DISCLAIMER:

This document does not meet the current format guidelines of the Graduate School at The University of Texas at Austin.

It has been published for informational use only.

Copyright

by

Daniel Alejandro Perera

2013

The Thesis Committee for Daniel Alejandro Perera
Certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:

"WE HAVE A ROAD MAP"

Whiteness, Biopolitics, and the Rise of Technocratic Philanthrocapitalism:
The Emergent Neoliberal Governance Project of the Guatemalan Oligarchy

APPROVED BY
SUPERVISING COMMITTEE:

Supervisor:

____
Charles R. Hale

____
Cecilia Ballí

“WE HAVE A ROAD MAP”

Whiteness, Biopolitics, and the Rise of Technocratic Philanthrocapitalism: The Emergent Neoliberal Governance Project of the Guatemalan Oligarchy

by

Daniel Alejandro Perera, B.A.

Thesis

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of

The University of Texas at Austin

in Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements

for the Degree of

Master of Arts

The University of Texas at Austin

December 2013

Tengo tanto sentimiento
que es frecuente persuadirme
de que soy sentimental,
mas reconozco, al medirme,
que todo eso son pensamientos,
que al final nunca sentí.

Tenemos, todos los que vivimos,
una vida que es vivida
y otra vida que es pensada,
y la única vida que tenemos
es esa que está dividida
entre la verdadera y la errada.

Cuál sin embargo es la verdadera
y cuál la errada, nadie
nos sabrá explicar;
y vivimos de manera
que la vida que tenemos
es la que tenemos que pensar.
— Fernando Pessoa

Abstract

“WE HAVE A ROAD MAP”

Whiteness, Biopolitics, and the Rise of Technocratic Philanthrocapitalism: The Emergent Neoliberal Governance Project of the Guatemalan Oligarchy

Daniel Alejandro Perera, M.A.

The University of Texas at Austin, 2013

Supervisor: Charles Hale

Scholars have tended to frame the rise of neoliberal governance in Guatemala as primarily shaped by the tangled, often contradictory relations between three main actors: multilateral organizations and international financial institutions, the state, and individual and collective subjects of rights. This thesis intends to contribute to the literature by focusing on a social actor that is seldom investigated academically—especially ethnographically—despite the determinant role that it has historically played in the destiny of Guatemala, namely, the oligarchy: an elite group of Guatemalans who by virtue of class position, family networks, and membership in business associations have “ruled since the conquest.” An ethnographic appraisal of elite discourses, attitudes, and practices, as well as an attunement to the affective dimension of elite subjectivities, can generate a better understanding of how historical relations of domination and exclusion in Guatemala are currently being reconfigured.

Based on ethnographic research and a series of interviews with a dozen of its leading members in July and August of 2012, this thesis is an inquiry into the contemporary governance project of the Guatemalan oligarchy and the place that it allots to multiculturalism. In this sense, it has three main objectives: firstly, to characterize an increasingly coherent liberal discourse of national development, modernization, and corporate social responsibility emanating from the economic elite's private foundations, think tanks and business associations. Secondly, it summarily compares this discourse to the general observable trends of capitalist accumulation around new dynamic "axes": megaprojects (the construction of major infrastructure such as roads and highways, bridges, airports, seaports; as well as call centers, corporate tourism, malls, technological corridors, hydroelectric power plants); the agroindustrial production of mega-monocrops for agrofuels (sugarcane and African oil palm), and; extraction and commercialization of natural resources (minerals, oil, cement), as documented by other analysts. Finally, it examines the current status of multiculturalism and the ascendancy of whiteness within this emergent material and discursive landscape. I have termed this emergent model of neoliberal governance "technocratic philanthrocapitalism."

Table of Contents

List of Figures ix

INTRODUCTION **10**

Methodological and ethical considerations of studying the elite 18

THE HISTORICAL CONTINUITY OF THE GUATEMALAN OLIGARCHY .23

Who are the oligarchs?...23

The rise of the industrialists in transitional times: a brief history..........................26

Popular protest, the Mayan movement, and (neoliberal) multiculturalism 29

The Young Turks: rich, white, bright & globalized 31

THE RISE OF TECHNOCRATIC PHILANTHROCAPITALISM **33**

Moral pragmatism, global validation, and the post-ideological "consensus"........37

A double structural shift? On the new axes of accumulation 49

Affect and elite self-image 54

POST-MULTICULTURALISM AND THE ASCENDANCY OF WHITENESS56

The oligarchy's historical racism 56

On the current status of multiculturalism..59

Biopolitics and the ascendancy of whiteness 69

CONCLUSION **75**

BIBLIOGRAPHY **79**

List of Figures

Source: Palencia Prado 2013, p.15 51

INTRODUCTION

The highest classes, as everyone knows, are the most conservative... No change can bring them additional power, and every change can give them something to fear, but nothing to hope for.
— Georg Simmel 1957 [1908]: 99

If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change.
— Tancredi, Sicilian oligarch
(from *Il Gattopardo*, the novel by Giuseppe Di Lampedusa1958: 53)

"To say that Guatemala is multicultural would be like saying that it is the Land of Eternal Spring, or that it rains from May to September." A member of the most blue-blooded of family clans in the Guatemalan oligarchy uttered this statement humorously at a press conference in early 2012. The youthful president of the CACIF, a powerful business association that gathers the most important economic interests in the country, had been asked by a reporter (in an admittedly confrontational tone) what the stance of the "organized private sector" was regarding the proposed constitutional amendment intended, among other things, to formally (and finally) declare the country "multicultural, pluriethnic and plurilingual." The precise wording is not casual: it emanates from the Accord on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which was signed in 1995 by the State and the leaders of the leftist insurgency, the URNG, and stands as a momentous achievement of the Mayan movement of the 1980s and 90s. The comedic sarcasm of the CACIF's president—a man I subsequently interviewed at length for this investigation—intended to portray cultural and ethnic diversity as banal and inconsequential: "We all

know that the country has these characteristics." And he would later exclaim to me, "Why on earth would it need to be written into the constitution?!"

This thesis is an inquiry into the contemporary governance project of the Guatemalan oligarchy—or ruling economic elite—and the place that it allots to multiculturalism. In this sense, it has three main objectives: firstly, to characterize an increasingly coherent liberal discourse of national development, modernization, and corporate social responsibility emanating from the economic elite's private foundations, think tanks and business associations. Secondly, it summarily compares this discourse to the general observable trends of capitalist accumulation around new dynamic "axes": megaprojects (the construction of major infrastructure such as roads and highways, bridges, airports, seaports; as well as call centers, corporate tourism, malls, technological corridors, hydroelectric power plants); the agroindustrial production of mega-monocrops for agrofuels (sugarcane and African oil palm), and; extraction and commercialization of natural resources (minerals, oil, cement), as documented by other analysts. Finally, it examines the current status of multiculturalism and the ascendancy of whiteness within this emergent material and discursive landscape.

Based on ethnographic research and a series of interviews with a dozen of its leading members, I begin to characterize what I claim to be a rising intellectual and political leadership within the ruling elite. Prominent among members of this group are Ivy-league-educated, relatively progressive, and thoroughly globalized young men (they are invariably men) from some of the "traditional oligarchical families" (Krznaric 2003; Dosal 1995; Casaús Arzú 1992). Armed with transnational corporate savvy, technocratic

bravado, and a certain kind of compassionate pragmatism they have been designing and gradually implementing a model of economic development, social policy agenda, and political governance project for the country in recent years, and they seem to be gaining traction.

Recent scholarship has examined the political and economic character of the post-genocide, postwar period (McAllister & Nelson 2013; Idear-Congcoop 2012; Hale 2006; Bastos & Brett 2007; etc.). Much of this work has tended to frame the rise of neoliberal governance in Guatemala as primarily shaped by the tangled, often contradictory relations between three main actors: international financial institutions (IFIs), the state, and the subjects of rights. Consequently, much of the analytical focus of the literature lies, on the one hand, in the revamping of neocolonial, capitalist hegemony and the corresponding possibility (if only implied) for the emergence of effective counter-hegemonic resistance (Velásquez Nimatuj xxx; Oglesby xxx; McCreery 1994; Jonas 1991; Torres-Rivas 1987; Dunkerley 1988; Martínez Peláez 1971). On the other hand, the literature considers the manifold effects of governmentality: that is, biopower and subject-formation, territorial encompassment, the expansion of state frames of legibility, the complex entanglements produced by neoliberal institutional frameworks and the inherently limited forms of everyday resistance to which they give rise (Oglesby 2004; Hale 2006; Nelson 2013; analyses outside of Guatemala include Scott 1990; Ferguson 1992; Escobar 1995; Murray Li 2007).

Some of the more sophisticated attempts to discern the discrete, often contradictory complexities of neoliberal governance have not only drawn attention to its

propensity to perpetuate and intensify historical racism, structural violence and socioeconomic inequalities, but also to its unique—though limited—potentialities and affordances. For instance, it has been noted that neoliberal reforms have tended to open up formerly foreclosed institutional spaces of representation to historically excluded or marginalized social actors and groups—such as racial and ethnic minorities or, more accurately, minoritized majorities—which has generated less hostile environments for the potential advancement of life projects otherwise (Hale 2011; 2006; Povinelli 2002). To echo anthropologist Charles Hale (2011, 197) it behooves scholars and activists to avoid lapsing into the kind of postmodern "scholarly conceit" that tends to portray resistance as irremediably caught in the webs of governmentality (and so ultimately futile), as much as the facile "romance of resistance" that uncritically celebrates it (Abu-Lughod 1990). In a similar vein, I argue that it is incumbent on scholars and activists to remain attentive so as not to oversimplify representations of powerful social actors, such as economic elites, and thus preclude analytical sophistication. To the extent that research can enhance analytical frames by approaching neoliberalism from novel perspectives or alternative registers, the complex challenges that it poses can more adequately be grasped and therefore engaged.

This thesis intends to contribute to the literature by focusing on a social actor that is seldom investigated academically—especially ethnographically—despite the determinant role that it has historically played in the destiny of Guatemala, namely, the oligarchy: an elite group of Guatemalans who by virtue of class position, family networks and membership in business associations (Krznaric 2003) have "ruled since the

conquest" (Dosal 1995: 3; Casaús Arzú 1992; Martínez Peláez 1971).[1] It has been noted that relatively little research is dedicated to studying the actors who control money, markets, and capital; an omission that, to use a recent argument about the study of corporations, is perhaps "symptomatic of a larger trend within the discipline, in which anthropologists pay more attention to the state and governmentality than to how corporations [and economic elites] shape the world in accordance with their pursuit of profit, growth, and legitimacy" (Benson & Kirsch 2010: 459, my brackets). Typically portrayed as inert entities that merely embody abstract capitalism, economic elites in fact constitute complex and internally heterogeneous agentive subjects.

An adequate interpretation of emergent neoliberal governance in Guatemala must therefore account for the oligarchy, and its individual members, as intricate social actors. One reason for this is that it enables an analysis of how elites and businesses respond and thus adapt to critique and adversity in order to maintain their power and privileges (ibid). Moreover, it is increasingly the case that economic elites and corporations not only do not seek to avoid critique but in fact actively engage in a form of social critique themselves (Baudrillard [2005] 2010; Žižek 2008; Cederström and Marinetto 2013, 418). An ethnographic appraisal of elite discourses, attitudes, and practices, as well as an attunement to the affective dimension of elite subjectivities, can generate a better understanding of how historical relations of domination and exclusion in Guatemala are currently being reconfigured. It is my claim that through a culture of corporate social responsibility, inclusion and equal opportunity, today's mode of governance is based less

---

[1] Throughout this study I use 'oligarchy,' 'ruling elite', 'economic elite' and 'business sector'

(or less overtly, at least) on coercive force and more on the attempt to forge broad-based "minimal consensual agreements" across ideological, sectorial, and ethnic divides. But rather than characterizing this moment as one of transition from the domination of the *Estado Finca* (AVANCSO 2007; Hurtado Paz y Paz 2007; Palencia Prado 2013) to a new project of elite hegemonic rule (Oglesby 2013), I view this as an ascendant biopolitical regime that is situated in the interstitial spaces between domination and hegemony. Driven by a modernizing liberal ethos and a corresponding ideology of "progressive" cultural engineering, I argue that the elite seeks to enhance the vitality of the general population, in particular the marginalized and undernourished indigenous majorities, for fitness and incorporation into a modern capitalist regime of citizenship and labor in a globalized economy.

Paradoxically, an analysis of such trends inevitably raises questions about how the current restructuring of capital might result in positive material consequences for the Mayan and impoverished Ladino majorities, in contradistinction to the "previous" moment of neoliberal multiculturalism. On one hand, the neoliberal model of economic development propels the (re)concentration of assets and resources through new axes of accumulation, thus perpetuating structural relations of inequality and remaking racialized forms of exclusion for the unfit and the unwilling. On the other hand, concerted efforts for "human development" through innovations in societal resource redistribution—i.e. no longer confined to taxes and wages—via the articulation of philanthropy, the nonprofit sector, social organizations, and public-private alliances, real improvements in the material conditions of the marginalized majorities might indeed be afoot. This in turn

raises questions about the further entanglements in the webs of neoliberal governance (Hale 2002) that indigenous and campesino communities must face as they struggle not only for economic and racial justice but also toward more expansive political horizons. Finally, this analysis may also enhance our understanding of the ways in which the oligarchy has navigated the significant social, political, and economic transformations the country has endured in the past two to three decades. In this period, the ruling elite has transited from a relatively defensive position of retrenchment throughout the 1990s and early 2000s to a much more visible and assertive one today.

Drawing from a series of interviews carried out in July and August of 2012, this investigation examines the views, attitudes, and practices of some of the oligarchy's most prominent leaders with regard to three broad themes: the societal role of the organized private sector, the desired model of economic development, and multiculturalism—particularly as it pertains to the opposition of local indigenous communities to major capital investment projects in recent years. This line of inquiry has enabled me to examine how current rounds of resource (re)concentration and accumulation throughout broad regions of the country is effectively coupled with a gradually institutionalized discourse, ethos, and praxis of corporate social responsibility, and a prominent involvement of the business sector in shaping and co-implementing the social policy agenda of the state. I argue that rather than explaining this tension away in terms of a contradiction between elite discourse and practice, the hypocrisy of the powerful, or the ideology of the ruling class, these dual phenomena in fact correspond to key components of an incipient yet seemingly robust form of (neo)liberal governance in Guatemala,

evoked in Swiss billionaire Stephan Schmidheiny's oft-quoted adage that appears as an epigraph to this thesis: "Business cannot succeed in failing societies." According to several of my interviewees, there is a general consensus within the business sector that the country's astronomical rates of poverty, chronic malnutrition, and insecurity not only represent a "disgraceful blight" in a country so well endowed with natural resources and "hardworking people," but are also "terrible for business." Therefore, they assert, a greater and more concerted investment in "human development" is indispensable for achieving "social peace" and the consolidation of a "common national vision" that can finally put the country on a path to development.

Through its well-endowed private foundations, its increasingly influential think-tanks engaged in partnerships with prominent US and European universities, its "multi-sectorial" public-private alliance-building platforms, and a prominent annual business summit (ENADE), a new generation of business leaders from the economic elite has aggressively broken into the public sphere as leading, socially-engaged civil society actors with a technocratic, as much as a philanthropic, vocation.[2] This thesis seeks to elucidate some of the intricacies and tensions of these trends, in such a way that one might begin to outline a framework within which to explain how the intensification of "accumulation by dispossession" throughout the country in recent years, particularly in the northern lowlands and the western highlands (Solano 2013; Alonso-Fradejas 2012;

---

[2] ENADE has featured Latin American ex-presidents Álvaro Uribe, Andrés Pastrana, Julio María Sanguineti, Alejandro Toledo, and most recently Ernesto Zedillo as keynote speakers, and has brought other neoliberal enthusiasts like Spanish ex-president José María Aznar, Ricardo Hausmann of the Kennedy School of Government, and Steve Forbes to discuss themes such as "economic prosperity", "poverty reduction", "security, justice and development", and "human development and social peace."

see also Harvey 2003), and a corresponding increase in militarization and securitization, have seen the parallel rise of a corporate culture of compassionate "solidarity" among the most powerful businesses and their associations. This is visible through their active promotion of public-private development alliances (Oglesby 2013, 146), the forging of "multi-sectorial minimal consensuses," an avowed commitment to "pragmatic," "post-ideological" politics, and an active involvement in the shaping of the government's policy agenda, all of which ostensibly seeks to provide genuine, effective, and sustained responses to some of the most pressing needs of the social majorities. I have termed the elite's emergent model of neoliberal governance "technocratic philanthrocapitalism."

