THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS LIBRARIES DUE RETURNED ®r 11T MAY NOT pp THE AUTmc • f, TTHOL']! AUTHOR’S PERHISSIOH THE DIPLOMACY OF THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, 1888-1903 Approved: .THIS IS AS OHIGmi MANUSCRIPT IIT MAY W r 2 COPIED WITHOUT SHE AUTHOR’S PERMISSION ' Approved: / 4 Dean of the Graduate School. THE DIPLOMACY OF THE BAGDAD RAILWAY, 1888-1903 THESIS Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of The University of Texas in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements For the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By James Taylor, B.A # , M.A, (Beaumont, Texas) Austin, Texas June, 1936 PREFACE The diplomacy of the Bagdad Railway is a story of rivalry among European imperialisms. It is more particularly the story of Germany’s quest for markets and raw materials in Asiatic Turkey and her collision there with the deep-rooted interests of Russia, Great Britain, and France. Perhaps no scheme of economic imperialism did more to poison the relations of the European great powers in the quarter century preceding the World War than did the German-promoted railway which was to have linked the Bosporus with the Persian Gulf. In my attempt to trace the development of the scheme from its inception to its collapse as an international undertaking, I concern myself primarily with its diplomatic aspects between the years 1888 and 1903. Professor Edward Mead Earle has, in his Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway, (New York, 1924), already given an adequate treatment of almost every phase of the question except that of diplomacy. He did not, however, have access to the recent exhaustive compilations of diplomatic correspondence and other source materials which are now available, and his book requires much revision in the light of this new evidence. Partial use of this new material has been made by Paul K. Butterfield, The Diplomacy of the Bagdad Railway, 1890-1914,' (Gb’ttingen, 1931), but only a brief and incomplete sketch is given of the years 1888-1903 when the scheme was taking shape as a purely German undertaking. They© still remain several gaps in the evidence which, when filled, will no doubt necessitate a revision of parts of this study. Although the German, British, French, and Soviet governments have opened their foreign office archives for the publication of documents covering the years before the World War, only the German and British series are complete for the years 1888-1903. The French are publishing their foreign office correspondence simultaneously in three series 397062 the first starting in 1871, the second in 1901, and the third in 1911. The French documents for the years after 1901 were thus available for this work, but at the present rate of appearance it will be several years before the volumes covering the entire period from 1871 to 1901 are completed. The Russian documents are also in process of publication, but the volumes which have appeared do not fall within the limits of this study. In the preparation of this work I have had access to The University of Texas Library which contains practically all of the materials to be found on the subject, and to the Congressional Library, Washington, D.C., which was valuable primarily for its files of foreign newspapers. I also had access to various documentary and newspaper materials in the British Museum, London, and the John Crerar Library, Chicago, by means of photostats. Acknowledgments are due numerous individuals who have aided me in the preparation of this volume, but major debts are due Professor Thad Weed Riker, without whose assistance and forbearance it could scarcely have been completed, and to V.H.T., who contributed many hours of indispensable labor and cooperation. Beaumont, Texas, April 5, 1936. James Taylor. CONTENTS Chapter Page I. Introductory: Turkey of Abdul Hamid II ....... 1 11. Evolution of the Idea of a Trans-Mesopot ami an Railway ... 14 111. The Diplomatic Struggle for the Bagdad Concession, 1888-1899 ♦ .31 IV• The Great Powers and the Bagdad Concession ...... 62 V. Failure of the Bagdad Railway as an International Project . .99 Bibliography ............... 140 Map: The Bagdad Railway Project . . . . vi CHAPTER I INTRODUCTORY: TURKEY OF SULTAN ABDUL HAMID lI—A LAND OF IMPERIALISTIC OPPORTUNITY SCAItS OF HUES This study deals primarily with the international rivalries which developed over the construction and control of the great trans-Mesopotamian railway-reaching from the Bosporus to the Persian Gulf—and the concomitants of economic and political hegemony within the Ottoman empire. But an understanding of the diplomatic story of this so-called Bagdad Railway would be difficult without some comprehension of the geographic, racial, strategic, political, and economic conditions which rendered the territories of Sultan Abdul Hamid II an attractive field for imperialistic enterprises. These factors go far toward explaining why Turkey became an international cockpit and why the "Eastern Question”, under the guise of such historic phrases as the "Question of the Straits” or the "Bagdad Railway”, has excited the jealousies of all the great European powers. This study thus deals with a typical case of economic imperialism in which an undeveloped country with a backward population became a stake of diplomacy for which the cabinets of Europe contended. 1. The Land and Its Inhabitants. In 1876 the new sultan, Abdul Hamid 11, inherited a disintegrating Ottoman empire. From the beginning of its decline in 1683, when John Sobieski, king of Poland, compelled the Turks to raise the siege of Vienna, the empire had undergone such a continuous reduction that the close of every subsequent quarter of a century saw the Turkish territories smaller in area than at the beginning of the twenty-five year period. Save for the clashing ambitions of Great Britain, Russia, and France the process of disintegration might well have been completed before the close of the nineteenth century; for the Russian tsars had repeatedly indicated their willingness to liquidate the estate of the ”Sick Man of Europe”. Yet it -was a vast empire which remained under the rule of Abdul Hamid II 1 even after the territorial losses sustained at the Berlin Congress in 1878. In Europe, to be sure, only Thrace and Macedonia remained under full Turkish sovereignty; but the mainstay of the Ottoman dynasty was the Asiatic portion of the empire which included within its limits the geographically distinct regions of the Anatolian plateau (Asia Minor), the Armenian and Khurdish highlands, the Mesopotamian lowlands between the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, Syria, Palestine, and the coast lands of western and northern Arabia. On the east Asiatic Turkey was conterminus with Russia and Persia* and in the southwest it enclosed on the west, north, and northeast the independent sections of the Arabian peninsula. The shores of Turkey in Asia were washed on the north by the waters of the Black Sea, the Straits, and the Aegean Sea* on the west by the Mediterranean Sea* on the southwest by the Red Sea* end on the southeast by the Persian Gulf. Of the once great Ottoman Empire in Africa nothing of substance remained. Tripoli and Cyrenaica were nominally subject to the Sultan, but both were actual-2 ly ruled by outlaw groups. Egypt was subject to the suzerainty of Turkey only in theory and was destined in 1882 to become a de facto protectorate of Great Britain. The French acquired a free hand in Tunisia at the Berlin Congress and this was converted into a formal protectorate in 1882. Geographically there is wide diversity in the lands which Abdul Hamid II ruled. In Asia are to be found the rugged plateaus of Anatolia and Armenia, the desert wastes of Syria and Arabia, the wide fertile valleys of Mesopotamia, the harbors along the Levantine coast, and the great mountains of the Taurus range blocking the route between the table lands of Asia Minor and the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates. The altitude varies from 17,000 feet above sea level to 1,000 feet below, while regional diversity ranges from the ” snows of Armenia to 3 the coffee fields of Yemen and the hot jungle of the Jordan valley.” practically every physical barrier known to nature can be found in the vast stretch of territory extending from Constantinople to Basra on the Persian Gulf—a distance equal to that from New York to Salt Lake City. In Europe the remnant of empire left to Turkey possessed a far greater degree of geographic unity although the rugged extension of the Alpine mountain range left Albania isolated from any effective 4 control from Constantinople. Racially the empire -was a museum of ethnic groups. In the Balkan peninsula Turks, Jews, Albanians, Bulgars, Serbs, Kutzo-Vlachs, Greeks, and Rumans were scrambled together in a manner to defy accurate classification. In addition to 5 the racially indistinct Turks there were the Kurds, Circassians, Assyrians, Ar-6 menians, Arabs, Greeks, Turkomans, and Jews. All these groups had their own customs, religion, language or dialect, and in most instances, their own nation-7 alistic ambitions. Moreover they were a rebellious people. The Arabs were in a chronic state of revolt. The Armenians were the cause of frequent disorders. The Kurds lived by the practice of banditry. And the subject peoples of the Balkan peninsula were as ready to fight among themselves as against their Turk-8 ish rulers. 2. Economic Backwardness and Potentialities. The economic life of the empire was little developed. The bulk of the population lived from agriculture, using methods of plowing, harvesting, and threshing almost identical with those of two thousand years before. The agricultural revolution with its adaptation of scientific methods to the tilling of the soil had left Turkey untouched. The Industrial Revolution, moreover, had damaged Turkish industry; for the handicraft system, in existence with little change from ancient times, was practically destroyed by competition with cheap machinemade European goods. Only by the importation of foreign capital could Turkey introduce the new industrial system to offset this damage since there was practically no surplus capital within the empire for investment. Foreign capital, as we shall see, was to be lured into the Sultan’s domain only under conditions which jeopardized, if they did not actually abridge Turkish sovereignty. The little commerce which existed encountered almost insuperable obstacles in the form of excessive taxes, brigandage, and the existence of few roads over which even pack horses, donkey trains, or camel caravans could pass. What roads there were consisted for the most part of remains of ancient trade and caravan routes 10 which antedated the Christian era. Potentially, however, Turkey possessed enormous wealth. The vast region from Constantinople to the Persian Gulf abounded in minerals, raw materials, and fertile farming lands. Great quantities of coal were to be found in Anatolia, as well as rich deposits of copper, chrome, antimony, and manganese. Commercially profitable, but in smaller quantities, were the deposits of zinc, tin, sulphur, and mercury* and in the rare mineral meerschaum Turkey possessed 11 virtually a world monopoly. Petroleum in almost inexhaustible supply was report-12 ed to exist in Mesopotamia by a German technical commission in 1905, and later developments have demonstrated that a considerable quantity of oil did exist be-13 neath Turkish soil. Dr. Paul Rohrbach, ardent champion of German penetration of Turkey, believed that the Sultan’s Asiatic lands could be made to produce great agricultural wealth. The cotton fields of Mesopotamia, he declared, could be made to rival those of southern United States, while irrigation of the lands situated along the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers would bring into being one of the most impor-14 ' tant granaries of the world. Wilhelm von Pressel, eminent German engineer and advocate of the Bagdad Railway, wrote in 1903 that the fertility of the soil of Mesopotamia was such as to yield four times as much grain per acre as was normal - ly produced on the European continent, end in addition to other mineral wealth the mountains and the lowlands east of the Tigris were, "so to speak, the ’place 15 natale’ of petroleum, naphtha, and bitumen.” There was no Question as to the economic potentialities of Asiatic Turkey either as to the production of raw materials or as a market for the manufactured products of the West, 4. Political and Strategic Significance—Rivalry of the Powers. It was not in economic possibilities, however, that the most vital signigicance of Turkish territories was to be found, but rather in the geographical 16 location of these lands in their relation to world politics and world economy. From ancient times the city of Constantinople, commanding as it does the straits of the Bosporus and Dardanelles, which connect the Black and Mediterranean seas, 17 has possessed an incomparable importance for international trade. The natural trade routes of three continents converge in the Near East, and a tremendous flow of inter-continental commerce moved across this region until the opening of all-water routes. Turkish lands were essentially a roadway—a bridgeland ■which, "less for their intrinsic importance than as a means of access to other 18 lands," stirred the jealous ambitions of the great powers. Th© most dangerous and persistent rivals of the Sultans for the control of the key position at Constantinople -were the Russian tsars. Geography dictated that the major economic highways of Russia be along the great rivers of the Kuban, the Bug, the Dnieper, the Don, and the Dniester which flow into the Black Sea. In the seventeenth century, when the tsars had achieved something of political unity and sought to develop the latent economic wealth of their empire, they found that the Black Sea was a Turkish lake upon whose waters no "infidel” vessel 19 was permitted. Since contact with the open waters of the Mediterranean was thus made impossible by the Turks at Constantinople, Russians of all classes came to believe that their nation’s "historic mission" was the expulsion of the Mohammedan interlopers from Russia’s rightful heritage. Russia’s relentless effort at expansion toward the Mediterranean started with the fruitless attempts of Peter the Great in the seventeenth century, but it was left to the great tsarina, Catherine, to make the first decisive gain. By the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji (1774) 20 the first permanent foothold on the Black Sea was secured. The limits of this study forbid relating the long story of the tsars’ unyielding and generally futile attempts to dismember the Ottoman Empire. Repeated military and diplomatic interventions in the Near East brought to Russia by the opening of the twentieth century only the comparatively meager results of annexation of the lands about the northern and eastern shores of the Black Sea with the right to navigate its waters and a precarious right of egress and ingress of Russian 21 merchantmen at the Straits. Complete control of the passage to the open waters of the Mediterranean was, however, essential to Russian political and economic interests; and the Tsarist government until its destruction in 1917 continued to threaten the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire. If predatory Russia had been the only state vdth vital interests and ambitions in the Near East, it seems certain that the Sultan’s empire would have fallen prey to its powerful Slav neighbor. Fortunately for Turkey, both France and Britain had long-established interests and ambitions there, and to these two powers goes the credit or blame for the preservation of the decadent Ottoman state. France had been, in fact, the traditional champion of the infidel Turk. As early as 1535 Francis I, involved in a dynastic struggle with the Hapsburg Charles V, had scandalized Western Christendom by becoming in effect the ally of 22 Suleiman the Magnificent. With the exception of a few brief periods, particularly in the time of Louis XIV and Napoleon Bonaparte, France played the rdle of protector to the Sultan down until the late nineteenth century. Since France was the first of the Western European states to enter into friendly relations with the Ottoman 23 rulers, she came to occupy a privileged position in the empire. The French nation came to look upon the Sultan’s territories as its special sphere of interest, and the Paris government wielded tremendous influence at Constantinople even after the weakening of French prestige after the Franco-Prussian War. But in th© nineteenth century it -was due largely to Great Britain that Russians efforts to aggrandize herself at the expense of Turkey were thwarted. That the preservation of the Sultanas suthority in the Near East should have been deemed as vital by the British is explainable largely in terms of their great Indian empire. Turkish lands were an important link in the route to India, and even after the opening of the Suez Canal, the presence of a great power at Constantinople or along the shores of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf would gravely menace Britain’s position in the East. Moreover, exaggerated fears were held in England concerning the influence of the Sultan of Turkey as Khalif of the Islamic world. Although the Khalif actually possessed little influence over Mohammedans outside the boundaries of the Turkish Empire, the British dreaded attacks upon the Sultan lest thev lead to disturbances among 24 the sixty million Moslems in India. Concern over the safety of the land link with India end anxiety over the arousing of her Mohammedan subjects thus to far toward explaining Britain’s persistent antagonism to Russian, and later to German imperialistic aims in Turkey. Rivalry in Turkey became further complicated in the period following the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 when the Hapsburg government, with encouragement from Bismarck, turned its attention toward southeastern Europe. By placing Bosnia and Herzegovina under Austrian control the Berlin Congress of 1878 definitely brought the Austrians into the scramble after territory and prestige in the Near East. As in the case of Russia and Great Britain, there was a clash of nationalistic ambitions between Russia and Austria which were almost impossible of peaceful adjustment. The interest of Germany in Turkey developed late; and, it was the effort of the Berlin government to encroach upon the traditional inf luence of Russia, France, and Great Britain in Ottoman affairs that contributed in full measure to the atmosphere of jealousy and suspicion which produced the Great War. 3. Abdul Hamid’s Government. The Ottoman government of the time of Abdul Hamid II may be described as a theocratic absolute monarchy in principle* In the hands of the Sultan was united the whole power of the state, both ecclesiastical and political, and the lives of his subjects were entirely in his control. Abdul Hamid was n at once a temporal autocrat in his own dominions; and in his capacity as Khalif, or recognized successor and vicegerent of the Prophet Mohammed, the spiritual head of 25 the Orthodox Moslem world.* The Sultan’s powers were subject to certain limitations such as pressure from the European powers, national customs, local privileges, and to a lesser degree, public opinion* There were likewise spiritual limits to his power in the form of precepts imposed on the Prophet’s successors to conform to the Koran 26 and the traditions of the sacred law* More serious limitations on the Sultan’s authority were to be found in the extra-territorial privileges of foreign powers within the empire. By the socalled Capitulations, nationals of the great powers secured exemption from the jurisdiction of the Turkish courts in both civil and criminal cases. Other privileges enjoyed by the subjects of the great states included virtual exemption from taxes levied by the Ottoman government with the exception of the ad valorem 27 export and import duties whose maxima were fixed by the Capitulations. A further and equally vital restriction of Turkish sovereignty was the control of finances vested in the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. Although nominally a department of the Ottoman government, the popularly called Public Debt was directed by a council of six members which drew one member each from among the holders of Turkish government bonds in Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, and Turkey. This foreign-controlled council had full power of assessing, collecting, and expending certain designated revenues and it constituted in effect foreign control of Turkey’s chief sources 28 of income. Import duties, furthermore, could be altered only with the sanction of the powers, since treaties had been forced upon Turkey setting all import 29 duties at eight per cent ad valorem. Abdul Hamid shared the responsibility of governing his empire by a curious arrangement between the Sublime Porte and the Palace® The actual departments of state were known officially as the Sublime Porte and popularly as the ’’Porte/ 9 They included in addition to the Grand Vizierate, the ministries of foreign affairs, interior, finance, justice, public instruction, marine, war, commerce, 30 public works, mines and forests, pious foundations, and police® Furthermore, the Sultan maintained a separate establishment of secretaries and chamberlains at his permanent residence in Yildiz Palace which constituted a second and rival 31 ministry and which often vied successfully with the Porte for influence® The Grand Vizier was the technical head of the ministry, but he was directly responsible for his actions to the Sultan who was in reality his own prime minister® Abdul Hamid, says Sir Edwin Pears, rarely saw his ministers because he trans-3 2 n mitted his orders through the Palace secretaries. The Sultan personally possessed the legislative power, and his decrees, or irad4s, were arbitrary fundamental law. The majority of legislation was actual. 33 ly the work of the Council of State, which was empowered to issue official reports called mazbatas and having the force of law. If a mazbata were unsatisfactory to the Sultan, it was returned to the Council of State for amendment; and as the members of that body were both appointed and removed at the Sultan’s pleasure, the acceptance of such amendments was in the nature of a foregone 34 conclusion. At the head of the ecclesiastical side of the Ottoman state was the Sheikul-Islam or Grand Mufti of Constantinople. By virtue of his appointment by the Sultan acting in the capacity of Khalif, the Sheik-ul-Islam was empowered to interpret the Koran and to issue legal opinions, or fetvas, on points of Islamic law. He also served as the supreme court for the hierarchy of Mohammedan courts over which the Moslem doctors-in-law, the ulemas, performed a variety of sacer-33 dotal, juridical, and scholastic functions. Thus the policy of Turkey in the period when the diplomats were maneuvering to gain control of the land route to the East was in large degree the reflection of the personality of her absolute monarch. Whatever else Abdul Hamid may have been, he unquestionably possessed a shrewd intelligence capable of driving a close bargain. While it is too much to say that he proved equal to the task of governing his vast empire with its heterogeneous population, he did realize that in railway transportation might be found the solution of Turkey’s twin problems of domestic rebellion and foreign interference. Perhaps Abdul Hamid foresaw that the Ottoman Empire must almost inevitably fall prey to the imperialistic designs of the Great powers if the Turks persisted in sitting tight upon the resources of a region which had once played a most important economic rtsle. Wat ever the reason, the Sultan more than any other individual was responsible for the attempt to regenerate the stagnant economic life of his empire through the construction of railways* 1 Turkish territories underwent what Lord Beaconsfield termed a ’’consolidation” at the Berlin Congress. Russia annexed the Asiatic provinces of Batoum, Ardahan, and Kars. Austria acquired the right to ’’occupy and administer” Bosnia and Herzegovina for an undefined term, and was also allowed to occupy for military, but not administrative, purposes the Sanjak of Novi Bazar. The ’’Greater Bulgaria” created by Russia in the Treaty of San Stefano was divided into the independent state of Bulgaria under Turkish suzerainty, and Eastern Rumelia which was given civil autonomy under a Christian governor named by the Sultan. Serbia, Montenegro, and Roumania cast off the last vestige of Ottoman control, while Greece, independent since 1830, annexed the province of Thessaly. E. Hertslet, The Map of Europe by Treaty, 1814-1891, IV, 2764-2798. England by a separate treaty with Turkey "compensated herself by taking over the administration of the island of Cyprus. Ibid., 2723-2725. 2 These regions were annexed by Italy following the Tripolitan War in 1911. 3 ’’The Problems of Turkey,” in Journal of Geography, XIX, 141. 4 Ewald Banse, Die LShder und die Vflker der Turkei, 29. 5 Racially speaking, ‘the Turk is a mixture of many elements, little of the original Turanian blood remaining in his veins. ”He had freely intermarried with all of his neighbors.«.so that he now represents a composite of the original Turanian; the Albanian converted by the sword; the Circassian women desired for their beauty; the Christian boys commandeered for the crack army troops called Janizaries; the Arab, Greek, and Armenian women seized for household slaves; the negroes from Egypt, the Sudan, and Abyssinia; the Poles made homeless by the partition of their country; the Bulgarians, and the Serbs.” G. Bie Ravndal, Turkey, 20. 6 Ibid., 20-25. Leon Ostrorog, The Turkish Problem, 8-16. 7 Victor Berard, Le Sultan, I*lslam, et les Puissances, 15-16. "Turkey has drawn the elements of vEs population from 'the grasslands of Semitic Arabia, from the highlands of Aryan Persia, from the Caspian plains of Mongolian Asia, from the multifarious race stocks of the Russian Caucasus, from the Greek coasts of the Balkan Peninsula and the Aegean Isles. The peoples comprised within the borders of Turkey differ in racial and geographic origins, in language and religion, in social and economic development... They are united by common bonds found in the semi-arid climate of Turkey, the prevailing steppe vegetation with its concomitant pastoral nomadic life, the patchy distribution of the arable land, the sparsity of the population, and finally the deep underlying community of ideals molded by this environment through a process of social development unfolded from within through the ages.” E.C. Semple, "The Regional Geography of Turkey,” in the Geographical Review, 11, 338. 8 Sir Edwin pears. The Life of Abdul Hamid 11, 88, 9 E.F. Nikoley, ’’AgricultureT"" in Modern Turkey (E.G. Mears, editor), 280- 301, describes the archaic methods of the Asiatic Turks. Ravndal, op. cit., 86, writes that plowing was done primarily with an "ox-drawn metal-tipped stick,” a crude sickle was used for harvesting, and the grain was separated on a ’’threshing floor of beaten earth by means of the ancient drag encrusted with flint.” 10 Talcott Williams, Turkey, a World Problem of Today, 70. Ravndal, qp. cit. 43. ~ 11 W.S. Monroe, Turkey and the Turks, 152. 1$ British Foreign Office Handbooks, No. 63, "Mesopotamia," 85-86. 13 tn 1933 Iraq produced 1,200,000 barrels of crude oil. World Almanac, New York World-Telegram, 1935, 660® 14 Paul Rohrbach, Die Bagdedbahn, 60-64. On the subject of cotton production E.M. Earle, Turkey, The Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway, 16, writes: "The climate of Mesopotamia is ideal for sucK a purpose.♦«lt is believed that Mesopotamia can grow cotton as good as the best Egyptian and better than the best American product." Despite the views of Rohrbach and Earle cotton production in Turkey amounted to only 168,000 bales in 1931 and dropped to 70,000 in 1932. Statesman* s Yearbook, 1934, 1353. 15 Wilhelm von Pressel, Les Chemins de fer en Turquie d’Asie, 11-12. Mesopotamia in ancient times had been one vast - field, and its fertility had won for it the name of granary of the world. Herodotus in extolling its fertility wrote that "In grain it is so fruitful as to yield commonly two-hundred fold and, when the production is the greatest, even three-hundred fold." Leon Dominian, "Eurone at Turkey’s Door,” in the Geographical Review, I, 287. 16 "Turkey lies at the junction of three ccntinents, It is thrust in between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf, between the Black Sea and the Bed. It is a great isthmian region, dominating the chief intercontinental trade routes of the eastern hemisphere. It flanks for a thousand miles the steamer highway of the Suez Canal and Red Sea. It controls the Dardanelles and Bosporus leading to the Black Sea lands.” E.C. Semple, “The Regional Geography of Turkey,” in the Geographical Review, 11, 338. 17 "Turkey is thus the center of the Eastern Hemisphere," writes Leon Dominian, "and mastery of its territories is bound to turn the flow of intercontinental tre.de into the lap of its holder." Geographical Review, I, 286. 18 J.A.R. Marriott, The Eastern Question, 39.— 19 Edouard Driault, La Question d*orient depuis ses origines jusqu’X la paix de Sevres, 39. 20 Noradounghian, Recueil d’Actes Intemationaux de I’Emnire Ottoman. 1300- 1902, I, 319-334. ~ — —— 21 Driault, op. cit., 239-240. 22 Pierre Albin, Les grands trait4s politiques, 128. 23 The first practi cal result of Franco-Turkisli friendship was evidenced in the Capitulations of 1535 which gave Frenchmen permission to trade in all Ottoman ports and required all foreign vessels which sailed in Turkish waters to fly the French flag. In addition, guardianship of the Holy Places in Palestine was entrusted to French Catholics who were thus to exercise a species of protectorate over all the Catholic (both Roman and Greek) subjects of the Sultan. Ibid., 128* New Capitulations in 1673 and 1740 confirmed France’s sole right of protection of Catholics in Turkey. Noradounghian, op. cit., I, 136-145- 277-306. 24 The Sultan as Khalif was far from, an effective head of Islam, and, Albert H. Putney writes: ’’Probably European.. .imagination exaggerated the idea of the Khalifate into a sort of Islamic popedom when actually it had become practically extinct and obsolete, existing only as a religious fiction or myth in so far as Mohammedans outside of Turkey were concerned.” Modern Turkey, (E.G. Mears, editor), 498-499. 25 Ronald Macleay, “Annual Report for Turkey for Year 1906,“ in British Documents on the Origins of the World War, V, 1. The Khali fate claim of the Osmanli dynasty'Tof which AbduTliamid if was heir) was based on the right of conquest and possession, and dated from 1517 when Sultan Selim I destroyed the Mameluke power in Egypt and forced Mutawakkil, a descendant of the Abbassides of Cairo, to make over to him his “nominal Khalifate and all the attributes, relics, and other sacred possessions of the office.” Ibid. $ W.S. Monroe, 133-149, gives an excellent brief description of the Turkish government. 26 Macleay, Brit. Docs., V., 1. 27 "The term 1 capitulation’-is commonly attributed to the condition of foreigners in the Ottoman Empire as regulated by a series of treaties concluded between the Sublime Porte and most of the Christian states of Europe and America.” Du Rausas, Le regime des capitulations dans I’empire ottoman, I, 1. The capitulatory or extraterritorial system has its origTn in "the ancient world when the principle of personality of law granting autonomous jurisdiction to strangers in foreign lands was generally recognized and rather fully observed by the Greeks, Romans, Hebrews, and Arabs. G. Bie Ravndal, “Capitulations,” in Modern Turkey, (E.G. Mears, ed.), 436-437. See also Nasim Sousa, The Capitulatory Regime of Turkey, 7-12. In more recent times the Italian city states enjoyed exterritorial privileges in the Eastern Empire, and in 1453, a few days after his victory over the city of Constantine, Sultan Mohammed II “gave to the Genoese in Constantinople freedom of worship and travel, preservation of the churches and property, and application of national jurisdiction on Turkish 50i1..." Ibid., 51-52. These personal, economic, and juridical concessions were thus originally voluntary and were conceded in accordance with common usage and mutual convenience. The modern meaning of "sovereignty" was unknown to the Ottoman rulers end the Capitulations were not viewed as concessions to foreigners, but as obligations "imposed on them as a condition upon which they enjoyed the privilege of residing in the foreign country.” Sir Edwin Pears, Turkey end Its People, 336. These unilateral grants were made when the Sultans were at the zenith of their power, and as Pradier-Fodere writdss "These capitulations were...concessions gracieuses, granted by the Sultans without previous discussions, conferring voluntarily certain rights or privileges upon the subjects of the foreign nations with whom Turkey kept relations of trade and friendship.” Quoted in Sousa, op. cit., 160. But by the eighteenth century the voluntary system began to assume a binding character. Turkey had ceased to menace Western Europe, ‘'nd her national existence was preserved large* ly as a result of clashing ambitions of the great powers. Thus the voluntarily granted Capitulations were transformed into international treaties which constituted a definite abridgment of Turkish sovereignty and which were continued in effect only by superior military strength. The full text of the various capitulatory treaties is given in Noradounghian, Recueil d’actes intemationaux de I’empire ottoman, 15500-1902, 4 vols., and in Van Dyck, Report on the Capitulations of the~~Ottoman Empire, Forty-seventh Congress, Special Session, Senate Executive document ho. 3, Pi rst Sessi on, Senate Executive Document No. 87. Doss., V, 6, and Sir Edwin Pears, Abdul Hamid, 171-173. George Young (ed.) , Corps du droit ottoman, V, chapter 85, gives a full account of the T- U establishment, functions, and operations of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration The creation of the Public Debt Administration was a product of the extravagances of Sultan Abdul Aziz (1861-1876) who had reduced the treasury to virtual bankruptcy when he was succeeded by Abdul Hamid II in 1876® The financial administration at that time was utterly rotten, and probably no more than forty per cent of the taxes collected reached the treasury. New loans were necessary to pay the interest on the old foreign debts which amounted in 1876 to 190,750,000 Turkish pounds. The war with Russia, 1877-1878, completed the process of bankruptcy, and the Flinch-controlled Ottoman Bank and other financial institutions in Turkey refused further advances until those previously made were amply secured. Consequently the Ottoman government, in 1881, entered into a contract with the representatives of its foreign and domestic creditors for resumption of payments on Turkish bonds and placed certain of the imperial revenue under the complete supervision of the specially created Council for the Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt. This agreement was embodied in the Decree of Mouharrem, December 20, 1881. Donald C. Blaisdell, European Control in the Ottoman Empire, 1. 29 Young, op. cit., 111, 221-228. ' 3$ Docs. 73. The name ”Porte”, by which the ministry in aggregate was known, was derived from the high gate which gave access to the large modern building in Constantinople which contained the Quarters of the principal departments of state. Monroe, cit., 261. Strictly speaking, however, the title ’Sublime Porte” applied only to the ministry of foreign affairs, but throughout Europe in both official and unofficial circles the term was used to designate the Ottoman government. Blaisdell, op. cit., 1. 31 Docs., V, 6. 32 Sir Edwln Pears, Abdul Hamid, 110. The very cunning Izzet Pasha, second secretary from 1887 to 1906, exercised great influence over Kami di an policies during the diplomatic struggle over the Bagdad Railway concession. Brit. Docs®, V,B. 33 The Council of State was composed of the Grand Vizier, the Sheik-ul- Islam, and ten subordinate ministers. Monroe, op. cit», 134. 34 mi* £222*» V, 6. 35 Ibid. FOO TA OF BAGDAD FA/LWAY FAO J ACT CHAPTER II EVOLUTION OF THE IDEA OF A TRANS-MESOPOTAMIAN RAILWAY BEFORE THE ACCESSION OF WILLIAM II It was certainly within the logic of events that the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century should have brought in its wake the idea of reviving the almost abandoned overland trade routes across Asiatic Turkey by means of a railway linking the Mediterranean Sea with the Persian Gulf. In an era when the nations of Europe were feverishly scrambling to gain economic and strategic advantages or political prestige by appropriating the lands of backward peoples, and when the diplomacy of these states was directed toward securing colonial markets and naval bases along with mining end railway concessions, it is small wonder that railways across the valuable territories controlled by the decadent Ottoman Empire should have been conceived. 1. Early British Interest in an Overland Route to the East. The British were the first to show interest in a trans-Me sopot ami an railway. The need of a swifter and less hazardous route to India than the long journey around Africa had been recognized almost from the date of the chartering of 1 the East India Company in 1600. The idea of a railway link in the route to the East did not receive serious consideration, however, until 1831 when Francis R. Chesney, a British army officer who had spent several years in Asia Minor, began to urge upon his government the need of a shorter route between England and India. Chesney proposed that a railway of some eighty miles in length be constructed from the Levantine coast across Syria to the headwaters of the Euphrates river where connection would be made with a navigation line which would in turn make contact with larger vessels along the coast of the Persian 2 Gulf, parliamentary support was obtained for the proposal in 1834, when £20,000 was appropriated for the "purpose of ascertaining the practicability 3 of navigating the Euphrates.” A royal expedition was sent out under Chesney’s direction the following year, end in the steamer Euphrates (transported to the Euphrates in eight sections from the Syrian coast) the expedition steamed down the river and eventually reached Bushire on the Persian coast. Despite the report of the expedition that there were no serious difficulties to be overcome either in the construction of the railway line or the establishment of navigation lines on the Euphrates river, the British government could not be induced 5 to take further action. Failing to secure parliamentary support, Chesney sought to enlist private capital in the project* His persistence was rewarded in 1856 when Sir William 6 Andrew joined him in organizing the Euphrates Valley Railway Company. This company proposed to connect the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf by a railway extending from the port of Suedieh, ancient Seleucia, by way of and Aleppo to Ja’ber Castle on the Euphrates—a distance of eighty miles—and eventually to extend the line ”by Hit, and other towns, to Bagdad, or on to Kumah, at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, or Bussorah, at the head of the Per-7 8 sian Gulf.” With the enthusiastic support of Lord Palmerston, the prime minister, 9 and of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, British ambassador at Constantinople, the company secured from the Turkish government in 1856 the option on a concession to build a railway from the Gulf of Alexandretta to the city of Basra, with the agreement that the Turkish government would guarantee a return of six per cent 10 upon the capital invested. The promoters soon found, however, that capital could not be induced to invest in the railway stock unless the British government would provide guarantees; and in 1857, when Palmerston definitely refused to commit the government in favor of such guarantees, the Chesney-Andrew group allowed 11 the option to lapse. Reluctant for Britain to lose what he believed was a rare opportunity to extend the empire, Chesney secured the renewal of the concession in 1862, but the government again declined to assume any financial responsibility 12 for the line. Meanwhile the development of another short cut to India was causing grave anxiety in official circles Of Great Britain. The famous French engineer, De Lesseps, was successfully completing the Suez Canal in spite of the obstruction-13 ist policies of the British in general and of Lord Palmerston in particular. The opening of this new all-water route to the East in 1869 provoked widespread alarm among the British over the security of their Indian empire. Consequently, when a British promoter in 1870 proposed a railway from Alexandretta via Aleppo and Mosul to Bagdad and emphasized that Great Britain could thus free herself from the menace of the French-dominated Suez Canal, Parliament evinced considerable interest. A Select Committee was appointed by the House of Commons to 14 study the possibility of railway communications with the Persian Gulf. And in 1872 this group reported in favor of a project which would have required an estimated expense of about £10,000,000 and pointed out that: amongst the advantages to be expected from the construction of the line were the more rapid transmission of the mails, the possession of an alternate and more rapid route for the conveyance of troops, and the great commercial advantage, both to England and India, which the opening of the route would confer. 15 But Parliamentary action went no farther, for Great Britain found the Suez Canal less of a menace after the Franco-Prussian War, and the acquisition of the bankrupt Egvotian Khedive’s stock in the canal in 1875 eliminated the pressing need 16 of an alternate route to India. 2. private Capital Builds the First Link toward Bagdad. Foreign capitalists did not long neglect the opportunity for profits from railway investments in Turkey. The first of a series of concessions to foreign groups was made by the Sultan in 1856 when an English syndicate was given the 17 right to construct and operate a line from Smyrna to Aidin. Keen rivalry soon developed between British and French promoters for Turkish railway concessions, and by 1888 when the Eastern Railways connected Constantinople with the capitals 18 of Western Europe, most of the coastal towns of Asia Minor were served by British or French owned railways, or concessions for lines had been granted to citizens 19 of these two countries® The French were responsible of the first link in the Bosporus-to-Bagdad railway. On August 4, 1871, a French syndicate was granted a concession to construct for the Turkish government a railway from Haidar pasha (across the 20 Bosporus from Constantinople) to Ismidt—a distance of ninety two kilometres® Under the technical supervision of an eminent German engineer, Wilhelm von Pressel, 21 ' this nucleus of the Bagdad route was completed in 1873. The Turkish government had retained ownership of the line, and in 1880 transferred the right of management from the French to a British company with the proviso that the Sultan could 22 repurchase full control of the railway at any time he desired® Meanwhile Sultan Abdul Hamid had come to cherish the dream of a great trunk line extending all the way from the Bosporus to Bagdad with branch lines to Smyrna, Aleppo, Damascus, Mecca, Beirut, Mosul—in short, a web of railways which would bind together all parts of the Ottoman Empire, Political, commercial, and economic reasons alike dictated Abdul Hamid’s interest in Turkish railways. By overcoming the problem of mountains and distance through railway lines the Sultan’s nominal authority over indifferent and rebellious subjects in Mesopotamia, Syria, Kurdistan, and Arabia might be made effective. The enforcement of universal military service, collection of taxes in all the provinces, a better defense against foreign invasions, the general tightening of the authority of the central government—all of these might be accomplished through improved means of communication. Likewise the stagnant economic life of Turkey might be stirred into a semblance of life. Economic development resulting from adequate transportation facilities might even increase the income of the Turkish treasury so that the foreign control exercised by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration 23 could be broken. There can be little question that if Turkey was to be preserved as an independent nation, political control and unity had to be restored military power increased, natural resources developed, and trade expanded. And Abdul Hamid well realized that railways might serve these vital ends. There is little information available concerning the Sultan’s conversion to the feasibility of railway schemes, but it seems quite probable that Wilhelm 24 von Pressel exerted considerable influence. Abdul Hamid’s first move in support of his plan to develop the railway communi cations of Asiatic Turkdy came in 1880 ■when he entered negotiations with the British lessees of the Haidar-Pasha-Ismidt railway for the prolongation of the line towards Aleppo and Bagdad* Kilometric guarantees of 23,000 francs to Aleppo and 25,000 francs to Bagdad were offered 25 as inducements, but no agreement could be reached. Why the negotiations failed to bear fruit cannot be answered satisfactorily, but the probable reason is that British investors were unwilling to risk their capital in a Turkish railway which was of questionable soundness even with a government guarantee. Again in 1888 the British group was approached. This time the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works suggested that the lessees of the Haidar Pasha-Ismidt railway prolong the line along a northern route to Angora with the view of later extending the line to Bagdad. Again substantial kilometric guarantees were promised, but the British company found that capital was still wary of projects in backward 26 Turkey. Thus again, as in the case of the Chesney concession, Great Britain failed to avail herself of the opportunity to assume control of this prospective overland route to India. Moreover, the best chance of the British to control the great Mesopotamian valley extending down to the Persian Gulf was lost. By the middle of the eighties Germany was coining of age as an industrial and commercial nation, and the opportunity long neglected by the British was to be seized eagerly by ambitious German financiers. 