The paradox of militarization: democratic oversight and military autonomy in Mexico and Colombia
| dc.contributor.advisor | Hunter, Wendy | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Brinks, Daniel | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Barany, Zoltan | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Newberg, Paula | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Ward, Peter | |
| dc.creator | Dizard, Jacob Goodman | |
| dc.creator.orcid | 0000-0001-9709-2340 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-10-18T15:02:17Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-10-18T15:02:17Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2018-08 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2018-08-17 | |
| dc.date.submitted | August 2018 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2018-10-18T15:02:18Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | Throughout Latin America, leaders facing persistent internal security threats have expanded military deployments. In such circumstances, civilian policymakers place an important political bet on military compliance and effectiveness in carrying out the mission—and are therefore loath to raise the military’s hackles by encroaching on sensitive institutional prerogatives. Contrary to the expectation of reinforced military autonomy, however, large-scale mission expansions in Mexico and Colombia showed that the disruptions induced by militarization can yield increased democratic oversight of the armed forces. In Colombia the change in democratic oversight was dramatic: between 2009 and 2017, over 1,000 soldiers were convicted of murder in civilian courts. Mexico’s oversight rise proved more tenuous, but the military lost its ability to protect soldiers accused of rights violations from prosecution in the civilian justice system. That the increases in oversight occurred most starkly in the realm of judicial accountability is puzzling, since prosecutions have been treated as the third rail of civil-military relations. To explain these changes, I start by noting that military autonomy thrives in the darkness, but militarization places a spotlight on military behavior. When rights abuses occur, civil society actors mobilize to create pressure for accountability at both the domestic and international levels, especially by calling attention to militarizing states’ failure to comply with obligations under domestic laws, international treaties, and foreign assistance packages. Greater international pressure, in particular, weakens domestic leaders’ commitment to protecting the military from greater oversight. Despite this pressure, reform will be limited while executives remain dependent on the military to maintain order—as in Mexico. The existence of a policy alternative to militarization, however—such as Colombia’s peace process with the country’s main rebel group—may result in a fracturing of the executive-military alliance and pave the way for a substantial increase in democratic oversight. | |
| dc.description.department | Government | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.15781/T2BZ61T5P | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2152/69009 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | Civil-military relations | |
| dc.title | The paradox of militarization: democratic oversight and military autonomy in Mexico and Colombia | |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.type.material | text | |
| thesis.degree.department | Government | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Government | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | The University of Texas at Austin | |
| thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | |
| thesis.degree.name | Doctor of Philosophy |