This thesis could have been overdetermined from the start. I harbored sincere doubts that any real insights would emerge from an ethnography of the Guatemalan elite. Yet what my research revealed, and the questions that it now raises, are simultaneously surprising, heartening, and troubling. This is only a preliminary study within a more ambitious project that I hope to continue pursuing through my doctoral research in social anthropology at the University of Texas.

Methodological and ethical considerations of studying the elite

Anthropologists value studying what they like and liking what they study and, in general, we prefer the underdog.

— Laura Nader

As I enter the academy four decades after Laura Nader made her famous plea for studying "up" and "sideways" in anthropology (1972), I am convinced of its pertinence for better understanding contemporary reality in countries like Guatemala. For although

much work on elites has been carried out historically in the social sciences[3], there has been relatively little anthropological and ethnographic work that examines the everyday life, worldviews, inner-workings, cultural dynamics, habitus formations, and self-representations of elites, especially in countries outside of Europe and North America (Abbink & Salvedra 2013). As George Marcus has argued, past research on elites would have benefitted from focusing less on elite organization and more on "the kinds of mental culture—worldviews and outlooks—that differentiated elites from non-elites" (Marcus 183, 13; Krznaric 2003, 30). The scant anthropological scholarship that has been produced about the elite highlights the methodological challenges of such work, especially concerning questions of access, power dynamics, research dissemination and praxis (Oglesby 2009; Smith 2005).

This thesis began as an inquiry into the governance project of the Guatemalan ruling economic elite more than fifteen years after the signing of the Peace Accords in December of 1996. Within this general pursuit, I was interested in elucidating the current status of "multiculturalism"—specifically as it pertains to the rights of the Mayan-majority population—from the perspective of the oligarchy, which has tended to self-identify and is generally perceived to be racially "white" (Casaús Arzú 1992; González Ponciano 2005). I decided early on to approach these two themes obliquely, by framing my research project in terms of the business sector's preferred "national development model." I did this mainly due to two methodological considerations. Firstly, given the ideologically charged nature of "multiculturalism" as a political claim, I did not wish to negatively predispose my interviewees toward me by bluntly broaching a divisive topic

[3] The work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on feudal and emergent bourgeois elites in mid-nineteenth century Europe, the classic sociological theorizations of the elite by Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto, and Robert Michels at the turn of the twentieth century, the writings of Max Weber and Karl Mannheim on the subject-matter, the influential work of C. Wright Mills on the "power elite" in the 1950s and 60s, and the contemporary writings of Pierre Bourdieu are but a few among the most prominent.

on our first (and only) encounter. At the time of my field research, the topic had stirred national controversy and regained public prominence due to the government's proposed constitutional amendment in early 2012. Secondly, in a related sense, I knew that the only way to gain potentially insightful access to the thoughts and attitudes of leading members of the economic elite, in a wide array of topics through one-time, one-hour interviews, would be if they felt as comfortable and empathetic toward me as possible. Therefore, one clear way to contribute to creating such an atmosphere was to frame our conversations around a topic that I knew to be of great interest to their particular worldview: namely, economic development. On the one hand, I safely assumed that "development" would not be a particularly threatening topic of conversation for businessmen, especially those who are publicly active in promoting it. On the other hand, it is a broad enough topic to allow for eliciting other more specific or speculative, and perhaps more sensitive or controversial domains of discussion, including multiculturalism. Finally, to the extent that my interviewees found my demeanor, tone, and line of questioning sympathetic, they would be more likely to "open up" and speak freely about issues such as inequality and racism. As it turned out, and will hopefully be conveyed in this thesis, the approach I have delineated proved effective.

Certainly a more determinant factor that facilitated my access to the individuals that I interviewed was a combination of my personal social position, background, and family ties. Other authors have noted the relative ease with which they gained access to members of the Guatemalan oligarchy. With the exception of Marta Elena Casaús Arzú (1992), who is herself a member of an oligarchical family, most of them have tended to be non-Guatemalans (see, for example, Segovia 2004; Krznaric 2003; Oglesby 2000; McCleary 1999; Yashar 1997; Dosal 1995). For the most part, local researchers find it exceedingly difficult to gain access to this reclusive group of powerful individuals,

especially those members of the elite who are not active in business associations or other semi-public entities.[4] As a native Guatemalan who was raised in the milieu of the economic elite (though certainly not belonging to the oligarchy myself), I have a personal history of contact and exposure to the world that is the ethnographic focus of this investigation. However, social position is necessary but not enough to establish intimate rapport and recognition with members of the oligarchy: being active within its community, that is, taking part in its forms of socialization is equally if not more important (Krznaric 2003, 64). The fact that in the past there have been exceptional cases in which individual oligarchs "defected" and joined the ranks of revolutionary movements is reason enough for most members of the ruling elite to remain guarded, if not outright suspicious toward inquisitive and unfamiliar researchers claiming connections through either kin or circles of friendship. Marta Elena Casaús Arzú's (1992) detailed indictment of oligarchical family networks contributed to instilling a lasting legacy of suspicion toward potential academic "infiltrators" with links to the elite. Given that I significantly distanced myself from that "world" since graduating from high-school in 1998—without severing ties, however—and have mostly lived abroad ever since, was both a potential limitation and an opportunity.

I prepared for my interviews knowing that first impressions would be important, and that in order to "clear the air" and establish rapport it would be additionally advantageous to be perceived as a conocido (literally, "someone familiar," with connections, interchangeable with de buena familia, that is, "from a good family":

[4] It is a common perception among local researchers that foreign scholars are more likely to gain access to members of the oligarchy than non-elite Guatemalans, especially indigenous women. In this sense, the importance of "studying up" was confirmed to me by Maya K'iche' feminist and activist anthropologist Irma Alicia Velásquez Nimatuj, who urged me early on to pursue this project. Among other reasons, she cited the fact that scholars like herself—Guatemalan, indigenous, female, and a public left-aligned intellectual, to boot—simply "cannot dream of" gaining access to many of the people who were on my list of interviewees, especially those who shy away from the public sphere.

euphemisms for upper-class and its racialized correlate, white); del Americano (meaning, from the elite American School of Guatemala, which several of my interviewees, young and old, had also attended); estudiado (meaning college-educated, which carries special weight if one has studied in North America, Europe, or certain select institutions in Latin America, such as the Monterrey Institute of Technology in Mexico, the INCAE Business School in Costa Rica, or the Zamorano Agricultural University in Honduras; I introduced myself as a graduate student from UT-Austin); and presentable (a combination of "properly groomed" and "conservatively-dressed"; I bought a sports jacket, a dress shirt, and a pair of slacks for the occasion, and also cut my hair, shaved off my beard, and removed my piercings). Moreover, the fact that all twelve of my interviewees wound up being men, roughly a third relatively close to me in age (i.e. under forty), and having several mutual acquaintances, helped to create an even greater sense of intimacy, if not complicity, about commonly-held worldviews or presuppositions with regard to the subject-matter of our conversations.

All of this raised challenging methodological and ethical concerns which were never fully resolved and I leave open for future consideration. For instance: I decided early on in my research that even though my interviewees had unanimously granted me permission—after concluding each interview—to publish their names in the final written product, I would not do so.[5] Also, the fact that this thesis is only a preliminary study within a larger project raised questions about the viability of the present analytical scope, the dissemination and processing of results, and the possibility for research continuity with the same subject group. I would like to think that this thesis posits a series of openings for further investigation, and that as such it be approached by readers as a

[5] See figure 1 in the next section for a general distribution of oligarchical families across the main branches of the economy.

critical approximation to, rather than a conclusive interpretation of contemporary forms of power in Guatemala.

THE HISTORICAL CONTINUITY OF THE GUATEMALAN OLIGARCHY

Set in 1860 Sicily, the protagonist Giuseppe Di Lampedusa's 1958 novel *Il Gatopardo*, Tancredi, is a young member of the Sicilian oligarchy who is facing the impending arrival of Garibaldi's Red Shirts at the door of his family's vast landholdings. Knowing that nothing can save the existing feudal order and that the future belongs to the republicans, he pronounces the timeless dictum: "If we want things to stay as they are, things will have to change" (Di Lampedusa 1958: 53).[6]

Who are the oligarchs?

It is as common to read about the Guatemalan "oligarchy" in the literature as it is to hear about it in the streets. Most Guatemalans could probably name at least one or two, if not half a dozen names of families reputed to have directly or indirectly ruled the country "since the beginning". The classic work of Guatemalan historian Severo Martínez-Peláez *La Patria del Criollo: An interpretation of colonial Guatemala* (1970) is a standard reference to understand how the descendants of the Spanish colonists inherited the nation from their forebears, remaining its powerful rulers through independence in 1821, the period of liberal reforms after 1871, and up until the present. Guatemalan sociologist and historian Marta Elena Casaús Arzú, herself a member of a prominent oligarchical family, published another standard reference in 1992, *Guatemala: Linaje y*

[6] *Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga com' è, bisogna che tutto cambi*. Others have also invoked this passage to illustrate how ruling elites tend to adapt to changing times with the purpose of maintaining their power and privileges (see Salverda & Abbink 2013: 4, and Krznaric 2003: 1).

Racismo, a comprehensive study of the economic elite through detailed genealogies of family networks and interviews with over 100 of its representatives. To quote historian Paul Dosal at length:

> Given the paucity of empirical data, it is impossible to determine the existence of an oligarchy by a quantitative means. There is not a Fortune 500 list of the elite that provides accurate information of family wealth. In any case, an oligarchy does not necessarily include only the wealthiest families, for wealth is only one of several characteristics of an oligarchy. In the original definition of Plato and Aristotle, *oligarchy* means "rule by the few," a concise definition that is still widely accepted. Those who rule do not necessarily govern, for they may control government policy without actually administering the state. An oligarchy rules Guatemala, but it has rarely governed it. The oligarchs do not have to administer state institutions to maintain their authority; at times, the oligarchy has delegated a part of its power to either the church or the military, but it has "ruled" since the conquest. Consequently, the term *oligarch* is used almost synonymously with *elite*, and the most durable definition of *elite*, by Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), is those "who have, who have had, or who will have power." The elites are the "dominant group with the wheels of authority at its disposal."
>
> As used by Casaús Arzú and in this book, the oligarchy consists of the family networks that control the means of production: land, labor, commercial institutions, banks, and industries. (Dosal 1995: 3)

Casaús Arzú's (1992) detailed account of the oligarchy was based on over one hundred interviews carried out in 1979 and the genealogical mapping of family networks from the 1500s to the present. Dosal (1995) incorporates the twenty-two family networks that she identifies as the core of the ruling elite, but expands it to fifty, examining the ways in which their economic interests are diversified across agriculture, commerce, industry and finance. Given this diversification, no clear distinction between the landed elite and the industrial bourgeoisie exists in Guatemala, as in El Salvador (Segovia 2004). Some prominent families like Bosch-Gutiérrez and Paiz are not included in either Casaús Arzú or Dosal, having risen to the oligarchy only until the second half of the twentieth

century (Krznaric 2003), yet today among the most powerful and influential within the ruling elite (see Fuentes Knight, 2011).

The general consensus in the literature is that Guatemala has historically had an oligarchy and continues to do so today. Most scholars identify the members of this ruling economic elite in three primary ways: through their economic dominance in agriculture and industry, through their belonging to elite family networks—thus tending to self-identify as "white" or "Euro-descended" (Casaús Arzú 1992; 2011)—and through their participation in business associations that enjoy significant political influence. Furthermore, a key feature of the Guatemalan oligarchy upon which there is also general consensus in the literature is its historical cohesion and continuity (Dosal 1995; Casaús Arzú 1992; Jonas 1991; Martínez Peláez 1971). This is partly attributed to its ability to incorporate new members into its ranks, such as Basque families in the eighteenth century (Casaús Arzú 1992, 295) and German coffee growers in the late nineteenth century (ibid.; Yashar 1997, 39; see also Wagner 1996; Stelzner and Walther 1999). Another factor has been its capacity to overcome internal differences and unite during times of crisis, such as the democratic revolutionary period of 1944-1954 and the political turmoil of the late early and mid-1980s. Equally significant has been the oligarchy's capacity to diversify and restructure its business interests in order to maintain its power. As Edelberto Torres-Rivas (1987) has noted, for instance, in the wake of World War Two and the October Revolution of 1944 the fledgling landowning oligarchy "revived" itself by partially morphing into an industrial bourgeoisie. This early instance of economic branching out into more bourgeois pursuits (such as cattle ranching and industry) prefigured later iterations of the same movement toward modernization in the 1980s and again in the 2000s, which I elaborate in the sections below.

Few scholars of neoliberalism in the postwar period account for the implications of the internal transition in the power structure of the oligarchy in the 1980s, as its center of gravity began to shift from agriculture to industry, commerce, and finance; what Paul Dosal has called "the rise of the industrialists" (1995). As they amassed wealth and married into traditional elite family networks, many so-called industrialists had become part of the oligarchy in the course of the twentieth century, while several traditional *finqueros*—coffee and sugarcane plantation owners, primarily—gradually diversified their investments into industry and finance. Therefore, I argue in this thesis that the gradual displacement in the 1980s and 1990s of the ultraconservative landed oligarchy from its historical role of dominance within the nucleus of the elite (Dosal 1995; Segovia 2004; Casaús Arzú 2011) should highlight the ascendancy of a modernizing faction within the oligarchy, but primarily serve to highlight the capacity for adaptation, self-renewal and continuity of the oligarchy as a whole. This ability to identify the oligarchy in the literature serves as the methodological justification to utilize the category of this specific social group as the object of my research.[7]

The rise of the industrialists in transitional times: a brief history

The more things change, the more they stay the same.
— Jean-Babtiste Alphonse Karr, 1849

Starting with the country's deep constitutional, political, and economic crisis in the early 1980s, the industrialist faction within the oligarchy aggressively pursued market liberalization as a way out of the turmoil. As one of my interviewees explained, the

[7] For analysis of the contemporary Guatemalan oligarchy see Oglesby (2013, 2004, 2000), Krznaric (2003, N/P) McCleary (1999), Valdez and Palencia (1998), Deborah Yashar (1997), Dosal (1995), Casaús Arzú (1992), James Painter (1987), René Pitevin (1977), Carole Snee (1974), Severo Martínez Peláez (1971)

model of Import Substitution Industrialization (ISI) that had driven economic growth through the 1960s and 70s had become unviable, due in large measure to the severe contraction (by over 50 percent) of the Central American Common Market (CACM), which followed the intensification of the Salvadoran civil war and the Sandinista victory in Nicaragua. As international financial institutions (IFIs) like the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Inter American Development Bank (IADB) pressured the military regimes of Lucas-García (1979-82), Ríos-Montt (1982-83), and Mejía-Víctores (1983-1985) to implement austerity and other structural adjustment measures in order to achieve minimal macroeconomic stability, it become clear to the oligarchy that only through a return to civilian rule would the effects of more than a decade of deep corruption and government deficits could lead to an economic turnaround (Segovia 2004), and itself become an active force of governance—and not just of rule—in the country's destiny (Dosal 1995). Furthermore, a commitment to a definitive process of democratization would facilitate market liberalization, while also securing the necessary funding from the US and IFIs, which considered it a necessary prerequisite. According to one of my interviewees—the only one of the twelve who does not belong to the family networks of the oligarchy but who by virtue of being "on its fringe" could provide privileged insights about it (Marcus 1982, 20)—the democratic transition culminated with what he calls a "pact of the elites" (i.e. the oligarchy, the military, and the church). This pact led to a constituent assembly and the drafting of the constitution of 1985, and subsequently to the election of Vinicio Cerezo in 1986, the first civilian president in fifteen years, thus consolidating a return to democratic rule inexistent since 1954.

Like their Salvadoran counterparts, many powerful individuals and families within the Guatemalan oligarchy had seriously considered fleeing the country when they

feared an imminent guerrilla victory during the Lucas administration in the early 80s. "Political instability and widespread violence had provoked a capital flight to the United States of USD 1.1 billion, as the oligarchs prepared to leave their tortured country for the more hospitable environments of Miami and Houston" (Dosal 1995, 158-9), which only further debilitated the national economy. When Ríos-Montt took over the leadership of the military junta that toppled Lucas-García in1982, he offered the organized private sector a deal: if they stayed and re-injected their money into the national economy he would guarantee that private property would not be jeopardized and that taxes would remain fixed (Ibid). He also assured them that he would firmly crack down on the Marxist insurgency, which, as was found by a national court ruling in May 2013 (a ruling that was later overturned), ultimately led to acts of genocide and crimes against humanity through his "scorched earth" campaigns, Victoria 82 and Sofia 83, in the Ixil Region of Quiché (CEH 1999; Casaús Arzú 2011). It is perhaps as a direct result of the counterinsurgency efforts of Ríos Montt that, unlike its Salvadoran counterpart, the Guatemalan elite ultimately did not perceive the threat posed to its integrity and interests by the insurgency as serious enough to merit leaving the country en masse (Segovia 2004; Dosal 1995). Instead, it retrenched and pushed for an economic and political transition that would ultimately guarantee its continuity as the nation's leading power in the long term.

