Make perception phenomenology again

dc.contributor.advisorTye, Michael
dc.contributor.advisorDunlop, Katherine
dc.contributor.committeeMemberMendelovici, Angela
dc.contributor.committeeMemberLitland, Jon
dc.creatorQuinn, Connor D.
dc.date.accessioned2024-05-14T00:03:32Z
dc.date.available2024-05-14T00:03:32Z
dc.date.issued2023-12
dc.date.submittedDecember 2023
dc.date.updated2024-05-14T00:03:33Z
dc.description.abstractThis project concerns the representational contents of experience generally and visual experience specifically. I justify and then employ a phenomenology-first methodology, where the most important test of a claim about perceptual content is whether it matches perceptual phenomenology. In the first chapter, I argue that the contents and phenomenology of an experience are identical, not merely correlated or explanatorily linked. I use this conclusion in the second chapter to argue that the content of visual experience is a property complex, which is itself structured from simpler properties and relations. Much of the defense of the property complex view consists in demonstrating how an experience with non-propositional content can play a robust cognitive and epistemic role in our mental lives. Despite compelling arguments to the contrary, I argue that we do not need to attribute propositional contents to visual experiences to explain how they reliably cause and justify true beliefs. The third chapter enlists George Berkeley as an ally. Berkeley appeals to a notion of association between non-propositional mental states in his writings on vision. I argue that this notion, properly understood, can be used today to explain away intuitions that lead some to posit higher-order visual contents.
dc.description.departmentPhilosophy
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.identifier.uri
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/2152/125297
dc.identifier.urihttps://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/51888
dc.language.isoen
dc.subjectExperience
dc.subjectContent
dc.subjectVision
dc.subjectPhenomenology
dc.subjectPerception
dc.titleMake perception phenomenology again
dc.typeThesis
dc.type.materialtext
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophy
thesis.degree.grantorThe University of Texas at Austin
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophy
thesis.degree.programPhilosophy

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