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dc.contributor.advisorMourelatos, Alexander P. D.en
dc.creatorErginel, Mehmet Metinen
dc.date.accessioned2008-08-28T22:25:30Zen
dc.date.available2008-08-28T22:25:30Zen
dc.date.issued2004en
dc.identifierb60772839en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2152/1960en
dc.descriptiontexten
dc.description.abstractMy dissertation is on Plato’s view on pleasure. I focus on the Republic, where Plato offers his first systematic treatment of pleasure and pain. Plato’s thought on pleasure, and in particular his view on the truth and falsity of pleasure, has received no small degree of attention in the secondary literature during the past few decades. Despite the amount of work that has been done, however, Plato’s thought on pleasure and pain has not been adequately understood, as scholars have persistently underappreciated the treatment offered in Republic IX. The account and evaluation of pleasures in Republic IX has often been criticized as fraught with serious problems and inadequacies. It has been argued that the account not only fails to describe the role of pleasure in our lives accurately, but is also inconsistent and full of ambiguity. The inconsistency attributed to the account in essays by Dorothea Frede is supposedly between two distinct criteria that the account employs for the evaluation of pleasures. Dorothea Frede also claims, with Gosling and Taylor, that Plato’s account contains fatal ambiguities. I argue that all of the above charges are false. I show that a careful examination of Plato’s text reveals his account of pleasure to be consistent, coherent, and compelling. Since Plato offers his account of pleasure by way of proving that the pleasures of the rational part of the soul are most pleasant, dismissing the charges also requires a close reading of the passages in Book IV concerning the Platonic division of the soul into three parts. I show that Plato’s view on pleasure and his division of the soul are mutually corroborative. The interpretation I develop allows us to see that Plato’s view on the best life is much less austere and much more livable than critics have claimed.
dc.format.mediumelectronicen
dc.language.isoengen
dc.rightsCopyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works.en
dc.subject.lcshPlato--Republic--Book 9en
dc.subject.lcshPleasureen
dc.titlePleasures in Republic IXen
dc.description.departmentPhilosophyen
dc.identifier.oclc67995996en
dc.identifier.proqst3143739en
dc.type.genreThesisen
thesis.degree.departmentPhilosophyen
thesis.degree.disciplinePhilosophyen
thesis.degree.grantorThe University of Texas at Austinen
thesis.degree.levelDoctoralen
thesis.degree.nameDoctor of Philosophyen


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