It is in this scenario that the industrialist elite began to embrace structural adjustment and macroeconomic stability, and to concertedly push for a neoliberal deveopment model centered on exports to the much more enticing markets of North America and Europe. As stated above, the modernizing elite also supported democratization, a precondition for economic aid from IFIs, the US, and Europe. Beyond these structural forces one should also acknowledge the unprecedented pressures being

exerted by collective social actors during the same period on the oligarchy, directly or indirectly; for instance, the spectacularly massive strike of over 80,000 sugarcane plantation workers in Santa Lucía Cotzumalguapa in February 1980 (Oglesby 2013, 144), or the protest of an indigenous-campesino coalition numbering over 16,000 in front of the National Palace in 1986, the first year of the Cerezo administration (Perera 1993).

Popular protest, the Mayan movement, and (neoliberal) multiculturalism

The last two decades of the twentieth century constituted a tumultuous, politically transformative period, and we are only now beginning to come to grips with its aftermath. Indigenous struggles coalesced in the mid-80s to form a new political subject, the Maya, thus providing the basis for broad-scaled identity politics that would tensely and productively coexist with the leftist insurgency—embodied in the URNG—until the year 2000 (Bastos & Camus 2013, 83). It has frequently been remarked that the ascendancy of the politics of recognition coincided with the rise of neoliberal globalization (Povinelli 2002). It is equally true that such recognition would be an impossibility were it not for the arduous struggles waged by indigenous peoples to obtain it in the first place. After years of tense and contradictory relations with the Ladino-led insurgent organizations (Bastos & Camus 2013, 79-82), the Mayan movement was able to position its specific and wide-reaching demands in the agenda of the peace negotiations in the early 1990s.

Rigoberta Menchú's Nobel Peace Prize in the emblematic year of the Columbus Quincentennial (1992) signaled a period of inflection in Mayan politics: in 1994 COPMAGUA would emerge as an unprecedented coalition of Mayan organizations that would represent the indigenous majority in the Assembly of Civil Society in the peace

negotiations; in 1996 the Accord on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples would be signed; in 1997 the ratification of ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent States by the Arzú government would be ratified, and with the Peace Accords of 1996 a series of institutional spaces would open up. All of this has led to the acknowledgement of longstanding indigenous demands, forcing open (limited) opportunities for political advancement, and allowing Mayan representatives to begin to get a foothold within the state. Many of them and their supporters have harbored hopes that increased representation might improve the likelihood that more expansive political alternatives can eventually flourish (Hale 2002). In effect, the years following the Peace Accords saw Mayan leaders and representatives occupying more spaces within the state than ever before in history, and almost thirty "Mayan" state offices had been established as of 2008 (Bastos & Camus 2013, 88; AVANCSO 2008).

Meanwhile, hundreds of indigenous-campesino communities and collectivities organized to acquire lands through FONTIERRAS, the World Bank-funded credit-granting state entity meant to facilitate "market-assisted land reform", and created in the framework of the Accord on Socioeconomic Aspects and Agrarian Situation. Although hundreds of communities were finally able to gain lawful access to land, the overwhelming majority of them have not been able to pay off their debts to the state, and remain bitterly frustrated by the lack of institutional support necessary to turn those lands into economically viable assets that can lead to prosperous and sustainable futures (CCARC 2010; Velásquez Nimatuj 2013). What Charles Hale has termed neoliberal multiculturalism has served as a key theoretical framework from which to apprehend and strategically engage the complex contradictions of contemporary Guatemalan governance (Hale 2006, 2011; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008).

In the aftermath of the 1999 Referendum that was voted down on whether or not to institutionalize the reforms proposed in the Peace Accords with regard to the specific rights of Mayan, Xinca, and Garífuna (Afro-Carib) peoples; as Mayan leaders occupying spaces within the State became increasingly isolated from their grassroots bases of support; and as the coffee-plantation regime crumbled, thus accelerating the neoliberal transition to the emergent, (neo)extractivist economic model, indigenous local communities being threatened by the encroachment of big capital into their territories started to emerge as the new protagonists of Mayan adversarial politics in the second decade of the post-peace period (Bastos & Camus 2013; Brett 2007).

The Young Turks: rich, white, bright & globalized

> They are the generation of change; will they become revolutionaries or will they be the engine of [economic] growth?
>
> — Santiago P.

> Today it is no longer a discussion between left and right, but between those of us who are moving forward and those who are moving backward.
>
> — Santiago B.

When the Peace Accords were signed in December of 1996, twenty-two-year-old Santiago P. was finishing up his bachelor's degree in finance and information systems management (with honors) from the Wharton School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania and heading to New York to do investment banking. Meanwhile, his contemporary and tocayo (homonym) Santiago B. was completing his degree in chemical engineering at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT).[8] Both of them had graduated from the American School of Guatemala a few years earlier and would go on to get their MBAs from the MIT Sloan School of Business and Harvard Business School,

[8] All the names of interviewees in this thesis have been changed.

respectively. Today, both of them are among the World Economic Forum's Young Global Leaders, "a unique, multi-stakeholder community of more than 700 exceptional young leaders [under 40] who share a commitment to shaping the global future." Santiago P. is founder, president and CEO of the investment firm that negotiated his family's retail giant's merger with Wal-Mart Stores. He now sits on the Board of Directors of Wal-Mart Mexico-Central America. Santiago B. is Head of New Businesses at Pantaleón Sugar Holdings, being "responsible for all strategic and growth investments, mergers and acquisitions, and energy and biofuels businesses," according to his profile in the WEF website. White, privileged, and clean-cut, they hold patrician surnames yet fashion themselves as the Young Turks of the Guatemalan oligarchy: a new generation that is committed to modernization, democracy, development, equality of opportunities, and to reducing the country's staggering social inequality. They partly attribute their social vocation to the fact that they came of age after the country's ideologically polarizing and traumatic war. Even though they could easily have made a successful living abroad, they returned to Guatemala committed to "give back" and "make a difference." They are both on the board of trustees of the private sector's most influential think-tank, FUNDESA, the Foundation for the Development of Guatemala. They consider themselves pragmatists; they are firm believers in "minimal consensuses" across social, ideological and ethnic divides; they are highly motivated and ambitious; and they see themselves participating actively in the country's public life for years to come. In short, they are prominent trailblazers of corporate citizenship and what I am terming here technocratic philanthrocapitalism.

THE RISE OF TECHNOCRATIC PHILANTHROCAPITALISM

The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits.

—Milton Friedman (1970)

The prevailing development paradigm—according to which market-oriented economic policies and the rule of law alone suffice to make all countries rich—appears to be losing credibility.

—Ricardo Hausmann (2001)[9]

Ha sido hasta chistoso, pues, porque a mí uno de estos—para no mencionar el santo pero sí el milagro, ¿verdad, vos?—de los más, pero más tirados a la izquierda, me dice: "Puchis, ¡pero vos las cosas que decís pareciera que sos más izquierdoso que uno!"

—Santiago P., Young Global Leader
World Economic Forum
(interviewed 08/30/12)

The tone of the Davos meetings is now predominantly set by the group of entrepreneurs who ironically refer to themselves as 'liberal communists' and who no longer accept the opposition between Davos and Porto Alegre: their claim is that we can have the global capitalist cake, i.e., thrive as profitable entrepreneurs, and eat it, too, i.e., endorse the anti-capitalist causes of social responsibility and ecological concern. No need for Porto Alegre, since Davos itself can become Porto Davos.

— Slavoj Žižek (2008, 16)

Business cannot succeed in a failing society.

— Stephan Schmidheiny, Swiss Billionaire
(As quoted by young leaders of the
Guatemalan oligarchy, 2012)

I knew Santiago B. socially because he had graduated a few years ahead of me from high school and we had mutual acquaintances. I remembered him as student body president of 1993, a year before I entered secondary school (eighth grade). I phoned a friend and got his mobile number and email address. I wrote him a short message referencing our mutual acquaintance and asking if he remembered me. I explained that I was carrying out research on "development models" for a master's thesis in Latin American Studies and would like to interview him, since he was a prominent business

[9] Advisor to FUNDESA and personal mentor to Santiago P., he is currently Director of the Harvard Center for International Development (a post previously held by Jeffrey Sachs), he is former chief economist at the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and former minister of planning in Venezuela (1992-1993).

leader working at one of the most powerful and influential Guatemalan corporations. He responded almost immediately from his Blackberry, saying that "of course" he remembered me and would be glad to talk.

On Tuesday, August 28th, I headed to Las Margaritas Conference and Business Center on Diagonal 6, in zone 10: the very heart of the financial and business district of the city. Between the two imposing towers—at eighteen stories each, they are skyscrapers by Guatemalan standards—sat a nondescript three-story building: the headquarters of Pantaleón. The Herrera family has owned the company since 1849, and they are still the largest sugar producers in Guatemala and the largest in Latin America outside of Brazil. They also happen to own a large swath of zone 10, including Las Margaritas. I walked through thick, bulletproof glass doors and checked in at an old vestibule (it was not big enough to be called a lobby). After a few moments I was buzzed into the interior of the building. Once inside, I was thrown off by the brightness; for a second I thought I might have stepped outdoors again. The building was designed around a central patio with an overhead skylight almost the size of the roof, which bathed the entire place in natural light. In the middle lay an exuberant tropical garden that adorned the centerpiece sitting at the focal point of the building: a very large pre-Columbian Mayan stela. It had been retrieved at the site of the company's main southern coast plantation and was legally under the its custodial care as national cultural patrimony. I wondered how many people—how many Mayans, especially—had been inside this building and seen it. I walked toward Santiago's office on the ground floor, and found him sitting behind a large desk made of precious caoba (Guatemalan mahogany). On the side wall I recognized a large painting by renowned modernist artist, architect, urban planner, and designer of the country's National Theater, Efraín Recinos, a.k.a. "Macho Loco", who had passed away a few months earlier.

"Ever since I returned to Guatemala my vision has been to contribute to the development of the country," Santiago explained after recounting his formative years in the Ivy League. He continued,

> …I faithfully believe that part of that contribution toward development passes through the creation of job opportunities. […]
>
> But aside from that I started to become more and more involved in different issues. For one thing, having had access to education, and the value that this has had in my own life, made me want to get involved in education advocacy. With a group of friends I started a non-profit run by youth that was called Juvea, which sought to facilitate opportunities to disadvantaged children and youth with scholarships, supported a community in Cobán, etc.
>
> Along the way, I was invited to participate in the *Consejo de Empresarios por la Educación* (Council of Entrepreneurs for Education), which is a private entity concerned about education-related public policy. Throughout the last several years it has done much advocacy for the improvement of Guatemala's educational system, particularly the public school system. During the government of Óscar Berger and during the work of María del Carmen Aceña in the [Education] Ministry I had the chance to help her in different efforts, from participating in a multi-sector effort called *Visión Educación* that sought to establish a consensus around a certain vision of the educational system in the country with different sectors, as well as other projects that sought to implement technology in the public school system.
>
> I continue to participate in *Empresarios por la Educación* and a few years ago I was invited to participate in the Board of Trustees of the Del Valle de Guatemala Foundation, which is a non-profit entity that brings together a series of educational institutions, schools and universities. […] and a few years ago I was also invited to form a part of the Board of Trustees of FUNDESA, which is the Foundation for the Development of Guatemala, an entity of more than twenty-five years, [focused on] issues of long-term development.
>
> […] Additionally, an initiative had emerged ten years ago called the *Encuentro Nacional de Emprearios* (National Business Summit), which seeks to be an annual forum in which topics of national relevance are discussed, revolving around development. There, two years ago it became clear that development has different facets, one of which is poverty reduction. So poverty reduction has become a challenge that we have all taken on—instead of having it be a topic for the government or another [social] sector to confront [alone]. And it was at that

> ENADE in 2010 where a process got launched in which FUNDESA seeks, well, to propose an integral agenda for development, not only focused on what we could call productive development—economic development proper—but also understanding that for the country and our future to be viable there also needs to be *social* development, there has to be an improvement in the security and justice situation, and along the way we need to strengthen institutions—public and private—to support the process.
>
> So we started a process for which we brought world-class experts [such as Ricardo Hausmann of Harvard], we worked with local research centers, and we carried out a very participatory process throughout 2011 in order to put together this agenda for integral development, and I personally had the opportunity, somehow, to coordinate the effort.

A central explanation for Guatemala's lack of progress and prosperity, according to Santiago, is the unfortunate—yet "understandable"—polarizing legacy of the Cold War and our own Internal Armed Conflict. He is convinced that in order to overcome the country's significant divisions and hurdles a culture of "trust" needs to be cultivated across "sectors." In this sense, he invoked the *Consejo Económico y Social* (Economic and Social Council) as an important and unprecedented effort to begin the process of creating "multi-sector pacts" (*concertaciones multisectoriales*). The CES is presided by Gustavo Porras, a former intellectual and militant of the Marxist insurgency, then Presidential Secretary during the Arzú administration (1996-2000), heading that government's Peace Commission (COPAZ) during the negotiations and signing of the Peace Accords. The CES is comprised of representatives from the organized business sector, the workers' unions, and cooperatives, and it is this internal composition that people like the two Santiagos and others cite as irrefutable evidence of the social legitimacy of the agreements that emerge from it. As Santiago B. put it,

> I think that part of the… main obstacle has been not being able to have a common vision as a society. […] It's important to acknowledge that we've had a very turbulent and dark past, but that if we really want to improve the situation of the country we can't continue to be tied to the past, but look forward instead. And

> looking forward would at some point entail that as a society we could have a shared vision and say: 'Well, this is what we want as a country'.

Moral pragmatism, global validation, and the post-ideological "consensus"

When I subsequently interviewed Santiago P., I asked him if he had ever personally participated in any of the much vaunted trust-building initiatives that I kept hearing about. His face lit up as he responded:

> Ah, absolutely! The best example is the case of *Tejedores* (Weavers)—I don't know if Santiago B. talked to you a little bit about it *Tejedores*—but it was an effort that we launched from FUNDESA as part of the broader initiative of *Guatemaltecos Mejoremos Guatemala* (Guatemalans, Let's Improve Guatemala). We understood that if we didn't build spaces of dialogue with people that weren't necessarily in our own sector, that don't necessarily think exactly like we do, we would continue to have a conversation by ourselves, and that is absolutely useless.
>
> So we created *Tejedores*, a space that today, well, walks by itself. All we had to do was get it started. "*Ajq'em Tejedores*," is the full name—we wanted to incorporate the whole indigenous theme, you know. Participants range from a confessed former guerrilla to Felipe Bosch, president of FUNDESA and ex-president of CACIF. You have a wonderful spectrum of people there who each think in their own distinct ways: church representatives, university representatives, indigenous representatives… there's an ecologist, I mean, right? It's a super interesting salad mix. And we created a very deliberate process of trust-building, in which we talk about… we do collective readings!
>
> In fact, we took the whole group to Boston to the Kennedy School and got a few lectures from professors there, and where we engaged in these collective readings: we read Gandhi, for example, we read all kinds of conflicts (sic) or readings about how these problems have been experienced and have been resolved in other countries, right? It's an… orthogonal scheme, or methodology, to grapple with the problems of Guatemala—because even though we don't talk about the problems of Guatemala in the group, we really are talking about the problems of Guatemala, you know what I mean? That way, by talking about the methodology that was used in South Africa or the methodology that was used in India or whatever, it winds up being less threatening for the participants.

> So it's been a space where I've truly seen people lower their guard, where real dialogue takes place, where, let's say, the… you know, it's funny because, well, one of the—I'll mention the saint but not the miracle, right!?—one of the [guys] most aligned with the left said to me: "Jeez, the things you say, it almost seems like you're more of a lefty than me, even!" Right? So it's been an opportunity to have, let's say, sincere dialogue. And when there's dialogue, well, there's space to find solutions, I think, right? That's part of what we need as a country.