3. Evolution of German Interest in Turkish Railways. The outstanding event in the economic history of the last half of the nineteenth century is the rapid rise of the new German empire as a great industrial nation* Almost coincident with the process of territorial unification, the Industrial Revolution struck Germany with full force. The entire nation was transformed, it seemed, into an enormous factory, consuming vast quantities of raw materials ' y 27 and producing an immense volume of manufactured products. If she were to prosper as an industrial state, Germany was faced with certain very urgent needs end requirements. Her very existence, as that of any industrialized state, was dependent upon an uninterrupted supply of foodstuffs for her industrial workers, an abundance of raw materials for her factories, and foreign markets for the sale of her surplus products. Germany did not possess these essentials. Ten millions of her peoples were fed on foreign grain; her industries were dependent on foreign sources for many indispensable raw materials; her foreign markets were at the mercy of tariff barriers in time of peace and of the British navy in time of 28 war. Economic progress thus pressed Germany to emulate the policies of her older neighbors by winning for herself colonies or spheres of influence wherein 29 raw materials and markets might be controlled. And if actual economic requirement did not suffice to convince the nation of the need of a colonial empire, there were political, moral, and sentimental motives which were ably exploited by German champions of imperialism. These factors largely explain Germany’s intensive quest for colonies in the eighties, end why Bismarck, in spite of his desire to avoid colonial conflicts and notwithstanding his skepticism as to the value of such colonies to the mother country, laid the foundations of the German overseas empire. But the results were disappointing to German imperialists. Extensive colonies came under ra+Ker the German flag it is true, but they wereApoor in raw materials, unimportant as producers of foodZstuffs, insignificant as markets, and undesirable for white colonization. This culled collection of colonies did little, in fact, to solve 30 Germany’s shortage of raw materials and markets. It is questionable though whether the acquisition of the choicest of overseas possessions could have given Germany economic security. Great Britain ruled the seas, and, in the event of war, routes of communication would be at the mercy of the British fleet. This factor was only too well realized in Germany, and, as Friedrich Naumann points out, German statesmen and economists sought to solve their problems of industrialism by a system of economic alliances which would bind Central Europe into an economic unit. And if the plan of incorporating the Near East into this economic alliance could be effected, economic self-sufficiency and freedom frorft dependence on British sea power might be realized at one and the 31 same time. That German imperialists should have been attracted to imperialistic schemes in Asiatic Turkey seems inevitable to H.A, Gibbons, who writes: "Hemmed in on the west by Great Britain and France and on the east by Russia, bom too late to extend their political sovereignty over vast colonial domains, snd unable (if only for lack of coaling stations) to develop sea power greater than that of their rivals, nothing was more natural than the German...conception of a Drang nach Osten through the Balkan peninsula, over the bridge of Constantinople, into the markets of Asia. The geographical position of the Central European Powers made as inevitable a penetration into the Balkans end Turkey as the geographical 32 position of England made inevitable the development of an overseas empire.” a. Bismarck and the Near East. Yet so long as Bismarck remained in power the expansion of German economic interests and political prestige in Turkey was to be frowned upon at Berlin. Having successfully directed the course of German unification, Bismarck desired to safeguard the new empire by keeping France diplomatically isolated while Germany maintained close relations with the two great powers on her eastern and southern frontiers—Russia and Austria. Only in so far as the Eastern Question threatened to disturb the peaceful relations between St. Petersburg and Vienna was Bismarck concerned. The rich estate of the Sultan offered no temptation to the Great Chancellor, and he believed that Germany’s international position was made all the more secure by the rivalries and jealousies engendered by the clashing aims 33 of Russia, France, and Great Britain at Constantinople. Evidence of Bismarck’s indifference toward staking out German claims in Turkey was revealed as early as 1876 when the dissolution of the Sultan’s estate seemed imminent, and the problem of division of the spoils threatened to precipitate a general European war. To surmount the crisis, Bismarck suggested that Turkey be partitioned with Great Britain taking Egypt, Russia annexing territories in Asia, Austria-Hungary occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina, France an-34 nexing portions of Syria, and Germany receiving nothing. Shortly afterwards, in discussing the Near Eastern crisis before the Reichstag, he first made his historic auip that the entire East was “not worth the bones of a single Pom-35 eranian grenadier,* As late as 1888 Bismarck counseled that Germany should conciliate Russia by leaving her an open field in the direction of Asia "including the Bl&ck Sea, the Straits and even Constantinople,” and maintained that ’’Russia, by the acquisition of Constantinople, would not become too strong, but by the hostility of England end France, which the possession of Constantinople would 36 entail, she would be weaker end in any case less dangerous for Germany,” Bismarck also wrote the young emperor, William 11, that it was not the task of German diplomacy to prevent Russia from taking the Turkish capital, but that it would be fitting to leave that to the other Powers if they should judge it to 37 their interests. Certainly Bismarck had no ambition to use the Ottoman Empire as a bridgehead for German imperialism, and his interest in Turkish affairs went little beyond the desire to calm the clashing ambitions of Austria and 38 Russia. Forces over which the Great Chancellor had no control, however, were drawing Germany toward a new course in the Near East. By the middle eighties German industry, commerce, and finance were emerging as vigorous competitors in the international field and were crowding into spheres which had long been viewed as sacred 39 preserves of the older powers. Bankers, merchants, and industrialists alike were becoming insistent that the Berlin government pursue imperialistic ends; and it is extremely doubtful whether even Bismarck could have checked for long 40 the development of German economic and political influence in Turkey. In fact the reel beginnings of German influence at the Porte are to be found, in Bismarck* s chancellorship. Although without official encouragement from Berlin, Count Hatzfeldt, an unusually astute diplomat, actively advanced 41 German prestige from the embassy in Constantinople in the early eighties. Not only was Hatzfeldt the first German ambassador to become the confidant of Abdul Hamid, but he was responsible for the appointment of a German military mission to reorganize the Turkish army after its miserable showing in the war of 1877 against Russia. Almost complete supervision of Turkish military forces had been in the hands of a French mission until its withdrawal at the opening of the Franco-Prussian War. Subsequently on three occasions the French republic had 42 declined invitations to provide Turkey with new military advisors. Hatzfeldt was eager that Germany should profit from this vacancy, and in May, 1880, he communicated to Bismarck a request from the Sultan for a German military mission. Due perhaps to fears of arousing Russia*s displeasure, Bismarck hesitated to sanction the request, but in 1883 he finally approved the appointment of General von der Goltz to head a group of German experts who were to reorganize the Turkish 44 military forces. Prince Hohenlohe says Bismarck consented to the von der Goltz mission as a sort of insurance against the possibility that chauvinistic, Pan- Slav, and anti-German elements might gain the ascendancy in Russia; and in such an event, it might be possible to utilize Turkey’s forces to Germany’s advantage 45 if they were trained by German officers. But whatever the motives which induced Bismarck to violate his Eastern policy, the sending of the German military mission was the prelude to German eco-46 nomic and political activity in Turkey. Moreover, General von der Goltz and his staff served the Sultan well and transformed the poorly trained and inadequately equipped Ottoman army into an effective military machine patterned after the Prussian model. The efficient work of the German mission unquestionably exerted much weight upon Abdul Hamid during the next years when he came to turn with in-47 creasing frequency to Berlin for advice and support. b. Deutsche Bank Secures the First German Railway Concession in Turkey. Bismarck’s chancellorship also saw German capital’s entry as a competitor for railway concessions in the Turkish empire. As early as 1887 Dr. Georg von 48 49 Siemens, managing director of the powerful Deutsche Bank, had been approached by the Sultan’s chief engineer, Wilhelm von Pressel, with a. proposition for German capital to construct the great trunk line from the Bosporus to the Persian 50 Gulf. Siemens, however, was dubious of the financial soundness of the scheme, and in March, 1888, wrote that he did not believe financial conditions in Germany 51 were opportune. But meanwhile Dr. Alfred von Kaulla, director of the Wrttembergische Vereinsbank of Stuttgart, while in Constantinople selling Mauser rifles to the Ottoman government, had become converted to the feasibility of the project. And on May 16, 1888, he wrote Siemens soliciting the assistance of the Deutsche Bank in bidding against British and French syndicates for Anatolian railway con-52 cessions. Again Siemens hesitated but after a summer of further investigation into the prospects of profitable returns on investments, he informed Kaulla on 53 August 9, 1888, that the Deutsche Bank was ready to cooperate. Six days later Siemens, now assuming direction of the German group, sounded out the German foreign office on the question of official support for this Turkish railway under-54 taking, Bismarck’s answer was given in a letter to Siemens from the foreign office, September 2, 1888, which stated that there were no diplomatic objections to the German bid for railway construction concessions in Asia Minor, and that the German embassy at Constantinople had been instructed to lend support to the Deutsche Bank’s application. But Bismarck revealed his distaste for the project by citing the risks for capital invested in Anatolian railvrays owing to the general lawlessness of the regions and the hazards of war; and he warned Siemens that the dangers involved therein for German investors must be assumed exclusively by the Deutsche Bank without counting upon the "protection of the German Empire 55 against the vicissitudes incident to precarious undertakings in foreign countries.” Bismarck had, in fact, indicated his position earlier. On July 30, 1888, Joseph von Radowitz, German ambassador to Turkey, reported to Bismarck that friction was developing between British and French rivals for Asiatic railway conces-56 sions, and that Sir Vincent Caillard, who was endeavoring to form a syndicate to undertake the construction of a Constantinople to Bagdad line, was attempting to 57 secure the support of German capital. "Our business in the affair,” answered Bis- marck, w is to let the rivalry between England and France take its course, just as 58 in Egypt.” Thus the Chancellor, while not vetoing outright the competition of German capital for Turkish concessions, made it evident that he was not willing to withdraw from his policy of diplomatic aloofness in the Near East. But failure to secure Bismarck’s blessings did not deter the Kaulla-Siemens group. In September, 1888, the favor of the Germans with Abdul Hamid was enhanced when the Deutsche Bank tentatively agreed to lend the Ottoman treasury, on relatively favorable terms, thirty million marks with which to discharge a Russian 59 ' debt. What influence this loan had upon the railway concessions in Turkey cannot 60 be definitely established, but on October 6, 1888, the Deutsche Bank group received a concession transferring to it, from its British lessees, the existing railway from Haidar Pasha to Ismidt with the right to construct a 486 kilometre 61 extension from Ismidt via Eskishehr to Angora. The Sultan also let it be under- stood that it was his intention that the line eventually be extended from Angora 62 on to Bagdad. To develop this concession there was organized on March 23, 1889, 63 the Anatolian Railway Company with headquarters in Constantinople, and the con- struction of the line progressed at such a rapid rate that trains were in opera-64 tion all the way to Angora by January, 1893. Thus in spite of Bismarck’s policy of aloofness, Germany through her great bankers had been entered as an active competitor for economic concessions in the Near East. As yet there is no evidence of an active political rsle on the part of the German government in Turkey, but if it is true, as Dr. J. Riesser asserts, that the leaders of the Deutsche Bank were governed by the viewpoint that "the skirmishes of the political advance posts are fought out on financial grounds," 65 then this initial move had considerably more than an economic significance. c, William Ils the Apostle of a New Turkish Policy. Bismarck’s restraining influence over German imperialism ■was soon to be removed# In 1888, the very year that the Kaulla-Siemens group was winning its first railway concession in Turkey with scant assistance from Berlin, William 11, a convinced imperialist, came to the throne of Germany. While the full significance of this event was not apparent, to be sure, until after 1890 when the Great Chancellor was virtually forced to resign, it soon became evident that German imperialism had won an ardent champion. Unlike the cautious Bismarck who shrank from the dangers of an active Eastern policy, the young Emperor was the apostle of a new generation which was impatient to press Germany’s claims for imperialistic spoils—and that with small regard for historic missions or previous claims of the older powers. In a very definite sense William II represented the new spirit of industrialized Germany in his demands for a program of aggressive economic imperialism. And the views of William, not those of Bismarck coincided with the aspirations of the nation as a whole. Moreover, it is in no sense peculiar that German imperialists came to center their interests in the Ottoman empire for, in addition to its being the logical direction for German expansion, it was the only valuable and backward country which had not fallen prey in one form or another to one of the Great Powers • William’s interest in Turkey was first indicated in October, 1889, when he and his empress planned a round of royal visits which included the Sultan at Constantinople. Bismarck, though deeply disturbed, was powerless to alter William’s plan; and when the Tsar, in Berlin later in October, expressed the fear that the approaching meeting between Abdul Hamid ©nd William in Constantinople might be crowned by an alliance between Germany and Turkey against Russia, the Chancellor could only offer the apologetic assurance that the visit to Constantinople had for a motive only the desire of our Majesties not to return from Athens •without having seen Constantinople. Germany had no political interests in the Black Sea and the Mediterranean and it -was consequently impossible that the visit of our Majesty could have a political character. The admission of Turkey into the Triple Alliance was not possible* we could not impose on the German people the obligation to fight Russia for the future of Bagdad. 66 To the Kaiser, however, the visit was more than a sight-seeing trip to the Turkish 67 capital. If William’s Memoirs can be trusted, there was an open clash of opinion between Bismarck and himself over German policy in Turkey. Writing in 1922, thirty three years after the conversation occurred, the Kaiser says: Upon my return from Constantinople in 1889 I described to the prince JpismarckJ .•.my impressions of Constantinople. In doing this, it struck me that Prince Bismarck spoke quite disdainfully of Turkey, of men in high places there and the conditions of the country. I thought I might inspire him in part with essentially more favorable opinion, but my efforts were of little avail... Prince Bismarck was never favorably 68 inclined towards Turkey and he never agreed with me in my Turkish policy. Bismarck’s resignation from the chancellorship in March, 1890, thus removed a major obstacle to the prosecution of German projects in Turkey. And while the idea that William II became his own chief minister is quite unsound, it is none the less true that his enthusiastic support of German railway schemes in the Near East is of tremendous importance in the history of the struggle for the concession and development of the Bagdad Railway. 1 The East India Company in 1600 discussed with the English-Turkish Levantine Company (established in 1581) the possibilities of a land route to India, C.A. SchSfer, Die Entwicklung der Bagdadbahnpolitik, 7• 2 Francis R. Chesney, The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris in the Years 1855, 1836,"and 1837, I, 187 Chesney’s efforts to interest the government in the Mesopotamian railway are discussed at length by H.L. Hoskins, British Trade Routes to India, 154-182; 321-342; 429-436. 3 Chesney, The Expedition Tor tEe Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris in the Years 1835, 1836, and 1837, I, xi£. " 4 Francis R. Chesney, Marrative of the Euphrates Expedition, 185. 5 Ibid., viii. 6 Sir William Andrew was chairman of the Scinde, Punjab, and Delhi railways. Mrs. Georgia Chesney, the wife of Francis R. Chesney, writes in the Life of General Francis R. Chesney, (Stanley Lane Poole, editor), 425: "Mr. Andrew saw in the Euphrates“"the ’missing link’ in the communications between England and India. By his exertions the Euphrates Company was formed, capital was subscribed, and the prospectus issued." 7 William P. Andrew, Memoir on the Euphrates Valley Route to India, 14. 8 " Che sney was as su red of. ..TKe cordial support ofLo rd Palme r ston ’ s Gove mment. Instructions were sent to the Ambassador, Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, to give him every support at Constantinople...” Georgia Chesney, Life of General Francis R. Chesney, 427. 9 In the negotiations with the Sultan, Chesney ’’had the unwavering support of Lord Stratford de Redcliffe.” G.iChesney, op. cit., 441. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was a warm admirer of Chesney and as earlyas 1832 had commended his useful work in behalf of a closer connection between England and India. Stanley Lane-Poole, The Life of Stratford Canning, (footnote), 512, 10 Alwyn Parker, ""The Bagdad Railway, ’ in Quarterly Review, Oct. 1917, 489. parker, former librarian of the British Foreign Office, had access to the files of the Foreign Office in preparing this authoritative account. Lord Morley, writing in 1911, referred to Parker as being ’’extraordinarily well posted” about the Bagdad Railway. Lord Morley, Recollections, 238. 11 G. Chesney, Life of General Frances R. Chesney, 445. Hoskins, op. cit., 341-342, writes that Palme rs'Eon’s change of attitude toward the Euphrates railway followed a conference with Napoleon 111 wherein the British minister abandoned the railway rather than accept the French proposals concerning a Suez canal. 12 Schafer, op. cit., 12. One definite result of the Chesney expedition of 1835-1837 was the establishment of the Lynch Brothers famous Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, Ltd. Lieutenant Henry Blosse Lynch, a member of the expedition, induced his two younger brothers to go to Bagdad and open up trade during the period 1840-1860* Within a score of years the Lynch brothers had secured a practical monopoly of the river trade between Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Hoskins, op. cit., 424-426. 13 C7W. Sall berg. The Suez Canal, 137-159. G. Chesney, op. cit., 427-428, writes that Lord Palmersbon was n so violently opposed to the project of the Suez Canal, that to mention the subject at the Foreign Office was like showing a red flag to a bull a ? ’ 14 Parker, op. cit., 490* 15 Lords, 4th series, CXXI, 1345* 16 Hallberg, op* cit., 240-243* Disraeli paid the Khedive for his controling interest in the Suez Canal only about two-fifths of the estimated cost of the railway route. Hoskins, op. cit., 460. 17 E.M. Earle, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway, 30. Professor Earle’s thorough account of the private details of thefinancing and construction of the Bagdad Railway was completed in 1923 before the diplomatic documents of the period were available. 18 Completion of the Eastern Railways in 1888 brought Constantinople into direct communication with Calais, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna by way of the Balkan cities of Belgrade, Nish, Sofia, and Adrianople. The Berlin Congress of 1878 had decided upon completing the railway across the Balkan peninsula, but nothing was done until 1883 when a conference A quatre of delegates from Turkey, Austria- Hungary, Serbia, and Bulgaria agreed on a plan of action "which, however, owing to money difficulties end international jealousies, took five years to carry out." Annual Register, 1888, 310. 19 The railways in Asia Minor by 1888 were the Smyma-Aidin, Smyrna-Cassaba, Mersina-AdAna, and Haidar-Pasha -Ismidt. All of these lines were in British hands, or practically so, except the Smyrna-Cassaba line owned by the French. H.C. Woods, "The Bagdad Railway and Its Tributaries,” in the Geographical Journal, July, 1917,33 20 Young, op. cjt., IV, 117. 21 Vilhelm von pressei had been retained in 1872 by Sultan Abdul Aziz to develop plans for a system of Turkish railways, and had remained in the service of the government after the accession of Abdul Hamid. Wilhelm von Pressel, Les chemins de fer en Turquie d’Asie, 72. TE W6ods7 bp7cre.7"SsT , 23 Earle, Bagdad Railway, 20-21, and Herbert Feis, Europe, the World*s Banker, 1871-1914, 342, discuss the exigencies requiring that all parts ofTurkey be joined together by means of railways. 24 Paul Imbert, w Le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in Revue des deux mondes, April, 1907, 658, and Karl Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 25, are both of the opinion that Abdul Hamid*® enthusiasm for railways was contributed to materially by Pressel. In his Les chemins de fer en Turquie d*Asie, Pressel makes no direct claim to influence over Abdul~amid,~although as technical advisor to the Sultan he recommended and supported an extensive ten-year railway construction program. 25 Young, op. cit., IV, 117. 26 Young, op* cit., IV, 117. 27 Karl Germany’s Economic Progress and National Wealth, 1888-1913, 6-7. • — 28 Henri Hauser, Economic Germany, (translation), 13-14. In 1910, Germany was spending 130 million pounds a year on imported food, while seventy per cent of her exports were manufactured goods. Arthur Bimie, An Economic History of Europe, 12. By 1914 it was calculated that 20 millions "of -the 67 millions German people depended for their maintenance on foreign harvests and foreign cattle. Hauser, op. cit., 11. 29 Ross J.S."Hoffman, Great Britain and the German Trade Rivalry, 1875-1914, 73-101, surveys the rise of Germany as a formidable competitor in the struggle for control of raw materials and foreign markets. 30 M.E. Townsend, Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, Ch. 111. SlFriedrich Naumann, Central Europe, 117, 32 H.A. Gibbons, The oons t ru c't ion of Poland and the Near East, 57-58, 33 Fuller, ZenitK,~"l%~ 34 Foreign office memorandum of Bismarck, Oct, 20, 1876, Die Grosse Politik der EuropEischen Kabinette, Sammlung der Akten des Deutschen jurats,it, TBK, fhis collection of German diplomatic documents will be quoted subsequently as Grosse Politik, 5 5 Reden des Ftfrsten Bismarck, edited by Horst Kohl, VI, 461. 36 Memo, by Bismarck for William 11, undated, Grosse Politik, VI, 312-313, 37 Bismarck to William 11, Aug. 19, 1888, ibid., 341. 38 Karl Helfferich, Die Deutsche Turkenpolitik, 9. 39 Hoffman, op. cit., 140. The emergence of Germany as a serious competitor for world marketsTs excellently treated by Hoffman, ibid., ch. 111. 40 Naumann, op. cit., 117. 41 Coincident with the rise of German influence at the Porte under the stimulus of Hatzfeldt’s efforts, there was a general lowering of British end French prestige. Britain*s popularity had been damaged by the Cyprus Convention (1878), and further impaired by Gladstone’s return to power in 1880. Unlike his predecessor, Lord Beaconsfield, Gladstone was a recognized friend not of the Turks but of the ’’subject peoples” as evidenced by the rectification of the Greek frontier at the expense of Turkey in 1881. The occupation of Egypt by the British in 1882 virtually destroyed the traditional Anglo-Turkish friendship. The reverses of the Franco-Prussian War, moreover, had left French prestige at a very low ebb in Turkey. Marriott, op. cit«, 393-394. 42 Moukhtar pacha, La Turquie, L’Allemagne, et I*Europe, 25-26. 43 Ha jo Holborn, and unci die Tvrkei, 1878-1890, 11. 44 Holborn, op. cit., 11. Moukhtar Pacha, former Turkish ambassador to Berlin, says that AbHul Hamid was influenced in extending the invitation for the mission to Germany because he had gotten the impression from Bismarck’s actions at the Berlin Congress that the chancellor was fsvorable to Turkey. The European political situation, however, left the Sultan little choice. Alexander 111 and his chief minister, Pobiedonostsev, were displaying strong Pan-Russian tendencies and more than ever viewing the Straits as the legitimate heritage of Russia. France was orientating toward Russia —a possible explanation for the French refusal to renew her military mission at Constantinople; and even more serious, Gladstone was reversing the protecting rfcle of Beaconsfield. Moukhtar Pacha also asserts that ”Bismarck acquiesced with eagerness to the request of Abdul Hamid to send a military mission.” Moukhtar Pacha, op. cit., 24-25. There is little to substantiate such a point of view. 45 Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe-S chillingsftfrst, (English trans.), 11, 268. See also Heifierich, Georg von Siemens, 111, 17, 46 Turkish munitions contracts now went to the German firm of Krupp instead of the British Armstrong company as formerly. Hoffman, op. cit., 140. 47 General von der Golts remained twelve years in Turkey during which time he reorganized the Ottoman military forces, and, incidentally, won for himself the coveted title of pasha. The von der Goltz mission received much credit in Turkey for the successes achieved by the Turkish armies in the war with Greece in 1897. Ahmed Emin, Turkey in the World War, 38. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein wrote in 1898 that a great part of the prestige which Germany enjoyed in Turkey was due to the work of General von der Goltz. Marschall to Hohenlohe, Mar. 5, 1898, Grosse. Politik, XII, 560. 48 Dr. von Siemens was perhaps the most influential of the great financiers who contributed to German Weltpolitjk. The Times, October 25, 1901, wrote of him editorially that in the field of finance "he proved himself not less efficient than Prince Bismarck in diplomacy or than von Moltke in strategy.” Karl Helfferich, Georg von SiemensI—ein 1 —ein Lebensbild aus Deutschi ends grosser Zeit, (3 vol s•),is an official biography written by the great financiers son-in-law end is an invaluable source for the study of the Deutsche Bank’s railway activities in the Near East. William II raised Siemens to the rank of nobility in 1899 in recognition of his services to the empire. 49 Th© Deutsche Bank, which became the mainspring of German imperialism in the Near East, was founded in 1870 for the special purpose of furthering and facilitating commercial relations between Germany end other countries. With its affiliates it constituted the largest end most influential banking group in the empire. In 1808 the Deutsche Bank group controlled capital to the sum of 1,045,396,355 Marks and the Deutsche Bank alone had capital pnd surplus of 301,831,917 marks. J. Riesser, The German Great Banks and Their Con cent r ati on, 643-644. 50 Heiferrich, Siemens, 111, 28-29, and Pressel, op. cit., 33. 51 Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 31. 52 Ibid., 32. 53 TO., 33. 54 TH3., 33-34. 55 Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 34-35. 56 Sir Vincent Caillard, an English financier, was chairman of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration. 57 26 ~ 27 • 58 Grosse Politik, XIV, footnote, 441. 59 Siemens, 111, 37. See also Parker, op. cit., 493-494. This loan which was definitely concluded on October 3, 1888, marks the first appearance of German financial houses in the arena of Turkish finance. Previously Germans had been merely ordinary investors rather than the principals in loan operations with the Ottoman government. Brit. Docs., V, 175. 60 Parker, of the British foreign office, contends that the loan to the Sultan was the principal cause for the success of the Germans in securing their railway concession of October 6, 1888, Quarterly Review, October, 1917, 493-494, 61 Helfferich, Siemens, 111, The full text of the concession treaty is given in Young, op. clb.,IV, 120-142, 62 HelffericK, Siemens, 111, 38-39, 63 The official title ।of the company was La Soci4t4 du Chenin de fer Ottoman d * Anat o lie. This company was the nucleus f the later Bagdad Rai Iway ’■‘Company was to be formed, 64 Grosse Politik, XIV, footnote, 441, Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 44, 65 Riesser, op. cit,, 474, In fact, German investments in Africa had already forced Bismarck into colonial competion in that continent, M.E. Townsend, Origins of Modem German Colonialism, ch. V, Moreover, it is practically impossible for a country to distinguish between political and commercial or financial interests. Sir Louis Mallet, British Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs contended: *.,.a commercial stake in a country brings with it political influence,” British Documents, VI, 456. And in May, 1903, Lansdowne told the house of lords: “It is impossible, to my mind, to dissociate our commercial and our political interests,” Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 4th series, CXKI, May 5, 1903, 1348. 66 Bismarck to Salms-Sonnewald, Oct. 15, 1889, Grosse Politik, VI, 360-361. 67 In August, 1890, William’s visit with Abdul Hamid bore practical fruit in the form of a favorable commercial treaty between Germany and Turkey. Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 56. 68 itaiser Wilhelm 11, My Memoirs, 1878-1918, 27, CHAPTER III THE DIPLOMATIC STRUGGLE FOR THE BAGDAD RAILWAY CONCESSION 1888-1899 During the decade following the resignation of Bismarck European political conditions were most opportune for the advance of German imperialism in Asia Minor. Thanks to the genius of the Great Chancellor, Germany possessed a practical hegemony on the continent. Italy and Austria-Hungary were her partners in the Triple Alliance. Anglo-German relations were on the whole quite cordial, and serious crises in South Africa and Egypt precluded any effective British resistance to German schemes in the Ottoman Empire. Bismarck’s fear of a Franco- Russian alliance was realized in 1894, but there were so many points of divergence in the aims of St. Petersburg and Paris in th© Near East that it was difficult for the two to act in concert. The balance of power in Europe was to remain tilted very decidedly toward Germany throughout th© period of the diplomatic maneuvers for the Bagdad Railway concession, and it was not until after 1903 when national jealousies had definitely destroyed the railway as an international project that the German advance in Turkey was to b© opposed by the combined influence of the foreign offices of Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 1. Reaction of the Powers to the Kaulla-Siemens Concession. The concession of 1888, which marked the entrance of Germans as competitors for railway development in Turkey, was viewed with suspicion by France and In both countries the press vigorously expressed the opinion that the railway enterprise of the Kaulla-Siemens group had some hidden political significance, end 1 warned of an impending attempt to Germanize Turkey. Russia particularly disliked g the scheme, not only because she was opposed to any political or economic of the Sultan’s empire, but because of her fear that Germany might develop 2 dangerous preponderance in Asia Minor. Great Britain, on the contrary, supported the undertaking. The explanation is two-fold. British capitalists had endeavored to secure the concession of 1888, 3 and failing, had associated themselves with the Deutsche Bank group. Thus with London banking interests cooperating with the German capitalists, sir William 4 White, British embassador to the Porte, joined Radowitz in securing the concession. Sir Vincent Gaillard, British member of the Council of the Ottoman Debt, was named as a director of the newly organized Anatolian Railway Company, and in 1890 British financiers invested about £1,000,000 in the company. In addition, the British viewed France and Russia as the restless powers in Europe at this time and believed that the growth of German interests in Turkey might actually 6 lend strength to British policies. The diplomatic relations of Great Britain with both France end Russia were shortly to become so strained that Sir Edward Grey commented: "...the least incident in any part of the world, whether Russian seizure of Port Arthur...or French action in Siam...the least rumor of that kindat once excited the press of both countries, and there were rumors of war more 7 than once.” And Valentine Chirol says that "Englishmen were at that time for the most part so entirely obsessed with the fear of Russia” that they were ”in-8 clined to welcome the newcomers as desirable collaborators.” Thus "with friction and rumors of war between the older powers who claimed special privileges in Turkey, German commercial interests, with the blessings of the new regime in Berlin, were to lay an economic foundation on which German diplomats would be able to build a political edifice. 2. Diplomats Lead the Fight for New Railway Concessions. The German concessionaires energetically pushed the construction of the railway toward Angora, and on June 2, 1890, the first section of fifty kilometres 9 extending from Ismidt to Adabasar was opened with elaborate ceremonies. The Sultan was so enthusiastic over the rapid and efficient work of the Germans that he expressed the hope that the Anatolian Company would extend the road as far as 10 Bagdad. And Radowitz, on June 4, prophesied that negotiations would begin soon between the German company end the Porte for the construction of a great railway 11 from. Angora to the Euphrates and Tigris. But before Abdul Hamid was to make official overtures for further railway agreements with the Anatolian Company, both French and British groups were to 12 commence energetic efforts to capture the Angora-Bagdad concession. On April 30, 1890, and again on August 3, 1891, Radowitz reported from Constantinople that a British group, headed by Staniforth, British railway builder, was attempting to 13 get the Sultan’s approval for a line to the Euphrates. Also Captain Berger, French military attachd at the Porte, who seems to have possessed considerable influence at Yildiz Palace, secured the support of Paul Gambon, the French ambassador, in a hasty attempt to improvise a proposition wherewith to bid for the concession. Cambon turned to Count George Vitali, well-known French railway entrepreneur who was engineer-in-chief for the Anatolian Railway Company, and, appealing to his patriotism, virtually demanded his cooperation in submitting a French proposal to the Sultan. Vitali, however, considered the Berger scheme of doubtful 14 value to France and flatly refused to compete against his German associates. Reacting to the pressure from the British and French, Abdul Hamid now eagerly sought to complete a further agreement with the German company. In August, 1891, he sent an urgent invitation to Alfred Kaulla in Stuttgart to come to Constantinople to open negotiations. To hasten Kaulla’s departure, Tewfik Pasha, Turkish ambassador at Berlin, made a special trip to Stuttgart to deliver the invitation 15 in person. Both Kaulla and Siemens were skeptical of the financial soundness of the Angora-Bagdad railway project and had been maintaining a passive attitude toward the Sultan’s earlier indirect suggestions that they undertake the con- 16 struct!on of the line. But this indifference did not extend to the German diplo- matic corps at the Porte. Radowitz, eager for German interests to profit from the German financiers, met Kaulla immediately on his arrival in Constantinople and urged him to withhold a refusal until technical surveys of the route could 17 be completed. Kaulla showed a tendency to temporize, proposing that a preliminary study be undertaken of only the section of the line from Angora to Sivas. The Sultan insisted, however, that the entire line to Bagdad be pushed and declared 18 that he himself would share largely in financing the survey of the complete route. At this stage of the negotiations there came a most significant development. The Sultan on October 7, 1891, appealed directly to William II for his moral sup-19 port in the Angora-Bagdad project. Radowitz wired Berlin at the same time urging that a favorable response be given to the appeal, lest a rebuff to the Sultan’s 20 pro-German inclinations allow other influences to gain the ascendancy. Two days 21 later Marschall conveyed to the ambassador the assent of the Kaiser; and Radowitz in turn informed Abdul Hamid that William II had long been grateful for the con- fidence shown in German enterprise and hoped that the Kaulla group would be charged 22 with the construction of the line. The responsibility for this decision, which definitely committed the German government to the support of the Bagdad Railway, must be shared largely by William 11, Marschall, and Radowitz. A refusal by the Berlin government to intervene officially in the railway negotiations might have administered a severe check to the rapidly growing influence of Germany in Turkey, but in such an event the later bitter rivalries and suspicions emanating from German railway diplomacy in Turkey might have been avoided. Henceforth, the promotion of railways in the Ottoman empire became increasingly less a problem for the engi-23 neer and more a task for the diplomat. Yet in spite of the moral support lent to the project by William 11, Kaulla was not enthusiastic. He complained to Radowitz that the railroad to Bagdad had little prospect of financial success unless it were prolonged to the Persian Gulf and that he did not believe that the moment was opportune for raising that 24 question. Nevertheless an agreement was reached whereby the Sultan was to contribute £T5,000 toward a technical study of the entire route from Angora to Bagdad, with the understanding that the Anatolian Railway Company was to undertake the 25 work immediately. Shortly after the agreement was concluded with Kaulla, Abdul Hamid called Radowitz to Yildiz Palace for a long conference. The completion of the Angora- Bagdad line, confided the Sultan, was one of the major tasks of his reign, and the Kaiser’s personal support had been solicited because he had confidence only 26 in the Germans to build the line. Djevad Pasha, the grand vizier, explained the Sultan’s preference for the Germans as being due to two factors: namely, confidence in the ability of the Germans to build an efficient end substantial line, and belief that only the Germans would not make use of the railway for political 27 exploitation. And in the light of previous experiences it is small wonder that Abdul Hamid should have been inclined to favor the Germans; for, unlike the other great powers, Germany (due probably to her tardy emergence as a state rather then to any inherent netional virtue) had never preyed upon the territories of the Ottoman Empire. The initiation of the technical studies of the route to Bagdad in October, 1891, caused a flurry of rumors in Constantinople concerning the secret negotia - 28 tions between Kaulla and the Sultan, British ??nd French competitors with strong backing from their respective embassies now renewed their efforts to win the concession. And while the technical studies were completed within six months, and while the Sultan’s desire to award the concession to the Germans appeared unaltered, this foreign interference checked immediate action. On December 23, 1892, Prince Radolin, who had succeeded Radowitz as German ambassador, wrote Berlin that a three-cornered fight had developed in Constantinople over railway concessions. The Deutsche Bank group represented by Kaulla was still in direct negotiation with the Sultan; a French group, led by Nagelmakers, a Belgian financier, was attempting to secure a concession from Eskishehr to Konia via Kiutaya; and the British syndicate, directed by Steniforth, was pressing for a concession to build a line from Heraclea, near the Black Sea coal mines, to An-29 gora and eventually on to the Persian Gulf. Both the French and British embassies lent strong support to the projects 30 of their nationals, Paul Gambon, the French ambassador, upon hearing the rumor that the Germans were to be awarded a line from Eskishehr to Konia, demanded that the Sultan grant the French-owned Smyrna-Cas saba Company a line from Alashehr to Konia, and added the warning that a refusal would be taken as lack of consideration 31 for the French Republic. Cambon also questioned the financial ability of the Deutsche Bank to finance the construction of Turkish railways without French sup- 32 port. Abdul Hamid refused to yield to Cambon’s demands but he seems to have been quite worried over the attacks on the financial strength of the Deutsche Bank, and he expressed much satisfaction when a wire came from Tewfik Pasha in Berlin reporting that a powerful financial consortium supported Kaulla and that there 33 was no question of this group’s abilitv to finance the line to Bagdad. Unable 34 to influence the Sultan, Cambon sought the support of the Grand Vizier, who seems to have opposed the Germans because he,had been ignored during the earlier negotia-35 tions between Kaulla and Abdul Hamid. The French, wrote Radolin, also attempted to repulse the German project by taking advantage of the Sultan’s hatred of Baron Hirsch and circula-ted false reports that Hirsch controlled the Deutsche Bank, that he was a near relative of Kaulla,, and that he wished to use the railway to make Anatolia a German-Jewish colony. But unfortunately, Radolin concluded, all the threats and false rumors 36 had not yet had any influence on the Sultan. 