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dc.contributor.advisorHiggins, Kathleen Marieen
dc.creatorHwang, Woo-Youngen
dc.date.accessioned2012-02-27T20:23:08Zen
dc.date.available2012-02-27T20:23:08Zen
dc.date.issued2011-12en
dc.date.submittedDecember 2011en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4594en
dc.descriptiontexten
dc.description.abstractWhen we consider the active involvement of a subject of an emotional state, we have to say that intentionality of emotional states is conative rather than cognitive. Emotion is much closer to desire or a conative state than a belief or perception. Since a conative state is successful when it is carried out, a conative intentional state is more related to action toward others and events rather than passive perception. So it is important to examine the relation between emotion and action to see emotion as an active response. In the first, second and third chapter of my thesis, I will argue that since perception is too passive to be emotions, it is wrong to insist that emotions are a kind of perception. In the fourth chapter, I will show that it is impossible to have emotions without self-involvement. In the fifth chapter, I will discuss the relation between emotions and action through the cases of brain damaged patients and the Confucianist theory of emotion.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.subjectEmotionen
dc.subjectIntentionalityen
dc.subjectConative stateen
dc.titleEmotional intentionality as a conative stateen
dc.date.updated2012-02-27T20:23:18Zen
dc.identifier.slug2152/ETD-UT-2011-12-4594en
dc.contributor.committeeMemberPhillips, Stephenen
dc.description.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.type.genrethesisen
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophyen
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen
thesis.degree.grantorUniversity of Texas at Austinen
thesis.degree.levelMastersen
thesis.degree.nameMaster of Artsen


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