His invocation of Gandhi and of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, and especially his giddy reveling in being teased by a former guerrilla fighter for being a "lefty" immediately brings to mind Slavoj Žižek's satirical portrait of what he calls the "liberal communist" (2008, 24). Žižek begins by asking rhetorically, "where have all the bright stars of Porto Alegre gone?"—meaning the "stars" of the World Social Forum in the Brazilian city where it originated. He answers his own question: "Some of them, at least, went to Davos" (15)—that is, the luxury resort in the Swiss alps that hosts the World Economic Forum. I believe a similar point could be made about individuals who have shifted in the opposite direction: that is, rising "stars" of Davos, i.e. entrepreneurial corporate leaders, who have drifted slightly to the left (meaning, to the center), just like Santiago P. After all, he himself is a "star" of Davos in his own right, named Young Global Leader by the World Economic Forum in 2009. In some ways, the young technocratic philanthrocapitalists of Guatemala resemble Žižek's "liberal communists":

> What increasingly gives the predominant tone to Davos meetings is the group of entrepreneurs, some of whom ironically refer to themselves as 'liberal communists,' who no longer accept the opposition between Davos (global capitalism) and Porto Alegre (the new social movements' alternative to global capitalism). Their claim is that we can have the global capitalist cake, i.e. thrive as profitable entrepreneurs, and eat it, too, i.e., endorse the anti-capitalist causes of social responsibility and ecological concern. No need for Porto Alegre, since Davos itself can become Porto Davos.
>
> […] Liberal communists like examples such as the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. They point out that the decision of some large international

> corporations to ignore apartheid rules in their South African companies, abolishing all segregation, paying blacks and whites the same salary for the same job, and so on, was as important as the direct political struggle. Is this not an ideal case of the overlapping between the struggle for political freedom and business interests? The self-same companies can now thrive in post-apartheid South Africa.

The following sentence is key, for I believe it very closely resembles the posture of Guatemalan "progressive oligarchs"—an analogous but more contextually-appropriate oxymoron than "liberal communists"—such as my interviewees regarding the "old" landed oligarchy and the "fundamentalist" Mayan activists who seek to "Balkanize" the country and sow divisionism:

> Both the old right, with its ridiculous belief in authority and order and parochial patriotism, and the old left with its capitalized Struggle against Capitalism, are today's true conservatives fighting their shadow-theatre struggles and out of touch with the new realities. The signifier of this new reality in the liberal communist Newspeak is 'smart': smart indicates the dynamic and nomadic as against centralized bureaucracy; dialogue and cooperation against hierarchical authority; flexibility against routine; culture and knowledge against old industrial production; spontaneous interaction and autopoiesis against fixed hierarchy. (18)

The spirit that prevails today in organizations such as the WEF, the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and even the UN's Development Program resemble quite closely the spirit that I encountered among some of the young business leaders of FUNDESA, CENTRARSE (the Center for Corporate Social Responsibility), and even CACIF. Although I cannot claim that all or even most members of the business elite have embraced this brand of corporate modernization, the fact that its last two presidents have sought to converge with the long-term plans of FUNDESA and the business ethic of CENTRARSE—is certainly indicative of a movement in that direction. Two thousand thirteen saw one of the most dramatic crises that the oligarchy has had to face in recent years with the trial against former head of state Efraín Ríos Montt, accused

of genocide and crimes against humanity. For several months Guatemala saw itself in the mirror, as ideological positions hardened and flared up, revealing the deep polarization that still divides society. When several former leftist militants who later served in the entrepreneurial governments of Álvaro Arzú (1996-2000) and Óscar Berger (2005-2009), including Gustavo Porras and Eduardo Stein, signed a communiqué condemning the trial as a "juridical fabrication" that maliciously intended to sow seeds of divisionism and reopen old wounds, the reactions were equally polarized and emotional.

According to William Godnick, policy advisor on Latin America to International Alert (Valdez and Monzón 2007, ix-xiv), a consensus emerged between international organizations at the end of the Cold War with regard to the role of the private sector in (post)conflict zones. It asserts the predominance of the free market economy and business-led growth as a route to economic development. This paradigm has since become generalized. The assumption is that the business sector will trigger a "virtuous cycle" of economic growth that will lead to poverty reduction, while contributing to the consolidation of lasting peace.[10] Thus, while external agents like governments, international organizations and NGOs are seen to play an important role in transitional periods such as Guatemala's, there is practically unanimous consensus about the fact that the main responsibility in the peace building process falls on local actors and civil society, including the business sector (ibid, xiii). Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the genocide trial and the prevalence of mining and hydroelectric conflicts in indigenous communities, the theme of the ENADE 2013 business forum was "Human Development and Social Peace: Without Divisions, We Multiply".

---

[10] Proponents of this model include the Canadian Agency for International Development, the Norwegian Agency for Cooperation for Development, the Commission on Private Sector and Development of UNDP, the British Ministry for International Cooperation, the World Bank, the Swedish Agency for International Development, among the most prominent (Valdez and Monzón 2007, xi).

Unlike Žižek's hypothetical "liberal communists," the business leaders I interviewed are not former leftists who have come to terms with market capitalism in the neoliberal age, and thus moved to the right. Rather, they could be imagined as moving from the anti-communist, counterinsurgent conservative ranks of their parents and grandparents toward a liberal-progressive middle-ground where they can meet with former guerrilla combatants, union leaders, and "moderate" indigenous leaders. Hence, Žižek's sketch winds up being even more fitting for those former guerrilla leaders and intellectuals, the union leaders, and cooperative representatives who make up the much vaunted "multi-sectorial platforms" for building "minimum consensuses" around "pressing social issues of national interest". Platforms like the *Consejo Económico Social*. This emerging group of young business leaders and former leftists is ideologically consolidating a notion of political progressiveness that is based on a kind of post-ideological moral pragmatism.

"I'm a pragmatist, not a dogmatist," insisted Santiago B. during our conversation. "I'm a problem solver! […] We need to be more pragmatic and less ideological," exclaimed the president of a major bank, who is also a major cattle rancher and African oil palm producer in the Sayaxché region of Petén. "We have to move beyond the 'dialectical platforms' that keep us mixed up in never-ending discussions […] away from those groups who have turned development into an ideological issue (*lo han ideologizado*)," energetically argued a financier and commercial titan. In the words of Žižek,

> Liberal communists are pragmatic. They hate a doctrinaire approach. For them there is no single exploited working class today. There are only concrete problems to be solved: starvation in Africa, the plight of Mulsim women, religious fundamentalist violence. When there is a humanitarian crisis in Africa—and liberal communists really love humanitarian crises, which bring out the best in them!—there is no point in engaging in old-style anti-imperialist

> rhetoric. Instead, all of us should just concentrate on what really does the work of solving the problem: engage people, governments, and business in a common enterprise, start moving things, instead of relying on centralized state help; approach the crisis in a creative and unconventional way, without fretting over labels. (18-19)

The language of building trust and reaching consensuses is of course very much a part of the corporate citizenship model that has been advanced by institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank for the past several years (Oglesby 2013; 2004; Valdez and Monzón 2007). Santiago B. had previously explained to me the importance of the connection between these cross-sector initiatives among parties of differing ideological standpoints and the spread of a culture of corporate social responsibility among the country's largest companies:

> In order to operate as a business you need a certain *social license* that is associated with the care of the environment, maintaining good relations with [indigenous local] communities, offering dignified jobs, treating your collaborators [i.e. employees] well. Some business leaders truly believe in this model in principle while others view it as self-interested, good business sense. In the end, the reasons don't really matter as long as it's becoming the dominant corporate culture. Hence the success of groups like CENTRARSE—the Center for Corporate Social Responsibility—where more and more businesses are participating, and where there's an increasing understanding of the broader implications of all of this.
>
> […] The important thing is that this change in business *attitude* is becoming generalized.

I did not want to take this claim at face value, coming as it did from Santiago B., who exudes optimism and seems to be genuinely committed to this progressive turn in business practices. I was (and continue to be) skeptical of the sincerity and the scope of its embrace by the broader private sector. Moreover, the sugar industry, with Pantaleón

at the helm, is known to be exceptional in this regard, having initiated a process of internal industrialization and labor restructuring as early as the 1980s, partly in response to mounting pressure from its massive workforce (Oglesby 2000; 2004; 2013). But was Pantaleón in fact an exception to the rule? I wanted to find out if this "attitude change"—a veritable progressive turn, by all appearances—was in fact spreading to other sectors within the economic elite, and particularly among the agroindustrialists. So I decided to interview the president of CAMAGRO (*Cámara del Agro*), the business association of the agricultural and livestock industry, a man who belongs to the largest and most powerful African oil palm-producing emporium in the country, and the founder of its trade association, GREPALMA (*Gremial de Palmicultores*), which is also part of CACIF. I also interviewed his cousin, the man who actually heads the HAME/Olmeca Oils empire, with plantation holdings of well over 60,000 hectares (Solano 2011). African oil palm is today by far the fastest-growing mega-monocrop in the national territory, expanding at a rate of approximately ten thousand hectares per year (Solano 2011; Palencia Prado 2013).[11] The ecological effects of this expansion of the so-called agricultural frontier into the rainforest region of the northern lowlands (Petén, Quiché, Alta Verapaz, and Izabal), as well as its impact on Maya-Q'eqchi' communities has been extensively documented in recent years (see especially Congcoop-Idear 2009 and Alonso Fradejas 2013, 2012, 2010, 2008). Yet the question remained: was the discourse found on the GREPALMA website and its advertising campaigns merely public relations propaganda to respond to mounting critiques of its corporate practices? Or is there a genuine commitment to the kinds of labor practices and social investment that has characterized the sugar industry?

[11] This number was also provided by the CAMAGRO president in our interview.

As a conceptual preamble before launching into specifics, I asked each of my interviewees what they understood development to be. Most of the answers were generic: respect for the rule of law, more infrastructure, industrialization, economic growth ("at least six percentage points above population growth"), full (formal) employment, lower mortality and morbidity rates, higher literacy rates and more education, a general improvement in the standard of living, and, across the board, "equality of opportunities." Part of the reason I wanted to start with this question, despite—or perhaps because—of my expectation to hear rote answers, was to confirm that the *telos* of any particular development "model" is generally the same: a linear progression toward Western modernity (Escobar 1995; Esteva 1998; Sachs 2003), or at least a "tropicalized version of it," as one of my interviewees put it. However, what is most interesting is not the definition per se, but the particular emphases or inflections with which each interviewee gave his answer. Some of them were frankly surprising, especially given the industries that some of them represented. For instance, the single-largest producer of African oil palm in the country—one of the biggest and fastest-growing in Latin America—is reputed to be implacable and cunning in his business practices. In the next section I examine some of the trends in land-control grabbing and accumulation, most of it revolving around this crop and sugarcane for agrofuels. I asked him why he thought there was so much recent opposition to major capital investments, and I was surprised by his answer and the forcefulness with which he delivered it:

> *Mirá, vos*, I think there are several factors. I think… how should I put this? There are ideological factors that continue to be there, leftover *guerrilleros*—and I don't mean *ex-guerrilleros*, because these guys continue to pursue the same agenda—there are these *guerrilleros* who continues with their agenda to attack the productive sector, come what may, ¿*verdad, vos*? They attack mining, they attack crops, they attack improved seeds, they attack… everything! That is, they would like the country to hit reverse instead of moving forward. That's one thing.

> But then there's… how should I put it, *vos*? There's an opposition—not an opposition—there's a rising up of legitimate voices demanding improvements in social conditions. I mean, this *has* to happen in this country. I think as business owners we have to be very clear that if Guatemalan society does not improve, our days here are numbered. Because there's going to be a social explosion that I have no idea where it can take us. I mean, we have to be very clear: we need to do better than this. That's why I'm telling you it's not only about creating jobs; its about creating dignified and well-paid jobs. Not having people in precarious conditions, *¿verdad?*

Then I asked each of them to tell me what they considered to be the primary obstacle to development today. Here the answers were a bit more varied and somewhat revealing of a shift in elite sensibilities and outlook. One of my interviewees, an industrialist and financier who heads, along with his cousin, what is perhaps the most powerful and wealthiest corporate conglomerate in the country, with diversified transnationalized interests in all sectors of the economy, from banking and finance to commerce, construction, energy, agroindustry, and services, including a famous fast-food franchise, said the following:

> The main problem is the lack of a proper conception of the state by the elites. That is to me the most important problem.

When I asked if he could elaborate, he continued:

> When we see the moment that Guatemala is living through and we take a close look at its most critical indexes: around 50 percent [of people] living in poverty; close to 50 percent of our children, for several generations already, are suffering from a degree of chronic malnutrition that has dramatically compromised their proper development, their intellectual capacity. That is, all of it, taken together: the poverty, the underdevelopment. That is our reality. Then, the absence of the state: the lack of institutions that can respond to the needs and the problems of society; the lack of a political party system that can rise to circumstances and fulfill the objectives for which a modern political party should exist: to be inclusive, to have ideas and projects, to embrace the possibility of governing responsibly. And then we see how far we are from growing our economy at the rate that we require. To develop a country it must grow its economy six

percentage points above population growth. [...] We are a country that doesn't work.

The emphasis on the active role that the economic elite must play in shaping a common vision for the country, designing and proposing public policy, and leading "the nation" on the path to development, is certainly a shift from the libertarianism that had characterized elite discourse for close to three decades, the legacy of influential "Chicago Boy" and oligarch Manuel "Muso" Ayau, founder of the conservative Francisco Marroquín University and a personal student of Milton Friedman. The fact that the oligarchy is directly or indirectly (e.g. through its private foundations) investing in social programs makes this shift all the more patent. When I asked another interviewee what the social role of the private sector should be, he exclaimed:

> Look, I think it's really interesting to look at the role that the organized private sector *is* playing: through a very clear proposal, through social investment aimed to develop a real long-term roadmap for the development of the country, with a super clear vision of the fact that, as Schmidheiny said, "in failed societies there are no successful enterprises."[12] So I truly believe that the private sector is

---

[12] This phrase was repeatedly quoted verbatim or paraphrased by several of my interviewees when discussing the societal role that the business sector should play in society. The Social Enterprise Knowledge Network was an initiative of AVINA, a foundation created by Stephan Schmidheiny, a fourth-generation member of a wealthy industrial dynasty in Switzerland, as the social arm of its enterprises. He was the principal leader of the initiative that led to the creation of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). AVINA is promoter of the Central American Agenda for Competitiveness (*Agenda Centroamericana de Competitividad*) with the Central American Institute for Business Administration, INCAE (Costa Rica), and the philosophy that underpins it. This foundation is financed by Viva Trust, which in turn bought Grupo Nueva, a holding company integrated by three large enterprises: Masisa (wood), Amanco (piping systems) and Plycem (fiber cement), employing more than 17,000 workers, and whose former owner is Schmidheiny. It has 21 headquarters in Latin America. AVINA became associated with Harvard Business School and business professor James Austin to create in 2001 the Social Enterprise Knowledge Network. Its objective is to develop knowledge and practical skills in "social enterprises in Latin America," "through joint research, shared learning, and teaching on the basis of specific case studies and the strengthening of the capacities of institutions dedicated to executive training to serve the needs of their communities" (Stephan Schmidheiny, in Austin, et. al., 2005, xxiv). The network, an example of cooperation between private business, academia and social organizations, is made up of diverse Latin American universities that teach business administration. (Valdez and Monzón 2007, 37-8)

In early 2012 Schmidheiny was sentenced to eighteen years of imprisonment, convicted of gross negligence for exposing his employees and customers to asbestos. One could hardly find a more compelling

> leaving behind—at least what is stereotypically thought to be—its role to only look out for its own interests, right?, and is really taking on these issues. In fact the title of the proposal is "The reduction of poverty in Guatemala" through these kinds of actions.

I then asked if he could elaborate on the contents of the proposal, and he provided a comprehensive summary of the current consensual long-term project that was designed by FUNDESA, the influential think tank of which Santiago P. is vice-president. It was publicly presented in the ENADE forum of 2012 and has subsequently been appropriated by CACIF and all other important entities across the business sector as the "roadmap" for national development, and its active role in making it a reality:

> The project and the platform of *Guatemaltecos Mejoremos Guatemala* looks to, basically, push forward the different axes that we consider to be important. First, what we call the axis of Prosperity, everything to do with the motors of development at the macro level, at the micro level, productive chains, the bottlenecks for economic development. We undertook an enormous job with 23 different sectors, 300 different business people, through a standard methodology in a standard timeframe—something that had never been done in Guatemala—a real consultancy, sector by sector, to understand by asking, 'So, in *your* sector, where are the bottlenecks that are keeping you from growing at twice the current rate of growth? And your sector… And your sector…' And having that 'map' you can begin to identify crosscutting issues—like physical infrastructure, electricity, education, for example… the issue of security—which would help each sector to grow more rapidly.
>
> The other axis is the whole theme of Solidarity. And there, obviously, we've first prioritized chronic malnutrition, because if you don't resolve that, then there is no subsequent capacity for learning. So it would be useless—well, it's not that it would be useless, but—in the end, you sequentially have to resolve the issue of chronic malnutrition first so that then children can get to school ages with a brain that has the capacity to absorb knowledge and really participate in a process of active learning, right? So there's a lot of emphasis on chronic malnutrition, followed by the issue of education, which is obviously another big one, another bottleneck for our country in terms of development.

---

cautionary tale of the contradictions inherent to the social business model and the phenomenon that I have been calling technocratic philanthrocapitalism throughout this thesis.

