 2016, relations between Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states have slowly improved from the nadir of Islam Karimov's regime.¹³² This improvement could create an opportunity for Uzbekistan and Tajikistan to work together on the issue of returning jihadis, but better relations could also lead to unforeseen consequences. A relaxation of visa requirements between the two countries could allow former fighters to circumvent border crossings and return undetected. Although issues regarding internal migration in Central Asia are beyond the scope of this paper, policymakers in the region would do well to consider the full ramifications of looser borders.

The next section of this chapter will analyze Russian concerns in the region moving forward.

¹³¹ Andrew E. Kramer, "Raised by ISIS, Returned to Chechnya: 'These Children Saw Terrible Things'," *New York Times*, February 24, 2018, accessed April 22, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/world/europe/chechnya-russia-isis-children-return.html>.

¹³² Catherine Putz, "High Hopes for Mending Tajikistan-Uzbekistan Relations Ahead of State Visit," *The Diplomat*, March 1, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/high-hopes-for-mending-tajikistan-uzbekistan-relations-ahead-of-state-visit/>.

SECTION TWO: IMPLICATIONS FOR RUSSIA

As noted previously in this paper, Russia has considerable interests in Central Asia, positioning itself as both an economic and military benefactor.¹³³ As such, national security issues in the region are inherently Russian national security issues, albeit sometimes only tangibly. Russia currently maintains the 201st Military Base in Tajikistan, which houses nearly 7,000 troops, and in recent years the Kremlin has also increased military aid to Dushanbe.¹³⁴ Russian spokesmen have repeatedly cited the presence of IS-K and the porous Tajik-Afghan border as security concerns, indicating that Russia lacks faith in Tajikistan to maintain its own internal security. A direct Russian response to outbreaks of violence in Tajikistan is more than a hypothetical: as a member of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), Tajikistan is entitled to military support in the event that its internal security is threatened.¹³⁵ Uzbekistan, meanwhile, has oscillated between CSTO membership and courting Western support. Currently, Uzbekistan is not a member of the CSTO, but the internal security of Uzbekistan – especially in regard to its border with Afghanistan – is also a key concern for Russia. With the largest population in the region and a common border with the other four Central Asian states and Afghanistan, any instability in Uzbekistan would likely resonate throughout Central Asia.

Moving forward, Russia's relationship with Central Asia is likely to remain complex. Russia and Central Asia enjoy geographical proximity and a shared political history, but often Russia's activities in the region invoke memories of its imperialist past. Central Asian autocrats,

¹³³ Dmitry Stefanovich, "Russia's Military Cooperation Goals in Central Asia," *The Diplomat*, January 31, 2018, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/russias-military-cooperation-goals-in-central-asia/>.

¹³⁴ Nadin Bahrom, "Kremlin's heightened military interest in Tajikistan raises 'Greater Russia' alarm," *Caravanserai*, January 19, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018, http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2018/01/19/feature-02.

¹³⁵ Bruce Pannier, "Majlis Podcast: Who Would Help Defend Central Asia From Insecurity In Afghanistan?" *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*, May 14, 2017, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-who-is-security-guarantor-central-asia/28487332.html>.

especially in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, often find themselves bristling at Russian attempts to influence regional politics. On the other hand, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are poor countries with significant security issues, making it difficult for the Uzbek and Tajik governments to turn down Russian offers of military aid and economic incentives. Russia's policy on the region can be summed up as keeping Central Asia needy, but not unstable.

Central Asian states are not entirely dependent on Russia, however, as both the United States and China maintain military-to-military training programs in the region.¹³⁶ The United States prioritizes stability in the region, given its commitments in neighboring Afghanistan, and has recently ramped up train-and-equip efforts in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.¹³⁷ Coupled with China's economic forays into Turkmenistan and its border security programs in Kyrgyzstan, Russia has serious concerns over foreign powers influencing Central Asian geopolitics.¹³⁸ Further strengthening of ties with China or the United States would cost Russia its place as a security guarantor, while a stagnant economy hindered by Western sanctions could see some Central Asian states begin to drift from Russia's economic orbit.

Further complicating security matters in the region is Russia's possible support of the Afghan Taliban. The commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General John Nicholson, has repeatedly accused Russia of funneling weapons into Taliban hands to prolong the military conflict in Afghanistan.¹³⁹ Although the veracity of General Nicholson's claim remains disputed, if Russia

¹³⁶ Ahmed Rashid, "A New Dawn in Uzbekistan?" *New York Review of Books*, March 27, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018, <http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/27/a-new-dawn-in-uzbekistan/>.

