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dc.contributor.advisorSchoenfield, Miriamen
dc.creatorDao, Steven H.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-05-11T15:05:02Zen
dc.date.available2015-05-11T15:05:02Zen
dc.date.issued2015-05en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/29739en
dc.description.abstractIn the 1960s, the philosophers J.R. Lucas and Paul Benacerraf presented arguments against mechanism, the thesis that minds can be simulated by Turing machines. Instead of discussing Turing machines directly, they shift their focus to using Gödel's incompleteness theorems to show that theories of classical first-order logic could not represent minds. They believed that these arguments about logical theories implied that the mechanistic thesis for Turing machines was incorrect. However, I show that their arguments are insufficient to topple the mechanistic thesis for Turing machines. I then present a new argument, focused directly on Turing machines, that seeks to show that mechanism is false. The argument is reminiscent of the halting problem for Turing machines, and it proceeds by inference to the best explanation to demonstrate that actual minds are not Turing-simulatable.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.subjectTuring machinesen
dc.subjectphilosophy of minden
dc.subjectepistemologyen
dc.subjectmechanismen
dc.subjectsimulationen
dc.subjectcomputersen
dc.subjectbeliefsen
dc.subjecthalting problemen
dc.subjectGodel's incompleteness theoremsen
dc.subjectJ.R. Lucasen
dc.subjectPaul Benacerrafen
dc.titleMinds, Machines, and Turingen
dc.typeThesisen
dc.description.departmentPhilosophyen


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