> If you have a change, last Thursday I wrote an op-ed column precisely trying to tie together the issues of education and employability. […] And that column is a summary of a longer article that is going to be jointly published by USAID, CACIF and several other organizations on the issue of juvenile violence and things like that. Because my postulate is that if you don't offer youth job opportunities, well, that derives into social instability, right? And those kinds of things.
>
> Revolutions, the great revolutions in the world, very often have had that component, right? Youth having no access to opportunities. But then on the one hand there is the creation of those job opportunities, and on the other there's the question of whether they have the necessary minimum competences to opt for those jobs. Because you can generate a bunch of jobs but if they don't have the competences, there's no *fit*. So it's not just job creation: you have to resolve both issues simultaneously. And that's where vocational training comes in, the third part of the Solidarity axis.
>
> Lastly, perhaps, in this platform, is the axis of Security and Justice, grouped with institution building (*fortalecimiento institucional*). We take this to be incredibly important. In fact, I have a study from the Kennedy School in which they identify security as the binding variable, the principal barrier to growth and economic development in the country, for many reasons: it scares off investment, it entails a very significant cost—today 7.3 percent of GDP is invested in security and justice and it doesn't even necessarily pass through the state, right? Security and justice in this country are improvised pretty recklessly: private security, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera.
>
> In addition, there's an interesting thesis floating around that part of what has prevented migration from rural areas to the urban centers in the country's provinces has been the security factor: the fear that in those urban centers, like the capital city, are not safe, "So I rather stay in the countryside, even if I'm worse off economically… because at least there I'll be safe."

There is no reason to conclude that predatory capital accumulation necessarily precludes a simultaneous process of "progressive" liberal democratization; the fact is that they historically tend to be mutually constitutive processes. If the project of the elite is to genuinely pursue national economic development, then the processes of predatory dispossession that we are also witnessing would constitute—from that perspective—the

"unavoidable underbelly" of industrialization, "progress," and modern subject formation. But this will be explored further below.

A double structural shift? On the new axes of accumulation

> Cuando tan pocos tienen tanto y la mayoría carece
> de los bienes básicos, el riesgo de una conflagración
> se encuentra en permanente gestación.
> — General Eugenio Laugerud García, 1975

An account of technocratic philanthrocapitalism would be inadequate without at least a summary review of structural economic relations, and specifically current observable tendencies of capital accumulation. The obvious question at this point would be the following: Is there a contradiction between the "progressive turn" in business elite discourse and corporate practice that I have been delineating so far and the processes of capital accumulation taking place in vast regions of the country? Do these trends constitute two distinct and contrasting "projects" of the economic elite, or are they in fact two converging processes in a single emergent project of governance? These are questions to which I can only offer a preliminary and inevitably tentative response, since they call for further research.

Scholars have argued that today's main sources of capital accumulation revolve around three axes: megaprojects (the construction of major infrastructure such as roads and highways, bridges, airports, seaports; as well as call centers, corporate tourism, malls, technological corridors, hydroelectric power plants); the agroindustrial production of mega-monocrops for agrofuels, and; extraction and commercialization of natural resources (extractive industry) (Solano 2011; Palencia Prado xxx; Alonso-Fradejas xxx). Due to the nature of these industries, they entail a great deal of land, resources, and

infrastructure, and they tend to be located in regions of vast biological and cultural diversity, such as the *Franja Transversal del Norte* in the northern lowlands, as well as in the western highlands (Solano 2013). Their steady, swooping encroachment into these regions has triggered an upsurge of community mobilizations, which national indigenous-campesino organizations such as the *Comité de Unidad Campesina* (CUC) and the *Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas* (CNOC) have rallied behind.

Scholars have characterized this general trend as a "structural break" in the traditional axes of capital accumulation, starting in the 1980s (Dosal 1995; Segovia 2004; Velásquez Nimatuj 2008; Palencia Prado 2013). Among the main causes were the crisis of the Central American Common Market, the collapse of traditional export crops (notably coffee), the increase in the price of oil, the introduction of structural adjustment policies and the heightened social tensions propelled by armed conflicts in the entire region (Palencia Prado 2013). This period thus provided an opportunity for the traditional landed oligarchy to apply strategies of adjustment to take advantage of the emergent axes of accumulation, but also for the rise of an industrializing elite with a clear orientation toward the globalizing market economy. Thus, the relative displacement of the traditional landed oligarchy from the center of power between the 1980s and the early 2000s, which I described above as "the rise of the industrialists," signaled a transition away from the primary sector of the economy toward the secondary and tertiary sectors (manufacturing, services, finance, tourism, etc.) as the main sources of GDP growth (Dosal 1995; Segovia 2004).

More recently, however, the primary sector has seen a boom throughout the region, as agribusiness, mining, and energy have become key enterprises for significant national and foreign direct investment, and today in fact constitute "the new axes of capital accumulation" (Palencia Prado 2013). This "return" of capital to the countryside

has triggered yet new rounds of accumulation by dispossession through land-control grabbing (Alonso-Fradejas xxx; see also Harvey xxx; Read xxx; Glassman xxx), while the construction of large-scale infrastructures is reshaping social space in strategic regions of the country and extending interlocking grids for the circulation of capital, information, and people, particularly in the *Franja Transversal del* (Solano 2013, xx; Penelope Harvey 2012, 81). Hence the questions posed above, and yet another: Was there no such "structural break", after all? Does this "return" to the primary sector signify the analogous return of the old recalcitrant landed oligarchy to the center of power? My answers to these questions are less tentative.

Consider the graph below: it depicts elite family distribution throughout the main branches of enterprise, illustrating their dynamism and interconnectedness across the economy. Of the twelve men that I interviewed, eleven belong to these family networks either directly or through (inter)marriage:



Source: Palencia Prado 2013, p.15

What is important to underscore here once again is the crucial fact that all transitions of power within the oligarchy that can be deduced for analytical purposes—whether from the landed oligarchy to the industrialists (Dosal 1995; Segovia 2004; Casaús Arzú 2011; Palencia Prado 2013), or from the industrialists to the agroindustrialists—are all transitions involving the same family networks and sometimes even the same individuals. Most important, as Palencia Prado has argued, is the fact that these interests become increasingly linked to each other, all the way "up" the financial ladder, as is illustrated in the diagram above. I argue here that what is really at stake in these "transitions" or "breaks" is not so much who holds power or even what is the material base of that power (e.g. land "versus" finance), but rather what is the *rationality of power* that corresponds to those other factors. In this sense, the current rise of technocratic philanthrocapitalism involves one particular rationality of neoliberal capitalism. The so-called "structural break" that took place with the collapse of the coffee plantation-based economy (Segovia 2004; Hale 2011), therefore, in conjunction with both the introduction of neoliberal economic policies and the end of the Internal Armed Conflict during the same period, are the precipitating circumstances for the emergence of this new kind of corporate culture to which we are attesting. Its embrace by an emergent group of young intellectual-entrepreneurial leaders, whom I have been portraying throughout this thesis, has only helped to consolidate this general shift.

Following this line of analysis, therefore, the current boom of primary industries and the concomitant "return" of major capital to vast regions of the national territory, should not automatically be interpreted as a revamping of past forms of capital accumulation and correlative labor market restructuring but rather as something else, partly indeterminate. Few scholars have yet to examine this pattern in the emergent

industries. One pioneering case study is Elizabeth Oglesby's investigation of Pantaleón and its introduction of the model of corporate social responsibility and the attendant restructuring of the sugar industry's labor market (2000, 2004, 2013). Already in the late 1990s, Oglesby identified the appearance of this phenomenon and raised important questions about its potential implications for the entire agroindustry. Through my interviews with key players of the African oil palm industry, this thesis has suggested that the philosophy of FUNDAZÚCAR—the influential private foundation of the sugar industry—has been adopted by GREPALMA, the newly-formed trade association of African oil palm producers. This would be a good time to carry out research along the *Franja Transversal del Norte* in the northern lowlands—the region that is seeing the fastest expansion of mega-monocrops—in the same spirit of Oglesby's work along the southern coast.

The extensive contemporary literature on land and resource (re)concentration, social displacement and dispossession, especially with regard to sugarcane and African oil plam (Hurtado Paz y Paz 2007; Alonso Fradejas 2011, 2012, 2013; Solano 2011; Palencia Prado 2013), though essential to an understanding of these economic trends, is simply not enough to obtain a complete picture of neoliberal governance. Similarly, any study of the discourses, attitudes and practices of urban elites that does not also attend to those material processes "on the ground" is bound to be incomplete. Therefore, an approximation to the questions posed earlier in this section would require that scholars, researchers, and activists pay close attention in the coming years to the ways in which the culture of corporate citizenship (Oglesby 2004) and the rise of technocratic philanthrocapitalism—which current trends show is only bound to expand and consolidate—relates to, modifies, perhaps as well emanates from, and certainly

articulates with the material processes of capital accumulation around these emergent industries, and their attendant forms of dispossession (Harvey 2005, 137).

Affect and elite self-image

Watching Santiago P. on the stage of the ENADE 2012 business summit presenting the "Road Map" to development to a crowd of major business owners, politicians, dignitaries, union leaders, donor agencies, globally acclaimed gurus of economics, representatives of financial institutions, and the presidents of two nations gives one a sense of the moral validation for which technocratic philanthrocapitalism might stand in elite circles. The excitement and the pride are almost palpable; the resounding applause, the smiles all around, the pats on the back, in short, the self-congratulatory reveling. An oligarchy that is fully aware of being perceived by many in Guatemala and abroad as a group of nefarious neocolonialists—even, perhaps, as racists complicit in acts of genocide and the most atrocious of crimes against humanity—might feel more than a modicum of moral vindication when it is publicly lauded by such a diverse and illustrious audience, for its Humanitarian Spirit and its Solidarity with those most in need among its compatriots. They sit and watch as one of their very own, a prodigiously talented son of the oligarchy, spearheads a national movement toward Progress, and, thus, their own redemption.

I am as skeptical as most about the credibility of the Guatemalan oligarchy, and the sincerity with which they embrace, as a group, this new ethos of equality and solidarity. But I am equally wary of those who automatically interpret this as yet another ploy of audacious manipulation and power. Here I do not refer to objective evidence, material facts, participant observation or discourse analysis; rather, I

attempt to shed light on another register of agentive subjectivity, beyond the strictures of intentionality, ideology or meaning-making that are typically privileged in the literature. In other words, I hope to complicate certain common misconceptions about members of the ruling elite. This move is not meant to "humanize" a social group that by virtue of wielding such disproportionate magnitudes of power has come to be reified as a faceless and implacable force of capitalist expansion and neocolonial domination. Rather, as Lauren Berlant has argued, a failure to attend to the affective dimension of recognition within neoliberalism risks missing a crucial component of the potential perpetuation of material privilege and exclusion:

> [...] Projects of compassionate recognition have enabled a habit of political obfuscation of the differences between emotional and material (legal, economic, and institutional) kinds of social reciprocity. Self-transforming compassionate recognition and its cognate forms of solidarity *are* necessary for making political movements thrive contentiously against all sorts of privilege, but they have also provided a means for making minor structural adjustments seem like major events, because the theater of compassion is emotionally intense. Recognition all too often becomes an experiential end in itself, an emotional event that protects what is unconscious, impersonal, and unrelated to anyone's intentions about maintaining political privilege. (Berlant 2007: 294)

There is little reason not to believe that the rise of technocratic philanthrocapitalism simply signals the reconfiguration of oligarchical domination and the perpetuation of its privileges. Yet while this may indeed be the case, I contend that something more is going on, and that spaces of potentiality, emergence, and indeterminacy may well open up in this new model of governance. As further rounds of accumulation, despoliation, displacement, and dispossession are battering entire regions of the national territory strategic to capital expansion and articulation, the conditions of possibility for the improvement, enhancement, and vitalization of modern subject-citizens—e.g. the student, the urban immigrant, the wage laborer—are also converging.

It is in all appearances a very entangled and contradictory process: at once one of proletarianization, cultural violence, and recognition. The implications for multiculturalism will be examined in the following section.

POST-MULTICULTURALISM AND THE ASCENDANCY OF WHITENESS

The future prosperity and happiness of [Mexico] now depend on the development of Protestantism.… Protestantism would become Mexican by conquering the Indians; they need a religion to compel them to read and not to spend their savings on candles for their saints.

—Benito Juárez,
A full-blooded native Mexican,
five-time president of Mexico
(1858-1872)[13]

Culture is more often a source of conflict than a synergy. Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster.

—Geert Hoftede

It is only in recent years that democratically elected governments have predominated in Latin America and several of the democratic experiments have ceased. The standard of living is roughly one-tenth that of the United States and Canada. Distribution of land, income, wealth, and opportunity is highly inequitable by the standards of the advanced democracies.

—Lawrence E. Harrison (2013, 132)

Clearly separating himself from conservatives, Harrison outlines a progressive agenda based on deliberate cultural engineering.

—Bryce Christensen

The oligarchy's historical racism

In her 2011 pamphlet on genocide titled *Genocide: the maximum expression of racism in Guatemala?*, Marta Elena Casaús Arzú argues that multi-ethnic, multicultural societies like Guatemala, with a history of structural racism, are more prone to commit

[13] Epigraph to Chapter 8: *Catholic Latin America* in Harrison 2013, 132.

acts of genocide. Drawing theoretically from Foucault (*The genealogy of racism*), and to a lesser extent from sociologist Zygmunt Bauman (*The holocaust and modernity*), and citing excerpts from historical documents of Guatemalan intellectuals and political leaders, as well as from her own well known interviews of 1979-1980 (which formed the basis for her most important book, *Guatemala: linaje y racismo,* 1992), as well as a more recent survey among urban university students in 2005, Casaús argues that Guatemala's oligarchy is deeply and dangerously racist. She contends that it is urgent to study a topic that is scarcely researched in Guatemala, namely, "the genesis, ontology, logics, and effects of racism and its link to genocide" (19). In a broad historical sweep, she identifies key "metamorphoses" in the expression and organization of "racism as a technology of power": for instance, during the colony racism was primarily "cultural," whereas during and after the liberal reform period that began in 1871, racism became eminently "biological" and constituted the very logic of the state in its project of governance. She quotes Foucault:

> Racism represents the condition under which the right to kill can be exercised. If the power of normalization wished to exercise the old sovereign right to kill, it must become racist. And if, conversely, a power of sovereignty, or in other words, a power that has the right of life and death, wishes to work with the instruments, mechanisms, and technology of normalization, it too must become racist. (Foucault 2003, 256)

Casaús eventually produces what she has elsewhere termed the "extermination thesis": namely, the notion that became established among the white elite around the 1930s, and was shared by a majority of the Ladino population, that the solution to the "indian problem" was to be found either through the extermination or the whitening of the indian population through eugenics. She conducted interviews with members of the oligarchy in the years leading up to the worst massacres of the military dictatorships

in the early 1980s. A quote from one of her interviewees, an industrial engineer in his 50s, reads:

> I can't think of another solution but to exterminate them or put them in reservations like in the United States. It's impossible to get any culture into people who have nothing in their heads; to cultivate these people is the job of titans. They are an obstacle and a weight for development, so it would be cheaper and quicker to exterminate them.

A young agriculturalist in his 20s, who "considers himself white" and has a college degree stated to her that:

> To integrate them would not be a solution, nor to give them land, nor money, not even educating them is worth it. Deep down I'm a reactionary because sometimes I just have the urge to exterminate all the indigenous people in the highlands. (2011, 56)

From these interviews she calls the reader's attention to the fact that the poll clearly reflected a racist "imaginary" and that there was a perceptible tendency, "not majoritarian but significant," that argued in favor of "the extermination of the indian or the use of eugenics" as a solution for integration into the nation (55). She continues:

> These answers are sufficiently eloquent to perceive the deep contempt, fear and hatred that a sector of the oligarchy felt and expressed when the poll was taken (1979-1980). Two years later the massacres and the genocide against a majority indigenous population took place. It is probable that these value judgments formed part of the collective unconscious of the oligarchical nucleus, and became a political practice of the dominant class. (57)

Finally, she relates how a poll carried out in 2005 in several Guatemalan university campuses revealed that there is strong correlation between levels of income, education and racial prejudices, and that students at elite universities like Marroquín and Galileo manifested their racism more overtly. The poll also revealed a strong negative correlation between racial prejudice and proximity or contact (which in turn would

presumably explain in part why there more racism was found among the white elite at private universities, for example) (53).

On the current status of multiculturalism

The climate of 2012 in which the president of the CACIF could flippantly dismiss multiculturalism in a press conference as a descriptive platitude is one in which the stakes involved in the debate over the country's economic development and governance models have not been as high in recent memory, especially for the oligarchy and the majority-indigenous population. The tensions and contradictions of neoliberal governance have never seemed quite as stark, either: on the one hand, new rounds of dispossession are battering extensive regions of the country inhabited by Mayan and campesino communities, as the new axes of accumulation become clearly discernible, consolidating primarily around mineral and resource extraction, hydroelectric power generation, expansive mega-monocrop plantations of African oil palm and sugarcane for agrofuels, as well as large-scale archaeological projects and communications infrastructures for high-end global tourism (Solano 2013; Alonso-Fradejas 2013; Palencia Prado 2013). The deployment of military and police forces to repress protests and evict communities from "privately owned plantations" has also been on the rise during this period, not only in the current administration of hardliner General Otto Pérez Molina, but also during the centrist administration of Álvaro Colom. On the other hand, the organized private sector, as putative representative of the interests of the oligarchy, has never before been so avowedly committed to progressive modernization, the promotion of universal rights and equality of opportunities and corporate social responsibility (Oglesby 2004; Valdez and Monzón 2007), nor assumed such an active and visible role both in leading the national

(not just sectorial) Development effort and in forging a new project of democratic governance.

Early on in my research one of my first interviewees kindly yet bluntly responded to my prompt regarding multiculturalism thus: "Multiculturalism is the wrong question." His subsequent elaboration was the most frank that I encountered on the matter, yet it could very well sum up the gist of what most of my interviewees either explicitly or implicitly argued when I asked for their opinion concerning multiculturalism. It is worthwhile to quote him at length:

> That topic constitutes another one of the great traps that has plunged us into a level of discussion that will lead us nowhere. I believe that diversity, that multiculturalism—the issue of languages, of distinct cultures—those are topics that have to be respected, that we need to learn to live alongside each other (sic), we need to develop higher levels of tolerance, and all that. The problem is that these topics become conflictive, because what we really have on our hands are social problems: social problems that some people seek to resolve from these dialectical platforms, from which it is argued that the real problem [in Guatemala] is that certain groups in society are not respected nor given their rights. In this manner, conflict, frustration, rage, disappointment, discontentment, hopelessness, and all of those kinds of elements are brought into discussions where these topics [i.e. multiculturalism] are addressed, but which are really going to lead us nowhere.
>
> Where do we need to take these discussions? *Toward the development model!* When in a country as diverse as ours there is sustained, buoyant, positive economic growth society is so busy resolving its problems of development—working, investing, taking advantage of opportunities—that all of this subject-matter disappears into the background [*pasa a quinto plano*], it's not important! Because if what we have here is a democracy—a liberal democracy—in which rights are respected, where everyone is obligated to fulfill their responsibilities, where the law is the same for everyone and whoever does not comply goes to trial—under this kind of political model rights will automatically be respected—the individuality and the culture of each person—to the extent that it does not violate the rights of the rest.
>
> […] We are lost in the wrong battlefields.

This metaphor of the "wrong battlefields" is of course very suggestive and not entirely innocent. As Oglesby has argued,

> If one sees civil society in Gramscian terms as an arena of struggle then the creation of these social spaces is hardly the end of the story. The promotion of elite-backed social foundations is, in this scenario, a logical extension of the neoliberal policy repertoire: allowing the World Bank to resolve some of its internal contradictions, while letting capital, now newly armored as 'citizen', into the trenches of civil society. (Oglesby 2004, 554)

In this sense, the field of contention that had allowed multiculturalism to be mobilized politically and theoretically in the 1990s and early 2000s was premised on the acknowledgement of the historical denial of the civil and cultural rights of the country's minoritized majorities. But to the extent that market liberalization, land-control-grabbing (Alonso-Fradejas 2013; 2012; 2011), and (neo)extractivism (Solano 2013; 2011) have engulfed growing regions of the country, and as the period of democratization has witnessed the electoral irrelevance of both the historical left (the URNG) and the fledgling Mayan movement (Winaq) (Bastos and Brett 2007), the stakes and the very language of political contention have been dramatically altered. Consequently, for the young "enlightened" leadership of the oligarchy recent community mobilizations that reject infrastructural megaprojects are perceived—or at least portrayed—as politically unintelligible (Rancière 2004) and so a considerable menace not only to its own economic interests but, fundamentally, to those of the nation. This is significant, among other reasons, because it implicitly both anticipates and legitimates potential political repression and violence to come; a violence that is inherently regionalized and racialized.

Scholars have demonstrated that the rise of multiculturalism is imbricated with the rise of neoliberalism (Žižek 1997; Povinelli 2002; Hale 2006; Puar 2007; Butler and Athanasiou 2013), which partly explains why the Guatemalan economic elite and the

state had—at least until recently—openly embraced it. Yet "multiculturalism" has acquired an increasingly ambivalent significance for those in power over the course of the past decade. On the one hand, it is still lauded as a virtuous trait of a democratic free-market culture: "color blindness" and humanistic tolerance are considered markers of social progress, preconditions for both liberty and equality before the law: the two central principles of modern liberalism (Krznaric 2003: 11). On the other hand, it increasingly evokes images of "illegally" blocked highways, "staged" cross-country protest marches by "manipulated" indigenous campesinos, "coercive" anti-mining community referenda, "hypocritical" appeals to the rights of "Mother Earth" and to *el buen vivir* (an alternative, non-Western notion of the good life now institutionalized in Bolivia and Ecuador), as well as of foreign activist "destabilizers" and "resentful" (ex)guerrilla "terrorists" who "make a living from instigating and perpetuating conflict"; images, in short, of an "opportunistic" if not "irrational" antagonism to what could be summed up as the *ethos* of Liberalism and *telos* of Development.[14] As is evident from my interviews with a dozen of its leading members, the oligarchy is struggling to apprehend the nature of contemporary community mobilizations against major capital investments in indigenous territories, rarely invoking conventional narratives of ideological antagonism (i.e. in the former logic of the Cold War) or of liberal claims to rights recognition when endeavoring to explain them.

The tendency among my interviewees was to portray "multiculturalism" in a few ways: firstly, it is considered to be a descriptive fact, even a platitude. In this rendition, typified in the CACIF's president's comments to the press at the beginning of the introduction, Guatemala is considered to be "evidently" multicultural in the sense that it

[14] I quote these terms as used by several of my interviewees when discussing the opposition of local communities to capital investment projects in recent years. See Silvia Gereda and Pedro Trujillo, Canal Antigua, 2012.

is ethnically and linguistically diverse, but that a singular national identity in fact unites and subsumes all other particular identities. In this sense, "multiculturalism" was conflated in one of my interviews with the US notion of the "melting pot"—a fact that is as telling as it is disconcerting, given the origin of multiculturalism precisely as a progressive injunction on the racism and institutionalized assimilationism for which the metaphor of the "melting pot" has historically stood in the United States. Needless to say, this brand of cultural diversity continues to be readily endorsed, representing the kind of "multiculturalism" that scholars have termed "neoliberal" (Hale 2005), "cosmetic" (Bastos and Camus 2013), and correlative to multinational capitalism as its very "cultural logic" (Žižek 1997). As such, it is invoked by the state and the private sector as part of the "wealth of the *patria*," its special "uniqueness" among the world's "family of nations". As has been widely demonstrated in the literature, the discourse of equality of rights in the context of cultural diversity—through metaphors like the "melting pot" or "color blindness"—is problematic for the ways in which it sustains the unmarked status of whiteness (i.e. the locus of enunciation), and thus perpetuates or reproduces racial hierarchy and injustice (see Wiegman 1999).

Alternatively, when it is invoked by Mayans in order to claim more substantive cultural rights, such as those to territory and natural resources, members of the oligarchy tend to view "multiculturalism" as a meritless ploy that is wielded by "leftist" leaders with little "real" legitimacy and social backing within indigenous communities, who seek to opportunistically capitalize on the country's stark poverty, ethnic divisions, and socioeconomic inequalities for their own political and financial gain. This was expressed by most of my interviewees, almost without exception. In recent years, this discourse has buttressed accusations of "delinquency" and even "terrorism" against community leaders,

social activists, and their supporters who have mobilized against major capital investments that threaten the integrity of indigenous communities and their territories.

In my interviews, I took advantage of the fact that "multiculturalism" was such a publicly contested topic, fresh in the minds of most people thanks to the recently proposed constitutional reforms by the government in early 2012, and the subsequent controversial declarations of the CACIF's president to the press comparing multiculturalism to Guatemala's status as "the land of eternal spring" and the fact that "it rains from May to September." So what do elite members think of multiculturalism? Is it compatible with development? With democracy?

Here's what Santiago P. responded:

> Mirá, yo al final—y lo creo, digamos, así—es: tiene que haber un set de reglas que aplique para todos. Y si acaso lo que tenemos que tener es una, digamos, un gran diálogo nacional para decir, "Bueno, ¿cuáles son esas reglas que van a aplicar para todos?" Donde creo que empieza un tema, eh… un "*slippery slope"*, ¿verdad?, en cuanto a Estado de Derecho, es cuando empezás a decir: "Estas reglas aplican para algunos y aquellas reglas aplican para otros", ¿verdad? Entonces, puede ser que el Gran Pacto Social requiere una revisión, *y puede ser, ¿verdad?, que ese Gran Pacto Social no tomó en cuenta algunas de las visiones y algunas de las necesidades y algunos de los intereses de una parte importantísima de la población guatemalteca, ¿me entendés? Pero lo que no me parece correcto es empezar en ese, digamos… creo que conlleva muchos riesgos empezar en eso de que le aplico reglas distintas a distintos actores en la sociedad*, porque eso, ¿verdad?, inevitablemente después va a caer en que alguien más dice, "Bueno, pero yo quiero mis derechos especiales por ser sembrador de palma africana" y alguien más va a decir, "Yo quiero mis derechos particulares por estar en la minería", "Yo quiero mis derechos particulares por ser de ascendencia judía, árabe…bla bla", ¿me entendés? Es un *very slippery slope*. Pero eso no quiere decir que no debamos atender, digamos, algunas de esas deficiencias que pueden existir en ese acuerdo y ese pacto social guatemalteco.

With regard to International Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 169, on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, which was ratified by the Arzú

administration in 1997, shortly after the signing of the Peace Accrods, this is what he had to say:

> Mirá, a mí el concepto de trabajar con las comunidades, de entender dónde están sus preocupaciones, sus intereses, y de, digamos, lograr acuerdos "gana-gana" entre, pues, las comunidades y aquellas empresas que operan, digamos dentro de ellas como buenos vecinos… es fundamental, pues. Y es parte de la forma—si me lo preguntás a mí—*correcta* de hacer negocios y la forma, al final, de que los negocios sean sostenibles en el largo plazo porque son buenos vecinos ante esas comunidades, ¿verdad? Sea cual sea el negocio. Y aquí, digamos, por los temas de Guatemala, quizás se enfoca mucho en empresas extractivas, hidroeléctricas y demás, pero, digamos, yo creo que ese es un postulado general que aplica a todas las empresas en todo momento, ¿verdad? Habiendo dicho eso, digamos, creo que las buenas intenciones que de alguna manera se plasman en el 169 lastimosamente han servido para dar cabida, digamos, y han sido mal utilizadas y aprovechadas por actores ajenos a las propias comunidades que *dicen* estar protegiendo. Y esa es la parte, digamos, nuevamente, delicada en todo esto, pues, porque el concepto, la intención, ¿verdad?, es interesante: *no te podés pelear con el concepto de preguntar a la comunidad qué piensa y… ¿verdad? Pero donde yo sí tengo problema es cuando ese concepto después es manipulado, aprovechado, por actores que no tienen nada que ver con la comunidad y de hecho, en detrimento de los intereses de esa comunidad, ¿verdad?* Y ahí, digamos, lastimosamente, los ejemplos son muchos, los casos y testimoniales, digamos, de vecinos que dicen, "Miren, yo realmente quisiera la hidroeléctrica porque ahí me van a dar trabajo", pero que han sido manipulados y/o llegan a extremos de coerción para comportarse de una manera en particular, desde pago hasta coerción. Y ahí es donde a mí sí me dan problema estas cosas, pues, y creo que es donde tenemos que encontrar los mecanismos para que se establezca un marco de ley de cómo se hacen estas cosas, de acuerdo a las leyes de Guatemala, pues, porque son las que aquí aplican.

Santiago B. also echoed this notion that there are legitimate concerns with regard to the manner in which certain enterprises conduct their business, and that it is fundamental to work closely with local communities to ensure full respect for the environment and their social concerns. He is equally certain, however, that certain interests groups have turned multiculturalism and in particular large investment projects like mining extraction and hydroelectric plants into "emblematic targets":

> Es difícil a veces agrupar todas estas situaciones que han surgido en una única causa. Porque habrá temas que sí son válidos cuestionar, por temas ambientales, por temas del impacto en las comunidades y demás, y creo que es válido cuestionarlos. Pero creo que hay muchos otros que es un tema de intereses. Y yo le escuché a alguien una frase que creo yo que es parte de lo que nos está pasando y es que *hoy en día ya no es una discusión de izquierda o derecha, sino es una discusión de si vas hacia atrás o hacia delante*. O sea, yo creo que no es que más allá de ciertas personas o grupos, muchos todavía de esa generación anterior—que sí tenían una carga ideológica más pesada—pero te diría una siguiente generación que está un poco más distanciada de esa discusión ideológica. Pues ya empezás a ver distintos intereses, pero *ahí ya es más un tema de si te quedás enganchado—como te mencionaba—hacia el pasado y vas retrocediendo o si estás dispuesto a caminar hacia delante*. Y entonces cuando empiezan a surgir estos proyectos grandes, pues también se vuelven objetivos emblemáticos, insignia, para poder hacer puntos y también por intereses creados o asociados. *De vuelta: es difícil generalizar porque yo creo que hay casos donde es muy legítimo el cuestionamiento del desarrollo de los proyectos por su impacto ambiental, su impacto social, el beneficio que está teniendo realmente para el país versus lo que están aprovechando las empresas que lo estén haciendo. Sin embargo, creo que mucho del bloqueo asociado está más asociado por temas de intereses que por temas legítimos de cuestionamiento*.

And with regard to the proposed constitutional amendments, there was once again a pragmatic, entrepreneurial approach to the question. In essence, what was the point of changing what it says in the constitution if nothing will change in actual day-to-day life for the people who are most disadvantaged? After all, development and equality cannot simply result from more laws, but have to be generated through practical action. Additionally, when I pressed them further on the *structural* nature of contemporary racial inequality, and drew the well-known example of affirmative action in the United States and other countries as a compensatory framework to revert those structural constraints to upward mobility and further equity, the answer tended to be that in principle that is certainly laudable, but that in actuality it would be impracticable "in a country like Guatemala" whose judicial system is so dysfunctional and society so polarized, that "we

would spend more time trying to figure out which groups deserve what quotas than in actually generating the jobs and the necessary conditions for general prosperity":

> De la misma forma que lo agregués en la Constitución o no, no necesariamente va a cambiar las condiciones de vida de estas personas o que estas personas tengan o no tengan más o menos derechos. Yo lo que creo es que al final, pues sí, ese es el país en el que estamos y creo yo que es una ventaja enorme, es parte de la riqueza que tenemos. Dos, pues, considero que como tal, pues todos somos ciudadanos de este país y todos deberíamos tener el mismo tipo de derechos y acceso a oportunidades. No por ser ladino, no por ser indígenas uno debiera tener ciertos derechos o privilegios, en ambas vías. *Y creo que tampoco se trata necesariamente compensar errores del pasado cometiendo errores hacia el futuro*. Dicho eso, creo yo que lo más importante es reconocer que sí, hoy en día hay una diferencia importante en el país, donde personas que viven en el área rural—mayormente indígenas—tienen menos acceso a educación, a salud y a oportunidades, y lo más importante es ver cómo se les puede proveer el acceso a esas oportunidades. Yo creo que eso es lo que como sociedad realmente te va a dar una mayor equidad. Hoy en día hay un montón de temas en la Constitución que no se cumplen; que agregués este tipo de claúsulas, pues sí, mandan mensajes y demás, pero no necesariamente el incorporarlo es lo que va a cambiar la realidad de estas personas. Y en lo personal, por eso te digo, para mí es más importante que logrés cambiarle la realidad a estas personas a que si un artículo más, un artículo menos refleje o mande un mensaje de inclusión, ¿verdad?

