Why normative realists ought to be robust naturalists

dc.contributor.advisorDancy, Jonathan
dc.contributor.committeeMemberDogramaci, Sinan
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLitland, Jon
dc.contributor.committeeMemberBonevac, Daniel
dc.contributor.committeeMemberShafer-Landau, Russ
dc.creatorMorton, James Justin
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-19T20:48:28Z
dc.date.available2021-03-19T20:48:28Z
dc.date.created2018-08
dc.date.issued2018-10-09
dc.date.submittedAugust 2018
dc.date.updated2021-03-19T20:48:28Z
dc.description.abstractSome philosophers think that facts about how we should think or act—the normative facts, as I will call them—do not depend wholly on the various attitudes or feelings we have about things. Call these philosophers realists. In my dissertation, I argue that the only viable form of realism is one on which normative facts are causally efficacious and fully depend on non-normative facts. Call this form of realism robust naturalism. Most arguments for robust naturalism assume a broader doctrine of metaphysical naturalism—roughly, the view that there are no non-natural or supernatural facts. My own arguments for robust naturalism do not assume this. I argue, first, that only robust naturalists can give a satisfactory reply to certain worries about the evolutionary influence on our normative beliefs; and second, that only robust naturalists can give a plausible account of how normative facts are grounded
dc.description.departmentPhilosophy
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2152/85043
dc.identifier.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/12013
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectNormative realism
dc.subjectRobust naturalism
dc.titleWhy normative realists ought to be robust naturalists
dc.typeThesis
dc.type.materialtext
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophy
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophy
thesis.degree.grantorThe University of Texas at Austin
thesis.degree.levelDoctoral
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy

Access full-text files

Original bundle

Now showing 1 - 1 of 1
Loading...
Thumbnail Image
Name:
MORTON-DISSERTATION-2018.pdf
Size:
1.59 MB
Format:
Adobe Portable Document Format

License bundle

Now showing 1 - 2 of 2
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
PROQUEST_LICENSE.txt
Size:
4.45 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description:
No Thumbnail Available
Name:
LICENSE.txt
Size:
1.84 KB
Format:
Plain Text
Description: