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dc.creatorBurton, Michael G.en
dc.creatorHigley, Johnen
dc.date.accessioned2010-10-29T22:29:01Zen
dc.date.available2010-10-29T22:29:01Zen
dc.date.issued1987en
dc.identifier.issn0892-3507en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/8952en
dc.description.abstractFollowing the classical elite theorists' injunction to study variations in elite structure, we examine the elite settlement as a major, yet largely overlooked, form of political change. Elite settlements consist of broad compromises among previously warring elite factions, resulting in political stability and thus providing a necessary precondition for representative democracy. To identify the common features of elite settlements, we draw upon four historie cases: England in 1688-1689, Sweden in 1809, Colombia in 1957-1958, and Venezuela in 1958. We conclude by arguing for the extraction of elite settlements from their current embeddedness in such concepts as "bourgeois revolutions" and "democratic transitions," and we advocate greater attention to the elite paradigm in efforts to explain macropolitical outcomes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.relation.ispartofseriesTexas Papers on Latin America;87-01en
dc.subjectPoliticsen
dc.subjectLatin Americaen
dc.titleElite Settlementsen
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.description.departmentLatin American Studiesen


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