¹³⁷ Joshua Kucera, "US Planned Big Boost in Military Aid to Tajikistan," *Eurasianet*, January 11, 2018, accessed April 28, 2018, <https://eurasianet.org/node/86726>.

¹³⁸ Paul Stronski and Nicole Ng, "Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic," *Carnegie Endowment for National Peace*, February 28, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/28/cooperation-and-competition-russia-and-china-in-central-asia-russian-far-east-and-arctic-pub-75673>.

¹³⁹ Justin Rowlett, "Russia 'arming the Afghan Taliban', says US," *BBC News*, March 23, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43500299>.

is indeed supporting the Taliban, it does so while putting the security of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan at risk. Although the Taliban may initially appear to be a non-factor in the fears of Afghanistan's northern neighbors – the Taliban lacks ambitions beyond controlling the domestic affairs of Afghanistan – a more unstable Afghanistan will enable IS-K to continue operating with impunity.¹⁴⁰

Unlike the Taliban, IS-K presents a clear security threat to Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and even to Russia. In addition to Russia's position as a provider of security to the region, Russian officials also worry that IS-K will present opportunities for further radicalization in the North Caucasus.¹⁴¹ Though some have suggested that fears of IS-K's expansion have prompted Russia's support of the Taliban, this suggests Russia views IS-K and the Taliban as perennial adversaries. Though the Taliban and IS-K have competing goals and have occasionally fought against one another in outright conflict, the two groups are not at war against one another. Any instability caused by IS-K in Central Asia could end up costing Russia far more than they gain by supporting the Taliban. IS-K has directly threatened the Russian government in the past, and the Islamic State's close ties with Chechens and other North Caucasian groups should make the Kremlin wary of prolonged Afghan instability.¹⁴²

Finally, the visa-free regime between Central Asian states and Russia (minus Turkmenistan) leaves room for returning Central Asian fighters to travel back up through Kazakhstan and into Russia. Russian officials have expressed concern regarding these returnees,

¹⁴⁰ Helene Cooper, "U.S. Braces for Return of Terrorist Safe Havens to Afghanistan," *New York Times*, March 12, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/world/middleeast/military-safe-havens-afghanistan.html>.

¹⁴¹ Bennett Seftel, "'Persistent, Expanding and Worrisome': ISIS Rebounds in Afghanistan," *Cipher Brief*, January 5, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/persistent-expanding-worrisome-isis-rebounds-afghanistan>.

¹⁴² Russ Read, "ISIS Warns Russia: You're Next," *National Interest*, June 22, 2017, accessed April 28, 2018, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/isis-warns-russia-youre-next-21272>.

but Russia and Central Asia's disparate network of rail lines makes it difficult to track individuals' movements.¹⁴³ The predominance of cash in economic transactions in Eurasia complicates things further, as returning militants can avoid a paper trail on their return to Russia. Although the FSB likely has a migrant watchlist of some kind, the sheer magnitude of the number of Central Asian migrants working legally and illegally in Russia leaves room for individuals to fall through the cracks. Russia has been accused of deliberately allowing radicalized migrants to leave Russia, prioritizing domestic terror prevention and passing the buck to other states to deal with.¹⁴⁴ This strategy may have serious ramifications, both diplomatically and politically, should these fighters return to Russia and orchestrate future terror attacks.

Suggesting policy recommendations for the Russian Federation is difficult, given the centralized authority in the Kremlin and the democratic limitations of the Russian state. Nonetheless, there are realistic policy options that the Kremlin should keep in mind. Security cooperation with Uzbekistan, often a point of contention between the two states, would benefit Russia tremendously. Due to its position as the demographic and geographic center of Central Asia, Uzbekistan can be viewed as the lynchpin to Central Asian security. New Uzbek president Mirziyoyev has shown a willingness to form legitimate partnerships with his neighbors; Russia would be wise to pursue a similar partnership. Although the options for intelligence sharing are limited, it is imperative to Russian security that the Uzbek and Tajik governments keep track of returning jihadis. Assisting in that effort would be a pragmatic policy option that treats Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as partners, rather than subordinates.

¹⁴³ "Returning ISIS fighters are a 'real threat' to Russia, according to security-service chief," *Business Insider*, December 12, 2017, accessed April 23, 2018, <http://www.businessinsider.com/r-return-of-defeated-is-fighters-real-threat-to-russia-ria-cites-fsb-chief-2017-12>.

¹⁴⁴ Maria Tsvetkova, "How Russia allowed homegrown radicals to go and fight in Syria," *Reuters*, May 13, 2016, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/russia-militants/>.

