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dc.creatorBrown, Jennifer Lynn, 1975-en_US
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-29T00:14:28Z
dc.date.available2008-08-29T00:14:28Z
dc.date.created2008-05en_US
dc.date.issued2008-08-29T00:14:28Z
dc.identifierb70654888en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/3850
dc.descriptiontext
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the spread of aggressive corporate tax reporting by modeling a firm's decision to adopt the corporate-owned life insurance (COLI) shelter. I use a sample of known COLI participants to examine whether certain firm characteristics are associated with the decision to adopt a COLI shelter. I find some evidence that firms with higher performance-matched discretionary accruals are more likely to adopt a COLI shelter, suggesting a positive relation between aggressive financial reporting and aggressive tax reporting. I also find that firms with greater capital market visibility are less likely to adopt a COLI shelter, consistent with a potential reputational cost for being associated with aggressive tax avoidance activities. Further, my results suggest that COLI adopters are generally R&D intensive firms with low leverage and few foreign operations. In addition to firm specific characteristics, I consider two explanations for the spread of COLI adoption motivated by theory on diffusion of innovations and institutional isomorphism. I investigate whether firms imitate prior COLI adopters and whether COLI adoption spreads through common auditors. My results are not consistent with an imitation explanation. Further, my results suggest that having the same auditor as a prior COLI adopter does not increase the likelihood that a firm will adopt COLI.en_US
dc.format.mediumelectronicen_US
dc.language.isoengen_US
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works.en_US
dc.subject.lcshCompany-owned life insuranceen_US
dc.subject.lcshCorporations--Taxationen_US
dc.subject.lcshCorporations--Accountingen_US
dc.subject.lcshTax sheltersen_US
dc.subject.lcshTax planningen_US
dc.titleThe spread of aggressive corporate tax reporting : a detailed examination of the corporate-owned life insurance shelteren_US
dc.description.departmentAccountingen_US
dc.identifier.oclc241303402en_US
dc.type.genreThesisen_US
thesis.degree.departmentAccountingen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineAccountingen_US
thesis.degree.grantorThe University of Texas at Austinen_US
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen_US
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen_US


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