Director Reputation, Ceo-Board Power, And The Dynamics Of Board Interlocks

dc.contributor.utaustinauthorWestphal, James D.en
dc.creatorZajac, E. J.en
dc.creatorWestphal, J. D.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-16T13:57:29Zen
dc.date.available2015-04-16T13:57:29Zen
dc.date.issued1996-09en
dc.description.abstractThis study advances research on CEO-board relationships, interlocking directorates, and director reputation by examining how contests for intraorganizational power can affect interorganizational ties. We propose that powerful top managers seek to maintain their control by selecting and retaining board members with experience on other, passive boards and excluding individuals with experience on more active boards. We also propose that powerful boards similarly seek to maintain their control by favoring directors with a reputation for more actively monitoring management and avoiding directors with experience on passive boards. Hypotheses are tested longitudinally using CEO-board data taken from 491 of the largest U.S. corporations over a recent seven-year period. The findings suggest that variation in CEO-board power relationships across organizations has contributed to a segmentation of the corporate director network. We discuss how our perspective can reconcile contrary views and debates on whether increased board control has diffused across large U.S. corporations.(.)en
dc.description.departmentManagementen
dc.identifier.citationEdward J. Zajac and James D. Westphal. Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 41, No. 3 (Sep., 1996), pp. 507-529. DOI: 10.2307/2393940en
dc.identifier.doi10.2307/2393940en
dc.identifier.issn0001-8392en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/29305en
dc.language.isoEnglishen
dc.relation.ispartofserialAdministrative Science Quarterlyen_US
dc.rightsAdministrative deposit of works to UT Digital Repository: This works author(s) is or was a University faculty member, student or staff member; this article is already available through open access or the publisher allows a PDF version of the article to be freely posted online. The library makes the deposit as a matter of fair use (for scholarly, educational, and research purposes), and to preserve the work and further secure public access to the works of the University.en
dc.subjectchief executive-compensationen
dc.subjectcorporate governanceen
dc.subjectunited-statesen
dc.subjectperformanceen
dc.subjectownershipen
dc.subjectstrategyen
dc.subjectdiversificationen
dc.subjectperspectiveen
dc.subjectdismissalen
dc.subjectadoptionen
dc.subjectbusinessen
dc.subjectmanagementen
dc.titleDirector Reputation, Ceo-Board Power, And The Dynamics Of Board Interlocksen
dc.typeArticleen
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