With large Muslim populations of its own, Russia must also keep in mind domestic support for its activities in the Middle East. Russia's intervention in the Syrian conflict rankled many domestic Muslim leaders, though feelings of concern appear to have largely dissipated following Russia's military successes.¹⁴⁵ Further geopolitical entanglements, including potential support for the Taliban and enhanced cooperation with Turkey, should be evaluated with Russia's Muslims (both resident and non-resident) in mind. With large numbers of Central Asian migrants continuing to travel to Russia – legally or otherwise – and Central Asian instability issues likely to continue, the issue of Central Asians radicalizing in Russia is unlikely to abate in the near future. If Russia is not careful, the Kremlin could find itself facing a problem of radicalized Central Asians remaining in Russia to carry out attacks domestically.

¹⁴⁵ Guy Chazan, "Russia's Muslims on edge over air strikes on Syria," *Financial Times*, October 13, 2015, accessed April 23, 2018, <https://www.ft.com/content/14878f10-71bc-11e5-9b9e-690fdae72044>.

Conclusion

The radicalization of poor and marginalized groups – Islamic or otherwise – is not a new phenomenon. The radicalization process for Central Asian migrants is still unique, however, as Uzbeks and Tajiks find themselves vulnerable to jihadi recruiters in Russia in ways that are not present at home nor in labor markets elsewhere in the world. The malleability of the recruitment pitch given to migrant workers should be cause for alarm; personalized recruitment pitches indicate that terror groups have further evolved in their messaging and propaganda efforts. Although the Islamic State has lost its territory in Syria and Iraq, the organization and its other branches remains a key security threat to Central Asia and Russia. The longer the patterns of Uzbek and Tajik recruitment in Russia continue, the greater the chances that Central Asia and its periphery will suffer from widespread instability. Combined with U.S. and Chinese interests in the region, Russian neglect of a burgeoning security problem could create serious geopolitical ramifications in the near future.

Works Cited

“Afghan Instability Threatens Tajikistan.” *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*. July 28, 2017, accessed April 16, 2018. <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/afghan-instability-threatens-tajikistan>.

Ahmadi, Mumin. “Ҳочӣ Мирзо: Русия лонаи чалби тоҷикон ба ҷанги Сурия шудааст.” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. May 14, 2014, accessed April 2, 2018. <https://www.ozodi.org/a/excl-iv-with-dfamous-cleric-hoji-mirzo-ibronov/25384535.html>.

Arnold, Richard. “Surveys show Russian nationalism is on the rise. This explains a lot about the country’s foreign and domestic politics.” *Washington Post*. May 30, 2016, accessed April 1, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/05/30/surveys-show-russian-nationalism-is-on-the-rise-this-explains-a-lot-about-the-countrys-foreign-and-domestic-politics/?utm_term=.37de31e47475.

Aron, Leon. “The Coming of the Russian Jihad: Part I.” *War on the Rocks*. September 23, 2016, accessed March 19, 2018. <https://warontherocks.com/2016/09/the-coming-of-the-russian-jihad-part-i/>.

Auzan, Alexander and Sergei Bobylev. “National Human Development Report for the Russian Federation.” *United Nations Development Programme*. 2011. <http://www.undp.ru/documents/nhdr2011eng.pdf>.

Ayyub, Rami. “U.S., Russia Both Worry About Growing Turmoil In Tajikistan.” *NPR*. May 8, 2016, accessed April 16, 2018. <https://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2016/05/08/477057772/u-s-russia-both-worry-about-growing-turmoil-in-tajikistan>.

Baddely, John Frederick. *The Russian Conquest of the Caucasus*. London: Longman's, Green and Co., 1908.

Bahrom, Nadin. "Kremlin's heightened military interest in Tajikistan raises 'Greater Russia' alarm." *Caravanserai*. January 19, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018. http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2018/01/19/feature-02.

Barrett, Richard. "BEYOND THE CALIPHATE: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees." *Souphan Center*. October 31, 2017.

Blokhin, A.B. and I.M. Gorodetskaya. "Взаимоотношения супругов в моно- и полиэтнических браках русских и татар." *Problems of Social Psychology of Personality*. (2008), accessed April 16, 2018. http://psyjournals.ru/sgu_socialpsy/issue/30318_full.shtml.

Botobekov, Uran. "Central Asian Children Cast as ISIS Executioners." *The Diplomat*. September 20, 2016, accessed April 22, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/09/central-asian-children-cast-as-isis-executioners/>.

Brimelow, Ben. "ISIS claimed responsibility for deadly attack on a children's charity and it shows their resilience in Afghanistan." *Business Insider*. January 24, 2018, accessed April 16, 2018. <http://www.businessinsider.com/isis-afghanistan-resilience-save-the-children-charity-2018-1>.

