Evaluating water resource management in transboundary river basins using cooperative game theory : the Rio Grande/Bravo basin

dc.contributor.advisorMcKinney, Daene C.en
dc.creatorTeasley, Rebecca Lynnen
dc.date.accessioned2009-10-19T17:02:45Zen
dc.date.available2009-10-19T17:02:45Zen
dc.date.issued2009-08en
dc.descriptiontexten
dc.description.abstractWater resource management is a multifaceted issue that becomes more complex when considering multiple nations’ interdependence upon a single shared transboundary river basin. With over 200 transboundary river basins worldwide shared by two or more countries, it is important to develop tools to allow riparian countries to cooperatively manage these shared and often limited water resources. Cooperative game theory provides tools for determining if cooperation can exist across jurisdictional boundaries through a suite of mathematical tools that measure the benefits of cooperation among basin stakeholders. Cooperative game theory is also useful for transboundary negotiation because it provides a range of solutions which will satisfy all players in the game and provides methods to fairly and equitably allocate the gains of that cooperation to all participating stakeholders, if that cooperation is shown to be possible. This dissertation applies cooperative game theory concepts to the Rio Grande/Bravo basin in North America as a case study. The Rio Grande/Bravo forms the 1,200 km border between the United States and Mexico. A comprehensive water resources planning model was developed for the basin including the major water users, water related infrastructure including reservoirs, and water policy logic related to the bi-national water sharing agreements. The water planning model is used to calculate the characteristic functions for the cooperative game analysis. For the Water Demand Reduction Game, the largest agricultural users, District 005, District 025 and the Texas Watermaster Section below Falcon were defined individual players. The cooperative analysis was between the individual players rather than the countries. In addition to the cooperative analysis, performance measures for water deliveries were calculated to determine if water delivery was improved to each player under the cooperative game. The results show that the amount of additional water to the downstream players may not be large enough to induce cooperation. The small amount of increase in water deliveries is related to the large system losses as the water travels downstream over a long distance and a division of water under the 1944 Treaty between the United States and Mexico.en
dc.description.departmentCivil, Architectural, and Environmental Engineeringen
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/6561en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works.en
dc.subjectWater resource managementen
dc.subjectTransboundary river basinsen
dc.subjectRio Grande/Bravo basinen
dc.subjectCooperative game theoryen
dc.subjectUnited States/Mexico borderen
dc.subjectWater resources planning modelsen
dc.titleEvaluating water resource management in transboundary river basins using cooperative game theory : the Rio Grande/Bravo basinen
thesis.degree.departmentCivil, Architectural, and Environmental Engineeringen
thesis.degree.disciplineCivil Engineeringen
thesis.degree.grantorThe University of Texas at Austinen
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen

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