An important element in some of the views expressed with regard to multiculturalism, especially among the young turks of technocratic philanthrocapitalism, has to do with their experiences while living abroad in "other multicultural societies," "like the United States." They often cited the experiential importance of debating and cohabiting with people of different cultural, racial and ethnic "backgrounds" for understanding the "ridiculousness of racism" and being capable of envisioning a common future for Guatemalans, in all their diversity and "cultural richness":

> Creo que definitivamente el haber estado expuesto a educación y a convivencia fuera del país, pues ha tenido un impacto enorme, y diría en muchos sentidos: uno, pues obviamente estar expuesto a formación del nivel y de la forma que lo fui expuesto y; dos, ha sido el ver distintas realidades en distintas partes del mundo, el compartir con distintas culturas, etnias, religiones, discutir ideas pero

> poder llegar a acuerdos y entendimientos. De vuelta: creo que una generación pasada vivió en este mundo polarizado a nivel global y a nivel local, porque pues en Guatemala se vivió en carne viva lo que estaba pasando a nivel macro en el mundo. Cuando estás en esa polarización extrema y que muchos temas son de vida o muerte, pues es muy difícil poder llegar, siento yo, a romper algunas de esas brechas sociales, culturales, étnicas. De vuelta: nuestra generación ha estado mucho más expuesta—sea por convivencia o sea por comunicación—hoy tenés acceso ubicuo a qué está pasando en todas partes del mundo a un costo casi que disponible a todo el mundo. Entonces siento yo que esto te va permitiendo el ir cerrando algunas de estas brechas que se tenía en el pasado. Sí, de plano, todavía—como vos decís—hay una brecha entre lo que pueda ser una nueva visión del concepto de desarrollo, del concepto de desarrollo económico y la realidad y las prácticas. *Pero yo creo que hay un reconocimiento de que si no se hace algo para cerrar la brecha de oportunidades, la brecha de una cierta mínima equidad en el país, el país no es viable para futuro. Y si un país no es viable como sociedad no hay empresa que vaya a sobrevivir. Entonces por las razones que sean yo creo que sí hay una consciencia mucho mayor. Eso que ya se traslade al actuar de todas las empresas y todos los empresarios y demás, como te digo, será un proceso espero que sea más rápido que lento, ¿verdad?, pero no vas a lograr, obviamente que sea de la noche a la mañana.*

In the end it came down to pragmatism: the sense is that no one, "no matter what culture they belong to" wants to see their children go hungry. Also, "more and more people want their children to go to school," "it's an actual rising demand from most people, regardless of culture," "they want to give their children the opportunities that they themselves didn't have. You can call that development or you can call it whatever you want, but regardless of ethnicity that's what most people are demanding." This businessman kept referring back to the minimum consensuses and the need for more basic infrastructure to provide for the kind of health and educational services that "all Guatemalans are entitled to." Ideologically, his pragmatism was intended to be both a "middle ground" between polarized extremes and, simultaneously—or perhaps because of it—portray that position as the most progressive one. He disagrees with a "one hundred percent libertarian capitalist perspective" like the one that is promoted at

Francisco Marroquín University, for example. But he also disagrees with the assertion that cultural diversity implies irreconcilable differences. In the end, such "extreme polarization is artificial, most people are somewhere in between":

> Dicho eso, por eso cuando a veces se eleva el discurso—como mencionabas—de que hay dos visiones completas, extremas de desarrollo: una cien porciento capitalista y una cien porciento asociada a sus creencias culturales, a su vivencia milenaria. Mi experiencia en la práctica es que no son esas extremas polarizantes. Y ese discurso, creo yo, que tiene mucho más interés de polarizar que realmente de resolver esos puntos extremos. De vuelta, en la práctica, yo creo que una versión extremamente, cien porciento capitalista libertaria no es viable y yo no la comparto porque, de nuevo, el mercado no resuelve todas las situaciones y hay temas donde—desde servicios como educación, salud, infraestructura—por eso existen gobiernos que tienen que intervenir, y hay ciertos casos donde podés aprovechar mecanismos de mercado, pero para resolver problemas sociales.
>
> […] Entonces regresando a tu pregunta, pues yo no creo en esas visiones polarizadas. Mi experiencia en la práctica es que, como te digo, si querés resumirlo en términos muy simples, las personas quieren poder ofrecerle oportunidades de salud, educación y oportunidades a sus hijos y los mecanismos para que los que logren eso, pues, yo creo que ya hay distintos mecanismos donde el Estado y el gobierno debe jugar un rol subsidiario hasta cierto nivel y donde a partir de cierto nivel, pues que la gente desarrolle sus oportunidades, sea en la parte agrícola, sea en la parte comercial, sea en la parte laboral.

Biopolitics and the ascendancy of whiteness

La principal riqueza de un país es su capital humano, y si ese capital humano está dañado ¡el país no tiene futuro!

— Abel Albino, ENADE 2013

En la mente de algunos guatemaltecos ha surgido, desde hace algunos años, la duda de si hay alguna razón subyacente, alguna "otra razón de raíz" que deba tomarse en consideración para acercarnos al tan anhelado camino al progreso. Esta razón subyacente puede ser la cultura.

— Mejoremos Guate, Edición VI

Denunciation will never have the shocking frankness of an unscrupulous discourse.

— Jean Baudrillard 2010 [2007]: 39

While the oligarchy had explicitly embraced (a limited form of) "multiculturalism" during the years of structural adjustment and democratization that preceded and succeeded the peace process—something of an innocuous, market-friendly notion promoted by the United States and international financial institutions like the World Bank and the Inter-American Bank—today its members are more circumspect about its endorsement. This withdrawal of multiculturalism from dominant discourse should not necessarily be interpreted as a reactionary (re)turn to prior forms of addressing "the indigenous question," but rather as a shift in emphasis within the broader project of democratic (neo)liberalization that is currently underway. Hence, modern liberal notions of inclusion, universality of rights and equality of opportunities are being discursively privileged over the specific cultural rights of indigenous and black peoples that were prominent in the 1990s and early 2000s. The former are deployed as "progressive" aims, while the latter are portrayed as "resistant" claims, that is, reactionary, exclusionary, and ultimately, racist. This provides an eloquent and forceful actualization of Balibar's "neo-racism" or what Hale has called the paradoxical accusation of *racismo al revés* (Hale 2006).

In the ENADE 2013 business summit, a pediatrician was one of the three expert speakers invited to address the audience of business, political, religious, and social leaders, including president Pérez Molina and ex-president of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo. He was an expert in infant malnutrition, the topic of his presentation, and was repeatedly interrupted by the applause of the audience. I believe that his intervention is revealing of the particular logic behind the notion of "Solidarity" that is being deployed by the technocratic philanthrocapitalists. He is worth quoting at length:

> Infant malnutrition is important because it generates mental weakness. But it is the only mental weakness that can be prevented, the only one that can be reverted, the only one that is created by man. Hence it must be fought and eradicated. The bodily organ that grows the fastest is the brain. When a child is born its brain weighs 35 grams; 35 grams are six coins, six little coins. When the child learns to walk around a year and two months later, his brain weighs 900 grams: 80 percent of the weight of an adult brain: 150 coins. And when he reaches adulthood, it weighs one kilogram and 200 grams: 200 coins. That means that the gigantic growth takes place during the child's first year of life. First the pregnancy, then the Gauss curve, the first year, the second year. There's his development, those are the 1000 days: 270 of the pregnancy, 365 of the first year and 365 of the second year.
>
> Chronic malnutrition happens when a child has been hungry for years—hungry for stimulus, not just for food! The child is also hungry for affection! And that hunger for affection diminishes him. And that diminishment implies a smaller cranial perimeter: he will never be admitted into a university. He will develop 20, 30, 40, 50 percent, he will learn how to add or subtract, but never to multiply and divide, he will never understand the Pythagorean Theorem and he will never go to college. And we all have to deal with him. The greatest wealth of a country is its human capital, and if that human capital is damaged the country has no future! [resounding applause]

After the summit, the sixth edition of *Mejoremos Guate's* magazine featured an article titled: "An education that promotes a cultural change." Touted as the "missing ingredient" to achieve human development, it starts thus:

> For several decades in Guatemala, government, private sector and civil society leaders have acquired awareness and taken action to promote a quality education for children and youth. FUNDESA and other organizations devoted to promoting development have come to consider education a *strategic imperative*, next to food security, citizens' security and the Rule of Law. This is proof of the commitment of Guatemalan society to go to the very root of the challenges we face on the path to development.

Readers are then instructed about the meaning of the word "culture" as understood in "social anthropology":

> Referring to the way of thinking, feeling and acting of a group. Geert Hoftede, Dutch anthropologist, has defined culture as "the collective programming of the

mind, which distinguishes the members of the group from persons of another. A more simple definition of culture is "the values and beliefs held in common consciously or unconsciously by the members of a social group".

Starting in 1985, the cultural variable began to be considered as a factor of great importance to explain the differences between developed and underdeveloped countries. A group of scientists, among them Lawrence Harrison, Francis Fukuyama, Ronald Inglehart and Samuel Huntington has advocated for the inclusion of culture as a variable in the equations that explain progress.

[…] Values and beliefs play an important role in economic development. Cultural values and beliefs greatly influence the evolution of societies, but in a subtle manner. Some values and beliefs can be beneficial in determinate stages of societal development, and can be damaging in others. For example, promoting values and beliefs to teach children hard work, or respect for their parents in a rural agrarian and illiterate society, might be useful in a specific stage. That's why one ought not emit value judgments regarding cultural beliefs or values, but rather evaluate whether they are contributing to reach the economic and political development goals that have been established at that time.

[…] The educational system is the most powerful element to achieve cultural change. The transmission of "new" cultural values and beliefs happens through formal systems of education, and the other 5 agents of cultural transmission: childrearing by the family, the messages of communications media, norms that are imposed and reinforced by the rule of law, the ethics and values provided by religion and the influence of role models and leaders in the general population.

[…] So how do we change a culture? To take small but forceful steps on the road to development, the following strategic actions must be followed in any attempt at cultural change:

Analyze and comprehend how decisions based on culture (values, beliefs) can be modified by agents such as government, individuals, civil society and development agencies.

Understand how the social meaning of undesirable practices (for example: the belief that girls should not attend school) can be changed. This could be done through the modification or redefinition of social, moral and legal norms to punish or incentivize a practice.

Comprehend the methods of cultural change that could be useful: whether through education, information, persuasion, or the provision of economic incentives to achieve the necessary changes.

[…] Is Guatemala ready for a cultural transformation?

This deployment of the "culture matters" discourse (Harrison 2000) is reminiscent of mid-century policies of *indigenismo*, which aimed to modernize indigenous peoples through applied anthropology and cultural engineering (González Ponciano 2005). Likewise, Hofstede has claimed that culture is "the software of the mind" and that it "is more often a source of conflict than a synergy. Cultural differences are a nuisance at best and often a disaster." He insists that one must endeavor to minimize cultural difference in an attempt to increase social trust and social peace. The title of this year's summit was "*Sin divisions multiplicamos. Desarrollo Humano y Paz Social"* and its stated ultimate objective is to achieve a "Guatemala that is more prosperous, more solidary, more secure, more inclusive and more transparent." Resuming Casaús Arzú's Foucaultian analysis of racism delineated above, this kind of "solidarity" through the "strategic imperatives" of food security (i.e. proper infant nutrition and adequate motherly care to avoid future intellectual deficiency) and education (i.e. to instill the values and beliefs that are conducive to progress and to train the workforce in the skills required by national industry) are perfectly emblematic examples of liberalism's biopolitical function (Foucault 2003, 245). However, I depart from Casaús Arzú, who emphasizes the negative aspect of biopower, that is, the state's sovereign right to kill those perceived as threats to the survival and vitality of the nation. I agree that this was indeed the driving function of biopolitics in Guatemala throughout the twentieth century, when *indigenismo* was driven by eugenics and biological notions of "racial improvement" through whitening. It was a time of ideological commitment to the "extermination thesis," starting in the 1930s and culminating in the actual genocide of tens of thousands of Mayans in the early 1980s. However, it seems that a crucial shift has taken place.

Contrary to what Casaús Arzú affirms, we are attending to the ascendancy of the positive biopolitical aspect, that is, the impulse to enhance the vitality of the *entire* population, including and perhaps especially the Mayan population. "Biopolitics will derive its knowledge from, and define its power's field of intervention in terms of, the birth rate, the mortality rate, various biological disabilities, and the effects of the environment" (2003, 245).

Thus, from this perspective the political claim of "multiculturalism" can be construed as only capable of gaining traction to the extent that poor indigenous campesinos (i.e. its primary stakeholders), can be helplessly manipulated by "outsiders," "leftists," and "resentful opportunists". According to the logic outlined above, Mayan campesinos can be portrayed as easily manipulated because historical chronic malnutrition among most of its children would have made them intellectually deficient. Furthermore, multiculturalism can be framed as "the wrong question" with regard to the "real" concerns of the marginalized and the disenfranchised: namely, poverty, hunger and inequality, as one of my interviewees succinctly expressed it. Multiculturalism is therefore taken to be not only a banner of political and criminal opportunists bent on "assaulting power," as another interviewee put it, but perhaps more ominously a misguided claim on the part of conservative traditionalists—or mental degenerates—who unwittingly or cynically wind up harming the very people whose interests they purport to endorse. Through this audacious discursive move, the technocratic philanthrocapitalists manage to portray themselves as the "real" progressives who can lead the nation, including and especially the Mayan peoples, down the middle of the road toward development, away from the obscurantists who have been leading it astray for so long, whether they are old reactionary landed oligarchs or radically recalcitrant cultural rights groups.

CONCLUSION

For almost three decades, the private foundations of the economic elite have been seeking proactively to shape and frame not only the policy agendas of the State but also the collective *visión de país* of society. One can look back at the reactions of the oligarchy to the "500 years of resistance" summit of indigenous peoples of the Americas that was held during the emblematic year of the Columbus Quincentennial in Guatemala in 1992:

> If 500 years have taught us anything, maybe it's a good pretext to look for renovation of spirit and national consciousness; we should reorient our efforts toward a positive mental attitude.... It's time to enter a new century as a just and dignified nation, *la patria grande*, as was the dream of our Central American patriots. Five hundred years of resistance hasn't left us much in the way of positive. Maybe it's time to stop resisting ourselves and begin to integrate a nation proud of its roots [that are] indigenous, creole [white], mestizo, mulatto or whatever, but which today make up a new Central American identity.[15]

One can then fast-forward to the present and read the recent declarations during the ENADE 2013 summit by the new president of CACIF, the man who presides GREPALMA and I had interviewed a year before, he is a member of the largest landowning family in the country today, controlling over 80 percent of all African oil palm production. The speech should be read in light of the recent prosecution of former de facto head of state Efraín Ríos Montt for genocide and crimes against humanity in May of 2013, a trial vehemently and publicly opposed by the organized private sector and its allies, including the "multi-sectorial" and "cross-ideological" leaders of the CES:

[15] Fundazúcar document from 1992 quoted in Oglesby 2013, 156; second bracket mine.

> In the first place, it is necessary to overcome the past. It is pathetic that after so much pain among brothers, provoked during the twentieth century, we continue to be incapable of overcoming the conflicts that are in the past. It makes no sense to continue to think of the unfortunate incidents of our history, when so many of its protagonists are no longer with us, or to continue opening the wounds of the Internal Armed Conflict that ended with the Peace Accords [*applause*]. […] For these reasons we want to propose to all Guatemalans that we leave behind our differences and act firmly from the coincidences that unite us. [*applause*] […] Let us realize that those who were born during the Peace Accords are now reaching adulthood and a future of great limitations awaits them if we fail to act responsibly by continuing to live rooted in the past. […] In this sense it is essential to build spaces of trust. In modern, booming societies it makes no sense to allow for polarization, for only *division* can come out of it and what we are proposing here today is, instead, to *multiply*. And we can only multiply if we direct the agenda of the government and the different sectors toward building trust. That is why, along with the workers' unions and the cooperatives we conform the *Consejo Económico y Social*, the CES, which is a space for dialogue between organizations with historically different points of view, but that today are united in a common purpose. [*applause*] *Guatemala must walk on the right path. But that requires a new culture, in which the executive, the public institutions and all social actors throw themselves truly onto the path of development, avoiding sterile distractions, isolated efforts, or confrontational routes*. […] *The time has come to unite and forge together a Guatemala of prosperity, security, and solidarity*.[16]

In 2005, President Berger lauded the first Guatemalan forum on corporate social responsibility as "an exercise in linking [CSR] to a long-term project of governability, as envisioned by some of the most influential members of the Guatemalan private sector" (Oglesby 2013, 144). Merely seven years later, the Encuentro Nacional de Empresarios that opened with Molina's words, achieved the country's first National Agreement on Human Development, a pact that was subscribed by the leaders of fourteen out of the fifteen political parties represented in congress—including Winaq—, in addition to an array of "Honorary Witnesses" ranging from the ambassadors of the US, Spain, Sweden, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, to the leaders of the Catholic and Evangelical church

[16] CACIF President José Santiago Molina, opening remarks, ENADE summit, October 10th, 2013.

hierarchies, to the heads of the CES, the presidents of CACIF and FUNDESA, and a few ancestral authorities from the Garífuna, Xinca, and Mayan peoples.