Burns, John F. "Fate of 5 Terrorists Hangs Between Japan and Lebanon." *New York Times*, March 17, 2000, accessed April 28, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2000/03/17/world/fate-of-5-terrorists-hangs-between-japan-and-lebanon.html>.

Burskya, Zinaida. “Дорога в ИГИЛ пролегла через Москву.” *Novaya Gazeta*. January 17, 2016, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://www.novayagazeta.ru/articles/2016/01/18/67080-doroga-v-igil-prolegla-cherez-moskvu>.

“Central Asian Involvement in the Conflict in Syria and Iraq: Drivers and Responses.” *USAID*. May 14, 2015, accessed April 1, 2018. https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/CVE_CentralAsiansSyriaIraq.pdf.

Chazan, Guy. “Russia’s Muslims on edge over air strikes on Syria.” *Financial Times*. October 13, 2015, accessed April 23, 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/14878f10-71bc-11e5-9b9e-690fdae72044>.

Chmaytelli, Maher and Ahmed Aboulenein. “Iraq Declares Final Victory Over Islamic State.” *Reuters*. December 9, 2017, accessed April 16, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-islamicstate/iraq-declares-final-victory-over-islamic-state-idUSKBN1E30B9>.

Chotiner, Isaac. “The Islamization of Radicalism.” *Slate*. June 22, 2016, accessed March 11, 2018. https://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2016/06/olivier_roy_on_isis_brexit_orlando_and_the_islamization_of_radicalism.html.

Cohen, Jared. "Diverting the Radicalization Track," *Policy Review* no. 154 (April 2009): 51-63.

Cooper, Helene. “U.S. Braces for Return of Terrorist Safe Havens to Afghanistan.” *New York Times*. March 12, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/12/world/middleeast/military-safe-havens-afghanistan.html>.

Cornell, Svante E. "Narcotics, Radicalism, and Armed Conflict in Central Asia: The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 17, no. 4 (2005) 6119-639.

"Creating Enemies of the State: Religious Persecution in Uzbekistan." *Human Rights Watch*. March 2004, accessed April 2, 2018.
<https://www.hrw.org/reports/2004/uzbekistan0304/3.htm>.

Dalgaard-Nielsen, Anja. "Violent Radicalization in Europe: What We Know and What We Do Not Know." *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 33, no. 9 (2010) 797-814.

Dannreuther, Roland. "Islamic Radicalization in Russia: An Assessment." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 86, no. 1 (2010): 109-126.

Dannreuther, Roland and Luke March. "Chechnya: Has Moscow Won?" *Survival: Global Politics and Strategy* 50, no. 4 (2008): 97-112.

de Waal, Thomas. "Greetings from Grozny. Fighting for Chechnya: Is Islam a Factor?" *PBS*. July 25, 2002, accessed March 18, 2018.
<http://www.pbs.org/wnet/wideangle/uncategorized/greetings-from-grozny-fighting-for-chechnya-is-islam-a-factor/3078/>.

Dunlop, John B. *Russia confronts Chechnya: roots of a separatist conflict*. Cambridge, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

"Eastern promises: why migrant workers are turning their backs on Russia." *Guardian*. May 19, 2016, accessed March 19, 2018.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/19/eastern-promises-migrant-workers-turning-backs-russia>.

“4,000 Russian nationals fight among militants in Syria – Putin.” *TASS*. February 23, 2017, accessed March 19, 2018. <http://tass.com/politics/932573>.

“ФМС: в РФ нелегально работают 3 млн трудовых мигрантов, остальные 4 млн "халтурят" с налогами.” *NEWSru*. November 23, 2010, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://www.newsru.com/russia/23nov2010/migranty.html>.

Galdini, Franco. “A Glimpse Into Moscow’s Little Kyrgyzstan.” *The Diplomat*. May 24, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2017/03/a-glimpse-into-moscows-little-kyrgyzstan/>.

“GDP Per Capita.” *The World Bank*. 2018, accessed April 2, 2018. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.CD?end=2015&locations=UZ-TJ&start=1990>.

Githens-Mazer, Jonathan and Robert Lambert. "Why Conventional Wisdom on Radicalization Fails: The Persistence of a Failed Discourse." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)* 86, no. 4 (2010): 889-901.

Goerzig, Carolin and Khaled Al-Hashimi. *Radicalization in Western Europe*. New York: Routledge, 2015.

Greenberg, Karen J. “Counter-Radicalization via the Internet.” *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 668, no. 1 (2016) 165-179.

“Гришин: вербовкой в ИГ на русском занимается 5-10 тысяч пропагандистов.” *RIA Novosti*. June 19, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://ria.ru/world/20150619/1079078702.html>.

