Cognitive penetration and the perceptual representation of high-level properties
| dc.contributor.advisor | Tye, Michael | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Dever, Joshua | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Montague, Michelle | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Sosa, Ernest D | |
| dc.contributor.committeeMember | Siegel, Susanna | |
| dc.creator | Piatti, Katherine Anne | |
| dc.creator.orcid | 0000-0002-1230-9721 | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2018-02-01T15:05:10Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2018-02-01T15:05:10Z | |
| dc.date.created | 2017-05 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2017-05 | |
| dc.date.submitted | May 2017 | |
| dc.date.updated | 2018-02-01T15:05:10Z | |
| dc.description.abstract | In recent years, two of the most popular debates in the philosophy of perception have been about whether there’s cognitive penetration and whether high-level properties are represented in our perceptual experiences. My dissertation concerns both of those debates. In the first paper, I argue that the debates about cognitive penetration and the perceptual representation of high-level properties are related. Namely, there has to be cognitive penetration for it to be plausible that our perceptual experiences represent high-level properties. In the second paper, I add to the literature challenging the alleged empirical evidence for cognitive penetration. I focus, in particular, on studies purportedly finding that (direct) influence from subjects cognitive states had altered their perceptual experiences over time. I argue those studies provide empirical evidence of perceptual adaptation, not cognitive penetration. In the third paper, I argue the view that our visual experiences represent high-level properties is unmotivated and I argue the explanation for how we come to perceptually represent high-level properties is implausible | |
| dc.description.department | Philosophy | |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier | doi:10.15781/T2JS9HQ9B | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/2152/63380 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.subject | Cognitive penetration | |
| dc.subject | Perceptual representation | |
| dc.title | Cognitive penetration and the perceptual representation of high-level properties | |
| dc.type | Thesis | |
| dc.type.material | text | |
| thesis.degree.department | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.discipline | Philosophy | |
| thesis.degree.grantor | The University of Texas at Austin | |
| thesis.degree.level | Doctoral | |
| thesis.degree.name | Doctor of Philosophy |