3. British Opposition and the Egyptian Question, 37 Even stronger diplomatic pressure came from the British embassy. Sir Clare Ford, who was ill-prepared for the post of ambassador to Turkey, allowed himself to be pushed into a diplomatic blunder which was to strain severely Anglo-38 German relations. Learning that the Sultan had directed the Grand Vizier to issue a firman committing the Eskishehr-Konia line to Kaulla, Ford made representations to the Porte insisting that the decree of the council of ministers should be deferred until the British government could be consulted and warning 39 of the danger for Turkey in arousing public opinion in Great Britain. At the seme time Ford encouraged the Ottoman Public Debt Administration and the Otto-40 man Bank to raise obstructions. Then on January 5, 1893, the London foreign office lodged a formal protest with the Porte against the granting of the Eskishehr-Konia line to the Germans, alleging that already existent British 41 railway interests would be jeopardized by the construction of such a line. And there was indeed no question but that the concession to the Germans threatened to throttle future development of the Smyma-Aidin and Smyrna-Cas saba lines by cutting them off from any extension into the back-country of the vilayet of Konia. It was only natural that interference from the British should have been 42 resented in Berlin. Foreign Secretary Marschall wrote Hatsfeldt in London that the affair had reached the stage where, if the concession were not granted to the 43 German candidate, it would be viewed as a personal insult to the Kaiser. The German government, moreover, immediately took decisive action. Sir Edward Malet, British ambassador at Berlin, was called into conference on January 6, 1893, and Marschall told him plainly that the British opposition was not only lacking in proper respect for Germany but that it was also an act of hostility which destroyed the basis for future Anglo-German collaboration in Eastern affairs. If the London government, Marschall continued, believed that the construction of a railroad by Germans in Turkey was detrimental to its interests, and if it gave an official expression to that belief, it need not be surprised if Germany ceased to support the British in Oriental questions. To Malet’s response that the construction of the line was important to Great Britain because the future route to India was involved, Marschall replied that official interference could even then 44 be justified only if the line were to be in the hands of a rival power. Then without awaiting Malet’s reply from London, Marschall proceeded to strike at Britain’s vulnerable position in Egypt, wiring to the German consul in Cairo on the same day: If you have not already sent out, in a binding official form, the declaration transmitted to you regarding the increase in the Egyptian army, I beg you to hold it back, because the offensively hostile attitude of the embassy in Constantinople which in all railway schemes in Asia Minor assists French interests to the injury of Germany, bears no relation to the respect that Germany has shown the British interests for years past... 45 46 Great Britain’s position in Egypt was dangerously weak, and when serious trouble from the Khedive seemed imminent late in 1892 she had requested that the powers 47 sanction the use of surplus Egyptian funds for an increase in the Egyptian army. 48 The French had refused their consent, and the German assent which had been prompt-49 ly given was literally indispensable. Lord Cromer, the British consul-general and high commissioner of Egypt, was dismayed at the prospect of losing German sanction (which had been given before Marschall’s wire of January 7) and immediately wired Lord Rosebery, British foreign secretary, urging the imperative need of cooperation between Britain and Germany in Egypt as well as in their general .50 policies. Lord Rosebery, who in his foreign policy seems to have been pro-German and 51 anti-French, had had no intention of offending Germany over Turkish railways and 52 was probably quite surprised at the uproar from Berlin. On January 9, Rosebery wired Berlin that Great Britain had no desire to obstruct the Angora-Bagdad concession, and that her representations to the Porte concerned only the prolongation of the Haidar-Pasha-Ismidt line to Konia which would be injurious to the two British lines which looked to Konia as their sphere of operation. Even in regard to this matter a delay had been requested only in order that the interests of the British companies might be considered. In eny event, Rosebery added: "Her Majesty’s Government have no desire to take any step inimical to German influ-53 ence or interests at Constantinople.* It was Rosebery’s desire that Sir Clare Ford and Prince Radolin negotiate 54 directly at Constantinople for the removal of German grievances. But the British ambassador, -who was apparently under considerable pressure from. Sir Edward Vincent of the Ottoman Bank and from Sir Vincent Caillard of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, continued to insist that the German line to Konia would constitute an unjust encroachment upon the British sphere and that the Germans should eon- 55 tent themselves with the Angora-Bagdad line. Rosebery hesitated in calling Ford to task for his actions, and it was necessary for Hatzfeldt to urge direct and immediate intervention before Rosebery, on January 17, agreed to wire Ford to abandon all support for the claims of the Smyrna-Cassaba line and to cease all opposition to Kaulla’s project for railway concessions in Asia Minor. It may be added that Rosebery had learned meanwhile that the capital of the Smyrna-Cassaba 56 line was largely French. In regard to the entirely British-owned Smyrna-Aidin line which desired eventually to construct extensions into the Konia territory, 57 Rosebery asked for une satisfaction d 1 amour propre, be it ever so small. Meanwhile a spirited competition had been going on between the Deutsche Bank and its French and British rivals. Radolin had reported on January 9 that great pressure was being brought to bear upon Abdul Hamid to prevent the concession from going to the Germans. The British, he wrote, were demanding that the line from Aidin to Konia be granted to their candidate with the prospect of extending it on to Bagdad and were threatening a demonstration of the British fleet in case their demands were rejected; the Russians were frightening the Sultan by declaring that railways could not be built in the vilayet of Konia since the 58 tithes of that province were pledged as payment of the war debt due Russia; and the French were stirring up agitations in the press against the Germans. And the ambassador concluded with the admonition that the Ottoman Bank was using 59 every means of intrigue possible to defeat the concession to Kaulla. Abdul Hamid seems to have been quite tormented by the various threats and 60 intrigues, and was particularly agitated by real as well as fanciful British and 61 Russian threats. Yet he could not be deterred from his ambition to have railways and for the Germans to build them. And since the British embassy refrained from interference, the negotiations between Kaulla and the Ottoman government were brought to a successful conclusion on February 15, 1893—nineteen months after the Sultan’s urgent invitation to Kaulla to come to Constantinople. The concession called for a two-fold extension; the first from the rail-62 head at Angora to Kai sari eh, and the second from Eskishehr (about mid-way between Ismidt and Angora) to Konia. The Angora-Kaisarieh grant also included an obli- 63 gation to extend the line eventually to Bagdad via Sivas and Diarbekr. The new concession, like the one of 1888, provided for a guarantee of a minimum annual return of 15,000 francs per kilometre of the line, and the German syndicate desired that the revenues set aside for the payment of the kilometric guarantees should be administered by the Ottoman Public Debt. British investors in Turkish bonds, however, objected to the proposal, and while the scanty evidence indicates that the British embassy in no way participated in the protests of the bondholders, the German foreign office none the less asked Rosebery to intervene. Thus on February 22, 1893, Rosebery wired Sir Clare Ford: Do what you properly can, without compromising your position to remove obstacles which Germans complain are being unnecessarily interposed by Cai Hard Ct he British president of the council of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in way of the Kaulla concessions... 65 These obstacles were soon removed, and the administration of the revenues was 66 assigned to the Public Debt Administration as the German company desired. The railway concessions of 1893 left considerable rancor in England. Edward Grey, parliamentary undersecretary for foreign affairs, was especially antagonized by what he termed a "sort of ultimatum from Berlin, requiring us to cease compe- 67 tition for railway concessions in Turkey for which Germans were applying.” That Germany should have expected compensation for her consistent support of British policies in Egypt is not so much a mystery as is the fact that Great Britain should have believed that she could lean on the Germans in Egypt and fight them 68 in Turkey. Certainly it was customary for the rowers to pursue quite practical ends in their diplomacy. Neither Germany nor any other power gave without expecting something in the way of a compensatory return. The necessity of German support for Great Britain’s Egyptian policy in 1893 is frankly admitted by Grey who writes: "There was no choice for us but to give way, unless we were ready to face the open-69 ing up of the whole Egyptian question without a single Great Power on our side." On a basis of equity, Germany was certainly justified in expecting no diplomatic obstructions from the British in Asia Minor* but doubtless Lord Rosebery could have been induced to check the British competition for the Turkish railways without the brusque diplomacy shown by Holstein and Marschall. Thus the success of the German group in winning the new concessions in 1893 was essentially a triumph for German diplomacy, and reveals just how far the new pilots of foreign policy at the Mlhelmstrasse had drifted from the Bismarckian course. 4. The Advance of German Influence in Turkey, 1893-1897. Further development of the Bagdad Railway project was to be delayed for many months following the concession of 1893. A series of bed harvests in Turkey sharply reduced the Sultan’s revenues, while the vrorld financial panic of the early nine-70 ties made it difficult to secure capital for hazardous imperialistic schemes® Turkey’s empty treasury was in itself sufficient to arrest progress; for, as previously stated, the concession carried a government guarantee of a minimum annual return of 15,000 francs per kilometre. The guarantee for the Konia section was raised with difficulty, and when the Sultan in 1895, and again in 1896, asked the German government to use its influence with the Deutsche Bank, Siemens told the foreign office that the financial status of Turkey was such that the bank 71 could not think of taking new railway concessions in that country. Conditions were so bad, in fact, that financial authorities in London believed that already existing Turkish obligations might be repudiated; and that at any rate Turkey 72 was in no position to finance any important extension to her railway system. a. The Armenian Massacres and German Policy. During the period of delay occasioned by the low state of economic conditions in Turkey, the German government did much to solidify its cordial relationship with Abdul Hamid. In the Armenian question Germany found an opportunity to demonstrate her new friendship for Turkey. The story of the butchering of Armenian Christians by the Turks was of long standing, and at the Berlin Congress the Ottoman government had bound itself to institute reforms which were intended to improve the lot of the Armenians. But the powers which had signed the treaty soon lost interest in the fate of the Armenians, and the old Turkish barbarities continued without interruption. About 1890 the Armenians began a violent agitation 73 with the view of forcing the reforms promised them at Berlin. More disturbances began in 1893 and were followed by a serious rebellion. Punitive measures were undertaken by the Ottoman government, and Sassoun was besieged where men, women, 74 and children were massacred by the Turks and Kurds. Germany’s attitude toward these massacres, which were winning for Abdul Hamid the title of the “Red Sultan”, was partially revealed by Foreign Minister Marschall who stated in effect that pressure could scarcely be exerted in Turk-75 ish domestic affairs without losing the confidence of the Sultan. Berlin’s principal fear seems to have been that Turkish maladministration in Armenia might lead either to British intervention or to a Russian occupation of that country. Consequently the Sultan was urged by .Germany to take measures to 76 improve conditions. In Britain the Liberal party took a strong stand in behalf of the Armenians, and in December, 1894, Lord Rosebery, acting in conjunction with Russia and 77 France, reminded Turkey of her previous pledges for reforms. On May 11, 1895, the ambassadors of the three countries submitted to the Porte a list of reforms proposed for the Armenian vilayets. Anticipating these proposals, Abdul Hamid appealed indirectly to the Kaiser to use his influence with the powers to pre-78 vent them from making unfair demands. The Kaiser, not at all pleased with the Sultan’s impervious attitude to German arguments for administrative reforms in Armenia, rejected the appeal with the marginal comment: "I would not think of 79 it.” None the less the German embassy eyed developments very closely, and anxiety was manifested over the failure of the British and the Russians to work together harmoniously. Indeed there was evidence that Russia, who was opposed to any administrative reforms calculated to check the processes of self-destruction in Turkey, was secretly encouraging the Turks to resist demands of the powers 80 to which she herself was a party. German fears for the preservation of the Turkish empire were also aroused from another source. Lord Salisbury, who had returned to power after the fall of the Rosebery ministry in July, 1895, had become convinced that reforms by the Semidian regime were beyond all hope. Apparently the British minister was willing to abandon Britain’s policy of bolstering up the decrepit empire and was ready to make a tentative assignment of the Sultan’s estate against the day of its dissolution. To Hatzfeldt in London, Salisbury confided that even if the Armenian affair were settled temporarily, Turkey as a whole was too *rotten” 81 to exist for long. The German embassador, in reporting the conversation, wrote that Salisbury seemed convinced that the preservation of the Ottoman empire was impossible and that Great to plan on the possibility of a partition in order not to be caught unawares. Then on August 5, 1895, the Prime Minister and the Kaiser met on board the Hohenzollern at Cowes. According to the German account of the meeting, Salisbury definitely raised the question of the partition of Turkey, arguing that the situation was constantly growing worse and that dissolution was dangerously near, William II denied that such was true. Conditions were really improving, he said, and all that was needed to correct the situation was to prevail upon the Sultan to dismiss some of his bad officials and to re- 83 place them with some capable and trustworthy ones. The German foreign office, moreover, suspected Salisbury’s proposal as being a clever attempt to involve the members of the Triple Alliance in difficulties with Russia over the division 84 of the Turkish territories. Although Salisbury later charged the Germans with grossly misrepresenting his suggestions, and although the German version of the Cowes interview has been vigorously challenged by the British, there seems to be no question but that the British prime minister did sound the Germans on the question of partitioning the Sultanas empire and that the suggestion met with 85 a rather sharp rebuff from the German side. Meanwhile th© Sultan had accepted, in October, 1895, the reform program submitted by the powers. But the Turks held the Armenians responsible for this interference in their domestic affairs, and there began a new and more frightful series of massacres which extended even to Constantinople. The slaughtering of the Christians continued throughout most of 1896 and 1897 with at least the tacit approval of the Ottoman authorities. Public opinion was outraged throughout 86 Europe, but only the British government offered serious protestations. Germany, to be sure, participated in joint protests to the Porte against these frightful 87 88 89 massacres on November 5, 1895, August 29, 1896* and again on January 3, 1897. And the Kaiser in commenting on the joint note of protest following the killing of some 8,000 Armenians in the summer of 1896 said: ”Too late! The wretched 90 people are dead, and Abdul Hamid wished it so! Let him be turned out!” But Marschall and Holstein were directing the current policy of the Wilhelmstrasse, and the 91 German protests gave the Turks no cause to take offence. William 11, moreover, must not have been very serious in his outburst against the Sultan for, on September 21, 1896, he remembered his good friend Abdul Hamid with the gift of a 92 signed portrait of the imperial family. While the powers were still disturbed over the Armenian massacres a serious insurrection broke out among the Christians in Crete. It was evident from the beginning of the uprising that the Athens government would not be able—even if it should make the attempt—to restrain the intense Grecian nationalists from interfering in the revolt, and a Turco-Grecian war became imminent. Germany’s policy was decidedly pro-Turkish, although the thrones of Germany and Greece were related through the marriage of the Kaiser’s sister Sophie to the Grecian crown prince Constantine. The Berlin government, as early as May, 1896, favored concerted action on the part of the great powers to forbid any intervention by 93 Greece in the Cretan revolt. And when war between Turkey and Greece became a virtual certainty in February, 1897, Chancellor Hohenlohe wired the principal German embassies that any action of the powers in the affair could only contribute to peace if Crete were left under Turkish suzerainty. He also added that the chances of peace would be so remote if Crete were emancipated that the German government would withdraw from all further cooperation with the powers whenever it became evident that the retention of Crete as a part of the Ottoman empire 94 was not a part of the program. As a matter of fact both Hohenlohe and William II favored a joint blockade of all Grecian ports in order to prevent the Hellenes 95 from entering the struggle for Cretan independence. The Turco-Grecian war, which finally began in April, 1897, developed into a succession of victories for the German-trained and German-equipped Turkish troops. By late April the British sounded the Berlin government on support for an armistice between the Greeks and Turks to be followed by mediation of the powers. Marschall replied that Germany would participate in no action unless the Greeks would declare in advance that thev accepted Turkish suzerainty over 96 Crete. In June the Sultan appealed to the Kaiser to aid Turkey in obtaining a 97 large war indemnity from the Greeks along with the recovery of a. part of Thessaly. Germany was not -willing, however, to oppose the other powers in support of any such extravagant demands. Holstein consequently advised Saurma that Berlin was acting in cooperation with St. Petersburg in efforts to effect a peace settlement; that Abdul Hamid had never had reason to conclude that Germany would dissociate herself from the other powers; and that the extensive demands of the 98 Sultan were a mistake against which German warnings had been given. Yet in the end the Germans withdrew from participation in the Cretan affair and left to the other powers the task of frustrating the efforts of the Turks to take full adven-99 tage of their military victories over the Greeks; and early in 1898 Baron Marschall could report from Constantinople that there was warm pro-German sympathy far and 100 wide amongst the Turkish people as a result of the successful war. Without question the prestige of Germany was advanced in Turkey as a result of her attitude during the Armenian massacres and her support for the Ottoman control of Crete; and it is not surprising that the Sultan came more and more to look to Berlin for advice and support. Perhaps the crafty Abdul Hamid saw in Germany a possible counter-balance to the internal and external forces which were working for the dissolution of his empire. And the already cordial Turco- German relations were, as shall be seen, on the eve of even greater intimacy. b. Marschall von Bieberstein Goes to Constantinople. During the interval in railway negotiations, there occurred an event of immeasurable significance for the future of German interests in Turkey. In November, 1897, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, who had retired as head of the Ger-101 man foreign office, was sent as ambassador to Turkey. Constantinople was an obscure post, and the appointment was generally regarded as a means of putting 102 Marschall in cold storage—a banishment from domestic politics. There is no 103 indication, however, that the new ambassador was dissatisfied with the position, and the probability is that he was named for the Turkish embassy at his own suggestion since there was practically no alternative if he were to continue in 104 “ the diplomatic service. Marschall, who seems to have taken but scant interest in Turkish affairs prior to his assignment to Constantinople, rapidly adapted himself to conditions at his new post and was shortly to make his powerful personality felt at the Sul-105 tanate and the Porte. What Marschall "set himself to do, and did,* writes Wile, "was to reduce the Sultan to a state of practical subjugation to German ambitions in Turkey... Nobody, Turkish or foreign, could withstand him. He became sort of unofficial Grand Vizier...By a process of auto-suggestion, people came to regard 106 the German ambassador as omnipotent and invincible." Obviously the foregoing exaggerates, but only in degree, for Marschall’s influence did become tremendous. Some of Marschall’s contemporaries, however, give an adverse picture. Bis-107 marck, who was a biased critic, said to Lord Rosebery in September, 1890: "Mar-108 schall thinks he is clever, which he is not.” Btflow makes the serious charge that Marschall became "very Turcophile", and that in his reports to Berlin on Turkish 109 affairs he was guilty of misrepresentations. And Eckardstein, who disliked Marschall for personal end political reasons, writes: "This Mannheim attorney, whose mind worked only in legal formulae, whose political instinct was non-existent... who blindly committed Germany to the building of the Bagdad Railway—-this was the man who for years was acclaimed in Germany as one of the greatest statesmen in the world. The Foreign Missions in Berlin had, however, taken his measure right-110 ly when they referred to him as a mini st re 4tranger aux affaires.” In spite of the opinion of these contemporaries, Marschall’s achievements at Constantinople are ample evidence of his ability- and as the champion of a strong politico-economic alliance between the German and Turkish empires, and especially as the protago- 111 nist of the Bagdad Railway, it is difficult to overestimate his significance. Germany’s economic interests in Turkey came to occupy the new ambassador almost from his first days in Constantinople. Writing to Chancellor Hohenlohe in March, 1898, Marschall discussed the rble which German enterprises should play in the Ottoman Empire. German capital, he said, should avoid projects which would produce large profits at the expense of the country; and he expected to support only such enterprises as would be profitable to the German promoters and beneficial to Turkey and her people. There was ample scope for the future expansion of useful undertakings in the Ottoman empire in which German capital and industry might be utilized—railways, ports, and bridges as well as many other things were needed—but while it was to be expected that certain concessions might go to others, Marschall concluded: One thing we must claim--the connecting up of the Anatolian Railway’s sphere of interests with the Tigris and Euphrates river districts and on down to the Persian Gulf. Whether the Sultan’s desire to prolong the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad is music of the future or not, a present question is...that no one should get there in advance of u5...1 consider it one of my most important tasks in the field of commerce to hold this subject before me. 112 4. The Germans Win the Preliminary Bagdad Railway Concession. After almost five years of relative inactivity, the scramble for railway concessions in the Ottoman empire was ready to begin anew in 1898. Turkish finances had improved, and as the world financial crisis of the early nineties receded, capital once again was tempted by potential profits from railway enterprises in backward countries. By April, 1898, Marschall had definitely assumed the rOle of champion of German railway projects in Turkey. To Hohenlohe he wrote that in view of the schemes which were being pressed upon the Sultan by non-German groups, it was 113 imperative for the Germans to take definite steps. As a matter of fact, Marschall had already been in negotiation with Herr Zander, director of the Anatolian Railway Company, and the two had agreed that: 1. The time had come to prepare for the extension of the Anatolian Railway from Angora to Kaisarieh; 2. The Anatolian Railway Company should assure itself of the right to extend the line to Bagdad to the exclusion of foreign competition; 3. With these two points achieved, an effort should be made to realize the Sultan’s desire to render the Tigris and 114 Euphrates navigable and to create a navigation company to operate on the rivers. The Deutsche Bank group, however, still viewed the Bagdad project somewhat askance, and their representative, Zander, had agreed to the definite program of action with Marschall only after a tentative understanding that the German government would lend its assistance. Since it was recognized that a guarantee to the bank by the government was impossible. Zander suggested that the Seehandlung (the government institution for the promotion of maritime commerce) should cooperate as an agency for the sale of the bonds issued by the Anatolian Company in 115 raising the capital for the construction of the line. Thus in September after the German minister of finance, von Miquel, had declined to instruct the state 116 institution to participate in the sale of the proposed bond issue, the Deutsche Bank informed the foreign office that it could not undertake the task of financing the extension of the Anatolian Railway unless the moral support of the German government were assured by the active cooperation of the Seehandlung. Btilow asked Miquel for an explanation and was informed that the Ministry of Finance was reluctant to recommend the participation of the Seehandlung in any enterprise 118 which had the character of speculation. And no definite assurance of the coOperation of this government institution in the sale of the Turkish railway bonds was given until September, 1900, after the Kaiser came to Btilow’s support and 119 directly intervened to force the assistance desired by the Deutsche Bank. Meanwhile the German group had been encountering strong competition for the Bagdad concession. An Austro-Russian syndicate, headed by Count Vladimir Kapnist (brother of the Russian ambassador at Vienna), proposed to build a railway from 120 Tripoli, in Syria, to Koweit on the Persian Gulf with a branch line to Bagdad. French financiers with M. Cotard, a director of the Smyrna-Cas saba line, as spokesman, made a proposal to extend this French railway to Konia and eventually to 121 Bagdad# Sir Ashmed Bartlett, acting for a gboup of British capitalists, sought a concession for a line from the Gulf of Alexandretta to Bagdad by way of Aleppo 122 and Syria. While only the French applicants had strong political and financial backing and while none of the schemes had much chance of winning favor with the Sultan, they did constitute a source of confusion and delay, and made it diffi’ 123 cult for Marschall and Zander to secure the concession for the Germans. While negotiations were in this confused state, there occurred a spectacular demonstration of the friendship of William II for Abdul Hamid. In October, 1898, the Kaiser commenced an ostentatious pilgrimage to Jerusalem. Every detail of the trip, from the arrival at Constantinople to the speech of the Kaiser before the tomb of Saladin at Damascus, was arranged with an eye for dramatic effect. The Kaiser lost no opportunity to display his deep personal friendship for the Sultan and for the Turkish people. At Bethlehem he said to Turkish listeners, "there is not a shadow of justification” for the Christian attacks on Mohammedan sovereignty, end he added that the Germans expected to show the Turks 124 what was "really the essence of Christianity.” Then at Damascus William II made his oft-quoted promises "Let me assure the Sultan and the three hundred million Mohammedans scattered over the globe who revere in him their Khalif that the Ger-125 man Emperor will be at all times their friend." It should be remembered that this imperial visit came at a time when Abdul Hamid was still under the odium of the Christian massacres in Armenia and Macedonia, and when the very name of the “Red Sultan” was anathema in practically 126 every part of the Christian world. Obviously the visit had political motives of a practical nature. Bflow, in summarizing the results of the trip for the foreign office, said that the bond of friendship between Moslem and German had been strengthened and that the French protectorate over the Christians of the East had finally been broken. "Not only our moral interests," Bulow added, "but also our material interests will profit from the trip of His Majesty. To German industry and German commerce are opened great horizons. The reaction of the imperial trip will, I hope, make itself felt as far as the banks of the Eu-127 phrates." The imperial visit visibly disturbed the French and news of the event shared 128 space in the French press with the Dreyfus affair. The Russians, moreover, were so suspicious and resentful of the pilgrimage that when the imperial yacht, the Hohenzollem, entered the Bosporus not a single Russian ship wore bunting; and — 129 among the embassies at Pera the Russian alone refrained from hoisting its flag. In Great Britain there was little adverse criticism, although much sport was made of a Cook*s tour for crowned heads. But the British were not unmindful of the purpose of the junket as was indicated in the following editorial comment of The Times: "It is anticipated that political and commercial results will at 130 tend the Emperor’s visit to the Sultan.” But the Kaiser scorned such worldly motives and wrote Tsar Nicholas II: I am most surprised at the amount of bash and blarney that is being ventilated in the newspapers of Europe about my visit to Jerusalem! It is most discouraging to note that the sentiment of real faith, which propels a Christian to seek the Country in which our Saviour lived and suffered, is nearly quite extinct in the so called better classes of the XlXth Century, so that they must explain the Pilgrimage by Political motives! What is right for thousands of our lowest peasants is right for me too! 131 The maintenance of the most cordial personal relations between the Kaiser and the Sultan had, indeed, become basic in the political relations between the Wilhelmstrasse and the Porte, and for all the expressions of piety by William II positive political and commercial results were to follow hard on the heels of his return from the Holy Lands. On January 29, 1899, the month following the imperial party*s return to Berlin, the Anatolian Railway Company was granted a concession to build a harbor 132 at Haidar pasha—the railhead of the line toward Bagdad. This award was confirmed in an iradd of March 23 which provided for the construction of docks and 133 warehouses in addition to the establishment of the port. Quay privileges on the European side of the Bosporus, across from the site of the harbor granted to the Germans, were controlled by a French syndicate, and the French embassy immediately voiced strenuous objections to this rival port, charging that the rights of the French group were being violated and threatening to hold the Turk-134 ish government responsible for ell losses involved. But quite unexpected results were to come indirectly from the French opposition to the quay concession. On April 12, the new French ambassador, M. Constans, conferred with Marschall concerning the quay difficulties, and after minimizing the seriousness of the question, remarked that he did not see why Germany and France continually engaged in injurious commercial competition in Turkey. In effect, Constans, acting with the approval of Delcass4, the new French foreign minister, proposed a Franco-German financial entente for the construction of the 135 line to Bagdad. Evidently the Paris government feared that Frano-German economic rivalries in Turkey might lead to such a condition as had produced the recent French humiliation at Fashoda. Collaboration -with Germany in Asia Minor offered the advantage also of strengthening France’s already vast economic stake 136 in the Ottoman empire. In Berlin, Btllow was favorably disposed to the suggestion of French cooperation, and after sounding Siemens on Constans’ overture, wired Marschall that the Deutsche Bank was agreeable to a Franco-German financial entente for the building of the railway to Bagdad, and that in case Constans reopened the question of collective action, he was to express the approval of 137 the German government. With the sanction of the two foreign offices, negotiations proceeded rapidly between the French and German financiers, end on May 5 end 6, 1899, an agreement was concluded between the Deutsche Bank and the Anatolian Railway Company on one side, and the Imperial Ottoman Bank, the Smyrna- Cassaba Railway Company, and the R4gie G4n^rale des Chemins de fer, on the other. It was agreed that the two groups should collaborate in financing the extension of the Turkish railways to Bagdad and Basra on the basis of 40 per cent participation for the Ottoman Bank and 60 per cent for the Deutsche Bank. Moreover, both the French and German bankers pledged their influence in winning the support of their respective foreign offices in behalf of the concession for the Deutsche 138 Bank. Thus the French were to discontinue their separate efforts to win the Bagdad award, and the combined influence of French and German finance and diplomacy was to be thrown behind the bid of Zander. Marschall, in discussing the new entente, expressed much satisfaction that it had been achieved without sacrificing Germany’s preponderance of control. It was his opinion also that the French were pleased since they would be relieved from the necessity of ’ 139 leaning on Russian support in Turkey. Despite the Franco-Russian alliance, the aims of the Tsarist government in Turkey were of such scope that little room 140 was left for the economic ambitions of an ally. Negotiations for the Bagdad Railway now moved forward rapidly—that is, 141 rapidly for the slow moving Ottoman government. Zander, acting for the Deutsche Bank, on May 29, 1899, applied to the Sultan for the definite concession of a line extending from the terminus of the Anatolian Railway Company’s line at 142 Konia on to Bagdad and Basra. A British banking group, led by Rechnitzer, sought to block the award by applying for a line from Alexandretta to Bagdad and the Persian Gulf. Sir Nicholas o*Conor, the British ambassador, lent some assistance to the Rechnitzer proposal, end informed Marschall that the difficulties interposed by the British competitors could be removed only by a fusion 143 of the new Franco-German group with the British financiers. At the Porte the 144 Grand Vizier and the Minister of Justice championed the Rechnitzer candidacy. The Russian embassy also raised some minor difficulties but took no decisive 145 action toward blocking the grant. Meanwhile Zander and Marschall were insisting that Abdul Hamid accept the Deutsche Bank’s proposal, wherein the construction of the railway to Bagdad and Basra was guaranteed within a period of eight 146 years* Faced with the decision of making the definite grant, the Sultan was assailed by a multitude of doubts® Questions such as the danger of offending Russia, the hostile attitude of Greet Britain, the Germanization of Asia Minor, the hazard of increasing the country’s already heavy financial burden, the fear of introducing further foreign influence in Turkish affairs—all caused Abdul Hamid 147 grave concern* Momentarily the Sultan seems to have hesitated, as if to re- nounce his railway ambitions $ and as Marschall points out, the final negotiations 148 became entangled pell-mell with personal and political interests. But by the untiring efforts of Marschall at the Palace and at the Porte, and by the lavish 149 payment of baksheesh by the Deutsche Bank, all of the obstructions were removed, and on December 23, 1899, the preliminary convention was signed by the Ottoman 150 government end the representatives of the Anatoli an Railway Company* Final terms of the agreement were to await the conclusion of the necessary technical 151 studies which the Germans were to submit to the Sultan within one year. ' Thus were realized the Sultan’s repeated promises that the German company should have priority in the construction of the great trunk line from the Bosporus to the Persian Gulf. The Bagdad Railway question now became one of the major irritants which disturbed the diplomatic relations of the great European powers in the pre-war period. Before the German concessionaires and the Turkish government signed the definitive agreement in May, 1903, the project was to be transferred almost entirely from the economic to the diplomatic sphere. It is necessary next to turn to the efforts of Russia, Great Britain, and France to control or to destroy the Bagdad project. 1 Radowitz to Caprivi, June 4, 1890, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 441-442; foot note, ibid,, 441, 2 Brit. Docs., 11, 188. 3 Parker, Quarterly Review, Oct. 1917, 494. 4 Ibid., 494. 5 Editor*s note, Brit. Docs., 11, 174. 6 Address of Sir Edward Grey to Committee of Imperial Defense, May 26, 1911, ibid., VI, 782. Grey was parliamentary undersecretary of state for foreign af- Tairs, 1892-1895. 7 Ibid. 8 Sir 'Valentine Chirol, Fifty Years in a Changing World, 91. Chirol was for many years the Near Eastern correspondent London Times. 9 Radowitz to Caprivi, June 4, 1890, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 441-442. Among those participating in the ceremonies were Taif Tasha, minister of public works, Siemens, Kaulla, and Kuhlmann, president of the Anatolian Railway Company. Ibid., 441. 10 Ibid., 442. ' ' 11 Ibid. 12 Radowitz to Caprivi, October 11, 1891, ibid., 444. 13 Ibid. — 14 TEH. 15 Radowitz to Caprivi, October 11, 1891, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 444. 16 Helfferich, Siemens, UI, 60. 17 Radowitz to Caprivi, Oct. 11, 1891, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 444-445. 18 Ibid., 445, 19 Abdul Hamid to Tewfik Pasha (Berlin), not dated, but probably Aug. 7, 1891, ibid., 446. 20 Radowitz to F. 0., Oct, 7, 1891, ibid ~ 443. 21 Marschall to Radowitz, Oct. 9, 1891, ibid., 443. Baron Marschall von Bieberstein succeeded Count Herbert Bismarck as head of the foreign office in Merch, 1890. 22 Radowitz to F. 0., Oct. 7, 1891, ibid., 443. 23 Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen aus dem Leben des Botschafters Joseph Maria von Radowitz, (Hajo Holbom, editor), 11, 289. 24 Radowitz Caprivi, Oct. 11, 1891, Grosse Politik, XIV,(2), 445-446. 25 Ibid., 445. The group making the survey of the route left Constantinople on October 10. Kaulla estimated that six months would be required to complete the work. 26 Radowitz to Caprivi, Oct. 24, 1891, ibid., 446-447. 27 Ibid., 447. 28 The negotiations had been in strict secrecy, unknown even to the Grand Vizier, until the principal details had been agreed upon. Kaulla had, however, kept the German embassy fully informed of the proceedings. Radolin to Caprivi, Dec. 23, 1892, Grosse Politjk, XIV (2), 449. Prince Radolin succeeded Radowitz as ambassador early in 1892. 29 Radolin to Caprivi, Dec, 23, 1892, ibid., 448-449. 30 Sir Edward Grey, who was parliamentary under-secretary in the Rosebery ministry, 1892-1895, explains this diplomatic support for the British group: "Concessions for railways, or anything else, were not to be obtained from the Turkish Government without diplomatic effort. An applicant for a concession, however, economically sound and attractive the terms he offered, had little prospect of success unless supported by his own government. Where diplomatic pressure was the rule, commercial interests could not succeed without it. British firms were applying for railway concessions in Asia Minor, and the British Ambassador at Constantinople was with the approval of the Foreign Office, giving them support.” Lord Grey, Twenty- Five Years, 1892-1916, I, 9. 31 Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 63. 32 Ibid., 63* Radolin to Caurivi, Dec. 23, 1892, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 449* 33 T 07., 449-450. 34 Ibid., 451. 35 448 • 36 Ibid., 451; Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 63. Baron Hirsch, a wealthy Austrian Jew, who was noted for his phi 1 ahthroples in behalf of the Jewish people, had aroused Abdul Hamid’s ill-will by his work in their interest in Rumelia. Some substance was lent to the stories circulated by the French by the fact that the Deutsche Bank in 1889 had purchased from Baron Hirsch his controlling shares in the Oriental Railways across the Balkan peninsula. Ibid., 9-10. 37 This opposition was forecast in an article appearing in The Times, Dec. 26, 1892, warning that the Sultan was preparing to grant the Germans not only a line from Angora to Be.gdad, but also one from Eskishehr to Konia. This, it was argued, would constitute an encroa.chment on the English spheres represented by the Smyrna- Cassaba and Smyrna-Ai din lines. The Smyrna-Cas saba line was in reality largely owned by the French. 