Hassan, Hassan. "Its dreams of a caliphate are gone. Now Isis has a deadly new strategy." *Guardian*. December 30, 2017, accessed April 16, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/dec/31/isis-dreams-of-caliphate-gone-now-deadly-new-strategy>.

Hille, Kathrin. "Russia and radicalisation: Homegrown problem." *Financial Times*, December 7, 2015, accessed March 19, 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/77156ed2-9ab0-11e5-be4f-0abd1978acaa>.

Hockstader, Lee. "Russia Pours Troops Into Breakaway Region." *Washington Post*. December 12, 1994, accessed March 11, 2018. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/longterm/russiagov/stories/chechnya121294.htm>.

Horsman, Stuart. "Uzbekistan's involvement in the Tajik Civil War 1992-97: Domestic considerations," *Central Asian Survey* 18, no. 1 (1999), 37-48.

Hughes, James. *Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad*. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007.

Ignatius, David. "How ISIS Spread in the Middle East." *Atlantic*, October 29, 2015, accessed April 2, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/how-isis-started-syria-iraq/412042/>.

"IS Militants Asked Baghdadi For Permission To Fight 'Infidels' In Tajikistan." *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. January 5, 2015, accessed March 26, 2018. <https://www.rferl.org/a/isis-tajikistan-syria-jihad-fighters-repatriated/26777220.html>.

Jardine, Bradley. "For Russia's Labor Migrants, a Life on the Edge." *Moscow Times*. November 4, 2016, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://themoscowtimes.com/articles/for-labor-migrants-a-life-on-the-edge-56018>.

Kaliyev, Arman. "Future in Russia 'dim', say Central Asian migrants." *Caravanserai*. December 13, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018. http://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2017/12/13/feature-02.

Karagiannis, Emmanuel. "European Converts to Islam: Mechanisms of Radicalization." *Politics, Religion, and Ideology* 13, no. 1 (2012): 99-113.

Karimova, Lilliya. "Russia's Muslims Are as Diverse as Their Experiences." *Wilson Center*. May 25, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/russias-muslims-are-diverse-their-experiences>.

Kendzior, Sarah Kendzior. "The Curse of Stability in Central Asia." *Foreign Policy*. February 19, 2013, accessed April 28, 2018, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/02/19/the-curse-of-stability-in-central-asia/>.

Khosrokhavar, Farhad. *Suicide bombers. Allah's new martyrs*. London: Pluto Press, 2005.

Kombo, Paul. "Radicalization as a Functional Aspect of Crime." *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences* 8, no. 6 (2017), 163-170.

Kramer, Andrew E. "New York Attack Turns Focus to Central Asian Militancy." *New York Times*. November 1, 2017, accessed March 26, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/01/world/asia/uzbekistan-isis-terrorism.html>.

Kramer, Andrew E. "Raised by ISIS, Returned to Chechnya: 'These Children Saw Terrible Things'." *New York Times*. February 24, 2018, accessed April 22, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/world/europe/chechnya-russia-isis-children-return.html>.

Kucera, Joshua. "US Planned Big Boost in Military Aid to Tajikistan." *Eurasianet*. January 11, 2018, accessed April 28, 2018. <https://eurasianet.org/node/86726>.

Lain, Sarah. "Strategies for Countering Terrorism and Extremism in Central Asia." 47, no. 3 (2016): 386-405.

Laquer, Walter. "Terror's New Face: The Radicalization and Escalation of Modern Terrorism." *Harvard International Review* 20, no. 4 (1998): 48-51.

Laville, Sandra. "Social media used to recruit new wave of British jihadis in Syria." *Guardian*, April 15, 2014, accessed April 2, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/15/social-media-recruit-british-jihadis-syria-twitter-facebook>.

Lemon, Edward and Helen Thibault. "Counter-extremism, power and authoritarian governance in Tajikistan." *Central Asian Survey* 37, no. 1 (2018): 137-159.

Mahler, Horst. "Birth and Death of the Red Army Faction." *Australian Left Review* 1, no. 78 (1981): 47-49.

Malashenko, Alexey. "Russia and Islam in Central Asia: Problems of Migration." In *The Fight for Influence: Russia in Central Asia*. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 2013.

McKirdy, Andrew. "Imprisoned Japanese Red Army founder Shigenobu holds out hope for revolution." *Japan Times*, June 8, 2017, accessed March 11, 2018. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/06/08/national/imprisoned-japanese-red-army-founder-shigenobu-holds-hope-revolution/#.WpSPRa2grIU>.

McNicol, Sarah. "Responding to Concerns About Online Radicalization in U.K. Schools Through a Radicalization Critical Digital Literacy Approach." *Computers in the Schools* 33, no. 4 (2016), 227-238.

