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dc.creatorJoung, Manhoen
dc.creatorBaldick, Rossen
dc.creatorSeok Son, Youen
dc.date.accessioned2014-09-19T20:10:13Zen
dc.date.available2014-09-19T20:10:13Zen
dc.date.issued2008en
dc.identifier.issn0195-6574en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/26038en
dc.description.abstractIn this paper ; we investigate how generators' ownership of financial transmission rights (FTRs) may influence the effects of the transmission lines on competition. In order for concrete analysis , a simple symmetric market model is introduced and FTRs are modeled in two different forms: FTR options and FTR obligations. This paper shows that introducing FTRs in an appropriate manner may reduce the physical capacity needed for the full benefits of competition. Among the competitive effects of ownership of FTRs , we focus on the effects on two possible pure strategy equilibria: the unconstrained Cournot equilibrium and the passive/aggressive equilibrium. We also analyze an extension of the model: asymmetric markets. Finally , a numerical illustration of applying the analysis is presented.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisherInternational Association for Energy Economicsen
dc.subjectFinancial Transmission Rightsen
dc.subjectElectricity Industryen
dc.subjectcompetitive electricity marketsen
dc.subjectDeregulated Electricity Industryen
dc.subjectgeneratorsen
dc.subjectmarket competitionen
dc.titleThe Competitive Effects of Ownership of Financial Transmission Rights in a Deregulated Electricity Industryen
dc.typeArticleen
dc.description.departmentElectrical and Computer Engineeringen


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