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dc.contributor.advisorBoone, Catherineen
dc.creatorByun, Young Harken
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-29T00:08:07Zen
dc.date.available2008-08-29T00:08:07Zen
dc.date.issued2006en
dc.identifierb69735207en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/3754en
dc.descriptiontexten
dc.description.abstractThis study is to explain why Taiwan’s elites delegate the independent authority of financial and monetary management to central bankers which resulted in survival of the Asian crisis, while Korean political leadership did not do so and the economy faltered in the crisis? My arguments are 1) if politicians choose capital-intensive industry and/or organized labor as their major coalition partners, they will not allow central bankers to have an independent authority; 2) if politicians choose other groups as their coalition partners (i.e., commercial banks, agriculture, and/or small-medium sized enterprises), they will be more likely to provide central bankers with independent authority. In addition to the two cases studies, I explore three Southeast Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand). By employing statistical analyses to test the generalizability of my arguments in the context of developing countries, I confirm the hypotheses. Implications of my study include 1) the state needs to include subordinate social groups to counterbalance big bourgeoisie, especially in the globalization era; and 2) merely institutional or economic reform does not guarantee an independent central banking system; rather it is necessary to include heterogeneous social groups into the growth coalition to support effective central banking systems from below.
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.rightsCopyright © is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works.en
dc.subject.lcshBanks and banking, Central--Asiaen
dc.subject.lcshBanks and banking, Centralen
dc.subject.lcshKorea--Economic policyen
dc.subject.lcshTaiwan--Economic policyen
dc.subject.lcshChosŏn Ŭnhaengen
dc.subject.lcshZhong yang yin hangen
dc.subject.lcshKorea--Politics and government--20th centuryen
dc.subject.lcshTaiwan--Politics and governmenten
dc.subject.lcshKorea--Economic conditions--20th centuryen
dc.subject.lcshTaiwan--Economic conditionsen
dc.subject.lcshFinancial crises--Asiaen
dc.titleChoosing coalition partners: the politics of central bank independence in Korea and Taiwanen
dc.description.departmentGovernmenten
dc.identifier.oclc212640485en
dc.type.genreThesisen
thesis.degree.departmentGovernmenten
thesis.degree.disciplineGovernmenten
thesis.degree.grantorThe University of Texas at Austinen
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen


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