Meek, James and Francisco Herranz. "Dudayev Threatens Holy War." *Guardian*. August 12, 1994, accessed March 11, 2018.

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/1994/aug/12/chechnya.jamesmeek>.

Mehdi, Hasan. "Did the invasion of Iraq heighten the threat from al-Qaeda-inspired terrorism?" *New Statesman*, September 16, 2011, accessed April 2, 2018,

<https://www.newstatesman.com/blogs/mehdi-hasan/2011/09/iraq-qaeda-verdict-terrorism>.

"Migrants and Their Descendants: Guide to policies for the well-being of all in pluralist societies." *Council of Europe*. December 2010, accessed 5/1/2018,

https://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/source/GUIDEMIGRANTS_EN.pdf.

Montgomery, David W. and John Heathershaw. "Islam, secularism and danger: a reconsideration of the link between religiosity, radicalism and rebellion in Central Asia." *Religion, State, and Society* 44, no. 3 (2016): 192.

Moore, Cerwyn. "Suicide Bombing: Chechnya, the North Caucasus and Martyrdom." *Europe-Asia Studies* 64, no. 9 (2012): 1780-1807.

"MPC Migration Profile: RUSSIA." *Migration Policy Centre*. June 2013, accessed April 2, 2018. http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Russia.pdf.

Najibullah, Farangis. "Life After Islamic State: Pardoned Tajik Militants Navigate Road To Reintegration." *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*. August 6, 2017, accessed April 19, 2018.

<https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-islamic-state-pardoned-militants-reintegration/28661770.html>.

"1944-1957: Deportation and Exile." *Telegraph*. January 1, 2001, accessed March 11, 2018. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/1399561/1944-1957-Deportation-and-exile.html>.

Noack, Rick. "How harsh counterterrorism measures can play into the hands of the Islamic State." *Washington Post*. November 1, 2017, accessed April 19, 2018.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/11/01/harsh-measures-keep-is-fighters-from-returning-but-they-may-have-radicalized-them-in-the-first-place/?utm_term=.180c749783e1.

Norland, Rod. “Captured ISIS Fighters’ Refrain: ‘I Was Only a Cook’.” *New York Times*. October 1, 2017, accessed April 28, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/01/world/middleeast/iraq-islamic-state-kurdistan.html>.

NPR Staff. “The Arab Spring: A Year Of Revolution.” *NPR*, December 17, 2011, accessed April 2, 2018. <https://www.npr.org/2011/12/17/143897126/the-arab-spring-a-year-of-revolution>.

Obituary: Chechen Rebel Khattab.” *BBC News*. April 26, 2002, accessed March 11, 2018. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1952053.stm>.

“Отношение к трудовым мигрантам.” *Levada Center*. April 28, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018. <http://www.levada.ru/2017/04/28/otnoshenie-k-trudovym-migrantam/>.

“Over 4 Million Immigrants Live in Russia Illegally, Official Says.” *The Moscow Times*. September 23, 2014, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://themoscowtimes.com/news/over-4-million-immigrants-live-in-russia-illegally-official-says-39675>.

Pannier, Bruce. “Majlis Podcast: Who Would Help Defend Central Asia From Insecurity In Afghanistan?” *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*. May 14, 2017, accessed April 23, 2018. <https://www.rferl.org/a/majlis-podcast-who-is-security-guarantor-central-asia/28487332.html>.

Parfitt, Tom. “The battle for the soul of Chechnya.” *Guardian*. November 22, 2007, accessed March 18, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/22/chechnya.tomparfitt>.

Parpiev, Ziyodullo. “Who is behind remittances? A Profile of Uzbek Migrants.” *UNDP*. March 5, 2015, accessed April 1, 2018.

<http://www.uz.undp.org/content/uzbekistan/en/home/ourperspective/ourperspectivearticles/2015/03/05/who-is-behind-remittances--a-profile-of-uzbek-migrants.html>.

Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka. "Islamic State in Kyrgyzstan: a real or imagined threat?" *openDemocracy*. October 1, 2015, accessed April 2, 2018. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/agnieszka-pikulicka-wilczewska/islamic-state-in-kyrgyzstan-real-or-imagined-threat>.

Pikulicka-Wilczewska, Agnieszka. "The complex reality of radicalisation in Central Asia." *New Eastern Europe*. October 31, 2017, accessed March 26, 2018. <http://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/10/31/complex-reality-radicalisation-central-asia/>.

Pokolova, Elena. *Chechnya's Terrorist Network: The Evolution of Terrorism in Russia's North Caucasus*. Santa Barbara, California: Praeger, 2015.

"Poverty in Tajikistan." *Asian Development Bank*. accessed March 26, 2018. <https://www.adb.org/countries/tajikistan/poverty>.

