Quantitative analyses of intellectual property right protection

Abstract

Research has demonstrated that the effects of intellectual property right (IPR) protection on firm research and competitive strategies are varied. This dissertation quantifies the dynamic effects of IPR protection along different dimensions. First, I show that countries choose different levels of IPR protection and develop a model to replicate these differences. This model enables me to assess the quantitative effects of trade, as well as the welfare impacts of global harmonization to a single IPR standard. Second, I explore whether IPR protection in the US is too strong. I develop a model in which firms make production and innovation decisions conditional on endogenous technological spillovers. I fit the model to key moments from US data and show that weakening patent protection is welfare decreasing. Thirdly, I show that changing US IPR standards during the 1980s had little real effect on the US Semiconductor industry vis-a-vis exogenous changes in market demand.