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dc.creatorWestphal, J. D.en
dc.creatorBednar, M. K.en
dc.date.accessioned2015-04-16T13:58:10Zen
dc.date.available2015-04-16T13:58:10Zen
dc.date.issued2005-06en
dc.identifier.citationJames D. Westphal, Michael K. Bednar. Administrative Science Quarterly Vol. 50, No. 2, (Jun., 2006), pp. 262-298en
dc.identifier.issn0001-8392en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/29361en
dc.description.abstractThis study examines how a social psychological bias referred to as pluralistic ignorance may occur in corporate boards and how this bias could contribute to strategic persistence in response to relatively low firm performance. Our theory suggests that under conditions of low performance, there may be a systematic tendency for outside directors to underestimate the extent to which fellow directors share their concerns about the viability of the firm's corporate strategy. This reduces the propensity for individual directors to express their concerns about the current corporate strategy in board meetings, decreasing the likelihood that boards will initiate strategic change in response to low firm performance. We also posit factors that may moderate the extent to which pluralistic ignorance occurs on boards. We suggest that demographic homogeneity among outside directors (with respect to gender, functional background, education, and industry of employment) and the density of friendship ties among them will significantly moderate the occurrence of pluralistic ignorance on boards. We test our hypotheses with original survey data from a large sample of outside directors at medium-sized U.S. companies and find support for our theory. We discuss contributions of our theory and findings to,the literatures on corporate governance, strategic persistence and change, and group decision-making processes in organizations.en
dc.language.isoEnglishen
dc.rightsAdministrative deposit of works to UT Digital Repository: This works author(s) is or was a University faculty member, student or staff member; this article is already available through open access or the publisher allows a PDF version of the article to be freely posted online. The library makes the deposit as a matter of fair use (for scholarly, educational, and research purposes), and to preserve the work and further secure public access to the works of the University.en
dc.subjectmanagement team demographyen
dc.subjectdecision-makingen
dc.subjectrelational demographyen
dc.subjectsocial integrationen
dc.subjectdecline processesen
dc.subjectceo compensationen
dc.subjecttop managersen
dc.subjectdiversificationen
dc.subjectgovernanceen
dc.subjectpoweren
dc.subjectbusinessen
dc.subjectmanagementen
dc.titlePluralistic Ignorance In Corporate Boards And Firms' Strategic Persistence In Response To Low Firm Performanceen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.description.departmentManagementen
dc.identifier.doien
dc.contributor.utaustinauthorWestphal, James D.en
dc.contributor.utaustinauthorBednar, Michael K.en
dc.relation.ispartofserialAdministrative Science Quarterlyen_US


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