38 Sir Clare Ford in 1892 had succeeded Sir William White, a really great ambassador, as the head of the British embassy in Constantinople. Ford failed to adapt himself to the Turkish political environment, and Arthur Nicolson was sent as secretary of the embassy, partly for the purpose of watching Ford and informing the foreign office if the new ambassador was as ill-suited for an Oriental post as was feared. Harold Nicolson, Portrait of a Diplomatist, 71. If the son of Arthur Nicolson can be believed, the foreign ofTice deliberately established a dual control in the Constantinople embassy. Ibid. Moreover, British policy was to be confused throughout the railway negotiations of 1892-1893 due to the divergence of opinion, and even of action, on the part of the ambassador and his counsellor. Nicolson lamented Ford’s indifference to important questions, writing: w His 14g£rt4 is appalling, and he does not care a two-pence about the work.” Ibid,, 70. Later Nicolson, who had come to believe that the obvious solution of the railway problem was for the British to go shares with the Deutsche Bank, wrote privately to the foreign office: *1 am afraid that Ford had muddled the railway affair by not going in with the Germans.* Ibid., 70-71. In 1894 Ford was transferred to Rome, and Sir Philip Currie took Ills place in Constantinople. 39 Radolin to foreign office, Dec. 1892, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 451-452; Nicolson, op. cit., 71. 40 Ibid. 41 Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Jan, 6, 1893, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 452; Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 66-67• 42 Radolin reported to Berlin that the irad4 (the Sultan’s decree) awarding the line to the Germans would have been issued but for Sir Clare Ford’s threats, Radolin to Marschall, Jan. 6, 1893, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 456, 43 Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Jan, 6, 1693, ibid., 452. 44 Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Jan. 7, 1893, THE,, 453-454. 45 Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Jan. 7, 1893, TEH., VIII, 185. Nicolson, op. cit., 71, credits Baron Holstein as being the author of the wire to Baron Leyden, the consul at Cairo. 46 British influence in Egypt originated with the purchase of the controlling interest of the Sues Canal in 1875, Then four years later, after the extravagance of Ismail Pasha had brought Egypt into bankruptcy, Britain joined France in estab- lishing a financial condominium over this nominal Turkish state. In 1881 serious nationalist uprisings led to a British military occupation, supposedly temporary in character. The French had declined an invitation for joint intervention but were resentful of the British failure to keep their pledge to withdraw their troops. 47 Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Dec. 26, 1892, Grosse Politik, VIII, 184. 48 Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Jan. 7, 1893, ibid., IWZ 49 Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Deo. 26, 1892, ibid., 184. That German support for Great Britain in Egypt was practically indispensable was the bpinion of Lord Milner, undersecretary of finance in Egypt, 1889-1893, who wrotes "Almost all European nations have interests in the Nile Valley, and these interests are intrenched in a manner which has no parallel elsewhere. We have seen that many acts of government cannot be performed in Egypt without the concurrence of the European powers. It is not too much to say that the work of England in that country.. .could not go on if the powers in general were opposed to it. Quoted by Parker, op. cit., 500. 50 Leyden to foreign office, Jan. 8, 1893, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 454; Leyden to Caprivi, Jan. 8, 1893, ibid., 454-455. 51 Algernon Cecil, British Foreign Secretaries, 274; Lord Crewe, Lord Rosebery, 347-348. 52 Baron Leyden reported to Berlin on January 8, 1893 that Rosebery had advised Lord Cromer that he was quite surprised over the conflict in Constantinople. Grosse Politjk, XIV, (2), 454. Cromer also confided to Leyden the opinion that Sir Clare Ford, had allowed himself to be used by Paul Cambon who was his intellectual superior. Leyden to Caprivi, Jan. 8, 1893, ibid., 455. And later, on January 17 Rosebery told Hatzfeldt in London that he had been surprised over the affair, and that he had never instructed Ford to transfer questions of commercial competition to the political field. Hatzfeldt to F. 0., Jan. 17, 1893, ibid., 463. 53 Memo by Marschall of telegram from Rosebery, Jan. 9, 1893, Grosse Politik XIV (2), 455. 54 55 ITadolin to F. 0., Jan. 11, 1893, Ibid,, 461, 56 Hatzfeldt to F.O„, Jan. 14, 1893, ibid., 462. 57 Hatzfeldt to F.Oi, Jan. 17, 1893, ibid., 464. 58 By the Treaty of Berlin, 1878, provision was made for the payment by the Ottoman government for a war indemnity of £T5,000,000 for which the revenues of the vilayet of Konia were assigned for payment. E. Hertslet, op. cit., IV, 59 Radolin to Marschall, Jan. 9, 1893, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 457® There is no evidence to show that any official of the British government threatened to use the fleet, and, as Radolin told the Sultan, all the uproar about the British fleet was only a pressure artificially stimulated by the opposition to the German group. Ibid., 459® The Russian protest concerning the guaranty for the new lines was not in point since the Sultan had no intention of using any of the tithes pledged to the Russians, says Radolin. Ibid. Radolin also asserts that the opposition from the Ottoman Bank, led by its director. Sir Edward Vincent, cam© only after the bank had failed to win the Deutsche Bank to a scheme of joint participation. Ibid. On the contrary, Nicolson, op. cit., 70, says that Vincent was not in favor of going shares with the Deuts'cne Bank. 60 The Sultan told Radolin that the vexation from these interferences had caused him to lose sleep and to weep so bitterly that his eyes were quite swollen. Radolin to Marschall, Jan. 9, 1893, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 460. 61 At one time Abdul Hamid was so furious at the British, French, and Russians that he was reported as saying that he wished to beg the three peaceful powers to admit him as a fourth member of the Triple Alliance. Ibid., 460. "Himmel!” was the Kaiser’s marginal comment on reading of the Sultan’s wish in Radolin’s report. Ibid., (footnote), 461. 62 The line to Angora had been completed in January, 1893. 63 Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 69; The Times, Feb. 16, 1893, 5. Simultaneously with the concession to the Germans, the Sultan authorized an extension of the French-owned Smyrna-Cassaba line from Alashe’nr to Afiun Karahissar—a distance of 250 kilometres. Memorandum by Adam Block, Brit. Docs., V, 178. The German line to Konia passed through Afiun Karahissar, and it was expected that the two tracks would be connected. A rate war ensued between the Anatolian and Smyrna-Cassaba companies in connection with the rival ports of Smyrna and Haidar-Pasha, and it was not until 1899 that the lines were actually joined. Earle, op, cit., 53, 64 Only the German documents are available for the study of of the Bagdad Railway prior to 1900, and there are no German documents published, dealing directly with the subject in the period between January 17. 1893 and April 9, 1898. 65 Nicolson, op. cit., 71. 66 Ibid., 71. 67 Grey, op. cit., I, 9-10. 68 Germany’s support of Great Britain in Egypt dates from the time of Bismarck. Lord Salisbury, as early as 1886, remarked that the position of Britain in Egypt would have "to depend on the good-will of the Triple Alliance, and of Germany in particular.” Lord E. Fitzmaurice, Life of Lord Granville, 11, 453. Evelyn Baring, later Lord Cromer, consul-general of EgypF, also writing in 1886, warned the foreign secretary, Lord Rosebery, of the necessity of working well with Germany. "Ber lin, and not Cairo," he said, "is the real center of gravity of Egyptian affairs. Marouis of Zetland, Lord Cromer, 128. Bismarck, however, had not hesitated to use Egypt to coerce the British. Tn February, 1887, at the time Germany was collecting her African territories, Lord Salisbury wrote Evelyn Baring: "The Iron Chancellor is hinting that if we do not behave well he will give the French their heads/* Ibid., 146. Yet in June, 1890, in response to a British request for German approval of certain financial changes in Egypt, Hatzfeldt was instructed to tell Lord Salisbury that German consent was given "in order to show our customary good will in Egypt towards England." Marschall to June 2, 1890, Grosse Politik, VIII, 156. Again in June, 1893, Hatzfeldt assured Rosebery that there had been no change in Germany’s policy of supporting Great Britain in Egypt. Hatzfeldt to Caprivi, June 2, 1890, ibid., 399-401. A memorandum by J.A.C. Tilley, clerk of the British foreign office says: "In Egypt, Germany generally supported Her Majesty’s Government. On the death of Khedive Tewfik, at the beginning of 1892, when the Porte was inclined to make difficulties in connection with the new Firman, the German Ambassador gave advice in the sense dbsired by Her Majesty’s Government." Brit. Docs., I, 324. In February, 1896, Lascelles reported that the French amba s s ado r in Berl in had summed up the theory of Germany’s policy in Egypt as follows: "Germany would be bitterly annoyed if England and France came to an agreement respecting Egypt, as she would lose her one instrument for putting pressure on England. Ibid.. 328. 69 Grey, op. cit., I, 11. 70 Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 82; Parker, op. cit., 502. 71Helfferich , Siemens, 111, 82-83. 72 Parker, op. cit., 5b2. 73 Radowitz*to Caprivi, Aug. 1, 1890, Grosse Politik, IX, 189-190. Treatment of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire•; Documents presented to Viscount; of FaTlodon, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Miscellaneous No. 31 (1916), 624. 75 Marschall to Hatzfeldt, Oct. 10, 1893, Grosse Politik, IX, 199. 76 Radolin (Constantinople) to Hohenlohe, Dec. 5, 1894, ibid., 210. 77 Armenian Documents, Mise. No. 31, 624. 78 Marschall to Willi am 11, May 12, 1895, Grosse Politik, IX, 227. 79 Footnote, ibid., 228. 80 Donnersmarck to Hohenlohe, May 25, 1895, ibid., 231; Radolin (St. Petersburg) to Hohenlohe, June 10, 1895, ibid., 232. Baron Saurma-Jeltsch, -who succeeded Radolin at Constantinople, wrote Hohenlohe, Oct. 25, 1896, that in spite of the excitement over the massacre of Christians in Turkey, the Russian government avoided everything which might endanger the Sultan’s nosition. Grdsss Politik, XII (1), 38. " —— ST Hatzfeldt to Holstein, July 31, 1895, ibid., X, 12. 82 I 3 * 83 Hatzfeldt to F. 0., Aug. 7, 1895, ibid., 25. 84 Hatzfeldt to Holstein, lug. 5, 1895*,"ibid., 25. Salisbury’s proposal, according to the Germans, was that Tripoli should go to Italy, Egypt to Great Britain, Salonica to Austria, and Constantinople or control of the Straits to Russia. Hohenlohe wrote Btflow, Feb. 11, 1896 and charged that Britain, having become the object of common distrust by Russia and France, was attempting to stir up an European war over the division of Turkey in order to improve her own position. Ibid., XI, 271. 85 In The Times of September 11, 1920, Sir Valentine Chirol asserted that the suggestion for partition came not from the British, but from the German side, and that Lord Salisbury had rejected the Kaiser’s overtures at Cowes. There is nothing in the German documents to indicate the correctness of Chirol’s statement, end Salisbury made no official record of what transpired at the meeting. Salisbury, however, was deeply offended at William’s account of the conversation and caustically commented that "it showed...the importance of having a third party present at any interview with that monarch." Quoted in Algernon Cecil, British Foreign Secretaries, 1806-1916, 303. R.J. Sontag, "The Cowes Interview and the Krtiger Telegram," PolTticaT Science Quarterly, June, 1925, 217-233, gives a full account of the Cowes incidents ~~ 86 Lobanoff, Russian foreign minister, told Radolin that Russia and France had only joined Great Britain in the Armenian affair for fear that the British, acting alone, might commit the folly of a naval demonstration and an armed intervention. Radolin (St. Petersburg) to Hohenlohe, Oct. 29, 1895, Grosse Politik, X, 91. ' — — 87 S surma to F. 0., Nov. 5, 1895, ibid., 96-97. 88 Marschall to William 11, Aug. *597~1896, ibid., XII, (1), 21-22. 89 Saurma to Hohenlohe, Jan. 3, 1897, ibid., 42. 90 Marginal comment by William II on telegram from Marschall, Aug. 29, 1896, ibid., 22. 91 Sir Edwin Pears charges that the German residents of Constantinople, ”evi» dently acting under orders,” refused to shelter the Armenians during the massacres in the Turkish capital as did the French and British residents of the city. Pears, op. cit., 162. There is nothing in the German documents to indicate that any such orders were given German residents of Constantinople, and the fact that Baron Seurma, the German ambassador, allowed a number of the distressed Armenians to take fefuge in the German Embassy would indicate that such was not true. Saura to Hohenlohe, 5ept.1,1896, Grosse Politik, XTI (1), 24. 92 Armenian Documents, Mise. No. 31, (footnote), 624* 93 tiatzfeldt to F. 0., May 29, 1896, Grosse Politik, XII, (1), 155. 94 Hohenlohe to London, St. Petersburg, Paris, Vienna, and Rome, Feb. 13, 1896, ibid., XII (2), 319. Hohenlohe reiterated this position in wires to the same embassies on February 17, stating that the maintenance of Crete as a part of the Turkish empire was a conditio sine qua non of further German participation in joint action to check the Greeks end Turks. Ibid., 329-330. 95 Hohenlohe to London, St, Petersburg, Paris, Vienna, and Rome, Feb. 17, 1896, Grosse Politik, XII (2), 329. The Kaiser told the British ambassador that "the powers should. adopt vigorous measures against the Greek ships, and that the Piraeus should be blocked, if such a step were necessary...” Footnote, ibid., 327. 96 Marschall to Tschirschsky, May 1, 1897, ibid., 412. 97 Hohenlohe to William 11, June 12, 1897, TETd., 423. 98 Holstein to Saurma, July 12, 1897, ibid., 427-428. 99 Baron Marschall von Bieberstein had retired from the foreign office in 1897 and late in the same year had succeeded Baron von Saurma as embassador to Turkey. 100 Marschall to Hohenlohe, March 5, 1898, ibid., XII (2), 559. Marschall also wrote that a great part of the prestige enjoyed by the Germans in Turkey was due to the work of the German officers directed by General von der Goltz. ”The corps of the Turkish officers know and realize that the late war was won only as a result of von der Goltz’ work...” Ibid., 561 101 Erich Lindow, Freiherr Marschall von Bieberstein als Botschafter in Konstantinople, 1897-1912, gives a full account of Marschall’s work at the Porte as revealed primarily in the Grosse Politik. No sour ce mat erial other than published documents were used by the author, and, quite naturally, most of the work deals with the period beyond the chronological limits of this study. Frederick W. Wile, Men Around the Kaiser, 150, describes Marschall as ”A blue-eyed, slightly stooping giant, witbTTnt eliect'ual force clearly marked on his scarred face; fearlessness and resource incarnate; a manner which could swerve from irresistible bonhomie to icy reserve; an amazing gift for adaptability to conditions; a German of Germans who believed to the depth of his being in the righteousness and eventual realisation of his Fatherland’s ambitions...” 102 Lindow, op. cit., 15; Earle, op. cit., 43, 55. 103 Lindow, op. cit., 33. 104 Bernhard von inflow, who succeeded Marschall as head of the foreign office, writes that Marschall asked for an embassy on retiring in 1897. The Russian embassy was out of the question because Marschall “had taken a large part in the nonrenewal of the ’Reinsurance Treaty’ with Russia and had been compelled to defend it in the Reichstag. London, too, was out of the question because he would not repudiate the responsibility for the Kruger telegram.. And since Count Philip von Eulenburg was a fixture at Vienna, there remained only Rome and Constantinople for Marschall to choose between. Memoirs of Prince von Bulow, (Trans, by Voight), J,9-10 105 Radowitz, while ambassador to Turkey, complained that Marschall seemed to know little about the East. Auf zeichnungen und Erinne rungen des Radowitz, 11, 325- Lindow, op. cjt., 33. 106 Wile, op. cit., 153. 107 Marschall’s appointment as head of the foreign office succeeding Bismarck’s son, Herbert, had been very distasteful to the former chancellor. 108 Lord Crewe, Lord Rosebery, 558. 109 Memoirs of prince B?flow, 1, 301. 110 Baron von Eckardstein, Ten Years at the Court of St. James, 1895-1905, 34. 131 In 1905 a friend of H.F.B. Lynch wrote him from Constantinople: "The German Ambassador is regarded here popularly as a second Stratford de Redcliffe, end the Grand Vizier as a dragoman of the German Embassy. Whenever the Grand Vizier is in difficulties he goes to the Ambassador for advice... chaiQ says he is here to push German commercial interests, and not to talk politics: nis colleagues are here, he is said to have remarked, with political objects in view; he is here on commercial business, and he cannot understand why they are so angry because he has been successful in directing and extending German business. He is quite ready to stick to business, and leave politics to his colleagues.” F.H.B. Lynch, w The Bagdad Railway,* in Fortnightly Review, March, 1911, 381. 112 Marschall to Hohenlohe ,~Kareh 5, 189§, Grosse Politik, XII (2), 560. Marschall charged that the French and British capitalists had participated in a shameless exploitation of Turkey in their construction of railways, and also in the operation of such companies as the Ottoman Bank, the Tobacco R4gie, and the French Quay Company; and that Sir Edward Vincent and Baron Hirsch were typical of the class of financiers who robbed the Turks and with filled pockets turned their backs on the country. Ibid. He attributed the friendship of the Turks for the Germans to the Sultan’s confidence that German economic enterprises had for their aim ,? not the exploitation but the prosperity of the country.* Marschall to Hohenlohe, May 24, 1898, ibid., 565. 113 Marschall to Hohenlohe, April 9, 1898, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 464. 114 The third point in the program was later abandoned. In March, 1899, Bti’low reported that Siemens was opposed to any action in regard to navigation of the Tigris and Euphrates until the major task of the railway to Bagdad was assured. Siemens pointed out that the stock of the Euphrates ©nd Tigris Steam Navigation Company, which maintained a line of boats on the Tigris between Bagdad and Basra, was in the hands of the Government of India. German competition on the Mesopotamian rivers would thus cause the Government of India to oppose the railway project, and Siemens added, ’’would mobilize the Colonial Office against us,” Billow expressed himself in a similar manner. Such action, he said, would unnecessarily provoke a resistance from Britain ’’which would thwart the realization of the aims we have fixed. It is essential to consider the extension of the Anatolian railto Bagdad as our primary work in Asia Minor. On the successful solution of this question...must rest the future extension of our commercial relations and the opening of the country to German interests.” Bti’low to William 11, Mar. 17, 1899, ibid., 476. 115 Marschall to Hohenlohe, April 9, 1898, ibid., 466. 116 Mumm (foreign office) to Marschall, Mav 17, 1898, Grosse Politik (2) XIV, 467-468. 117 BUlow to William 11, Sept. 30, 1898, ibid., 468-469. 118 Ibid., 471. Von Burchard, president of See handlung, told Bfflow that his company refused as a matter of principle to participate in the sale of bonds to the German people in any case where there was not full guaranty for the security of the capital invested and that he opposed the participation of the institution in the sale of the Turkish railway bonds because of the hazardous character of the enterprise. Ibid., 470-471 119 William II to F. 0., Aug. 19, 1900, ibid., XVII, 386. Siemens was particularly displeased at the attitude of Miquel and refused to take any further step toward financing the railway until the cooperation of the Seehandlung was assured. Ibid.* Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 87. Miquel defended his action on the grounds that no accurate investment advice could be given the German people until the Turkish government had definitely set the guarantees for the railway. Miquel was also aroused at Marschall for what he termed erroneous reports from the embassy at Constantinople concerning the railway negotiations. Miquel to Bttlow, Aug. 29, 1900, Grosse Politik, XVII, 387-388. In a letter to Btilow, Sept. 20. 1900, Miquel reported that the desired declaration had been made by Seehandlung. Footnote, ibid., 390. Finally in October, 1900, an agreement between the Deutsche Bank and theSeehandlung provided for the cooperation fo the two in the issuance and sale of the Bagdad Railway bonds. Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 118-119. 120 The Times, Dec. 17, 1898, 7. 121 Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 87. 122 Ibid. . . 123 Marschall to F. 0., Apr. 12, 1898, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 578. 124 The Kaiser’s Speeches, (trans, by Wolf von Schierbrand),3l6-317. 125 Tiros se Politik, Xll(2), 575. Btflow, who was a member of the imperial party and who claims that he attempted to edit the Kaiser’s famous speech before it was released to the press, writes as follows: “After the banquet I sent for the shorthand writer on our staff...and told him that I could not allow him to circulate his transcript of this speech until I had made certain amendments in it. He...replied that His Excellency Baron von Marschall, acting.he said, on direct orders from His Majesty, had instructed him to dispatch the report by telegram to the Wolff Agency, and the wire had been sent off some time ago. I thereupon went to Marschall and had things out with him in a frank discussion. I told him that,.,it was my duty to see that this “back-scratching" attitude in diplomacy did not get out of hand, for exaggerated expressions of sympathy might not only* give rise to dangerous misconceptions in Constantinople, but also arouse suspicion and even coolness in Peris, London, and St. Petersburg, since each of these governments had millions of Mohammedan subjects.” Bulow, Me moi rs, I, 301. The lapse of time between the writing of his apologia (published in 1931) and the the visit of 1898 may account for Billow’s effort to blame William II and Marschall for the Damascus speech; for, in a dispatch to the foreign office from Malta, November 15, 1898, Btilow enthusiastically described the trip and asserted that the Kaiser’s toast at Damascus definitely won the Mohammedan world for Germany. Grosse Politik, XII (2), 578. 126 The French embassy at Constantinople termed the Kaiser’s visit as an ’’absolution for the Armenian Massacres." Note by Bapst, Documents Diplomatiques series 2, 11, 503. 127 Btflow to MHller, November 15, 1898, Ibid., 128 Below-Schlatau (Paris) to Hohenlohe, Sept. 7, 1898, ibid., 612. 129 The Times, October 28, 1898, 5. 130 131 Marschall to Hohenlohe, Nov. 20, 1898, Grosse Politik, XII (2), 558, 132 Marschall to F. 0., Jen. 29, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 472. 133 Marschall to F. 0., March 23, 1899, Ibid.,’ 477. 134 Marschall to F. 0., Feb. 3, 1899, ibiTT; 473-474. 135 Marschall to F. 0., April 12, 1899, ibid., 481. 135 Marschall to F. 0., April 12, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 136 Foreign Minister Delcass4 wrote that his department favored the financial agreement between the French and German financiers because it appeared that it was to the interest of France to join with the Germans in the execution and control of the enterprise rather than to let them continue either alone or with the assistance of others, Delcassd to Constans, Feb. 5, 1901, Diplotiques Franqais, series 2, 11, 84. M.ow'"to Marschall, May 4, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 484-485. 138 Footnote, ibid,, 485-486; Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 94-97. 139 Marschall to Hohenlohe, June 6, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 486. 140 Bapst, secretary of the French embassy at Constantinople, wrote the foreign office in 1902 that France was no more guaranteed against the jealousies of Russia in Turkey than were the other powers. Documents Diplomat!ques Frangais, series 2, 11, 506. 14T The Turks were notoriously dilatory in their negotiations, and the frequent and unnecessary delays so exasperated Marschall that he wrote Btflow that the Ottoman government was guided by the following proverbs "Haste is inspired by the devil but God inspires the patience of waiting.” Grosse Politik, XVII, 425. 142 Marschall to P. 0.., May 30, 1899, Ibid., XIV (2), 485. It should be noted that this request for the railway to Bagdad by way of Konia came in May, 1899, some eleven months before the Black Sea Basin Agreement between Turkey end Russia closed the northern part of the Ottomen empire to all save Russian or Turkish railway projects. 143 Marschall to F. 0., Sept. 15, 1899, ibid., 490* Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 98-99. 144 Marschall to F. 0., Nov. 26, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 491-493. 145 Memo by BCtlow, Nov. 8, 1899, ibid., 4 90-491 T" 146 Marschall to Hohenlohe, Nov. 27, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 495-496. 147 Ibid., 496-497. 148 5 0 4 * 149 Dr/ Arthur von Gwinner, who succeeded to the position of managing director of the Deutsche Bank at Georg von Siemen’s death in 1901, says that a total of £120,000 was paid as baksheesh in securing the concession. But in Gwinner*s opinion the amount was quite modest in view of the importance of the concession and considering the fact that payments to officials of all ranks were an absolute necessity in the execution of any official business in Turkey. Letter, Gwinner to H e Lutz in Journal of Modem History, June, 1932, 240. 150 Footnote, Grosse Politik," XIV (Sj, 493". Young, op. cit., IV, 156-157, gives the full text of the agreement. 151 Marschall to Hohenlohe, Nov. 27, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 496. CHAPTER IV THE GREAT POWERS AND THE BAGDAD CONCESSION The preliminary concession of December, 1899, marked a crucial step toward the fulfillment of the trans-Mesopotamian railway scheme, but there were many obstacles yet to be surmounted. The convention was little more than an exchange of declarations—the Anatolian Railway Company had declared itself ready to construct a railway from Konia to Bagdad and Basra, and the Porte had expressed its determination to grant the concession to the German company. At most the agreement of 1899 did no more than clear the field of competing groups. Al 1 details as to guarantees, routes, specifications, and privileges of the contracting parties were left to future negotiations which could be undertaken only after technical surveys of the possible routes had been completed* A German commission had in fact left Constantinople early in 1899 to begin this study, and although its report was submitted in June, 1900, an agreement between the 1 concessionaires and the Porte was not reached until January, 1902* In this interval the Bagdad Railway project was further complicated by diplomatic interventions in behalf of British and Russian imperialistic interests. 1. Russian Opposition and the Black Sea Basin Agreement. The prospect of the construction of the Bagdad Railway under the aegis of Germany, or of any other power, was infinitely distasteful to Russia. It was perhaps only natural that a chorus of protestations should have rung from the Russian press and that the St. Petersburg government should have interposed ob - jections even before the German promoters had received the provisional concession of 1899. Having no intention of abandoning her historic ambition to seize the Straits, Russia could scarcely be indifferent to the construction of railways which promised to check the processes of disintegration in Turkey. Nor could she view calmly the increase of German influence in a region which she had long regarded as her own special sphere. Russian uneasiness over German schemes led to a proposal from St. Petersburg for a Russo-German understanding in Asia Minor. The Haidar Pasha port concession of 1899 stirred the Russian government to action. Count Osten-Sacken, the Russian ambassador in Berlin, told Btflow that Constantinople had always been a noli me tangere for Russia, and that the port concession had caused consider-2 able alarm in St. Petersburg. To which Bfflow replied that there was no occasion for Russia to be disturbed since Germany pursued only commercial aims in Turkey and had no intention of opposing Russia’s political objectives, Russia could not, however, expect to claim the ■'/hole of the Turkish empire as her exclusive domain, he contended, since she had never exercised particular influence in western, southern, or southeastern Asia Minor where the French and British had in turn predominated; and Russian interests could not be injured if German capitalists instead of British should construct roads, put down railways, and irrigate 3 desert zones. Count Muraviev, Russian foreign minister, continued the discussion in St, Petersburg -with Prince Radolin, the German ambassador, Muraviev said he feared that Germany would be eventually obliged to defend her economic stake in Asia 4 Minor in such a manner as to entail a political conflict with Russia. Radolin denied this argument and pointed out that German and Russian interests in Turkey could not possibly become involved in a political conflict since Germany had only economic ambitions in the region. .And if Russia should forcibly take possession of Constantinople and the adjacent territories, he believed that the stockholders of the Haidar Pasha port and Anatolian railway enterprises would be greatly pleased since Russian sovereignty over the regions would result in 5 a greater development of traffic for the railway and the port. Both Osten-Sacken and Muraviev were fishing for some sort of collaboration with Germany in Asia Minor, and it would appear that Btflow was seriously interested in removing the Russian opposition to Germany’s pursuit of new markets in Turkey. He told Osten-Sacken that a well-conducted Russian policy would consider German economic interests in Asia Minor not as an objet de scission but as a trajtd d*union between Russia and Germany. The Russian ambassador responded that Russia also viewed Asia Minor as a region in which Germany and Russia could march hand in hand, and it was merely a question of the two powers 6 reaching an entente. "We live," he told Btflow, "in an era of arrangements; Ger« 7 many and Russia should conclude an arrangement relative to Asia Minor." Btflow was scarcely in a position to make a definite response to such a proposition, and he replied that he would look forward to a more concrete proposal from the 8 Russian side. A. few days later Osten-Sacken returned to the question. He told Btflow that the Straits were vital to Russia, and if Turkey should disintegrate, Russia could accept no other power at Constantinople—that the key to the Black Sea was a 9 point on which no concession could be made. Germany and Russia, he proposed, should conclude an arrangement whereby Germany would set Russia at ease about 10 the Straits, end Russia would leave Germany a free hand in Asia Minor. Such a far-reaching proposal necessitated a thorough discussion at the Wilhelmstrasse• - It was argued that Germany could not guarantee Russia’s claim to the Bosporus and Dardanelles without damaging the bonds of the Triple Alliance, 11 and without sacrificing the friendship of Great Britain. That Russia was to leave Germany a free hand for her industrial and commercial enterprises in Asia Minor was scarcely a compensatory advantage for the complete readjustment of her foreign policy. Consequently ©Slow informed Osten-Sacken that the preliminary ccndition for the proposed collaboration in Asia Minor was a guarantee 12 of territories between Germany, Russia, and France. To the Kaiser, Btflow wrote that what Russia asked was without relation to what she offered; Russia wished to promise nothing more then to respect Germany’s economic interests in a region where she possessed no rights of sovereignty, while she demanded a fundamental 13 transformation of German policy. And Germany, he added,- could scarcely depend upon Russia to guard the secrecy of an agreement of such character that its mere announcement would cost Germany the friendship of Turkey and cause Great Britain to abandon her friendly attitude toward German enterprises; and in view of the threat to the integrity of the Triple Alliance, the Russian proposal could not be accepted unless there was also included "a defensive alliance by which the 14 two countries would be guaranteed their territorial possessions in Europe.” The Russians had never intended such drastic changes in policy, and by July, 1899, the discussions between Btilow and Osten-Sacken had been dropped® As a matter of fact the proposals had had no chance for success from the outset 15 since Russia asked a great deal and was willing to concede little® Muraviev, who lacked much of being an astute diplomat, seems to have banked heavily upon bluffing the Germans into accepting the unequal terms through threats of an 16 Anglo-Russian rapprochement. The Russian minister failed, however, to appreciate either Germany’s ability to play off Russian end British rivalries in Turkey and the Middle East or the fact that the Franco-German financial entente over Turkish railways had materially strengthened Germany’s position. With the failure of the overtures of 1899 the opposition to the Bagdad Railway in St. Petersburg was to become more and more outspoken. Yet the Russian foreign office did not openly fight the awarding of the con-17 cession to the Anatolian Company. The Russian press, however, vigorously at-18 tacked the Bagdad project throughout the summer and fall of 1899. The Novoe Vremia took the lead and urged the Russian government to check the zeal of the l9 German promoters by a positive veto. This same newspaper raised the cry that once a trans-Me sopot ami an railway was opened, Russian agriculture would be seriously damaged by competition from Anatolia and Mesopotamia; that Russian political nrestige would be impaired in Central Asia; and that the railway was confirmation of the rumors of a secret Anglo-German agreement by which Great Britain 20 was to have a free hand in Africa and Germany in Asia Minor. In November, 1899, Muraviev accompanied the Tsar on a visit to Potsdam and there explained the Russian attitude toward the Bagdad Railway to Btflow. He said that Russia realized that the enormous scope of German industry and commerce obliged Germany to find new markets overseas and also in Asia Minor. That German capitalists wished to construct railways there, Muraviev went on, was not antipathetic to Russia because the Germans were more to be preferred in Asia Minor than the British, but Russia did desire that no railroads be constructed which were directly opposed to Russian financial or strategic interests. And he asked Btflow to keep Russia fully informed of future railway projects in Turkey 21 so that all possibility of friction between the two countries could be avoided. Muraviev made no further move until the Germans had secured their preliminary concession; then he took decisive action at Constantinople to protect Russia’s interests. In January, 1900, Zinoviev demanded of the Porte une satisfaction 22 morale for the award to the Germans, in the form of a monopoly of all railway 23 concessions in the Black Sea coastal region. In February the ambassador more clearly revealed the Russian objective. He told Tawfik Pasha that' if the Porte would abandon the Bagdad Railway scheme, Russia would withdraw her demands concerning the Black Sea basin. Zinoviev added that his government stood ready to enter into a written agreement with Turkey whereby Russia would renounce all claims to railway concessions in the Ottoman empire if Turkey would consent to the following conditions: (1) to construct no further railways within her territories except by her own means;(2) to contract no loans abroad for railway con-24 struct!on; and(3) to grant no concessions to private groups. It is not surprising that the Porte should have resisted this Russian effort to perpetuate the 25 economic stagnation of the Ottoman empire. The St. Petersburg government, however, was determined to exclude railways from Armenia and northern Anatolia, and in April the Turks were intimidated into accepting a treaty which closed all rail-26 way construction in the basin of the Black Sea to other than Turks or Russians. The Turks were able to retain the right to have recourse to foreign loans for railway construction in the region, but since Ottoman administration of the lines was required it was not likelv that foreigners would be willing to 27 provide capital. Marschall wrote Berlin that the agreement really gave the Russians an exclusive right to construct railways in the Black Sea region* for Turkey neither had the necessary capital nor the ability to borrow it; it was then the Russian government which would decide if railways were to be built in the zone of the Black 28 Sea, and that meant that there would be no railways. Yet Marschall considered the Black Sea Basin Agreement favorable to the Bagdad Railway project. Not only had Turkey succeeded in definitely setting the limits of Russian pretensions in Anatolia, he wrote, but now that northern Asia Minor was condemned to economic 29 inertia the Turks more than ever realized the necessity of the Bagdad Railway. Various writers have asserted that the proposed northern route of the Bagdad Railway by way of Angora was abandoned because of Russian objections as finally 30 crystallized in the Black Sea Basin Agreement. "it may be concluded,” writes Alwyn Parker, "that the German Government had a very clear indication of the objections entertained by Russia to the northern variant before the Turco-31 German railway agreement of December, 1899, was reached.** That such objections existed may possibly be true, but the published German documents fail to confirm the theory that Russia was responsible for the adoption of the southern route. The Sultan, to be sure, had strongly favored the Angora-Sivas-Diarbekr route for strategic reasons, and the concession of 1893 for the Angora-Kaisarieh railway had provided for the eventual extension of the line to Bagdad via Sivas and Diarbekr. The Russians had opposed the awarding of this concession to the 32 Germans, but nowhere is it revealed that the St. Petersburg government offered specific objections to the northern route either at the ime of the award in 1893 or in the period which followed. It would appear, moreover, that the German promoters abandoned the northern route to Bagdad because of difficulties of construction* As a matter of fact, the concessionaires were so little interested in the line from Angora to Kais-33 arieh that the survey of the route was not completed until 1898. The report of the survey party was unfavorable for the construction of the Angora-Kais arieh section, and Marschall wrote Hohenlohe that the Deutsche Bank preferred to extend the Anatolian Railway from Konia to Eregli and Alexandretta and from there toward the interior, but the Sultan, for military end political reasons, was be-34 lieved to be unwilling to accept any extension except from Angora and Kaisarieh. Marschall had urged that the German orometers accede to Abdul Hamid’s desire, and Zander, the director of the Anatolian Railway, agreed to support the con-35 struct!on of the Angora-Kaisarieh line. But Siemens, the president of the Anatolian Company, favored the Konia route because it was shorter and the cost 36 of construction would be considerably less. In May, 1899, Marschall wrote that the extension to Bagdad from Konia had always been preferred by the Anatolian Company to the line leaving Angora because it was some 500 kilometres shorter 37 and offered fewer technical difficulties. Only in February, 1900, did the Germans indicate any concern over the Russian attitude toward the route followed by the railway to Bagdad. Zinoviev’s demands on the Porte concerning the construction of lines in the Black Sea basin aroused Marschall to the danger of Russia’s barring the fertile right bank of the 38 Tigris river to the German line. Consequently the German ambassador urged an immediate agreement between the Porte and the Anatolian Railway Company on the 39 general course of the Bagdad Railway, and on March 10, 1900, the Tigris route 40 was definitely agreed upon. Even in connection with the Tigris route there is no evidence that Russia objected to the specific course to be followed. Yet in January, 1901, Siemens told o’Conor end Sanderson in a conference at Downing Street that the technical commission which had been sent to study the routes for the Bagdad Railway had reported that the extension of a railway by Angora-Sivas-Diarbekr was too expensive and also impractical from the technical point of view; and furthermore there was "noticed on the side of Russia a strong 41 diplomatic opposition to this line." This statement would indicate that the St. Petersburg foreign office made representations to Berlin which are nowhere mentioned in the documents. If true, it is most unusual that Marschall, who thought no point too trivial to include in his frequent and voluminous reports on the 42 Bagdad Railway, would not somewhere have referred to this Russian opposition# Certainly technical difficulties were of themselves sufficient to have brought an abandonment of the northern route. Negotiations for the definite route -were finally concluded on October 8, 1900, •when the Porte gave its sanction to the line ■which had been proposed by the Anatolian Railway Company, namely that of Konia-Karaman-Adana-Hamidjeh- Osmanie-Kilis-Ras el Ain-Nisibin-Mosul-right bank of Tigris-Bagdad-Basra-Koweit 43 with branch lines to Castabol, Aleppo, and Khanikin. While the evidence is scanty concerning Russia’s influence in shaping the course of the Bagdad Railway, there is no such doubt as to the rsle of Great Britain in blocking the proposed terminus of the line at Koweit on the Persian Gulf. 2. British Imperialism and the German Advance in Asia Minor. Great Britain’s attitude toward German railway activities in Asia Minor can be explained largely in terms of imperial interests. The keystone of the British imperial system was India, and a far-flung empire had been seized in order that the routes to India be safeguarded. The Atlantic and Mediterranean approaches to the East had been protected by the acquisition of Cape Colony, Gibraltar, and Malta. When the Suez Canal opened a new all-water route to India, the British appropriated it. Then to protect the Suez Canal route, Egypt and the Sudan were occupied, and a variety of British control was established over the Red Sea regions of Somaliland, Aden, and Arabia. Later, after the Russians had begun to exert pressure in the Middle East, a part of Baluchistan was annexed, and a species of British protection was placed over Afghanistan and Southern Persia. Also Great Britain had acquired a special position on the shores of the Persian Gulf by clearing from its waters the pirates and slave traders who had infested it. Treaty relations had been forced upon the Arab chiefs along the coast of the Persian Gulf under under which they bound themselves to observe perpetual peace and to refer all 44 disputes to the British resident at Bushire. It was not surprising then that British imperialists should have been keenly interested in a railway project which would provide a short-cut to India and which sought a terminus on the 45 coast of the Persian Gulf. Yet the first reactions in Great Britain toward the German scheme for a railway to Bagdad had been on the whole friendly* Anglo«-German relations were so cordial in the late eighties and early nineties that the Germans were welcomed as desirable collaborators against the extension of Russian influence in the direction of the Persian Gulf. As previously mentioned, the British ambassador, Sir William White, had encouraged the Germans in winning the concession of 1888, and some million pounds of British money had been invested in the railway to Angora. Excepting the unauthorized opposition of Sir Clare Ford in 1893, the London government indicated no hostility to the Bagdad Railway enterprise. As a matter of fact, the British attitude was increasingly friendly. In March, 1899, the ardent imperialist, Cecil Rhodes, encouraged the Kaiser to develop Mesopotamia and promised to do all that he could at Downing Street to encourage 46 the railway to Bagdad. And Lord Balfour told Btflow at Windsor in November, 1899 that he in no way objected to German contractors securing the concession and that n Great Britain was not thinking of putting obstacles in Germany’s path in 47 Asia Minor.” After a conference with Salisbury, Balfour, end Chamberlain, in January, 1900, Baron Eckardstein, German charg4 d’affaires, wrote Bulow that he had the distinct impression that the British cabinet believed that Germany pursued both political and economic aims in Asia Minor, but that the British would do everything to encourage the Germans to proceed with their project. Salisbury, he wrote, had said that Great Britain had not been disagreeably affected by the granting of the concessions to Germany but was pleased at German inter-48 ests being brought alongside those of Britain in the Persian Gulf. Moreover, Sir Nicholas o’Conor from Constantinople had urged his government to support the efforts of the Germans for railway concessions in return for ”some understanding securing to British capitalists a right to cooperate on fair terms in the pro-49 longation of the existing railways to Bagdad and Basra.” But even before the Anatolian Railvray Company had won its concession in December, 1899, a champion of British imperialism, Lord Curzon, had taken steps 50 to protect Britain’s interest in the Persian Gulf. Curzon had gone to India as viceroy in the autumn of 1898, and he was much disturbed by the increasing activ-51 ity of the Russians, French, and Germans in the Gulf. He foresaw that any trans-Mesopotamian railway must almost of necessity have its terminus at Koweit 52 which possessed the only good deep-water harbor on the northwest end of the Gulf* Koweit formed a part of the Turkish vilayet of Basra* The sheikh of Koweit had the rank of a Turkish kaimakam, or local governor, and since 1870 at least, had paid tribute to the Ottoman government, but the Sultan’s authority over Koweit 53 was shadowy at best and little effort had been made to give it practical effect. The British conceded that ’’Turkey had some vague form of sovereignty over this territory,” but that had not deterred Salisbury from suggesting in 1898 that a 54 British protectorate be established over Koweit as a precautionary measure, O’Conor had objected to the step as likely to result in serious diplomatic com- 55 plications and suggested the alternate of an agreement with the sheikh, While the foreign office was debating the Koweit question a report reached London in December, 1898, that Count Kapnist, a brother of the Russian ambassador at 56 Vienna had obtained a concession for a railway from Tripoli in Syria to Koweit. The report was false, but it precipitated decisive action. Curzon immediately ordered Colonel Meade, the British resident for the Persian Gulf region, to Koweit, and on January 23, 1899, an agreement w to be kept absolutely secret” was signed with Sheikh Murabek whereby he promised to cede no territory and to receive no foreign representatives without the sanction of the British government. In return the sheikh received 15,000 rupees and the promise that the 57 Government of India would prevent by force any attack on Koweit by the Turks. Thus the British had quietly closed the gate to the Persian Gulf almost a 58 year before the Germans won their concession. The secret Koweit agreement was aimed directly at Russian plans, but Curzon 59 was not unmindful of the German activities* To the India Office he wrote: ’’The obvious corollary to a system of German railways in Asia Minor would be similar 60 railroads to the Persian border and through Mesopotamia to the Persian Gulf.’