I would argue that this event could very well stand as a symbolic crystallization of a process that began in the mid-1980s, when the industrialist faction of the oligarchy began transforming itself in order to position the private sector as the leading force for development in Guatemalan society and establish a new hegemonic project of governance and rule based on consent and consensus. Of course, there are several actors who "shine in their absence," starting with the party of the former insurgency, the URNG, and more significantly the leaders of popular as well as indigenous-campesino organizations, not to mention the Garífuna, Xinca, and Mayan traditional authorities who are associated with communities that are currently mobilizing in opposition to capital investment projects and large infrastructural works in their territories. But their absence only serves to highlight the representativeness and robustness of the emerging consensus that cements the legitimacy of the organized private sector—as putative representative of the oligarchy—in its leadership position in the path to the nation's development and its emergent project of governance. Finally, the signing of the pact serves to buttress an underlying argument that I have endeavored to make throughout this analysis: namely, that in the wake of the Peace Accords neoliberal multiculturalism has not only contributed to the remaking of racial hierarchy (Hale 2006, xxx) and the perpetuation of white minority rule (González Ponciano 2005; Casaús Arzú 1992; Martínez Peláez 1971), but has also, most significantly, been complicit with the ascendancy of whiteness (Puar 2007, 26; Chow 2002): a progressive disciplining of ladino and indigenous "ethnic" bodies for fitness within capitalism.

There is obviously a tension in this project of governance between, on the one hand, the racial implications of espousing a universality of rights and a concomitant

"color blindness" in matters of justice and social entitlement, and, on the other hand, the actual material gains that can be brought forth by a robust process of modernization such as the one being proposed. To borrow Casaús Arzú's metaphor, this moment in neoliberal governance would arguably constitute yet another "metamorphosis of racism": one in which, as I have proposed above, the life-enhancing, vitalizing aspect of biopolitics is emphasized across the racial-ethnic spectrum of society, after its negative, life-denying aspect had predominated up until the democratic transition and the signing of the Peace Accords. Thus, the project of neoliberal multiculturalism appears to have been a transitional phase in which Mayan ascendancy forced an end to the necropolitics of the war and counterinsurgency period (Mbembe 2003). In this manner, indigenous, black, ladino and white Guatemalans are today being energetically called upon to join together in a process of collective unity through economic and "human" development. The image of the nation, however, has fallen by the wayside and given way to the market. As the *Mejoremos Guate* presentation at ENADE 2013 stated: "Guatemalan is a quality, not a nationality."

In very diminished way, perhaps, this moment signals the return, or rather the perpetually deferred arrival of the promise of liberalism; not neoliberalism or classical economic liberalism, but modern political liberalism. If this is so, then it would be a modest (and certainly compromised) appropriation by an "enlightened" faction of the elite and its key allies on the left of the violated promise of the October Revolution, cut short by the powerful interests of a retrograde landed oligarchy and the Cold War imperatives of the United States (Grandin 2004). This does not therefore constitute a displacement of multiculturalism and a regression to earlier forms of national belonging through assimilationism or racial improvement. Rather, it is a moment in which culture reenters the field of politics, not substantively but adjectively, through the

transmogrification of race into ethnicity, and the "folding in" of cultural specificity into a common endeavor. It is a project of governance in the interstitial spaces between domination and hegemony, a biopolitical project for the ascendancy of whiteness.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Abbink, Jan & Tijo Salverda

2013 "Introduction: An Anthropological Perspective on Elite Power and the Cultural Politics of Elites", in *The Anthropology of Elites*. Jon Abbink & Tijo Salvedra, Eds. Palgrave MacMillan, New York, NY.

Alonso-Fradejas, Alberto

2013 "Sons and Daughters of the Earth". Land & Sovereignty in the Americas. Food First/Institute for Food and Development Policy; Transnational Institute (TNI), Issue Brief No. 1

2012 "The Politics of Land Grabbing in Guatemala". Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing II, organized by the Land Deals Politics Initiative (LDPI), and hosted by the Department of Sociology at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY.

2011 *Plantaciones Agroindustriales, Dominación y Despojo Indígena-Campesino en la Guatemala del Siglo XXI*. Instituto de Estudios Agrarios y Rurales (IDEAR), Coordinación de ONG y Cooperativas (CONGCOOP). Guatemala, Guatemala.

Alonso-Fradejas, Alberto, José Luis Caal Hub, Teresita Chinchilla Miranda

2008 *Caña de Azúcar y Palma Africana: Combustibles para un Nuevo Ciclo de Acumulación y Dominio en Guatemala*. Instituto de Estudios Agrarios y Rurales (IDEAR), Coordinación de ONG y Cooperativas (CONGCOOP). Magna Terra Editores, Guatemala.

AVANCSO

1999 *Por los caminos de la sobrevivencia campesina*. Tomo I. Guatemala: AVANCSO.

2000 *Por los caminos de la sobrevivencia campesina*. Tomo II. Guatemala: AVANCSO.

2007 *Por los caminos de la sobrevivencia campesina*. Tomo III. Guatemala: AVANCSO.

Baudrillard, Jean

2010 "From Domination to Hegemony", Chapter 1 in *The Agony of Power*. Semiotext(e) Intervention Series. The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Benarjee, Subhabrata Bobby

2009 "Necrocapitalism". Organization Studies, 29: 1541.

Benson, Peter & Stuart Kirsch

2010 "Capitalism and the Politics of Resignation". Current Anthropology, Vol. 51, No. 4 (August 2010), pp. 459-486.

Butler, Judith and Athena Athanasiou

2013 *Dispossession: The Performative in the Political*. Malden, MA: Polity Press.

Casaús Arzú, Marta Elena

1992 *Guatemala: Linaje y Racismo*. Guatemala: F&G Editores, 4ta. Edición.

2011 *Genocidio: ¿La Máxima Expresión del Racismo en Guatemala?* Guatemala: F&G Editores.

Clastres, Pierre

1974 *La Société Contre L'État. Recherches d'Antropologie Politique*. Paris: Éditions de Minuit.

Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico (CEH)

1999 *Guatemala: Memoria del Silencio*. Informe de la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico. Guatemala: CEH.

Coronil, Fernando

2001 "Smelling like a market". American Historical Review 106(1):119-129.

Di Lampedusa, Giuseppe

1958 *Il Gattopardo*. Milan: Feltrinelli Editore.

Dosal, Paul

1995 *Power in Transition: The Rise of Guatemala's Industrial Oligarchy, 1871-1994*. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger Publishers.

Dunne, Stephen

2008 "Corporate Social Responsibility and the Value of Corporate Moral Pragmatism". Culture and Organization, Vol. 14, No. 2, June. 135-149.

Escobar, Arturo

1995 *Encountering Development. The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Fábregas Puig, Andrés

2012 "De la teoría de la aculturación a la teoría de la interculturalidad. Educación y asimilación: el caso mexicano." Intercultural Communication Studies. XXI. 1.

Foucault, Michel

2008 *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978-1979*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

2003 *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976*. New York, NY: Picador.

1990 *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction*. New York, NY: Vintage Books.

Fuentes Knight, Juan Alberto

2011 *Rendición de Cuentas*. Guatemala: F&G Editores.

Ghosh, Kaushik

2006 "Between Global Flows and Local Dams: Indigenousness, Locality, and the Transnational Sphere in Jharkhand, India." Cultural Anthropology. Vol. 21, Issue 4, pp. 501-534.

Glassman, Jim

2006 "Primitive Accumulation, Accumulation by Dispossession, Accumulation by 'Extra-Economic' Means". Progress in Human Geography 30, 5 (2006), pp. 608-625.

González Ponciano, Jorge Ramón

2005 *De la patria del criollo a la patria del shumo: Whiteness and the criminalization of the dark plebeian in modern Guatemala*. PhD dissertation. The University of Texas at Austin.

Gordon, Edmund T., Galio C. Gurdian, and Charles R. Hale

2003 "Rights, Resources and the Social Memory of Struggle. Reflections on a Study of Indigenous and Black Community Land Rights on Nicaragua's Atlantic Coast." Human Organization. Vol. 62, Issue 4, pp. 369-381.

Gutiérrez Aguilar, Raquel

2009 "Hacia un Balance de Época." [unpublished manuscript]

Gidwani, V.

2010 "The Cultural Logic of Work: Explaining Labour Deployment and Piece-Rate Contracts in Matar-Taluka, Gujarat – Parts 1 and 2". The Journal of Development Studies, 38:2, 57-108.

Hale, Charles R.

2011 "Resistencia Para Qué? Territory, Autonomy and Neoliberal Entanglements in the 'Empty Spaces' of Central America". Economy and Society. 40:2, 184-210.

2006a "Activist Research v. Cultural Critique: Indigenous Land Rights and the Contradictions of Politically Engaged Anthropology". Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 21, Issue 1, pp. 96-120.

2006b *Más Que Un Indio (More than An Indian): Racial Ambivalence and Neoliberal Multiculturalism in Guatemala*. School of American Research Press, Santa Fe, New Mexico.

2006c "Rethinking Indigenous Politics in the Era of the 'Indio Permitido'", Dispatches from Latin America: On the Frontlines Against Neoliberalism, South End Press, Cambridge, Mass.

2005 "Neoliberal Multiculturalism: The Remaking of Cultural Rights and Racial Dominance in Central America". PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review. Vol. 28, No. 1, pp.10-28.

2002 "Does Multiculturalism Menace? Governance, Cultural Rights and the Politics of Identity in Guatemala". Journal of Latin American Studies. 34: 485-524.

1999 "El discurso ladino del racismo al revés," in Clara Arenas, Charles R. Hale and Gustavo Palma, *Identidades y Racismo en Guatemala*. Guatemala: AVANCSO.

Harvey, David

2011 *The Enigma of Capital and the Crises of Capitalism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

2005 *The New Imperialism*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence

2007 *The Revolution Will Not Be Funded: Beyond the Non-Profit Industrial Complex*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: South End Press.

Krznarik, Roman

2003 *The Worldview of the Oligarchy in Guatemalan Politics*. PhD thesis, Department of Government, University of Essex, Colchester, U.K.

Mannheim, Karl

1997a [1952] *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Routledge.

1997b [1936] *Ideology and Utopia*. London: Routledge.

Marcus, George E.

1983a '"Elite" as a Concept, Theory and Research Tradition' in George E. Marcus (ed), *Elites: Ethnographic Issues, School of American Research*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press: 7-27.

1983b 'Elite Communities and Institutional Orders' in George E. Marcus (ed), *Elites: Ethnographic Issues, School of American Research*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press: 41-57.

Marti, Werner J. and Rolando Eliseo Ortíz Rosales

1993 *El Sector Privado y el Estado Guatemalteco (1871-1993)*. Guatemala: Centro de Estudios Urbanes y Regionales, Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala.

Martínez Peláez, Severo

1990 [1971] *La Patria del Criollo: Ensayo de interpretación de la realidad colonial guatemalteca*. Mexico City: Ediciones en Marcha.

Marx, Karl

1954 *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels

1974 *The German Ideology*. London: Lawrence and Wishart.

McCleary, Rachel M.

1999 *Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End of Violent Revolution*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press.

McAllister, Carlota & Diane M. Nelson, eds.

2013 *War By Other Means: Aftermath in Post-Genocide Guatemala*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Moncrieff, L.M.

2011 "The Molotov Milkshake: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Market". Law Critique, 22: 273-293.

Nader, Laura

1997 "Controlling Processes: Tracing the Dynamic Components of Power". Current Anthropology, Vol. 38, No. 5 (December 1997), pp. 711-738.

1972 "Up the Anthropologist: Perspectives Gained from Studying Up", in *Reinventing Anthropology*. Dell Hymes, Ed. Pantheon Books, New York.

Oglesby, Elizabeth

2013 "We're no longer dealing with fools: Violence, labor, and governance on the south coast." In *War By Other Means: aftermath in post-genocide Guatemala*. Carlota McAllister and Diane M. Nelson, eds. Durham: Duke University Press.

2010 "Interviewing Landed Elites in Post-war Guatemala". Geoforum 41, pp. 23-25.

2004 "Corporate Citizenship? Elites, Labor and the Geographies of Work in Guatemala". Society and Space. Vol. 22, pp. 553-572.

Palencia Prado, Mayra

2013 "Élites y Lógicas de Acumulación en la Modernización Económica Guatemalteca".

Peck, Jamie & Adam Tickell

2002 "Neoliberalizing Space". Antipode.

Perera, Víctor

1993 *Unfinished Conquest: The Guatemalan Tragedy*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Porras Castejón, Gustavo

2009 *Las Huellas de Guatemala*. Guatemala: F&G Editores.

Puar, Jasbir K.

2007 *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in queer times*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Ramdas, Kavita S.

2011 "Philanthrocapitalism: Reflections on Politics and Policy Making". Society, Vol. 48, Issue 5, pp. 393-396.

Rancière, Jacques

2010 *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*. New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group.

2009 "A Few Remarks on the Method of Jacques Rancière". Parallax, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 114-123.

2004 *The Politics of Aesthetics*. New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group.

Read, Jason

2002 "Primitive Accumulation: The Aleatory Foundation of Capitalism." Rethinking Marxism, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Summer 2002), pp. 24-49.

Recinos Aquino, Ivonne

2013 *De la Patria del Criollo a la Nación de las Élites*. Guatemala: FLACSO.

Sachs, Wolfgang, ed.

2003 *The development dictionary: a guide to knowledge as power*. New York: Zed Books Ltd.

Segovia, Alexander

2004 *Modernización Empresarial en Guatemala: ¿Cambio real o nuevo discurso?* Guatemala: F&G Editores.

Shamir, Ronen

2008 "The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded Morality", *Economy and Socity*, 37:1, 1-19.

Smith, Katherine

2006 "Problematizing Power Relations in 'Elite' Interviews". Geoforum 37, pp. 643-653

Solano, Luis

2013 "Development and/as dispossession: Elite networks and extractive industry in the Franja Transversal del Norte." In *War By Other Means: aftermath in post-genocide Guatemala*. Carlota McAllister and Diane M. Nelson, eds. Durham: Duke University Press.

2009 "Estudio del Destino de la Producción de Caña de Azúcar y Palma Africana y la Situación de la Producción y el Mercado de Agrocombustibles en Guatemala". ActionAid, Guatemala.

Stelzner, Uli and Thomas Walther (directors)

1999 *Los Civilizadores: Alemanes en Guatemala*. Berlin: IKSA Productions. Documentary Film, 130 minutes.

Taracena Arriola, Arturo, et. al.

2002 *Etnicidad, Estado y Nación en Guatemala, 1808-1944*. Vol. 1. Antigua Guatemala: CIRMA.

Tischler Visquerra, Sergio

1998 *Guatemala 1944: Crisis y Revolución. Ocaso y Quiebre de una forma estatal*. Guatemala: Instituto de Investigacinones Históricas, Antropológicas y Arqueológicas de la Universidad de San Carlos de Guatemala.

Taussig, Michael

1993 *Mimesis and Alterity*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Torres-Rivas, Edelberto

1987 *Centroamérica: La Democracia Posible*. San José, Costa Rica: Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, EDUCA.

Tucker, Robert C., ed.

1978 *The Marx-Engels Reader*. Second Edition. NY: W. W. Norton & Company.

Valdez, J. Fernando & Iván Monzón

2007 *Política, Empresa y Cambio Social: El potencial de la responsabilidad social empresarial*. Guatemala: Universidad Rafael Landívar.

Van de Sandt, Joris

2009 *Mining Conflicts and Indigenous Peoples in Guatemala*. Amsterdam University Law Faculty. Cordaid, The Hague.

Velásquez Nimatuj, Irma Alicia

2008 *Pueblos Indígenas, Estado y Lucha por Tierra en Guatemala. Estrategias de Sobrevivencia y Negociación ante la Desigualdad Globalizada*. Guatemala: AVANCSO.

Wagner, Regina

1996 *Los Alemanes en Guatemala, 1828-1944*. Guatemala: Afanes.

Welker, Marina A.

2009 "Corporate Security Begins in the Community': Mining, the Corporate Social Responsibility Industry, and Environmental Advocacy in Indonesia". Cultural Anthropology, Vol. 24, Issue 1, pp. 142-179.

Yannuzzi, María de los Ángeles

1993 *Intelectuales, Masas y Élites: Una introducción a Mosca, Pareto y Michels*. Rosario, Argentina: UNR Editora (Universidad Nacional de Rosario).

Žižek, Slavoj

2008 *On Violence*. London: Profile Books.

2006 "Nobody has to be vile". London Review of Books. Vol. 28, No. 7, p. 10

1989 *The Sublime Object of Ideology*. Brooklyn, NY: Verso.

1997 "Multiculturalism, Or, the Cultural Logic of Multinational Capitalism." New Left Review. No. 225, pp. 28-51.