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    The Seller's Side Of The Story: Acquisition As Courtship And Governance As Syndicate In Entrepreneurial Firms

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    Date
    2004-09
    Author
    Graebner, M. E.
    Eisenhardt, K. M.
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    Abstract
    In contrast to the prior acquisitions literature, which has emphasized the buyer's perspective, we examine the seller's perspective. This has important implications for understanding both the acquisition process and, more broadly, corporate governance in successful firms. Using a multiple-case, inductive study of 12 technology-based ventures, we find that acquisition occurs when sellers are pushed toward acquisition by difficult, albeit natural strategic hurdles, such as a chief executive search or funding round, and by strong personal motivations for sale, such as past failures and investments by friends. Sellers are also more likely to be pulled toward acquisition by attractive buyers that offer synergistic combination potential and organizational rapport, factors usually associated with the long-term interests of buyers. We reframe acquisition as courtship and corporate governance as a syndicate, indicating joint decision making with some common goals, and explore the generalizability of these views for private versus public firms and other contingencies. Together, courtship and syndicate suggest a behaviorally informed account of organization that belies the rhetoric of price and self-interest.
    Department
    Management
    Subject
    corporate-control
    horizontal acquisitions
    retrospective reports
    venture capitalists
    ownership structure
    acquiring firms
    self-interest
    poison pills
    agency costs
    performance
    business
    management
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/2152/29383
    Citation
    Melissa E. Graebner and Kathleen M. Eisenhardt. Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 49 No. 3 (Sep., 2004), pp. 366-403.
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    • facebook
    • twitter
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    • CONTACT US
    • MAPS & DIRECTIONS
    • JOB OPPORTUNITIES
    • UT Austin Home
    • Emergency Information
    • Site Policies
    • Web Accessibility Policy
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    • Adobe Reader
    Subscribe to our NewsletterGive to the Libraries

    © The University of Texas at Austin