*’ And the Germans did aspire to a position on the Persian Gulf* At the very time Meade was concluding the secret agreement with Sheikh Murabek, the German foreign office was seriously considering a base at Koweit or Muscat* On February 2, 1899, Btilow wrote the Kaiser that Lieutenant-Colonel Werther had discussed with Sultan Feisal of Muscat a proposition whereby Germany was to protect the sultanate in return for the cession of a port on the coast of Oman and a lease on the port 61 of Gwadar on the coast of Baluchistan. Bti’low opposed the scheme because he be-62 lieved it would destroy the existing friendly relations with Great Britain, but the Kaiser, who was intrigued with the idea of acquiring a footing on either the Red Sea or Persian Gulf, thought that Hatzfeldt in London ought to be able to extort something from the British in exchange for dropping the Muscat proposal. A coaling station on the Arabian coast and sympathetic support for the Eu-63 phrates railway would be suitable, wrote William II in a marginal note. This suggestion met strong resistance from Hatzfeldt, however. He thought that the time was not propitious, and that British susceptibilities were certain to be 64 aroused* On May 23 Bttlow wired Hatzfeldt that he was to let the Muscat question sleep, and if he were sounded by Salisbury, he was to state that Germany was con-65 cerned in Asia Minor only with completing the Anatolian Railway as far as Bagdad. Meanwhile German interest had increased at Koweit. In March, 1899, Richarz, the German consul at Bagdad, wrote Berlin that the terminus of the Anatolian Railway’s line from Haidar Pasha should be at Koweit which possessed a wonderful 66 harbor and was easily accessible to steamers of large tonnage. From Turkey also came support for the Koweit terminus. Tewfik Pasha, the minister of public works, told Marschall that he believed it would be advantageous for the Anatolian Company to build directly to Koweit and extend a branch line over to Basra. Basra was not a suitable terminus, he explained, because the sand bar across the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab blocked large ships from reaching its port. Then too, he added, there were political reasons why Turkey desired the terminus at Koweits (1) to establish better control over the Sheikh of Koweit, and(2) to block efforts of the British to get their hands on the port. Tewfik Pasha therefore asked for a secret agreement between the Turkish and German governments over Koweit in or-67 der to forestall British designs. Btflow was favorably disposed toward the proposal, but he thought that Germany ought to receive some compensation for what was the equivalent to a recognition end reinforcement of Turkish sovereignty over Koweit. He believed that the moment was very favorable for the acquisition of 68 a German coaling station on the Red Sea. Marschall, however, advised that it would be of advantage to delay action until the technical commission had com-69 pleted its survey at Koweit. 70 The German technical commission reached Koweit in January, 1900, and overtures for a port were made to Sheikh Murabek by Stemrich, the consul at Bagdad, 71 who was in charge of the group. Further delay by Great Britain in notifying the Germans of the secret treaty of the previous year with the sheikh was manifestly impossible. At o*Conor’s suggestion. Sir Edward Law, member of the Ottoman Public Debt council, wrote Siemens a private letter end informed him of the intimate relations which existed between Sheikh Murabek and the British government and expressed the hope that the efforts of the commission to acquire a port at Koweit 73 would not be pressed. It was not until April 9 that the German government wag put on notice. o*Conor told Marschall that in view of ’’certain arrangements” which existed between Great Britain and the Sheikh of Koweit, an Anglo-German understanding would be necessary for the extension of the Anatolian Railway to Koweit. And he warned Marschall that if British capitalists were to participate in the Bagdad enter-74'' prise, it was necessary to avoid all friction. The British ambassador also told Tewfik Pasha that Great Britain would permit no action which would give another power special rights and privileges over territory belonging to the Sheikh of Koweit, and he hoped that the Turks would renounce the plan to continue the rail-75 ’ way to Koweit. In spite of o’Conor’s warnings, Marschall did not believe that Great Britain had any serious intention of blocking the line to Koweit. That o*Conor had suggested an entente over Koweit to the Germans while threatening the Turks with opposition gave Marschall the impression that the British were angling for concessions from both sides—from Germany a financial share in the Bagdad enterprise and perhaps a promise concerning the special interests of the British in the Persian Gulf* and from Turkey, an important concession, perhaps 7 6 a telegraph line to Fao at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, There is some reason to believe that the British would have conceded the Koweit terminus to the Germans in 1900 under relatively favorable terms. The statements of Sir Frank Lascelles, the British ambassador in Berlin, were such as to indicate that Great Britain desired to enter into an agreement over Koweit in connection with other Anglo-German understandings relating to Asia 77 Minor and the Persian Gulf, British apprehensions over Russian designs in the Gulf were acute at this time while the Germans were not regarded as a menace to Britain’s special interests, Salisbury had stated in January, 1900, that he was pleased at the BagdadAgoing to the Germans because Germany would thus become 78 reconciled with British interests in the Persian Gulf, During the course of the year the need of German support against the Russians became more and more evident. Russian activities included an effort to establish a coaling station at Bundar Abbas; a railway survey from Ispahan (in Persia) to four different termini on the Persian Gulf—Mohamme rah, Bushire, Bundar Abbas, and Chabar; a tour of the Gulf by the Russian gunboat, the Ghiliak, which penetrated the Shatt-el-Arab as far as Basra* and an ostentatious visit of the consul at Bag-79 dad to Basra and Koweit. The evidence is incomplete, but it is probable that an Anglo-German agreement over Koweit was desired in 1900 by the London government, ©nd could have been had by the Germans in return for concessions to the British in the Persian Gulf. The German foreign office was confident that an Anglo-Russian rapprochement was impossible and believed that in time the British would be forced to a general understanding with Germany even though 80 the terms were high. But in ignoring the overtures of Lascelles, the Germans were guilty of misinterpreting the significance of the Persian Gulf to Britain’s route to India. Regardless of the justice of the claims of Turkey to sovereignty over Koweit, it should have been evident that Great Britain had acquired a de facto position which she would surrender only at a price. The German foreign office decided upon a policy of temporizing in regard to Koweit. While refusing to recognize British claims, the Germans would not agree to a definite concession of the Koweit terminus from the Turks for fear of 81 arousing the hostility of the London government for the entire Bagdad enterprise. Russia’s designs on Koweit also disturbed the Germans. Her activities of 1900 in the Persian Gulf had been followed by the establishment of a line of oom-82 mercial vessels to its waters in 1901. When Baron Richthofen, who had succeeded Btflow as secretary of foreign affairs, learned of the arrival of the Kornilov at Koweit, he wrote Marschall that he suspected the Russians of aiming at a permanent establishment. "In any case," he added, "the establishment of a foreign power at Koweit —be it Russia or Great Britain—is undesirable for us. It would call into question our entire plan for the subsequent execution of our Anatolian 83 railway to the Persian Gulf.” The Koweit question was reopened in the spring of 1901 when tribal warfare 84 broke out between the Sheikh of Koweit and the Emir of Nejd, When Turkish inter- ference seemed imminent, Curzon again urged that a British protectorate be de-85 dared. To this the foreign office would not agree, but when it was learned in London that a Turkish force was being sent to overpower Sheikh Murabek, the Porte 86 was warned that the British would prevent such an attack with force. And on August 24 when a Turkish sloop, the Zohat, attempted to land troops at Koweit, — 87 Commander Pears of the British cruiser, Perseus, ordered it away. The Turkish commander of the Zohat reported to Constantinople that Pears had also declared 88 ■ that he had orders from his government to declare a protectorate over Koweit. On this rumor BUlow” founded a protest to the British end declared that such a step would be considered as an infraction of the Berlin Treaty and an ’’unfriend-89 ly act toward Germany." The British replied that the news of the declaration of a protectorate at Koweit was incorrect, and furthermore, that they had no inten- G hi q we v c tion of taking such a step. This answerAf ailed to satisfy Btflow, who wired Metternich in London that the British action in preventing the landing of Turkish troops and munitions was in direct contradiction to the assurances given by 91 Crown Prince Edward to the Kaiser at Hamburg on August 11 that Great Britain 92 would not question the authority of the Sulten at Koweit. Undersecretary Sanderson told Metternich that the British assurance "not to interfere with the Sultan’s authority" at Koweit had not been violated; for Turkey had never exercised 93 a true sovereignty over the region. The German foreign office, however, viewed the interference of the British cruiser as a definite alteration of the status quo at Koweit which might induce 94 other powers to take possession of other valuable Turkish territories. Diplomatic relations between France and Turkey had been suspended in the summer of 1901 as a result of a quarrel over the rights of a French quay company in the 95 Bosporus, and rumors had reached Berlin that the French were planning to occupy 96 some of the Turkish islands in the Mediterranean* Abdul Hamid was therefore advised by Berlin to settle his differences with either the French or British as soon as possible and then to submit the other conflict to the International 97 Court of Arbitration at the Hague* Meanwhile the British had informed the Porte that they had never intended to occupy Koweit or to claim a protectorate over the territory but that Turkey ■was expected to promise that she would respect the status quo and would not send 98 troops against Sheikh Murabek* With the recommendation of Berlin, Tewfik Pasha advised o*Conor on September 6 that Abdul Hamid had abandoned his intention to 99 send troops to Koweit and had agreed to maintain the status quo. Two days later, however, Tewfik Pasha reopened the question* To Wangenheim he said that Abdul Hamid had intended to go no farther than to renounce his right to send troops to Koweit *at this time”. The permanent renunciation of the right to maintain troops in Koweit, he added, would be equivalent to Turkey*s recognizing the independence of the Sheikh and that would compromise the realization of the Bagdad Railway, as the Sultan would prefer to give up the enterprise rather than to 100 negotiate with Murabek or Great Britain for a passage to Koweit. The ouarrel between the Sultan and the British gave Berlin much anxiety, and when o*Conor pressed the Sultan for a written promise to maintain the status •quo and to send no troops to Koweit, a determined effort was made to secure the 101 submission of the dispute to the Hague Court, Marschall was instructed by Richthofen to induce the Turkish government to raise the question by proposing to Great Britain that the dispute over the rights of sovereignty at Koweit be submitted to arbitration. If the British government should accept the proposition, Richthofen said, the German government would be prepared to support the Turkish point of view; but if, contrary to all expectations, Great Britain refused, the Koweit question would be none the worse; and in the eyes of the public Great Britain would have placed herself in flagrant contradiction to her attitude at 102 the time of the founding of the Hague tribunal. But Btilow had no desire for the Koweit question to evolve into an Anglo- German quarrel. To Richthofen he wrote on October 1, 1901, that the foreign office should carefully avoid giving the British action at Koweit the appearance of a blow at Germany, The British were nervous, he said, because of the turn which the South African War had taken and were momemtarily irritated at Germany for a variety of reasons; and considering the attitude of the Government of India and the bitterness of British public opinion, a situation should not be created, which would end in diplomatic defeat for the Germans or which would agitate the people and governments of the two countries. "To my knowledge," he continued, n we have never had any claims on Koweit,,.and we have no more bound ourselves to protect Turkish rights at Koweit against other powers than we have for the rights of Turkey over other parts of Turkish territory. The Anatolian Railway 103 is not specifically a German project; it is an international enterprise,” Marschall likewise hesitated to precipitate a controversy with Great Britain* He wrote the foreign dffice on October 2 that a continuation of the status quo at Koweit offered no particular difficulties relstive to the negotiations for the definitive Bagdad Railway agreement* There was no need, he thought, to mention Koweit in the treaty; it was sufficient to speak of the extension of 104 the line ”to the Persian Gulf*’* Btflow replied on October 4 that since Great Britain had proclaimed in writing that she would neither occupy Koweit nor declare a protectorate over it so long as Turkey respected the status quo, no further effort should be made to have the Sultan appeal to the Hague tribunal* ”ln regard to the Bagdad Railway,” the chancellor added, *the interest which we have in this project is hardly sufficient under present circumstances to justify a strong intervention in favor of the rights of the Sultan at Koweit, **What guides our conduct in the Koweit affair is first, the maintenance of our prestige, then the integrity of Turkey in general, and third the interest which we have in 105 the future railway* * Then on October 10, Btflow instructed Metternich in London 106 to tell Lansdowne once more that the Germans had never had aims at Koweit* Salisbury end Lansdowne both assured Metternich that no difficulties would be 107 created for the railway to Koweit and that they viewed the project with favor* Indeed the Germans seemed to have become reconciled to the British position at Koweit in the expectation that the participation of British capital would make the port accessible at the desired time* The definitive agreement of March 18, 1902, between the Anatolian Railway Company and the Porte evaded the question of the Koweit terminus by setting the 108 eastern terminus of the line at a point to be decided on the Persian Gulf* The question of Koweit was to fade into the background in 1902 and the early months of 1903 when the Germans were angling for the cooperation of the British in financing the Bagdad Railway. Not until after the refusal of the London government to lend its support to the enterprise did Koweit really become a source of serious discord between Germany and Great Britain. Only then did the Germans complain bitterly that the British were playing the rtle of the dog-in-the-manger in closing the gate to the Persian Gulf. On the eve of the Great War the British conceded the extension of the line to Koweit. Ironically the terms were probably less advantageous than the Germans could have secured in 1900 when Great Britain was without allies and when she did not regard the Germans as a major menace to the route to India. Rising anti-German sentiment in Great Britain and the formation of the Triple Entente made the final negotiation much more difficult from the German side. It was not until May 5, 1903, that Lord Lansdowne announced his Monroe Doctrine of the Persian Gulf. In answer to a question, he told the House of Lords: ...we should regard the establishment of a naval base, or of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly resist it with all the means at our disposal. I say that in no minatory spirit, because, so far as I am aware, no proposals are on foot for the establishment of a foreign naval base in the Persian Gulf. 109 There is ample evidence that Russian activities in Persia and the Persian Gulf rather than the Bagdad Railway project were the target for Lansdowne’s warningif, in fact, the statement was anything more than an effort to quiet Lord Curzon and other ardent imperialists. The "Curzon Dispatch" of September 21, 1899, had pointed to the increasing menace of the Russians to British imperial interests, stating: "We could not contemplate without dismay the prospect of a Russian neighborhood in Eastern or 110 Southern Persia...We should strongly deprecate the political rivalry of any European nation in the neighborhood of the Persian Gulf; even though such a situation while fraught with constant annoyance, might not, as in the case of 111 Russia, constitute a positive menace to the Indian Empire.” Moreover, Lansdowne had defined British policy in January, 1902, when he wrote to Sir Arthur Hardinge at Teherans "Great Britain could not consent to the acquisition by Russia of a military or naval station in the Persian Gulf, for the reason that such a station must be regarded as a challenge to Great Britain and a menace to her 112 Indian Empire.” Shortly afterwards when the London government was alarmed over the possibility that the Russian Baltic squadron might attempt to enter the port of Chabar on the Persian Gulf, the ministry decided that if necessary the Russian government would be informed that a Russian occupation of that port would be re-113 garded as an unfriendly act. Furthermore the Germans took no offence at Lansdownes pronouncement. Metternich wrote Bttlow that the foreign secretary’s speech was an indication of the 114 British opposition to Russian aspirations in the Persian Gulf. Count Bernstorff reported that Lansdowne’s discourse had destroyed the hopes of the Russophiles in London* He said that such journals as the Spectator and the National Review, which had been preaching to their readers that Germany was the only real enemy and that the British should not oppose Russian efforts to reach a”hot”port, were bitterly disillusioned by Lansdowne’s indication that Russia was a serious threat 115 to British interests* The Times in an editorial of May 6, 1903 left the definite impression, without actually making the statement, that the British were primarily 116 concerned over the Russian advance toward the Gulf. In Berlin the National Zeitung on May 8 saids "This warning cannot be directed against Germany who has no 117 territorial ambitions on the Persian Gulf.” The Berlin Post interpreted Lansdowne’s remarks as an indication that Great Britain was determined to maintain 118 her interests in Persia against Russia. And the Berlin correspondent of The Times wrote; "Lansdowne*s speech is rather welcomed than otherwise by Berlin politicians, since wherever they see the prospect of a sharp conflict between British and Russian interests and policies they expect that it will bring grist 119 to their mill." The St. Petersburg correspondent of The Times reported that —” “ 120 there was practically no comment in the Russian press concerning the speech. 3. First Efforts at International CoOperation. Progress toward a definitive convention between the Anatolian Railway Company end the Ottoman government for the development of the Bagdad concession had been expedited by two events in the autumn of 1900* Active prosecution of the enterprise by the Deutsche Bank had been assured by the promise of cooperation by the Seehandlung in the sale of the railway bonds, and definite agreement on the southern route to Bagdad had been reached. Technical details, guarantees by the Turkish government, privileges and obligations of the concessionaires yet remained for solution. And, of even greater importance, more than $100,000,000 121 had to be found with which to finance the enterprise. Whatever ambitions may have been held at the Wilhelmstrasse, Georg von Siemens and the Deutsche Bank were first of all interested in profits. This largely explains the delay in completing the final convention. Siemens clearly foresaw the almost insurmountable obstacles which confronted the promoters of the Bagdad Railway. To technical end financial problems, he realized, were added the instability of the Turkish government and the dangers of foreign interference. Thus it was that the German financiers desired the participation of foreign capitalists in the enterprise for the twofold purpose of providing necessary capital and lending security to the investments through the friendly support of their governments. Foreign cooperation was essential, Siemens told the German foreign office, for two specific reasons. First, German capital was available for no more than one-third of the total cost of construction; and second, the Ottoman government had to increase its customs duties in order to provide the funds 122 necessary for the kilometric guarantees of the line. The first step toward internationalizing the construction of Turkish railways had occurred in 1888 when the British had been assigned a twenty per cent participation in the line to Angora and three British directors had been named 123 to the board of the Anatolian Railway Company. The Turkish railway stock had 124 found little market in London, and most of it was eventually sold to Germans. Then in 1899 the Deutsche Bank had proposed a merger of the Anatolian Railway Company with the Smyma-Aidin Company, but the bondholders of the British line 125 had rejected the offer. The agreement betw r een the Germans and the French group 126 had followed in May, 1899. Provision, however, had been made for the participation of the British in a stipulation in the contract between the Deutsche Bank and the Ottoman Bank by which the two groups promised to assign a pro rata of 127 their respective shares to a third group in case it was formed. Siemens’ desire for the participation of British capital in the development of the Bagdad concession met with no opposition from the German foreign office. In January, 1900, Eckardstein in London was informed by MMhlberg that he was to point out to the British that his government entirely approved the intention of Siemens* to solicit the assistance of British capital for the Bagdad Railway, "We have even discreetly encouraged him," he added, "for the participation of British capital will have a soothing effect on the hostile attitude against the enterprise in London, and the financial risk will thus be divided between more 128 than one nation," Siemens did not believe the time was appropriate to contact the London banking houses, and not until near the close of the year was the Deutsche 129 Bank ready to begin definite negotiations for British participation. In December, 1899, Siemens received an invitation from Sanderson, the undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, to come to London to discuss the Bagdad . 130 Railway undertaking. In the course of a long conference with Sanderson and o*Conor in Downing Street on January 4, 1901, Siemens was given the tentative conditions under which the Germans might expect to secure British approval for an increase in the Turkish customs duties and for the participation of British capital in the Bagdad concession. First, British industry must be assigned a proportional participation in supplying rails, machinery, and other materials for the construction of the railway; second, British political rights at Koweit must be protected; and third, the British might also require that a special wire 131 to India be fixed to the telegraph posts of the Bagdad Railway, The question of British agreement to a new commercial treaty with Turkey over customs duties, Siemens was told, would have to await the formation of a British group to take 132 over participation in the Bagdad enterprise, Siemens explained that he had discussed the question with London bankers* Alfred and Leopold Rothschild had expressed the opinion that since a definitive convention had not been signed, the enterprise possessed only a political character and was not yet mature for negotiations between bankers* Other London banking firms, he added, had expressed 133 corresponding opinions. Siemens and o*Conor therefore agreed that the Deutsche Bank and the Ottoman Bank would make a joint declaration promising equality of conditions of participation to a British group aTter the final treaty had been 134 signed with the Ottoman government. The Deutsche Bank, however, continued its efforts to secure the cooperation of the London bankers* In June, 1901, Arthur von Gwinner, a director of the 135 Deutsche Bank, began negotiations with Sir Clinton Dawkins, who was associated with the Morgan banking house in London, and Sir Ernest Cassel, an influential London capitalist* A tentative agreement was reached between the bankers, and the British government approved the participation of a group of capitalists to be formed by Dawkins and Cassel provided the British were given a proportional share in the furnishing of supplies, the construction, and the administration of the line. To this the Germans agreed in principle* Negotiations lapsed after June, 1901, with the understanding that they would be renewed as soon as the fi-136 nal treaty was signed* Rumors of the negotiations between the Deutsche Bank and the British brought a hostile reaction in Russia and France* In st. Petersburg the Novoe Vremia vigorously attacked the Bagdad project as damaging to vital Russian in-137 terests in Asia Minor, And in Constantinople, Zinoviev declared that "he would not oppose the Railway if confined to French and Germans, but that if England 138 joined he would do all that he could to frustrate its realisation.” was ardused because Siemens had negotiated with the British without a preliminary understanding with the Ottoman Bank. He complained that the French bankers had failed to retain their position of equality and had permitted the Germans such complete control that it appeared that the Bagdad Railway was a German enterprise destined to damage the interests of Russia in Asia Minor with the assistance of 139 French capital. The foreign office, he added, had supported the entente between the Ottoman Bank and the Deutsche Bank, but if the line were to escape French control and become an exclusive German project, the French government was no 140 longer interested end would not permit financial operations on the French market, "We do not object in principle to the participation of British capital in the Bagdad Railway,” Deleass4 wrote Bapst in Constantinople, but he added that the Germans must consult the Ottoman Bank regarding such steps. "The German group," he 141, complained, *acts as if it were the sole beneficiary of the Bagdad concession/ position was extremely difficult. France’s problem of cooperation was complicated by the clash of her economic interests with her political needs. To allow the Germans to develop and control the Bagdad Railway without French participation might damage the great economic stake which she had long held in the Ottoman Empire, but to arouse the susceptibilities of Russia by cooperating in the enterprise might cost France her sole political prop in Europe. Thus Delcass4 who was certainly no pro-German, ardently desired to make the Bagdad Railway an international affair with both Russian and British capital participating. Definite efforts were made by the French foreign office to secure the support of their Russian ally. In May, 1901, Delcass4 informed the Russian government that the French financial market would be favorable for a Russian loan but for the fear of the French financiers that Russia would raise difficulties in connection with the providing of Turkish funds for the Bagdad Railway, He suggested, therefore, that the Russian ambassador at Constantinople be instructed to raise 142 no objections on this point. The same month Delcass4 discussed the Bagdad project with the Tsar, Lamsdorff, and Witte in St. Petersburg. He assured them that although the concession of the Bagdad line had been obtained by the Anatolian Railway Company, the group which would construct and control the railway would not be German but would be international. Should the Russians desire to take part, Delcass4 added that he believed the Franco-German concessionaires would consent 143 to make them a place, and if desired, he would intervene to that effect with them. On his return to Paris, the foreign minister opened negotiations with the 144 French and German financiers who were then in conference at Weisbaden. Through Count Vitali, of the Ottoman Bank, Delcass4 informed the group that the Franco- Russian pourparlers had reached the stage where Lamsdorff, the Russian foreign minister, had agreed that Russia would withdraw all opposition to the Bagdad Railway and would conclude a commercial treaty with Turkey for an increase in Turkish customs duties provided the following conditions were nets (1) that none of the surplus of the income resulting from the new commercial treaties go into the 145 Ottoman treasury; (g) that the Bagdad Railway Company become an international affair subject to the ccntrol of all the participants; and(3} that Russia be 146 granted participation in the enterprise. The Russian propositions were accepted 147 by Siemens, and an agreement was reached whereby Russia’s share was to be taken 148 equally from the fifty per cent participation of the German and French groups. Delcass4, in summarizing the result of the discussion, wrote Montebello in St. Petersburg: "It was agreed..»that as soon as the Bagdad Railway concession is definitely obtained by the Anatolian Company, there will be constituted a distinct international administration of the company for the construction and exploitation of the line. Russia will naturally have a representation in the man-149 agement of the enterprise proportional to her participation." Not until June 4 did Siemens give the foreign office at Berlin a full account of the Russian negotiations. He assumed responsibility for Delcass4*s demarche, which, he said, had been undertaken because of the need of Russian consent to a new commercial treaty with Turkey whereby Turkish customs duties might be in-150 creased. Richthofen complained that Siemens had accepted the Russian propositions without having warned the foreign office and without being previously assured of German consent to the Russian participation. The foreign secretary was partially soothed by Siemens* assurance that the administration of the railroad would be kept in German hands in spite of Russian participation, although he feared German influence would be materially reduced, especially since Siemens held that the German group could burden itself with financing no more than 800 of the 2400 151 kilometres of the line. Richthofen’s fears of Russian participation were groundless. From the French ambassador at Constantinople, Delcassd learned that Witte had declared to Zinoviev that he was not willing to let Russian capital engage in the Bagdad 152 Railway. Confirmation of this report came on August 6 when the French ambassador wrote that certain Russian Journals, the Novoe Vremia taking the lead, had inaugurated a violent campaign against the project and had forced Witte and Lamsdorff 153 to reverse their policies. Later Montebello wrote Delcassd that he believed the Russian government itself was not responsible for the press campaign but that it was carried on by tt that part of Russian public opinion represented by the consuls, pan-Slavs, and Orthodox societies which zealously watched the foreign interests 154 of the empire.* Yet it is difficult to credit Russia*s action entirely on the force of public opinion when it is remembered what little regard the Tsarist government had for popular rule. The answer is perhaps accurately given by Witte in March, 1903, when he charged that the Bagdad Railway was diametrically opposed 155 to the political, military, and economic well-being of Russia. He did not add, as he might have done, that anything which strengthened the Ottoman empire or which enhanced the influence of a foreign power in Turkey also came under that category. The German government seems to have desired the participation of Russia although Richthofen had criticized Siemens* action in consenting to the Russian conditions without a preliminary sanction by the foreign office. In August, 1901, the acting secretary of foreign affairs, Wthlberg, wrote that in order to prevent an Anglo-Russian entente it was necessary to transform the Bagdad Railway from a German enterprise into a Franco-Russian-German affair and thereby destroy the 156 primary source of political friction between Germany and Russia. Bttlow in October instructed Pttckler, the chargd d’affaires at St. Petersburg, to tell Lamsdorff that the Bagdad Railway did not have the least appearance of an enterprise directed against Russia since France was a participant and since a share was re-157 served for Russia. The following month Bttlow assured Lamsdorff and Witte that the Bagdad enterprise had never been a political project and that international 158 participation should remove any reason to doubt its purely economic character. Further efforts to internationalize the Bagdad project were to await the final treaty between the concessionaires and the Ottoman government. As early as May, 1901, representatives of the French and German financiers had met at Weisbaden and had reached an agreement on the details of the draft proposal to be 159 submitted to the Porte. Later in the same month this proposition was submitted 160 to the Ottoman government for examination. Although Marschall wrote that the Sultan’s desire for the construction of the railway had been intensified by the insubordination of the Sheikh of Koweit and Russia’s extortion of the Black Sea Basin Agreement, the usual delays were encountered in the negotiations. Abdul Hamid complained that the guarantee of 17,000 francs per kilometre asked by the concessionaires was too high and pointed out that various rivals—Pres sei and 161 Rechnitzer among others —had offered to construct the railroad without a guaranty. But kilometric guarantees were a sine qua non for the concessionaires, and the Sultan ardently desired the construction of the railway. In September Abdul Hamid ceased temporizing. Zander, the representative of the German group in Constantinople, was summoned to Yildiz Palace where he was informed that the Sultan was ready to sign the final convention based on the terms submitted to the Porte in May on condition that the amount of the kilometric guarantees be lowered; that the guarantees be covered by increases in the Turkish revenues to be effected by an increase in the customs duties, savings from the unification of the Turk* ish public debt, and from certain monopolies to be ceded to the concessionaires; 162 and finally, that the financiers make a large loan to the Turkish government.'' These conditions -were not acceptable, but the Sultan was becoming impatient, and in October the formal negotiations got under way at the Porte with Kurt 163 , Zander and Edouard Huguenin representing the Anatolian Company. Further delay resulted when Zander went to Berlin to attend the funeral of Siemens who died 164 on October 23, 1901. By December an agreement had been established on all 165 points of importance save that of kilometric guarantees. With Marschall act- ing in the rble of mediator the guarantees were reduced from 17,000 to 16,500 166 francs per kilometre, and on January 15, 1902, the Council of State signed the maz-167 bata providing for the terms as agreed upon with Zander and Huguenin. The following day the Sultan issued an imperial irad4 giving official sanction to the decision 168 of the Council of Ministers. By the terms of the convention the Anatolian Railway Company definitely obtained for ninety nine years the concession rights for constructing a main line from Konia to Basra through Karaman, Eregli, Adana, Hamidjeh, Kilis, Tel Habesh, Nisibin, Mosul, Tekrit, Sadidjeh, Bagdad, Kerbela, Nedjef, Zobeir, and five branch lines: from the main line to Castabol on the Gulf of Alexandretta* from Tel Habesh to Aleppo; from the main line to Urfa; from Sadidjeh to Khanikin; and from Basra to a point on the Persian Gulf. Eight years were given for the construction of the lines which would commence as soon as the Turkish government 169 could provide the necessary guarantees. This concession, it should be noted, was to the Anatolian Railway Company, not to an international syndicate. Marschall wrote the foreign office that it was a great tribute to Siemens that he had successfully opposed all efforts to acquire the concession in the name of an international group, or of a French group, and had obtained the award for the Anatolian Railway Company alone. The German ambassador significantly added that the promise of participation in the enterprise would be loyally fulfilled, but that henceforth it would be left to the Anatolian Company and to the German financial institution which stood behind 170 it to make the final decisions. In summarizing the events leading to the successful termination of the negotiations, Marschall wrote the Chancellor that he had no complaint concerning the attitude of his colleagues. Constans, he said, had let him conduct the affair alone, refraining from any interference; o*Conor, while giving the impression of not knowing sur quel pied danser generally spoke of the affair in a friendly manner; and Zinoviev made no attempt to interrupt or thwart the negotiations. Although he was convinced that Russia looked on the project with disfavor, she had neither officially nor unofficially made the least gesture against it. Marschall explained this passive attitude as being due to the fact that the hands of the Russian government were tied because it had demanded and had received important compensation for the Bagdad Railway at the time of the 171 preliminary concession. With the technical end financial details of the Bagdad enterprise in definite form, the question of international participation was to be debated with renewed vigor at the foreign offices of Berlin, Paris, London, and St. Petersburg. 1 Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No. 3140 (1903), 27. The commission included Dr. Mackensen, director of the Prussian State Railways; Dr. von Kapp, surveyor of the State Railways of Wurttemberg; Herr Stemrich, German consulgeneral at Constantinople; and representatives of the Ottoman Ministry of Public Works. Earle, op. cit., 34. 2 Btflow to Radolin, March 24, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 533. 3 Ibid. 4 Radolin to Hohenlohe, April 5, 1899, ibid., 478. 5 Radolin to Hohenlohe, April 5, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 479. 6 P.O. note by Bulow, April 18, 1899, ibid., FdS. 7 Ibid., 540. 8 Tbn. 9 KO? note by Btflow, April 26, 1899, ibid., 541. 10 Ibid., 542. ' 11 Hatzfeldt in London strongly objected to the Russian proposal. He wrote Holstein that such an agreement would incontestably violate the Triple Alliance and would necessitate a new grouping of the powers. If Germany were to guarantee Constantinople to Russia, Hatzfeldt maintained that Germany should demand as an equivalent a tripartite guarantee of territory between Russia, France, and Germany. Hatzfeldt to Holstein, May 1, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 543-544. 12 Bttlow to Hatzfeldt, May 6, 1899, ibid., 545; F.O. note by Btflow, May 5, 1899, ibid., 546-547. iTWlow to William 11, July 4, 1899, ibid-, 558. 14 559. 15 In a foreign office note of December 4, 1900, Baron Holstein summarized the proposed Russo-German agreement over Asia Minor and the Straits® ’’This agreement," he wrote, "was to have brought to Russia all sorts of political and territorial advantages, whereas Germany would have had to content herself with carrying on commerce in Asia Minor and Mesopotamia and constructing railways® What prevented Germany from giving her consent to this Russian proposition was less the unequal partition of advantages than the fact that the prospective agreement touched on interests •which -were the object of disputes between Russia and Great Britain.” Grosse Politik, XVIII (1), 6* 16 Note by Tschirschky, secretary of German embassy at St. Petersburg, July 3, 1899, ibid., XIV (2), 556. 