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dc.creatorShepard, Daniel P.
dc.creatorHumphreys, Todd E.
dc.date.accessioned2018-01-30T17:08:19Z
dc.date.available2018-01-30T17:08:19Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifierdoi:10.15781/T22805F9P
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/63294
dc.description.abstractTest procedures are developed for characterizing the response of civil GPS receivers to spoofing attacks. Two response characteristics are analyzed in detail for four representative GPS receivers: (1) the spoofer power advantage over the authentic signals required for successful receiver capture, and (2) the aggressiveness with which a spoofer can manipulate the victim receiver’s time and position solution. Two of the tested receivers are commonly used in critical infrastructure applications, one in smart power grid regulation and one in telecommunications networks. The implications of the test results for these critical infrastructure applications are discussed.en_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.relation.ispartofRadionavigation Laboratory Conference Proceedingsen_US
dc.subjectSheparden_US
dc.subjectHumphreysen_US
dc.subjectspoofing attacksen_US
dc.subjectGPS receiveren_US
dc.titleCharacterization of Receiver Response to Spoofing Attacksen_US
dc.typeConference paperen_US
dc.description.departmentAerospace Engineering and Engineering Mechanicsen_US
dc.rights.restrictionOpenen_US


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