Putin, Vladimir. "News conference of Vladimir Putin." *President of Russia*. December 20, 2012, accessed April 1, 2018. <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17173>.

Putz, Catherine. "High Hopes for Mending Tajikistan-Uzbekistan Relations Ahead of State Visit." *The Diplomat*. March 1, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/03/high-hopes-for-mending-tajikistan-uzbekistan-relations-ahead-of-state-visit/>.

Putz, Catherine. "Tajikistan: Remittance Values Fall." *The Diplomat*, January 5, 2016, accessed March 26, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/tajikistan-remittance-values-fall/>.

Qosimzoda, Siyovush, et al. “Central Asian Migrants in Russia Find Religion.” *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*. June 13, 2014, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/central-asian-migrants-russia-find-religion>.

Rabasa, Angela and Cheryl Bernard. *Eurojihad*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015.

Radcliffe, Damian. “Five years after the Arab Spring, how does the Middle East use social media?” *The Conversation*, February 24, 2016, accessed April 2, 2018. <http://theconversation.com/five-years-after-the-arab-spring-how-does-the-middle-east-use-social-media-54940>.

Rashid, Ahmed. “A New Dawn in Uzbekistan?” *New York Review of Books*. March 27, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018. <http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/27/a-new-dawn-in-uzbekistan/>.

Read, Russ. “ISIS Warns Russia: You’re Next.” *National Interest*. June 22, 2017, accessed April 28, 2018. <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/isis-warns-russia-youre-next-21272>.

Reeve, Simon. *The New Jackals: Ramzi Yousef, Osama bin Laden, and the Future of Terrorism* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1999).

“Returning ISIS fighters are a 'real threat' to Russia, according to security-service chief.” *Business Insider*. December 12, 2017, accessed April 23, 2018. <http://www.businessinsider.com/r-return-of-defeated-is-fighters-real-threat-to-russia-ria-cites-fsb-chief-2017-12>.

Rowlatt, Justin. “Russia 'arming the Afghan Taliban', says US.” *BBC News*. March 23, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43500299>.

Rubin, Alyssa J. “She Left France to Fight in Syria. Now She Wants to Return. But Can She?” *New York Times*. January 11, 2018, accessed April 22, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/11/world/europe/emilie-konig-france-islamic-state.html>.

Russell, John. “Kadyrov's Chechnya—Template, Test or Trouble for Russia's Regional Policy?” *Europe-Asia Studies* 63, no. 3 (2011): 509-528.

Ruzaliev, Odil. “Islam in Uzbekistan: Implications of 9/11 and Policy Recommendations for the United States.” *Journal of Minority Muslim Affairs* 25, no. 1 (2005), 13-29.

Sanderson, Thomas M. “From the Ferghana Valley to Syria and Beyond: A Brief History of Central Asian Foreign Fighters.” *Center for International and Strategic Studies*. January 5, 2018, accessed April 16, 2018. <https://www.csis.org/analysis/ferghana-valley-syria-and-beyond-brief-history-central-asian-foreign-fighters>.

Seftel, Bennett. “‘Persistent, Expanding and Worrisome’: ISIS Rebounds in Afghanistan.” *Cipher Brief*. January 5, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018. <https://www.thecipherbrief.com/persistent-expanding-worrisome-isis-rebounds-afghanistan>.

Silke, Andrew. “Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization.” *European Journal of Criminology* 5, no. 1 (2008): 99-123.

“Six North Caucasus Insurgency Commanders Transfer Allegiance To Islamic State.” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. January 2, 2015, accessed March 18, 2018. <https://www.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-north-caucasus-insurgency-commanders-allegiance/26773615.html>.

Stefanovich, Dmitry. “Russia’s Military Cooperation Goals in Central Asia.” *The Diplomat*. January 31, 2018, accessed April 28, 2018. <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/russias-military-cooperation-goals-in-central-asia/>.

Stronski, Paul and Nicole Ng. “Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and the Arctic.” *Carnegie Endowment for National Peace*. February 28, 2018, accessed April 23, 2018. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/28/cooperation-and-competition-russia-and-china-in-central-asia-russian-far-east-and-arctic-pub-75673>.

“Syria Calling: Radicalisation in Central Asia.” *International Crisis Group*. January, 2015, accessed April 2, 2018. <https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/central-asia/syria-calling-radicalisation-central-asia>.

“Tajik Diplomats Plan Return of Children of ISIS Fighters from Iraq.” *Fergana News*. January 13, 2018, accessed April 22, 2018. <http://enews.fergananews.com/news.php?id=3710&mode=snews>.