17 After TKe~negotiations had been completed for the preliminary concession, Marschall wrote Btflow that the attitude of Zinoviev, the Russian ambassador, had been neutral, but that certain members of the Russian embassy at Constantinople had worked against the Germans. Marschall to Hohenlohe, Nov. 27, 1899, ibid., 505. 18 Earle, op, cit., 147. 19 Quoted Tn TKe~"Times, Ausr. 10, 1899, 3. 20 Quoted in The Times, Dec. 1, 1899, 5. 21 F.O. note by Bttlow, Nov. 8, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 491. 22 Marschall to F. 0., Feb. 28, 1900, fbid., XVII, 382. 23 Footnote, ibid., 371-372. 24 Marschall to F. 0., Feb. 28, 1900, ibid., 382. 25 Ibid., 380-381. 26 Marschall to Hohenlohe, Apr. 4, 1900, ibid., 383-385; Young, op. cjt., IV, 64-68, gives the full text of the agreement. Paul Imbert, u Le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in Revue des deux mondes, Apr. 1, 1907, 659, and EaTTeT^pT"cit .73497 assert that the Russian demand was accompanied by the threat to take immediate measures to collect the arrearage of some 57,000,000 francs indemnity due to the Tsar under the terms of the Berlin Treaty. There is nothing in the documents to substantiate this statement. 27 Marschall to Hohenlohe, Apr. 4, 1900, Grosse Politik, XVII, 384, 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid., 385, 30 Sarlo, op. cit., 149, says Zinoviev told the Porte that the "proposed extension of the Anatolian Railways from Angora across Armenia to Mosul and Bagdad would be a strategic menace to the Caucasus frontier and, as such, could not be tolerated,” Earle bases his statement upon information found in Paul Imbert, "Le chemin de fer de Bagdad,” in Revue des deux mondes, April 1, 1907, 659, for which no reference is given. Parker,’’op. cit., 503, writes that the "northern variant" was abandoned in favor of the Konia "route because of political reasons. Similar expressions are also found in A. Geraud, "A New German Empire: The Story of the Bagdad Railway," in Nineteenth Century, May, 1914, 969; Moon, op. cit., 239; and Feis, op. cit., 348, Karl Helfferich, who is the outstanding authority on the Bagdad Railway for the period prior to 1903, says in his Deutsche Turkenpolitik, (1921), 17, that Russian objections in 1893 caused the abandonment of rhe Angora-Bagdad route, but in his Georg von Siemens (1923) he fails to repeat this statement. W.L. Langer, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, 1890-1902, (New York, 1935), 636, calls attention lack of e"vi(fence to support the view that Russian objections led to the abandonment of the Angora-Bagdad route, and concludes that it seems most likely that the "Kaisarieh-SiVas-Bagdad route was not constructed because the Germans were not interested in it," 31 Parker, op. cit«, 503. Biraviev’s statement to Btflow of November 8, 1899, that Russia desired no railroads to be constructed in Asia Minor which were directly opposed to Russian financial or strategic interests, is the only reference found which might indicate that there was any Russian protest prior to December, 1899, relative to the route of the Bagdad line. F.O. note by Bttlow, Grosse Politik. XIV (2), 491. ' 1 32 Radolin to Marschall, Jen. 9, 1893, ibid., 458. 33 A.D.C. Russell, ’’The Bagdad Railway, 1 ' in the Quarterly Review, Apr., 1921, 34 Marschall to Hohenlohe, Apr. 9, 1898, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 465. 35 Ibid., 465-466. 36 Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 98* 37 Marschall to F/O'., 'May 30, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 485. WilhelM von Pres sei always contended that the route was more desirable than the southern route both from the view of strengthening the Ottoman empire and producing a profit for the German capitalists. Pressel, op. cit., 84. 38 Marschall to P. 0., Feb. 11, 1900, Grosse Politik7“XVll, 376-377. 39 Btflow to Marschall, Feb. 12, 1900, ibid., 377-3’79. 40 Marschall to F. 0., March 10, 1900, ibid., 382. 41 Note by Siemens to F. 0., ibid., 394; Heifferich, Siemens, 111, 98, 121-122. 42 Following the concessions of 1899 and 1902, Marschall prepared exhaustive summaries of the events leading to the concessions. Both reports discuss foreign interferences encountered in the negotiations, but there is no mention of a Russian protest concerning the route. Marschall to Hohenlohe, Nov. 27, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 493-505; Marschall to Bttlow, Feb. 2, 1902, ibid., XVII, " 5T Marschall to F. 0., Oct. 8, 1900, ibid., 391. 44 F.O. Memorandum, Nov* 23, 1910, Brit, Docs., VI, 550. 45 In discussing the unique position of Great Britain in the Persian Gulf a foreign office memorandum says: “When...it is borne in mind that the most direct route to the East has always in the past been controlled by the Rulers of India—that the Portuguese acquired Algoa and Delagoa as ports of call to and from Goa, that the Dutch East India Company established a port at Table Bay in 1652 for a similar purpose, that the Cape was subsequently ceded to the British Crown, and that the port of Aden was occupied by the British as an outpost of India—when all this is taken into consideration, it cannot give rise to surprise if His Majesty’s Government...regard with some measure of concern the advent of a great trans-continental railway under the aegis of a foreign power.** Ibid., -551. H.L. Hoskins, British Routes to India, ch . T, surveys British interests in the various approaches to India. 46 F.O. note by Grey, November 13, 1907, British Documents., VI, 92; Prince von Bttlow, Memoirs.,- 11, 338-339, 409; William 11, My Memoirs, 85-86. 47 Btflow to F. 0., Nov. 24, 1899, Grosse Politik, XV, 414. Joseph Chamberlain told the Kaiser, who was also at Windsor, that he desired that British capital participate in the railway and "he preferred to see the Germans in Asia Minor rather than the Russians and French." Ibid., 418. 48 Eckardstein to Btflow, Jan. 22, 1900, Grosse Politik, XVII, 373. 49 o’Conor to F. 0., Nov. 9, 1899, Brit, goes.? 11, 175. 50 Curzon had long been alarmed over "the menace of Russia to British interests in the Persian Gulf. In 1892 he had written in his Persia and the Persian Question, 11, 465: "I should regard the concession of a port upon the Persian Gulf to Russia by any power as a deliberate insult to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture of the status quo, and as an intentional provocation to war; and I should impeach the British minister who was guilty in acquiescing in such a surrender as a traitor to his country." Quoted in Earl of Ronaldshay, Life of Lord Curzon, 11, 308. ' 51 Nin© months after his arrival in India Curzon sent his famous dispatch to Lord George Hamilton, secretary of state for India, in which he discussed the activities of the powers in the Persian Gulf. "Prolongations of the Turko-German railways to Bagdad and to the Persian Gulf," wrote Curzon, "have been and are still being freely discussed...ln the Gulf itself a German consulate was established in 1897 at Bushire, to safeguard the interests of six German subjects in the entire ports of that sea...At Basra a resolute attempt is being made to capture the local market. Quite recently a number of Germans have been engaged in a study of the situation at Bunder Abbes. During the spring of the present year, a German man-of-war, the "Arcona”, visited Maskat, Lingah, and Bushire; and reports have reached us of the likely appearance, at no distant date, of a German line of merchant steamers in the Gulf.” But while Curzon regarded the symptoms of increasing German interests in the Gulf as adding to the complexities of the problem, he wrote: "We do not question the bona fide commercial enterprise which is carrying German trade here...and we can conceive that we may even find, in the existence of German political interests, an occasional ally or safeguard for our own. German interests, however, have a tendency to grow with some rapidity...and we think that the need for an early decision upon the future policy to be adopted by Her Majesty’s Government is not diminished, but is enhanced, by the appearance of so active a competitor upon the scene,” Curzon to Secretary of State for India, Sept. 21, 1899, Brit. Docs., IV, 357, 52 Ibid., 357-358. Basra, the terminus named in the concession of 1899, is locate'd on the Shatt-el-Arab which is formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, and is 500 miles south of Bagdad and some 60 miles from the Persian Gulf. Koweit, or Grene, is located on the northwestern end of the Gulf and possesses an excellent deep-water harbor, free of the disadvantages of an inland port. General Chesney had urged Koweit a.s the terminus for the British line he had contemplated. Valentine, Chirol, The Middle Eastern Question, 230. 53 s£££•> 333; British Foreign Office, Peace handbook, No. 76, 51-52. The Times, Oct. 2, 1901, 7, gives what is in many respects the best account of the history of Koweit. 54 r tt. Docs., 333; Roanldshay, op. cit., 11, 50. Lord Cranbome, the under-secretary of state for foreign affairs, told Commons on January 16, 1902: "His Majesty’s Government do not deny that the Sultan has a certain position there (goweitj, very vague and ill-defined, and largely dependent upon his leadership in the Mohammedan world." Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 4th series, CI, 130. 55 Ronaldshay, op ♦ cit., 11, 50; Brit. Docs., I, 333# 56 Brit. Docs., I, 333. The Times, Dec. 17, 1898, 7, printed an account of the Kapnist rumor. 57 Brit. Docs., I, 333; H. Marchand, w Les questions d’Arabie, le Yemen, Mas cate, e't Koweit, ” in Questions diplomatique s et coloniales, 1911, 397-400. 58 Curzon desired a formal British protectorate over Koweit in order to guard against the danger of the Sultan ceding the port of Koweit over the head of Sheikh Murabek. Ronaldshay, op. cit., 11, 50. 59 In February, 1898, the German charg4 d l affaires at Teheran, Bodmann, evidently •without authorization from Berlin, procured an option for the construction of a rail-way from Khanikin, on the Turco-Persian frontier, to Teheran. The option extended to November 11, 1900, but the Deutsche Bank refused to consider financing a Bagdad-Khanikin-Tehe ran line, and the violent opposition from the Russians and British caused Btflow to inform Count Rex, the German minister at Teheran, that for reasons ”as much political as practical*’ the project should be dropped. BKlow to Rex, March 18, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 513; Rex to Bulow, March 18, 1899, ibid., 512; Curzon to Secretary of State for India, Sept. 21, 1899, Brit. PocsTTlV, 357. 60 Curzon to Secretary of State for India, Sept. 21, 1899, Brit. Docs., IV, 357 tt 61 Bttlow to William 11, Fob. 2, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 509. 62 Ibid. — 63 Marginal note by William 11, ibid., 510. 64 Hatzfeldt to Btflow, March 17, “1^99, ibid., 510-512; May 11, ]899, ibid., 516-517; May 16, 1899, ibid., 519-521. “ ‘ 65 The Germans were perhaps scared off of an active policy in Muscat by the harsh treatment meted out to France by Great Britain in February, 1899, after the French had acquired a lease on a coaling station from the Sultan of Oman. In 1862 the British and French governments had engaged to guarantee the independence of Oman, but in March, 1891, the British violated the joint agreement by entering into a secret treaty with the Sultan of Oman whereby he bound ’’himself and his heirs and his successors never to cede, to sell, to mortgage, or otherwise give for occupation, save to the British government, the dominions of Muscat and Omen or any of their dependencies.” A.T. Wilson, The Persian Gulf, 237. And when the London government learned in 1899 that the SuTEah of oman”KaH‘ violated this agreement by e. concession to the French, British na.val forces preceded to Muscat and under threat of bombardment of the city the Sultan was forced to cancel the French agreement. Ibid., 239. Curzon was largely responsible for the summary treatment of the French, and the example no doubt caused Btflow to be wary lest the viceroy mete out the same treatment to the Germans. Ronaldshay, op. cit., 48. 66 Richarz to Hohenlohe, March 10, 1899, Grosse Politik, XIV (2), 514. Btflow declined to take any action on Richarz* suggestion. Btflow to Richarz, Anril 12. 1899, ibid., 515. 67 Marschall to P. 0., Dec. 23, 1899, Grosse Politik, XVII, 465-466. 68 Btflow to Marschall, Dec. 26, 1899,"ibid., 467. In the summer of 1899 the German foreign office had considered the question of acquiring a position on the Red Sea. On August 17 the d’affaires, Schlbzer, reported that Abdul Hamid had proposed that a railway from Hodeida, on the Red Sea, to Sana, capital of the province of the Yemen, be awarded to the Anatolian Railway bv a fait accompli. Ibid., XIV (2), 522. Schlbzer to F. 0., Aug. 23, 1899, ibid.', 524. Richthofen, acting secretary of foreign affairs, was of the opinion that it was hazardous to enter upon such an enterprise without complete information concerning its financial prospects. He hesitated, moreover, to encourage the Anatolian Railway to accept other concessions so long as the Deutsche Bank had not raised the funds for the railway to Bagdad. Richthofen to Schlb’zer, Aug. 19. 1899, ibid., 523. Hatzfeldt desired that the Deutsche Bank accept the proposition in principle, as Germany might not soon have another opportunity to secure a position on the Red Sea. Hatzfeldt to F. 0., Aug. 25, 1899, ibid., 525. Btflow approved Hatzfeldt’s suggestion and after the Anatolian Company and the Deutsche Bank had agreed to accept the Hodeida-Sana railway concession in principle, Marschall was instructed to enter immediately into negotiations with the Sultan. Btflow to Marschall, Aug. 29, 1899, ibid., 526-527. Btflow’s decision seems to have been influenced by the Kaiser’s ardent desire for a base on the Red Sea for the German fleet. Ibid., 527. The Sultan was informed by Marschall that the Deutsche Bank was ready to construct the line provided it was assured sufficient financial guarantees, and a place on the sea-coast placed at its disposition where materials might be disembarked, shops erected, and provisions stored. Since no definite agreement could be effected until surveys had been made, the Sultan offered to finance personally a survey by engineers of the Anatolian Company. Marschall to Btflow, Sept. 8. 1899, ibid., 527-528. Btflow desired that the engineers undertake the work at once, but bhat the expedition be kept an absolute secret to avoid disagreeable rumors. And, he frankly admitted: “...the acquisition of a coaling station on the southeastern coast of Arabia is the principal motive for our interest in this project.” Bttlow to Marschall, ibid., 528-529. For reasons not revealed in the documents, the project collapsed! footnote, ibid., 529. BUlow*s suggestion in December 1899, that a coaling station on the Red Sea would be suitable compensation for a German guaranty of Turkish sovereignty in Ko wit would indicate perhaps that the Turks had balked at the idea of granting the Germans a coaling station. BUlow to Marschall, Dec. 26, 1899, ibid., XVII, 467. 69 Marschall to F. 0., Dec. 27, 1899, ibid., 468. 70 Marschall to F. 0., Jan. 18, 1899, ibid., 468-469* 71 Marschall to F. 0., Feb. 1, 1899, iTOT, 469. 72 O’Conor to Sanderson, Jan. 22, 1900, Brit. Docs., 11, 175. 73 Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 111. 74 Marschall to F. 0., Apr. 9, 1900, Grosse Politik, XVII, 470, 75 Marschall to F. 0., Apr. 12, 1900, ibid., 471-472. 76 Mafschall to F. 0., Apr. 12, Gtosse Politik, XVII, 472. 77 F.O. note by Btilow, June 14, 1900, ibid., 477; Metternich to Btflow, June 24, ibid., 10-11. 78 Eckardstein to Billow, Jan. 22, 1900, ibid., 373. 79 Ronaldshay, Curzon, 11, 310-311* Richarz to Hohenlohe. April 19 and 27 1900, Grosse Politik^Wl, 473-476* Wilson, op. cit., 252. 80 Langer, op. cit., 11, 727. 81 Metterni’cn to R. 0., Aug. 16, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 481. 82 In October, 1900, Bttlow succeeded Hohenlohe as chancellor, and Richthofen took over the position of secretary of foreign affairs. 83 Richthofen to MarschallMarch 6, 1901, ibid., 478-479. 84 P.O. note by Tilly, Brit, Docs., I, 333. 85 India Office note, June 14, 1901, ibid., 333• 86 F.O. note by Tilly, Brit, Docs., I, 333-334, 87 The Times, Sept, 28, 1901, 5; Btflow to Eckardstein, Aug. 29, Grosse Politik, ““ 88 Ibid. 89 ibid,* F.O. to Lascelles, Sept, 3, 1901, Brit, Docs,, 334. 90 Richthofen to Wngenheim, Aug. 30, 1901. Grosse Politik, XVII, 483. 91 At Hamburg on August 11, 1901, a memorandum had been given to the Kaiser by the King which said in parts "Her Majesty’s Government did not desire to intervene with the status quo or with the Sultan’s authority in these parts (K°“ witj.” Brit. Docs., 11, 94; Grosse Politik, XVII, 123-124, 92 Bttlow to Metternich, Aug. 31, 1901, ibid., 484. 93 Metternich to F. 0., Sept. 4, 1901, ibid., 485. 94 Richthofen to William 11, Sept. 6, 1901, ibid., 488-489. 95 The French ambassador, Constans, had left Constantinople August 22, 1901, because of the failure of the Turkish government to agree to satisfactory repurchase terms for quay concessions held by two French citizens, Salm and Michel, and of its refusal to pay sums which were claimed due them by two other Frenchmen, Lorando and Tubini. Wangenheim to F. 0., Aug. 22, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVIII (1), 453-454; Bulow to William 11, Nov. 7, 1901, ibid., XV1T7~%69; The Times, Sept. 18, 1901, 4, and Nov. 4, 1901, 5. The French threatened to send their squadron to effect the occupation of the Turkish island of Mitylene, and on November 10 the Sultan accepted the French demands. Marschall to Btflow, Nov. 1, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVIII (1), 460; Marschall to F. 0., Nov. 10, 1901, ibid., 475-476. 96 Richthofen to William 11, Sept. 6, 1901, iTC, XVII, 489. The German foreign secretary probably had in mind Mitylene in the Aegean rather than islands in the Mediterranean. 97 F.O. note by Rosen, Sept. 6, 1901, ibid. 98 Wangenheim to F. 0., Sept. 6, 1901, ibid., 491. Ronaldshay, Curzon, 11, 318, writes that “as a result of discussions in which Germany participated on the side of Turkey, it was agreed that all concerned would maintain the status quowhatever that comforting phrase, beloved by diplomats, might be held to Lord Curzon had strongly recommended a protectorate in the summer of 1901, and he thought Lansdowne’s action “a timid evasion of the realities of the case.” Writing to Lord Percy, Curzon said: “When you hear a Foreign Minister say anywhere that all he wants is to defend the status quo, you may guess in nine cases out of ten that he has no policy at al 17* Tbid. 99 Wangenheim to F. 0., Sept. 6, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 490-491. 100 Wangenheim to F. 0., Sept. 8, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 493-494. 101 Richthofen to Bttlow, Sept. 12, 1901, ibid., 494-495. 102 Richthofen to Marschall, Sept. 28, 1901, ibid., 497. 103 BtJlow to Richthofen, Oct. 1, 1901, ibid., 498. 104 Marschall to F. 0., Oct. 2, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 499. 105 Bttlow to Marschall, Oct. 4, 1901, ibid., 500-501. 106 Billow to Metternich, Oct. 10, 1901, ibid., 502, 107 Metternich to F. 0., Oct. 15, 1901, ibid?, 502-503. 108 Marschall to F. 0., Jan. 17, 1902, ibid., 413. 109 Parl i ament ary De bate s, Lords, 4th series, CXXI, May 5, 1903, 1348. 110 Curzon to secretary of state for India, Sept. 21, 1899, Brit. Docs., IV, 358. ' 11l Curzon to secretary of state for India, Sept. 21, 1899, Brit. D0c5.,1V,362. 112 Lansdowne to Hardinge, Jan. 6, 1902, ibid., 370. 113 Ibid., 371. 114 Metternich to Btflow, June 2, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 592. 115 Bemstorff to Bttlow, May 9, 1903, ibid., 569. 116 The Tiroes, May 6, 1903, 11. 117 Lascelles to Lansdowne, May 8, 1903, Brit. Docs♦, 11, 193-194. 118 The Tiroes, May 7, 1903, 5. 119 The Times, May 8, 1903, 3* 120 FbTd., May 13, 1903, 7* 121 F. 0. note by Siemens, Jan. 4, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 394; Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 114. 122 F.O. note by Rosen, June 4, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 399; Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 116-117. Under the terms of the Capitulations no increase wa.s possible in Turkish customs duties save with international sanction. 123 F.O. note by Siemens, Jan. 4, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 393. 124 Ibid. The British bankers originally took £5,000,000 of the Anatolian Railway stock. Footnote, Brit. Docs.,. 11, 174. 125 F.O. note by Siemens, Jan. 4, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 393. Smyrna- Aidin bondholders were offered a guarantee of fourper cent interest, while stockholders would have received Anatolian Company stock in exchange. Ibid., 393. The merger of the British-owned Smyrna-Aidin line with the Anatolian Railway was championed by o’Conor who wrote London that the amalgamation of the two lines ’’would in the long run be to the advantage of British trade and influence.” o’Conor to F. 0., Nov. 9, 1899, Brit. Docs., 11, 175. After the Ana.tolian Company had won the concession of 1899, the ambassador wrote; ”Dr. von Siemens still hoped to come to an understanding with the Aidin Railway. It would be far better to make the line an international one.” o*Conor to P. 0., Dec. 27, 1899, ibid., 175. 126 F.O. note by Siemens, Jan. 4, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVIITT93-394- Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 121. 127 It was expected, Siemens said, that this prospective third group would be British. Ibid., 97 > F.O. note by Siemens, Jan. 4, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 394. 128 Whlberg to Eckardstein, Jan, 31, 1900, Grosse Politik, XVII, 375, Eckardstein had reported on January 22 that he understood Siemens -was expected in London shortly to confer with the Rothschilds, and Lord Hardwicke, the head of a financial group with large investments in Asia Minor. Ibid,, 3.74, 129 Ibid.; Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 106-107, ISO Eckardstein to Bttlow, Jan. 9, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 392* 131 Siemens to F. 0., Jan. 4, 1901, ibid., 396. 132 Ibid, o*Conor was distinctly pleased at the results of the conference at Downing Street. To Sanderson he wrote on February 23, 1901; "Have written to Dr. von Siemens expressing satisfaction that he has opened the door to British capitalists,,.l think it would be a pity to stop here and not do what we can in other ways to bring about an international arrangement." Brit, Docs., 11, 175. 133 Siemens to F. 0., Jan. 4, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 397* 134 Ibid. 135 After Siemens 1 death in October, 1901, Gwinner, a distinguished international financier, succeeded to the managing directorship of the Deutsche Bank, which position carried with it the presidency of the Anatolian Railway Company and the Bagdad Railway Company which was organized in 1903. 136 Billow to William 11, Jan* 31, 1902, ibid., 414-415. Gwinner had formed the friendship of J.Pierpont Morgan when he had been in the United States in 1896 supervising the reorganization of the Northern Pacific Railway by its European creditors, and in May, 1901, he attempted to interest Morgan in the Bagdad Railway. Morgan directed him to his London associates with the plea that his own head was too filled with American enterprises to interest himself in Turkish affairs. Later Btilow raised the question of negotiating with some other American banking firm, but the Deutsche Bank wag of the opinion that such a step would arouse the strongest of opposition from Morgan and would compromise the assistance of the Morgan house in London, and, thereby, the whole question of British cooperation. Ibid., 415. 157 Montebello (St, Petersburg) to Delcassd, Feb. 5, 1901, Documents Diplomatiques Fr angaj s, series 2, I, 83. Quoted subsequently: D.D.F. o‘donor to Sanderson, Feb. 23, 1901, Brit. Doos., T17T75. 139 Delcasse to Constans, Feb. 5, 1901, D.D.F ~ series 2, I, 84. 140 Ibid., 84-85. 141 Delcasse to Bapst, Mar. 2, 1901, ibid., 151-152. 142 Marschall to F. 0., May 14, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 399; Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 126* Count Vitali showed'Delcass4”s note to Huguenin in Paris in May, 1901. It is not included in the printed French documents. 143 Delcass4 to Montebello, June 21, 1901, D.D.F., series 2, I, 338. Siemens told Rosen that the idea for Delcass4*s proposal to The Russians had come from him. F.O. note by Rosen, June 4, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 399. 144 A conference was held at Weisbaden on May 22 and 23, 1901, between Siemens and Gwinner for the Germans, end Vitali, Biedermann, and Bardac for the French. Ibid., 399-400. 145 Vitali told Marschall that Russia insisted on condition ”1” because she desired that none of the funds intended for the Bagdad Railway guaranties be used to improve Turkish armaments. Marschall in commenting wrote that the Turks were attempting to hasten the conclusion of the new Russian commercial treaty with the argument that the increase in the income could be used to balance the Ottoman budget, whereas that was precisely what Russia wished to prevent. Marschall to F. 0., July 1, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 401. 146 Ibid., 400; Delcassd to Montebello, June 21, 1901, D.D.F., series 2 ,1, 338-339. 147 F.O. note by Richthofen, July 3, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 402. 148 Delcass4 to Montebello, June 21, 1901, D.b.F., series 2, I, 338. 149 338-339. 150 F.O. note by Rosen, June 4, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 399-400. 151 F.O. note by Richthofen, July 3, ibid., 401-402. 152 Delcass4 to Montebello, July 31, 1901, D.D.F., series 2, I, 412. Witte’s statement, Delcass4 said, was in contradiction to His attitude at the time of the discussions in St. Petersburg. Ibid. 153 Montebello to Delcass4, Aug. 6, 1901, ibid., 420. The Novoe Vremia continued its attack throughout the summer and fall of 1901, charging among other things that the Bagdad line would allow the Germans to dominate all the -way from Hamburg to Koweit, and warned France that a Teutonic wedge would thus be driven between the Slavic and the Latin world. Prinet to Delcass4, Aug. 18, 1901, ibid., 430-431; Montebello to Delcass4, Aug. 26, 1901, ibid., 447-448; Boutiron to Delcass4, Oct. 23, 1901, ibid., 533-534. Sidney B. Fay, Origins of the World War, I, 269, says: ’’The Russian Foreign Office stood in close touch with itovoe Vremia. 154 Montebello to Delcassd, Aug. 26, 1901, s•£•£., series 2, I, 448. 155 Bompard to Delcass4, Mar. 12, 1903, ibid., 111, 180. 156 F.O. note by Mtlhlberg, Aug. 2, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 403. 157 Billow to Pttckler, Oct. 19, 1901, ibid., 158 Billow to PUckler, Nov. 12, 1901, TORT., 409. 159 Helfferich, Siemens, 111, 127. 160 Marschall to BUlow, Feb. 2, 1902, Grosse Politik, XVII, 423. 161 Ibid., 421. Marschall commented that Abdul ftamid, who allowed no public opinion to exist in the empire, and who considered the assembling of more than one person as dangerous to the state, had the temerity to question the kilometric guar antee because he feared the reaction of public opinion. Ibid. The Germans were later subjected to a great deal of criticism because of the system of kilometric guarantees® O’Conor, however, found no fault with the German insistence upon the fixing of a definite amount for earnings and working expenses per kilometre. In 1899 when Rechnitzer was bidding for the concession he wrote London: "The main feature of his fßechnitzer *s} proposal is the absence of any kilometric guarantee, and this brands it as counterfeit, for no one would undertake the work without a solid security of some sort." o’Conor to Sanderson, Nov. 9, 1899, Brit. Docs., 11, 174-175. Again on July 3, 1900, in transmitting a copy of the report of the German technical commission, O’Conor wrote Sandersons *The discouraging accounts which it contains of the state of the country and the small estimate of receipts would hardly tempt the investor, unless accompanied by exceptionally satisfactory arrangements for kilometric guarantees." Ibid®, 175. 162 Bttlow to William 11, Sept. 28, 1901, Grosse Politik, XVII, 407. Zander suspected that the Sultan was more interested just then in a loan than in the railway, and he told Bttlow that the Deutsche Bank was not disposed to make an advance to Turkey before the financial basis of the Bagdad enterprise was established. In a marginal comment concerning the loan, the Kaiser said: "That might be the main point and the Bagdad Railway would pass into the background." Ibid. 163 Marschall to Bttlow, Feb. 2, 1901, ibid., 424. 164 The Times, Oct. 25, 1901, 5. Arthur von Gwinner succeeded Siemens as the head of tKe Deutsche Bank and henceforth is the primary figure in the promotion of the Bagdad Railway. 165 Marschall to Bttlow, Feb. 2, 1902, Grosse Politik, XVII, 424. 166 * 426; Bttlow to William 11, Jan. 2, 1902, ibid., 411. 167 Marschall to Bttlow, Feb. 2, 1902, ibid., 426. 168 Marschall to F. 0., Jan. 17, 1902, Grosse politik, XVII, 411. Marschall was quite surprised at the speed vdth which the Sultan*s irad4 was issued. Ordi' narily a considerable length of time elapsed between the signing of the minister ial ma zb at a and the imperial i rade; eleven years and one day was the record, and Marschall declined to send a telegraphic report of the Sultan*s action until the following day so sure was he that the report of the issuance of the irad4 within a period of one day was not true. Marschall to Btflow, Feb. 2, 1902,‘""ibid., 426. 169 Marschall to F. 0., Jan. 17, 1902, ibid., 413. 170 Ibid. 171 Marschall to F. 0., Feb. 2, 1902, Grosse Politik, XVII, 427. CHAPTER V FAILURE OF THE BAGDAD RAILWAY AS AN INTERNATIONAL PROJECT With the signing of the convention of 1902, the -way was cleared for the financiers and diplomats to carry forward their efforts to transform the Bagdad Railway into an international undertaking* Prospects for friendly action were encouraging at both Downing Street and the Quai d*Orsay. Had the ministers and financiers been free to carry on their negotiations without interference, there is good reason to believe that the great trans-Mesopotamian railway might have been removed from the list of coveted stakes of pre-War diplomacy and what eventually became the ”spectre of the twentieth century" laid low in its infancy. 1. British Cooperation Blocked by the Insensate Clamor of the Press. The fate of the Bagdad Railway as an international enterprise was to be decided by Great Britain. The concessionaires required not only the assistance of her capital but the friendly cooperation of her government. Great Britain’s consent to an increase in the Turkish customs duties to provide the Ottoman treasury funds for the kilometric guarantees, her promise to utilize the railway for conveying the mails to India, and her assistance in securing an eastern terminus on the Persian Gulf—all of these were necessary to facilitate the progress of the undertaking. While British hostility might not necessarily prove fatal, it was certain to render most difficult the problems of the promoters and effectually dash hopes for the internationalization of the line. The position of the British foreign office was outlined in March, 1902, in a discussion between Foreign Secretary Lansdowne and Metternich, the German ambassador# Lansdowne wrote Lascelles at Berlin of his statement concerning the Bagdad Railway in the following words: We did not regard the project with unfriendly eyes; but if it were to be carried into effect with our support and good will, we should expect that a share, at least equal to that given to any other Power, should be given to this country in respect of the capital employed for the construction of the line, of its management when completed, and of its orders for materials. 2 Metternich had observed that the w door was open” for the British, Lansdowne continued, and had asked him for his views regarding an increase in the Turkish tariff duties. To this the foreign secretary said he had replied: ”lt would be for us to consider, when the time came, whether we were justified in such an increase, and that we would depend to a great extent on the adequacy of the share assigned 3 to us in the enterprise♦" Lansdowne was no doubt considerably influenced in favor of British cobpera tion by Ambassador o’Conor who, from Constantinople, urged upon his government an active part in the railway project. To the foreign office he wrote on January 27, 1902: If our object, like Russia’s, was the impoverishment of Turkey, we should be able to show good reason for objecting to an increase in customs duties for the benefit of a foreign railway. My belief is that our commerce will increase with the development of the country, and that the burden of the new duties will fall chiefly on the consumer. lam convinced it is to our interest, politically and commercially, to assist in the development of the country, and there is no more effective means than by constructing railways...l hope the English Syndicate will spare no pains to come in on a footing of equality with the French and Germans. 4 By April, 1902, Lansdowne seems to have become thoroughly convinced that it was vital to British interests that the railway be given an international character. In a foreign office minute of April 21 he wrote: It would, to my mind, be a great misfortune if this railway were to be constructed without British participation.•.lt is clearly for our interest that the enterprise should be given an international character and that we should have our full share in the control of the line as well as of any advantages to be derived from its construction and maintenance...lf the project is to be successfully financed, our consent to (1) increase of customs duties, and possibly also to (2) creation of monopolies is indispensable. (It must, howeve r$ be borne in mind that if France, Germany, Austria, and Italy were all to give their assent to the increased Tariff, we might have some difficulty in holding out...and the fact that we should be able to look only to Russia for support and cooperation would increase the difficulty.) 5 Lansdowne added that he had informally discussed the customs increase with the French and German ambassadors and had informed them that ”our attitude would depend upon our being given a share at least equal to that of any other Power in the enterprise." But if the British were to insist upon having a share, it was necessary that someone be prepared to receive it, and as a result of his inquiries with the London bankers Lansdowne was of the opinion that unless the British government gave ’’practical proof of its material support in one way or another” British financiers were not likely to come forward. Confronted with the possible difficulty of no British group being willing to accept a financial share in the railway, and doubtful of Great Britain’s "ability to veto the project by refusing to accept the new Tariff," the foreign secretary made a rather extraordinary suggestion: In order to secure the international character of the railway we might propose to France and Germany that we should each of us take a certain amount of shares.•.lt would, no doubt, be most unusual for a British Government to invest public money in such a project. On the other hand, the acquisition and retention by the British Government of a certain number of shares seems to be the only mode of securing for this country a permanent share in the control of the railway. 6 This suggestion appears to have gone no farther, but it does indicate the importance which Lansdowne attached to British collaboration. In November, 1902, the question of British participation was discussed, by a conference of representatives of the admiralty, foreign office, India office, and way office. This group decided that M it would be a great mistake to oppose the project, which we ought, on the contrary, to encourage to the best of our power, provided we can acquire a proper share in the control of the railway and 7 of its outlet on the Persian Gulf.” With such an attitude on the part of the British government, a speedy arrangement with the German concessionaires should have been imminent. But unfortunately Lansdowne carefully concealed the actual views of the British from Gwinner and the German government. In what was obviously an effort to give strength to the British position, Lansdowne in January, 1903, told Gwinner that he considered the railway project as damaging to British interests. "Until now Great Britain alone has held the shortest route to India," he continued, "and with the construction of the Bagdad Railway, this will no longer be the case." Lansdowne further warned Gwinner that the united strength of Great Britain and Russia would be sufficient to -prevent the construct 8 ion of the line. Throughout the period of negotiations with the British, Gwinner and the Wilhelmstrasse were in the dark as to the real desire for participation on the part of Lansdowne and the London government. Meanwhile Sir Clinton Dawkins, Morgan’s London associate, and Sir Ernest Cassel had continued their discussions with Gwinner. On February 4, 1903, Lansdowne told Cassel and Dawkins: "We are favorably disposed toward the project, and we should regard it as most undesirable that it should be carried out without our concurrence and without a sufficient participation on the part of this 9 country in the construction, administration, and control of the line." The British bankers told Lansdowne that it was desirable that the government’s goodwill should be indicated in the following ways: ”1. By the grant of a subsidy for the carriage of the mails to India; 2. By facilitating the introduction of the new Turkish Customs Tariff; and 3. By aiding the promoters to obtain a terminus, probably at or near Koweit, in the Persian Gulf." To this the foreign secretary replied that he saw "no reason why proposals of this kind should not 10 be entertained." Before proceeding farther, however, Lansdowne -was responsible for a shift in the official direction of British financial participation. The Deutsche Bank had offered the share assigned to the British to Dawkins and Cassel who, of course, expected to secure the support of other financial houses in the country. Dawkins, however, was tainted by his connection with the Morgan group, which was at the time unpopular on account of having fathered a trans-Atlantic shipping combine; and Cassel, as a former German subject who had been natural- 11 ized, was in a. delicate position. Consequently Cassel had told Lansdowne that if the British government preferred that the leading part be taken by some other 12 group, he and Dawkins would step aside and cooperate with anyone that was named. Thus Lansdowne asked Baring Brothers and Company, headed by Lord Revelstoke, to assume the official management of British participation. The offer was accepted and henceforth served as the official spokesman for the British cap-13 italists with Dawkins and Cassel cob'pe rating. In February, 1903, the Franco-German financiers concluded arrangements for the organization of a new corporation, the Imperial Ottoman Bagdad Railway Company, which was to take over and develop the concession which had been awarded to the Anatolian Railway Company, Gwinner and Sir Hamilton Laing, representatives of the Ottoman Bank, conferred in Berlin on February 5 and agreed on a plan for the distribution of shares and direction of this new company. It was agreed that participation was to be distributed on the basis of twenty-five per cent each to Germany, France, and Great Britain; ten per cent to the Anatolian Railway Company; and fifteen per cent to Austria, Switzerland, and other nations, The board of directors of the company was to comprise thirty members, assigned as follows; eight German; eight French; eight British, one to be nominated by the Ottoman Bank; one Austrian, to be nominated by the Deutsche Bank; two Swiss, one to be nominated by the Deutsche Bank and one by the Ottoman Bank; three to be nominated by the Anatolian 14 Railway Company. This scheme of participation and direction seems to have met with only one serious objection from the British, namely that the Anatolian Railway Company’s line from Haidar Pasha to Konia which had been in operation since 1896 was not to be brought under international control. On March 13, Dawkins wrote Gwinner that the British government was favorable to the project ’’provided always” that the basis of the whole business was an international railway from sea to sea, and that the British financial group was ready to enter the enterprise if the Germans would concede the control and operation of the Anatolian Railway as part 15 of the international line. Gwinner’s answer was given in a letter of March 18 to Revelstoke. If the British participated in the Bagdad Railway, wrote Gwinner, he was ready to use his best efforts to secure the internationalization of the Anatolian Company’s line from Haidar pasha to Konia; but "if and when" this line should be placed on the same basis of international control as the Bagdad Railway, the British government would be expected to lend its support to the following: Ist. To allow Turkey to increase her customs revenue and pledge the increase for the Bagdad Railway guarantees; 2nd. To secure for the Bagdad Railway line as large a share as possible of the India mail and passenger service, as soon as the route shall be established via the Persian Gulf shorter than via Suez; 3rd. To provide at Koweit all terminal facilities required, including an Ottoman custom-house. 16 Lansdowne’s acceptance of Gwinner’s stipulations was indicated in the following formula of assurances which he said the British government would be willing to give to the Bagdad concessionaires: 1. To agree to a reasonable increase of the Turkish Customs Tariff in connection with the pending negotiations for a new Commercial Treaty [with Turkey}, and to offer no opposition to the inclusion of a portion of the increased customs revenue among the guarantees of the Bagdad Railway, 2. Should the new route offer substantial advantages over existing routes for the carriage of mails and passengers to India, to make use of it for the purpose upon terms to be agreed upon between His Majesty’s Government and the Company. 3. To give assistance, not, of course, pecuniary, towards the provision of a terminus with proper facilities at or near Koweit, and to cooperate in procuring convenient customs arrangements. 