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dc.contributor.advisorSainsbury, R. M. (Richard Mark)
dc.creatorGrzankowski, Alex Paulen
dc.date.accessioned2013-09-30T18:03:30Zen
dc.date.issued2013-05en
dc.date.submittedMay 2013en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/21381en
dc.descriptiontexten
dc.description.abstractI argue that there are irreducibly non-propositional intentional states, mental states that are about things (states such as fearing snakes, liking ice-cream, and so on) but which do not have a propositional content. I provide a positive account of such states and offer philosophical insights concerning concepts and content that emerge once they are recognized.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdfen
dc.language.isoen_USen
dc.subjectPropositional attitudesen
dc.subjectIntentionalityen
dc.titleNon-propositional objects of the attitudesen
dc.date.updated2013-09-30T18:03:31Zen
dc.description.departmentPhilosophyen
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophyen
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen
thesis.degree.grantorThe University of Texas at Austinen
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen


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