“Tajik Official Says Migration To Russia Down.” *Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty*. July 22, 2016, accessed March 19, 2018. <https://www.rferl.org/a/tajik-official-says-migration-to-russia-down/27873757.html>.

“Tajikistan.” *Freedom House*. accessed March 26, 2018. <https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2017/tajikistan>.

“Tajikistan Bans Giving Babies Russian-Style Last Names.” *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*. April 30, 2016, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://www.rferl.org/a/tajikistan-bans-giving-babies-russian-style-last-names/27708093.html>.

“Tajikistan’s crackdown on observant Muslims intensifies.” *Economist*. September 21, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21729451-beards-veils-madrassas-and-arabic-sounding-names-are-all-banned-tajikistans-crackdown-observant>.

“Тезисы выступления представителя центра "СОВА" на консультации ЕС-Россия по правам человека в Брюсселе.” *SOVA Center*. May 29, 2009, accessed April 1, 2018. <http://www.sova-center.ru/racism-xenophobia/publications/2009/05/d16123/>.

“The number of cases of deportation of Tajik citizens from Russia increasing.” *Asia-Plus*. October 5, 2016, accessed April 2, 2018. <http://news.tj/en/news/tajikistan/society/20161005/231636>.

The World Factbook, Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1990.

Tomsen, Peter. "Untying the Afghan Knot." *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs* 25, no. 1 (2001): 17-24.

Torfeh, Massoumeh. “Why is Tajikistan imposing a dress code on its people?” *Al Jazeera*. July 31, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/07/tajikistan-imposing-dress-code-people-170728092646033.html>.

Tsvetkova, Maria. “How Russia allowed homegrown radicals to go and fight in Syria,” *Reuters*. May 13, 2016, accessed April 23, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/russia-militants/>.

Tucker, Noah. “Islamic State messaging to Central Asians Migrant Workers in Russia.” *CERIA Brief*, no. 6 (2015): 1-8.

“Turkey a Magnet for Migrant Workers.” *Institute for War and Peace Reporting*. December 18, 2006, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://iwpr.net/global-voices/turkey-magnet-migrant-workers>.

Turovsky, Daniil. “How Isis is recruiting migrant workers in Moscow to join the fighting in Syria.” *Guardian*. May 5, 2015, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/05/isis-russia-syria-islamic-extremism>.

“USSR: Demographic Trends and Ethnic Balance in the Non-Russian Ethnic Republics.” *Central Intelligence Agency*. April 1990, accessed March 26, 2018. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000292353.pdf.

“Uzbek president says economic data was 'fiction' for years.” *Reuters*. December 22, 2017, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-economy/uzbek-president-says-economic-data-was-fiction-for-years-idUSKBN1EG24T>.

“Uzbekistan says uncovering militants daily among returning migrants.” *Reuters*. November 1, 2017, accessed April 19, 2018. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-uzbekistan-islamists/uzbekistan-says-uncovering-militants-daily-among-returning-migrants-idUSKBN17Y1ND>.

Vasilyeva, Nataliya. “In Russia, Bribes Drive Up the Cost of Living.” *Associated Press*. April 1, 2016, accessed April 1, 2018. <https://apnews.com/a3fef3fd83294d52bc92cb1bda34b568>.

Winter, Charlie. “War by Suicide.” *International Centre for Counterterrorism – the Hague*. February 2017.

“World Economic Outlook Database, October 2017.” *International Monetary Fund*. October 2017, accessed April 3, 2018. <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2017/02/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2017&ey=2017&ssd=1&sort=country&ds=.&br=0&pr1.x=37&pr1.y=9&c=923%2C927&s=PPPPC&grp=0&a=>

Wood, Graeme. “What ISIS Really Wants.” *Atlantic*, March 2015, accessed April 2, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2015/03/what-isis-really-wants/384980/>.

Yaffa, Joshua. "Chechnya's Isis Problem," *New Yorker*. February 12, 2016, accessed March 19, 2018. <https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/chechnyas-isis-problem>.

Yegorov, Oleg. "Building bridges: Russia encourages traditional Islam to combat extremism." *Russia Beyond the Headlines*. Jan 24, 2017, accessed March 18, 2018. https://www.rbth.com/politics_and_society/2017/01/24/loyal-muslims-how-russian-authorities-work-with-islam_687648.

Zaman, Muhammad Qasim. "Sectarianism in Pakistan: The Radicalization of Shi'i and Sunni Identities." *Modern Asian Studies* 32, no. 3 (1998): 689-716.

Zenn, Jacob. "The IMU is extinct: what next for Central Asia's jihadis?" *Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*. May 3, 2016, accessed April 2, 2018. <https://cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13357-the-imu-is-extinct-what-new-for-central-asias-jihadis?.html>.