17 A copy of Lansdowne’s formula was given to Revelstoke to take to Paris where 18 on March 24 he, with Dawkins and Cassel, negotiated with Gwinner. This meeting brought British concurrence very near. Gwinner expressed his willingness to accede to the British desire for the amalgamation of the Anatolian Railway with the main Bagdad project, end also agreed that the three members of the board of directors which had been assigned to the Anatolian Company should be named by the 19 whole board of the Bagdad Company. Following a personal report of the conference from Revel stoke and Cassel, Lansdowne wrote in a foreign office minute: n They explained to me that, in their view, the participation was to take place upon a ’basis of absolute equality between English, French, and German interests,’ and that ’no one group was to be given any superiority or control*. ..France, Germany, and England would have eight members each, and no one Power would, therefore, be able to override the wishes of the other two, which would commend 16 votes out 20 of a total of 30.” The British and German financiers had in fact reached an understanding at Paris. Gwinner took back to Berlin the draft of an engagement for which he was to secure the consent of the German government, and then to send the signed draft to 21 the British group who were to submit it to Lansdowne for approval. But for reasons which are not clear, Gwinner encountered delays in Berlin. Whether the Wilhelmstrasse raised objections to the surrender of German control over the Haidar Pasha-Konia section cannot be satisfactorily answered. But whatever the cause, 22 the delay was fatal. Already rumors of a deal between Downing Street and the Germans had gotten into circulation. The British public was decidedly unfriendly toward any sort of collaboration with Germany. The explanation may be found in a variety of 23 cumulative factors; Germany’s tremendous commercial strides of the nineties; her colonial aspirations in Africa; the Anglophobe attitude of her press during the Boer War; her extension of interests in China in 1897 end 1898, followed by Anglo-German irritations during the Boxer uprising; her navy bills of 1898 and 1900; her interference in the Koweit affair in 1901; and the ill-feeling result-24 ing from the German-Canadian tariff controversy from 1898 to 1903. All of these had engendered in Great Britain an aggravated and unreasoning hostility against everything German. Fuel to the flame was added by Joseph Chamberlain, who in a speech at Edinburgh on January 2, 1902, had replied to the ’’insulting criticisms of the German Press” on the conduct of the British army in South Africa by charging that the measures to which the British had been forced to resort in reducing the resistance of the Boers were less severe than those employed by the German army in 1870. A violent outburst of indignation had followed in the German press, and when the outcry had been "practically endorsed by Count Btflow” before the reichstag, an equally spirited rejoinder had followed from the British 25 ~ . p re s s • British animosity toward Germany was further aggravated by the ill-fated joint intervention in Venezuela in 1902. That Germany was not the initiator but 26 had followed British leadership in the affair, did not save the Germans from 27 reaping most of the odium in both the United States and Great Britain. During this crisis Lansdowne had -written the British ambassador in Washingtons "The violence of anti-German feeling here has been extraordinary, and it has been 28 allowed to go much too far.* Thus it was that the very rumor of British cooperation with the Germans in the Bagdad Railway was certain to provoke protests from the British press. The negotiations had, however, been surrounded with such secrecy that the press was unaware of what was transpiring until a Reuter’s telegram of March 27, 1903, reported General von der Goltz as having stated in a lecture at Kb’nigsberg that the Anatolian Railway had secured the extension of the line to Koweit 29 after diplomatic negotiations with Great Britain.” It was this erroneous statement which gave rise to the first blasts of a bitter campaign in the press and parliament against British participation. Leo Maxse, editor of the National Review, opened the press attack. After loosing a tirade against the Kaiser in the April issue, he added: It has long been one of his Cthe Kaiser 1 s 3 most cherished designs to "’’interest”, i.e, entangle, this country in the Bagdad Railway, so as to extricate himself from the false and dangerous position into which he blundered when, in a moment of impulse, he threw Germany across Russia 1 s path in Asia Minor,. .Downing Street has become a mere annex of the Wilhelmstrasse, and it would have made for economy if we put up the shutters on our costly Foreign Office. We saw, for example, the facility with which,.,this country became involved in the "joint action” against Venezuela, the ultimate object of which, in the mind of our predominant partner, was to realise German territorial ambitions in South America under the convenient aegis of the British navy. No sooner are we clear, if we are clear, of this miserable episode, than we are plunged headlong into the Mesopotamian mess, which is far more serious...and from which a very determined and vociferous expression of public opinion will be required to release us. 30 Moreover, Maxse wrote, there was good reason to believe that there was a secret arrangement between Germany and Russia whereby Russia was to withdraw all opposition to the Bagdad Railway on the understanding that the German share in the scheme would, at some agreed date, be transferred to the Russians; and he added: "Russia would then control the line as she could certainly count on the support of her allies the French... The British would find themselves in a hopeless minority. This would be a great coup for Germany, as it would eventually bring Russia 31 and England to loggerheads.” After advancing this fantastic theory for which there is no shred of evidence, Maxse resorted to a demagogic appeal. "It is late," he wrote, "but it is not too late, for the British nation to protect the British interests against the British government. Public opinion can gain as 32 great a victory in Asia Minor as in Venezuela." The alarmist outcry was continued by St. Loe Strachey in the Spectator of April 4. Accepting Maxse’s theory that the Russians were being ushered into Bagdad and a port on the Persian Gulf, Strachey commented; "All that we are concerned to say for the present is that till the allegations of the National Review are denied, and till we have the assurance of our Government that they do not contemplate taking any action whatever as regards the construction of the of the Baghdad Railway, official or semi-official, the utmost vigilance is required of that portion of the public—we believe it is the vast majority of the nation—which wishes for no further entanglements with Germany, and is determined that Britain shall not be made the lightning-conductor for German animosity 33 toward Russia.” Other London newspapers joined the chorus of protests. Germany had no other 34 aim, wrote the Daily Maj 1, than to embroil Great Britain with Russia. The Daily Chronicle expressed the hope that the rumors of the government’s support for the Bagdad Railway were without foundation, and recommended that the ministry learn 35 to say "no”. And the Morning Post feared that the ministry was preparing to cobp- 36 erate with the Germans in spite of recent disagreeable experiences. That the press attack was effective was revealed on April 7 when Lansdowne told Revelstoke and Cassel that a serious attempt was apparently being made to discredit the enterprise, end to render it impossible for HQs3 Government to associate themselves in any way with it...We felt that until we were better able to judge of the proportions which this hostile movement might assume, it would be desirable that we should avoid giving it any further encouragement. 37 The foreign secretary added, moreover, that the future course of action could probably be decided upon in a few days, since the Bagdad Railway would come be-38 fore the house of commons before its adjournment. As a matter of fact the affair came before parliament that same day. T. Gibson Bowles, rabid opponent of the Bagdad Railway, raised the question of the government’s attitude toward participation. Prime Minister Balfour, in a written answer, informed the house of commons that there had been no formal communication between the government and any foreign government on the subject of the railway. Continuing, Balfour said* The proposed railway is not, as suggested in the Question, to be a German railway. The subject was referred to in two brief conversations, one with the French and one with the German ambassador, about thirteen months ago. Lord Lansdowne then stated that we should not regard the undertaking with unfriendly eyes provided that British capital and British interests were placed at least on terms of equality with those of any other Power... Communications have been and still ere going on with the British capitalists on the subject... 39 The suggestions which the British government had under consideration were, the prime minister said, as follows: (1) That British capital and British control are to be on an absolute equality with the capital and control of any other power; (2) that, in respect to the negotiations which are now going on with the Turkish Government for a new Commercial Treaty (and which, quite apart from the Bagdad Railway, raise the question of increasing the Turkish customs), His Majesty’s Government should not object to a reasonable increase in these duties...(3) that if the railway should prove to be a substantially better route for conveythe mails to India, it may be used for conveying those mails, on terms to be agreed upon hereafter; (4) that His Majesty’s Government should assist, not by money, or the promise of money, but by their good offices in providing a proper terminal at or near Koweit. 40 The following day, April 8, British cooperation as outlined by Balfour was debated on the floor ofcommons• Bowles charged that the line was Undoubtedly a German project” and was destined to ruin the British-owned Smyrna-Aidin rail-41 way; and that since customs duties in Turkey were largely paid by British merchants the contemplated increase would constitute ”an increased charge on Brit-42 ish goods in order to add to the profit of a German railway.” Moreover, Bowles said, the plan to use the new railway for the conveyance of the mails to India would deprive British mail carriers of their contracts for the benefit of the 43 Germans* Lord Edmund Fitzmaurice commented that it was almost impossible to isolate the commercial from the political aspects of the question and what caused the public and the house of commons to take a live interest in the affair "was the feeling that, bound up with the future of this railway, there was probably the future political control of large regions in Asis Minor, Mesopotamia, 44 and the Persian Gulf.” Balfour replied that he believed it would be impossible to block the railway. *1 have no doubt whatever," he said, "that whatever course the English Government may pursue, sooner or later this great undertaking will be carried out... whether the English Government assist or do not assist, it is undoubtedly in the power of the British Government to hamper and impede and inconvenience any project of the kind; but that the project will be ultimately carried out, with 45 or without our having a share in it, there is no question whatever." Continuing, the prime minister said: There are three points which ought not to be lost sight of by the House when trying to make up their minds upon this problem in its incomplete state. They have to consider whether it is or is not desirable that what will be undoubtedly the shortest route to India should be entirely in the hands of French and German capitalists to the exclusion of British capitalists. Another question is whether they do or do not think it desirable, that if there is to be a trade opening in the Persian Gulf, it should be within the territories of e Sheikh whom we have under our special protection, and with whom we have special treaties, or whether it should be in some other part of the Persian Gulf where we have no such preferential advantage. The House must also have in view a third consideration with regard to a railway which goes through a very rich country, and...is rather likely after a certain period of development to add greatly to the riches of Turkey, and indirectly, I suppose, greatly to the riches of any other country which is ready to take advantage of it... 46 The prime minister’s utterance gave rise to a veritable storm of objections from the British press. The Spectator took the lead. "The Baghdad Railway turns out to be a matter even more urgent then we had believed,” wrote its editor, Strachey, who urged that the government be given a ’’clear mandate from public opinion” in order to prevent British participation in a "financially unsound and 47 politically dangerous project.” To Strachey the enterprise was above all else a scheme to embroil Great Britain with Russia. "We stand," he wrote, "on the edge of the Mesopotamian morass. Germany, already half in, tells us that it is not nearly as soft or as deep as it looks.♦.Shall we take the fatal step, perhaps to fall; or shall we refuse, end tell Germany that though it may be worth her while to quarrel with Russia over the Baghdad Railway, it decidedly is not worth ours. The opposition newspapers roundly scored the government’s policy. In an editorial headed *Mess-opotamia?,* the Pall Mall Gazette condemned the "recent unfortunate exhibition of excessive pliability of Downing Street to the exigencies of Germany,* and warned that a sharp watch should be kept on the government since British pride had been "too deeply wounded in the Venezuelan affair to brook 49 any approach to a repetition of that lamentable blunder.” The Daily News viewed Balfour’s pronouncements as "distinctly alarming,” and raised the question: *ls this a time to put yet more money on ’the wrong horse?.Our preposterous flirtation with Germany in the West would become tragic if it led to an alliance with 50 Germany in the East.” Later the Daily News asserted that *nine out of every ten men would, if the question were fairly put to them, contemptuously reject the latest of Lord Lansdowne’s wildcat schemes... The sole reason why the Government has been infatuated by Baghdad is that pressure has been bought to bear upon ministers by certain financial syndicates who wish to float their speculations 51 under the aegis of British prestige.” In the same tone the Daily News charged that British participation was "just a scheme for subsidising German railway enterprise at the cost of the Turkish peasant and the English merchant. We are to do all the paying, and Germany is to take all the profit...ls it not astounding? 5g ...Would not Lord Lansdowne and Lord Cranbome look better in German uniforms?” No less vehement was the Liberal Daily Chronicle, charging that the government, after it had established a reputation for "muddle, mess, and makebelieve,* was about to allow Germany to inveigle Great Britain into a "Mesopota- 53 mian Mess, wherein we are once more to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for her.” The Daily Chronicle was also alarmed at reports that two army corps might be needed to guard the line, and asked: "Who will supply them? The analogy of Russian action in Manchuria suggests the most probable answer. Germany, whose line it is will police it. Is that a British interest, justifying a heavy tax on British 54 trade?" No more favorable was the attitude of the influential Man diester Guardian which said: "...it will be a far more perilous adventure than the Venezuelan ’mess* if the present Government really decides to take an active part in finan- 55 cing the Baghdad Railway..." The radical Daily Mail advised that it would be wise to "-walk warily" in this affair, and added: "Our policy requires to be con- sidered from the cold standpoint of ulterior British interests and the security 56 of India, which is among the first of them." Among most of the Unionist journals, however, Balfour found support. The St. James’s Gazette, in referring to the Bagdad Railway scare provoked by the article in the April issue of the National Review, said: "This story, which has thrown the "Spectator" into a most pitiable state of trepidation, is that Lord Lansdowne has been cajoled by Germany into a pledge to subsidise the railway when finished with a contract to carry the Indian mails, and that Government influence had been exerted to induce British capitalists to invest money in a German wildcat enterprise••.such support to the Baghdad railway as would be afforded by a conditional promise to use it for Indian mails would give Russia no just cause for resentment...and it would therefore be the height of shortsighted policy if we were to decline to take part in the game owing to the groundless suspicion 57 that we should simply be helping Germany to win the tricks." The Daily Telegraph observed: "There is a section of the community...•which appears to be infected with anti-German rabies. Their over-tutored minds see the Kaiser in storms and hear him in the wind...lt is therefore hardly to be expected that they will be satisfied with Mr. Balfour’s assurance that...the Government have not been duped 58 by the Kaiser or cling to the skirts of German financiers." A similar view was taken by the Standard. "Much has been said about the disgrace of hanging on to the skirts of German financiers,” it said editorially, "and we have heard a great deal too many rhetorical phrases that do duty for arguments with excitable people...We cannot adopt the dog-in-the-manger policy of endeavouring to ob- 59 struct the undertakings of other nations, in territory not belonging to ourselves. The Times, politically independent, was not alarmed at the proposed participation. "The association of the French and Germans has,” it said, "already given the enterprise an international character# We welcome this association, which France certainly would not have accorded to Germany, had the scheme seemed to her of a political and not of a commercial nature? and, if we decided to share in the undertaking ourselves, we should rejoice to see Russia herself fol-60 low the example of her ally#" Fuel for the Bagdad controversy was also provided by the appearance in 1902 and 1903 of two books written from contradictory points of view* The French publicist, Andr4 Ch4radame, in his Le chemin de fer de Bagdad expressed skepticism as to the financial soundness of the railway, and charged that it would 61 constitute a menace to both French and British interests# More disturbing to the British was Dr# Paul Rohrbach’s Die Bagdadbahn. In a glowingly enthusiastic description of the enterprise, the German professor pointed to the Fatherland’s opportunity for economic advancement in Turkey# "If Turkey were doomed forever to linger in weakness,* he wrote, ’’then it would be hardly justifiable to risk big German interests and capital in an undertaking like the Bagdad Railway# But the condition is quite different if the Turkish Empire is enabled to strengthen and consolidate itself politically. Only in that case can we venture to risk hundreds of millions in building the railway and other hundreds on the develop- 62 ment of the country.* “it is a matter of course,” he added, "that if the country is opened up through German capital, German industry will know how to secure 63 for itself the preference in supplying necessaries there.” Rohrbach also frankly discussed the ends to which the railway might be used to advance German imperialism, In the event of an Anglo-German war, he wrote, there was only one vulnerable spot at which Great Britain could be attacked—Egypt. "The loss of Egypt,” asserted Rohrbach, "would mean the end of her control of the Suez Canal and of her routes to India.,,But we couldn’t think of attacking Egypt until Turkey possesses a railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until by means of the construction of the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad she was able to resist an attack 64 of Great Britain upon Mesopotamia,* British public opinion was no doubt affected also by H.J. Whigham’s The Persian Problem which appeared in 1903 on the eve of the press campaign. Whigham was not hostile to British cooperation in the Bagdad Railway, but, in emphasizing that Britain was confronted with a crisis in Persia which threatened the "peace of the whole highway from Gibraltar to Shanghai,” he rendered British imperialists 65 more sensitive to a railway which sought a terminus on the Persian Gulf. The British public was further made conscious of the dangers threatening Great Britain’s hegemony along the route to India by a series of twenty articles in The Times on 66 the "Middle Eastern Question* written by its foreign correspondent, Valentine Chirol, Meanwhile the Anatolian Railway Company as concessionaires of the line to Bagdad had, on March 5, 1903, concluded a final convention with the Turkish government. The details of the contract for the construction, maintenance, and operation of the railway, as well as the statutes governing the organization and control of the new Imperial Ottoman Railway Company had been drawn up in final 67 form at the same time. The terms of the convention and statutes were not immediately made public, but the British vice-consul at Constantinople, Waugh, wrote 68 the foreign office on March 9 describing the salient points in the new agreement. This report which was published in The Times of April 11 pointed out that Article 35 of the convention did not provide the holders of the railway loans any voice in the management of the company. It was Waugh’s conclusion that the entire management of the line was thus secured in German hands and was independent of the 69 nationality of the capital which might be raised to build the line. While Waugh correctly reported that the investors would be asked to purchase Turkish bonds which were to be furnished the Bagdad Railwav Company and that these bonds car-70 ried no voice in the direction of the company, it was equally correct, as O’Conor pointed out in an analysis of the convention of 1903, that this in no way affected the fact that the directors were to be drawn equally from the French, Brit* 71 ish, and Germans on a permanent basis. It was Waugh’s report which caused a new barrage from the press, led now by The Times. This report, The Times said editorially on April 14, threw grave doubts on Balfour’s statement of April 8 that British capital and British control were to be " on an absolute equality with the capital and control of any other Power." The Times continued: It was stated in the debate (pf April E 0 that the report referred to a time when the scheme was a- purely German scheme, but that the character of the project had since been altered*..ls it contended that the scheme which was a German scheme on March 9, had become transformed into an international scheme by April 8, when the debate took place? If not, how is the text of Article 35 in the railway cmvention.. .to be reconciled with the theory that the line is not to be a German line and that British "control” is to be at least on equality with that of any other Power? 72 Various influential individuals also joined the attack on British participation by letters to the editor of The Times. T. Gihson Bowles, M.P., on April 14 and April 20 continued his attack by this medium. A not disinterested communicant, H.F.B. Lynch, head of the Euphrates and Tigris Navigation Company, Ltd., whose steamers possessed a practical monopoly of the trade on the Tigris and the Shatt-el-Arab, wrote on April 18 to warn the British people of a possible loss of Mesopotamian trade which contributed to the ’support of thousands of British 74 homes** 1 He did not add, of course, that a railway from Bagdad to the Gulf would drain traffic from the Lynch Brothers* river steamers. Another representative of vested interests. Sir Thomas Sutherland, of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, whose vessels operated in the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean, and which stood to lose the Indian mail if the British participated, wrote The Times that he saw no parallel between the Bagdad Railway and the Suez Canal* and he added? "We can protect our interests in the Persian Gulf without committing ourselves to an international partnership Involving considerable risks and devoid of any prima facie advantage, an association in which not we, but another “ 75 nationality, would be the ruling power.’ To summarize the arguments most frequently advanced against British participation in the railway before the full text of the March 5 convention between the Anatolian Company and the Turkish government was finally made public in London: British capital and British official aid would be used for a German political and economic scheme; Russia opposed the line and British participation would be viewed by her as an unfriendly act; British consent to an increase in the Turkcustoms duties would constitute increased taxation on British goods for the benefit of Germany; the railway was a hazardous investment and the government, by participation, would be guilty of encouraging British investors to put money into a project little likely to pay; the Germans would be able to make over control of the line to the Persian Gulf to Russia; and collaboration with Germany in Mesopotamia would involve Great Britain in risks for which there were no compensatory advantages. The most serious outburst of public opinion did not come until April 22. On that day The Times published the nrincipal points of the convention of March 5 along, with the specifications of the line and the statutes for the new Bagdad Railway Company, a copy of which it had lust received from the newly elected pres-76 ident of the company, Arthur von Gwinner. "It seems almost inconceivable," commented The Times, "that the British government should have entertained suggestions for the promotion of the scheme without having fully informed themselves as to the contents of the convention which determines the constitution of the company and the control to be exercised over the undertaking... The German Anatolian Railway Company♦..invites foreign capitalists to come to its assistance.•.but...it has been verv careful, at every point of the scheme, to ensure that the real con-77 trol of the company and of its property shall be nlaced in German hands." The afternoon of April 22 the Pall Mall Gazette observed? "The only answer which Downing Street can properly give to the German invitation must be an uncompromising 78 negative." The following day the Morning Post wanted to know how Herr Gwinner of the Deutsche Bank had "acquired the faculty of mesmerising statesmen like Lord Lans-79 downe and Mr. Balfour." To the Daily News the text of the convention absolutely ~ 80 confirmed the suspicion that the railway was "to be an entirely German affair.” The Daily Chronicle ridiculed Balfour for stating the scheme was to be in no sense German and added: *How they must have smiled in Berlin when they read the English Prime Minister’s assurance that their darling scheme, and—may we not add?—their closely guarded preserve, would in no sense or sort whatever be a 81 German line." The Daily Mail was only slightly less hostile. "The German concessions,* it said, "offer no adequate compensation to England for earning odium 82 with Russia while Germany quietly pockets the profits of the scheme.” The St. Jernes 1 s Gazette, however, refused to see anything in the convention of March sto become excited about. In an editorial headed "Baghdad and Bag Everything" on-April 22, it commented: The articles of the Convention between the Imperial Ottoman Government and the concessionaires of the Baghdad Railway Company, as received by the "Times” from Herr Gwinner...certainly do not support the curious and alarmist deductions which the journal draws from them. ..We regard the construction of a railway from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf by a company controlled in Germany with no special favour; but the concession is a monument of the German Emperor’s activity, built on the ruins of the influence which we threw away, and we do not precisely see what our locus standi in the matter is... The Emperor William, like Jack Jones, has ’’come into ’is little bit of splosh” in Asia Minor, and it is quite useless to be soreheaded about it. If we believed there were any political entanglements involved, we should be the first to condemn the Government thereof, for we have the most profound distaste for walking hand-in-hand with Germany. But it is childish to be forever carping and nagging, and "panicking”. 83 On April 14, in the midst of the press campaign, Lansdowne prepared a memorandum for the cabinet in which he continued to champion British collaboration in the Bagdad Railway on the basis of the terms which he had discussed with Revelstoke on March 23 and April 7. ”l hope,” wrote the foreign secretary, "the Cabinet will authorise the British group to proceed with the negotiations... That it should be made without British participation would, to my mind, be a national misfortune.” Arguing that British abstention would only retard and not prevent completion of the line, he added? It will be a most important highway to the East. It will shorten the journey to India by about three days. It will open up new regions, some of which will certainly prove rich and productive. It will have a terminus in the Persian Gulf, in which our interests are supreme. I submit that we ought not to let such a line be made over our heads; and we should insist upon having our full share in its control, as well as in any advantage to be derived from its construction. But for the anti-German fever from which this country is suffering, I am convinced that we should be unanimously supported in holding and acting on these views, nor so far as I am able to judge, has the attempt to discredit us for having consented to examine the project with an open mind produced much effect on the public. 84 To the suggestion that Britain follow a policy of neutrality and show her hand on the tariff increase and terminus at Koweit only when the line should near the gulf, Lansdowne answered that the British financial group, then ready to participate would withdraw, and askeds ’’Could we in that event look forward with safety to reconquering hereafter the position which we are at this moment free to assume in regard to this line? I doubt it.” Thus Lansdowne recommended to the cabinet 85 that the proper solution was an international free port at Koweit. The foreign secretary also told the Russian ambassador the same day that he believed that France, Germany, and Great Britain were to be ’’offered an absolute equal participation; end each of the three groups was to have the seme number of Directors;” and this arrangement ’’would obviously put it out of the power of any one group to 86 dominate the rest. 1 * But Lansdowne was not able to carry the cabinet with him in the face of the rising tide of opposition; and the storm of indignation which arose from the press swept the government before it. On April 23 Balfour announced to the house of commons a complete reversal of the stand which he had taken on April 7. pressed by Bowles for a statement concerning the new Bagdad convention, the prime minister said; A copy of the convention between the Turkish Government and the Anatolian Railway Company...is in our possession. This convention, a summary of which was published in The Times of yesterday, (kpril 2^J, leaves the whole scheme of railway development through Asia Minor to the Persian Gulf entirely in the hands of a company under German control. To such a convention we have never been asked to assent, and we could not in any case be a party to it. The alternative arrangements which have lately been under our consideration were, on the contrary, designed to place the railway, including the existing Anatolian Railway, throughout its whole length from sea to sea, under international control, and to prevent the possibility of preferential treatment for the goods or subjects of any one country. In these arrangements it was suggested, inter alia, that equal powers of control, ccnstruction, and management should be given to German, French, and English interests. After careful consideration of these proposals, His Majesty’s Government have come to the conclusion that they do not give this country sufficient security for the application of the principles above referred to; and they have therefore intimated that they are unable to give the suggested assurances with regard to the policy which they might hereafter adopt as to the conveyance of the Indian mails by the projected route, as to facilities at Koweyt, or as to the appropriations of a part of the Turkish customs revenue in aid of the contemplated guarantee. 87 Whatever the full explanation of this volte-face by the government, it appears quite certain that political exigencies produced by the press attacks were the 88 , L primary cause. In contradiction to Balfour 1 s statement toAcommons there is no evidence that the arrangements under discussion between the British and Germans underwent any change between his declarations of support on April 7 and of opposition on April 23* On the contrary there is good cause to believe that the terms not only were not altered but were substantially all that Lansdowne and the British financiers had requested* While it cannot be definitely established that Balfour knew of the details of the Bagdad convention of March 5 at the time 89 of his first speech toAcommons on April 7, it seems most probable that he did* Vice-consul Waugh’s report of March 9 contained an accurate account of the principal points of the convention, and it was received at the London foreign office 90 on March 16* Moreover, statements by those best informed concerning the negotiations—Lansdowne, O’Conor, Gwinner, and Dawkins—leave no room to doubt that the British were fully aware of the nature of the arrangements and that the convention of March 5 not only was in no sense a surprise but that it even met with Downing Street’s approval. Lansdowne’s reaction to Balfour’s statement of April 23 was given on the following day in a letter to Curzon in which he wrote: We have had a sharp recrudescence of the anti-German fever over the Bagdad Railway question. The result has been that the scheme has been discredited...l believe, however, that we had the game very much in our own hands and that we might have done a great stroke by getting rid of the existing Anatolian Railway as a German enterprise, and substituting for it an international line from sea to sea upon conditions which would have permanently secured for it and for its terminus on the Persian Gulf an international character*..Whether we shall ever again have as good a chance of insisting upon our own terms, I do not know* 91 Certainly there is no indication here that the new convention was made known to the foreign office unexpectedly in mid-April and that it destroyed the basis of the arrangements under consideration. Lord Newton writes that in later years Lansdowne stated privately that he had been forced to yield to an ”insensate 92 outcry*, and that Joseph Chamberlain had opposed the project. O’Conor, who was in a better position than any Briton to understand the railway arrangements, wired London on April 24 deploring the action of the 93 British government. And on April 28 he analyzed the convention of March 5 and defended it against a variety of distorted criticisms. ”lt was to be regretted,” o’Conor wrote, "that misapprehensions have been caused by incomplete or incorrect publication of the documents in the case.” Pointing out that Article 5 provided that the Anatolian Railway Company should transfer to the new Bagdad Railway Company the concession which had been granted by the Ottoman government ”with all the rights and privileges attached thereto or resulting therefrom,” the ambassador stated that the control of this new company would be vested in a board of directors of thirty members to which the British, 94 French, and German financiers would each name eight. O’Conor continued: This distribution was intended to hold good, independently of any transfer of the shares; and, as 75 per cent, of the share capital would be in the first instance in the hands of the three groups, they have the power of securing the acceptance of the nominations by the general meeting of the shareholders, which under the statutes has the right of appointing the directors... The fact that the money for the construction of the line is to be raised by an issue of Government bonds, and that the holders of these bonds will not have any voice in the management of the Company, does not in any way affect its international character, as is alleged in Mr. Waugh’s commercial report of March 16th, a copy of which owing to my absence in England I unfortunately did not see. 95 o*Conor thus contended that any two of the national groups ’’could command an absolute majority on the Board and that the company would really be international in the sense that it would be impossible to direct its policy and working to the 96 benefit of any single country at the expense of the others.” It was the ambassador’s opinion that the anti-German feeling had ”to a large extent influenced the attitude of the press end public opinion’' which had in turn produced the 97 ill-advised refusal of the British to participate. Dawkins 1 testimony supports that of Lansdowne and o*Conor. Immediately after learning of Balfour’s refusal, he wrote Gwinner to express his regrets. "After all that you have done to meet the various points raised,” wrote Dawkins, ”you will naturally feel very disappointed and legitimately aggrieved.•. Your grievance lies not against the British group but against the British Foreign Office. The fact is that the business has become involved in politics here and has been sacrificed to the very violent and bitter feeling exhibited against Germany by the majority of our newspapers and shared by a large number of people. The attack proceeded from a magazine and a newspaper (the National Review and the SpectatoiQ.».Who instigated these papers, from, whence they derived their information is a matter upon which I cannot speak with certainty. My own impression is that the instigation proceeded from the Russian embassy in Paris.* Lansdowne, he added, "endeavoured sincerely and earnestly to make his views prevail,** but London had gone into a frenzy "which it would have been impossible to counter-98 act or influence.” Dawkins’ letter was sent to the Wilhelmstrasse by Gwinner, and Bb’low commented that the British rejection was most singular since not only the influential British financiers but also the British government was convinced 99 of the advantages of participation. Gwinner gave his version of the causes for the failure in a conversation with o*Conor in Constantinople in December, 1903, He is reported to have said "that he attributed the breakdown entirely to the sudden ebullition of public opinion” which was contributed to by the anti-German feeling prevalent in Great Britain, It was his belief, however, that "if the question had been fully explained to the British public, and they had been made aware of the conditions 100 offered by the Deutsche Bank, their views would have been considerably altered,’ 1 Gwinner suggested that it was the British financial group which gave way first, o’Conor reported him as having said; "The members of the British syndicate did not Msh to expose themselves to the ill-feeling consequent upon proceeding with the negotiations, which were viewed so unfavourably both in political circles 101 and in the city.” Lansdowne corroborated Gwinner’s statement in a foreign, office minute: *lt is to be observed that he [GwinnerJ admits frankly that the insensate outcry which arose against the scheme had the effect of choking off the British Government, If it had not been for the ’scuttle* of the financiers, 102 I should have been in favour of sticking to our position.” Gwinner also is reported to have told O’Conor that ”he had practically accepted the terms and conditions laid down in Sir E. Cassel’s letter, and had agreed to amalgamate the Anatolian section with the Bagdad Railway.” This he said had been done with the consent of the German government. So far as Koweit was concerned, Gwinner said that the German promoters did not in the least care •whether it was a British protectorate; they were merely interested in avoiding customs inspections of passengers and goods at the Koweit port and at the Koweit border. To a suggestion by 0* Conor that an Anglo-German understanding might be facilitated by the Deutsche Bank consenting to give the construction of the Persian Gulf end to the British, Gwinner replied that ”for his part he would have been quite willing to agree to this, but if he did so he could not have been expected to give up the Anatolian section while leaving the Persian Gulf end to England. Apart from this, there was a political side to the question, and he was unable to say with certitude whether his Government would have been willing to agree to an arrangement which would have been viewed with great 103 displeasure by Russia. With this position Lansdowne found no complaint, commenting: “As Dr. Gwinner points out, we could not have expected to attain the ’internationalization* of the Anatolian Railway, if we had insisted upon 104 such a condition.” What then was the explanation of the British government’s change in attitude, since it is apparent that Balfour’s statement to the house of commons was neither frank nor complete? Certain facts seem clear. The opposition contributed an unreasoning nucleus for the outcry against participation. Perhaps of greater influence was the prevalent anti-German attitude of the British people which had been increasing in intensity for several years. To this was added the jealousy of the British imperialists who, having aggrandized themselves at the expense of weaker or more backward peoples, viewed with jealous alarm a railway which might promote German imperialism in Mesopotamia and prove a source of danger 105 to the route to India. The shipping interests alarmed at the possible loss of traffic and mail subsidies, the Lynch Brothers’ navigation company, and other British vested interests contributed to the volume of protest against partici-106 pation, but there is no cause to believe that their influence was decisive. Nor is there reason to believe that British commercial groups who felt that their interests would be damaged by preferential treatment for German goods by the Bagdad Railway had material influence on the government’s decision. While several points are obscure, it seems obvious that the hostile attitude of the press was the primary cause for the British negative. The position of the Unionist cabinet was weak, and the press criticisms caused apprehensions. The cabinet, moreover, was divided, with Chamberlain and possibly others opposing the line championed by the foreign secretary. Then when the British, financiers either "scuttled”, or at least indicated a reluctance to proceed, the government gave way with Balfour covering the retreat as adroitly as the circumstances permitted. Yet there is no absolute certainty that the terms which the Germans offered were entirely satisfactory to the British government. That Lansdowne believed the terms provided genuine internationalization can scarcely be questioned; nor is there any good cause to doubt the sincerity of Gwinner and his associates in their offer to share the Bagdad concession with the British and French on a basis of absolute equality. But the aims of the Deutsche Bank and the German i government were not identical, and there is no evidence to show that the Kaiser, Btflow, Marschall, or any other influential German official was at any time willing to surrender the Bagdad concession to an international group. A study of the diplomatic correspondence, moreover, leaves one with the distinct impression that the Berlin government would never have consented to any arrangement which would have destroyed the German preponderance in the control of the Bagdad Railway. There is at least a possibility that the negotiations with the British were disrupted because of difficulties interposed by the German government in the merging of the Anatolian Company’s line from Haidar Pasha to Konia with the main Bagdad project* The evidence is contradictory. In December, 1903, Gwinner asserted that the German government had given its consent to the amalgamation 107 of the two lines, but in July, 1905, the British Committee on Imperial Defense stated in a memorandum: "it is clear from the former negotiations that the German Government is strongly averse from the internationalisation of the Ana-108 tolian Railway." Against this single statement there is also the fact that both the British and the German documents ere silent on any effort of the Berlin government to block the inclusion of the Haidar Pasha-Konia section in an internationally controlled line. Nor was there anything in the scheme under discussion with the British which, on the surface, would have prevented real internationalization or even Anglo-French control. But of the fact that the British withdrawal destroyed the Bagdad Railway as an international undertaking, there can be no question. 2. Russia Opposes and France Refuses participation. The French, in the meantime, were confronted with a difficult choice. Foreign Minister Delcass4 desired to safeguard France’s special position in Asia Minor, but he could scarcely do so at the expense of alienating the republic’s sole ally, Russia. Consequently Delcass£ favored participation in the Bagdad Railway only on condition that the French have an "absolute equality" with the Germans, and that the Russians be allowed participation on a basis which would 109 assure majority control to the French and Russian elements. From this position the foreign minister did not deviate until after the Russians had definitely rejected his proposals for participation. Failure to secure Russian consent to cooperate in the Bagdad project in 1901 had not deterred Delcass4. On January 1, 1902, he instructed Montebello to re-110 open the Bagdad question with Lamsdorff and Witte. The ambassador replied that France need have no illusions about Russia’s attitude, for Witte’s official organ, the Messager des Finances had, on January 6, published an inspired article in which the entire Bagdad undertaking was strongly condemned as detrimental to Russia’s economic and political interests. Under such circumstances Montebello recommended that the question not be broached to the Russian ministers at that 111 time. The announcement of the Anatolian Company’s concession of January, 1902, had also brought the Bagdad question before the French Parliament. Firmin Faur4, deputy from Paris, offered a resolution on March 24, 1902, providing that ’’the issue of debentures, stocks, or bonds designed to permit the construction of the Bagdad Railway should not be authorized upon French territory except by a vote ’ll2 of the Chambers.” The deputy also condemned the railway as a German scheme which offered no political or financial advantage to France. The project, Faur4 charged, was anti-Russian, and it would be far better for French money to be in-113 vested in the Russian trans-Siberian railway than in the line to Bagdad. In reply, Delcass4 denied that French diplomacy had lent its assistance to the Germans in securing the concession, but he argued that since it had been awarded to the Germans, the French could not afford to reject participation in the construction and direction of the line which had been offered them by the concessionaires on a basis of absolute equality. The minister’s position was upheld by a vote 114 of 398 to 72. The conclusion of the agreement of 1902 had, however, put the Russians in an ill-humor* Constans was quoted as saving that the Russians on numerous occasions 115 had attempted to put pressure upon the French government to block the undertaking. Delcass4 had resisted the Russian efforts, as he was convinced that the safest course was to sterilize the Bagdad enterprise by joining with the Germans provided always that his conditions were met. Thus he continued his efforts to quiet the fears of Russia. While the Ottoman Bank and Deutsche Bank were formulating plans in the spring of 1902 for the organization of a new company to take over and develop the Bagdad concession, he sent word to Witte and Lamsdorff that an Ottoman company was to be formed in which ’’French and Germans would be on the basis of complete eaualitv,” and that Russian participation was to be permitted 116 without in any way affecting the relative position of the French and Germans. But obviously the Germans were not going to surrender to Franco-Russian control a project which had been conceived and nurtured by German finance and German diplomacy. It is difficult to understand how Delcass£ could have seriously believed that the Germans would accept such a proposal, even though he considered the railway impossible without the support of French capital. As the Ottoman Bank and Deutsche Bank neared an agreement in regard to the division of financial participation and the control of the new Bagdad company late in 1902, Delcasse attempted to force the acceptance of his terms. He wired Constans to warn the director of the Ottoman Bank at Constantinople that any project of unification of the Ottoman Debt would not have French consent so long as an absolute equality of the Bagdad group had not been established f ’in terms not capable of leaving any doubt in everything which concerns the name, the composition, and the operation of the company as well as in the construction and 117 development of the line.” Despite Delcasse’s warning the German and French bankers signed a tentative con' tract in Berlin on February 5, 1903, whereby participation was divided on a basis of twenty-five per cent each to the German, French, and British groups; fifteen per cent to Austrians, Swiss, and others; and ten per cent to the Anatolian Company. Concerning Russian participation, the contract said merely that in case it should ne necessary to grant a share to groups of another nation, this participation would be provided by thirds from the three major groups, or if the British did 118 not enter, by halves from the Deutsche Bank and Ottoman Bank shares. The special position given to the Anatolian Railway Company drew fire from Delcass4. To Bompard, the new ambassador in St. Petersburg, he wrote: Sin ce the authors of this project have strayed from the conditions to which I have made our agreement dependent, namely absolute equality between French and Germans, and the right for the Russians to take an important participation on a basis which would assure the majority to French and Russian elements, I have responded orally...that I do not accept the project, but that we shall oppose it by all the means which we command. 119 The representatives of the French group were disturbed by his threat, continued Delcassd, and promised to attempt to induce Gwinner to modify the scheme which had been accepted contingent upon the approval of the French government. The foreign minister therefore instructed Bompard to inform Lamsdorff that the French feared that the construction of the Bagdad Railway was inevitable, and that if the project were not realized through the cooperation of French, Russian, and German capital, it would be executed by either the Germans alone or by an Anglo- German group. Delcassd therefore urged that the French and Russians enter the 120 affair and asked for Lamsdorff’s decision at once. It was not until March 9, however, that Bompard wired that the Russian min-121 istry had decided against participation. Then on March 12 he wrote that Witte was unalterably opposed to the Bagdad project, and had told him that the scheme was injurious to Russian interests and favorable solely to Germany. Witte also said that he would be more tempted to furnish capital to prevent the construction of the railway than to facilitate it, since a line from the Bosporus to the Persian Gulf ran counter to his plan to construct a line across Persia to the Gulf. Lamsdorff, wrote .Bompard, was not in agreement with Witte, but was not disposed to oppose either the minister of finance or public opinion as represented by the 122 Pan-Slavs. On April 25 Bompard wrote Delcass4s *The attitude of the imperial government has not varied; the minister of war deplores the project, the min- ister of finance fights it, and the minister of foreign affairs abstains from 123 it.* Thus with Russia’s definite negative to Delcassi’s overtures and Balfour’s retreat of April 23, only the French remained as possible collaborators with the Germans. While there may have been some question as to Germany’s willingness to grant full equality to British and French participants in an international undertaking, there was certainly no intention on the part of Germany to share the Bagdad concession with the French on the basis of Delcass4*s "absolute equality", The Germans had desired the support of British capital to be sure, but of greater concern had been the good offices of the British government. They had also wanted British participation in order to allay British opposition and to secure support against Russian hostility. The French, however, held no trump such as the Koweit terminus, and with Russian opposition certain, France could offer only financial assistance; and the Germans knew that French capital was available regardless of the position of the Paris government. Consequently after the British refused participation, the prospect of internationalization vanished. All that really remained in doubt was whether the fagade of the enterprise would have a slight French tinge. Yet the French persisted in their efforts to share the project equally with the Germans. Shortly after the British withdrawal, Constans told Wangenheim in Constantinople that unless further outward sign of French equality were -provided neither Delcassd nor the French parliament would sanction participation of French capital, since already Berlin had been named as the seat of the new Bagdad Railway Company and its presidency had been reserved by the Germans. A concession to French amour-propre, Constans suggested, such as allowing M. Vernes, the French vice-president of the company, the title of president in Paris might do much to allay criticism. With exceeding frankness Wangenheim wrote Berlin that Germany should not submit to Constans’ request. The internal structure must be German, he wrote, but some concession might be made to the French upon secondary 124 questions. The details for the participation of French capital reached tentative form on June 13 as a result of negotiations between Gwinner and Auboyneau, represent-125 ative of the Ottoman Bank. The arrangement provided for thirty per cent financial participation each for the Ottoman Bank and the Deutsche Bank; ten per cent for the Anatolian Railway Company; ten per cent for Swiss bankers; and ten per 126 cent reserved for the Turkish government. Such an arrangement was not acceptable to the French government. Constans wrote Delcass4 that French and German equality was illusory, for actually the Germans reserved sixty per cent to sev-127 enty per cent for themselves and left only thirty per cent to the French. He believed, however, that more equitable terms could be secured. Unification of the Ottoman debt, Constans argued, was the sole means by which the Turkish government could raise funds for the kilometric guarantees called for in the concession and without which the promoters would never construct the railway. Thus he continued? Without unification the Bagdad project, if not impossible, would be at the very least delayed to an indefinite date—so distant that it can be considered as impossible of realization... The Germans could construct the line to Eregli. They could reach perhaps up to the difficult Taurus passages; but there they would be checked due to the great expense. 128 Constans also warned Delcass4 that the Germans confidently expected the French financiers to make loans to the Turkish government from which the kilometric guarantees would be provided. He believed consequently that if the French financiers could be induced to make no concessions, and if unification of the Ottoman debt were blocked, the French government could demand and secure real 129 equality. Delcass4*s position was given in a letter of July 13 to the minister of finance, Rouvier, He said that no real equality had been granted to the French participants; for not only had the Germans reserved the presidency but they also dominated the administration of the company. Furthermore he understood that the Germans had refused to transfer to the Bagdad Railway Company the concessions for branch lines to the Eastern Mediterranean which would extend out 130 from the main line to Bagdad, "There can be no doubt then," added Delcass4, "that as long as the French group is not placed on a footing of absolute equality with the Germans, we must refuse our assent to its entry into the projected consortium," Therefore he recommended to the minister of finance that the question of the unification of the Ottoman Debt and that of the Bagdad Railway be connected, and that French sanction for both be withheld until the Ottoman Bank submitted to the French government a complete list of all its engagements with the Germans and until the Sultan gave France complete satisfaction with regard 131 to discriminations against French interests in Turkey, The foreign minister also asked Rouvier for his views concerning Constans’ suggestion that the bonds 132 resulting from the debt unification be refused quotation on the Paris Bourse, Rouvier replied to oelcass4 on July 20. He expressed surprise that the foreign office “wag in the dark about the engagements between the French and German financiers, since Constans had been au courant des pourparlers, Nor did the minister of finance agree with the objections raised by Constans* "The worst of solutions," he wrote, "would be that which would exclude us completely 133 from the direction of this great enterprise. As for refusing quotation of the unified debt bonds on the Bourse, Rouvier contended that it would cause great 134 losses to French citizens who possessed the greater portion of the Ottoman bonds. Then on July 23 Rouvier wrote Delcass4 that after further communications with the Ottoman Bank he was convinced that there should be no connection between the unification of the Ottoman debt and the Bagdad Railway. He further pointed out that the Bagdad concession was indisputably a German one, and that the expense of constructing the first section of 200 kilometres, which the concessionaires were preparing to start, did not exceed the financial possibilities of the German financial market. Thus he insisted; You ought to recognize that the program of July 13 in reality attributed to the French elements all the influence which we could hope for and which it was possible to obtain...l call your attention to the grave consequences which may result for our capital, our industries, even for the prestige of France, from a rupture of the negotiations engaged in with the German group, and I repeat that the worst of solutions would be the one which would leave to the Germans alone the construction and development of the Bagdad Railway. 135 But Delcass4 was unwilling to accept anything short of what he believed to be absolute equality, and on July 28 the question of French policy toward the Bag-136 dad Railway was carried to the council of ministers* The result was support for the foreign minister’s position and an official statement of the conditions under which the French government would sanction the participation of French capital. Four alterations in the arrangements of June 13 were asked: (1) distribution of the capital of the company in the proportion of forty-five per cent to France and forty-five per cent to Germany and ten per cent to others; (2) nomination of a French administrator-delegate if the president were German or vice-versa; (3) equal division between France and Germany of the members of the committee of the company for direction of the construction of the line; (4) a written declaration that there would not be any secret treaties between the French and German groups 137 other than those which had been or would be communicated to the French government. This proposal was communicated to the German embassy at Constantinople by Auboyneau of the Ottoman Bank on August 3. Wangenheim told Auboyneau frankly that he did not believe that the Germans -would even discuss the proposal to include the Anatolian Railway’s share with the German forty-five per cent for it was an Ottoman company on whose administrative council both Greeks and French had 138 seats. But on October 1 modifications of the terms of June 13 were offered to the French in a conference at Brussels* The German proposal included a ten per cent participation for the French-owned Cassaba Railway Company to equalize the share of the Anatolian Railway Company; the nomination of a French secretary to be added to the committee of directors which was to be composed of three French and three German members with the administrator-delegate to be German; and guarantees for the protection of French influence in the Syrian railways* These conditions were submitted to the Ottoman Bank with the warning that they constituted the extreme limit to which the Germans would go, and that unless the French group signified its acceptance by October 12 the Germans would proceed with the arrangements to construct the first 200 kilometre section of the railway to Eregli 139 without French assistance. Without waiting for the opinion of the Paris government, the Ottoman Bank definitely accepted the Brussels offer as the basis for 140 its participation. Rouvier and Constans both approved of the new program, but Delcassd denied that it afforded the absolute equality which had been demanded by the ministry on July 28. The foreign minister therefore presented the question to the counbil of ministers a second time on October 23 and urged that sanction for the participation of French capital be denied. The decision was that the complete equality with any foreign element which,the French government had always claimed, was not provided by the Brussels agreement since both the president and adminis-143 trator-delegate were German? and Delcass4 thus notified Rouvier: ...the council of ministers has been of the opinion that the government could neither advise its nationals to enter this affair nor favor them in any way, if they were participating without having obtained from their foreign co-partners the equality of treatment that we judge necessary. 144 In writing Constans of the ministry l s action, cited only the fact that the Germans had claimed both the president and the administrator-delegate 145 as cause for his opposition. And therein lay the difficulty, for the Germans had no intention of permitting the control of the Bagdad Company to pass from their hands. Marschall, back in Constantinople after several weeks in Germany, clearly stated the German position in a conversation with the Sultan. French capital had been admitted to participation, he said, only on the condition that 146 the direction of the whole enterprise should remain in the hands of the Germans. He also assured Abdul Hamid that the Germans would not deviate from the principle of German preponderance? not only would they keep the majority of stock in their 147 hands but they would also control the organization itself. The Sultan in the meantime had signed an ired 4 on September 10 providing for 148 the unification of the Ottoman debt. These unified bonds were denied quotation on the Paris Bourse, but the Ottoman Bank, without governmental sanction, con- tinued to participate in the Bagdad Railway under the terms of the Brussels 149 agreement. Thus the efforts to secure international cooperation were frustrated, and for the next ten years the question of the Bagdad Railway was to engender illfeeling in Europe. As Lowes Dickinson writes, ’’The Bagdad Railway. . .became a 150 new and acute centre of inf lamination in the chronic fever of the world.” The undertaking, moreover, lost whatever economic character it had originally possessed and became one of the various sources of friction from which were generated the national suspicions and jealousies culminating in the Great War. Yet in all justice the Germans can scarcely be condemned for desiring an imperialistic stake in an era when economic needs and nationalistic ambitions led all the major powers to pursue similar ends. The repeated assertions by the Germans that they had only economic aims in the Ottoman Empire were obviously untrue, if nor no other reason than that a large financial investment in a relatively backward country inevitably carries a degree of political influence. But German imperialism in Turkey was not of the orthodox variety. Great Britain in Egypt and South Africa, France in North Africa, and Russia in the Far East combined active political control with economic exploitation. The Germans, for practical rather than altruistic reasons, desired to bolster the authority of the Sultan with the expectation of profiting from the economic development of his rich empire. The best evidence of the services rendered Turkey by the Germans is revealed by the failure of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 to interrupt the cordial relations between Berlin and Constantinople. In the period after 1903 the Bagdad Railway became more than ever the most important driving force in Germany’s economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire. German diplomacy came to revolve about the ’’Bagdad policy”, and the story of the railway is closely interwoven with practically every important maneuver of the Wilhelmstrasse. The eve of the World War saw the Germans on the verge of removing the last diplomatic obstacle to the completion of the line. In November, 1910, Sazonoff, acting for Russia, and Kiderlen-W’dchter for Germany reached an agreement at Potsdam which cleared the way for the signing of a treaty on August 19, 1911, 151 •whereby Russia ceased her opposition to the railway. Following long discussions 152 with the French financiers, the Ottoman Bank and the Deutsche Bank on February 15, 153 154 1914, reached a new arrangement which was approved by the Paris and Berlin foreign offices through an exchange of notes. Negotiations with the British resulted in 155 a tentative agreement between Grey and Lichnowsky on June 15, 1914. The terms were acceptable to both governments, and on July 27, the Kaiser gave the German 156 ambassador full authority to sign the treaty for Germany. But the agreement never became effective for it was forgotten in the frenzied days preceding the collapse of European peace in August, 1914. 1 Morris Jastrow, The War and the Bagdad Rail-way, 9* 2 Lansdowne to Lascelles, March 18, 1902, Brit. Docs., 11, 177-178. 3 Ibid., 178. The German summary of the Lansdowne-Metternich conversation is given in Metternich’s dispatch to Bttlow of March 18, 1902, Grosse Politik, XVII 431. ~ 4 O’Conor to F. 0., Jan. 27, 1902, Brit. Docs., 11, 176. 5 F.O. minute by Lansdowne, Apr. 21, 1902, Brit. Docs., 11, 178-179. 6 Ibid., 179. In contrast to this British view, Gwinner, the new managing director of the Deutsche Bsnk, told the Wilhelmstrasse in September, 1902, that an equal share must be granted to the British because it was impossible to construct the railway without their participation or against their will. F.O. note by Rosen, Sept. 11, 1902, Grosse Politik, XVII, 431. 7 FiO. note by Lansdowne, April 14, 1903, Brit. Docs., 11, 188. 8 F.O. note by Rosen, Jan* 31, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 432. 9 Lansdowne to Cassel, Feb. 4, 1903, Brit. Docs., 11, 179. 10 Ibid. 11 o’Conor to Lansdowne, Dec, 15, 1903, Brit. Docs., 11, 196. 12 Sanderson to Baring Brothers and Company, Feb, 24, 1903, ibid., 181. 13 Ibid., 181-182. 14 F.O. note by Sanderson, Feb. 23, 1903, Brit. Docs., 11, 180; Revelstoke to Lansdowne, April 21, 1903, ibid., 190-191; Delcass4 to Bompard, Feb. 11, 1903, D.D.F., series 2, 111, 102. "“15 Dawkins to Gwinner, Mar. 13, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 435. In a communication to Lansdowne on April 21, 1903, Revelstoke wrote; "The British group made it a condition that the Anatolian Railway should not remain under German control, but should be brought under the same control as that which was adopted in the case of the Bagdad Railway, so that the whole line from sea to sea would be under international management.” Brit. Docs., 11, 190. 16 Gwinner to Revel stoke. Mar. 18, 1903, Brit. Docs., 11, 184. Gwinner, writing in December, 1903, asserted that with the consent of the German government he had agreed to the amalgamation of the Anatolian Railway section with the Bagdad as asked by the British. O’Conor to Lansdowne, Dec. 15, 1903, ibid., 196. There is no evidence in the German documents to indicate that the Berlin government at any time approved of this action. 17 F.O. memo given to Revelstoke, March 23, 1903, Brit, Docs, 11, 185. 18 F.O. memo by Lansdowne, Apr. 7, 1903, ibid., 19 Ibid,, 186. 20 TOlcT. 21 Dawkins to Gwinner, Apr. 23, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 442-443,, 22 Dawkins was of the opinion that if Gwinner had forwarded the signed draft agreement from Berlin immediately after the Paris conference, Lansdowne would have been able to secure the Government’s acceptance before public opinion had had time to interfere. Dawkins to Gwinner, April 23, 1303, Grosse Politik, XVII, 443. 23 Hoffman, op. cit., 224-229, 279-282, discusses the national alarm in Britain over the "rise of Germany as a commercial rival. 24 F.O. memo, by J.A.C. Tilley, Jan. 5, 1905, Brit. Docs., I, 322-337, gives an excellent summary of Anglo-German relations between the years 1892-1904. A commercial treaty of 1865 between Great Britain and the German Zollverein gave German goods equal treatment with British goods in the British colonies. In 1897 the Dominion of Canada enacted a customs tariff which offered preferential tariffs to any country fulfilling certain conditions of reciprocity, and as Great Britain had already met these conditions British goods were given the advantage of reduced customs duties. When the German government raised the question of German rights under the treaty of 1865, the British government, at the request of Canada, exercised its right to denounce the treaty by giving a year’s notice. Then in 1898 a new Canadian tariff act confined preferential treatment to Great Britain and certain British colonies, with the ordinary Canadian tariffs being applied uniformly against all foreign countries. The German bundesratAin June, 1898, approved a proposal to extend most-favored-nation treatment to Great Britain and her colonies and possessions with Canada alone excepted. The controversy aroused considerable ill-feeling, and in April, 1903, the German government intimated that should the other British colonies follow the lead of Canada, Germany might refuse to accord mo st-favored-nation treatment to Great Britain. Ibid., 336. 25 334. 26 H,C« Hill, Roosevelt and the Caribbean, 129-130, points out that "the acceptance of British leadership appears throughout the private correspondence of the German authorities as well as in their official dispatches,” Brit. Docs,, 11, 153-156, likewise indicate that the lead was taken by the ' ” 27 Herbert to Lansdowne, Dec, 29, 1902, ibid., 164, 28 Newton, op. cit., 258. The Times, March 28, 1903, 7, 30 National Review, April, 1903, 166-167. 31 1bid.,168-169. 32 TbvT., 171. 33 Spectator, April 4, 1903, 521. 34 ESS April 4, 1903, 4. 35 Daily Chronicle, April 4, 1903, 6. 36 Morning* Post, April 4, 1903 , 4. Metternich wrote Billow on April 4 giving a summary of the unfavorable comments of the British press. Grosse Politik, XVII, 436-437. 37 P.O. memo by Lansdowne, April 7, 1903. Brit. Docs., 11, 185. ”My own view,” said Lansdowne, ’’was that the attack was founded upon misapprehension, and I strongly deprecated any modification of the attitude which had hitherto been assumed.” Ibid., 186. 38 iW, 185. 39 parliamentary Debates, Commons, 4th series, CXX, 1247-1248. 40 Ibid., 1248. 41 TOT., 1360-1361. 42 TOT., 1363. 43 Tbid., 1364. 44 TOT., 1366-1367. 45 parliamentary Debates, Commons, 4th series, CXX, 1371-1372. 46 — 47 Spectator, April 11, 1903, 560-561. 48 Ibid., April 18, 1903, 596. 49 Pall Mall Gazette, April 9, 1903, 1. 50 t)aiiy ftews, April 9, 1903, 6. 51 TblcCfTpHl 14, 1903, 4. 52 TH?., April 21, 1903, 6* 53 Dally Chronicle, April 15, 1903, 4. 54 Daily Chronicle, April 21, 1903, 6* 55 Manehesher Guardian, April 9, 1903, 4. 56 Daily MelT, April ~9, 1903. 57 St. Jameses Gazette, April 9, 1903, 3. 58 Thdly Telegraph, April 9, 1903. 59 Standard, April 13, 1903, 4. The Glasgow Herald and the Edinburgh Scots* man both indorsed the position of the government in their issues of April 9, 1903* Also both the National Zeitung and Vossische Zeitung of Berlin praised the Prime Minister’s p ronoun cement's« Quoted in The Times, April 10, 1903*3. As to be expected, the Novoe Vremia roundly scored Balfour 1 s statement, and condemned the whole Bagdad project. Quoted in The Times, April 14, 1903, 3. 60 The Times, April 9, 1903, 7. 61 The preface of Ch4radame’s work is dated April 3, 1903. By April 19 a copy had reached the hands of T. Gibson Bowles and had inspired this opponent pf the project to write a letter to the editor of The Times in which reference is made to both Ch4radame’s and Rohrbach’s books. The Times, April 20, 1903, 7. 62 Paul Rohrbach, Die Bagdadbahn, (Berlin, 1902), 15. 63 26. 64 Ibid,, 18-19, It -was the opinion of the Berlin correspondent of The Times that the extreme claims of German writers were detrimental to the Bagdad project, ’’The late Herr von Siemens himself complained,” wrote the correspondent, the most serious enemies of the Bagdad railway scheme were to be found in Germany in the persons of Pan-Ge rmans and others who revelled in imaginative schemes of German immigration into Anatolia and Mesopotamia.” The Times, Apr. 22, 1903, 5. 65 H.J. "Whigham, The Persian Problem, 1, The Koweit question and the Bagdad enterprise are treated at length by Whigham, 91-107, and 220-248. 66 These articles appeared in The Times at the rate of about three a week over a period extending from October 14,T§02', through April 21, 1903. That Whigham’s work and the articles in The Times were not without influence is attested to by Lord Lamington who on May 5, 190$, told the house of lords: who reads.,,Mr. Whigham’s book, or the remarkable series of articles that have appeared in The Times, must see how seriously at stake are our interests.” Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 4th series, CXXI, 1338. Chirol’s Middle Eastern Question appeared in book form later in 1903. 67 The full text of the convention, the statutes of the Soci4t£ importale ottomane du chemin de fer de Bagdad, and the Cahier des Charges is given in Parliamentary Papers, Ko. Cm (1911), No. 1, 2- 26, and also'in British and foreign State papers, CII, 833-869. 68 Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No. 2950 (1903), 2. 69 The Times, April 11, 5. Waugh*s interpretation of Article 35 was grossly distorted, since control of the Bagdad Company was to have been vested in a board of thirty members who would have been assigned on a permanent basis to the nation* al groups participating. Quite naturally with such an arrangement the investors in the railway bonds could not have exercised a voice in the direction of the company. Revelstoke in a communication to Lansdowne, April 21, 1903, explained the basis of control which he believed would have secured international control of the line. Brit. Docs., 11, 190. 70 The Times, Apr. 11, 1903, 5. 71 o*Conor To Lansdowne, April 28, 1903, Brit. Docs., VI, 326. O’Conor wrote that he ’’unfortunately did not see” a copy of Waugh * s commercial report of March 16 owing to his absence in England. Ibid. 72 The Times, April 14, 1903 , 7. 73 TOd., 4; ibid., April 20, 1903, 7. 74 W., AprTTTB, 1903, 13. 75 TWL, April 22, 1903, 7. IS The Times, April 22, 1903, 7. On April 11 the French and German representatives met' in Constantinople to organize a company to develop the concession in accordance with the terms of the statutes of March 5. Ibid., April 11, 1903, 4. And on April 13 the Imperial Ottoman Bagdad Railway Company was organized with Gwinner as president, and Vergens, of the Ottoman Bank, as vice-president. Wangenheim to F. 0., April 13, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 439-440. 77 The Times, April 22, 1903, 9. 78 The Pall Mall Gazette, April 22, 1903, 1. 79 Morning Post, April 23, 1903, 6, 80 23 > 1903 » 6 * 81 Daily Chronicle, April 23, 1903, 6. 82 Daily Mail, April 22, 1903, 83 St, Jameses Gazette, April 22, 1903, 3* 84 F.O. memo, by Lord Lansdowne, April 14, 1903, Brit. Docs., 11, 187. 85 Ibid. Lansdowne wrote? "My strong conviction is that in all cases such as this the best policy is to treat the question as one of common and international interest—an international free port, open to all, and unfortified, at Koweit would not be a source of danger to us, while its existence would be an answer to those who accuse us of desiring to treat the Persian Gulf as a British Lake. If Russia desires access to the Persian Gulf, let her build a line from Erivan to Baghdad and Koweit, and obtain running powers over the ’Anatolian* Railway between Baghdad and Koweit. Russia would in that case build a costly and probably not very profitable Railway; we should not be any the worse, and Persia would regain her freedom of constructing Railways in other parts of her territory.” Ibid., 188. 86 Lansdowne to Scott, April 14, 1903, Brit® Do cs., 11, 189. 87 Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 4th series, dXXI, 221-222* 88 Leo 'Maxse had no doubts as to the influence of the press campaign* In the May issue of the National Review, 343, he wrote; "...thanks to the protests of almost every important paper with a soul to call its own, Lord Lansdowne’s scheme for acting as Germany’s cats-paw in Asia Minor has for the time collapsed*” Later he commented; "...the withdrawal of the Baghdad Railway scheme.**was a precipitate operation effected under the wholesome pressure of public opinion** Ibid*, June, 1903, 531* From Berlin the correspondent of The Times wired on Ipril 24, 1903; "It is believed by the promoters of the company that the British government yielded to three distinct inf luences—first, to those politicians and publicists who urge an understanding with Russia; secondly, to Eastern shipping interests; and, thirdly, to anti-German feeling*” 89 The Times, April 23, 1903, 6; O’Conor to Lansdowne, April 28, 1903, Brit* Docs*, VI, 326; Arthur von Gwinner, "The Bagdad Railway and the Question of Brl€- ish ~Cobpe rati on," in the Nineteenth Century, June 1909, 1089. 90 Diplomatic and Consular Reports, No. 2950, (1903), 2, shows that the report was dated by Waugh on March 9, 1903 and was received at the foreign office on March 16, 1903, 91 Newton, op* cjt*, 254* 92 Ibid*, 2T5* In December, 1903, when he was conducting negotiations with the French ambassador, Paul Gambon, for an Anglo-French settlement concerning Egypt and Morocco, Lansdowne wrote Lord Cromer: "I have told Balfour that he must make up his mind to be told by the Spectator and critics of that kidney that we have given away the Western Mediterranean and betrayed the interests of the Empire at other points. We must make up our minds to that sort of music, and I don’t want another Bagdad Railway fiasco,” Newton, op. cit,, 287. 93 O’Conor to Lansdowne, April 24, 1903, Brit, Docs,,ll, 191. 94 o*Conor to Lansdowne, April 28, 1903, ibid,, VI, 325. 95 Ibid,, 325-326. 96 TSH., 326, 97 o*Conor to Lansdowne, April 28, 1903, Brit, Docs,, 11, 191, 98 Dawkins to Gwinner, April 23, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 442-443. This private letter was first published in an article of Gwinner’s in the Nineteenth Century, June, 1909, 1090-1091, The Spectator, June 5, 1909, 880-881, was indignant at the accusation that the press campaign had been inspired by the Russians, ”Sir Clinton Dawkins,” wrote the Spectator editorially, "was no doubt exceedingly sore at the failure of a great business transaction which, had it come off, would have brought...a very large profit to his firm in the shape of commissions,” 99 Btflow to William 11, April 26, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 441* 100 O’Conor to Lansdowne, Dec. 15, 1903, Brit. Docs., 11, 195. 101 Ibid., 195-196. 102 F.O. minute by Lansdowne attached to o*Conor’s report of Dec. 15, 1903, ibid., 196. 103 O’Conor to Lansdowne, Dec. 15, 1903, Brit. Docs*, 11, 196. 104 F.O. minute by Lansdowne, ibid. 105 Sanderson, who was permanent secretary of the foreign office in 1903 prepared a memorandum in January, 1907, at the request of the then permanent secretary, Sir C. Hardinge, in which he discussed certain aspects of Anglo-German relations. Among other things Sanderson wrote; ”lf the mere acquisition of ter- ritory were in itself immoral, I conceive that the sins of Germany since 1871 are light in comparison to ours, and it must be remembered that, from an outside point of view, a Country which looks to each change as a possible chance of selfaggrandisement is not much more open to criticism than one who sees in every such change a menace to its interests, existing or potential, end founds on this theory continued claims to interference or compensation. It has sometimes seemed to me that to a foreigner reading our press the British Empire must appear in the light of some huge giant sprawling over the globe, with gouty fingers and toes stretching in every direction, which cannot be approached without eliciting a scream.” Brit. Docs., 111, 430. 106 Paul Gambon, French ambassador at London, wrote Delcass4 on April 24, 1903, that the navigation companies had declared a state of war against the Bagdad Railway. It was Gambon’s belief that the route to India was the primary reason for British alarm, end that what the British imperialists really desired was that all lines of access to India belong to them. He also commented that the Persian Gulf had become for the British a vital question, n of an importance equal to that which they gave the Belgian question a hundred years ago.” D.D.F., series 2, 111, 264. " 107 O’Conor to Lansdowne, Dec. 15, 1903, Brit. Doos., 11, 196. 108 Memo of Committee on Imperial Defense, July 31, 1905, Brit.,Docs. g Vl, 333. 109 Delcass4 to Bompard, Feb, 11, 1903, D.D.F.., series 2, 111, 103; Delcass4 to Montebello, June 17, 1903, ibid., 11, 353. 110 Delcass4 to Montebello, Jan, 1, 1902, ibid,, 1. 11l Montebello to Delcassd, Jan. 16, 1902, D.D.F., series 2, 11, 1. 112 Ddbats Chambre de DdputdT/"March 24, 1902, 1855. 113 m;; — 114 TW., 1857-1858. 115 Marschall to F. 0., March 3, 1902, Grosse Politik, XVII, 430. Constans told Marschall that the Russians were in an 111-humor because they feared a regeneration of the Ottoman empire. Constans also told Marschall that Delcassd had said that he ”completely approved the agreement.” Ibid. 116 to Montebello, June 17, 1902, 13.D.F.., series 2, 11, 353. 117 Delcass4 to Constans, Jan 2, 1903, 111, 47. 118 Delcass4 to Bompard, Feb. 11, 1903 ~ib£d, 102; F.O. memo, by Sanderson, Feb. 23, 1903, Brit. Docs., 11, 180. 119 Delcassd to Bompard, Feb. 11, 1903, D.D.F., series 2, 111, 103. 120 Ibid., 104. 121 Bompard to Delcass4, March 9, 1903, ibid., 159. Delcassd wired Bompard on February 19 that the Russian ambassador, Prince Ouroussoff, had told him that Lamsdorff was really favorable to participation, and that the opposition in Russia was due to Witte. Ibid. 122 Bompard to Delcassd, March 12, 1903, ibid., 179-182. In July the Russians attempted to forestall the Bagdad Railway by securing from the Sultan a concession for a line Van-Mosul-Bagdad. The Turks repulsed the Russian ambassador’s demands, and there is evidence that BCflow was reedy to give firm support to the Ottoman government if the Russians had oersisted in what was obviously an effort to thwart the Bagdad line of the Germans. Muhlberg to Alvensleben, Aug.B, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 454-455. 123 Bompard to Delcass4, April 25, 1903, D.D.F., series 2, 111, 273. 124 Wangenheim to F. 0., Apr. 28, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 446. Bompard was much disturbed over the selection of Berlin as the seat of the Bagdad Railway Company, and from St. Petersburg inouired of Delcass4: ’’Will the correspondence be in German when the language of commerce in the Levant is indisputably French?” 3 *£*£.•* ser i® s 111, 274. 125 DelcaTsi to Rouvier, July 13, 1903, ibid., 450. 126 Constans to Delcass4, June 16, 1903, ibid., 397. The remaining ten per cent was reserved for minor financial groups. 127 Ibid. 128 TSH., 398. 129 Constans to Delcass4, June 16, 1903, series 2, 111, 398-399. 130 Delcass4 to Rouvier, July 13, 1903, ibid., 450. 131 Ibid,, 452-453. 132 Ibid ~ 454; Constans to Delcass4, June, 16, 1903, ibid., 399, 133 Rouvier to Delcass4, July 20, 1903, I).!).!?., series 2, 111, 469-470. Delcasse*s marginal comment to this was: ”oui, mais une participation rdele, efficace.” Ibid., 470. 134 Ibid., 471. 135 Rouvier to Delcasse, July 23, 1903, ibid., 479-480. Rouvier obviously refers to the program of June 13 rather than of July 13. 136 Delcass4 to Rouvier, July 27, 1903, ibid., 487-492. In this letter Delcass4 informed Rouvier of his intention to submit the question to the ministry and cited his objections to the program of June 13. 137 Unsigned F.O. note, Nov, 26, 1903, D.D.F., series 2, IV, 106; Wangenheim to F. 0., August 3, 1903, Grosse Politik, XViT,“”4F3-454. 138 Wangenheim to F. 0., August 3, 1903, ibid. 139 Ottoman Bank (signed Vernes and Hottinguer) to Rouvier, Oct. 8, 1903, D.D.F., series 2, IV, 5-6. 140 6 * 141 Rouvier to Delcass4, Oct. 17, 1903, ibid., 25-26. 142 Constans to Oct. 23, 1903, ibid., 32. 143 Delcass4 to Rouvier, Oct. 24, 1903, D.D.F., series 2, IV, 48-49. 144 Ibid., 49. 145 Delcass4 to Constans, Oct. 24,1903, ibid., 49-50? Gwinner was named to both positions. 146 Marschall to F. 0., Nov. 17, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 459. 147 Ibid. 148 The Times, Sept. 11, 1903, 3. 149 Marschall to Bb’low, Dec. 4, 1903, Grosse Politik, XVII, 459. 150 G.L. Dickinson, The International Anarchy, 261. 151 Pourtales to F. 0., Aug. 19, 1911, GrosseJPolitik, XXVII (2), 960. 152 Deutsche Bank to F. 0., Feb. 19, 1914/ ibid., XXXVII (2), 583-588. 153 F.O. note, March 31, 1914, ibid., 606-607• 154 F.O. note, April 9, 1914, ibid., 608-609. 155 Lichnowsky to F. 0., June IT/T914, ibid., XXXVII (1), 448. 156 Footnote, ibid., 469; Jagow to Wedel, July 22, 1914, ibid., 469-470. BIBLIOGRAPHY (Confined to works actually cited in the dissertation) PRIMARY AUTHORITIES I. DOCUMENTS British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898-1914. Edited by George P« Gooch and Harold Temperley. 192?- Die Grosse Politik der EuropKischen Kabinette, 1871-1914. Edited by Johannes Lepsius, and Friedrich Thimine. Berlin, 1922-1927. 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Noradounghian, G., Recueil d’actes intemationaux de I 1 empire ottoman. 4 vols. Paris, 1897-1903. Van Dyck, E. A., Report on the Capitulations of the Ottoman Empire. Forty-seventh Congress, special session. Senate executive document no* 87. "Washington, 1881-1882. Young, George, Corps de droit ottoman—recueil des codes, lois, r&glements, ordonnances, et actes"Tes plus imporFants du droTE intdrieur, et d'dtudes sur le droit couEumier de l y empire ottoman. 7 vols. Oxford, 190^-1906• IV. MEMOIRS, AUTOBIOGRAPHIES, BIOGRAPHIES, CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES (containing source material) Andrew, William P., Memo!r on the Euphrates Valley Route to India. London, 1857. Bismarck, Die Politischen Reden des FHrsten von, Edited by Horst Kohl. 14 vols. Stuttgart, 1892-1905. Btilow, Prince von, Memoirs. Translated by F. A. Voight. 4 vols. Boston, 1931-1932 Chesney, Francis R., The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigri in the Years 1835, 1836 and 1837. 4 vols. London, 18So. 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Chirol, Valentine, Fifty Years in a Changing World. London, 1927. Chirol, Valentine, The Middle Eastern Question. London, 1903. Curzon, G. N., Persia and the Persian Question. London, 1892. Dickinson, G. Lowes, The International Anarchy, 1904-1914. New York, 1926. Driault, Edouard, La question d*orient depuis ses origines jusqu* A pajx de Sevres. Paris, 1921. Earle, E. M., Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdad Railway. New York, 1924. Emin, Ahmed, Turkey in the Great War. London, 1930. Fay, Sidney 8., The Origins of the World War, 2 vols. New York, 1929. Feis, Herbert, Europe, the World's Banker. New Haven, 1930. Fuller, J. V., Bismarck*s Diplomacy at Its Zenith. Cambridge, 1922. Hallberg, C. W., The Suez Canal. New York, 1931. Hauser, Henri, Economic Germany. Translation. London, 1918. Helfferich, Karl, Die Deutsche Turkenpolitik. Berlin, 1921. Helfferich, Karl, Germany*s Economic Progress and National Wealth. New York, 1914. Hill, H. C., Roosevelt and the Caribbean. Chicago, 1927. 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SIGNED PERIODICAL ARTICLES Domini an, Leon, ’’Europe at Turkey’s Door.” Geographical Review, vol. I. Dominian, Leon, ’’Fuel in Turkey: Petroleum.” Near East, July, 1917. Gdraud, Andre, "A New German Empire.” Nineteenth Century and After, May, 1914, Imbert, Paul, ”Le chemin de fer de Bagdad.” Revue des deux mondes, April, 1907. Marchend, H. s ”Les questions d*Arable, le Yemen, Mascate et Koweit.” Questions diplomat!ques et coloniales, 1911 • Parker, Alwyn, ’’The Bagdad Railway Negotiations.” Quarterly Review, October, 1917. Russell, A. D. C., ’’The Bagdad Railway.” Quarterly Review, April, 1921. Semple, E. C., ’’The Regional Geography of Turkey.” Geographical Review, vol. 11. Sontag, R. J., "The Cowes Interview and the Kruger Telegram." Political Science Quarterly, June, 1925. Woods, H. C., "The Bagdad Railway and Its Tributaries." Geographical Journal, July, 1917.